 Ladies and gentlemen, the Vice President and I are very pleased to welcome you to our press conference. We will now report on the outcome of today's meeting of the Governing Council, which was also attended by the Commission Vice President, Mr. Dombrowski. Based on our regular economic and monetary analysis and in line with our forward guidance, we decided to keep the key ECB interest rates unchanged. Regarding non-standard monetary policy measures, the asset purchase programs continue to proceed smoothly. As explained on previous occasions, our monthly asset purchases of 60 billion euros are intended to run until the end of September 2016 and, in any case, until we see a sustained adjustment in the path of inflation that is consistent with our aim of achieving inflation rates below but close to 2% over the medium term. When carrying out its assessment, the Governing Council will follow its monetary policy strategy and concentrate on trends in inflation and the medium term outlook for price stability. All in all, the information that has become available since the Governing Council meeting in early June has been broadly in line with our expectations. Recent developments in financial markets, which partly reflect greater uncertainty, have not changed the Governing Council assessment of a broadening of the euro area's economic recovery and a gradual increase in inflation rates over the coming years. The ECB's monetary policy stance remains accommodative and market-based inflation expectations have unbalanced, stabilized or recovered further since our meeting in early June. The latest information also remains consistent with a continued pass-through of our monetary policy measures to the cost and availability of credit for firms and households. Our measures thereby continue to contribute to economic growth, a reduction in economic slack and money and credit expansion. The full implementation of all our monetary policy measures will lead to a sustained return of inflation rates towards level below but close to 2% in the medium term and will underpin the firm anchoring of medium to long-term inflation expectations. Looking ahead, we will continue to closely monitor the situation in financial markets, as well as the potential implications for the monetary policy stance and for the outlook for price stability. If any factors were to lead to an unwarranted tightening of monetary policy, or if the outlook for price stability were to materially change, the Governing Council would respond to such a situation by using all the instruments available within its mandate. Let me now explain our assessment of the available information in greater detail, starting with the economic analysis. Euro area quarterly GDP growth was confirmed at 0.4% in the first quarter of 2015, supported by contributions from private consumption and investment. The latest survey data, available up to June, remain consistent with a continuation of the modern growth trend in the second quarter. Looking ahead, we expect the economic recovery to broaden further. Domestic demand should be further supported by our monetary policy measures and their favorable impact on financial conditions, as well as by the progress made with fiscal consolidation and structural reforms. Moreover, the recent decline in oil prices should provide additional support for households' real disposable income and corporate profitability and therefore private consumption and investment. Furthermore, demand for euro area exports should benefit from improvements in price competitiveness. However, the ongoing slowdown in emerging market economies continues to weigh on the global outlook and economic growth in the euro area is likely to continue to be dampened by the necessary balance sheet adjustments in a number of sectors and the sluggish pace of implementation of structural reforms. The downside risks around the economic outlook for the euro area have generally been contained as a result of our monetary policy decisions, as well as oil price and exchange rate developments. Inflation bottomed out at the beginning of the year and has moved back into positive territory in recent months. According to Eurostat, euro area annual HICP inflation was 0.2% in June 2015, slightly down from 0.3% in May. On the basis of the information available on current oil futures prices, annual HICP inflation is expected to remain low in the months ahead and to rise towards the end of the year, also on account of base effects associated with the fall in oil prices in late 2014. Supported by the expected economic recovery, the impact of the lower exchange rate and the assumption embedded in oil futures markets of somewhat higher oil prices in the years ahead, inflation rates are expected to pick up further during 2016 and 2017. The governing council will continue to monitor closely the risk to the outlook for price developments over the medium term. In this context, we will focus in particular on the past through of our monetary policy measures, as well as on geopolitical energy and exchange rate developments. Turning to the monetary analysis, recent data confirmed robust growth in broad money M3. The annual growth rate of M3 was 5% in May 2015, compared with 5.3% in April. Annual growth in M3 continues to be strongly supported by its most liquid components, with the narrow monetary aggregate M1 growing at an annual rate of 11.2% in May. Loan dynamics continue to improve. The annual rate of change of loans to non-financial corporations increased to 0.1% in May, up from minus 0.1% in April, continuing its gradual recovery from a trough of minus 3.2% in February 2014. This is consistent with the positive evidence from the Banklanding Survey for the second quarter of 2015. Banks reported a continued net easing of credit standards on loans to enterprises which were stronger than expected in the previous survey round. Net demand for loans to enterprises increased further, supported by demand for credit related to fixed investment. Fragmentation in terms of credit demand in individual countries decreased, and the targeted longer-term refinancing operations helped to improve the terms and conditions for credit supply. Despite these improvements, the dynamics of loans to non-financial corporations remain subdued. They continue to reflect the lagged relationship with the business cycle, credit risk, credit supply factors, and the ongoing adjustment of financial and non-financial sector balance sheets. The annual growth rate of loans to households increased to 1.4% in May 2015 after 1.3% in April. Overall, the monetary policy measures we have put in place since June 2014 provide clear support for improvements both in borrowing conditions for firms and households and in credit flows across the Euro area. To sum up, across check of the outcome of the economic analysis with the signals coming from the monetary analysis, confirms the need to maintain a steady monetary policy course, firmly implementing the governing council's monetary policy decisions. The full implementation of all our monetary policy measures will provide the necessary support to the economic recovery in the Euro area and lead to a sustained return on inflation rates towards levels below but close to 2% in the medium term. Monetary policy is focused on maintaining price stability over the medium term, and its accommodative stance contributes to supporting economic activity. However, in order to reap the full benefits from our monetary policy measures, other policy areas must contribute decisively. Given continued high structural unemployment and low potential output growth in the Euro area, the ongoing cyclical recovery should be supported by effective structural policies, particularly in order to increase investment, boost job creation and raise productivity, both the implementation of product and labour market reforms and actions to improve the business environment for firms need to gain momentum in several countries. A swift and effective implementation of these reforms in an environment of accommodative monetary policy will not only lead to higher sustainable economic growth in the Euro area, but will also raise expectations of permanently higher incomes. Fiscal policies should support economic recovery while remaining in compliance with the stability and growth pact. Full and consistent implementation of the pact is key for confidence in our fiscal framework. We are now at your disposal for questions. Julia Chatterie. Good afternoon. Can I ask a first question on Greece and whether or not a deal on short-term financing is sufficient for the European Central Bank to raise emergency liquidity assistance for the Greek banks or whether you need further guarantees, be it a signature on a third bailout deal, further clarity on potential bank recapitalizations. And then my second question refers to... I'm sorry, what's the first question exactly? It's the short-term financing that's being discussed right now sufficient for the ECB to raise ELA liquidity to the Greek banks. Second question regarding terminology, time out on the Eurozone, a potential temporary Grexit that's been talked about in the last week and a half and at 4 a.m. on Monday morning it seemed a potential Grexit was a possibility. I just wondered whether using that terminology is opened Pandora's box on the perception of Eurozone membership and by inference the Euro. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. The decision to raise ELA gain we took today is symmetrical to the decision we took a few days ago to freeze ELA's. As you know, ELA goes to solvent banks with adequate collateral. After the breakdown of negotiations and the likely default to the IMF, consequently the ECB decided to freeze the ELA at that level, applying what we call the proportionality criteria. In other words, there were some were actually calling for a draw into ELA to zero, which would have caused an immediate collapse of the banking system. The governing council decided to keep ELA at that level. Now things have changed now. We had a series of news with the approval of the bridge financing package, with the votes, the various votes in various parliaments to begin with in the Greek parliament, which have now restored the conditions for a raise in ELA. Now your second point is about the Grexit, whether this should be pronounced or not. Let me tell you what I said in the course of the summit meetings that we had in Brussels last weekend, the various meetings, the Eurogroup meetings, summit meetings and various summit meetings. Especially it was addressed to the several observers, policymakers, public opinion, scholars that have suggested that we should have cut ELA to Grexit a long time ago. We said, I said the ECB, I said basically that it's not up to the ECB to decide whose member is not. They said the ECB has acted within its mandate and will continue to do so. Under the assumption that Greece will remain a member of the Euro area, whether this assumption proves right is entirely within the responsibility both of the Greek government and of the member states here represented. So the ECB continues to act on the assumption that Greece is, of course, and will remain a member of the Euro area. Brian Blackstone with Wall Street Journal. What would happen on, there's this big Greek repayment due to the ECB on Monday? They didn't pay the IMF. What happens if Monday comes and goes and they don't pay you back? What would the ECB's response be? Because the money doesn't seem to be there right now. And my second question is, you've said before that the ECB is the central bank of Greece. Have you let the people of Greece down by freezing ELA, forcing the closures of banks? People have to line up for however long it is to take a little bit of money out of the ATM. What do you say to those people who might say that the ECB let them down? Thank you. Thank you, Brian. On your first question, I should read to you the Eurogroup statement on Greece that just came out. So the Eurogroup welcomes the adoption by the Greek Parliament of all the commitments specified in the EuroSummit Statement of July 12th. On the basis of a positive assessment by the institutions which concluded the authorities have implemented the first set of four measures in a timely and overall satisfactory manner, and which confirmed that the EuroSummit Statement has been included in the preamble to the implementing law adopted by the Greek Parliament. We reached today a decision to grant in principle a three-year ESM stability support to Greece subject to the completion of relevant national procedures. Upon the completion of the relevant national procedures and the formal decision by the ESM Board of Governors expected by the end of this week, the institutions would be entrusted with the task of swiftly renegotiating an MOU, detailing the policy conditionality attached to the financial assistance facility. So the Eurogroup calls on the Greek authorities to swiftly adopt the second set of measures by July 22nd as foreseen in the EuroSummit Statement and update the legislation related to the first set of measures consistent with the recommendations made by the institutions in their compliance report. So several positive things have happened that would justify us to the increase in ELA that we approved today. Incidentally, I didn't say by how much. We substantially accommodated the request put forward by the Bank of Greece recalibrated over one week. So the increase would be 900 million over one week. To your second point, let me say that the liquidity provision according to our rules was never meant to be unlimited and unconditional. Here it's just one good opportunity to clarify some confusion. Oh, by the way, let me preface this saying that we take these sort of criticisms very, very seriously. And I don't want to underplay the difficulty that the ECB and the governing council of the ECB had in the last few weeks about having to take decisions between making sure the payment system continues to work, the liquidity provision, the monetary policy, not to amass excessive risks for the Euro system at the same time, all at the same time. But just let me make one legal point. First of all, the payment system that some people have referred to doesn't have to do with liquidity provisions. There is an article in the treaty that says that basically the ECB has the responsibility to promote the smooth functioning of the payment system. But this has to do with the functioning of target two, the distribution of notes, coins. So not with the provision of liquidity, which actually is ruled, is regulated by a different provision in the article 18.1 in the ECB statute, first of all, in order to achieve the objectives of the ESCB, the ECB and the national central banks, may conduct credit operations with credit institutions and other market participants with lending based on an adequate collateral. This is the treaty provision, but our operations were not monetary policy operations, but ELA operations. And so they are subsequently regulated by a separate agreement, which makes explicit reference to the necessity to have sufficient collateral. So all in all, liquidity provisions never been unconditional and unlimited. But is it true that we did not provide liquidity enough to Greece all throughout this time? Let me just give you one piece of data. Now, the month with the highest deposit outflow was January 2015. This was the month of the Greek elections. The monthly deposit outflow was where 13.3 billion. The increase in euro system lending in ELA was 35.2 billion. The month with the second highest deposit outflow was last month, June 15, June 2015. Again associated with increased political uncertainty related to the breakdown of the negotiations. At the announcement of the referendum, the monthly deposit outflows were 8.1 billion. The increase in euro system lending to Greek banking sector was 10.3 billion. So as I said several times, ELA has increased from zero to almost 90 billion euros. And now the euro system has a total exposure to Greece of 130 billion. Which makes of the euro system the largest depositor in Greece. Because if you take total deposits in Greece, they are 120 billion. While the euro system exposure to Greece now is as I said 130 billion. So I find these sort of observations that there wasn't enough liquidity assistance or that actually there was a bank run that was caused by the ECB quite warranted and certainly unfounded. Incidentally, each time we announced a liquidity in ELA operation we also said and I think I said it explicitly in April and emergency lending assistance will continue, liquidity assistance will continue. So even communication wise there was always quite open stance. However, when the solvency and the collateral adequacy and quality prospects deteriorated, we had to calibrate the provision of liquidity according to these developments. And that's how it went for the reasons that I mentioned before. And we did it. And we did it however as I said always acting on the assumption that Greece will be a member of the euro area. That was never questioned. And that is what makes us different from the ones who said you should have cut ELA a long time ago. They wanted us not to respect our mandate. Deciding who should be a member of the euro area and who should not. Alessandro Speziale, Bloomberg News. Another question on Greece, Mr. President. What is your assessment of the deal of the agreement that has been reached with Greece and do you think that it might lead to conditions that will lead to reduce the haircuts on the collateral which you have raised recently? And another question again on the discussion of Brexit because the option of the exit of the euro country has been clearly on the table in negotiations in the past few days. And you have said in the past that one country leaving a currency union would put at risk the whole of the currency union and would put into doubt the fungibility of money. So the foundation of the money itself. So the fact that this was discussed openly put on the table. Do you think you will have an impact of the strength of the euro in the long term? Thank you very much. Thank you. Sponsored to the first question. I frankly hesitated in commenting on the program as such. In part because it's been still, I mean, we basically had a mandate to negotiate now the institution. So there will be some follow up. Let me say one thing that for I believe the first time the text that circulated at the level of heads of state was not generic. It was quite specific. It contained an impressive list of policy measures, prior actions and structural reforms for which it was asked that either the Greek parliament either would take a vote. Vote on that or endorse these measures. Without commenting specifically on that, let me say that the overall purpose of that document is to ensure that Greece will become a thriving economy in the euro area. Quite considerable space in that document was given to structural reforms. So it was not the usual budget based document only. That's one thing. The second thing is that it's something that I did say a long time, many times. The program had to be a strong program which promotes growth, which ensures social fairness, which is also fiscally sustainable and which addresses the financial stability. Problems. I believe that by and large that program has these features. And finally, there's another issue that's been widely discussed. Is that relief necessary? It's it's uncontroversial that that relief is necessary. And I think that nobody has ever disputed that. The issue is what is the best form of that relief within our framework, within our legal institutional framework? I think we should focus on this point in the coming weeks. The second point is about whether to have the simple fact of having discussed a possibility would weaken the union. Well, I mean, if you if you phrase this way, you can see that that is not an issue. Discussions were there. And I think discussing discussions by themselves don't necessarily weaken. But they have shown against something that that I've said many times that this union is imperfect is and being imperfect is fragile is vulnerable and doesn't deliver. That's the very least it doesn't deliver all the benefits that it could if it were to be completed. And so the future now should see the size of steps on further integration. Clare Jones. So you've raised the LA today, but it's by quite an incremental amount. How is that going to change the situation in Greece? So we're still going to have deposit withdrawals limited to 60 euro per day, for instance, the capital controls on foreign payments going to remain in place. And if that's the case, what needs to happen before we see some of those capital controls lifted? Just returning to Brian's question on the decision to freeze the LA. A lot of those criticisms are focused around the refusal to provide additional lender of last resort support to banks at your own regulators or saying a solvent. You mentioned there was an issue in the answer to Brian's question about eligible collateral. I don't quite understand how you can have a situation where there's a lack of eligible collateral, but banks can still be judge solvent by the regulators here at the SSM. Thank you. On your first question, we have today we have accommodated the Bank of Greece request completely and fully those scale to one week. This is understandable because we want to see how the situation will evolve. In so doing, we have accepted the assessment of the Bank of Greece in terms of the immediate needs of liquidity that the Greek economy has. Now, if things continue to proceed in a positive way as they've done in the last two days, we will have a phase during which the Bank of Greece and ECB, which are working very actively monitoring the situation, will look at exactly the needs of the Greek economy. How can they be gradually satisfied? What are the general conditions so as to make sure that we are always there ready to provide the Greek economy with the need of liquidity? And at the same time, we don't risk a bank run again. In the meantime, all these developments are improving the quality of collateral that the Greek banks can post. Because you see, each time we have an improvement in the quality of the government paper, of the Greek government paper, we have an improvement in the quality of the collateral of the banks. And not only in that, because as you know, much of the equity, probably more than 50% of the equity of the Greek bankings, these are the Greek's largest banks at least, is formed by credits to the state. So the quality of these credits improves or worsens according to the overall developments. And the quality of the policy dialogue between the Greek government and the Euro member states. The second point is, see, we give, there are two assessments that are being given of the solvency of a bank. The point in time assessment which is given by Supervisor looks at the common equity tier one at 4.5%, the total capital ratio at 8%, and the tier one capital ratio at 8%. If you take these numbers, Greek banks are solvent. And that's what the supervisor, the chair of the supervisory board has said several times. However, if you look at it prospectively and just on the base of what I said about the enormous influence that the quality of the government paper has on the solvency of the banks, well, you question their solvency in perspective because you look at how things go, how the policy dialogue develops, and therefore how the quality of the government paper changes according to these developments, and therefore you give some assessments. Now, it's on the basis of this perspective assessment that looks at what I said now, the quality of the government paper, but also at the quality of the overall banks balance sheets after such a protracted recession, and therefore with a foreseeable increase in non-performing loans. It's on the basis of these two considerations by large, may also others, but these are the two most important, that an overall envelope of 25 billion euros was earmarked out of a program of between 82 and 86 billion, was earmarked for the Greek banking system. Claudio Perez. Hi, Mr. Draghi. This is Claudio Perez from El Pais, a central banker of Europe. It's a quick question. Do you think it's a good idea to suggest the reversibility of the euro, that the reversibility is on the table, as German finance minister Wolfgang Schäuble has done in the last few days? Well, I'm not, as I said before, in a sense, what I said before could be used in several ways, and I'm not going to comment on politician's statements. I only know what's our mandate, and our mandate is to act based on the assumption that Greece is, and will be, is of course, and will be a member of the euro area. Alessandro Merli. Could you try and give us an assessment or a prediction of when the banking situation will normalize, and maybe the banks could reopen without limits to withdrawals and capital controls could be removed? And could you also tell us why the total lack of transparency in about ELA? I mean, you've given us a number today, but normally we're left to chase every time what is the increase, and if you have decided it or not, and if there is an air cut, and by how much. Why is it not possible just to announce simply every time you make a decision what the decision is, which then comes out in a very turnaround way, I mean, in the end comes out anyway. Yeah, I never doubt your investigative capacities anyway. But I mean, just the answer to the first point, it's hard to predict. It's clearly, we are all aware, it's clearly in the interest of the Greek economy to have these capital controls last as little as possible. By the way, the responsibility to lift capital controls as well as to impose them is with the Greek government. So that is something that in a sense the Greek government has to decide. But we have to be doing this in a way that we don't run the opposite risk, which we were about to run before the imposition of capital controls, namely a bank run, which would leave all the depositors being basically hit. So the capital controls have protected the depositors, which, by the way, to a great extent are now small depositors. So it's the awareness that capital controls are hampering the recovery of the Greek economies there. And so the idea is to move as fast as we can, but also with the due degree of caution. Now, on the ELA, you see, you're absolutely right, that was the past, in fact. In the past, there was a certain reticence to publish the numbers of the ELA because the whole ELA concept was born as to address liquidity shortages of individual banks. So if you have individual banks that are solvent and have collateral. So the idea, the situation that was addressed by the old ELA agreement was one where a bank which was solvent and with adequate collateral, and in spite of this, was experiencing a liquidity shortage of some kind would be protected by this facility. Now, it was quite understandable if you had that situation and the ELA and the amounts and the modalities of ELA were to be made public, this could have, was thought at least, that this could worsen the situation of that bank at that time. Now here we are facing a completely different setup where we are not talking about individual banks, but we are talking about countries banking systems. So we are talking about a systemic problem, not only, not any longer about an individual bank, an individual institution short of collateral. And so we are in fact revising our communication about ELA. There is absolutely no reason to keep things secret now when we are addressing a massive systemic problem, a macroeconomic problem. Jonathan? You said that the ECB is a rules-based organization and I am curious to know at what point or is this point ever reached when the ECB has to stop assisting Greece? For example, on July the 20th in the hypothetical case that the bonds were not to be repaid, but more broadly is there any circumstance under which it would envisage stopping assisting Greece? And secondly, you have often emphasized how it is up to politicians to decide the future of the Eurozone. If politicians were to decide however, as Wolfgang Schoibler would like them to grant Greece a temporary exit from the Eurozone, would the ECB respect that decision or what would it do in a circumstance where politicians would make such a decision? Well, on the first of July 20th, the repayment, all my evidence and information leads me to say that we will be repaid as well as the IMF. And so that is off the table. I don't want to speculate what are the conditions whereby countries would not receive the assistance of the ECB. But the treaties and there are three documents that you should look at. One is the treaty, another one is the ECB statute and the third is the LA agreement. All of them make the point that of solvency and availability of adequate collateral. Then as you've just seen in the case of Greece, the assessment of these two features is not at all simple. It's not at all one-dimensional. It's point in time, it's dynamic, it depends on the underlying issuer of this collateral, what is the credit worthiness of the underlying issuer. So it's very difficult to think about a system where you simply push a button and you decide what to do. Each and I think by and large the Goetting Council has shown that it is a rule-based decision-making body even in the very difficult circumstances that have characterized our work in the last few months. Your second point is whether we respect the decision of the politicians. Well, if you phrase this way, it's hard to answer, but I would phrase it differently. Do we respect the treaty as it is today as it may become tomorrow? Yes, that's where our mandate is enshrined. Sebastian Joost? Thank you. Two questions, Mr. President. First on ELA again, what they're also a decision regarding the haircuts for the collateral given for ELA. And the second one, you said before that further integration is needed for the Eurozone. Have you been sort of disappointed that there was not much discussion about the so-called five presidents report some weeks ago? Thank you. Thank you. No, there was no decision on the haircut. We had raised it before and we took no decision today. On the point of further integration, it's not so much what Maris is my disappointment or not. Clearly, there was such a complex climate focused on what was happening in Greece. My understanding is that European Council is going to discuss this report at next meeting, I believe, or the week after the meeting after that. What is important is that I was answering before with the same words that what this experience shows is that we have to act. And we can act in different ways. The five presidents report is really sort of a rather broad roadmap. But it says three messages. First of all, complete the banking union. That is to say, establish a deposit insurance guarantee scheme and the single resolution fund. Again, the modalities of this oscillate, and I don't want to get into too much of detail, but oscillate between a purely private sector financed system and a purely mutualized public sector financed system. So we'll have to decide there, but the important thing is to move now on that front. The second area of action is what the Commission, European Commission has launched, namely the creation of a capital market union. That's very important for an area that doesn't share a common budget or a federal budget because a capital market union would be an extraordinary assistance in sharing risks across the union. And that is actually a very ambitious and complex and very likely long undertaking because it entails changes in legislation in several parts of the area. Mostly that legislation has been with the national countries for ages, really, like bankruptcy legislation and so on. And then the third area is what are member countries going to do in a certain number of years now as far as fiscal union is concerned, economic union and political union. So the report doesn't tell what countries should do in this area. It should only urge member countries to reflect on what sort of road map they want to design for themselves in these areas. Estelle Pierre. Mr. President, I have two questions. One, the first one was the decision on ELA unanimous in the governing council. The second one is to know why you are so confident that Greece will manage to pay back next Monday, which solution has your favor maybe. Yeah. Now, on the first point, technically I believe the question about whether it was unanimous or not is not well posed because the decision here is not to object to the request of the Bank of Greece. And what you need in order not to object is a two thirds majority. And that was there. So by definition, you never have unanimity on these decisions because it's not really what's required. Now, the other thing is about what makes us confident. We know that there is a financing concept that's been elaborated and it's on its way to be approved with, it's been elaborated by the European Commission, which I want to thank for their responsiveness, for their designs capacity. And I want to thank also all the members of the European Union. That have made this possible. Thank you. The first one is also on Greece. Last time you stressed very much the importance of strong implementation of reforms, et cetera, and not only designing a program, but also implementation. What makes you confident that this time will be different, especially given the fact that the Greek people clearly said no. And that also Prime Minister Tsipras is publicly saying that he doesn't believe in the program and the deal. And the second question, if I may not on Greece, it's on QE. The governing council has recently added some corporate names to the QE, to the list of QE eligible bonds. I just wanted to know if you can elaborate a little bit on the decision, on the reasons for that decision, especially why do you judge companies like NL, public sector agencies, thanks. Now, you are right. Of course, there are, I mean, no matter whom you talk to, there are, I would say, questions about the implementation, will and capacity. And so it will be, that's what I said, it will be really in the Greek government capacity to respond with policy decisions, with actions that would dispel these doubts. It would dispel this sort of, these doubts, I would say. I won't use other words that have been used recently, but that's really an issue. But let me ask you, would you think it would be legitimate for the ECB to take its decisions based on doubts about a government's capacity to implement the measures? That's not for us. We follow the mandate. The next point is about the expanding list of agencies. Frankly, we have received requests. This list is not casting stone, as you've seen, we changed it two, maybe three times. We keep on adding members. The requirement of this is that basically they are public sector entities. They issue bonds that have a certain rating and therefore they are eligible for QE purchases. And there isn't any deep strategic reflection behind the list of this. We certainly don't want to have private sector entities because then it would be a different program. But other than that, I think basically that's what it is. Vito, do you? Yes. Johanna Tric, please. Johanna Tric, Market News. Mr. Draghi, believe it or not, another question that's not on Greece. There is, in your introductory statement, you say that you are monitoring financial markets and will react. Should there be any development that results in a tightening of monetary conditions? You didn't have that statement last time, despite there being a period of volatility just before your governing council meeting. So I'm wondering, has that volatility led to more monetary tightening than you had previously assumed? Or what was your motive for including that sentence this time around? My second question is, assuming everything goes smoothly now with Greece, when is the earliest that you could actually include Greece in your QE program? Would that be after the first review of that successful or what would be the timeline there? Thank you very much. You're welcome. Are you sure that sentence wasn't the previous statement? It wasn't the previous, previous one. It was in two statements ago. Here we have the memory of the institution that says two. So it was two statements ago. There has been a certain, so there isn't any specific policy decision behind having the sentence now. But certainly what's happened, and we discussed it in the last two meetings actually, has been a considerable increase in volatility, which has led to higher interest rates, to a rise in interest rates. This rise in interest rates could be explained in a variety of ways, and I think we went through this last time, higher expectations of inflation, higher expected growth, or simply higher term premium. It's not clear which one of these explanations seems to be more robust. Probably the higher term premium is one that receives attention. But having said that, we don't see this as having changed the medium term outlook for price stability. So this sentence basically says what I said all throughout, that if we are to see an unwanted tightening of monetary policy, which could lead to a change in the medium term outlook for price stability, then we would seriously think, and we have instruments to address this. Then on Greece and QE, now for being eligible to QE, the issuer has to have instruments that are eligible for monetary policy instruments. So there is an issue of going back to a rating, which would make these Greek bonds eligible for monetary policy. So that's one thing. Yeah, should be a waiver. Yeah, the waiver has to be. So that's one thing. Second point is the limit that is on how much of each country's bonds can be bought by the ECB. And as the S&P holdings will be now repaid on July 20, then Greece would comply with this limit, and there would be some room for doing QE. Then there is another requirement. By the way, all these requirements, someone hinted or suggested that they were devised for Greece. That just makes no sense. All these requirements come from previous programs. And so the third requirement is that the country has to be, we can't buy bonds during a review period. So the review has to be successfully concluded so much so that we are now buying bonds. We're now doing QE for Cyprus. So I think that's more or less the response. And it describes in a sense the roadmap that we plan, the Greece will plan and we plan to follow to make Greece eligible for QE. So waiver, even before the first review, can we do it? Please. The point is the following. When a country has a rating which is below the investment grade, which is the minimum, then to exceed monetary policy operations, it has to have a waiver. And the waiver is granted if there are two conditions. The first condition is that the country must be under a program with the EU and IMF. And second, we have to assess that there is credible compliance with such a program. That's what we did in the 18th of February this year, when in spite of the fact that Greece was formally still under the second program, the governing council assessed that there was no credible compliance. And that's then when we abolished the waiver. So the governing council will have to assess after there is a program at a certain moment that there is a credible compliance with the program. That may come at the end of the first review because that would be clear. The governing council could nevertheless decide, even before that, if, meanwhile, implementation would be sufficient to justify the view, the assessment that there was credible implementation. So it's at the discretion of the governing council either to wait for the review or to do it slightly before. If indeed, nevertheless, there is good implementation of the program. So these two conditions are to be fulfilled before the waiver can be reinstated. So it says here on the basis of and following the implementation of the steps and measures outlined in the Euro Summit statement of July 12, 2015, Greece is expected to soon enter into a three-year ESM program. Assuming that it is decided that the implementation of the referred steps and measures would be sufficient, a two-month window for PSPPQE purchases of Greek government bonds would open after the ESM Board of Governors have officially approved the first disbursement attached to the approval of the MOU. The purchase window would be suspended upon the beginning of the first review or after two months, the earliest date. The same constellation of requirements and restrictions would apply following the completion of future reviews. You have all time for studying this thing and so you get the answer. It's pretty complicated as you can imagine. But it was not meant to be complicated for Greece only. And the last question goes to Mr. Blaschak, please. Mario Blaschak, World Business Press. Thank you. Governor Draghi, I'm getting back to your introductory statement. You cheer the positive effect of lower oil prices to household and corporate finances. At the same time, aren't you a bit worried that this 15% drop in oil prices will affect the inflation bringing it back to the inflationary territory after being mere 0.2% in June? That's my first question. Second question goes back to Executive Board Member Beno Akure, who pre-announced the front-load asset purchases. And there is no front-load asset purchases as far as annual or weekly basis statistics. So what's going on with that? Are you happy with or what do you mean by front-load asset purchases by then? Thank you. Thank you. First of all, it's quite clear that drop in oil prices have an effect on inflation. But the issue is whether there are going to be stable second-round effects on inflation. And we do believe that our monetary policy decisions have avoided the second-round effects of a drop in oil prices in January and will continue to do so now. So our commodity monetary policy will avoid this risk of a stably lower inflation in the medium term. At the second point, I'm sorry, I have to contradict you. There has been front-loading. There has been front-loading by about... By the way, why should there be front-loading? Well, there should be front-loading because usually people work less in August. And so there is less of a market then, like in December. So be ready, yeah, because we may... And frankly, I can't see why there should be such a drama. August as a month doesn't come unexpected. So that's why Mr. Carré suggested, said actually that there should be front-loading. Front-loading had taken place. It was by 3 billion in May and 3 billion in June. It's likely to be slightly less in July. And so you can kind of figure out what's going to happen in August. Thank you.