 Welcome to George H. Smith's Excursions into Libertarian Thought, a production of Libertarianism.org and the Cato Institute, narrated by James Foster. Instead of a review, a commentary on Libertarianism, What Everyone Needs to Know by Jason Brennan, Part 2. In Part 1 of this commentary, I indicated that my remarks about Jason Brennan's book, Libertarianism, What Everyone Needs to Know, would consist of two parts. But having read the book again and having concluded that my disagreements with Brennan run deeper than I initially believed, I have decided to extend my commentary to at least three parts, possibly more. This is necessary if I am to do even a modicum of justice to a number of important issues, such as Brennan's defense of positive liberty. Before diving into those deep philosophical waters, I will first address some of Brennan's points about the origins of hard Libertarianism, as well as his comments about Ein Rand. Brennan, page 94, claims that hard Libertarianism, that is what most people think of when they think of Libertarianism, originated with three women. Ein Rand, Isabel Patterson, and Rose Wilder Lane. This is incorrect, of course. Hard Libertarianism preceded Rand, Patterson, and Lane by more than a century. Indeed, it would not be stretching the point to trace the origins of hard Libertarianism to the English levelers of the mid-17th century. In contrast to Rand, neither Patterson nor Lane originated much of anything. One might as well say that some of their male Libertarian contemporaries, such as A. J. Nock, originated hard Libertarianism. That statement would be equally false. Many to mid-20th century writers popularized Libertarian ideas that had been around for a long time. Although they sometimes drew from different currents of Libertarian thoughts, such as Jeffersonian individualism, in the case of Patterson, and Georgism, in the case of Nock, they were not original theoreticians for the most part. It was with good reason that Nock characterized himself and other Libertarians of his day as the remnant. In other words, I'm Rand falls into a different category, for she was far more than a popularizer of earlier Libertarian ideas. But if anyone deserves to be called the originator of modern, hard Libertarianism, that person would be Murray Rothbard, not I'm Rand. It is primarily to Rothbard that we owe the integration of various elements into what we now associate with Libertarianism. These elements include the natural rights thinking of Lockean liberalism, the radical individualism of Spooner and Tucker, the economic theories of Menger, Mises, and other Austrians, the anti-militarism of 18th century radical wigs, the anti-imperialism of 19th century Cobbdenites and other little Englanders, and the isolationism of the old right in America. It is exceedingly odd that Rothbard was only once, page 11, in Brennan's book, and then only in passing as an example along with Rand and Nozick of a hard Libertarian. Rothbard's name does not even appear in Brennan's discussion of Libertarian anarchism, pages 57 through 60, even though Rothbard was the principal architect and advocate of that position. Nor are any of Rothbard's writings, such as For a New Liberty, listed in Suggestions for Further Reading. Brennan's The God of the Machine, an eccentric treatment that quickly faded into oblivion and had virtually no lasting influence, made the list of five recommended books under the heading Hard Libertarianism, but we find nothing by Rothbard. Let us now turn to Brennan's treatment of Ein Rand, who has mentioned numerous times in his book. It is clear that Brennan is not a fan of Ein Rand. This is fine, of course, but it does not excuse some of his remarks about her. In the introduction, page 14, Brennan writes, Chapter 3 investigates issues about personal morality and ethics. It is largely meant to correct mistakes about Libertarianism, in particular the mistake of thinking that most Libertarians are followers of Ein Rand. I cannot say who makes this mistake, since Brennan does not tell us, because concede, page 21, that Rand is influential. Nevertheless, Rand does not represent the main line of Libertarian or more broadly classical liberal thinking. Rand was a hard Libertarian and hard Libertarianism is not the main line of Libertarian thinking. In other words, it is false to say that most Libertarians are followers of Ein Rand, because Brennan identifies the main line of Libertarian thinking with classical liberalism, not hard Libertarianism. If one accepts this view, which I do not, then there is no effective objection to be made against Brennan's linguistic coup. The fact is that when most people talk about Rand's influence on the Libertarian movement, they are thinking specifically of hard Libertarianism, not of a diffuse tradition called classical liberalism. Nevertheless, even most hard Libertarians do not view themselves as followers of Ein Rand. To be influenced by a philosopher does not make one a follower of that philosopher. Despite my disagreements with Rand, I have been influenced by her and I admire her, but I don't consider myself one of her followers. Many hard Libertarians would say the same thing. It was therefore unnecessary for Brennan to make his point by defining Libertarianism so broadly as to relegate hard Libertarians to a minority status within Libertarianism. Brennan, page 21, has more to say about Rand. In her later years, Rand styled herself as a philosopher, but most philosophers, including most Libertarian philosophers, regard her philosophical work as poor. The first thing that struck me about this remark is why Brennan decided to include it. It seems a gratuitous swipe that reflects little more than a camouflaged way of stating Brennan's personal opinion. Although I don't know where Brennan got his information, he is probably right about how most philosophers view Rand. It is also quite possible that most philosophers regard Libertarianism itself as a poorly reasoned and unjustifiable political philosophy. Such speculations cause me to wonder why any Libertarian should care about what most philosophers believe about these matters. After all, we are dealing in the main with a class of state-subsidized intellectuals whose economic interests frequently conflict with the free market educational proposals of Libertarians. Proposals that would almost certainly bring about a dramatic thinning of the quasi-monopolistic herd of credentialed academics in philosophy, sociology, and other soft disciplines whose primary beneficiaries are the teachers, not the students. Adam Smith made a similar point in his Wealth of Nations. In short, I would no more expect to find a high opinion of Rand in a typical academic philosopher than I would in a typical government bureaucrat. I am far more skeptical about Brennan's claim that even most Libertarian philosophers have a low opinion of Rand's philosophical work. That may be true of Brennan's small band of neoclassical liberals, but it is not true of many Libertarian philosophers such as John Hospers, T. Bohr McCann, Randy Barnett, Eric Mack, Doug Rasmussen, Doug Denial, Ellen and Jeffrey Paul, and many more. Given Brennan's low opinion of Rand, we might expect his summary treatment of her ethical theory to be less than satisfactory, and we would not be disappointed. It's difficult to characterize Brennan's presentation of Rand's egoism. Although not exactly wrong, technically speaking, on some points, it is slanted in a manner that makes her egoism seem wholly implausible. Consider this passage, pages 44 through 45. Rand argues that selfishness is a virtue. She believes that every person has only one moral obligation to promote his or her own self-interest. On its face, this theory of ethics is clearly false. If ethical egoism were true, then if torturing babies would benefit me ever so slightly, I would be permitted to do so. However, it's clearly wrong for me to torture babies to get a slight benefit for myself, and so ethical egoism is false. This sort of facile analysis, complete with the specter of torturing babies, is something we might expect from an undergraduate student who knows nothing about the history of ethical egoism. But I was surprised to find it stated by an accomplished philosopher. It is not true that ethical egoism is clearly false on its face, just as it is not true that utilitarianism is clearly false on its face, because it might justify the sacrifice of innocent people for the sake of the greatest happiness for the greatest number. It could also be said that philosophy is useless on its face, because philosophers merely discuss the same problems over and over again, while rarely reaching a consensus on vital issues pertaining to morality and politics. Brennan goes on to say, however, this may not be fair to Rand. May not? He continues, Rand has an esoteric concept of self-interest. On the contrary, Rand's conception of self-interest is quite similar to that found in many earlier philosophers, especially among the so-called British moralists of the 18th century. Brennan then writes, she does not seem to mean what most people mean by selfish. True enough, but then Brennan does not seem to mean what most people mean by libertarian, so the problem of using terms in a somewhat idiosyncratic fashion was not confined to Rand. Brennan continues, for instance, Rand seems to believe it is logically impossible for a person to benefit on net from taking something or acquiring something he does not deserve. This is just flat wrong. Rand never characterized such possibilities as logically impossible. Nor, contrary to Brennan, did Rand believe that it was logically impossible for a person to benefit on net from aggressing against, abusing, or exploiting others. Brennan's slipshod manner of summarizing Rand's theory of egoism indicates, to me at least, that he didn't make much of an effort to understand her ideas. Fortunately, his subsequent remarks, for example, that Rand thinks selfishness requires that we respect others' rights are more accurate.