 Well, good morning, everyone. What I will say does not overlap at all with anything that my two prior colleagues have talked about. The one thing I'll say more broadly about the U.S.-China relationship in this summit is, you know, to me, the U.S.-China relationship is just, in many ways, it's too big and it's too important just to be left to the two governments. In other words, this is a relationship that you need to have a good personal connection between the top leaders. I think it's very important. And I think, and I think Mike would agree, that President Bush worked hard to cultivate that with Jiang Zemin and with Hu Jintao to the point where they could both call on each other and also challenge each other to do things. And that, I think, is very important. It's particularly important in the Chinese system, because that's the only way things really register. And it's sometimes difficult to create that sort of personal relationship when you're dealing solely with bilateral issues. Because in bilateral issues, whether it's currency, whether it's transparency of the Chinese military budget, many of these issues can be often seen as zero sum, so it's very hard to do. But one of the ways that leaders can build personal relationships is when they work together on an external issue. And clearly the issue that these two hopefully will and have been working hard on trying to correct is the North Korea problem. I think this issue will probably be one of the most important issues, if not issue number one, maybe number two in this summit. It'll be important in the sense that we won't see a lot publicly on North Korea coming out of this summit. But I think there'll be a lot of discussion behind the scenes. In many ways, this is a change from the past. Because in the past, I think it's fair to say that for the Obama administration, when it was dealing with China, North Korea was not a top priority issue. There were lots of other things that were on the agenda. They still are on the agenda, currency, climate change, Iran, and other cases. But because of the events over the past year, because of the events over the past three weeks even, this has really become a front burner issue. And I think it's fair to say that there has been a gap in the way both the United States and China have dealt with the North Korea issue over the past year, if not over the past two years. We know that the United States wants China to use more of its material leverage on the North to try to get them to come back to negotiations or to stop provocations. And the Chinese in return want the United States to meet North Korean provocations with the willingness to come back to negotiations, come back to the six-party talks as a way to try to bring stability back to the situation. I think our response to most of that is every time the North Koreans provoke and the Chinese call for a return to six-party talks or an emergency six-party talk session, the way we interpret it, and I think the way the administration interprets it, is China is basically just trying to move the pressure off of themselves. If there's no dialogue, all the pressure's on China to try to calm the North down. But if we can move this back to six-party talks, then the pressure comes off of China. And once negotiations start, the pressure all comes on to the United States. So I think this is the dynamic we were in in U.S.-China relations when it came to North Korea. And I think it was a real gap. I mean, I think it was a real serious and substantive gap. And my hope and my expectation reading the tea leaves is that this summit may actually represent more of a coming together of Washington and Beijing's positions on North Korea, more of a closing of the gap, coming closer, getting closer to a common front on North Korea. And I think there are two reasons for this. The first reason is, ironically, the South Korean artillery exercises on Yongpyeong Island whenever it was, a week, two weeks ago. I think it was really at that point, as you all know, the North Koreans shelled the South Korean island in November. And there was exercising between the U.S. and the ROK, the U.S. and Japan. But South Koreans wanted to conduct their own live fire exercises on the very islands that were shelled. And there was a lot of concern on the part of the Chinese that this could elicit some sort of North Korean action or retaliation to which everybody believed the South would respond militarily, would not just sit still. And I think the Chinese became very concerned that the whole situation was going to spin out of control when it was clear that the United States was not going to stop South Korea from doing these live fire artillery exercises. I think the Chinese came to the U.S. and said, can you stop this? And the United States says, you know, they're a sovereign country, they're our ally, it's their territory, it's their exercise. And I think it was at that point that the Chinese really got a sense that this thing could start to spin out of control. The dynamics that we're talking about now surrounding the Korean Peninsula are quite concerning. And as you've all written and has been spoken about in the papers and in the policy expert circles, the Chinese worked hard to prevent the North Koreans from responding to this live fire artillery exercise. So I think, again, one reason, a proximate cause for more of a common front is that the Chinese do see the situation deteriorating rapidly and the live fire artillery exercise is really an important point in their thinking. The second reason I think that there may be more of a common front between these two countries is I think the United States is increasingly seeing and increasingly conveying that the North Korean threat is no longer simply a threat to U.S. allies in the region. It's not, I shouldn't say simply, but it's not just a proliferation threat, potential hypothetical proliferation threat in the future. It is now more of a direct threat to U.S. security. And I think the first sign of this was, of course, Secretary Gates's statement 48 hours ago in which he talked about how he was concerned about North Korean intercontinental ballistic missiles within five years of posing a direct threat to the United States. I think this is a change in the way the United States has talked about the North Korea problem. And I think it's very important, it's a change that I think one is dictated justifiably by the circumstances. But it's also a change that conveys to China how serious this issue is for the United States now. And it also conveys to the North, I think, that we may be entering a new period in terms of the way the United States is looking at this problem. And I think these two things in particular I think are drawing or hopefully will draw the United States and China closer together. If they do come closer together, what is it that we would want China to do? And these are my own views. These aren't the administration's views. Well, I think the first and obvious thing is that you would want the Chinese to do more to stop any more conventional North Korean armed provocations. Things that are a violation of the 1953 armistice, the armistice of which China is a signatory. Second, I think you would want the Chinese to work very hard to use whatever offices and leverage they can to pre-position North Korea if we eventually see a return to negotiations. And the three issues on which you need to pre-position North Korea is, first, they have to be willing to engage in serious North-South dialogue because I think the administration has said very clearly it is not interested in coming back to a broader negotiation unless there is some North-South interaction first. And then the North Koreans coming back ready and willing to affirm the 2005 and 2007 denuclearization agreements from the Six-Party Talks. And then thirdly, of course, a willingness to freeze and begin a negotiation on their uranium enrichment program. I think these are the things that we want the Chinese to work hard on pre-positioning the North. And then finally, the third thing is to gain better, and there has been good cooperation with Iran, but to gain even better cooperation with China on counter-proliferation issues as it comes to North Korea, either in terms of the U.N. Security Council sanctions, the financial sanctions, or PSI, the Proliferation Security Initiative. So as an observer of this meeting, I have high hopes and high expectations that we will see good things between the two coming out, North Korea coming out of the summit, but you're going to have to look really closely because it's not going to come out in the form of a very clear statement. You're going to have to look really closely and try to read the tea leaves to see if there is more of a meeting of minds on this problem.