 Rhaid i bwysig i'r cyfnodd gyda'r ysgolhaeth am yw'r hyn yn ymgyrch yn ymgyrch o'r drwy'r dynnu'n ffordd. Yn ymgyrch yw'r ysgolhaeth, mae'n mynd i'r ffrindwch deolch rhywbeth wedi'i yn ymgyrch yn bwysig ymgyrch. a flwyddyn ni'n ei wneud cyfnod, fe wnaeth yw'r hynny'n gwneud bod y cyfnod am hynny yn ff aunquech o rhan o'r cyfnod ynghylch, ond mae'n fyddech yna mwn o rhan o'r cyfnod yw'r cyfnod, ond mae'n dweud o'r cyfnod yw'r cyfnod o'r cyfnod a'n dweud o gwelio'r cyfnod, a'n dweud o'r cyfnod o un o bobl yn hynny, os yw dweud o'r gweithio'r cyfnod, mae'r law, mae'n gweithio ar gyfer gwaith, Mae ddwyyr o unigion wahanol gan gynnig y cerdd, gan fod eich ddweud o ddweud o'r ddweud o waith, pariantol, ond nodiwch y ddiweddio at unigion reliable a gwahog o Chyrgyffredinol. Roedd gennyn ni wneud ei ddweud o unigion ac mae nid o ffordd yn gwybod i Crippui Cymru ychydig, arall felly mae'n arliegedi ar hyn o oed yn cael daith yna cynnig y gallwn gwiaith o phethu ddweud y syndig ac mae'n ceisio'r rhan yn cyffraith i bobl they both appear to be rigid designators, so that's not an objection either, but I did say that if you want to question Cripke, any of these three questions would be questions you would want to ask yourself. So I'm going on now to the third objection which is this, you might want to insist that there are identity statements that appear to be contingent, in other words possibly false, oedd o Sportswil yw os bwynt yn y bwrdd yn niolio, mae'n eu mynd o'r oedon. Yn y cyhoedd, mae'n mynd i ni ddewyd yn ddechrau'r cymdeinol, ac mae fydd o gweld yn gwybod ein ffosg, oherwydd mae'r cymdeinol maen nhw yn dweud, boi'r cymdeinol byddwch yn eu cyhoedd yn niolio, mae'n ymddangos i ddweud, a'i ddweud ond mae'r cywbwysig yn gwybod, with two's. And it's somehow very irritating Anyway that, you know what I mean here. So it look to us as if water, is H2O could have been false, but it's...even if it looks as if it could've been false actually it couldn't. As it is true it's necessarily true. So there's an epistemological contingency. i amdod yn gweithio'r dynol. Yn gyntaf, maen nhw'n ddigon anhyoling ddweud hynny, i amdod yn ffosri, ddysgrifol, a'r ddiddordeb y ffat, mae nid i ddim yn greu. Ond yn fawr, mae'r ddiddor ffosri, maen nhw'n ddiddor ffosri, gan gyda'r ddiddor i wahanol mae sgwr F2O yn ddiddor i ffosri. Roeddwn ni? Mae'n ddim yn ymdweithio. Rwy'n rhesblwyd. Y cyfrifyddiad yw'r ddwyll yn H2O. Mae'n ddweud yng Nghymru, mae'n ddweud yw'n ddweud yw'n ddweud yn gallu mwy ffordd. Mae'n ddweud yw'r ddweud yw'r ddweud yn ddweud yw'r ddweud, ychydig o'r ddweud yn ddweud yw'r ddweud, ond mae'n ddweud yn ddweud yw'r ddweud. Felly, yna'r planau yw'r ddweud yn ddweud, oex chains, oes going into showers and water in or sorry water like stuff but it turns out to have a different molecular structure instead of being H2O it's xyz so what we just oh look it's not water this stuff that that seems to be water well we can imagine that can't we and that's why it iswyr yw'r FFWW er mwyn o'r ffordd. Ond yn ymdyn nhw, yw'r ffordd o'r rwy'n mynd i'r ffordd, yw'r cyffredin gyda'r ysgol yw'r cyffredin o'r ffordd mewn ei wneud yn fwyaf, ac mae'n fwyaf o wneud yn fwyaf, o'r ffordd. Rwy'n fwyaf o'r ffordd i wneud yw'r ffordd ac mae'n fwyaf o'r ffordd, ac mae gwybod yn ddechrau h20 wedi bod yn y mhwyth. Fyddo yn ymddangos amser, sefydlu'r pryd yn ddwych, ond mae'n ddweud ymddangos. Fyddo'r pryd yn ddweud yr hynny'n ddysgu'r pryd yn ddwych, ond mae'n ddysgu'r pryd yn ddysgu'r pryd. I put it to you that most of us would say, well no, because if you think you are in pain, you are surely in pain. Surely, you can't falsely believe you're in pain can you, or can you?íbуб semoedig ysbyrthy gwrwp? Well, aren't you in pain when you are in psychosomatic pain? There is no tissue damage, but there could be another cause of pain that isn't tissue damage. perhaps – Psychological pain – Is pain, is still pain isn't it? The experience of pain… What, yes, I mean pain is that's which feels awful. I mean sometimes it feels awful in your tooth, sometimes it feels awful in your head etc. But if you think that there's no imaginable situation where you could think you're in pain but not being pain, ticking, there's no gap between appearance and reality in the case of mental states and the way there is with respect to natural kinds like water. Water it can appear that there's water when there is no water but it doesn't look as if there could appear to be pain when there is no pain. It's certainly true that there could appear to be pain then when there is no tissue damage which is what psychosomatic pain is but is that pain Mae hollwch chi llwyddoedd yn ymlaen i ddwylo.ysiwch ddweud o'n tufodol, ni'n gweithio eu bod... Nid rywun â'r awdddiadau arall. Rydyn ni'n amlwg maen nhw'n chi'n gweld o'r awddiadau a'r awddiadau a'r awddiadau. Mae'n ddigonion fydd yn gallu gyda'r uchydig. Mae'n ddinddo i chi'n gwybod gwahoddiad, oherwydd ddych chi'n meddwl inniad, ac maen nhw'n ddweud ar yr hyn. Allan, wyddon y gallwn krypt lliwyr ei gweithio, ddill y gallwn yn credu ei fathion eithaf yn gwahanol, mae hynny chi'n gallu gwestiwch ar ymarfer. Felly mae'n golygu y cwestiynau sydd angen unio'r cryp llwydoedd ydw i yn medium ni, byddai am datganoedd o'r senod o deallol sy'n syl jewch ddim yn rhoi yn bain nhw. Fe wyd measuren defnyddio weithiau roedd o gyfan 라wn ac mae hi'n Sanhaf yma i chi osion yn gwdiswain. Felly, mae hwn i'n celydd yw'r gweithiau siw ymgymell yn Aberchur i newid gydaill y Llywodraeth. Doерrwydd yr onebwyllol yn teimled mewn i'n mewnówIA, wedi chefnw dechound i wer confidential ymenu ddiddordeb yn credu gymrydau sefydliadau i ddimenu i ddiddordeb yn ddiddordeb mewn ddiddordeb yn mynd i gael edrych eu ddiddordeb. Lodd yn gallu mor hwnnw yw'r storlachau yn credu ddiddordeb yn ddiddordeb yw'r gweld yn sylwedd o ddiddordeb a'r ddiddordeb er mwyn a'r ddiddordeb yn ei ddiddordeb o'r teimlo'n ddiddordeb, cymhag o eich anhygoel yn dod yn ddiddordeb maen nhw'n credu gymryd dan cael llyfr a bwyddemol i'r frysgol yn symud y bwydden nhw. Byddai rhywbeth i fel y gallu gwelch gilyddol mewn mentall a'r frysgol yn gallu bydd oedd fel hefyd yn drefodaeth ymchwil, rhywbeth yn bod yn ei gydig yn fawr mewn mentall a frysgol. Fwrdd dim yn ei cyflogu cyrficnydd. A rydym wedi ar y ddwy o bwyd am hyn o dech judgement cyrficnydd ac rydym yn ei gylweddol, ond eu bod yn dod i'n ysgol o bwysig of that you could look at in your own time or don't forget we have a whole lecture five tomorrow is a whole question and answer session. So if you stay up all night and find that you can answer one of these questions in the infirmative, then I should be interested to hear. Okay there's all the references that you might want. I've put on the final slide of each presentation so you've got it on the handouts that you've got. Felly, rydyn ni'n rhoi'n arferwad i'r ffordd hynny ymlaen i ddweud a'r eu gwneud oedd yn rhan o'r ffordd hefyd ar y teiriadau yn gweithio ymweld. Felly, yma'n gyfnod o'r cartesiadau yn y dweud o'r hyn, ond yw'r cartesiadau yn y dweud o'r cyfrifol yn y gweithio'n gweithio. Mae'r cyfrifol yn fwyaf, oherwydd mae hynny'n gwneud o'r cartesiadau yn y dweud o'r cyfrifol, oherwydd mae'n gwneud o'r hynny'n gwneud o'r cyfrifol, but let's have a look and see if we can come up with a different sort of physicalism, a different way in which the mental can be physical. So in this session we're going to look at non-reductive physicalisms, and the problems they face. So we're going to first look at what non-reductive physicalism is, why it's attractive, and then why everyone isn't a non reductive physicalist. In other words there are quite a lot of people who are still, ond sy'n gwybod yn dweud gydag y bydd y peth yn sicr bod yn ystod gyda'r cyffredinol. Gwyddo, felly mae'n gydag. Felly ydych chi'n gael gydag yn ceisio yn ffysgol ar gyfer ddyddol. Felly ydych chi'n gwybod y fersiwn, fyddwch chi'n gwybod ffunctionalism, ac mae'n gwybod ydwch chi'n gwybod yn ffysgol. Gwybod ychydig yn gwneud ei wneud yn ei wneud ychydig. Actually, maybe after dinner tonight, see whether I can say it. Both versions of non- reductive physicalism, reductionism. What that means is that they deny that we will ever find bridge laws. Do you remember I said that the reason that identity theory is a reductive theory is it says we'll reduce psychology to physics by finding bridge laws between mental states i ffysicol ac ydw i'n mynd i gadoedd eu methu hyn. Mae angen nifer o golygu gyda iddyn nhw. Maen nhw'n g 무슨 gweld. Rhywbeth iddyn nhw'n bwysig barsgyflau'r wath i gynllun ffysicoladau i wedi fy ffysicoladau yna ydy hynny. Felly, os ble gweld o'r ffysicoladau yn brwysig i'n corsio eu ddegolol yw wrth fynd i ffysicolidol i'r wrth ymgwysig argynni, i ddadwch ddiolch yn bwysig. a that's what both these theories do. So they deny that mental state types are numerically identical to types. So do you remember I had that circle and is a pain, is a C-fibre firing underneath. That's what they reject. So functionalism, which we're going to look at first, is the view that mental states are theoretical or functional states. there is states that are the states they are because they play a particular role in a given theory. Let's have a look for a minute at the idea of a theoretical state. Whenever you formulate a theory, you will usually be postulating something as an explanation of something else. sy'n meddyliad, ac mae'r berthynas llwyddoedd ei gallu eu tro i'r cyfathai allu'r teimlo ar gyfer cyflwyprodu. A ystod ei ffrwng am eu ffrwng o'i mynd i fod yn mynd i gael i ymryd. Oni'r gweithio hynny mae chi'n meddyliad ar gyfer cyflwy резur? Rwy'n meddyliad yr oed yn mynd i ffrwng arill y teimlo. Nid oedd i'n gwneud ei chael i'r siarad. ..y'r bwysig yn y gwybod, mae'n gwybod y cyfeiriwyr sydd y gweithio graf. Mae'n gweithio bwn i gwybod ychydig o'r felly... ..y'n dweud o gweithio gwoith mawr. Felly mae'r gweithio gweithio. Efallai yna. Oes yw'n bywch gyflongaf yr hyn deilio sy'n oed bod cyflongaf... .. sy'n gweithio gweithio gweithio o'r amcriptor o magic o AD. OK. If you find a better theory, of course, you'll junk your theory of witchcraft and magic, won't you? And you'll stop drowning nice single women with cats. Because you'll instead discover that it's actually virus or something like that or some bacterium. So a theoretical state is a state like magic, for example, that plays a certain role in a theory. So nobody can see magic, no one can see witchcraft, but you know what it is because you know the role that it plays within a theory. So God is the ultimate theoretical state or theoretical object because you say, well, here's the world, it works like this. The only way we can explain this is by postulating this unobservable who has these properties, therefore God exists. So again, you've got a theory by which to explain what we see around us and a theoretical object or property that does the explaining. So functionalism is the view that that's what a mental state is. It's a theoretical or functional state. It's a state that functions a certain way in a theory. And the theory that generates our ontological... Do you remember I used the word ontology before? Our ontology is our list of what exists. And so our ontological commitment to a mental state is our belief that mental state exists. So the theory that generates our ontological commitment to mental states, according to the functionalist, is the theory so-called folk psychology. It's the everyday theory to which we appeal in explanation of behaviour. So I saw David a minute ago... It is David, isn't it? Yes, right. Good. Walking downstairs. Now was it the case that you were walking downstairs because you wanted a cup of tea and you believed that you could get a cup of tea by walking downstairs? Coffee, actually. Coffee. All right. You see, I got my explanation slightly wrong, but it wasn't bad, actually, was it? I mean, another explanation was it would be that he was sick of listening to me and he was just... Or I had stopped speaking and he thought he would go... Do you see what I mean? We attribute to each other beliefs and desires and intentions and hopes and fears in explanation of behaviour. So if Alan and I are going hiking in the mountains and we're both going up one track and Alan's in front of me and he suddenly stops dead like that. Now what am I... What might I think? There's a lion or a gorilla or a panther or something, exactly. And he's seen it and he doesn't want to be... Do you see immediately I start thinking, okay, there's an explanation for this. What is this explanation? The explanation is going to be in terms of beliefs, desires, intentions, hopes, fears, et cetera, et cetera. And of course, perceptions and sensations because he's seen the gorilla and he is frightened of it, et cetera. Okay, so that's the theory that we postulate in explanation of our observable behaviour and that theory appeals ineliminably to beliefs, to mental states, beliefs, desires, sensations, perceptions, et cetera. And the functionalist believes that that's why we believe that mental states exist because they are that which explains our behaviour and we can't explain our behaviour in any other way. Therefore, they exist. So I've said all this, I think. In our everyday interactions, we attribute mental states to each other all the time on the basis of our observations of behaviour and we think of the mental states we attribute for the reasons that I gave earlier as internal states that are causally implicated in the production of behaviour. So if I put my glass on the table, you think I've done that because I believe the table's there. If I put it there, you still think I believe the table's there but that my belief is false. Okay, oh, look. Sorry, I've discovered how to use these bits on PowerPoint and I can't resist them. Okay, black box here. You've got the environmental stimuli and the behavioural output and we don't know what this is but we do know that it's a belief or a desire. So this is the mind, if you like, and the mind is populated with things like beliefs, desires, et cetera. But it's a black box. We don't know anything more about it. All we know is that beliefs and desires explain our behaviour. So pains, for example, are internal states that are caused by tissue damage, we know, or usually caused, I should say, by tissue damage, and that cause exclamations and cries of pain and limb withdrawal. Sorry, I touch a hot plate, I move my hand pretty damn quick. So there's the input. I can fill this in a little bit. I'm calling it a pain and there's the output. I always thought that diagrams were overrated. And the beliefs that it's raining are internal states that are caused by perceptions of rain, let's say, and that cause umbrella rainings. Look, there's going to be another diagram. Here we go. I think you've got the idea, have you? So for the functionalist, mental states are functional states, but importantly this on its own doesn't make the functionalist a physicalist. And that's because the claim that mental states of functional states are consistent so far with dualism. Can anyone tell me why? Why you could still be a dualist, even though you're a functionalist? No? Okay. You're not saying anything about them? Yep, you're not saying anything about them. All you're saying is the pain, the only thing we know about pain at this point is that pain plays a certain role in the production of our behaviour. It could be a Cartesian dualist state that plays that role. We're leaving it entirely open at this point what a pain is in its very nature. So functionalism so far is consistent with dualism, but functionalism is physicalist insofar as it insists that only physical states can play or they use the term realize the functional role of mental states. So if we go back to my diagram of pain, this is functionalism, but it's entirely consistent with dualism, but once you say anything that plays this role must be physical, then you are a physicalist, not just a functionalist, okay? And that's physicalist functionalism at this point. Do you see why functionalism is physicalist and why it needn't be physicalist? Okay. So functionalism is non-reductive because it permits multiple realizability, multiple realizability. So one of the same mental type can be realised by different physical types. So if I draw again that, okay, is a pain, okay, that's the relation or the class and in here all the token, tokens of that type or if you prefer members of that class. And the functionalist will say each of these is a pain because it's playing a certain role in the theory, but this one is a C-fibraphiring and this one is a D-fibraphiring and this one is a Neural State W or whatever. Doesn't matter, we're completely open about the sort of physical state it is as long as it is a physical state and instantly it might be the same in all human beings so pains are divided into different classes themselves so these are pains in humans which happen to all be paid by C-fibraphirings. These are pains in dogs which happen to be played by D-fibraphirings. These are pains in margins which happen to be hydraulic systems or whatever and so on. So as long as it's physical what type of physical state it is is completely irrelevant to the functionalist. It could be a computer chip. So it could be a computer chip exactly so. It would have to play the right functional role so the computer would have to convince us that it was displaying pain behaviour but if it did convince us of that it would be a pain exactly whatever was inside. Have we found a problem with functionalism already? Well, are they? I can see what I'm thinking about Types. If you had a particular mental state like the one I'm in now, would they say that that could have been realised by a different physical state from the one I'm in now? Well, that's a very difficult question because if you're saying could this token state have been realised by or could this token state which is a state of this type could there have been another token that was realised differently? The answer is yes to that one. Is that an empirical discovery or just what it is? Or just assuming the fact rather than claiming it? They're assuming that, yep. Well, so functionalism, the only argument it has for the claim that all functional roles of pain are played or realised by physical states is because it's physicalist. And it has all the reasons that I gave before for thinking that mental states are physical states for wanting to be physicalist. Is it fairly quick? Once you said it's some kind of physical state that you're automatically not a dualist? No, exactly. No, the minute you say that they must all be physical you are a physicalist. So functionalists could be dualists but the minute the functionalist says what's more, all pains are realised by physical states you are a physicalist. Okay, oh goodness. Right, do you get the idea? So this is, all of these are pains and these two are the same physical state and these two are the same, no, they're not quite, those two are and so on. I think you've got the idea. By such means, by this multiple realisability the functionalist avoids Kripke's argument. Can you see why? Kripke's argument fell only those claims or at least it looks as if it fell only those claims that says every type of a physical state is identical to a type of mental state. And once you allow multiple realisability you're saying actually any mental state could be realised by all sorts of different physical states. So it looks as if we avoid Kripke's argument. Is that the same as saying token identity? That would be saying that not quite but you could say it's a token identity theory because each mental token is identical to a physical token of some kind. So that would be a token identity theory? It could be a type of token identity, yeah. So one way of being a non-reductive physicalist is to be a functionalist. The other way is to be an anomalous monist, okay? The anomalous monist believes that mental states causally interact with physical states. Well, most of us believe that. And that causal interaction depends on law. Talk about that in a minute. The anomalous monist also believes that all causal laws are physical. And if you put these things together it believes that all mental states must have a physical description. Well, okay. Again, the physical description is going to be... Well, no, let me... I'll talk just a bit about this. Okay, we believe that, don't we? We don't want to quarrel with that one. We think that mental states causally interact with physical states. It certainly appears to be the case. Why should we believe that causal interaction depends on law? Well, let's pull apart our concept of causation for a moment. Let's say that A causes B. What would be our evidence for this claim? Every time you observe a... Okay, so you see a perception of a correlation between A and B. Yeah? That's induction, though, isn't it? Well, whether it's induction or not that would be our evidence, wouldn't it? If we saw a case of A without B that would be evidence against this claim, wouldn't it? So, perception of A and not B, that just means not, is evidence against A causes B. It might be that it just shows us that only some A's cause B. Do you see that? It might be that no A's cause B. I mean, we could say, well, okay, that blows that one. It's obvious A's don't cause B. But probably we wouldn't say that, would we? We would probably say, well, maybe only some A's cause B. Only A stars cause B. Now, notice that in allowing that as evidence for and evidence against, we're assuming some sort of determinism. Well, actually, let's not use the word determinism. Let's say that if A causes B, then A is sufficient for B, aren't we? In other words, if you've got an A, then you will have a B. You don't have an A without a B if A causes B. Okay? In every case. The minute we see an exception, we lose faith in our causal claim, don't we? We think that at the very least, it's got to be modified a bit. It can't be A's cause B. If you see an A without a B, it's got to be A's stars cause B or A's in conjunction with C cause B, but not A's without the conjunction with C. You talked about other worlds before. I can imagine other worlds with different worlds. Well, we're not worrying about other worlds at the moment. We're just thinking about this world at the moment. Don't forget I did say that other worlds could be this world, but different possibilities in this world. It's true that the laws of nature may have been other than we take them to be, but we don't want to think about all we're doing at the moment is asking what cause means. Okay, we're pulling apart. We're engaging in the conceptual analysis of our concept of cause. So we think that you don't get causation unless you get sufficiency, unless you get A. A and not B is reason to believe that A doesn't cause B. That's not the case that A causes B. This is why you think that causal interaction depends on laws. What we think we're doing in identifying causal relations is we're building up a description of the uniformities that nature, by which nature governs the earth. Do you see what I mean? There are natural uniformities. I'm running over all sorts of philosophically interesting things in saying this, but we think there are natural uniformities. A is whenever you get an A, you get a B. We try and describe these natural uniformities thus. Our laws, which are linguistic, are descriptions more or less accurate of the uniformities of nature, of laws that we understand nature that are out there independently of us. See what I mean? That's why we might believe that premise. That we think that where there's causal interaction, there's law. Okay, do you accept that? One question, okay? How do you come to this side? They seem to use words differently than we do normally, but only one cause gives one effect, whereas most things seem to be a combination of multiple causes so that you can get a storm from a number of different causes. Sometimes you have one necessary cause, but it seems, and they say, if it's necessary, it's necessary in all possible words, whereas that's very difficult. No, by necessary here, we don't mean logically necessary, i.e. every possible world, because as John said, there might be different laws of nature in different possible worlds. The laws of this world might have been other than they were. So laws are not logically necessary. If they're necessary, they're only naturally necessary, i.e. they're necessary by nature. So a natural uniformity, which is what we're trying to describe when we describe a law, is a natural correlation, not a necessary one. And your bit about the storm, et cetera, you're absolutely right. We tend to pick out so any event that causes another event, this'll have all sorts of, it'll only cause, so the striking of a match will only cause the lighting of the match if there's oxygen around. If there isn't oxygen around, it doesn't matter how often you strike the match, you're not going to get a lit match. So the A causes B is only, if you like, setter as parables, because there are lots of other conditions that would have to be satisfied, but if those conditions are usually satisfied, you usually think about them. We don't usually need to add them into the law. And there are some things like storms that, as you say, are always going to be multi-factorial. Okay, let's go down to this one. All causal laws are physical. The person who's saying this is a chap called Davidson, Donalds Davidson, and what he actually argues is there are no psychophysical laws, or no laws governing events in virtue of mental properties. Okay, let's think about that. Why does he think that? Well, okay, we've seen what we've got about causation, haven't we? We've seen that causation seems to imply law, and it seems to imply correlation, exceptionless correlation. But let's say that... Penny, I'm sorry, I did ask you before. Penny, I see Penny crossing the road, and on the other side of the road is an ice cream van. And I know Penny's love for ice cream, and I know that 10 minutes ago she was telling me how much she'd like an ice cream, so I think, ah, okay, Penny is crossing the road because she wants an ice cream, and believes that she can buy one from that van over there. Do you see a perfectly straightforward belief desire explanation? Now, do I believe that? Because every time I've seen Penny crossing the road, I've explained that she wants an ice cream and she believes that she'll be able to get an ice cream. Is that why I say that on this occasion, Penny is crossing the road because she wants an ice cream and she believes she's going to get one? Is it? So, do I explain every road crossing by Penny by appeal to a desire for an ice cream? I certainly don't because she'd be a very odd person. Actually, if every time she wanted an ice cream, she crossed the road, sometimes she might be on a diet, sometimes she might have no money, sometimes she might be in a hurry, sometimes, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. But actually, it's not on the basis of regularities that I attribute mental states to us. If I look at Alan and I say, I know what he believes he's a man of a certain age, a man of a certain background, therefore I don't even have to ask him. He's going to get pretty pissed off with me if I do that. And the reason is because actually we like to think that our beliefs and desires are actually not a function of exactly what we've come from and what we look like and da da da da. Regularity in the mental world is actually not what lies behind our attributions of belief to each other. What I'm actually trying to do, can I finish Bob? What I'm actually trying to do in attributing these beliefs and desires to Penny when I do is make her intelligible. So, whereas in thinking about causes, I'm thinking of the principle of the uniformity of nature or of induction, as somebody at the back said. I believe nature is uniform. I believe that the future is going to be like the past. I believe that there are correlations between causes and effects and so on. And I always attribute causes on that basis. When I'm talking about reasons, what I'm using is the principle of charity. And the principle of charity says to me, what Penny's just done seems completely crazy. And I don't say, therefore, she must be crazy. What I say is, well, that's interesting, there must be a reason why she's doing it. What is that reason? I say, Penny, why have you just done that? That's mad. Ann tells me she believes P. Well, I believe not P. So, I could just say, well, Ann's obviously mad and dismiss her. But actually, she might be right, mightn't she? And I might be wrong. So instead, I'm going to say, well, OK, I know Ann's rational. Why does she believe P? What's her reason for believing P? And I try and work out which beliefs I can attribute to Ann that will make the belief that P intelligible. And in doing so, I might discover that actually her reason for believing P is better than my reason for believing not P. And I drop my own belief rather than. So there are two principles, the principle of the uniformity of nature, P-U-N. It was blue, wasn't it, the one you gave me. Principle of the uniformity of nature and the principle of charity. And that governs causation and causal explanations. And this governs rationality and reason explanations. So a violation of the principle of the uniformity of nature when I'm thinking of causes is reason to think that my explanation is wrong. And a violation of the principle of charity, the appearance of irrationality when I'm attributing reasons is reason to think that I'm wrong again. So completely different constraining principles in the two sorts of explanation. So the mental states causally interact with physical states. We all believe that, doesn't really need explanation. Causal interaction depends on law. Causal explanation and causal interaction, therefore, is governed by the principle of the uniformity of nature. Causal laws are physical because mental states don't obey laws. They obey charity, not laws. They obey logic, not correlations, if you like, not constant conjunctions. So what Davidson gets from this is if you've got mental states causally interacting with physical states, in the context of the truth of both of these claims, then mental states must have some physical description. What that tells us is that every mental state has a physical description. It doesn't tell us what this physical description is. It just tells us there must be a physical description. So if you like, there are events that are... Here's an event. And it has mental properties. And it has physical properties. And in virtue of its physical properties, it obeys causal laws. And in virtue of its mental properties, it makes true reason explanations. And I think I might have a... So in virtue of the physical description of the state, the state is governed by physical law. And in virtue of its mental description, it can underwrite a reason explanation of behaviour. That is to Penny's Crossing the Road. When I said she's crossing the road because she wants an ice cream and she believes that she'll be able to get one, there is inside her physical states, one of which can be described both as her desire for an ice cream and as some sort of physical state. And in virtue of that physical state, it causes another physical state of the intention to cross the road, which is also a mental description, but there's no law between the desire for an ice cream and an intention to get an ice cream. So that is reason to believe that, but there's no causal law between those two things. That all got rather complicated. If there are both physical events, if there's a physical event that she's equivalently wanting, and there's a physical event equivalent to her deciding to get across the road, presumably one causes the other according to the law of physics. So in fact her desire does cause the intention, even though in both psychology we might not put it that way. I see what you mean. Yes, absolutely. You're absolutely right. The reasons are causes, but the reasons don't obey causal laws, because you get the interaction. Let's see if I can draw this. Actually, I had it there, didn't I? Let's see if I can draw it from this one. Well, no, because as you have decided to get across the road, it's too late. So, want to cross road, intention to cross road, road crossing. Just imagine that road crossing over here. Here is Neural State M, and this is Neural State W, and so on. This and this are not law governs, not lawfully related. You often get a desire to cross the road without an intention to cross the road. You see the ex-boyfriend across the road and you have a yearning to go across, but you think if I do, I'm not going to look very cool, so you don't go. So there's no law here. Neural State M, there is a law here, if you like. That's why that causes that. But the next time you get a desire to cross the road, it's not going to be Neural State M. And the next time you get an intention to cross the road, it's not going to be Neural State W. So the fact that you get a law there doesn't mean you get a law there. Are you with me? But actually we're going to question this in a minute. Is there a law here? Well, no, says Davidson, because the desire to cross the road is not always a Neural State M. So there's no law here, and there's no law here. The only law is between these two, but that's a physical law. It's between Neural State M and Neural State W. What do you mean how can you believe it, are you? I don't believe that exactly the same mental state can be a different physical state every time. I've got the functionalist to address it well. What's the... In what sense are they correlated? Sorry, what's correlated? The mental state and the physical state. The mental state and the physical state are not correlated. That's exactly what's important here. They're at the same event. They are identical. Tokens are identical. But why does he think that? For the argument that I had up here, mental states causally interact with physical states. We agreed on that. Causal interaction depends on law. If that causes that, there must be a law somewhere. And here it is. All causal laws are physical. Here it is. But mental states are not lawfully governed. So what you've got to have is every mental state has a physical description in virtue of which it instantiates a physical law. One in the same state makes true this causal law on this occasion. And it makes true this reason explanation on this occasion. But on a different occasion you wouldn't have the link between this and this and so you wouldn't get that necessarily. That's why you'd think it. One fairly quick question. I must move on. I understand it. Most people don't. I feel hungry. I want to satisfy my hunger. Are they causing the fact in both mental states? I feel hungry is a bit different. I should say now that Davidson actually only thinks of beliefs and desires and propositional attitudes as mental states. He doesn't think of qualitative states like hunger, pain, etc. as mental at all. It wouldn't work if it was talking about pains, etc. Because it's much more likely that pains are correlated with C-fibre fiery at least in a species-specific way. Right. Let's move on. Anomalous moddism really is very complicated. The only thing you really need to get, oh hang on. Yes. Okay, so in virtue of the physical description of the state it's governed by a physical law and in virtue of its mental description it underwrites reason explanations of behaviour. Here's where there's quite a useful diagram. Here's the event. Under one description it's a pain and under another description it's a neural state M I see I've caused it. As a pain it's a reason to pain. I must have been tired. It's obviously going to be a belief that that's penny over there, isn't it? Scrub that pain and write belief it's penny. That's a reason for my waving to a friend. Okay? But under the description neural state M what it's causing is arm moving. It's not causing waving, is it? Because that neural state M would always cause arm moving and not all arm movings are waving. Some of them they're cleaning, window cleanings and some of them they're not waving but drowning but some of them are window cleanings or something like that. So, a nominalist monism is physicalist insofar as it insists that every causally efficacious mental state token has a physical description. Okay notice it says nothing about state tokens that aren't causally efficacious. But if it causally interacts with physical states then it must have a physical description and it's on reductive because each token of a mental state type might have a different physical description. So exactly like functionalism you get multiple realisability. Here you are. So, is a belief I'm going to put here could be in one case it's a neural state M, neural state N, et cetera et cetera. So you don't get any type identities in the way you must have if it's identity theory itself. Okay, that was it. Oh, there you are. Again, multiple realisability of the mental by the physical as done by power point basic shapes. One day I'll get even more on whistles. Okay, so anomalous realist, monism is realist about the mental. It believes that mental properties are real properties but that can't be reduced to properties of other kinds. Okay, it's not. Let me compare that. Functionalist is reductionist about mental properties. It thinks that mental properties are real but it reduces them to functional properties. Are you with me? So do you remember the functionalist said that pain is that state that is caused by tissue damage and that causes avoidance behaviour. So any state that plays that function is a pain. Okay. So a mental state is a functional state, a functional role. Okay, we're reducing pain, mental states to functional states. So it thinks they're real all right. Doesn't have any problem with adding them on to the ontology but it says they're real but they're something slightly different than we thought they were, their functional states. Whereas the anomalous monism, monist believes that mental states are real and what's more they can't be reduced either to physical properties or to functional properties. Okay, so anomalous monism is if you like more a realist about mental states than functionalism is because it doesn't reduce them to anything at all. It's easy to say why none reductive physicalism is attractive. Can anyone tell me why? Easy to say. Easy isn't it? Come on, easy. No, that's not the reason because that was also I'm not sure what that is a reason for but that's not a reason for the attraction of non reductive physicalism. Can anyone else? You don't need to be a dualist. Yes, that's one of the reasons for non reductive physicalism being attractive is you don't have to be a dualist or at least actually the anomalous monism is a dualist about properties but not as the Cartesian dualist was about substances. So you've got a form of dualism back in here but it's a very different form of dualism in Cartesian dualism because it's a dualism not of substance but of properties of substances. Why else? Okay, you don't have to be a dualist or rather you don't have to be a Cartesian dualist if you can be a functionalist or anomalous monism. What else do you not have to be? You don't have to be an identity theorist. We all wanted to be identity theorists because we believe that mental states are physical. We all saw why we couldn't be identity theorists but this allows us to say that mental states are physical without being a reductivist, without being an identity theorist. Way! This is exactly what we want isn't it? Fantastic! So we don't have to be Cartesian dualists and we don't have to be identity theorists we can be a functionalist or we can be anomalous monist and therefore we can both accept that the mental exists and is real and is causally efficacious and we can accept that it's physical. What more do we want? Well here are some problems for functionalism. According to the functionalist mental states are functional states and this means that so long as a thing has inside it a state that is playing the functional role characteristic of a given mental state that thing enjoys that mental state enjoys being a term of art here. So if pain is a state that plays a certain functional role an internal state that plays a certain functional role if you have inside you a state that plays that functional role you are in pain. Can you see that? This is exactly the identity theorist claim again. If you've got inside you a pain that's because it's playing that functional role because the functionalist identifies pains with the playing of a certain functional role not with a physical state but with the playing of a certain functional role and there's a big problem with this and actually John was wandering around by it earlier on I don't know if you actually got there can we imagine something that is enjoying a given mental state but that hasn't got inside it a state that's playing the functional role characteristic of that mental state I know why I put this there the answer to that is no I put that there so that to get you thinking but I hope you're already thinking but the answer to that is no but what about this one don't forget that if you've got an identity A is identical to B in this case A is a mental state and B is a functional state then if you can split these two apart you've shown that there isn't an identity see what I mean so I'm asking you to imagine something that's enjoying a mental state but that hasn't got inside it a state that's playing the functional role characteristic of that mental state and the answer is no you can't imagine that so that's a strength of functionalism but what about this one can we imagine something that has inside it something that's playing the functional role characteristic of a mental state but that isn't enjoying that mental state that's where when you said a computer I thought you were seeing the trouble for physicalism already the fact is if we can create a robot that is identical to Donald is it no I'm sorry what's your name John I'm sorry another John okay if we could imagine that we create a robot that is exactly like John looks like John acts like John speaks like John he wakes up in bed I assume you're his wife by the way sorry what's your name Pat he wakes up in bed next to Pat and Pat's him on the shoulder or whatever she does in the morning and you know she thinks it's obviously John etc now we have is it clear that the robot John feels things like we assume that John does or do you think there's a gap here why do you think there's a gap there's no form of training it's had no primitive early attachment theories or anything like that that might be reason to think that he doesn't have beliefs he could still have pain perhaps but the same pain the robot no well I mean we have to ask whether but we've already agreed that different things might have different sorts of pain but can you if you think that it's possible to imagine a robot that behaves exactly like us but that doesn't feel exactly like us then you've got a counter example to functionalism I would agree with that Turing was suggested if you can't tell the difference there is no difference then the computer is showing human characteristics the Turing test would actually play straight into the hands of functionalism because the Turing test says that if you can interact with a computer in exactly the way you would interact with a human being then the computer is intelligence but notice that the computer there we're talking about beliefs and desires and things like that we're really not talking about pains I mean Turing never imagined the possibility of a robot well we might have imagined it but this wasn't what the Turing test was about the robot who looked exactly like someone sounded exactly like them engaged in pain behaviour etc it doesn't exclude it though no you might think that if something behaves as if it's in pain it is in pain if there's really you cannot tell the difference between this thing and a thing that's in pain then you might think that it's in pain you would have said that would you okay we think that's about people we do think that's about people we absolutely do but then isn't that because we because of our own experience so I experienced Susie's coat as that rather nice red colour and I assumed that you you at least have some visual experience when you look at it probably run rather similar to mine but I can't be sure of that but it doesn't matter because you'd call it red as well but if we had built a computer so we knew that it was nothing like us inside as it were would we still think this anyway can you see what the problem is if there's a gap then we've got a functionalism has a problem and lots of people think there is a gap okay we can certainly imagine the former I said that the answer is no but the functionalists ugh actually it is important but as we've managed to go over it unless it comes up in questions I'm going to ignore it okay the second question the robot who's functionally equivalent to you if you think that he could be functionally equivalent to you and yet not experience the world as you do then functionalism has a problem the Chinese room is a thought experiment that Searle put together where god it goes like this here we go there's this room and there are two windows in this room there's the window where little people are feeding in things with I can't even do a Chinese character but squiggles and squuggles cards with squiggles and squuggles are being fed in here and inside here is a little homunculus and he has a manual okay the manual says when you get a squiggle and squuggle that looks like that you output I'm in pain and when you get a different squiggle and squuggle one that looks like that you output can you see where I'm getting to so this chap this little homunculus gets very very very good at this really really good so good that there's almost no gap between the input and the output and what we're wanting to know is when he says he's in pain is he in pain because if not again you've got a gap inside that is functioning just like actually utilises this for understanding rather than pain so the mental state of understanding this behaviour of whatever this thing is looks as if he's understanding he's acting exactly as if he understands Chinese does he understand Chinese again if you think there's a gap there this is a problem for functionalism because functionalism says if it functions like a pain it is a pain if it functions like a belief it is a belief and your job is to say well actually is that true could it function like this and yet not be a pain or not to be a belief and if so that's an objection to functionalism okay so in all these cases we're supposing oh I missed one didn't I missed oh the population of China actually I hate some of these thought experiments but people seem to enjoy them so this one goes we issue the population of China well I don't know why it's always China either because there's so many of them we issue them all with mobile phones smart ones that can interact and so on and we have a manual that looks exactly like it tells us what to feed in in order to get out pain behaviour or understanding or something like that and we get on our walkie-talkie and we ask the citizens of China to do this that and the other and they do it whatever it is they're all supposed to do and the output is functionally equivalent to whatever it is understanding or whatever do you see where I'm going it's not so easy to understand the idea is if you think of each Chinese person as a neuron and you're getting them all to interact together in such a way that you can say that the functional structure is exactly the same you get that input you get that output and that is the input and output that you need to have a mental state then the population of China would apparently be the mental state and what you're supposed to think this is nonsense, couldn't be the case therefore there's a problem for functionalism because if they are truly playing the functional role of a belief of a pain say and they are not in pain they're not feeling pain then functionalism is false but if you replace the population of China with all the neurons in your brain you are going to say it's a mental state aren't you? but isn't that because you know that you can feel pain? I'm saying you can't distinguish between the two of these but we've already established that you don't think there is a gap and if you don't think there is a gap then you won't think there's a gap in the Chinese case either but most other people will probably think there is do we know that the population of China going up like this won't feel pain? no, maybe they will I mean if you're a functionalist you have to assume that they are actually they won't feel pain they will be the feeling of pain in total they will be pain which is actually it's not even clear and you can't no, it is possible something bit analogous to that with a colony of bees a colony of ants in that as units they are useless but all together they can be looked upon as a single organism with its own rules and personality and so on and that might be one reason for believing that actually if you were to get the Chinese population all acting in the way required to be the feeling of pain maybe you would have to say the feeling of pain is there against that of course we tend to think that this is not the sort of thing that even could feel pain but then we think that computers are not the sort of thing that even could feel pain I mean actually if you've got a, the Turing if you created a robot and run the analogous experiment with a robot as with a computer if you thought this is the sort of thing I could end up marrying maybe it really would maybe you would have to say that this I believe it, I mean certainly you would believe it felt pain etc wouldn't you I mean it's not as simple as I think I've already said I don't particularly like I like that experiment actually but I don't like that one but I think that one's probably the one that hits home hardest because that's the one that's most imaginable isn't it and if you think there's a gap there if you think creating functional equivalence leaves out or at least leaves a possibility that the mental isn't there functionalism has a problem so in all these have I done this in all these cases we're supposing that a thing has inside it the thing in the last case would be China itself something that functions in the way a mental state supposedly functions but that it's not sufficient for it's enjoying a mental state that's the problem for functionalism if you think that if like Christopher you don't think that then you can still go for functionalism of course oh let's just ignore that I don't do flowcharts and things yes okay there you are said that a minute ago okay this is a way to get round that so we looked at functionalism and the arguments for it and we've just looked at some arguments against it and now I'm just coming back on those arguments against it to say actually functionalism isn't necessarily dead if you can insist that anything that has inside it something that's playing the functional role of a given mental state is enjoying that mental state even if it does lack the properties usually believed to be essential to the mental then functionalism will be okay and this is the one that Chris and Bill and so on were coming up with but there's also if the functionalist could say that any state that causes a state of believing that one is in pain is a pain state then what you're saying is that pains don't essentially have to have qualia okay do you remember we said a minute ago that a pain had to have that feeling of being awful but actually if I believe I'm in pain and you think as you all said you did short time ago that believing you're in pain is sufficient for being in pain why do I need a state that feels awful the belief will do it won't it do you see so I could just get rid of sensations I can get rid of qualia completely because what I'll do instead is beliefs that I have qualia false beliefs as it happens but do I believe that I think it's actually I think it's very convincing because I do Occam's razor tells us if you can do all the stuff you need qualia for without qualia why not so if you check the insensate person or thing you're a check the insensate thing but you for some reason you wanted to experience pain every time I sustain tissue damage now every time I sustain tissue damage I believe I'm in pain tissue damage causes in me both pain behaviour so you think I'm in pain and the belief that I'm in pain so both the first party evidence is in and the third party evidence is in what more is there to pain well if phantom limb causes me to think that I'm think that I'm in pain when I'm not in pain do you see that I needn't be in pain if I believe I'm in pain depends what pain is what pain is is what we're discussing in the whole of these sessions so I'm certainly not going to say what I think pain is does this I think it's morphine we know that we can falsely believe well we know that we can falsely believe we've sustained tissue damage so we can if we have phantom limb we've still got pain because pain is in the brain it's not in a limb no this is a more pertinent thing you have tissue damage you feel dreadful pain you take the morphine I think and the patients report they can still feel the pain but they don't mind it any longer but it doesn't hurt actually I found myself sitting at a dentist he was saying does that hurt and I was thinking it depends what you mean by hurt what about mental pain compared to physical pain I think you can run exactly the same experiments with mental pain as well let's move on but I hope you see how that would be an argument to come back on behalf of functionalism against the people who think that there's a gap because of robots and the population of China oh god another one do you find them useful because if you do I will talk you through them you don't put your hand up if you would find these useful right the diagrams so the way I'm defending the functionalist is this tissue damage is input this causes the belief I'm in pain which is output as both the belief that I'm in pain sorry that's output down here sorry it's output as the owl avoidance behaviour etc so the first person evidence that I'm in pain is in because I believe I'm in pain and the third person evidence pain behaviour is also in if you think there is no more to pain than that then actually I think the functionalist has got a very good defence against the robot who doesn't feel anything even though it behaves in exactly the same way well that would be the other question you might say that actually even the robot doesn't even have any beliefs in which case he would be programmed he would be programmed I mean he would have to be wouldn't he no I'm saying it behaves identically no no I certainly didn't mean it was physically identical I mean it behaves in exactly the same way so everything it does so it says God I feel I've got a terrible headache etc so you believe it's in pain but the question is is it in pain listen if it doesn't have a mind it doesn't have free will if it does have a mind the question whether free will has free will arises in the same way it does for us yeah and the question is we're asking does it have a mind so we certainly can't answer the second question because we don't know the answers to the first yet okay let's move on so on this story the functionalist is reducing all talk of qualia to talk of beliefs which means that the functionalist's story about belief becomes very important if you reject the functionalist's story about belief then the functionalist has a problem okay and at this point we might want to ask whether there really are functional roles that are characteristic of beliefs so let's look again at the belief it's raining it may be caused as I said it was a perception of rain but it can be caused by almost anything else as well so pat you've forgotten this but about three years ago no you haven't forgotten you've remembered this very about three years ago we agreed that if it was raining outside you would do this to me okay so I see pat come in today and I see her go looking very meaningfully at me and I think oh god I wish I'd brought my umbrella because I now believe it's raining do you see um I have a reason to believe that it's raining pat's doing this has given me a reason and it's caused me to believe that it's raining do you see what I mean and also it may cause umbrella raising as it does but it might also cause if I think it's my wedding day I might start crying oh god it hasn't rained for ages this is just what the garden needs I might start dancing so actually this belief can be caused by almost anything actually anything probably and it can cause almost anything actually anything probably the thing about beliefs is that there are reasons for acting and reasons are holistic almost any belief can be a reason for any other belief given the right context so why should we think that there's any such thing as the functional role of a belief and if there isn't such a thing as the functional role of a belief functionalism is at the very least in difficulties if it claims to be a scientific theory of any kind because we're never going to be able to identify the functional role if each belief has a different functional role it might still have a functional role we're not saying functionalism is wrong in principle but in practice it's not any theory that's going to do us any good I would disagree with that because I think it can still be a correct theory without being a correct scientific yes well that's what I've just said it could be a correct theory without being a correct practical theory it doesn't enable us to do anything with it I completely agree if each belief plays a different functional role that would still be functionalism would still be true but it wouldn't be very practical there wouldn't be anything we could actually do with it because if each of your beliefs that there's a nice creamer van over the road is a different functional role then I couldn't even generalise from you never mind from all of us ok let's let's move on to functionalism faces major problems but are the problems conclusive aren't certain no if we can countenance the non-existence of qualia in the way I said earlier that seems to be a point in favour of functionalism we would also if we think that mental states could have just individual functional roles that would be another problem but it would be only a problem in practice not in principle let's look at anomalous monism we've got just the right time left the key problem for anomalous monism is the problem of causal exclusion the causal exclusion argument points to the fact that the anomalous monism acknowledges that all causally efficacious mental events have physical properties in virtue of which they're subsumed by physical laws ok so let's go back to this one so all mental events have physical properties in virtue of which they're subsumed by physical laws ok and what the abjector to anomalous monism asks is well then why does he think that mental events are causally efficacious if a hand withdrawal so let's do a different diagram here so here's an event let's call it a C-fibre firing causes a hand withdrawal sorry it's a C-fibre firing and a pain ok two different properties if there's a law that means that as it's a C-fibre firing it causes hand withdrawal then when you say what causes the hand withdrawal you're going to answer C-fibre firing there's no role that pain plays at all if C-fibre firing and hand withdrawals are correlated by some causal law as they are here then unless pains and C-fibre firings are related by some bridge law unless they're identical unless these two things here are identical ie going back to our identity theory pain has no causal role to play in causing the hand withdrawal so here you've got pain here you've got this is actually I do diagrams and they're not even correct ones because those are the same state ok but two different properties and it's in virtue of that property that there's a causal law linked to hand withdrawal there's no law at all between this and this and so we've just why should we think that pain causes hand withdrawal because we don't know what the fibre actually I mean we call it pain but now you've told us or we could be told the science has told us that pain is associated with the fibre firing now we might call it the fibre firing ok but the thing is those who play this particular objection say the only way we can establish that pain causes hand withdrawal in this case is by identifying the pain with the C fibre firing and so you go right back in this case the person who puts this objection is a chap called Yegwon Kim you go right back to identity theory though not to generalised identity theory you go back to species specific identities to which of course there are all the problems that we looked at earlier so if the causal exclusion argument is right then even if the mental is real on anomalous monism it has no causal role to play it's epiphenominal and because anomalous monism design sorry and this is because it denies the existence of bridge laws I'm just going to say I'm going to lose my voice in a minute the causal exclusion argument so we put the objection there's an objection to the objection as usual you can reject the account of causation on which it's based but I can't even think about explaining that right now so we might have to look at that again tomorrow during the question and answer time we haven't got time to look at it now um that's what we won't be looking at now so like functionalism anomalous monism faces serious problems but again the question is are these problems conclusive again if we're prepared to countenance the idea that the relata of the causal relation are not properties but events and that's what I haven't explained to you we can junk anomalous monism but I think that we probably shouldn't be but let's worry about that later so this is where we are on physicalism just before dinner reductive physicalism is scuppered by Kripke unless you want to accept any of the positions that I outlined that might be questions against Kripke's argument functionalism seems to involve eliminating qualia from our ontology okay qualia are the qualities of experiential states so the awful feeling of pain the experience of blue that you get when you look at these curtains the experience of love okay okay so functionalism seems what it's like to be exactly seems to involve eliminating qualia and anomalous monism seems to involve embracing an unusual to say the least experience of causation or theory of causation and what I'm going to look at after dinner is perhaps physicalism in all its forms is simply wrong but for all the reasons we looked at earlier dualism also seems simply wrong so what do we do now and after dinner I'm going to look at a couple of suggestions that would reject both physicalism and dualism and have a completely different way of looking at the mental okay we'll do that after dinner if anyone wants to ask a question we have got five minutes and there are your references why is anomalous monism comes from monism which means that there is only one stuff has two properties but there's only one stuff and anomalous comes from the fact that it isn't law governed we don't have qualia do we have any experience yes I will if you have no qualia no you believe you do isn't that enough hang on you believe you have experience and that leaves us open that there is still a world to experience all you've lost is you look at me and you see this beautiful hang on you look at this and you have this beautiful experience of pink and you believe in your seeing pink you're not actually seeing pink you're not actually seeing pink you don't know that I've got qualia do you you don't know that I'm not a robot you don't know that I'm not a robot no well you don't do I do you and as long as you don't know you can imagine that gap between something that behaves exactly like me but doesn't experience the world in any way at all for all you know I might be that person if you're all you might be you might be that person you might not really experience red at all you just think you do no not if this do you I'm giving no there are beliefs that there is something that it's like but there is nothing that it's like well no because having a belief isn't the sort of thing that has what it's like to be does it what is likes just that there is a some referential thing that it relates to to see what I mean well not really because if there's something that it's like for me to look at Susie's sorry I'm very glad you wore that to look at Susie's jacket there's something that it's like for me or is there is it just that I believe that there's something that it's like for me but the whole experience of redness that you must innate you have somewhere I'm suggesting that there isn't any experience of redness what there is is beliefs when jackets reflect night at 600 nanometres it causes in me a belief that the jacket is red there aren't any experiences no not necessarily isn't the unconscious create this kind of picture outside world that passes to the point of sight yeah and a picture is that true to the Twigwalia here's I want sorry I just want to be a bit creative here this is Susie in her lovely red jacket sorry the rest of you got red as well and that's causing in me you think that it's causing an experience of red which is causing in turn a belief that I am experiencing red okay so there are two that's causing that which is causing that and I'm suggesting if you just get rid of that you don't lose anything do you what do you lose whether it's a deception well no but if I have other false beliefs why can't I have a false belief that I'm perceiving red you think it is but I'm saying if the Twigwalia drops out what's actually missing because I believe I'm experiencing red doesn't matter and you believe I'm experiencing red okay why do you actually need an experience of red how do you know it's red because it's reflecting light if it were not reflecting light at 600 nanometres or whatever I think that's what it is it wouldn't be causing a belief that I'm seeing red it would be causing a belief that I'm seeing blue or green but you only know it's red and something else somebody said that's called red exactly and whatever that was let's say it's oh look Tom's wearing a red oh and Penny is too so here's Tom and here's Penny and they're both causing me to have the belief that I'm seeing red but that's because in each case what they're wearing is reflecting light at 600 nanometres therefore causing this belief you want me to say that it's first causing an experience and then a belief and I'm saying why don't we just supply Occam's razor here we can get rid of that good example let's take that I think it's time to finish now the bar's open