 Hello, everyone. Welcome to the U.S. Institute of Peace and to the launch of OECD's States of Fragility 2015 report. My name is Andrew Blum. I'm the Vice President for Program Management and Evaluation here at the Institute. We're just really excited to be able to host today's event. When my friend and colleague from USAID, Joe Hewitt started to ask, you know, would you be interested in hosting? I think I said yes even before he got the question fully out. And that's because we really believe that fragility and its integration into the Sustainable Development Goals process is just incredibly important to the work we do here at USIP as well as the sort of broader importance of this approach. So we're just really excited to be able to participate in this conversation today with our friends and colleagues from OECD, from USAID, and from the World Bank. The way this conversation is going to work today, to get us started, the President of the U.S. Institute of Peace, Nancy Lindborg, is going to make some opening remarks. Then I'm going to invite Brenda Killen from the OECD to give a little bit of the rationale and the background of the report. Then the lead author of the report, Sarah Hearn, from the Center on International Cooperation and Yolanda Profos from the OECD will talk about the content of the report. And then we're going to get reactions from Melissa Brown from USAID and Alexander Mark from the World Bank. And then we'll have a good amount of time, I believe, for a question and answer and we'd really like to get your views on what you've heard today. Lastly, I'd like to welcome those of you here in D.C. and around the world who are watching online. And that's also a reminder that today's event is on the record. So without further ado, I'd like to invite the President of USIP, Nancy Lindborg, to make some opening remarks. Good morning, everybody, and thank you for joining us here. I, as Andrew indicated, I'm the President of USIP. I'm still getting to use the word new President for a few more weeks, I think. And for those of you who are here for the first time, I just want to underscore again that USIP, the United Institute of Peace, is a congressionally created, independent, nonpartisan institute with the awesome mission of preventing, mitigating, and resolving conflict around the world. And we do this by engaging directly in conflict zones. I've just come back from Afghanistan, Pakistan, where we've had programs for over a decade and providing resources, education, and analysis to those working on peace, both from the top down and the bottom up, and by working in partnership with a lot of you. And so I'm delighted to be hosting this event. I share Andrew's delight, and it's wonderful to see a lot of old friends from USAID, from World Bank, OECD, and I especially want to congratulate OECD for the States of Fragility 2015 report, which we're here to launch today. I am enthusiastic that the framework and the data in this report will really be able to move us forward as we think about how the interrelationships work of justice, security, development, and move towards a more comprehensive framework that help us make the kind of progress that will be critical in the post 2015 framework as we move to negotiate the SDGs, how important it is to really incorporate that. As many of you know, and I have some old colleagues in the room with us today, prior to coming here eight weeks ago, I was the assistant administrator at AID for democracy conflict and humanitarian assistance. And we saw in 2014 a really historic year in terms of the number of what are known as level three emergencies, South Sudan, Central Africa, Syria, and Ebola. And each of these was the result of conflict. And it becomes ever more imperative as we look at the enormous packages of expense that go out towards peacekeeping for humanitarian assistance that we understand how to get upstream and that we understand how these factors interrelate so that we can be more effective as a globe. And I spent my last six months at USAID leading the Ebola response. So I was pleased to see in here a pull out box on Ebola because for me that was a very important wake up call to the world as to why it matters that we understand and pay attention to fragility, that even in Liberia and Sierra Leone who were struggling to move forward on this pathway towards peace and development, we're still fragile enough that they could succumb to the Ebola virus and how important it is that we plug the holes in the net for countries, for regions, for global security. We also hosted President Ghani here two days ago who joined us for his public question and answer. And for those of you who know President Ashraf Ghani, he has his own encyclopedia knowledge of these issues and many of the many of the points that he really underscored, including the story of the young woman who was tragically killed by a mob that included police officers. You know, he gets the inner relationship and he could almost be plotted against the five dimensions that the report includes. I love a good Venn diagram and I love the graphic that helps us just really quickly embrace the core concepts that we need to think of these together. And in fact, here at USIP the last two days, we've been hosting a conference that enables those who work on the security sector to understand how to more effectively grounded in a framework of human rights and connected to justice and to development. I believe we're making progress and this report will help with the data, with the analytical frameworks to really move us forward, hopefully to ensure that proposed SDG goal 16 sticks and that we're really able to make progress in the years ahead. Peace depends on it. I think our global security depends on it. This is a very important conversation. I'm just delighted, delighted to host it and I look forward to the comments from our panel and the discussion from this group. Many thanks and welcome. So now we'll hear from Brenda Kellen. Well, I'd just like to start by saying thank you to the US Institute for Peace for organising and hosting this launch event in this wonderful building and such a good turnout. Together with USAID and the World Bank, we're very happy to be here and have the chance to launch this report and exchange in a discussion with some of these major experts on this topic in the room today. So also I'd like to say thank you to Germany and Switzerland who are the main sponsors of the report, the Central and International Corporation at New York University for great collaboration. Sarah Hearn is here with us today and also the strong reference group that we worked with to guide the report that included the G7 Plus Group of Fragile States, the UN, the World Bank, IMF Brookings, SIPRI and others. With this report, we're intending to make a contribution to the post-2015 debate. So starting to look at fragility as a universal concept. I think we're really bringing something new and hopefully useful to the table. So a universal understanding of fragility, risks and vulnerability. I'll say a few words about where this report comes from and why the OECD is working on fragility. The OECD has produced an annual report on Fragile States for about 10 years and we did this in response to demand from senior policy makers in our member states. The Senior Level Forum on Development Effectiveness in Fragile States in 2005 asked us to develop a system for monitoring resource flows to countries that attract in cycles of poverty, insecurity and weak governance. And that's what this series of reports has done since then and the aim was, and it still is, to help international actors to do a better job, to target assistance much more smartly, so to help states make a sustainable exit from poverty and insecurity. And in doing this, we face the difficult task of defining which countries to monitor, which countries to focus on and that's why we came to rely on a Fragile States list. And the list approaches is the traditional way of doing business in development often and many other organisations have used this too. The advantage of having a list of Fragile States was it allowed us to draw comparisons and draw attention to the needs and challenges of a certain group of countries, but it had many drawbacks and most importantly, it conveyed the wrong impression that we were looking at Fragile States as a homogeneous group and also that you were either fragile or you weren't. So it failed to capture the spectrum of fragility. So with this report, we're making a radical shift in the way OECD is approaching issues around fragility. It's time now to change our thinking. We need to move towards a universal understanding of fragility and in fact we're planning to phase out our traditional list over the next three years or so. So we'll drop the old label of Fragile States and instead we're developing, we're putting out a working model in this report that marks a shift towards a multi-dimensional concept of fragility. So that's why this report could really be groundbreaking in terms of understanding and monitoring fragility, risk, vulnerability, building resilience. We're no longer speaking of a binary system of Fragile and not Fragile States but looking at many shades of spectrum and that's why we've renamed the series. It's not a Fragile States report, it's our report on states of fragility. We want to look at all countries and their specific challenges. So vulnerability and fragility, we shouldn't just be looking at it as a challenge facing the least developed countries, the poorest countries. This report we show that middle income and high income countries are not exempt from these challenges. And I'd like to underline that the OECD and its members are very much part of this universal framework. We're committed to assessing ourselves as much as we do others and this is very much in line with the universal agenda of the sustainable development goals. And actually this is very close to the way that OECD works. It's the bread and butter life of the OECD to conduct peer reviews, multilateral surveillance, peer pressure, identifying best practice and working together to try and achieve that to improve policies within the OECD. So that's something that we want to bring to the table in the OECD with this report. And then another aspect of this report is a fresh look at financing. We're advocating not so much for more financing, but for better aid, smarter development finance overall. And that's also at the heart of OECD's current efforts to modernise ODA and also define what is total official support for sustainable development, the so-called measure of TOSSD and how we then incentivise this to work in the direction of the SDGs, including delivering progress for the fragile states. So we're committed to making a contribution to a universal way of monitoring development finance flows in line with the approach in this report. So just to conclude, this is the first step. We've changed the name, but we need to work with people like yourselves to further refine this. The model is by no means fully developed, but it's food for thought. We very much want to hear from you, and we're happy that you're here with us today to discuss it. And just to let you know that those of you who would like a copy of the report, it's available on our website. And when Yolanda makes her presentation, there's a link at the end. Or if you get in touch with us, we can make sure you get a copy when it's launched, when it's printed next month. But thank you very much. Thank you. Thank you very much. Thank you, USIP USAID. We'll bank the opportunity to speak today. It's an exciting opportunity. We at New York University led the development of this report myself and my colleagues Ben Oppenheim and David Stephen. Perhaps maybe I'll just kick off by explaining a bit about the post 2015 development agenda itself for those that don't know as a bit of background. And then I'd like to highlight some, I think, major political points that I'd like to convey based on the research that we did for the OECD. And then Yolanda will speak to the OECD's findings and ways forward. So first of all, on the post 2015 development framework, this is the negotiations that are happening in New York to replace the Millennium Development Goals, which expire this year, with the new Sustainable Development Goals agenda. And what's happening is a real paradigm shift. It's quite interesting. If you follow the UN, the framework that's been proposed is universal. So it's not just about developing countries and about poverty, but about development in all countries and for all people. It's also an extremely inclusive negotiation process. There have been 70 countries representing all countries involved in a so-called UN Open Working Group, which has developed a draft framework of 17 goals and 169 targets. And the real critics of that framework, that it's too expansive, that it's too ambitious, but the strength of it is that it's inclusive and it was based on what all countries wanted to bring to the table and what all countries' priorities are. A lot of QDOS has to go to the negotiators of that framework, that there is currently a draft goal for peaceful and inclusive societies. This was an enormous mission in the Millennium Development Goal era, that meant that many countries that suffered from conflict and that suffered from fragility were left behind on poverty or mitigation. It's also a pretty progressive articulation of an agenda that's otherwise been somewhat dominated, but quite securitized, if not militarized approaches, particularly in countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq and beyond. And Yolanda will speak a little bit to some of the post-mortem we did on the geopolitics of aid in the MDG era. So let me just say something about the Sustainable Development Goal framework itself. It recognises in a universal approach to fragility, that we all have fragility problems. On the economic front, we all have to rebuild state legitimacy and meeting expectations of people in the aftermath of financial crisis in rich countries, as well as poverty eradication expectations in the poorer countries. We have to challenge violence and end violence as a major impediment to development everywhere. New York City, as much as the DR Congo. We have to promote access to justice for all as an essential foundation for development. We all need institutions that can deliver on all of the Sustainable Development Goals that are being proposed for the post-2015 development era. And we have to build resilience to future economic shocks and natural disasters. And we saw just last week serious effects on Vanuatu of not having been prepared for natural disasters there. In this context, Kudos to the OECD as well, who asked New York University to develop an alternative approach to the fragile states list. One that serves the needs of monitoring aid to the poorest and most fragile situations that they do receive the support that they need. But also one that's universal and this is in implementing the Sustainable Development Goals on a universal level. Thus, we developed a draft framework for discussion and you'll see the Venn Diagram shortly. We developed five dimensions of risk and resilience based on the goals and targets that countries themselves have negotiated in New York. So the five dimensions are based on violence, justice, institutions, which are the three main components of the Peaceful Society's goal. Plus, economic foundations and resilience to shocks and disasters. When we experimented with different indicators in these different five areas of risk and resilience, we found that of course the G7 Plus group of fragile and conflict affected countries, plus Syria, plus Libya, plus other countries that are seriously affected by conflict now, are of course most behind on most indicators of fragility. But we also found universal challenges. In middle-income countries, we see spikes in violence driven by organized crime across Latin America and the Caribbean and serious vulnerabilities to natural disasters and economic shocks. In high-income countries, we see many members of the European Union on extremely shaky ground on the economic foundations and the aftermath of financial crisis and recovery there. The United States is of course in the middle of the world rankings on homicide rates and there's progress that needs to be made here on that. And the UK is in the midst of an enormous child abuse scandal that goes back for decades and speaks to impunity in our own institutions. So every country will need to assess and act on its challenges, no more so than the countries that are most behind on the MDGs that have the furthest to go and the fastest to go to close the gap. Right now, 43% of the poorest people in the world live in so-called fragile states on the OECD's fragile states list. If we fail to take action on the Peaceful Society's goal, we projected that by 2030, 62% or 500 million people below the $1.25 poverty line will live in those countries by 2030. Accelerating institutional development and Peaceful Society's can make a huge difference to hundreds of millions of people, potentially bringing that down to 300, 350 million people by 2030. So it's time to deliver. Leaving no one behind means accelerating institutional development and building peaceful societies. But meeting global ambitions is going to mean some serious change when it comes to international aid policy and international aid practices. As I said, we did something of a post-mortem on aid practices and financial flows and Yolanda will speak to this in more detail. But a few points that I'd like to underline before I hand over. The first is that national ownership is key. We can't build peaceful societies from the outside. National actors have to be in the driving seat. And aid must be aligned to national priorities. And when we looked, we find that aid is not currently sufficiently aligned to national peace building and state building priorities. Secondly, there's a lot that's gone wrong in terms of the there's a lot that's gone wrong in terms of levering in private finance. So we've spent a lot of our attention in the MDG era on spending aid on social and economic programs, but less on helping countries to build their own domestic revenues and less on helping countries to pull in their own private finance. And as a result, many, many countries that are fragile remain aid dependent and have no end in sight of no longer being aid dependent. And finally, there needs to be much, much, much more innovation. We're using the same aid modalities and the same project designs that we've been using for a very long time. We need to look at multi stakeholder and multi sector partnerships that reduce violence. We need to be building on South-South cooperation, recognizing that it's Southern actors that in the MDG era accelerated their own institutional development and poverty eradication. They know a lot that we in the West don't necessarily know and that knowledge needs to be brought to the table. And finally, we need to develop a new portfolio of tools and aid instruments that we can bring to bear for building peaceful societies. And before I hand over to Yolanda, I think I'll do my job as New York University by saying that on this front there needs to be a lot more research on what aid does work and what aid doesn't work. So thank you very much and now I'll hand over to Yolanda. Thank you very much. I would like to illustrate some of the points that Brenda and Sarah have now made with a couple of slides and visuals from the report. First point and the most important one is really this shift of focus from fragile states to states of fragility. And that is really a shift towards the universal understanding of what vulnerabilities and risks look like in today's world. As Brenda alluded to the mandate that we were given at the OECD to monitor resources to fragile countries, made it necessary for us to distinguish between fragile states or fragile developing countries and other developing countries. And we didn't create our own list or our own criteria for that but we used two lists that already existed. One is the harmonized list that the World Bank, the Asian and African Development Bank put out every year called the harmonized list. And the other is the one by the Fund for Peace which is also issued every summer. So those two lists, combination of those lists that's what we used to base our analyses on. The most recent one, the one that we use in this report, contains 50 countries that you see represented on this map. So this is what we use as a sample of analysis when people want to know how fragile states are doing against the MDGs or how much development finance they receive. It is in no way an attempt to define what fragility really is and where we can find it. It is simply a sample of analysis that we're using. But Brenda's already said one of the big drawbacks of the list is that they lump together states that have faced quite distinct risks and development challenges ranging from endemic violence to economic instability, weak institutions. Just think about how Mali and DPRK are different and they're both on this list. So therefore we're moving towards a concept that looks more like this. And this is what you find in this report. It's sort of the core piece of a synthesis of the research that is in this report. This Venn diagram shows you the five dimensions of fragility that emerge from the SDG framework. Violence, justice and institutions as part of SDG 16 and economic foundations and resilience from the broader SDG framework. So those are the five aspects that are particularly salient with regard to fragility when you look at the SDG framework as it stands now. What can we read out of this? In the core, you see a range of countries that are vulnerable in all five clusters. They're mostly low income countries, mostly sub-Saharan states. And when you move out, you see countries that may be vulnerable to four, three or two dimensions. So as you move out, you find more diversity. You find countries from Middle East, Northern Africa, from Latin America, especially in the violence cluster, also from Central Asia. So this is a model that tries to capture what we find when we run data relating to violence, justice, institutions, economic foundations and resilience when we run those data through all countries, not only developing countries. And what we've done is to choose the 50 most challenged states or countries on each dimension. Now, this approach is really different from the previous fragile states list. It offers a much more detailed and therefore a much more meaningful assessment of fragility, what fragility can be. But also it gives us a much more complete picture because we're not only looking at developing countries, we are running these data, this analysis through all countries because the SDG framework will be universal. I would like nonetheless to put out two caveats. This is not supposed to be the new fragile states list. This is, the point here is not to show which country is where exactly on the diagram. We're putting this out as a model to get the conversation going. What we're interested to know is whether people find it helpful to think of fragility as a multi dimensional issue and to break down the notion of fragility into various challenges to which countries are actually exposed and then to discuss how we can use this information. And the second caveat I want to make is that this is really a working model. The measures for the five clusters that were used here are proxy measures. When the SDG framework is defined and the indicators are set, then of course it's time to run this model again and see what comes out then. But until then, this is really a working model we'd like to show you. The second point I would like to make is to illustrate the need for a better allocation of development assistance. For fragile states, and here I'm talking about the 50 on the traditional list, there's been some good news over the MDG period. ODA has increased to fragile states. And since 2007, when you look at aid, the majority of aid has actually gone to fragile states and economies. 53% of all aid to developing countries. And per capita aid to fragile states, and that's what you see on this line graph, has almost doubled since 2000 to an average of 36 US dollars per head, compared to 10 US dollars in other developing countries. But what we are actually interested in is to dig a bit deeper to look at what this actually has meant. And there's a lot to be said about distribution of that aid. Per capita and total allocations of this ODA vary quite wildly. About 22% of aid to fragile states during the MDG period went to Iraq and Afghanistan. And a few others received also a large chunk of that pie. And here in the first bar, the large, the high bar, you can see the aid that the top nine per capita recipients of aid among the fragile states have received on average. And next to it, that small bar is what the other 41 fragile states received on average per capita. This is a very big difference. Also, 10 out of 11 aid orphans in the world are on the fragile states list. So definitely we're drawing attention to the fact that almost no donor takes into account the decision of other donors when they allocate their aid. And that is something that needs to change. Another, an important point is of course not only to look at the quantity of aid, how much aid is spent is important, but at least as important is how is that money actually invested? And this report draws on detailed OECD data on the project level to find out to what extent peacebuilding and state building was reflected in the allocation of development assistance. And here we've taken the five PSGs, the five peacebuilding and state building goals as they were defined in the New Deal. And we've looked at how much money donors allocate to each of them in fragile states. And we were very surprised to find that ODA support for security is as low as 1.4% of all aid going to those countries. For justice it's just 3%. For political reform it's 4%. And those are three of those peacebuilding and state building goals. So that's very low while 46% of ODA was allocated outside the PSG areas. Of course that doesn't mean we shouldn't invest in health and education. That's not the message that we want to give here but the allocation pattern is almost the same as in other developing countries. And that really raises the question for us as to whether this aid responds to the context and the impediments to building resilient societies and peace. And I'm getting to the third and last point that I want to raise which is about flows beyond official development assistance. If you think back of the five dimensions in the Venn diagram you will probably be wondering what financial resources are available to those countries. So what we're looking for is almost a mirror image to that Venn diagram to figure out what resources are available to respond to the challenge because not all of these challenges violence, economic foundations, resilience are addressed solely by aid and nor should they be or can they be. However, our knowledge about other resource flows beyond aid is relatively limited. What we do know is what you see in this diagram. Remittances, it's a blue bar is the highest resource on the aggregate to developing countries. But it's concentrated in populous countries over 50% of it go to Nigeria, Egypt and Bangladesh while ODA so official development assistance which is green in this diagram continues to fill a crucial gap in financing in low-income fragile states much more so than in middle-income fragile states. Foreign direct investment which is the orange bar here you can see that it's third after remittances and aid but it's concentrated in a handful of fragile states. Nigeria, Iraq, DRC, Egypt, Congo and Sudan and you'll notice that those are all resource-rich fragile states. So those manage to attract foreign direct investment but it's much harder for other fragile states to do so. Only 6% of development for foreign direct investment to developing countries goes to fragile states only 6%. Other official flows are on the rise that includes official export credits, sector equity, portfolio investment however we do not currently have the right tools to measure all of those. What we really don't know for many of them is how they contribute to development. Often we can't track them down to specific sectors many times the data are incomplete and that's why it will be important to harness the data revolution and agree on a way to measure all those flows beyond aid. So we hope that the findings of this report can be useful to you in your work and can be also useful generally in defining a package of measures for fragile for countries affected by fragility in some way. We hope that it can in particular do three things this report to help foster an understanding of the complex nature of fragility and to talk about it in more nuance. And secondly, to address imbalances in the distribution of official development assistance with a view to better serving the poorest and the most fragile among the countries but also that it can contribute to a better understanding of financing beyond ODA and perhaps to a global system through which we can better measure all the flows that are available to countries affected by fragility in their development. Thank you very much. And this is the link under which you will find the report and you can download it for free. Thank you to Brenda, Sarah and Yolanda for a great overview. It's of so many thoughts and questions. It's kind of killing me that I have to play the moderator role right now. But I will let our other panelists respond. So first, Melissa Brown. Great. Thank you. I can attest that you can print the report from the link cited by Yolanda. In fact, when I was coming through security into this building, someone behind me saw the full report in my bag. It was very impressed that I actually had printed it out. So it's thick, but it is an incredibly valuable read as you're getting a preview here today. First, let me just say how very pleased I am to be here today on a panel that has such experience and expertise to share. I think it's a real testament to the 10 years of this publication that we're here today with such a great turnout and an event that's co-hosted by USIP. And thank you very much for such a lovely venue. OECD DAC, the World Bank in USAID. In the office where I'm from, the Office of Conflict Management Mitigation at USAID, we have been preparing for 2015, meaning that there is an incredible amount of focus and energy on the development agenda and as relates to the topic we're talking about today. Not only do you have the completion of the Millennium Development Goals and negotiations over a new framework, you also have the mandate renewal of the International Dialogue for Peace Building and State Building and the New Deal, which is the coalition of self-identified fragile states, donors and global civil society to address fragility and help countries with their transitions out of fragility. You also have the United Nations Review of Peace Operations, the high level review of 1325. So it is so important from our perspective to host discussions like the one today so that we can take advantage of very well timed data and analysis, because clearly we're still in an era of great learning around these issues. I know there's, I'm sure, a lot of questions and interests for our expert panelists, but I did want to highlight a few points before I turn it over to my World Bank colleague. First is the report importantly highlights extreme poverty has been halved around the world. Clearly it's a major accomplishment, but at the same time roughly two-thirds of those countries that are now considered fragile have not made progress against this very important goal. As many of you hopefully are aware, USAID's mission statement is to partner to end extreme poverty and promote resilient, resilient democratic societies while advancing our security and prosperity. In order to address extreme poverty, we recognize there must be an emphasis on political and economic inclusion. People must have a voice in their own political processes and social and economic opportunities must be opened up and broadened. We've recognized this relationship for many years at USAID and our definition of fragility both encompasses capacity as well as legitimacy with a central focus on the relationship between state and society. We believe that fundamental concept is spread across all the five dimensions that are highlighted in the report today. We also recognize and we appreciate that this report is pushing us collectively to do more. I think it's quite striking to see the level, the percentages rather, of ODA devoted to issues of political legitimacy, security and justice. Again, just to reinforce four percent, two percent and three percent respectively. We all know that it can be hard to move the needle at times on assistance allocations, but we think that this is important for consideration. I would like to highlight four things briefly. First, we think we must continue to invest in the evidence base and again applaud this report for moving us forward and we're still internalizing the content ourselves, but we think it's great to amplify it and have that discussion collectively. We think that the World Bank's 2011 development report on these issues was a great example of how well-presented data and evidence can stimulate very important conversations. Our engagement in the new deal for conflict and for fragile and conflict-affected states we feel has pulled together a lot of that data and evidence and has formed a coalition that very much emphasizes country ownership to the point that I think Sarah was bringing up and the exchange of experiences across sort of South-South countries. And we feel that it's been a really important tool to try to bring together best practice across a broad community. We feel though that we can't stop there. We need to continue to push ourselves and look at the next frontier of analysis to change our approaches as appropriate and to clearly keep this issue on the agenda which has already mentioned, includes pushing for strong, measurable targets on peaceful and inclusive societies and capable and accountable institutions in the post-2015 agenda. Second, we must continue to use this evidence as I was alluding to to inform our development assistants. At the same time, we think we, as was highlighted by Yolanda, we must be effective, more effective in catalyzing non-ODA flows. For example, and the report emphasizes this, remittances are the largest inflow in fragile states. Through the G20 process, we and others are committed to lowering the transfer costs of remittances. We are, and we're going to encourage others to be open to creative ideas for how remittances can be better incentivized to address key impediments to development, particularly since these are household level flows. Third, we also must consider how to leverage foreign direct investment. And I think your point, Yolanda, is really interesting about how we also need to find better ways to track these flows and understand these flows. But I wanted to highlight some interesting analysis related to this. That has come out of the G7 Plus. And those are the 20 countries that are self-identified as being fragile and conflict affected that are part of that new deal framework that I mentioned. They produced an excellent report in 2014 on natural resource management. And the report states that between 2008 and 2010, the average annual loss to sub-Saharan Africa due to the mispricing of natural resources is estimated at $38.4 billion. This is nearly $10 billion more than the average ODA to the region during the same period. And as you likely know, 80% of fragile states contain high value natural resources that are strategically relevant to the global economy. And the focus really should be how we ensure these resources are more effectively managed to build prosperous societies. Fourth, we must work more concertedly across lines of effort. We know that there is a lot of work that's being done that's not necessarily measured and captured in ODA figures, but is extremely important in these contexts. Diplomatic engagement, the opening up of communication channels, the spreading of informal networks of dialogue. We know that many of these things don't have a resource figure attached to them, but they are a very important part of the equation. And as we know from our New Deal experience, political will on all sides is an absolutely essential ingredient that clearly doesn't come with an explicit price tag. While amounts spent tell us a lot, they do not tell the whole story. We think we need to do a better job understanding the story and telling that story. We really feel that the paper and the approaches in terms of looking at the different dimensions are going to help us get there sooner. I'd like to end with just a brief quote from Minister Emilia Perez from Timor Leste, who many of you may know was very involved in conceptualizing and leading the early days of the New Deal. And what she said is the New Deal is not about getting more money, it's about doing smarter work better. So I think I'll leave it at that and hand it over to my bank colleague. And very much again, so pleased by the turnout, look forward to the discussion. Thank you, thank you very much Melissa. We're also extremely pleased to be here. We have actually had a lot of interactions with the team over the finalization of the report, both in Nairobi and in Washington, in different places, been at each time absolutely fascinating debates and discussions. So for me it's one of the most important report on development of the year certainly and it's going to be a historical report. So congratulations in doing that. I think the report raised a number of important issues and I'm not going to go into it. It's an extremely timely report for us in the World Bank also, for reasons I will mention briefly in my presentation. And of course we all know it actually shows the tip of the iceberg, right? So the tip of the iceberg because there's a huge, huge amount of issue we still need to look at like Melissa says. But if you compare the donor community to the Titanic, we know that knowing where the tip of the iceberg is is already very important, right? Certainly in terms of ability to turn around, there's some comparison we can make. So this is a really important report. I mean just a very few point that we're already mentioned. This value about the data on poverty for an organization like ours for which the main mandate is the reduction of poverty and sharing prosperity, it's now absolutely clear that in 2030 at this period, at this time, fragility will have on the absolute top of development institutions if we want to be actually effective. Because even the numbers you give a 62% is a little bit conservative. If you add some other countries like Honduras or Central America that you've actually looked into your other diagram, you probably get two numbers of 70, 75% if you look at poverty in areas also affected by high level of violence that might not be on those different dimension of fragility. So and also we know that the direction is very clear. The problem is that when the country is fragile, affected by conflict, they cannot implement poverty reduction policy effectively. So we know the direction also of the problem and therefore we need to address frontally the problem of fragility and conflict. The second thing that is really, really important and that's where I was talking about the Titanic a little bit is our difficulties to reorient our head. And the fact that we know now that it's so central to deal with political facts, with security, with justice, that it comes out again and again but we are managing to only provide so little funding to those areas and we still remain in very comfortable in our more standard type of intervention I think is a real problem and we need to really think seriously about that. So these are some of the big findings but there's other findings that I think really, really important for this report. One is that we move out of this idea that we can work effectively on fragile countries using lists. I mean we all have lists. Now we see in my own organization that the list is much more of a problem than a support. It's a type of comfortable, ineffective type of tool. It's very comfortable because it's easy to monitor. You know whether you're working on it or not. You can say yes, now I have double my project in fragile country. You can, but actually in terms of effectiveness is quasi disincentive to do good work in those areas. So we need to move much more in this approach which will be more difficult, more risky that our board will probably don't like too much because it's much more difficult to provide your effectiveness to measure what you're doing well but is essential. And I will just mention three reasons why the lists are difficult. The dynamism of fragility and we know very well how Mali was not in the list when it exploded and Mali sort of got on the list. How now with our own list we're working with countries like Lebanon, Nigeria that are not in our own list and that does not propose insurmountable problem but it's still they cannot get additional allocation of IDA. They cannot get additional attention that they're supposed to get. And these are the country that really need the most urgent support these days, countries of the sky. The other issue with the list is that you always have to use a set of index and that's the powerful aspect of the list but it's also the reductionist aspect of the list. When we know that really it's a very complex set of interaction between different factors that makes fragility. And finally the regional dynamics. More and more we see that it's not a country problem. It becomes a region problem. It becomes all the theory of conflict system have already shown that this is a regional system. So for all those reasons I think it's really important that you're giving us this sort of authorizing environment to start to questions our own list very strongly and I can promise you we're going to do that in the World Bank. Then what I'm really happy with is we finally don't have fragile states on the cover of a report on fragility. Because I think that was a very, very wrong problem. We calling fragility, associating fragility to fragile states was a real problem. For what reason was it a real problem? Because we felt deeply that the problem was fixing the state. And we know very well that fixing the state does not work. I mean probably the largest graveyard of unsuccessful development projects are state building projects. So fixing the state is actually not an effective ways to deal with fragility. You have to do it. But fragility is about fractures in society, societal dynamic, traditional institution, private sector institution, how private sector work with traditional elders, how all this is happening in a country that has very often very little to do with the state or nothing to do with the state. On the other side, also another real problem with that is though our analysis of fragile states is improving, and we know that there are three factors that are really important, and that's for a long time already since Max Weber's and others. But legitimacy, authority, and capacity are the most important thing. Now, we know that in fragile country, legitimacy is the number one, authority number three, capacity number three. But because what we have as tool is about capacity, we do everything about capacity. And we do practically nothing about legitimacy and authority. And sometimes by doing a lot of capacity, we actually delegitimize the whole process of state ownership, state reality. So it's a real problem, this association, this symbolic association, the fact that fragile state is everywhere. So that's again something I'm very, very happy about. And then I think there's a, as I was saying, there's other, a number of other issue. And this is really that we need to look much more about the dynamic of fragility. That fragility is not a static element, and now I'm getting a bit inside the iceberg maybe. That, in most case, fragility is societies that want to transform and are not able to transform in a nonviolent way. So fragility is not about a failure. It's about a society that tries to transform, that feels the needs to transform. Different sections are not working anymore in a way that is effective for the whole society. But we have this very static approach of fragility or this very failure-oriented approach to fragility. And not enough vision about how do we help society to transform. And that's where I'm, again, very nervous with some terms that we use. And I was a very strong promoter of using much more resilience before. But when you look at the definition of resilience, this is how you bring a material to this original state, one it has actually been bent or it comes from physics, right? Then you realize that what you don't want is resilient society, because you don't want society to go back to the static codes where they have not changed before. So we have to be very careful. Again, we use terms that will give us symbolically a sort of vision about what the problem is that is actually not the problem. We have to use the crisis as a way to sort of move forward. And we have to remember historically that wars, violence, warehouse societies, our own societies have changed and then made them heroic sort of events, right? Because they have helped the society change. Now, of course, in our world, fortunately, you want to do that to happen without conflict, without fragility. But it's about changes in society. So just a few words for the discussion. Thank you. Thank you very much. As I said, a lot to think about and a lot to chew on. We're going to open it up for Q&A. We have two mics. Haider, if you could get the mic on this side. We're going to pass you the mic. Maybe I guess on this side. We're going to pass you the mic because we do have some folks listening online. When you do ask a question, please introduce yourself, your affiliation. And I'm going to make the classic moderators please keep your questions brief. And to the point, while we get the mics going, I am going to take the opportunity to ask one question of our panel. And that's really about the context that this report is sort of entering. I'm reminded of the quote, the future is already here, but it's unevenly distributed. When I see that pie chart, it seems like to us sort of the argument has been made in one. But in the organizations that are actually going to have to reform development assistance sort of toward this focus on fragility first, where are we in regard to that change process? How far along in regard to that change process are we? I'd love to hear some thoughts from our panelists about that. And then we'll take a few questions and give the panelists a chance to respond. So please, sir. I'm Wally Moutaz-Mill, alumni from USIP. And I represent Wellness Recovery. We are in the work of mental health wellness. My question is dealing with post-traumatic stress growth in the area of fragility, conflict, and violence from a regional market. I certainly support the comments of all the panelists, in particular in the area of social transformation. And I'm just curious if any one of the panelists can speak to the idea of a measurement that's dealing with post-traumatic stress growth. And I'll focus so much on the problem, but in change. Brad, would you like to ask a question? And then we can give folks a chance to respond. Sure. Fred Tipson, unaffiliated, but jaundiced. I'd like to play devil's advocate in light of the fact that I regard the SDGs as being essentially a punt on the part of the international community. Development is everything everywhere. Therefore, it will be very unhelpful in deciding where to prioritize assistance. And therefore, studies of this kind become that much more critical in segmenting the market, the environment for assistance and investment, private investment, and other considerations. And in that light, though, I think this report moves in the right direction, I think it underrates some very significant elements of fragility by neglecting, or at least downplaying, certain key considerations. Population growth is going to be an overwhelming consideration in the creation of fragility, which doesn't seem to play much of a role here. Climate volatility, those areas that are going to be particularly stressed by climate, intensification of fragility for that reason. Youth unemployment, though I recognize it's a fact to recognize, it doesn't seem to be measured very well. And those kinds of dimensions, to me, are going to determine the triage process that both donors and investors go through under the radar, perhaps, without candor, but looking in places where aid or investment will actually have an opportunity, those places that they write off as being worthless to put your money in. And that big middle category where people will continue to do things for reasons other than the effectiveness of aid, traditional relationships, security, counterterrorism, all the things that are often lots of money is spent that has no real development impact. So I'm interested in your reaction to that. Again, I think kudos to the idea that we need to give much more guidance as to the realities of the world and that these SDGs do very little to help us in that direction. But whether you agree that perhaps we need to be even more dramatic in emphasizing certain things that will affect the environments. So feel free to respond. I invite the folks from OECD as well if they'd like to respond to anything that Melissa and Alexander said as well. So. Should I make a start? Or are you? Yeah, okay. Thanks for all these good questions. I think this is going to be a really good discussion. Maybe let me start with the last question first. This is something that you will find so that the addressing the challenge with youth and perhaps also the opportunity that the youth bulge can represent is something that we do look at in this report in question seven. So when you do look at the whole report, please do check out that section if you're interested in that. That is indeed a very big issue for fragile environments that there's real growth in the youth population that's a potential for the economy. It's also potentially a danger. And unfortunately it's something that's really difficult to measure. We actually what the model that we're using for this Venn diagram did first try to look into youth unemployment, but data are really hard to come by. And this is why in the end we ended up with a proxy measure related to education because it does relate to the way in which you can use this youth bulge in productive employment. So I think we would like to look at this as both a challenge and an opportunity. Yes, I think I am not a specialist on anything related to post-traumatic stress. Maybe I think I'll hand it over to my colleagues here. I'll just add a few comments. Actually, this is maybe think of something that somebody presented to me last week about managing upwards by reading. You throw something out and then see where all the comments come back. I think it's very interesting to hear from you the issues which aren't in the model. I mean, we've heard from Yolanda that some of these, it's driven by the fact that there isn't the data available. But then that's an opportunity to influence the calls for a data revolution. Where should we invest in ensuring that the information is available to be able to pick up on some of these issues and some of them very challenging. I very much recognise the points that Alessandra was making about some of the softer issues around relationships or legitimacy authority. How do we pick up on this? It's challenging, but we have to start recognising this. So, with all the changes, and again, it's something that Alessandra was saying about, let's use a crisis yet, let's use a transformation. Having this conversation now, let's look at what we should be doing to enable us to shine a light on some of these issues and target a broad range of engagement. Many of which is not going to be about aid, it's not about aid, but not even about money to reach these sources of fragility. So, very good to have this conversation. I can speak a bit about what we're doing in the OECD, but I think that as one of the questioners said, there's a need to review across the board the way in which we engage with problems. The old lists, the old buckets that we put things into, whether they ever worked in the past is open to question, but they certainly don't work for the future. I mean, I believe in the SDGs, and I want us to achieve an agreement to have a transformation globally. I think that's what the world needs. But whether we agree or not, just focusing on states of fragility, we can do much better. What we're doing at OECD at the moment from the point of view of aid is better defining what is and what isn't aid, but also taking note of the fact that we've had so much pressure around the definitions that there's a lot of engagement in development and particularly in areas around fragility, around whether it's refugees, whether it's security expenditure, does it count as aid or not? A lot of pressure there. So, where there's conflict within our own definitions, let's look and see what is this telling us. And that measurement of aid has been so strong to guide engagement. We need to be much, much smarter about what we do. We are developing a broader measurement of total official support for sustainable development, which will look at national efforts that are positive towards development. Very, very difficult to measure and very controversial about what's in there. At the moment, the debate has been populated by people who want to look at how do we use aid to leverage investment in infrastructure, but let's all of us start talking about, actually, we should be looking at how do we recognize and reward efforts, long-term partnerships, long-term people-intensive, but not money-intensive efforts to support countries in states of fragility and really focus on some of those societal relationships that make all the difference. So, we are consulting broadly, this will be part of the financing for development process, but I think it's a discussion that needs to go on. How do we, we have a relatively minor tool to influence this, but it has been very powerful so far the data that we put out, what we report, what we list to shine a light on where development engagement can make a difference. So, I'll just leave that with you, but I think let's start raising some of these issues and if we're looking more broadly at development engagement, it's not just about getting big private sector firms into build roads, that's important, but this area is very, very important and it's not captured by the definitions we have at the moment. Any additional comments on that, Seth? Thank you, just two points. So, on the Venn diagram and the construct of that, I mean, this is definitely designed as a provocation rather than a definition. So, I hope that there'll be a lot of technical, political and academic debate around the concepts put forward. I think some, the kind of advantage of the model we've put forward is that it's based directly on what countries themselves have negotiated, so it has some political legitimacy in that sense, but there are real flaws in terms of the data that is not necessarily comprehensive on the issues and in the waiting. So, one thing that we probably do need to do in the future or there needs to be a debate on in the future is that institutions and the accountability, inclusivity, effectiveness of institutions are really the game changer between whether a society can withstand transformation and problems and challenges or whether it starts to descend into conflict. So, I think these are, you know, so, as I said, I think there are big improvements that can be made, but this is a provocation. As a provocation, I think it's, it seems to be working in that sense. On where we are on donor change, I used to, for many, many years, I worked in UK government and the great thing about being at New York University now is I can say whatever I want, so I'll say a few comments on the donor side. I think on the peace-building and state-building goals and the aligning aid to those areas, we've been doing some field research and we don't see sufficient political will to truly realign aid to the priorities that countries are coming up with. So, when we did some field research in Somalia, which has a New Deal compact, we found that it's kind of too easy to say everything that we're doing is already supporting the peace-building and state-building goals, which is a lot like the Afghanistan compact when that was agreed, when was that 2006 or something like that. There appears to be a political blockage that means that aid doesn't realign itself very, very rapidly and I think it's important to try to unpack why that's the case. Secondly, I think the big challenge with donors is they haven't, I think, welcome the OECD and the USAID and the World Bank's response to this. As a global community, I don't think donors have really begun to consider or even touched the edge of the iceberg, I guess, of what this new peaceful society's goal will mean for international development. Change is going to have to be happening by 2020 in terms of rapid institutional developments. If the countries that we're talking about that are most fragile can achieve, start to achieve the sustainable development goals by 2030, it takes time for the impact to happen on poverty eradication and other objectives. And I think there's three key points that I like to emphasise. The first is organisational reform of donor organisations. You've been focused on the millennium development goals. You need to scale up for a much broader range of goals and targets, including peaceful societies. Secondly, I think, as I said before, there's a need for aid reform, a lot more innovation. A new package of instruments needs to be put on the table sooner rather than later. And thirdly, I think breaking out of the donor recipient paradigm is going to be important. I thought it was great USAID mentioned the building of South-South Corporation and I think these types of innovations are exactly what's going to be needed. Let's take some additional questions. How did the gentleman, if you could just pass the mic into... Hi, Michael Lund, Management Systems International. Thanks so much for further effort in pushing the fragility concept and so on. It's a little depressing after all these years that it hasn't sunk into mainstream development policy. But I certainly appreciate your effort at the global level to realign financial flows and so on to some understanding, substantively, of what fragility is all about in its various dimensions. The word politics hasn't been really mentioned. I think Alexandra used it once. But people at LSE, Tom Carruthers, other people for some years have been saying, we're really missing an important entry point in terms of effecting any grounded fragility strategies by not figuring out how exactly to engage political elites. State building maybe have been a more technocratic approach that doesn't work as Alexander said, but the political process and the process of political change, as he also alluded, is key to getting buy-in. And of course the phrase national ownership, local ownership has been used for years. But operationally, how does that... I mean, we're moving a little bit perhaps off the report, but to tap the expertise at the table. How operationally does one engage with political elites who have very urgent pressing political interests, conflicts of interest, who are trying to balance the pressures from the bottom with the need to stay in office and so on. Operationally, what sort of mechanisms, what sort of entry points, what sort of leverage can this kind of analysis provide for that problem? Thanks, Nick Kraft. I was previously the country director for World Bank in Afghanistan. I'm now a freelance consultant. The one question I kind of would like to or comment really is about the sort of implication that aid is somehow homogenous. And I was at an extremely interesting workshop here a couple of weeks ago on Afghanistan, which ideally should have taken place six years ago, but unfortunately, even if it had, I don't think we would have got where we did at the end of this summit, because people wouldn't have been able to speak the way they did. If you understand, and I'm interested in Afghanistan, in particular, if you look at Afghanistan and the massive amounts of money that have gone in, primarily for the United States, but the UK and other European countries, the primary goal, which I had not understood until actually two weeks ago, was to do with the fight against anti-terrorism and security from the United States point of view. And that is why so much money went into Afghanistan. It wasn't because of state building, it wasn't because of development, it was the fight against terrorism, security and the like. And the problem with that, and I don't think that goal has ever been fully understood, but the problem with that is that you then have, the CIA and other monies coming in getting bags of money going to people like Marshall Faheen, and then the question is, well, who is going to support the fight against terrorism? Well, maybe you latch on to some big warlords who themselves are very interested in the fight against terrorism, but they represent corruption, graft, maintenance of power and injustice. And so what you have had over the last years, I think this is only just now beginning to come clear, you've got a sort of development community trying to do development. Some of this money over here, which vastly exceeds the money that's coming in from the development community, doing some positive things as well, but at the same time, doing things, I mean, I use the example of the warlords, you can also, another example would be customs officials. Well, you're trying to build up a customs service where there's not much corruption, but at the same time, who do you want to collect the, to be at the customs point, those who are going to fight terrorism? So you may have counter objectives, and I don't think we've adequately understood that very often these two objectives run counter to each other. In fact, the sums of money and security in Afghanistan have been huge, not 2%, I mean, it's massive in relation to the total. But how do you address that conflict? And that result, of course, there has been nothing achieved on rule of law and governance, very little achieved. And in fact, some of the actions seen by the United States and others, UK and others talking about good governance and why Karzai, it seems hypocrisy because the population can see what's going on over here. And it makes a very difficult development scenario for state building. And I think that's something that, I know it's not part of the fragility issue, but it is important because if one talks about aid as being homogenous, you know, it's all, it isn't. And often it does run this counter course where you're fighting the same, maybe two, it's true in Colombia and some of these other countries. Two other very quick points. Quick, please. Yeah, one thing, I'm surprised Afghanistan doesn't appear as a weak institution in one of your five, what are you, clusters. And picking up on Brenda's point at the beginning, I mean, I think the evaluation is really important. It's really disappointing to me that the European countries, either jointly or singly, haven't looked at these vast sums of money they put into PRTs and hundreds of millions from the UK PRT and Helmand, for example. And to my knowledge, there's no evaluation of that. Thanks. Let's take two more questions. Ma'am, would you like to? And then we'll take one more from over here and then we'll give a chance for a response. Yes, Doris Mariani, Chief Executive Office of Nonviolent Peace Force, we're an international NGO doing unarmed civilian protection and peacekeeping in conflict zones. And my question is, Melissa mentioned that UN peace ops review that is going on now. We have been consulting with this panel and your report points out that only 1.4% is really what can be tracked on the security reform. You also called for innovation. So, do you have any practical recommendations or thoughts how the donor community collectively could address this? What are the opportunities to increase that part from 1.4 to higher? And how do you tie it more innovatively to development? Do you know really tying that peace part and the security part? Thank you. Yes, Jim Michael, I'm presently an independent consultant working in development area. First of all, I want to commend the producers of this report. I think it really is a major step forward to think about states of fragility in a conceptual way rather than pinning labels on countries. And I really commend that. This is a big, I agree, it's a big tip of the iceberg that is now available and makes us all think better, I think. The concern I wanted to express and get reactions from the panel about is that when you look at those small percentages of resources that are coming from outside and going into countries to deal with the political governance, justice, institutions, dimensions of fragility, I was just a little bit bothered because I know that there are cases and we just heard about Afghanistan as one where a lot of money has gone into some of those areas. But sometimes the donors know what to do about programs that are directed at capacity. But they aren't addressing those legitimacy and authority issues and as a result, there's the risk that Mr. Mark mentioned that you can undermine legitimacy by the donor influence on capacity of institutions and developing countries that don't reflect the local problems and culture and the capacities within that need to be worked with and the systems that need to be worked with rather than introducing models that don't fit. The good enough governance approach, the good fit idea, the local leadership and knowledge that we've all now learned are important aspects of sustainable development and sustainable societal transformation. And it seems to me that saying we wanna spend more money on these things is not the answer, but we need to be thinking more in terms of how does development work in ways that it's not just donor money, but it is a matter of dealing with the politics of change and the leadership that needs to be cultivated within the developing country society, within the fragile environment rather than we'll do it for you. And I would just like to hear more from the panelists about that and I think it's scary to say we should be spending money on these things without picking that apart and looking at how that fits into the broader political dialogue, policy dialogue and support for keeping that local ownership out in front. I think there's a nice cluster of issues here around political elites, the political situation in a country as well as the sort of competing interests within these societies that may have different agendas, both domestic and international. So maybe with that sort of frame to bring some of these questions together, I'd sort of welcome comments from the panel. I'll then bravely stand up for spray. I'm not sure whether I would have said a nice cluster. I mean, certainly the right cluster of issues were very, very challenging. But I'll just respond to a few of the points. Hearing about the challenges on the ground and obviously, I'm sitting in Paris working with a group of donors. It's very, very good to have this response from people who are seeing what's actually happening in the ground, where things are challenging, where what is agreed in headquarters, how it plays out in country. I'm really hearing comments that show that we need to look at the new deal, is it, delivering? Some of these difficult questions are supposed to be being addressed and looking at the politics, understanding that it's hugely important to find a political solution as quickly as possible and underpin that. And we can't do that with a model where it's driven by how much money is provided and it's business as usual or focusing on capacity. So I think getting into some of those issues in more detail and putting more pressure behind the partners in the new deal to deliver on the aims there. And agree, we need evaluation, particularly where there's been large amounts of money spent to find out what do we learn from what's happened there. Completely agree with the points about the percentage of finance going to certain areas. It's not the best indication of is this right engagement and often these areas, in order to make a difference, it's about being there for the long term and having the right people there and maintaining the line to communication and it may actually be a slow spend, but that's key. And I think the length of time that that relationship is there is very important. Something that struck me from some work that Brookings did ahead of the Busan Conference on Effective Development Corporation looking at the success of Korea. They really underlined the fact that there was a partnership there with development partners, principally the US and Japan, sticking with them through thick and thin, coming from a situation of post-conflict and moving into developments and that long-term partnership was really key. Some of the points that have been raised, I mean, I thought the description of Afghanistan, I just think it sounds like a classic project failure if we don't know what the aim is and what the vision is. But also, some of the points that people have raised have pointed me in the direction of the work that we're doing in Paris to look at the agency of the future. Development assistance is going to be spent across the whole of government. It's being delivered by actors outside of government, particularly as we get into public-private partnerships or other types of partnerships. So we've already started to look at what does this mean in terms of how governments organise themselves, but you're really underlining the need to raise this voice around peace, security, diplomacy and have a vision that binds all of that together. So it's a very, very different working model. And I think, maybe, Jim, it was a point you made. I just made me think that would be possibly some very highly effective small amounts around peace and security supporting legitimacy. And then, for example, in Sierra Leone could have come in and just delivered a health system and would have left the country in a stronger position without donors having to move out of their comfort zone. So it needs to be much smarter and think about how this whole package comes together. We don't have the answers, but at least having this conversation, which I think is a very positive step. Alexander, I wonder if I could ask, could you talk about that idea of sort of transformation and what drives transformation in societies? And I think that relates to these issues. Yeah, and I think there was the question where absolutely central that were posed and around those dynamic of transformation. I mean, the role of political elites is absolutely central. When you think the money that countries like the ones we're living in here or my own country in France put into making sure that political elites behave is absolutely enormous, right? So you can put it whether this side or call it democracy, but democracy is about that. Create a system of accountability so that political elites maneuvering becomes positive for the outcome. It's a huge amount of money, an extremely complex system that we have developed of accountability, of flow and all that. And so political elites is actually a big problem. It can be a big solution, but it's very often a big problem. And I think that's the big issue. For example, for my institution is a big issue in institutions that come out from the Cold War. I mean, one article of agreement is about beware of your political implication for what you say, right? So we're not supposed to become political because we are a Cold War-born organization. And that causes a lot of problem, though we have expanded a lot this area. Now, where I can see place, and you know, we have huge discussion around South Sudan now, as you know, between us and you and many others and about how do you actually handle development in a country where the main problem at the moment is this total disagreement and unwillingness to be at a table by the political elites, right? So I think one, there's a couple of answers, and there's not one answer. Of course, ideally it's the institution again. You need to elaborate more institution. And we know in South Sudan that the military institution is one, the justice system is another. All this institution have not been developed at all since the end of the war. So developing this institution, but that has to come from the political elite. So one thing that I believe more and more now is the regional organization because I think that if we have zero influence, maybe Kenyans, the Kenyan president, the Ethiopian president might have more, not only more power, but they might be able actually to have more economic convincing words to say and action to take. So in Western Africa, the increased involvement of ECOWAS, for example, was absolutely central in bringing more peace in this region. So I think the new big area where we need to look at is how development organization collaborate much, much stronger with those regional political organization. It's not a whole answer, but it's one answer. Those people talk from political elite to political elite in an area that is seen as relatively similar. It's not the US or the French speaking to those political elite with a patronizing way, right? So I think it's going to be the big question now. I think it's a big question of G7 Plus, for example, that in the G7 Plus you have in the same bag country where the political elites have no intention to reduce fragility and countries where you actually have a real effort. And for the moment we don't differentiate between the two, right? And that poses huge problem in the logic of the way the G7 Plus works. That's my own opinion, right? So just to say that this is, but I believe very much in working much more regional, local, regional organization, trying to get the people in power who have an interest locally to be much more involved and give them the means to do that. I'm aware that people are standing, so thank you for your patience. Let's just get four more comments perhaps and then we'll give folks on the panel a chance for some final responses. So sir, thank you for your patience. Kenneth Dillon, Siancia Press, a comment on the very important question that was asked about post-traumatic stress disorder and how to measure it. And that is, firstly, I have heard in a very informal opinion-stating way that every single person in Afghanistan can be viewed as having post-traumatic stress disorder. And so achieving methods of measuring that more accurately I think is a priority, should be a priority. And a second point related to that is we don't have good research even in the United States with the problem of reintegrating our soldiers with PTSD and traumatic brain injury. We do not have good research on what that methods work best. So those are two priorities, measuring the prevalence and coming up with good research that tells us which methods work best for therapy. Yes, Will Farage, our consultant on conflict governance in media. Alexander I think just kind of addressed a bit of my question, but it seemed, and I'm still digesting the report, but it seemed that the presentations this morning about the report seemed to suggest that the onus on fragility and development assistance is still with national actors. And Alexander and his comments seemed to say that the dynamism of fragility suggests that they're regional and other dynamisms. So I just would like you to comment a little further how those two meet, whether they do or don't. And it might address to a certain extent the political will issue, because if you're thinking about addressing regional dynamics, you might be able to multilateralize your responses. So that would be my question. Thank you. Ma'am. Thank you. Veronica Cartier, International Conflict Management Research. Thank you for showing all this diagram and all this information of fragile stage. And my question is focused on the mechanism. What kind of mechanism of metrics do you use in data mining the failing or success of funding? And is there any further investigation in understanding if it's fail? For example, is that the fragile stage, it's the source itself, as Mr. Alexander's Mark said, is maybe regional and also maybe inside the state itself. The poverty consists of maybe several different cultures inside. So then previously have we brought political culture and so forth. And this is the further to it, the mechanism to finding out. And if we determine that one state is included in the fragile states, would it be, is there any mechanism to finding out, dividing what culture that the most poverty and how the funding is focused on that specific culture. Otherwise you just put it universal or this just state and keep giving funding and that the funding itself doesn't help. Thank you. Thanks. So two comments over here, please. Thank you. Rabin Pasha, formerly a USAID Middle East Senior Health Advisor and now independent consultant. Thank you so much for all your time in addressing this and I feel like some of my prior work and working in GH and DRG integration and country ownership, it's like sort of coming full circle with the whole fragility, both the indicators component and also some of the determinants. I had a lot of questions, some of them have already been addressed, but especially on the regionalization, although I think that will probably be addressed a bit more on the panel. What I'd love to ask and hear your thoughts on is what we could do both about the current response, the immediate response of how we integrate the conversation about addressing fragility and also the prevention and coming up with some sort of a warning system because in a sense, and a lot of the issues that have also been raised about regionalization and some of these fragility factors, there's always early warning signs about where they come out. It's important for us to address it now when countries are going into fragility, but even prior to that happening, what is happening in the area, what is OECD World Bank doing and sort of creating models and research and helping countries understand where some of these early warning signs are coming in. But going back to the response component, I say that because what we're speaking about now is going to of course inform and change the way that aid and the model for development works, hopefully in several years and things take a really long time. But what about in the meantime, and I think some of the conversations was raised and I disagree with it, that some areas of funding and defense or in essential services perhaps are either distracting or sometimes not necessarily addressing fragility. I think that there is a lot of key windows of opportunity for creating that shared value space and helping countries, both aid organizations as well as countries that are host government partners in understanding that look, you have essential services funding coming in, but what are you doing in building the community capacity component? What are you doing in addressing the youth unemployment and citizen engagement, the responsive institution? And so I'd love to hear about how we can most immediately incorporate that conversation more on the global scheme and very quickly change the dynamic of creating indicators and creating metrics around how to address some of these issues within the defense and you know, whatever it may be, countering violent extremism, global health agenda, et cetera. Thank you. My name is Zach Ocer. I'm a recent graduate of Tel Aviv University's Conflict Resolution and Mediation Program. And while I think it's safe to say that everyone here understands the importance of development organizations to have this kind of information at their disposal, I'm curious to hear your perspective on what's being done here in the United States to raise awareness and more specifically to motivate and empower young Americans to want to join the peace building field and international development community. And at the same time, what's being done in these development programs in these fragile areas to plant the seeds for future leadership and empower their youth to want to get involved as well. Thank you. I'm gonna give our panel a chance to respond. A lot of great questions and I know they're probably not gonna answer them all, so I'll sort of take Brenda's cue and say the questions are part of the conversation. And so apologies if you don't get your specific question answered. But I guess I'd like to give maybe Melissa a chance since she hasn't spoken yet if you'd like to weigh in. And then whichever other panelists would like to have final thoughts. Fantastic, I've been trying to keep track of the various questions and so I'm gonna be addressing some, including the first one that was asked. So in terms of politics, I disagree that the community has not made progress in taking politics into account. There's so much more that needs to be done. But if you look at, and I encourage you to do this if you haven't already, the New Deal framework. The framework has as its first pillar peace building and state building goals. The first goal is legitimate and inclusive politics. That came out of countries around Busan that were self identifying as fragile that said that the Millennium Development Goals were not necessarily speaking to their realities and that this issue among the other peace building goals including security, justice, economics, jobs, revenue generation, that these were the issues that they were grappling with and the goals that they wanted to work towards in partnership with the international community and called upon us to work differently with them in moving towards those goals. Part of the New Deal project has been, of course not only reaching agreement on that kind of strategic framework but also focusing on country level implementation. And I can assure you that is what the international dialogue is seized with and there are a lot of discussions about how that focus on politics, the state society relationship, local actor, ownership of their own development agenda are things that are talked about regularly in the context of how is the New Deal being implemented in Somalia for example. Brookings just hosted a discussion on that yesterday where we heard from international civil society organizations based in Kenya working with their civil society counterparts how that needed to be moved forward. So I just use that as an illustration to give a little bit of a texture to how these things are being moved forward in a more real time way to get to the question that was raised before. Secondly, I loved how Sarah had said that the report is to paraphrase you to serve as a provocation. And I think we should see the percentages of resources going, percentage of ODA going to, as we've been talking about politics, security and justice as a provocation. And we shouldn't take that necessarily on those numbers on the face of it either. I think the report nicely caveats that we don't have good tracking mechanisms that help, that give us confidence that those are exactly the right percentages. I think that we should also, we're not, I'm not challenging them per se, I'm just saying that it starts a conversation about okay, really what were they measuring, what else should they be measuring. Also related to those I think is the reality that, well, maybe it's a hopeful reality that programs that are not necessarily explicitly directed at political legitimacy in terms of counting budget numbers or justice or security could possibly be integrated throughout other development investments. And I was hearing a little bit of what Ambassador Michael was saying point to that. Within USAID, we are moving more and more to approaching a conflict sensitivity lens to all of our development programs working very closely in partnership with our mission. So I think that we need to maybe expand that aperture a bit and think about the fragility concepts as well and how we can bring those to thinking about our investments as a whole, how those investments are contributing to a healthy state society relationship that's producing legitimate and effective outcomes. Two more points. One, the question, I'm not sure if the gentleman's still here but I thought it was a really good one about what about other obvious sources of potential fragility, be it population growth or be it other shocks related potentially to climate change. And what I hear in the conversation that at least resonates with me in our office is that there will be shocks and there are more than just the ones that were mentioned in this conversation. But what's really critical is again working on the institutions and their relationship with society to weather those shocks. That I think takes us nicely to the resilience agenda and where I think we need to do more with you on how we advance resilience in countries affected by fragility and conflict. Conflict is a different kind of shock we think and we're trying to push forward our own thinking. And then lastly on this point on trauma that's come up twice. I would just say that over the past week I've been in two separate conversations with outside experts where this point has been raised. And these are made by people who are familiar with the peace building and state building goals. And the question has been whether we are taking trauma and reconciliation enough into account in thinking about whether a country is prepared to get into issues of security, justice, and certainly those must be affecting political legitimacy. So I just wanted to say that to me that's saying something that this keeps coming up. It's almost that maybe we're missing something about the underlying health of people within the societies where we're working. That might be something for future consideration. Thanks. Yolanda and Sarah from the perspective of the report a little bit. Thank you, so I'll make it. I think there is various points made about security spending. So I might just spend a second on that. So the report opens up a discussion but doesn't provide the answers on how to better monitor security spending. So the figures that Yolanda spoke to are just those registers as ODA. And of course there's lots of types of security expenditure which aren't eligible as ODA. There's no global system beyond measuring UMP's keeping for measuring the impact of security spending as a global public good vis-a-vis security spending which is in the national interest. So there's all kinds of military to military cooperation, police to police cooperation, counter-terrorism cooperation which has no monitoring system. So we don't really know, we don't have a real sense of how much is being spent in these areas and no way of knowing what the impact is in these areas. Given the growth in these forms of cooperation, likely continued growth in these forms of cooperation that seems to be something that the international community needs to consider. And the OECD, the US specifically and others I think can need to advance that conversation. If I can just make maybe one last observation on the question around political elites and regional dynamics that's not in the report. But I was in South Africa a few weeks ago for a dialogue of the BRICS who are preparing the BRICS Bank for Africa talking about South-South cooperation. And there were people there from the African Union and NEPAD which is the peer review mechanism which was established by South Africa about 10 years ago. And it's striking the sea change in African leadership, forming collective African visions, African Union positions on the post-2015 agenda on structural transformation of the continent, on governance priorities, political priorities and so on. And although the leaders there recognize that not everybody conforms all the time and that's the same in the European Union not all EU leaders conform all the time. There's been massive change, a sea change in African Union leadership and I think it's probably a question of getting behind that leadership and those African institutions to try and tap into political incentives and showing the patience for the time that it takes 10 years from when NEPAD was established. Now it's having an impact, now it's setting an agenda. Maybe I'll just make one last point that went through my head when we were talking about engaging with elites and engaging with political leaders. Alexander made the point that we really have to think also beyond the state level to the regional level and that's where we can really engage on many of these issues of fragility much more effectively because one of the limitations also perhaps in the concept of fragile states is really that we all realize that fragility doesn't always manifest itself where the cause is there's a lot of displacement issues for instance that play into that or transnational organized crime and so on many of those factors are regional or global. But it also brought me to the point that one level at which certainly development actors also work a lot is really the sub-national level and that is where a lot of the entry points perhaps of improving governance can lie. Maybe this kind of cooperation is less visible than at the national level but it is certainly no less effective. So I think we have to start thinking really at all levels of entry points when we talk about legitimate politics. Often it's the local leaders that have concrete ability to improve services for citizens and I think that's an important entry point we should stress and also when we talk about fragility not forget that this is not an issue always of fragile states at the state level that there are pockets of fragility and sub-national elements that we have to take into account. Brenda, did you have any final thoughts? Just a couple of comments. Firstly to fully agree with the recognition of the role of regional organizations and this is something that will need to be picked up more broadly in monitoring and promoting the achievements of the SDGs across the board. I think the ability of shared challenges at the regional level and peer review approach has so much longer term, peer-to-peer learning much a lot of potential there to identify sources of fragility early and work together particularly because fragility is not kept within national boundaries and likewise also recognizing opportunities at the sub-national level and that requires donors where we're looking at aid being an instrument to come in and engage here recognizing it's not the only one, looking at and how donors are told to be able to operate at this level because the comfort zone is government's government. And just to pick up on a point that was raised by one and the question is about just raising awareness of this agenda just generally among young people, among people more generally and I think that's incredibly complicated. I mean we look at the issues in the report when you get down to the details of the country level it's far more complicated and yet this has to be explained to people who are paying taxes. Those of us working on the inside know that this is essential for the future of the planet but it's very, very difficult to explain that and I think it's a very good point. I've been worrying this year actually about how the media generally is going to report financing for development in Addis. It's really important that that's a success but probably it will come out and the media is not being a success and we've got to get everyone, it's a universal agenda so everyone needs to be on the inside of these conversations so I think that point about raising awareness and communicating is very important. I don't have the answers but I think it's a very important point. Just like Melissa I want to say that I think the trauma is absolutely central. I mean if we see the dealing with the trauma if you see that problem of fragility is more a problem of society than just a problem of state and if you see that it's a problem of change and trying to find a society feeling that the structure that are there are not the ones that will allow them to move forward then the problem of trauma is absolutely central on that because if you want to get the ability of those society to be able to take their destiny in hands and all that the trauma is one thing that will hold them back and we don't do enough about that in those countries and we've started a big program of mental health and a lot of attention given to that on that because I believe that in country that have been highly, highly traumatized by conflict and violence and all that there's a huge issue about reconstruction of the trust in communities and with the state and with others that is tremendous. Costly and take long time but it's necessary. Well thanks to everybody. Just to close I'd like to first congratulate Sarah and the OECD for a really outstanding report. I know this is the second leg of a world tour I was thinking you get t-shirts printed up. So best of luck on the rest of the tour. I'd like to thank the panelists. I'd like to thank USAID, OECD, World Bank both for their participation but their help in planning this. I love the fact that I've been labeled a provocateur today I didn't see that coming. So I think that's a really a good way to think about it because this is about change processes and from my own perspective that sort of change management processes driving changes is at a heart of a lot of this agenda that we all care about. One last thing I'm the evaluation guide at USIP so if you have your event feedback card we'd love you to fill it out and you can just give it to USIP staff on the way out. We really do use this data to help improve our events. So join me in giving a final round of applause to our panelists. Thank you for coming and you can exit out the back of the auditorium. Thanks. Thanks for coming.