 While the last remaining people are being cleared to come in, let me first of all welcome you to this panel discussion. And of course, you know the subject of the discussion is on the bow and road initiative bringing the east and the west together, question mark. Well, the question mark is left there so that we can actually have a open discussions as to whether the BLI actually brings the east and the west together. And if it does so, how it does so, I think it's always good to keep an open mind on it. The bell and row initiative is clearly a very important issue for China and arguably for the rest of the world, because it is something that affects most of the countries that are being studied at SOAS, which is why we are doing this panel discussion here. And before I introduce the speakers and for those arriving, please do just come in and then there are spaces for you. Let me first of all be clear that this event will be captured by video so that you know it will be filmed. And if you have a problem with the filming, now is the time to make sure that you make that view known. The panel discussions will be conducted in a way to encourage the panelists to discuss and potentially debate among themselves and also with you. And I will try to guide that process. And for the panelists, I'm delighted that we have here two very distinguished guests from Hong Kong, from our partner organization in hosting these events, the so-called Economic Development Research Center in Hong Kong. The first one of them is Mr. Joseph Chen, who is the chairman of the Research Center in Hong Kong. He's had a career as an investment banker and he's also an executive director of the Kaizen Holdings Limited in Hong Kong. The other Hong Kong panelist is Professor Thomas Chen. He is the director of the One Belt, One Road Institute at the Zhuhai College of Further Education in Hong Kong. And he has a long academic career where he had taught at different institutions, including the University of Hong Kong. And he also served as head of the China Business Center at the Hong Kong Polytechnic University. And the other panelist is our own Charles Parton. Charlie is with us here and is also with the China Dialogue, with Ruzi, and is also at the moment serving as a specialist advisor on China to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee. Charlie is a career diplomat with long service in China, including observing and reporting on the 19-party Congress last October. Now, what I would suggest we do is that I will ask our panelists a few questions and they will respond. And if any of the other panelists would like to chime in at any one point, they are welcome to catch my eyes. And after a round of discussion here, then I will open this to the floor. And if you could say who you are before you raise your questions or make your comment, that would be fantastic. Please try to keep it as succinct as possible, then we can squeeze in more of your interventions. So let me start by asking Thomas, what does the Chinese government want to achieve with the Baron Road Initiative? Is there a master plan? Or if there is a master plan, what does it look like? If there's no master plan, what drives the Chinese government? What guides the Chinese government in terms of the Baron Road Initiative? I think there's originally there's no master plan and the Chinese government are not sure what to do. Even up to now, we haven't seen any coordination very conscious by the Chinese government. Except in Pakistan, the China-Pakistan-Ikarta corridor, there's a national program, but still it's not very coordinated. I think the whole thing comes quite natural. Since the 1990s, in the past, there was always a civil war, and civil war was blocked by the great power game between Russia and England. And after the Cold War, I think there's a possibility of collecting the civil war again. And so we can see that there are many organizations including Asian Development Bank, UNESCO, even the UN's Economic Commission of Europe, they start to build up the link again between China and Europe. So China comes at a time when all this kind of programs have been set up, feasibility studies have been done, but there's not much money to implement them. So China comes to pay for the expenses. Also, there's a factor, because China has changed, transforming itself from an importing capital country into a capital exporting country. So we had to think about what to do with the way we export capital. So the civil war, all these kinds of plans by other organizations come quite handy for China to use them as the basis for its reorganization of its export outward economic activities. So this is a very natural outcome, not because of China, but because China, that it will become a more kind of better and more initiative. But up till now, I'm not sure whether China is at a very conscious kind of a master plan. China is learning about it, trying to change itself again in the process. It's great that you say that China doesn't have a master plan. And I think you're absolutely right that China doesn't have a master plan. But then the spread of the bell and roll does raise questions. You talk about the Silk Road, which was the original Silk Road economic bell. There's also the Palo Liao Marine Town Silk Road that went through Southeast Asia into Indian Ocean and further west. Those are easy. That makes sense. How does New Zealand get into the bell and roll? How do you have countries that really are geographically so far from either the land route or the marine town route fit into bell and roll? I think in the mainland Qing dynasty, the Silk Road has covered the whole world, not just Europe and China. So you can see the export silver in exchange for silver applauded from China, extended to America, to Africa, everywhere. So there's actually not much land had been explored by the Silk Road. It's not because of China. It's more because the merchants are trying to carry out a trade with all countries, that all locations that's possible. It's one Greek thing to say that China trades with the rest of the world and China does. China is one of the leading trading powers in the world. It's also one thing to say that in the past, Imperial China had also trade with different parts of the world. But those were not the Silk Road. When they talked about the Silk Road in the Imperial past, they were talking about what essentially in today's language is the Silk Road economic bell. It didn't increase the others. They were other parts of trade. So look at the trade in the last centuries. It's not just trade by the Imperial Government of China. In fact, the Chinese government tried to forbid trade. I think you can see that the Europeans coming to force open China's doors for trade. And even before that, China had the merchants from China trade all everywhere, even against the orders of the central government. So it's not so much an act of Imperial Government, but it's an act of many agencies, many countries, many individual merchants involved. So it's a market force. The force is that there's available of silver in the world from Japan, from America. And with the silver, they can trade goods from China. And because the silver influx, China had to produce more for overseas market. And whether you will go to Europe or whether you go to other countries depends not so much by China's Imperial order, but rather by the merchants. Okay. I'll move on. Joseph, how is BLI financed? And what investment opportunities are there for other people, particularly people in the recipient countries of the Beowen Road projects? And some of the Chinese colleagues have compared the Beowen Road with the Marshall Plant. Can it really be comparable? So three questions there. Okay. Well, obviously, China put this Beowen Road initiative up. And initially, China is funding almost everything. I wouldn't say 100% because China don't have that money. But at the beginning, it's basically through policy banks, state-owned enterprises going outside of China to finance it. And at this current moment, China is implementing the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank to help. Because obviously, China cannot afford to put up 100% of everything in the initiative. And to be honest, it's no longer an initiative. It's been on for five years. It's a development already. And China has attracted participants from the like of Temasek of Singapore, and now the sovereign funds to come in and help. So funding is beginning to get into commercial entities rather than just Chinese government. And even in London, there are investment managers putting up cash or raising cash and put it into the Beowen Road countries. And in terms of opportunities in the Beowen Road countries, obviously, huge. Because as you raised the question that why New Zealand is involved, New Zealand needs money also. So there is opportunity investing into New Zealand also, other than the typical emerging markets like Africa or the ASEAN countries, and as well as Central Asia. So plenty of opportunities for not just government organizations, but business entities to put in money and invest. How are they benefiting from it? And what are the opportunities for them to invest and benefit from the whole thing, in contrast to the governments involved in those countries? Apart from some developing countries, emerging markets, people would benefit in my point of view. They have a better living to begin with, with the Chinese money. And for example, they have better roads. They have a train to ride instead of walking. What can we do to the really poor people who can't afford the train fare and they don't drive? They can't use the road. Well, at least they can walk in the road. I give you an example of my own. We invest into a country called Tajikistan. It's a landlocked country, high altitude. We build a road there. And yeah, they can't afford to ride a car, but they can walk in a better condition. They benefit certainly from that. And as for those developing countries where people are a little richer than the emerging markets, we have co-investors. China needs partners locally. And through John Ventures, through cooperative John Ventures, equity John Ventures, they can make money as well. So there is opportunity, definitely. And how is it compared to the Marshall Plan? The Marshall Plan was mostly grants in aid. Beowen Road are mostly loansed. I wouldn't say, I would say, initial stage is grant, financial aid. And China do not expect to get them back, to be honest. But going down the road, loans, it depends on whether the country can afford to raise the loan. Well, a lot of criticism is on China putting in very stringent conditions. And I did for the day, if the recipient country cannot pay back, China will take over. I think it depends on how you look at it. If you borrow and if you cannot meet the requirements, what is the problem? What is the problem of having your assets foreclosed by the lender? That's a fair deal, right? I would say a lot of the misconceptions from the West, if you look at it from the West, yeah, well, we don't have the money now. So it's so great. Does that make it into an argument that fits in with some people who says that Beowen Road therefore creates debt traps for countries which cannot afford those wonderful modern infrastructure. And in the end, they have to pay with their shirts. Well, they can always turn to the West for help. Well, okay. I'll leave it there on that particular one for the moment and turn to Charlie. Well, first of all, the question is, I want you to take a completely different perspective and ask you what you think about the arguments you have heard so far, whether it is about the master plan or whether it is about the, it is fair that if you can't pay your debt, you may pay with your assets argument. And also I want you to share with us whether what we have heard so far of Chinese government policy and how Chinese government proposed to deal with the financing of Beowen Road times your understanding of what it is meant to do and what you think the British and European governments look, how they look at the Beowen Road initiative. Do we understand it correctly? Do we understand it in a way that are being presented or are we looking at it in the wrong way? So Steve, you've given me an hour, have you to answer all that? No five minutes, Max. Yes, lots of very interesting points. And I hesitate to talk with people who come from Belton Road institutes because they do this professionally all day. And controversially, the first thing I would say is that Belton Road doesn't, it doesn't exist. The BRI, it's a slogan, it's meaningless. And really we shouldn't use it because it's everything. It's things, projects of the past that happened before Belton Road started, it's projects all over the world. Okay, so it's a slogan and it's a propaganda tool and it's very successful. Great, well that's very well done. But what is serious and what is really important is what it really represents, which is Chinese globalization. And that's been going on since, since Jiang Zemin in 1999 with his old true policy of going out. And that's extremely important. So it's, in that sense, not at all meaningless. And that's what we, in the West, have to react to. It's reacting to China's globalization, both it's, it's, it's beneficial and, and it's competitive parts. I agree with both speakers that, you Steve, when you say there's, there's no master plan in one sense, there is, however, a very coherent set of aspirations. And that's in the March 2015 plan, Belton Road plan put out by the NDRC. So I think that's really very important that people look at that and see the five areas where Belton Road is, is, and I, you have to use the phrase out how much you should want to say Chinese globalization where, where, where it is, is very relevant. And there is a tendency and I think we've started it already to concentrate on projects and investments and trains and roads, etc. And actually not look at the other four aspects of that plan, which are really, really important. So the first one is, is basically trying global governance. Then you have facilities connectivity, which does mean infrastructure projects, etc. But it also means things like internet connectivity. You've got financial stuff, very important, and I'm sure you can comment on that. Unimpeded trade, extremely important. I mean, both in terms of customs, making things flow much more fast, but also a very competitive angle in terms of standards. This is probably the most important part of, of, of Chinese globalization. Who sets the standards for industry? Because on that is based as, as to who benefits in, in trade and markets most. So, you know, people don't talk about that very much. It's extremely important. And that's an area where UK and Europe must engage with China, both cooperatively and, and probably competitively as well. And the fifth one is people to people, which can include just about everything. So I think it's really important to see that in a much wider context. I'm not sure that I necessarily go along with your, your view on financing that, well, if people get into debt, they just default and, and who loses. Yes, actually, of course, if countries do default on their debts to China, that is a problem for China. And China, I think, I'm sure, is making great efforts to ensure that it's, it's loans are perhaps a little bit better structured than what they were in the past. This is serious money that could be at stake. And China, we always talk about China's internal debt, but there are those that feel that China may have quite an external liability too. But for the countries that are receiving it, it doesn't really help because to the, in the process of getting towards that default, you go through an awful lot of pain in terms of the way paying interest, trying to pay off the interest, even if eventually you decide you can't. And that money is going away from other development, developmental needs of the people. So I, I'm, I'm not sure that it's an answer just to say, well, the West can step up. Recently, the Americas announced a large amount of money, but it's, it's, it's not, it's not by name means the answer. What's the UK government view? What's, what's, what's the European government's view? I think this is changing a little bit from a rhetoric of a golden era to a much more realistic approach to this. And, and that's right. I mean, BRIA is a slogan, but beneath it is Chinese globalization. And we should look at the projects. We should look at the governance issues or the standards issues, the concrete things and, and work off those. And I think there's a much more realistic attitude being developed by, by Europe and the UK on, on, on where we can cooperate, work well together, where it adds up and, and where, quite frankly, we have to agree that we're going to compete. That's, that's the way the world is in a number of ways, which we can go into detail if you wish, Steve. But, sorry, that's short of my hour, but, but longer than your five minutes. Well, thank you. It's a short hour. I would like to give you a chance to respond. Are you comfortable with this characterization that BLI really is just slogan? It's, it means everything. Therefore, it means nothing. And what we really are looking at is China's globalization. That's not to diminish the importance of China. It's just a different way of looking at it. Yeah, that's two things. One is that China is trying to build a, a, a global strong venture with all the, all the countries involved. So China's emphasized very much the spirit of a silver. Silver is not so much dominated by China. It's not like a Marshall plan to give out the loan so that you can conquer the market of Europe. China is just providing all this investment funds that may not turn out to be beneficial to China, but at least in the short term period. So China is trying to build up something. So you can see that with this China's initiative, with China's money pulling in, you can see the other countries involved. Those countries involved along the silver road also put up their own money so that there will be more money used for infrastructure. And for example, even Japan, they're competing with China. So you can see that in Myanmar, Japan will feed more funds, more loans than China. So China stirs up the whole thing so that all the countries have to follow. Even America had to follow. Even Europe had to follow to invest in Africa. So it's not so much a way that China creates a master plan to conquer the world, to implement globalization on China. In fact, in the process, because China cannot dominate, cannot control the whole things, it relies on all this kind of interactive response from others. So they are building up a process for changing the status quo in the world nowadays. And the status quo is that many countries involved in the Belt and Road have been explored by the developing country, by international organization, and also by multinational cooperation investment. So you can see that China investing there, they are not, may not be for commercial interest because they cannot get back the loans. But without the Chinese money, nobody is investing. So this is a way that China trying to change it. The other thing is that China has something larger in reason. Our presidents talk about the community of common destiny, although we are not sure how to achieve it. But China trying to use the existing multinational cooperation, multinational agreement to build up something that we share. And you can see the last year when we had the summit of the Belt and Road Initiative, it was a part of the UN series of Alliance of Civilization. The focus is on Alliance of Civilization, not on classes of civilization, or one civilization dominate the other. So this is a larger, more ambitious kind of aim of the Chinese President, may not be shared by everybody in China. But at least as a very responsible political leader, it raises a certain kind of idea for not only for China, for the world to think about it. Okay. I'll come back to you, Joseph, then ask me the same question. But before that, I think Charlie wants to respond to what Thomas just said. Yeah. Let's not take away from what China has achieved and what China has given and is giving to the world. Excellent. And I have no quarrel with that. And I particularly have sympathy with the idea that China has basically stirred up the financial pod. Good. And there are many other things that we should welcome in Chinese globalization. But Xi Jinping and others have said that Belt and Road Initiative is the main plank of their foreign policy. Countries' foreign policies are not altruistic. They simply are. I'm sorry, but they... And furthermore, if you actually look at the genesis of the Belt and Road and what lies behind it, the important motivations are domestic. And I could go into that in great detail. But if one looks at Wang Ji Su's original paper, which I think was very much instrumental in the devising of the whole strategy, and I do recommend people to read it, even though it includes the word geo-strategy in the title, the reasons that he's giving for why this strategy should be adopted are mainly domestic. So it's about markets, energy. It's about stabilizing Xinjiang and disparities. It's about getting more technology for China, which is exactly what Xi Jinping, Wang Yi, Yang Jiechi have said in their comments on Belt and Road at various times. It is benefiting China. That's fine. That's... Everyone, country's foreign policy is designed to benefit your country, and it's also based on domestic needs and things. So I don't think we should sort of go overboard on that this is about the destiny of common future for mankind, et cetera. That too is a phrase which may or may not have purchase in China, but it doesn't really cut it in Europe. I'm not sure how we relate the domestic use and foreign policy of China. This is not a simple mechanical exercise. I've worked on China for decades, and I've worked with some of the top think tanks in China within a confidential area. I don't see the kind of speculation that are really actually shaping the policymaking process in China. In fact, I do not think outside world knows so much about the policymaking process in China. So try to figure out a quick picture, a good story. It's not right for marketing purpose, but can we learn from the world by these kind of stories? Well, if I may just come back on that. I think that's a call for transparency, because we in the West are going to react to Chinese globalization one way or another. So whether we know how Chinese policy is made or not, whether we may make mistakes, our perceptions matter, because we will react to them. And so I would say maybe China's political system needs to be an awful lot more transparent, so we don't make the mistakes that you think we're making. Okay. Let me go back to you, Joseph, to the question that Charlie put on the table first. Is it a better way to look at China's going out policy in the prism of the BLI, or is it a matter to see it in terms of China's globalization? Well, I kind of agree with Charlie's saying, but when low initiative is very hollow, it's a label. China learned it from the West. We never had marketing. We are now having marketing. We learned it from Harvard. It's a good thing. Otherwise, we cannot draw attention to the world, what we are doing. It's like Vice President Mike Pence said in the APAC meeting that America is putting up $1.4 trillion just to catch an attention. So I don't dispute that, but this initiative is not something new. It went back all the way to obviously the ancient Silk Road, but more recently, last century in the 50s, the modern China helping Africa to build up our relationship so that we can get nominated back to the UN. We started this. Then in the 80s, we put in a lot of efforts. At the time, China was still very poor, but we put in a lot of efforts to build infrastructure for the Middle East countries, and we got screwed. We put in a lot of money, never get back. We said nothing because, well, we're confused, very confused. And this initiative is a complement of 1997 going out policy. We went out. At the time, we were a little bit better. Our foreign exchange reserve was climbing up. Then 2013, it was more or less at the peak of our reserve. We had about close to $4 trillion dollars of reserve, so we need to spend it, and America wants us to spend it. So we spent it actually in 2008 when we helped the West during the global financial crisis. And probably our president thinks that, well, this is time to make a big thing out of it. So the Belt and Road Initiative. I do not believe this is something wrong because the West wanted to be number one. China, maybe. But our Chinese characteristic is always recipe number two, because being number one has a lot of weight to carry. China was united historically. It never satisfied for being number two. Qing was number one. Tang was number one. Ming was number one when the Mongols were not beating them. And you can go all the way back to Han and to Tang. You know, choose to be number one. They were made number one at a time. Well, a very nice way to put it, that... I think one might interpret the second centennial goal as a desire to be number one, but I'll be dead by 10249. No, it's like, you know, most of the Chinese believe, you know, it's better to be probably number four, because number one can fall. Then number two has to take up the responsibility. So being number four, probably we are saver. Who, therefore, would be number two and number three? Well, you don't have to be told you're number one and number two and number three. It depends on how you flex your muscles. At this current moment, who's flexing more muscles? It's number one. All right, we'll leave it there for the moment. Just wanted to stay there on one remark, which is that while the West have popularized a lot of things and a lot of them are very, very good, not everything is that the West has popularized are great. One of which is hubris. That got us to the financial global financial crisis. So that's one thing perhaps good for China not to learn from us in terms of the kind of hubris that could put us in a very tight spot and it could also potentially put China in a very tight spot. I want to move on to ask you, the panelists, how do you see BLI or China's globalization, whichever way you want to put it, changes the world? I mean, what do you see as the likely positive outcomes and what do you see as the likely negative ones? Joseph, if you could get a bit further from the mic. It's this Belt and Road Initiative drew a lot of attention on China, which is a good thing because we're always in the past lagging behind. Now we are on the international arena. And honestly, this initiative, let's don't focus on the label. China is like any other country wants to do more business, want to have more representation globally. So we do that. And the Chinese language is only recently picked up by the West. Otherwise, everybody here speaks English. You read the English media. How many of you read the Chinese media? Not a lot. Well, you are one of them. Apart from you, no. So when you look at the, when you read the Chinese media, do they tell you different things? Yeah. So when you read the West, you know, it's all about, well, China is doing bad things. Is that right? So why? I mean, why don't we all think from others, you know, people's perspective? So I think we should draw a balance. You know, it's not always, you know, China is the villain. You know, we're not, you know, how much... The question was, what are the good things that China is going to bring about... No, I'm coming to that. I'm coming to that. All government major policies will have good and negative. It depends on how you look at it. From the government's point of view, it's always good. You know, we criticize the government. I don't like, you know, our government putting up all the loans, you know, to, you know, the recipient countries. Because at the end of the day, how many of them can repay? Not a lot. At the end of the day, what do China do? Forfeit them. Forget it. Have you ever read that? Take, for example, Central Asia that I just talked about. How much financial aid of, you know, loans turn into financial aid? Read the paper. Almost all. Okay. How many countries repay China? Not a lot. I think we should look at it in a broader terms. You know, it brings good things. At the end of the day, you know, they can't repay what can we do? All right. Turn it into financial aid. Forget it. EDRB, you know, they work on it. They ask me, why is China not asking, you know, these countries to live up to their promises? We do have a concrete case, which is very hot at the moment. And that's Pakistan. Pakistan is in a financial meltdown. It owns China a lot of money. It can't pay China back. It's going to the IMF for money. The IMF is basically saying that while we're happy to lend, provide that what we lend will not simply be used to repay China. We will only lend to improve the financial situation in Pakistan. Now, Pakistan is an extreme case at the moment. You potentially will have other countries in Central Asia that may get into the similar situation under BLI. What do you see the Chinese government going to do about it? Will the Chinese government write off the loans to Pakistan and enable Pakistan to get the IMF loans and rebalance its economy and get out of the financial hole? I think it's a very interesting question. On the one hand, Pakistan or the world claim that, you know, China puts Pakistan into this situation. But then, you know, Mr Khan went to Beijing and Shanghai recently and asked for more money. So why? They do. Why? They don't have a choice. Let's be practical. All these are nonsense. They need the money. That's only China that could provide the money. So you go to China. And if I were Xi Jinping, I would turn the loan into investment. All right. But then again, you know, we'll create another issue. All right. Oh, China is taking over Pakistan. Come on, you know, we're different breed. How are we going to take over Pakistan? All right. So, you know, I think again, it's, you know, it's a misconception that, you know, China is conquering the world. We we kind of fought to conquer the world. I don't think we actually think we think that. And the history of Pakistan is in terms of Western involvement has not been very happy and it may end up that way for China. I don't know. But the question was what what good is coming out of Chinese globalization. And I just think it's to quote Premier General Li a little earlier to say. I mean, there are many good things. Or it just depends on the way that it goes down the line. It can go to good or oral. I mean, for instance, Chinese greater involvement in the world. The most important issue in my mind is what happens to the environment. Is China's going out to globalization going to be a force for good, not just climate change, but localized in terms of, let's say, water problems or sustainability of agriculture and things like that. That's a really important question. And China, if it does it in the right way, would be an amazing force for good. If it does it in the wrong way, it'll be very bad. So and you can, you know, again, when it comes to the question of finance, if China is financing projects as a sustainable and help development of countries, it cannot be anything other than a force for good. If it's financing badly for whatever reason, then the opposite apply. And there are other questions. To what degree will China, in terms of if you look at the whole Belt and Road plan and the governance issue, to what degree will China play a positive role in UN and peace and stabilization? It's paying a much bigger role than it has done. And I think so far, that's been good. But there are other areas where people worry, South China Sea, as to whether China's role is ultimately going to be peaceful. And again, other things, will China itself open up and allow a level playing field? For all Xi Jinping's talk about globalization, perception in Europe and in Australia and the West is generally, is that China is providing a level playing field. And finally, one comes to a question of values in China's globalization. Will China and China's rise be good for the world in terms of its values? And these aren't Western values. These are values to which China itself has signed up under the various UN conventions and are in China's own constitution. So this isn't an East-West argument. It's a question of the degree to which China, through transparency, through the internet governance, through various other things, including its surveillance capabilities, is this going to be a force for good or for ill? And I don't want to say either at the moment. I think it's too early to say. But these are the big questions. Can you talk about globalization in China? You have to remember that first, in the last few centuries, there's a globalization of Britain, and then globalization of America. But the problems we face nowadays in the world is not just a result of globalization of China, but more a result of globalization of Britain and America. So you see that China is not trying to assert to be the savior of the world. Then you should not expect China to be a savior. And in fact, you can see that the world, there are still many Western interests from the globalization of Britain, from the globalization of America, trying to perpetuate the existing problems. So I think the better way is to see China's globalization is a way that the world together will have to solve the problems. So you should not just put the brain on China or to put the responsibility on China, but the whole world should work together. And not only just to turn globalization into a good exercise, but we have to clear all these problems created by the globalization of Britain, globalization of America. So when our president used the summit of the BLI as a part of the alliance of civilization of the UN program, this alliance of your civilization, we work together. So I think it seems to be we are too much standing from the certain position and to see China as the antithesis of the existing world and trying to have you force China to change in your way, you think that would be good. Welcome to being number one, because whether you're Britain in the 19th century or America in the 20th century as number one, you are unpopular. That's just a fact of politics, I'm afraid. And it's up to you just have to deal with it. And of course, as they say, they prefer China to be number four. Now, we have passed the halfway point of our time for this panel discussion. So I'm going to actually now open it to everyone. And we have four, keep your hands up, please. We have four children ambassadors with microphones. So I think you have your hands up first. That's the first one I saw. I'll try to get as many of you in as possible. And in the front, in the middle, in the front, please. And you could be as succinct as you can. We can try to squeeze in as many as possible. I won't necessarily get all of them. So if you have a particular person, you want to direct this to say so. Yes. I just wanted to first you say with regards to western media kind of perceptions of China, it does normally tend to focus on the negative stories, as you say. And but I think perhaps tonight, we haven't addressed some of the more signs of kind of risks and examples of BRI failure, namely, you know, what happened in Sri Lanka, they haven't booked a port. You know, that is a significant risk for partnering nations to have a sovereign territory taken over on a 99-year lease. It's an incredibly large risk. And I think one which hasn't necessarily been factored in to the decision-making process behind funding funding. So one of the biggest risks, I think, for BRI at the moment is kind of partnering with nations that, you know, that the domestic politics can change. We've seen this in Myanmar, we've seen it in Malaysia and in Pakistan as well slightly, but not to the same extent as in Sri Lanka and Malaysia. You know, politicians are elected, they come in and say, we don't want this kind of funding. It's releasing our sovereignty. I mean, we've probably had too much of this phrase in the UK. But what I wanted to ask is because in the process of funding these projects, China specifically says we are not bringing political judgments. We are not the Marshall Plan. We are funding not on the basis of domestic politics. Will they have to start thinking more about domestic politics in order to skew the future of these projects? Okay. Obviously, I'm not from the civil surface. You know, I cannot represent the country. But the way I look at it, at the time, Sri Lanka wanted the money. They wanted to, you know, build up a better economy. So they went to China. All right. And China, you know, you come to us, you know, we think about that. We give you the money. And they don't think, you know, that thoroughly. Now, at the beginning, now, you know, after, you know, five years, they learned a lesson. They would, you know, obviously consider all political, you know, aspect of making a loan or a grant or an investment in a foreign country. And it's not, probably it's too early to say, you know, it's a failure. You know, it's like trying to lease Hong Kong to Britain for nine to nine years. You know, Hong Kong did well. All right. And I suppose, you know, Britain did not expect that. But, you know, Hong Kong people, you know, did their work. And at the end of the day, you know, Hong Kong prosperous. I suppose if, you know, if you look at, you know, a longer term, Sri Lanka, they need to build up a better economy, you know, and to survive, you know, they have to learn the lesson internally, you know, their politics, you know, they got to play a better, you know, politics, you know, look, feed the people before you talk about politics. That's, you know, what, the way I look at it. And also, you know, at the end of the day, you know, is China going to take over? Probably not. You know, the world is watching China. How can China, you know, just take over the port? I, you know, it's a question, you know, it's a big question. I cannot answer, but I'm sure, you know, the world is watching if China do move and, and, you know, take over, everybody will go against it. Very, very short. I would like to give an example in Myanmar. Japan's investment has a fine year plan. Even the South Korea and Finland has a fine year plan after doing in Myanmar. But China has no plan. So what do we expect China? For example, when in Thailand, with Japanese loan, there was an official of Japan sitting in the government office of the Thai government. Should China do the same? Okay. I think if it's basically on the same line, we probably try not to, so that we get more questions from the, from the floor. Charlie, you wanted to provide a contrary view. Just very briefly. When I, before I came here, I made a list of risks just, and there were 11 from Chinese thinkers that I put down on the risks for China and four for foreign, foreign countries. So that balance. But, but it's, you know, the Hanban Toto thing is, sure, it doesn't help Sri Lanka, but it doesn't help China either. You know, I mean, if that goes wrong, you're sure you've got a 99-year lease, but you put an awful lot of money in and you're not getting paid back. So, so, you know, the risks are shared. It's just a matter of getting the projects right in the first place, which one hopes with experience will happen. Okay. I'll, I think there was some questions at the, at the, at the, at the ends there. Yes. Yes, there. Hi. I'm from Myanmar. My name is Tai. I'm doing an MSc, political and religious. So I, I just want to ask the question because you mentioned that the project is helping developing country. But like, I want to, again, ask someone already mentioned at the front. Like how much you are developing for the country people, because for example, in Myanmar, we have all the company is owned by the military hunter. So if military asking for more money, it's not meaning to helping the country or the governments. Thank you. Okay. Thomas. I think the Chinese government has stopped investing heavily in Myanmar. Instead, Japan had done a better job in a way. And because China has no plan to change the government there or change the political culture there, they just concerned more with the project. So I'm not sure whether China will continue or started to. I think the question really isn't about so specific about just what happens in Myanmar. The question really is about Chinese government engage with governments. And governments in those countries along the road do not necessarily care about the welfare of their citizens. And her question is really about what is the Chinese government's doing to make sure that the citizens of the partner countries along BLI benefit from it in contrast to the elite, the governments in those countries. Well, I think what China is doing nowadays are mostly infrastructure investment. And infrastructure investment benefit more of the general public, not just the elite, although the unit may make a better use of it. But I think it's a bit too demanding to ask China to take up the job to look after the people of Myanmar or other countries involved. I think even the UN cannot do that. Okay, let's move on. Yes, let's hear a hopefully Chinese face, Chinese perspective there. Hi, thank you for the speech. So my question is that you talked about China going global earlier. So how to what extent and in what way does the trade war affect the BRR? That's my question. It does interrupt, you know, our Belt and Road Initiative or development because, you know, there's a trade war and America is putting, you know, in a lot of sanctions to recipient countries like, you know, Russia, Iran, where they're in need of help, you know, on better infrastructure, you know, better, you know, you know, employment opportunities. So, well, it depends on, you know, whether the West is, you know, still going against this idea. Otherwise, you know, it's not going to make the world a better living place. All right. And, you know, China is slowing down because, you know, everybody is against it. Why should we go ahead? So we slow down, you know, it's only the countries that really in need of the cash that China is putting, you know, the money into it. Otherwise, you know, a lot of the projects has been suspended for the time being, you know, so the trade war does, you know, create some, you know, something for the Belt and Road Initiative. Charlie, you want to come in? Very briefly. I don't think tariffs and Trump's attempts to balance trade are at all helpful to anything. On the other hand, I think you have to say that what is important, much more important than that, is a true level playing field in business. And that's not what's happening. And that's what Europe in particular is. A reason why Europe now is becoming more skeptical about Belt and Road and demanding that things are evened up. And secondly, we get onto the question of intellectual property and a proper regime there. Those two are really important issues, tariffs and balancing trade. Well, that's Mr Trump. For locality, equalities, is there anything from this side? Okay, I think this I'll go for the gentleman at the back. Yeah, you. Yeah, there's a microphone coming in. Mr. Parton mentioned globalization, Chinese globalization, but I think we probably ought to distinguish between Chinese globalization and Western globalization. I think Western globalization in some ways reached its nemesis in 2008. And the financial crisis, the problems have not really been resolved. In fact, debt has increased. And economies are really quite stagnant in the West. And also, there's the whole question of whether the fiat currencies can be sustained under this sort of economic on the series of economic problems. I would also suggest that the West sees itself from a unipolar position where whatever happens, it should defend that position. Now, if we look at Chinese globalization, I don't really want to judge this because I'm not in a position to do so. But I think that China is looking at a more multipolar position. And the one crucial thing in my mind that China wants to reintroduce is development. Globalization put an end to development as a concept and a study. And what it did instead was to globalize finance and create an international deregulation. Now, I would say China's objective, and this is probably quite selfish on the part of China, is to reengage the economy in the process of development. In doing so, it will benefit itself. But I could also say that in doing so, it could potentially help the West as well, because the West does not have an engine of growth. Thank you, Charlie. Well, yes. I think we should be more welcoming of China's initiatives on development. But I don't think you should also disparage the West. I mean, if you look at the figures for aid, for instance, I think UK aid as opposed to loans was bigger than China's by a factor of four last year, 2016. America's so as well. So that's not disparage what the West is trying to do. Yes, we've made a lot of mistakes. And we're probably still making them in terms of the way our economies are dealing with stagnation and banking. But I'm not sure either that actually in terms of the economy that China's model is going to work either. It's still a bit early to say that. Okay. So there's stuff from both of us to learn, but I don't think you should just disparage the West straight off like that. I'm going to the far end there. Yes. The gentleman in the white. Yes. Thanks. My name's Yaniv. I'm from Israel. You mentioned Iran as one of your main recipients of investment. Now, as an Israeli businessman, how much does politics play into it? Because I'm a businessman who wants to go to China. Yeah. And let's say that should I be nervous that you might give more favor to Iran instead of me as instead of my country as we all know Israeli and Iranian relations are not the best to put it nicely. So how much should I take this into a factor if I'm considering doing business in China, especially with a BRI? Okay. In fact, that's why you need China. We deal with Iran. We deal with Israel. Israel is a good friend of China. And the two countries are doing business since the incorporation of Israel and more than China. So I don't believe it will hinder Israeli businessman. China import a lot from Israel. And I am personally, you know, involving in a deal in Israel at this current moment and funding is from China. So I don't see why, you know, you have to worry. You know, China is doing business with, you know, anyone that needs China. Okay. Now, those of you who have the hands up earlier that you have not been called to ask a question, don't give up. I'm just going around to make sure that nobody feels being left out. I'll try to come back to you as much as I can. Yes, here. Thank you. I'm Ambrose, a student from Hong Kong. And I saw the headlines a few days ago about Trump trying to persuade EU or his government to sponsor his technology to deal with the 5G technology, because like China is also trying to enforce this state-owned enterprise Huawei into certain 5G development in certain EU countries, say Hungary and Romania, for example. How would you guys address that about how China is putting its innovation and technology into a global sense and so on? Thank you. Okay. China is open and the 5G technology should be a strong venture of all countries involved. This will not be a money-making machine by a certain company of a certain country. So China is trying to promote the 5G and I think it's open. For some of you, if you go to Shenzhen, I mean it's open to all countries to have work together. So I don't see this as an issue. I'm afraid I do see an issue. Both America and Australia have declared that China Huawei will not be allowed into development of the 5G. I think that's with very good reason because the control or potential control by a foreign power of someone else's telecommunications is just too vital a national security interest ever to be allowed to anyone who might use it against you or might threaten to use it against you. It's extremely easy to hide stuff in millions and millions of lines of code as the Intelligence Committee report in 2013 on the original involvement of Huawei in the UK telecom system, starting back 2003 or 2005, suggests it cannot be ruled out that stuff is not there. It's got particularly, I think, more sensitive since the recent national security legislation in China now obliges Chinese companies by law to do what the security authorities deem to be in their national security interest. So whether or not Huawei has or is or will do things that you shouldn't with other countries' telecommunications, it would be a very foolish country that put its national security in the hands of another one. But that means the same principles will be applied to all, not just to China, but also to America and other countries. For example, in the UK, you should kick off all these foreign dominated kind of software or systems. But there's a big difference because the UK is an ally of America. We've actually got formal alliances and we're not an ally of China. The only ally of China is a formal signed agreement with North Korea, so it's not the same. Well, I think the alliance will change. This year, you are allies and this year, you may not. Okay, I don't think there's going to be an agreement on that one. Let's move on. I think the lady there first, I'll try to come to you. Yes, we still have about 23 minutes left. Hello, I have two questions. One. Let's take to one, please. Okay, fine. I was asked the most important one about the depth sustainability. So you were saying that there's high risk of depth default, so is there any kind of assessment before the investment project actually going on? Are you going to assess the certain countries' risk? Do they have the ability to pay back all the debt they owe to China? If the question refers to my earlier comments, at the beginning, no, because the recipient country is in need of the cash, but now, yes, there is always the assessment now because China is learning, it's only becoming rich in the last probably 10 years. So we have a long time to adapt to that. Okay. Yes, so in the middle, I'll try to come to you. Yes, you. Yes. Thank you very much for the interesting discussion. I would like to follow up on the possible outcomes of the BRI in particular regarding possible pacifying effects of the project. In particular, if we think about Afghanistan and Pakistan, India, and Jambu and Kashmir, could it be so that China could be using its weight in trying to pacify the region in order because security is a prerequisite for development and building things? On the other hand, if China is getting involved, could we see a risk there of China being dragged more and more into these conflicts? Thank you. Yes, for Afghanistan, China is trying to have a peace settlement. Before then, Americans tried to use Afghanistan as the hub of central Asia, so they proposed a modern civil war with China, with Russia, but it had not been materialized. So China is trying to do in a way to have the peace agreement and working with the central Asia countries to make Afghanistan once again a hub. And also in the China-Pakistan economic corridor, they also invite Afghanistan to join. So this regard or this political speculation, I think the actual result may be a change of the game in central Asia. Central Asia is no longer a landlocked country, a landlocked area. It could be the hub of the east and west, north and south. So it depends on Afghanistan. It depends on central Asia working with Afghanistan. You can see that there's a recent opening up of Kistan, and that would maybe there's a major change in that area. I spent 13 months working in Afghanistan. I wish the Chinese all the best, because we didn't do very well there. And I think it's extreme. Has anybody done well there? Well, I think that's a very good point. And so let's hope that China does an awful lot better than we do. I have to say I'm not optimistic having been there and seen the nature of the disunity and the way people will act on very small incentives, personal incentives in front of them, rather than looking at the long term. But China will have to get much more involved if it wishes to invest in the area, in the security side of it, which is difficult when China doesn't like the concept of interference in other people's countries. And in that context, I think what's happening in Xinjiang is an additional worry, because so far the Islamic populations of central Asia have not reacted very badly to the concentration camps in Xinjiang, but that may not last. And therefore, we saw an unfortunate attack on the consulate in Calcutta. These sorts of things may become more common. So it's a factor. Four questions. I think just the lady behind the, in front of the poll. Hi, thank you. My name is Bernie and I'm a research analyst. We've talked a lot about infrastructure in regards to like trade and investment in the building of the BRI, but I was wondering more with the building comes people and the movement of people and with immigration being such a hot topic in the West at the moment. I was wondering about your thoughts with regards to the movement of people out of China as the BRI develops. Movement of people, a very good question, because I do travel to Xinjiang a lot. The company that I work for is the mine owner in Xinjiang. The movement of people, Xinjiang do not like to have too many people from Central Asia to come into Xinjiang. Whereas for Central Asia, they don't mind the Chinese to go. They don't like the Uighurs to go for some reasons. Probably economic reasons that they believe only Huns are rich enough and not the Uighurs. So that sort of movement, if you can see, it's not just security. It's also culture and perception. Charlie? I think actually I turn it all the way around almost. It's not so much about migration. It's about the degree to which Chinese globalization can promote employment in the countries. And if it does that and uses less Chinese labor and more Indigenous labor and trains up those people, then I think the development becomes much more sustainable. Putting in a railway line or a bridge or whatever, an airport or a port, is not in itself sustainability. It's the software that goes with it, the training of the people and the other types of long-term employment that flow from it, which is important. So the fewer Chinese workers and the more training that China can do, then the greater the development and the sustainability of it. More questions? I think there was one, yes, I think I kind of promised you that you Yes, the lady here. And then I'll come to you, sir. Yes, thank you. Actually I have a question for Professor Steve. It's also about the debt thing. What happens if the receiving countries cannot pay back? So firstly, China, I think China is not forcing any of the countries to accept the loans from the very beginning. And the countries choose to accept the loans, accept the funds voluntarily based on their own analysis of the pros and cons. So meaning if at the end of the day it turns out that they can't pay back, they should be expecting some kind of legitimate and justifiable like penalties from China. And secondly, why is it when it comes to about an road initiative, there are so many pessimistic projections on the development of the recipient countries, while when the Western countries try to invest in the development of certain kind of countries, people will focus on how this kind of investment, these funds will help the local people to develop. Thank you. Since you asked me, I will respond. I don't think it's entirely fair to say that we actually look at development aids that European and North American countries give us automatically in positive light. I think we focus a lot on the problems that those development aids are very poorly invested and not doing very well. So it is the sort of things that are being looked at wherever it is actually being invested, whichever countries is doing it. Now on the first question you asked in terms of is it fair for people who borrow money that they can't afford that they have to pay back? We live in the 21st century, the world's move on. In the UK and Europe, we simply don't accept that. Now perhaps in other parts of the world, there is still an acceptance that if you borrow and you can't afford to borrow, it's your fault. But here we actually legislate to make sure that companies cannot lend money to people who cannot afford to pay them back. That's not fair on them, that's creating problems for them. So I think it would be a good thing globally that if we accept respecting people and helping them to prevent them falling into debt trap is a good thing that we do not apply and restrict that only to British citizens but we apply it to citizens of any country. It connects back to the Lady from Myanmar's question too because the leaders may well go for this but it doesn't necessarily mean that the people support these projects. And in Malaysia, there's been some question about whether there was corruption involved. So I think that as part of China's globalization there needs to be an awful lot more emphasis on fighting corruption abroad. Xi Jinping is doing that within his own country. He's not doing it abroad. I was part of the G20 preparations for the Hangzhou meeting and it was noticeable that all the talk and we had a dinner with the Vice Minister in charge from the CCDI. It was all about help for China's Skynet and Foxhound. It wasn't about preventing Chinese companies bribing abroad, in fact there's a considerable history of that. So I think that there needs to be as part of the Belt and Road or Chinese globalization a really big effort on China's part to ensure that its own companies and state companies don't bribe abroad. Okay. And then maybe the projects. Go for more questions. I think there was a gentleman at the back that had their hands up a lot. Yes. Yes, thank you. Interesting so far. Yes, I'm persistent. So I'm getting my question. First of all, a comment which was with China manufacturing PV which was made here over 150 years ago, it finally became affordable at 25 pence a watt when I was buying it at two million pounds per megawatt. If you understand the difference that's two pounds a watt. So thank you very much China for making it affordable and 30 year guarantee. My question is in technology today we're doing nano and Pico technology which is going into humans. Pico technology is 10 to the minus 15. What does that mean? It means we can make a switch with three atoms switch on yourselves, switch them off again, switch on the glandular system, switch it off. So you can see that as we're morphing from humans to something like cyborgs. How is that going to affect China's policy and the globalization that we hear so much of? Because every single civilization from Persia upwards was built on technology. Okay, Tom? It's too difficult to project the future. I simply don't know but what China is trying to do is the first, they're trying to catch up with the developed countries. So they follow the pattern and models of America, Britain. Now China's stage of polls catch up period. So China is trying to test the frontiers. It's too early for China to talk about this because China is more pragmatic. Well maybe they are not innovative enough but I think you can see that Shenzhen is now the hardware citizenry in the world. So they are testing all everything but it's too early to talk about all these kind of technological scenarios. Okay. That's the corner that's been overlooked. Yes, the gentleman in the white jacket. A comment. First of all, when talking about BRI, can you keep it very short? Yes, very short. When we're talking about BRI, we shouldn't look it very monotonously about Chinese investment as Chinese money going out to support other countries or doing investment itself. Both Professor Thomas Chan and Mr. Joseph Chan mentioned something very different. Professor Thomas Chan is trying to mention that China is not being a savior. China is not giving out money. But Mr. Joseph Chan is trying to say that the money going to countries like Central Asia is not actually... China is not actually wanting to get those money back. I kind of agree with Professor Steve Xiang that the loans given to the countries should not be unethical in the sense that they cannot repay the loans. In fact, China is actually trying to establish kind of institutions like AIIB. In fact, AIIB is not the kind of Chinese money that is ordered from the Chinese government to invest in different countries. The AIIB is an international organization with principles of sticking to international standards. But on the other hand, Chinese investment from the Chinese government orders is actually coming from the Chinese state-owned enterprise. So in the same sense that Chinese money is actually doing both ways, first is in the international ways that it follows all the international norms. But at the same time, Chinese money is also channeling through the Chinese government policies to invest in different countries. So I would like to ask all the panelists that what do you see the future of Chinese money? Is it going to be a more international standard investment or would it be more stick to the Chinese government official policies? Thank you. Right. Will Chinese state investments overseas follow the standards of AIIB or will it be invested with Chinese characteristics? Some quick response. In the past, China has not so much concern about the A. There's no established pattern of giving A. Recently, China learned from Japan. Japan started for all these countries with a soft, long, even A for infrastructure investment. And after that, with the A infrastructure, the companies will come. So China has just set up an international A organization last year or this year. So China is learning from the rest of the world good practice that may help to channel much better Chinese money into the other countries. I'm not too sure whether AIIB has done anything just yet. You know, it's been talked about and the increasing of members of AIIB is ever going. But have you ever heard of a project really done by AIIB? But they still need money. India still need money. Yeah. I think the question really is, is China going to be using its own money in terms of the B.I. investments following the standards that AIIB has established and AIIB has been making major loans to recipient countries following the same kind of standards that other international development banks are following? AIIB is not China owned. So it has a board of directors. It doesn't really matter whether China is China owned or not. I think the question is, will Chinese investments be following the standard that... If it's Chinese money alone, it's not from AIIB, I'm not too sure. But if it's AIIB, I'm sure it's pretty much the international standard. What is the international standard? It's the West standard. And for the Chinese money, to be honest, if you look at the balance sheet of China, a lot of the money are borrowed. Japan is one major lender. Do you believe Japan will allow China to misuse the money and China is not repaying them back? Look at it. And you will find the answers. Okay. Very quick intervention here. AIIB is actually lent out so far in the first year, 4.4 billion dollars. So it is working. I think it's a very good model and whether or not China chooses to adopt some of those practices in Ex-Im Bank or China Development Bank is up to China. But I do think that we tend to think that China has got any amount of money and it can just pay it around. I think it's going to have to be quite careful actually in making sure that the way it lends money is effective and sustainable and repairable, preferably. So I think it will adopt some of the practices of AIIB. At the far ends there. Yes, that's Professor Simpson. Yes, yes. Hi, my name is Edward Simpson. I'm the Director of the SOAS South Asia Institute. I'd like to thank you all for a very interesting discussion which I found quite magical actually. At the beginning we were told that the subject of the discussion didn't exist and then we had 90 minutes of kind of insightful and entertaining discussion about it. The second part of the magic is quite often in this lecture theatre people are selling books or films or dance performances of various kinds and it's quite obvious what the product is that the person is trying to sell. So given that you the three panellists have a room full, the largest room on our campus full of impressionable young minds, could I ask you to give us the thought you would like to sell us most, the thought you would like us to leave this room with? Thank you, Ed. I'll start with Joseph and then in this order. Joseph, what is the one thing you want to sell to this room full of impressionable young bright minds? Look at Belt and Road Initiative longer. I mean it's only five years old and Xi Jinping said it should take no less than 50 years to develop it. I'm not sure whether I could leave it to that stage but at least I'm still very confident about the progress of it. The focus is a sealed road spirit which is not shaped by China but shaped by all the countries or the people involved and the focus should be on the alliance or civilization, not the classes of civilization or one civilization dominating the world. Johnny? I somewhere in my distant mind, I remember a phrase seek truth from facts, can't remember where it came from. My message to everyone will be look very carefully at what the Belt and Road is and try to understand what really lies behind all the rhetoric. The reality is very important to all of us and you. I wish that I had given you the last question and I still have a thing about three minutes so I was squeezing one more question. Thank you so much for the opportunity. What kind of a road do you think Hong Kong or the greater Bay Area will play in the BRI with the change in the distribution of power we are seeing now with all these provincial governments competing with each other in order to garner more power and say in the initiative and having said that, do you think China can sustain in projecting its influence elsewhere with the current regime mode? No, no, I'm actually glad that we end with this question because after we have two panelists from Hong Kong so they are as well placed as anybody could be in answering the question. Well, I'm from Hong Kong too so let me tell you something about the contribution of Hong Kong. Take a very good example of the recent typhoon that happened in Hong Kong. We recovered very quickly and in a day whereas our neighboring countries like Japan, even America, it takes them probably months. They're still recovering it so I think we can input our soft power, our software. Our civil service did a very good job despite the criticism from the public. The Hong Kong civil service. Well, Hong Kong is part of China so we did a very good job actually the last 20 years since the return to the motherland. That's something we can export to the Belt and Road countries and also set an example for the Greater Bay Area competitors. Thomas, quick response of how was Hong Kong fit into the Hong Kong Delta region fit into the Belt and Road? It depends on how Hong Kong integrate with Shenzhen and Guangzhou, the core cities in the region. I'm not sure, it depends on the initiative of the people and the government. But one thing is certain is that there's an emerging huge trade flow along the coastal of China to Southeast Asia joining up with the China Europe freight train and the China Central Asia freight train. They allow there's Japan, Korea shipping the coast to China, the coastal region and it could come along the coastal region through the Pearl River Delta region to Guangxi, to Yunnan and down to Southeast Asia with all this connectivity being improved. So I think this is a quick opportunity for the Pearl River Delta region and Hong Kong, but it depends, which will benefit more depends very much on the initiative of the people and also the government. You very clearly snuck a second question in there, so I'll answer that one, which on whether the whole Belt and Road or Chinese globalization is sustainable. The answer hasn't done bad so far, but whether or not it's sustainable over the long term really depends on whether China succeeds domestically. Back in 2007, Wen Jiabao said that the economic and social model was unbalanced, unsustainable, uncoordinated. Xi Jinping repeated that in 2013 in his communique about his explanation about the reforms in 2013. Yang Jieqiu repeated it in 2017. The model doesn't work, that's what the reform process is about, both the 3rd and 4th Kingdom. If China succeeds and becomes very strong domestically, then of course it will be strong and influential externally through its globalization. If it doesn't succeed internally, then it won't. Well, thank you very much and on that point I will draw these panel discussions to a close and I would like to thank Joseph Chen, Thomas Chen, Charlie Parton, to all of you who have raised questions and also to those of you who have their hands up but have not been called for your patience in my failures to give you the chance to ask your questions or make your comment. Well, thank you very much. Good evening to you.