 So that's that's clear. So we had the sort of two two views quite different Olivier you're not a centrist but Your role is to sort of yeah, exactly. I find myself Surprisingly in between there's a lot of space between the two so it's easy to be I think the euro has real problems That Jean-Claude did not emphasize that I shock other emphasized. I think they can be Eleviated, I don't think they can be eliminated The I've organized my remarks in seven points. I'll try to stick to that. So the first one is Remember the remark about the democracy about democracy being the The best of all bad systems. I think it's the same thing for the euro I think that for the countries at least for most of the members, maybe not all The euro is the least bad of the my tree and exchange rate arrangements Again may the footnote maybe some members might be better off out But let's leave this aside. The reason I say this is that we tried Other ways before we tried the soft peg. We tried the hard peg. It didn't work so good So what's left is floating Which would be difficult to manage given the depth of the of the financial markets And I think that floating between Germany and France is a non-starter at this point I just don't see it. So it seems to me We have to accept the fact that there is no we know that that there is no good or perfect My tree system or exchange rate arrangement, but this is probably the best we can get so we better Make the best of it So second point So what is it that I think doesn't work very well? Why is it that the euro is not functioning? Perfectly, it's due to and the original said and a shock mentioned that and Mandel gave conditions for an optimal currency area And it's fairly clear that on its face the euro just did not satisfy those conditions, right? So even you need all the countries to have the same shocks, which we found that it's not the case Or you need a lot of mobility of factors so that when one country does poorly people move to the other and There are limits to this when people don't speak the same language And so the only thing which is left is that when you have a shock you have to have an adjustment of competitiveness you have to have an adjustment of Relative prices and that is what is not working. Well when Ashok refers to the inability of Italy to Depreciate it could in principle do it at a fixed exchange rate within the euro But it would have to decrease prices and wages and that's what's Not happening. So I think that's the source of the pond Again Europe has many other palms and they interact with this but this one is I think the implication of the euro itself So the third point is why is it so bad? Well, we know and we've seen it now. We've seen it in two ways first we saw the very large current account deficits of the countries in the south be the Greece be the Portugal the Spain and How dangerous it was? Both because it would come to an end naturally or it could create a sudden stop and we saw that so we saw that when you Cannot adjust your relative price and you run very large current account deficits Then you run into trouble now. We're seeing the opposite. We're seeing basically an enormous German current account surplus It's a bit of a different beast because you can sustain the surplus more or less forever But it is not a good idea from your point of view But it is and something which affects the others and basically other things equal the current account surplus of Germany is leading to your appreciation Which is clearly affecting other countries as all kinds of other effects, which I will not discuss so lack of adjustment of prices and wages Has major implications as that we know these implications can basically determine politics and we're seeing this So the question is what is it? So if we take this as the issue Why is it that the adjustment is so low so slow so difficult? And so that's my fourth point, which is very short. I think there are two reasons The first one is that not all countries play by the rules now come back to Germany I think it is not playing by the rules of the euro and that's an important point Then the other is even when they play by the rules You have a very slow response of prices and wages to the labor market and as a result You have a long period in the case of current account deficits of High unemployment and that again politically humanly politically it is very costly so let me now turn to Two rules and then to the slow response. So rules is my fifth point What are the what are the rules? The rules of the game is that countries which have current account surpluses Should basically have prices increase faster than the average so they should have more inflation Then the average and if they refuse to do that either for Contractionary fiscal policy or other means then the other countries cannot adjust and that's exactly what we're seeing in Germany Where you have contractionary fiscal policy? Limiting the amount of inflation and making the adjustment impossible. This is not Respecting the rules. I mean if somebody needs to decrease their prices below the others The others have to accept a higher price than the average So I think that that is a big issue and that's something which should be addressed and it can be addressed Under the existing institutions, but Germany has to understand that what is good for the euro And it's actually good for Germany should be allowed to happen. So higher inflation in Germany is Both for Germany and for the euro essential on the slow response of wages and prices at about one or two minutes I think there are two reasons the first one is when the average inflation rate in the euro is low and you need to have less Inflation in order to improve. It's very difficult You may have to have cuts in wages nominal wages and this is extremely difficult to achieve people do not like Cuts in wages and in seed you see that it doesn't happen. So you don't get the adjustment So that's an issue for the ECB the second which is something that I care very much about at this point Is the lack of trust between social partners in many countries in many countries? What's needed is a decrease in wages and prices which would lead to a very small decrease in real wages some but not much It could be achieved if the partners understood without the unemployment They do not agree and as a result what happens is you have a long period of unemployment Which forces the same outcome, but with five or ten years of hardship And here it seems to me that that's that the level of countries I'm thinking of my own in France The level of discussions the between the social partners is extremely poor It used to be much better on the indicative planning in the old days where the partners would sit down and see what could be done And then they agreed or they did not agree, but at least they discussed the issues. It's not happening. So I just conclude What would I do higher inflation at the your level? I would love more than two percent, but I accept two percent I want two percent at least Respect for the rules in the case of Germany and the other countries, but Germany in this case Improvement in labor relations, which is a national issue Let me end there and mention one issue I did not discuss because I do not think it's an essential reform is fiscal union I fully agree with Jean Claude about the banking union capital markets union But I don't think the fiscal union is an essential part of the solution Good. Thank you and thanks for sticking to the time to all three