 Good morning, everyone, and thank you for joining us for this session on the strategic outlook for ASEAN. My name is Warren Fernandez, and I'm editor-in-chief of the Straits Times in Singapore. And this session is jointly organized by the World Economic Forum and the Straits Times in Singapore. And we are very happy to collaborate with WEF on this subject because covering the strategic outlook of Southeast Asia and the wider Asian region has been our key focus for many, many years, and we've been watching this story for decades. Some of you will know that the Straits Times was founded in 1845, during an earlier era of globalization, and it was precisely to track that flow of goods and people and ideas from China through Southeast Asia onto India and Europe and vice versa, passing through that strategic straits of Malacca, hence the name of the paper, Straits Times. And this story has been of interest to us over the last few years and decades, especially given the rising economies in our part of the world, but also because of the growing strategic tensions between the U.S. and China, which informs much of what we do. My colleagues, I've been watching this, they do a series of features called PowerPlay and also a recent series of videos called Flashpoints Asia. And these are helpfully on the little postcards from Singapore, which you find on your seats for your reference. But this is how the EU president, Ursula von Deladen, recently characterized the region into Pacific and Asia. She referred to it as both a thriving region and a theater of tensions, a thriving region but also a theater of tensions. And she added that the EU wants to play a more active role and take responsibility for the region, which is so vital for our prosperity. So a region full of promise, but not without its perils. And it seems to me that the strategic outlook for ASEAN turns on this question of how we get the balance between being a thriving region as opposed to a theater of tensions right. And to help me grapple with this issue, I have a very distinguished panel, a diverse panel. I'm going to introduce them very briefly, starting from my left. First of all, I have Dr. Lin Kwok from the Shangri-La dialogue, a Shangri-La dialogue senior fellow for Asia Pacific from the Institute of International Institute for Strategic Studies, the IWS, based in Singapore. Then next to her, I have Tengku Mohamad Taufik, president and group CEO of Petronas in Malaysia. And then Shinta Vijayakamdhani, who is coordinating vice chair, maritime investment and international relations at the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Kadin. And further down the left, we have Matthias Corman, who is Secretary General for the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development. And then we are especially delighted today to have with us the Honorable Prime Minister of Cambodia, Hun Sen. Prime Minister, thank you for joining us. He's also the chair of ASEAN at the moment. And he's told me he wants to sort of be here to listen and absorb the discussion that's going to take place. And then at the end of the proceedings, he would share his thoughts and takeaways of what he will bring home to ASEAN for further discussions in the region. Prime Minister, I hope your trip to Davos has been fruitful and interesting so far. And you've got interesting discussions lined up. We'll be looking forward to hearing your comments. Please. Thank you for your comment. And thank you for the participation from others. Of course, this year we are proud to be ASEAN chair in 2022. In fact, ASEAN is 55 years old and has become a community filled with peace, security, stability, innovation and prosperity. ASEAN has also played an important role in political and economic architecture at regional and global levels. Actually in addition to recent challenges such as the COVID-19 crisis, the Ukraine war and the issue in Yenma, we are all aware that we are at the critical juncture in the history of the world where the rule-based international order supported by multilateral mechanisms has also been shaken. In this regard, as the ASEAN chair, Cambodia will focus on capturing the rising momentum of ASEAN and making ASEAN to be more vibrant, competitive and attractive through promoting the development of ASEAN community, addressing ASEAN challenges, and participating with ASEAN partners in addressing the regional and global common challenges. I look forward to hearing from our panelists here on the strategic outlook on ASEAN. Thank you. Thank you, Prime Minister. We'll come back at the end and hear your final thoughts to wrap up our session. But let me get the discussion going by raising the question for Lin. I'm sure, like many of us, you've been following all the developments that have been taking place back home in Asia while we're all here in Davos. So yesterday we had the launch of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. There were remarks about Taiwan, which has caused a bit of a stir. We've had recently the ASEAN US Summit in Washington. But there was also the launch of the Global Strategic Security Initiative by Beijing. And I'd like to get your sense, you know, of all this flurry of activities happening, what you make of these developments and also what are the key challenges facing ASEAN or opportunities, as it may be, to help us get on the right side of that equation of, you know, between being the thriving region as opposed to a theater of tensions. Thank you, Warren. And thank you, everyone, for being here today. I'm delighted to be here at Davos. And it's wonderful to see some familiar faces in the room. It's really good to see everyone. I think what you've just outlined, Warren, you know, it represents a flurry of diplomatic outreach both on the part of the United States, but also on the part of China to seek to engage the Southeast Asian region more actively, to enhance the engagement with the region. And I think this probably sets in context what's going on in the region and also sort of the challenges that the region finds itself facing, namely, in a sense, being caught up. It's nice to be wooed by both sides, but also it's not so nice to feel like you have to choose. And I think very often Southeast Asian countries, and I'm speaking about Southeast Asia more generally because, of course, the context impacts ASEAN, the institution as well. And Southeast Asian countries often feel like they're caught between a rock and a hard place because they feel like they have to choose as U.S.-China competitions squeezes the region. They have sometimes felt that their strategic options are being narrowed as we see increasing tensions between the United States as well as China. And they do not want to have to choose, if I put it quite simply, between the U.S. as a security provider and China as its rainmaker. I mean, it's a little bit more complex than that, but in a sense, that's the dichotomy. U.S. with security, China for not just current economic opportunities, but also future economic opportunities as well. So that's one challenge for the region, how U.S.-China competition might be squeezing it. The second challenge that I see, and this is less often spoken about, you often hear the region say they do not want to choose. But that refrain, in a sense, obscures a deeper seat of concern that is related to unlawful and coercive Chinese actions that we are also seeing in the region, not least in the South China Sea. Sometimes they push back against it, they make objections, but quite often they also just bear it silently. And these actions, unlawful and coercive Chinese actions, pose a real challenge to the region and amines their rules-based order that was highlighted by Prime Minister Hun Sen earlier. And it also belies the narrative that we sometimes hear that all will be well in the region, if not for outsider or Western interference. So that's the second challenge in terms of a third challenge. So the second challenge I highlighted concerns China. Third challenge relates to the United States. And I think what the region is increasingly concerned about is the United States that they see as unnecessarily confrontational and that's necessarily confrontational in terms of its relations vis-a-vis China. And I think one clear example of this is the framing of the current competition between the US and China as one between democracies and authoritarian states. And we heard President Biden just talk about that I think I heard on the news this morning. So he was saying this is a competition between democracies versus authoritarian states. But I think that this sort of framing unnecessarily deepens divisions between the United States and China. It makes issues like trade, technology, these disputes. It makes it far more difficult to resolve such issue once you throw ideology into the mix, once you start demonizing the other. So that is also very concerning. And unfortunately I think what we're seeing with the war in Ukraine and the China-Russia joint statement that was issued about two weeks before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, what we've seen with that is actually a hardening of geopolitical competition around ideological lines, which I think is immensely detrimental with Russia and China declaring a no-limits partnership. We are seeing the world threatened to cleave into the West versus the rest as liberal democracies seek to align themselves against authoritarian states. And I think this leaves much of Southeast Asia in a very uncomfortable position. You have much of Southeast Asia that are either elible democracies, backsliding democracies, or authoritarian states. And many of these countries are actually very important strategic partners for the United States and other countries who seek to promote a rules-based order. So that's the third challenge I see for the region and the fourth challenge is the rise of political and security minilaterals that, in a sense, go around the ASEAN-centered security architecture in the region. And I think this reflects a sense that ASEAN has failed to achieve the strategic interests of the United States and its allies and partners. And of course, I think the US and its allies and partners will, of course, continue to give paid lip service to ASEAN. However, without additional resources being devoted to ASEAN, we might see ASEAN by the sidelines. And finally, after this, I'll stop. I think the final challenge relates to ASEAN itself. And I think ASEAN has demonstrated a lack of unity and a lack of strategic clarity, which has relegated it to sitting on the sidelines in its own backyard. And I think two problems lie at the heart of this. Number one, I think China has successfully divided and ruled the region. And number two, I think the region, unfortunately, has, at times, or some countries within the region, have adopted a rather parochial view of their interests. And of course, I'm not saying that countries in the region should set aside their national interests and place it at the altar of multilateralism. What I am saying, however, is that four countries, especially small countries, multilateralism and multilateral organizations, are an essential means by which countries, particularly small countries, can achieve their national interests. And I think nowhere is this more true than in Southeast Asia, where countries lie in the shadow of China's, lie in the dragon's shadow and actually need to stand together or hold hands or fall divided. So I think I'll just stop there and I'll leave you to follow up. Thanks, thanks, Lynn. You talk about strategic options being narrowed, even as they're being booked, right? But it seems to me there's also a sort of contest of narratives being played out. We're hearing this in many other sessions around Davos this week. On the one hand, you have the idea of the free and open Indo-Pacific rules-based order. On the other, you have the competing idea of Asia for Asians, and this was spelled out during the Global Security Initiative, as well as in Xi Jinping's 2014 speech. And just let me repeat to you what he said. It is for the people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia and solve the problems of Asia and uphold the security of Asia. Now, tell me how you see that in terms of the competing narratives that you've referred to. Challenge or opportunity or a bit of both? I think narratives are so important. So Asia for Asians, I would prefer to cease talking about, I guess, cultural ethnic blocks, right? The West versus the West, Asia for Asians. We live in an international community. We talk about the international rules-based order. We talk about international law. I would prefer not to carve out the world into regions. We are past that. I think history has seen that, done that. Let's move on. We have international law for a reason. And so I think that sort of narrative is very damaging. And I think if we look at Asia for Asians, the problem, of course, is the issue of balance of power as well. And in Asia, there is a clear unbalance, right? We have a large country and we have very small countries. And so that doesn't quite work out. And China often accuses the United States of meddling in the region, et cetera. But the United States started looking more closely at the issues like the South China Sea in 2010, right? When it, you know, and the Secretary Clinton, who was then Secretary of State, she said that the US has national interests in the South China Sea and in freedom of navigation. But even prior to that, the region was facing very quietly, perhaps, but it was nonetheless facing concerns about Chinese encroachments into the exclusive economic zones. That's damaging. And then, on the other hand, you have the free and open Indo-Pacific, which you talked about. That's a wonderful narrative. And in fact, if we could achieve the free and open Indo-Pacific, that would be perfect, right? That is, in fact, what we should be aiming for, freedom and openness, so that ships can fly their waters of the region and trade and commerce can continue openly and freely. What we do not want to go to is have that as a sort of a cover for something that is more confrontational, that is more about achieving dominance of one country over another. And sometimes, there are hints of that in even U.S. strategic documents. So the declassified U.S. Indo-Pacific strategic framework that was declassified in January, 2021, when it was the Trump administration handing over to the Biden administration. That one, in fact, highlights U.S. goals and one of its stated goals is strategic primacy in the Indo-Pacific. That sort of language isn't ideal. And so what we should be looking for, in fact, is a free and open Indo-Pacific, but that should not be language for other motives. So keeping it inclusive. Keep it inclusive, absolutely. I'll come back to that and maybe get Matias's comments on that later. But first, I'd like to draw in our business leaders on the panel to get a slightly different perspective. So maybe first Taufik and then Shinta. Maybe you could tell us as you look around the region, how do we continue to be a thriving region rather than an area where everybody's talking about flashpoints and tensions. Taufik. Thanks, Warren. Thank you for having us here. It's an honor to be on the same stage with such a distinguished panel. Of course, Excellency, Prime Minister and Sen. Let's frame ASEAN and probably in the larger context, Asia. I think the whole narrative around Asia being for Asians already implies the region is very deeply misunderstood. And forcing us or painting us into a corner and having to choose between the two ends of this dichotomy, as you've mentioned, just worsens the situation. As a business, when I attend forums like this, I think just look around you, look at the composition of the people in attendance here, not accusing WF participants of not having the appetite, but just look at it. Just look at it. There's very little appetite to understand the quirks and the idiosyncrasies that we face as individual economies. ASEAN, more than 600 million people, potentially reaching a GDP total of six trillion within the next two decades. We're looking at a hive of activity, resource rich, all the potential, a very talented human capital pool. But this has not yet been unleashed, despite all the resources available to it, because nuances such as security are still not held upon as something that all the member states need to respect. I thank His Excellency for reiterating in his position as chair the need to have a rules-based order to an unfortunate extent also. I think Dr. Lin also raised the point of this philosophy of non-interference between each state of ASEAN. Sometimes creates these nebulous moral debates. Should we be promoting more respect for borders? Please, don't take me as a representative of the Malaysian government. What I state here is my own. What I face here, and I'm front-facing here, I have offshore facilities in the South China Sea, a little-known piece of trivia. More than 50% of the LNG that powers East Asia goes through South China Sea. The ability to deliver, Petronas has held that. We've had a very good track record of delivering up to 12,000 cargoes to our core customers in Japan, Korea, Taiwan, every China even, starting in the late 1990s. But the questions of security, the questions of ability to freely flow commerce and trade, which you cited at the outset of this dialogue, that continues to be a point of worry and concern. But of course, when I go on road shows, when I go on speaking with investors and partners, even with my team going out to promote Malaysia's bid rounds and developing resources here, this continues to be a question. Now, ASEAN has so much promise. It has suffered through the pandemic, not everybody's recovering at the same pace. Why I also want to pick on the fact that it is misunderstood, I often see, and I'm already seeing now increasingly in the WF, this emerging narrative of a global South, yet another divide. Why? Because the expectations of ESG that we have to pursue, the expectations of energy transition pace, you're painting it with a very broad brush. Each country, each economy has its own energy access, energy affordability, energy security concerns. And at a forum such as this, I would have hoped that a spectrum would have been addressed rather than one clear narrative saying this shall be the pathway. Petronas has always asserted this. Malaysia has always respected this. Even as 90% of the countries in the world committed at the last COP26 to nationally determined contributions, ASEAN has its own pace. Now, all of these, and I just bring this to a conclusion, all of these stack up to layers of demands, expectations, standards, and unfortunately it's become polarized even further with the tensions, choose a side. Why do we have to choose a side? The very fact of economic prosperity is available to all, should that not be the premise that WF pushes for? I'll conclude there. Well, come back to energy security because it's such a huge issue that's being discussed all around. But first, let me draw in Shinta. Yeah, thank you and thank you for this opportunity. Actually, I like to illustrate mine like a traffic lights for ASEAN. So I think I'm talking about ASEAN progress and achievement can be symbolized as a green light to be further developed, but also some geopolitical events and your economic shock provide ASEAN with some yellow lights or warning. And of course, the red light signs things that must be stopped and counterbalanced. So I want to give a little bit perspective on some of the positive side that we have done as well because I think in the green light, as ASEAN has moved into a regional entity that highly emphasized in some of the priority global issues, like we're talking about the green-based development at the core, the region effort through the ASEAN climate and energy project and 2015 at Zero Target. Also, we have a working group on climate change. I think has embraced us on more strategic cooperation between the environmental champion countries around the globe. The energy demand obviously is very high, but finance remains, of course, the critical challenge. And I think this is why we talk about energy transition is the financing aspect, right? So we speak therefore of fiscal spending and also how we can leverage private finance with utilization of the regional international funds. But I want to also on the decarbonization natural economy, I think we are standing with many countries and not in the same level, I agree with topic. So when we talk about the decarbonization technology, how we can put that in which perspective and how we can actually... So many of the narratives are there, but how can you actually execute it? But I want to especially also recognize that we have tried very hard to enhance our intra-regional trade and investment cooperation. And this is very much integrated into our global supply chain. I think the ASEAN government recently have agreed to push back against globalization protectionist measure with a more transparency, predatory role-based and open trade and investment system. And I think this, I believe, stands on its right path. But of course, what are yellow lights? And this is something I think some Dr. Lin also mentioned and Taufiq mentioned a little bit that ASEAN countries have divergent interests, very sure. And priorities also, of course, have to be different. And in a way, who are we? We are not... I mean, I know Dr. Lin mentioned ASEAN is not united. Well, each of us have our own interests. And with that also come the competition. You know, every time we talk about Indonesia wanting to push our investment, we always compete ourselves with Vietnam. What Vietnam has done? Why Vietnam has been able to attract more investment than Indonesia? So, you know, I think members have between access and capacity to reap the benefit of our integration, but it prompts further challenges. And second, I think we have disparity and income level gap as well. And this is how we are both exposed with this thing turned out from the regional integration, either from economic production, good services, distribution, and human connectivity. And I can obviously explore more, but you can really see this, I think, a gap. And the second thing is, the dynamic domestic political changes also have fundamental impact on the regional economic cooperation. ASEAN has always been strategic for the global and multilateral economic and trade partnership and we can mention RCEP, which is, you know, RCEP, CPTPP, and BII. And of course, you mentioned about the newest US Indo-Pacific economic framework, many, right? But even with the Indo-Pacific, US Indo-Pacific, not all ASEAN countries are participating. They're still not very clear on what this is all, what DINIPIC is this. So, those, I think, members must work together to obviously strong a more credible and well-functioned ASEAN with varying different position. But I wanted to also, I think, navigate the major power competition effectively. I think this is a red flag to how we can avoid the unintended consequences. I think the reason I have to mention the Ukraine-Russia crisis remind us not to over-reliance over any countries or good services and capitals, and it could impact the regional consumption, supply chain stability, and account balance. So all members must consistently provide and open to new opportunity, I think, for trade and investment type with alternative parties. So I think this is what we need to continue working on, but this is definitely a key red flag that we need to open our mind. And I think I wanted to also share that as the chairmanship of G20 this year, I think Indonesia, I've been tasked to chair the B20. I think we discussed all these issues as well, and we want to align with, because we will, after our presidency, this year of the G20, will be the president of ASEAN, taking over from Cambodia. So many of these issues also will be aligned as well. Thank you. So some red lights flashing, some yellow and some green as well. So thank you for that other perspective as well. But very quickly you mentioned the Indo-Pacific economic framework. I'd like to get a quick brief response from the two business leaders. Is this something you welcome, or are you skeptical about it, or is it more wait-and-see? Shinta and Tafiq. Please, Doctor. Okay, thank you. Look, when CPTPP first came to Malaysia shores, even sector like Petronas, you were looking at promoting competition, but also protecting a degree of nurturing for SMEs, because inevitably, SMEs pick up a huge proportion of our respective GDPs. There was a metered approach in allowing competition to come through. Of course, these are not things that are being imposed upon us to become less competitive, or these are draconian measures. We're talking about improving degrees of trade. The very things that we are proposing right now that we would be put under a microscope for, ESG. Everybody thinks about dealing with emissions front and center, but there's, of course, the society and also the governments that you need to deal with. And I think this offered a pathway. We saw this very early on, at least in Petronas level, having to deal with emissions, having to deal with labor standards, having to allow for competition. We see this, we anticipate it, and we have to prepare for it. That is the very nature of open economies and joining such multilateral trade agreements. You just have to make sure you're robust enough, resilient enough, which should be at the core of every commercial enterprise. But it is not without the risk of unintended consequences. Okay, so sounds like you're welcome, but with some caveat. Shinta? Well, I have to share this story, because this is really fun. Before the actual summit, the US asset summit, so I brought the business, Indonesia business delegation, and we met with a number of good government officials, the US, including US trade, even the US commerce and so forth, USDR, US government, and they, of course, mentioned about the Indo-Pacific framework agreement. And the question is, what is it, right? And I really like the narrative, because in the narrative clearly said, connected economy, resilient economy, clean economy, fair economy. Wow, I said, this is amazing. But what's in it for the business? How is this going to impact the business, right? So I think there's still very much uncleanness of course, it seems like US seems to be committed and say, we will invest. So the world wants to invest, already give us a very big optimism. Oh, that means US will invest to us, right? And, but I think there is no market, this is not like a regular negotiate-trade agreement. So there's still very uncleanness. So I would say that our position is we are open-minded, we want to hear more what it is, but what's in it for us, for business? Open-minded, but let's see what's in it for us. Okay, let me bring in Matthias now. You've been waiting very patiently. But as someone watching all of this discussion and all this playing out in our region, what's your sense? Well, the first point, sort of picking up on the question that you posed at the beginning, is that ASEAN very clearly is a thriving region in its own right. I think we should be very clear about that. I mean, the successes that ASEAN have achieved. I mean, ASEAN as a whole is the fifth largest economy in the world, home to about 660 million people. And ASEAN is made up of successful export-focused trading nations, and ASEAN has its own interest in well-functioning global markets in a rules-based international system in good working order. So from where I sit, it's not so much about picking sides. It's about advancing its own interest in well-functioning global markets, a rules-based international trading system. And in terms of how has ASEAN and economies across ASEAN achieved the incredible progress in rising incomes, in reducing poverty, it's through, yes, increased regional market integration, but it's also through increased integration into the global market, it's through trade and investment liberalization. And on that front, on all of these fronts, I think that there is further that ASEAN economies can go to further strengthen the opportunities. I mean, countries around the world were thrown back, of course, in the context of the pandemic. And one of the key risks across ASEAN and the rest of the world for that matter is to continue to do everything we can to stay on top of the pandemic risk in the context of potential new variants. But beyond that, I mean, there is a lot of untapped potential still to unleash private sector-driven growth through regulatory reforms. I mean, even just looking at the logistics arrangements out of ASEAN, which are so important for export-focused trading economies, you know, a regulatory refresh could substantially boost economic growth. And that is not about taking sides. This is not about anything strategic. This is essentially just good economic reform, good domestically, good focus, structural reform. In terms of competition policy, in terms of making sure that there is a level of playing field between state-owned enterprises and private sector businesses and so on, there's a whole range of areas where I think ASEAN can go even further and to further advance the regional market integration and the integration into the global economy, I think, you know, are all important aspects of ASEAN's future success. But our assessment of ASEAN's growth into the future is very optimistic. Thank you, Matias. I think at last night's ASEAN dinner. Please, yeah, did you? Okay, if not, let me raise a question, which is to draw in some of the conversations that we're hearing elsewhere in Davos, because we've been talking about the strategic outlook so far, largely on the geopolitical and security aspect. But the strategic outlook also depends much on food prices and energy prices and the cost of living. And someone described the worker caught in between all these forces drawing in on him. I'd like to get a sense from the two business leaders on the panel, how do you see those challenges playing out in the next few weeks, months and years ahead for ASEAN? May I see it, you know, let's talk about oil, palm restrictions and now there's a chicken spat between Malaysia and Indonesia and Singapore on chicken exports. How can ASEAN work together to get through these challenges on energy and food and cost of living? Jita, you want to start? No, please go ahead. This is something that's probably, again, an alien concept. This is why I'm an alien concept to the denizens in WF. We often talk about the long play the next decade in many households, hundreds of millions of households in Asia, in parts of Asia. They're not talking about the next decade, they're talking about next week. Can I put food on the table next week? I mentioned at the outset affordable, accessible, secure energy still remains a top concern for many of the governments in Asia. Something like Ukraine happens and this is real. I think we're talking about 40% of the gas into Europe being removed from the system, three to four million barrels of production, making its way in different routes to the market. We're looking at, as I spoke to the press yesterday, $111 rent. We now have a combination of this energy-pushed inflation combined with commodity scarcity. Countries have responded by either restricting exports. We've lost wheat out of Ukraine. All of this is converged and what worries me in Davos is there's already whisperings of increasing de-globalization. Yes, keep hearing that word. Yeah, and I think at a time like this, and you've almost answered your own question there, where at a time like this it's collaboration that's going to get us through. Cyclicality with energy is getting to a point where it's ridiculous. I was quoted in the Sierra Week by saying it's bedlam because there's no fundamentals to this anymore. It doesn't make sense. We're there to ensure a reliable supply of energy to our customers. But if you ask me, ask any energy CEO, what prices are going to be next month, forget next year, most of us will get it wrong. We combine this with the complexities of a food ecosystem which is under threat. No gas means no urea, no fertilizers, no farm feed. The knock-on effects are immense. We're all part of a global supply chain. Now the more these whisperings of de-globalization emerge, the more regions are compelled to collaborate and more and more the philosophy of regionalization is emerging. And in ASEAN's context, in fact, the trade routes, the connections, the trade relations have already been deep for a very long time. We can remain resilient. I think in so far as the context of energy food, that just needs to be more openness, more coordination, collaboration. Easiest said than done. This has to be done across jurisdictions and sovereign nations, all dealing with their own distinct and unique challenges for society. But we do know what happened in the Middle East when energy and food prices converged. Many times this has been cited. It led to an Arab Spring. Let's not allow this to happen in ASEAN if I may implore everyone. Lynn wants to come in on that, but I'll get Shinto to you on this issue of de-globalization and diversification. I wanted to say, it's basically what Kofi said. It's easier said than done. We do want to collaborate. We want to put the regional cooperation and so forth, but at the end, each government has to protect their own, we talk about food, we talk about energy. That's really a priority. I'm thinking there are two aspects that I would like to see as the more medium-long-time risk as well. First, this is stagflation, obviously. I think so much, it costs very stagnating or even declining real economic growth or employment growth. I think this condition might happen if there's a continuously high or higher inflation throughout 2022. And this obviously will continue disruption of our global viral change and rise in commodity prices we're already seeing. But the other thing that I wanted to mention is there is definitely a geopolitically polarized GF, the Global Value Chain Reorganization. And I think depends on how this conflict progressing, there might be a real long-term risk of having a polarized global economy based on geopolitical alliances or solidarity. And this has to be, I think, really underlined. What's even thinking about like a Cold War, right? Given to the tendency of countries throwing and accumulating sanctions to each other while at the same time increasing neglecting rules of the multilateral trading system. So US, EU, and I refocke even the MFN treatment to Russia. So all this, I think, try to pull and push other countries to be pro or against will definitely impact this, you know, the global value chain, ASEAN position. Really, I think we need to really pay attention to this. Okay, briefly, I'll give Lynn the last word on this because we are running out of time on this strategic issue on other fronts. Well, I just wanted to respond to some of the points that were made earlier by the business leaders. And I've heard a lot about the necessity, the imperative of economic growth and development, et cetera. And I fully share that view. However, I think economic growth is built on the backbone of an international rules-based order which has international law at its heart. We have Petronas represented on the panel. And I believe it was just last year when Petronas had sent the West Capella, which is a ship that surveyed for oil and gas within Malaysia's exclusive economic zone. But Petronas, but the West Capella unfortunately faced harassment from Chinese vessels that were seeking to stop or deter Malaysia from drilling for or surveying for oil and gas in Malaysia's exclusive economic zone. So in a sense, you cannot have growth and development without proper security, without security and an international rules-based order. So that's the first point I'd like to make. The second point I'd like to make is, yes, countries should not have to choose. I do not disagree with that. However, it cannot be about inactively or being really passive about things. Countries do have to stand to put something. And I take Shinta's point that, all the Southeast Asian countries have got diverse interests. Yes, and they're sometimes competitors as well. But I think there is a shared interest in principles and a shared interest that they need to be in an environment where they can have a situation where it's not about might is right, but it's about the rule of law. And I think that's very important. I think Southeast Asia or in ASEAN need to focus and have strategic unity in terms of like, we don't want to choose, but we do stand for something. And what we stand for is about principles and the rule of law. Thank you. So shared principles and shared interest in trying to build on that. I'm afraid we've run out of time. So I'm going to turn to our Prime Minister Hun Sen, who's been listening intently throughout. And maybe you can give us your closing thoughts, your takeaways from this discussion that you will bring back to ASEAN in your role as a chair. Please, Prime Minister. Thank you very much. I don't know how much time do I have because you have taken a lot of my time already. And I saw only two minutes remaining. However, I have the role to take some notes on the discussed issues. First of all, we should see that ASEAN is a community which is in the situation where it got the impact from the outside. Of course, what we agreed here is that we took note on not to take side with anybody. I take note that our friends who are superpowers also told us that it is not necessary to take part with anyone. And we also emphasize that although you asked us to take side, we will not do so. However, this Dr. Lin from Singapore also mentioned that we do not take side, but we also have a position, for example, on the trade. We cannot just not take side but not working with anyone. What I want to add is that the geopolitical rivalry makes ASEAN a lot of difficulties. The point is that now we see the Indo-Pacific initiatives. How many of these initiatives? Indo-Pacific of US, of Australia, of Japan, Indo-Pacific initiative of Europe, and other initiatives related in the region. But for me, I announced in principle that in any initiative related to Indo-Pacific must serve three purposes, whether we should support or not. Number one, that should serve for peace, security, and development. This is number one. Number two, not against any country because we are not aligned with anyone. Number three, it must serve the ASEAN centrality because ASEAN centrality, we remember clearly that that was the initiative from Indonesia who prepared the ASEAN outlook on the Indo-Pacific, which has become a working plan of the ASEAN. So we also have the Indo-Pacific initiative. We don't just ASEAN support others, but others should also support ASEAN initiative. This is what I want to raise here. Don't just see that ASEAN follow others. Any outside mechanism from ASEAN, we need to be cautious. Because they say they respect ASEAN centrality. But if ASEAN just support others and others do not support ASEAN initiative, so what is the point on the focus of what? These are also related to us. We should also take into account the issue. Of course, there are different interpretations. Even though in DC, there was some people who should not say it, but they said that on the court. Because court is not ASEAN mechanism, but at the end of the discussion, Indonesia is the coordinating country between ASEAN and the United States. Cambodia is the ASEAN chair relating to the court initiative fighting against the COVID-19 regarding the vaccines. Because we don't want to have any alignment and against the others. But on the other issue is that on the South China Sea, of course, South China Sea is a process. There are challenges and some good points. This is the 20th anniversary of the signing on the DOC, the declaration on the parties to the South China Sea. We are also promoting the COC. What Cambodia has raised so far and the process, the point is that we need to respect the DOC. DOC clearly states that about the freedom of navigation overflight and the on-close 1982. So first, we need to have the full and effective implementation of the DOC. And secondly, the related parties have to be at utmost restraint because Cambodia is not claiming country, but Cambodia wants to see bilateral resettlement if they can do. And the number three, we need to create the COC for the South China Sea. And we try our effort to make it this year. But we don't know how much hope remains. We encourage more negotiation between ASEAN and China. I even announced that I can provide the five-star hotel of Hyatt for negotiation place, but nobody show any willingness to come to Penongpeng for negotiation. I will bear the burden. I hired the five-star hotel for ASEAN-China negotiation for the COC. So this is something should be raised. And lastly, I want to emphasize, actually not the last one, but the flashing point relevant to what has happened. While COVID-19 crisis, Myanmar is very hot issue. South China Sea is very hot issue. But a few days ago, I told in ASEAN US Special Summit, I said that I am the ASEAN chair this year as if I receive the hot stone, not the hot potato. If hot potato, I can eat. But hot stone, on Myanmar, on other issues, but the severe issue is the Russian invasion of Ukraine. That is the most severe problem for us. Because if during the COVID-19 start to ease Cambodia today, it's the 17th day where zero infection case has happened. After the pouring of vaccination of almost 94% of coverage rate, but the effect of this war between Ukraine and Russia is a very severe problem. This is actually not a global military war. But the economic war starts because, you see, the price of fuel starts to rise everywhere. Even though Petronas producing oil, you cannot sell at a cheaper price than the global market. So now we are entering the energy crisis. I see whether 2023 could be a food crisis year because the wheat production now have the problems. I hope that in ASEAN, not so severe, relatively, because almost half of ASEAN members producing rice. However, with this food crisis, it also creates a challenge for us. Therefore, if we don't find the solution quickly on the Russian invasion in Ukraine, this will prolong and create more severe crisis. I am in agreement with the Madam from Indonesia. Now, the countries who do not directly involve with the problem, we are facing the dilemma. On one hand, the Ukraine-Russian issue. The other one is the sanctions. Sanctions should be stopped because it doesn't create any benefit. Even if the country putting sanctions also affected not only the poor countries, the countries put or imposed sanctions on Russia, what do they get back? This is the problem. I give you an example. If Russia cut off gas to Europe, what is the alternative? Whether you cut wood to cook rice to cook your food? So this is not the point where Russia cut off all gas yet. But now, what has exported to Russia and out of Russia is compared to the closing of the door. If you close the door, you cannot get out. And the other cannot get in. So the sanctions impacted us, who are not directly involved. So this is the problem which is created out of sanctions. So lastly, that I want to raise here for ASEAN. This year, we have made our effort as what I have raised. But we need to take the opportunity to promote integration through AFTA framework, through free trade agreement between ASEAN and other partners, including ASAP, which has been into force. When COVID started in ASEAN, we took separate measures. We closed the borders, but now ASEAN start to coordinate together on how to open borders and open trade. The trade volume between Cambodia and other ASEAN members, especially neighboring countries, have been increasing. This is a complementarity within the trade of economic relation. So we should take this year as a good year, because ASEAN is held in Cambodia, G20 in Indonesia, and APEC to be held in Thailand. So we need to seize the opportunity out of this. Thank you. Prime Minister, for dealing with all those hot stones and hot tables, I think we have to wrap up. Please thank all my panelists. Thank you very much.