 CHAPTER XVII. The Commission believes that our present system of public assistance contributes materially to the tensions and social disorganization that have led to civil disorders. The failures of the system alienate the taxpayers who support it, the social workers who administer it, and the poor who depend on it. As one critic told the Commission, the welfare system is designed to save money instead of people and tragically ends up doing neither. The system is deficient in two critical ways. First, it excludes large numbers of persons who are in great need, and who, if provided a decent level of support, might be able to become more productive and self-sufficient. Second, for those who are included, it provides assistance well below the minimum necessary for a humane level of existence, and imposes restrictions that encourage continued dependency on welfare and undermine self-respect. In short, while the system is indispensable simply because, for millions, mostly children, it supports basic needs, drastic reforms are required if it is to help people free themselves from poverty. Existing welfare programs are a labyrinth of federal, state, and local legislation. Over 90% of national welfare payments are made through programs that are partly or largely federally funded. These reach nearly eight million persons each month. Two point eight million are over sixty-five, blind, or otherwise severely handicapped. Three point nine million are children in the Aid for Dependent Children program, AFDC, whose parents do not or cannot provide financial support. One point three million are the parents of children on AFDC. Of these, over one million are mothers, and less than two hundred thousand are fathers. About two-thirds of the fathers are incapacitated. Only sixty thousand fathers are in the special program called Aid to Families with Dependent Children Unemployed Parents, AFDC UP, operating now in twenty-two states. Among all the welfare programs, AFDC and AFDC UP have clearly the greatest impact on youths and families in central city areas. For this reason they will be the principal focus for discussion here. State and local governments contribute an average of about forty-five percent of the cost of supporting the AFDC program, with each state setting the level of grants for its own residents. Accordingly monthly payments vary widely from state to state. They range from nine dollars and thirty cents per AFDC recipient monthly in Mississippi to a high of sixty-two dollars and fifty-five cents in New York. In fiscal year nineteen sixty-seven the total annual cost of the AFDC program, including federal, state, and local contributions, was approximately two billion dollars, providing an average of about thirty-six dollars monthly for each recipient. This sum is well below the poverty subsistence level under almost any standard. The National Advisory Council on Public Welfare has commented, �The national average provides little more than half the amount admittedly required by a family for subsistence. In some low-income states it is less than a quarter of that amount. The low public assistance payments contribute to the perpetuation of poverty and deprivation that extend into future generations. Over the last six years, despite the longest sustained period of economic progress in the history of this country, the AFDC caseload has risen each year while the unemployment rate has fallen. Fiscal years increased nationally by three hundred nineteen thousand during fiscal year nineteen sixty-seven, and will, under present HEW estimates, increase by another six hundred eighty-six thousand during the fiscal year nineteen sixty-eight. The burden of welfare and the burden of the increases will fall principally on our central cities. In New York City alone five hundred twenty-five thousand people receive AFDC support, and seven thousand to ten thousand more are added each month, and it is estimated that in nineteen sixty-five nationwide over fifty percent of persons eligible to receive assistance under welfare programs were not enrolled. In addition to the AFDC program almost all states have a program of general assistance to provide minimum payments based largely or entirely on need. During calendar year nineteen sixty-six the state spent three hundred thirty-six million dollars on general assistance. No federal funds have ever been available for this program. In fact no federal funds have ever been available for millions of unemployed or underemployed men or women in the United States who are in need but are neither aged, severely handicapped nor the parents of minor children. The dimensions of this pool of poor but unassisted individuals and families, either ineligible under present programs or eligible but unenrolled, is indicated by the fact that in nineteen sixty-six there were twenty-one point seven million non-aged persons in the United States with incomes below the poverty level as defined by the Social Security Administration. Only a third of these received assistance from major public welfare programs. The bulk of the non-aged poor live in families where there is a breadwinner who works either every day or who had worked a part of the year, so that the picture that people have of who the poor are is quite a different thing from an analysis of the poverty population, and what we have done in effect is carve out, because of our categorical approach to public assistance, a certain group of people within that overall poverty population to give help to. Seventy percent of the non-aged poor families were headed by men, and fifty percent of these held full-time jobs, and eighty-six percent of them worked at least part of the year, so that the typical poor family is much like the typical American family, except they don't make enough money, and they have been historically excluded from the AFDC program. The gaps in coverage and low levels of payments are the source of much of the long-term dissatisfaction with the system. The day-to-day administration of the system creates even sharper bitterness and dissatisfaction, because it repeatedly serves to remind recipients that they are considered untrustworthy, ungrateful, promiscuous, and lazy. Among the most troublesome statutory requirements and administrative practices and regulations are the following. First, in most states benefits are available only when a parent is absent from the home. Thus in these states an unemployed father, whose family needs public assistance in order to survive, must either abandon his family or see them go hungry. This so-called man-in-the-house rule was intended to prevent payments to children who have an alternative potential source of support. In fact, the rule seems to have fostered the break-up of homes and perpetuated reliance on welfare. The irritation caused by the rule is aggravated in some states by regular searches of recipients' homes to ferret out violations. Second, and until recently, all amounts earned by adult welfare recipients on outside jobs, except for small allowances for expenses, were deducted directly from the welfare payments they would otherwise have received. This practice, required by federal law, appears to have taken away from many recipients the incentive to seek part or full-time employment. The 1967 amendments to the welfare laws permit retention of the first thirty dollars earned by a recipient each month, and one-third of all earnings above that amount. This is a start in the right direction, but does not go nearly far enough. New York City has, for example, begun experimenting with a promising program that allows welfare mothers to keep the first eighty-five dollars of earnings each month, and a percentage of amounts above that. Third, in most states there is a residency requirement, generally averaging around a year before a person is eligible to receive welfare. These state regulations were enacted to discourage persons from moving from one state to another to take advantage of higher welfare payments. In fact, they appear to have had little, if any, impact on migration, and have frequently only served to prevent those in greatest need, desperately poor families arriving in a strange city, from receiving the boost that might have given them a fresh start. Fourth, though large amounts are being spent on social service programs for families, children, and young people, few of these programs have been effective. In the view of the Advisory Council on Public Welfare, the inadequacies in social services are themselves a major source of such social evils as crime and juvenile delinquency, mental illness, illegitimacy, multi-generational dependency, slum environments, and the widely deplored climate of unrest, alienation, and discouragement among many groups in the population. A final example of the systems in adequacy is the brittle relationship that exists between many welfare workers and the poor. The cumulative, abrasive effects of the low levels of assistance, the complicated eligibility requirements, the continuing efforts required by regulations to verify eligibility, often by means that constitute flagrant invasions of privacy, have often brought about an adversary relationship between the caseworker and the recipient family. This is intensified by the fact that the investigative requirements not only force continuing confrontations, but in those states where the same worker performs both investigative and service functions, leave the worker little time to provide service. As was stated by Liesl Carter, Assistant Secretary of Health Education and Welfare, in testimony before the Commission, we think it is extremely important that welfare recipients begin to feel that the welfare worker is on their side instead of on the side of the agency. There have been statements made that the welfare workers are among the most hated persons in the ghetto, and one of the studies shows that the recipients tend to feel that what the worker says is something that cannot be challenged. Nowhere do you get the feeling that the worker is there to really go to bat for recipients in dealing with the other pressures that they face in the community. One manifestation of the tension and dissatisfaction created by the present system has been the growth of national and local welfare protest groups. Some are seeking to precipitate a national welfare crisis, in part by bringing on the welfare roles so many new recipients that America will be forced to face the enormity of its poverty problem. Others, often composed of welfare recipients or welfare workers, seek expanded welfare programs and attack day to day inequities in the administration of the system. On the other hand, many Americans who advocate better housing, better schools, and better employment opportunities for disadvantaged citizens oppose welfare programs of all kinds in the belief that they subsidize people who should be working. The fact is, as we have pointed out, that all but a small fraction of welfare recipients are disabled because of age, ill health, or the need to care for small children. Even more basic is the fact that the heads of most poor families who can work are working and are not on welfare. For both of these groups the people in need, those who cannot work and those who can and do, the problem in at least one vital respect is the same. Lack of a sufficient income to provide them with the kind of base on which they can begin to build a path out of poverty, if not for themselves at least for their children. An altered and expanded welfare system, by extending support to more of those in need, by raising levels of assistance on a uniform national basis, and by eliminating demeaning restrictions, could begin to recapture the rich human resources that are being wasted by poverty. Basic Strategies In framing strategies to attack welfare problems, the Commission recognizes that a number of fundamental questions remain to be answered. Although many of the present inadequacies in the system can be identified and specific changes recommended, long-term measures for altering the system are still untested. A first strategy is to learn more about how welfare affects people and what its possibilities are for creative use. We endorse the recommendation of the Advisory Council on Public Welfare for greatly expanded research. We also commend the experimental incentive programs being carried out through the Department of Health Education and Welfare and the Office of Economic Opportunity, as well as the Model Cities program through which some cities hope to develop integrated programs of income supplementation, job training, and education. We further commend the President's recent creation of a Commission on Income Maintenance programs which may provide answers to the complex problems here presented. Despite the questions left open, we believe that many specific inadequacies in the present structure can and should be corrected. The most important basic strategy we would recommend is to overhaul the existing categorical system to, A, provide more adequate levels of assistance on the basis of uniform national standards, B, reduce the burden on state and local government by financing assistance costs almost entirely with federal funds, C, create new incentives to work and eliminate the features that cause hardship and dependency, D, improve family planning and other social services to welfare recipients. Our longer range strategy, one for which we can offer only tentative guides, is the development of a national system of income supplementation to provide a basic floor of economic and social security for all Americans, suggested programs overhauling the present system. To repair the defects in the existing categorical system is not simply a matter of changing one or two aspects. Major changes are needed in at least seven areas. Standards of Assistance. The federal government should develop a minimum income standard for individuals and families enrolled in AFDC. The standard for AFDC recipients should be at least as high as the subsistence poverty level periodically determined by the Social Security Administration. Only a few states now approach this poverty level, which is currently set at $3,335 for an urban family of four. Amending legislation should, if feasible, also permit cost of living variations among the states and within high cost areas in each state. As a critical first step toward raising assistance levels, the Commission recommends that the present provisions under which the federal government pays $15.18 of the first $18 of AFDC monthly payments be amended to provide that the federal government will assume the entire first $15 and the same proportion of payments beyond $15 presently applied to that above $18. Taken together with existing legislation that requires the states to maintain levels of support when federal assistance rates are increased, the effect of this change would be to raise by over one-third the monthly welfare payments in eight states in the deep south. In Mississippi payments would be more than doubled. Extension of AFDC UP The Commission strongly urges that the temporary legislation enacted in 1961, which extends the AFDC programs to include needy families with two unemployed parents, be made permanent and mandatory on all states, and that the new federal definition of unemployment be broadened. This program, which reaches the family while it is still intact, has been put into effect in only twenty-two states. Even in states where it has been implemented, the numbers participating have been small, partly because many states have narrowly defined the term unemployment, and partly because the number of broken homes makes many children eligible under the regular form of AFDC. Financing Because the states are unable to bear substantially increased welfare costs, the federal government should absorb a far greater share of the financial burden than it presently does. At least two methods are worth considering to achieve this end. The first would be to rearrange payment formulas so that even at the highest levels of payments the federal government absorbed ninety percent or more of the costs. A second method would be to have the federal government assume one hundred percent of the incrementing costs that would be encountered through raising standards of assistance and rendering AFDC up mandatory. Under either of these approaches the share of costs presently imposed on municipal governments should be removed to release their limited resources for other uses. Work Incentives and Training In three important ways steps were taken in the 1967 amendments to the Federal Welfare Act to encourage or compel welfare recipients to seek employment. Each of these controversial steps had some salutary aspects, but each requires substantial further attention. Job Training The amendments provide substantially greater funds for job training. This was in principle a wise step. The amendments also, however, require the states to condition grants to appropriate adult welfare recipients on their willingness to submit to job training. Though the commission agrees that welfare recipients should be encouraged to accept employment or job training, we strongly disagree with compelling the mothers of small children to work or else lose welfare support. Many mothers we believe will want to work. A recent study of about one thousand five hundred welfare mothers in New York City indicated that seventy percent of all mothers and eighty percent of Negro mothers would prefer to work than stay at home. Daycare Centers for Children The 1967 amendments provide funds for the first time for daycare programs for children of working mothers. Further expansion is desirable to make centers an effective means of enabling welfare recipients to take advantage of training and employment opportunities. Efforts should be made to ensure that centers are open in the evening and that more education features are built into center programs. State and federal standards that prevent centers from employing sub-professional workers, including welfare recipient mothers, should be removed. Welfare mothers themselves should be encouraged to set up cooperative centers with one or more mothers tending the children of other mothers and with welfare funds available for their salaries. Such living room daycare can only be effective if the mother taking care of the children can be paid without losing any substantial portion of her own welfare check. C. Retention of Part of Earnings The amendments permit an AFDC or AFDC UP recipient to retain the first thirty dollars of earned income monthly and one-third of the balance. The sums that can be kept without penalty and the percentage of the balance that can be retained should be raised substantially to maximize the incentive to work. Some experimental programs are now going forward, but expanded efforts are needed to test different combinations and approaches. These programs should be supported at all levels of government. Removal of Freeze on Recipients The 1967 Welfare Amendments freeze for each state the percentage of children who can be covered by federal AFDC grants to the percentage of coverage in that state in January 1968. The anticipated effect of this new restriction will be to prevent federal assistance during 1968 to four hundred seventy-five thousand new applicants otherwise eligible under present standards. In the face of this restriction states and cities will have to dig further into already depleted local resources to maintain current levels. If they cannot bear the increased costs a second alternative less feasible under existing federal requirements will be to tighten eligibility requirements for everyone or reduce per capita payments. We strongly believe that none of these alternatives is acceptable and that the freeze should be eliminated. Restrictions on Eligibility The so-called Man in the House rule and the restrictions on new residents of states should be eliminated. Though these restrictions are currently being challenged in the courts we believe that legislative and administrative actions should be taken to eliminate them now. Other features of the system that should be altered or strengthened. A. Clear and enforceable rights. These include prompt determinations of eligibility and rights to administrative appeal with representation by council. A recipient should be able to regard assistance as a right and not as an act of charity. Applicants should be able to establish initial eligibility by personal statements or affidavits relating to their financial situation and family composition subject to subsequent review conducted in a manner that protects their dignity, privacy, and constitutional rights. Searches of welfare recipients' homes, whether with or without consent, should be abandoned. These changes in procedures would not only accord welfare recipients the respect to which they are entitled, but would also release welfare workers to concentrate more of their time on providing service. Such changes would also release a substantial portion of the funds spent on establishing eligibility for the more important function of providing support. B. Separation of administration of AFDC and welfare programs for the disabled. The time that welfare workers have available for the provision of services would be increased further by separating the administration of AFDC and general assistance programs from aid to the aged and physically incapacitated. The problems of these latter groups are greatly different and might better be handled at the federal level through the Social Security Administration. Any such change would, of course, require that programs for the disabled and aged continue to be paid out of general funds and not to impair the integrity of the Social Security Trust Fund. C. Special neighborhood welfare contact and diagnostic centers. Centers to provide the full complement of welfare services should be combined into the multi-purpose neighborhood service facilities being developed by the Office of Economic Opportunity and the Department of Housing and Urban Development. Federal funds should be provided to help local welfare agencies decentralize their programs through these centers, which would include representatives of all welfare, social, rehabilitation, and income assistance services. D. Expansion of family planning programs. Social workers have found that many women in poverty areas would like to limit the size of their families and are either unaware of existing birth control methods or do not have such methods available to them. Governments at all levels, and particularly the federal, should underwrite broader programs to provide family planning information and devices to those who desire them. Through such programs the Commission believes that a significant contribution can be made to breaking the cycle of poverty and dependency. Toward a national system of income supplementation. In 1949 Senator Robert A. Taft described a system to provide a decent level of income for all citizens. I believe that the American people feel that with the high production of which we are now capable there is enough leftover to prevent extreme hardship and maintain a minimum standard floor under subsistence, education, medical care, and housing to give to all a minimum standard of decent living and to all children a fair opportunity to get a start in life. Such a minimum standard of decent living has been called for by many other groups and individuals, including the AFL-CIO, major corporate executives, and numerous civil rights and welfare organizations. The study of the new Commission on Income Maintenance Programs and the Model Cities Program will be of particular importance in providing direction. We believe that efforts should be made to develop a system of income supplementation with two broad and basic purposes. To provide for those who can work or who do work any necessary supplements in such a way as to develop incentives for fuller employment, to provide for those who cannot work and for mothers who decide to remain with their children a minimum standard of decent living, to prevent deprivation and aid in saving children from the prison of poverty that has held their parents. Under this approach, then, all present restrictions on eligibility other than need would be eliminated in this way two large and important groups not covered by present federal programs would be provided for, employed persons working at substandard hours or wages, and unemployed persons who are neither disabled nor the parents of minor children. A broad system of supplementation would involve substantially greater federal expenditures than anything now contemplated in this country. The cost will range widely depending on the standard of need accepted as the basic allowance to individuals and families, and the rate at which additional income above this level is taxed. Yet, if the deepening cycle of poverty and dependence on the welfare system can be broken, if the children of the poor can be given the opportunity to scale the wall that now separates them from the rest of society, the return on this investment will be great indeed. End of Section 56 Recording by Maria Kasper Section 57 of the Kerner Commission Report This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders Kerner Commission Report. Chapter 17 Recommendations for National Action, Part 8. 4. Housing. Introduction. The passage of the National Housing Act in 1934 signaled a new federal commitment to provide housing for the nation's citizens. Congress made the commitment explicit fifteen years later in the Housing Act of 1949, establishing as a national goal the realization of a decent home and suitable environment for every American family. Today, after more than three decades of fragmented and grossly underfunded federal housing programs, decent housing remains a chronic problem for the disadvantaged urban household. Fifty-six percent of the country's non-white families live in central cities today, and of these nearly two-thirds live in neighborhoods marked by substandard housing and general urban blight. For these citizens, condemned by segregation and poverty to live in the decaying slums of our central cities, the goal of a decent home and suitable environment is as far distant as ever. During the decade of the 1950s, when vast numbers of Negroes were migrating to the cities, only four million of the sixteen point eight million new housing units constructed throughout the nation were built in the central cities. These additions were counterbalanced by the loss of one point five million central city units through demolition and other means. The result was that the number of non-whites living in substandard housing increased from one point four to one point eight million, even though the number of substandard units declined. Statistics available for the period since 1960 indicate that the trend is continuing. There has been virtually no decline in the number of occupied dilapidated units in metropolitan areas, and surveys in New York City and Watts actually show an increase in the number of such units. These statistics have led the Department of Housing and Urban Development to conclude that while the trend in the country as a whole is toward less substandard housing, there are individual neighborhoods and areas within many cities where the housing situation continues to deteriorate. Inadequate housing is not limited to Negroes. Even in the central cities the problem affects two and a half times as many white as non-white households. Nationally over four million of the nearly six million occupied substandard units in 1966 were occupied by whites. It is also true that Negro housing in large cities is significantly better than that in most rural areas, especially in the south. Good quality housing has become available to Negro city dwellers at an increasing rate since the mid-1950s, when the post-war housing shortage ended in most metropolitan areas. Nevertheless, in the Negro ghetto, grossly inadequate housing continues to be a critical problem. Substandard, old and overcrowded structures. Nationwide, 25% of all non-whites living in central cities occupied substandard units in 1960, compared to 8% of all whites. Preliminary Census Bureau data indicate that by 1966 the figures had dropped to 16 and 5% respectively. However, if deteriorating units and units with serious housing code violations were added, the percentage of non-whites living in inadequate housing in 1966 becomes much greater. In fourteen of the largest U.S. cities, the proportions of all non-white housing units classified as deteriorating, dilapidated, or lacking full plumbing in 1960, the latest date for which figures were available, were as follows. New York. Percentage of non-white occupied housing units classified as deteriorating or dilapidated 1960, 33.8%. Percentage of non-white occupied housing units classified as deteriorating, dilapidated, or sound but without full plumbing, 1960, 42.4%. Chicago, 32.1% deteriorating or dilapidated, 42.8% deteriorating, dilapidated, or sound but without full plumbing. Los Angeles, 14.7% deteriorating or dilapidated, 18.1% deteriorating dilapidated or sound but without full plumbing. Philadelphia, 28.6% deteriorating or dilapidated, 32.0% deteriorating dilapidated or without full plumbing. Detroit, 27.9% deteriorating or dilapidated, 30.1% deteriorating dilapidated or without full plumbing. Baltimore, 30.5% deteriorating or dilapidated, 31.7% deteriorating dilapidated or without full plumbing. Houston, 30.1% deteriorating or dilapidated, 36.7% deteriorating dilapidated or without full plumbing. Cleveland, 29.9% deteriorating or dilapidated, 33.9% deteriorating dilapidated or without full plumbing. Washington, DC, 15.2% deteriorating or dilapidated, 20.8% deteriorating dilapidated or without full plumbing. St. Louis, 40.3% deteriorating or dilapidated, 51.6% deteriorating dilapidated or without full plumbing. San Francisco, 21.3% deteriorating or dilapidated, 34.0% deteriorating dilapidated or without full plumbing. Dallas, 41.3% deteriorating or dilapidated, 45.9% deteriorating dilapidated or without full plumbing. New Orleans, 44.3% deteriorating or dilapidated, 56.9% deteriorating dilapidated or without full plumbing. Pittsburgh, 49.1% deteriorating or dilapidated, 58.9% deteriorating dilapidated or without full plumbing. Conditions were far worse than these citywide averages in many specific disadvantaged neighborhoods. For example, a study of housing in Newark, New Jersey before the 1967 disorders showed the following situation in certain predominantly Negro neighborhoods as of 1960. Percentage of housing units dilapidated or deteriorated in selected areas of Newark, 1960. Area number 1, population 25,300, 75.5% non-white, 91% of all housing units dilapidated or deteriorating. Area number 2, population 48,200, 64.5% non-white, 63.8% of all housing units dilapidated or deteriorating. Area number 3A, population 48,300, 74.8% non-white, 43.1% of all housing units dilapidated or deteriorating. These three areas contained 30% of the total population of Newark in 1960 and 62% of its non-white population. The commission carried out special analyses of 1960 housing conditions in three cities, concentrating on all census tracts with 1960 median incomes of under $3,000 for both families and individuals. It also analyzed housing conditions in Watts. The results showed that the vast majority of people living in the poorest areas of these cities were Negroes and that a high proportion lived in inadequate housing. Detroit, total population of the study area, 162,375, 67.5% non-white, 32.7% of housing units substandard by HUD definition, 53.1% dilapidated, deteriorating or sound but lacking full plumbing. Washington, DC, total population of study area, 97,084, 74.5% non-white, 23.9% of housing units substandard by HUD definition, 37.3% dilapidated, deteriorating or sound but lacking full plumbing. Memphis, total population of study area, 150,827, 74% non-white, 35% of housing units substandard by HUD definition, 46.5% dilapidated, deteriorating or sound but lacking full plumbing. Watts area of Los Angeles, total population of study area, 49,074, 87.3% non-white, 10.5% of housing units substandard by HUD definition, 29.1% dilapidated, deteriorating or sound but lacking full plumbing. Negroes on average also occupy much older housing than whites. In each of the 10 metropolitan areas analyzed by the commission, substantially higher percentages of non-whites than whites occupied units built prior to 1939, percentage of white and non-white occupied housing units built prior to 1939 in selected metropolitan areas. Cleveland, 33.2% white occupied units, 90.6% non-white occupied units. Dallas, 31.9% white occupied, 52.7% non-white occupied. Detroit, 46.2% white occupied, 86.1% non-white occupied. Kansas City, 54.4% white occupied, 89.9% non-white occupied. Los Angeles, Long Beach, 36.6% white occupied, 62.4% non-white occupied. New Orleans, 52.9% white occupied, 62.2% non-white occupied. Philadelphia, 62% white occupied, 90.8% non-white occupied. St. Louis, 57.9% white occupied, 84.7% non-white occupied. San Francisco, Oakland, 51.3% white occupied, 67.6% non-white occupied. Washington, D.C., 31.9% white occupied, 64.9% non-white occupied. Finally, Negro housing units are far more likely to be overcrowded than those occupied by whites. In U.S. metropolitan areas in 1960, 25% of all non-white units were overcrowded by the standard measure, that is, they contained 1.01 or more persons per room. Only 8% of all white occupied units were in this category. Moreover, 11% of all non-white occupied units were seriously overcrowded, 1.51 or more persons per room, compared with 2% for white occupied units. The figures were as follows in the 10 metropolitan areas analyzed by the commission. Percentage of white and non-white occupied units with 1.01 or more persons per room in selected metropolitan areas. Cleveland, 6.9% of white occupied units, 19.3% of non-white occupied units. Dallas, 9.3% of white occupied units, 28.8% of non-white occupied units. Detroit, 8.6% of white occupied units, 17.5% of non-white occupied units. Kansas City, 8.7% of white occupied units, 18% of non-white occupied units. Los Angeles, Long Beach, 8% of white occupied units, 17.4% of non-white occupied units. New Orleans, 12% of white occupied units, 36.1% of non-white occupied units. Philadelphia, 4.9% of white occupied units, 16.3% of non-white occupied units. St. Louis, 11.8% of white occupied units, 28% of non-white occupied units. San Francisco, Oakland, 6% of white occupied units, 19.7% of non-white occupied units. Washington, DC, 6.2% of white occupied units, 22.6% of non-white occupied units. Higher rents for poorer housing. Negros in large cities are often forced to pay the same rents as whites and receive less for their money, or pay higher rents for the same accommodations. The first type of discriminatory effect, paying the same amount but receiving less, is illustrated by data from the 1960 census for Chicago and Detroit. In certain Chicago census tracts, both whites and non-whites paid median rents of $88, and the proportions paying various specific rents below that median were almost identical, but the units rented by non-whites were typically smaller. The median number of rooms was 3.35 for non-whites versus 3.95 for whites. In worse condition, 30.7% of all non-white units were deteriorated or dilapidated units versus 11.6% for whites. Occupied by more people, the median household size was 3.53 for non-whites versus 2.88 for whites, and more likely to be overcrowded, 27.4% of non-white units had 1.01 or more persons per room versus 7.9% for whites. In Detroit, whites paid a median rental of $77 as compared to $76 among non-whites, yet 27% of non-white units were deteriorating or dilapidated as compared to only 10.3% of all white units. The second type of discriminatory effect, paying more for similar housing, is illustrated by data from a study of housing conditions in disadvantaged neighborhoods in Newark, New Jersey. In four areas of that city, including the three areas cited previously, non-whites with housing, essentially similar to that of whites, paid rents that were from 8.1% to 16.8% higher, though the typically larger size of non-white households with consequent harder wear and tear may partly justify the differences in rental, the study found that non-whites were paying a definite color tax of apparently well over 10% on housing. This condition prevails in most racial ghettos. The combination of high rents and low incomes forces many Negroes to pay an excessively high proportion of their income for housing. This is shown by the following chart, showing the percentage of renter households paying over 35% of their income for rent in 10 metropolitan areas. Percentages of white and non-white occupied units with households paying 35% or more of their income for rent in selected metropolitan areas. Cleveland, 8.6% of white occupied units, 33.8% of non-white occupied units. Dallas, 19.2% of white occupied units, 33.8% of non-white occupied units. Detroit, 21.2% of white occupied units, 40.5% of non-white occupied units. Kansas City, 20.2% of white occupied units, 40.0% of non-white occupied units. Los Angeles, Long Beach, 23.4% of white occupied units, 28.4% of non-white occupied units. New Orleans, 16.6% of white occupied units, 30.5% of non-white occupied units. Philadelphia, 19.3% of white occupied units, 32.1% of non-white occupied units. St. Louis, 18.5% of white occupied units, 36.7% of non-white occupied units. San Francisco, Oakland, 21.2% of white occupied units, 25.1% of non-white occupied units. Washington, DC, 18.5% of white occupied units, 28.3% of non-white occupied units. The high proportion of income that must go for rent leaves less money in such households for other expenses. Undoubtedly this hardship is a major reason many Negro households regard housing as one of their worst problems. Discrimination in Housing Code Enforcement Thousands of landlords in disadvantaged neighborhoods openly violate building codes with impunity, thereby providing a constant demonstration of flagrant discrimination by legal authorities. A high proportion of residential and other structures contain numerous violations of building and housing codes. Refusal to remedy these violations is a criminal offense, one which can have serious effects upon the victims living in these structures. Yet in most cities few building code violations in these areas are ever corrected, even when tenants complain directly to municipal building departments. There are economic reasons why these codes are not rigorously enforced. Bringing many old structures up to code standards and maintaining them at that level often would require owners to raise rents far above the ability of local residents to pay. In New York City, rigorous code enforcement has already caused owners to board up and abandon over 2,500 buildings rather than incur the expense of repairing them. Nevertheless, open violation of codes is a constant source of distress to low-income tenants and creates serious hazards to health and safety in disadvantaged neighborhoods. Housing Conditions and Disorder Housing conditions in the disorder cities surveyed by the commission paralleled those for ghetto negroes generally. Many homes were physically inadequate. 47% of the units occupied by non-whites in the disturbance areas were substandard. Overcrowding was common. In the metropolitan areas in which the disorders occurred, 24% of all units occupied by non-whites were overcrowded against only 8.8% of the white-occupied units. Negroes paid higher percentages of their income for rent than whites. In both the disturbance areas and the greater metropolitan area of which they were apart, the median rent as a proportion of median income was over 25% higher for non-whites than for whites. The result has been widespread discontent with housing conditions and costs. In nearly every disorder city surveyed, grievances related to housing were important factors in the structure of negro discontent. Poverty and Housing Deterioration The reasons many negroes live in decaying slums are not difficult to discover. First and foremost is poverty. Most ghetto residents cannot pay the rent necessary to support decent housing. This prevents private builders from constructing new units in the ghettos or from rehabilitating old ones, for either action involves an investment that would require substantially higher rents than most ghetto dwellers can pay. It also deters landlords from maintaining units that are presently structurally sound. Maintenance too requires additional investment, and at the minimal rents that inner city negroes can pay landlords have little incentive to provide it. The implications of widespread poor maintenance are serious. Most of the gains in negro housing have occurred through the turnover which occurs as part of the filtering down process. As the white middle class moves out, the units it leaves are occupied by negroes. Many of these units are very old. Without proper maintenance they soon become dilapidated, so that the improvement in housing resulting from the filtering down process is only temporary. The 1965 New York City survey points up the danger. During the period that the number of substandard units was decreasing, the number of deteriorating units increased by 95,000. Discrimination. The second major factor condemning vast numbers of negroes to urban slums is racial discrimination in the housing market. Discrimination prevents access to many non-slum areas, particularly the suburbs, and has a detrimental effect on ghetto housing itself. By restricting the area open to a growing population, housing discrimination makes it profitable for landlords to break up ghetto apartments for denser occupancy, hastening housing deterioration. Further, by creating a back pressure in the racial ghettos, discrimination keeps prices and rents of older, more deteriorated housing in the ghetto market higher than they would be in a truly free and open market. End of Section 57, Recording by Maria Casper. Section 58 of the Kerner Commission Report. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, Kerner Commission Report. Chapter 17 Recommendations for National Action, Part 9 Existing Programs To date, federal building programs have been able to do comparatively little to provide housing for the disadvantaged. In the thirty-one year history of subsidized federal housing, only about eight hundred thousand units have been constructed, with recent production averaging about fifty thousand units a year. By comparison, over a period only three years longer, FHA insurance guarantees have made possible the construction of over ten million middle and upper income units. Federal programs also have done little to prevent the growth of racially segregated suburbs around our cities. Until 1949, FHA official policy was to refuse to ensure any unsegregated housing. It was not until the issuance of Executive Order 11063 in 1962 that the agency required non-discrimination pledges from loan applicants. It is only within the last few years that a range of programs has been created that appears to have the potential for substantially relieving the urban housing problem. Direct federal expenditures for housing and community development have increased from six hundred million dollars in fiscal 1964 to nearly three billion dollars in fiscal 1969. To produce significant results, however, these programs must be employed on a much larger scale than they have been so far. In some cases the constraints and limitations imposed upon the programs must be reduced. In a few instances supplementary programs should be created. In all cases incentives must be provided to induce maximum participation by private enterprise in supplying energy, imagination, capital, and production capabilities. Federal housing programs must also be given a new thrust, aimed at overcoming the prevailing patterns of racial segregation. If this is not done those programs will continue to concentrate the most impoverished and dependent segments of the population into the central city ghettos where there is already a critical gap between the needs of the population and the public resources to deal with them. This can only continue to compound the conditions of failure and hopelessness which lead to crime, civil disorder, and social disorganization. Basic Strategies We believe the following basic strategies should be adopted. The supply of housing suitable for low-income families should be expanded on a massive basis. The basic reason many Negroes are compelled to live in inadequate housing is the failure of the private market to produce decent housing at rentals they can afford to pay. Programs we have recommended elsewhere are directed toward raising income levels, yet it is obvious that in the foreseeable future there will continue to be a gap between the income of many Americans and the price of decent housing produced by the normal market mechanisms. Thus the implementation of the strategy depends on programs which not only generate more lower-cost housing but also raise the rent-paying capability of low-income households. Areas outside of ghettos neighborhoods should be opened up to occupancy by racial minorities. Provision of decent low-cost housing will solve only part of the problem. Equally fundamental is the elimination of the racial barrier in housing. Residential segregation prevents equal access to employment opportunities and obstructs efforts to achieve integrated education. A single society cannot be achieved as long as this cornerstone of segregation stands. Suggested Programs We are proposing programs in 10 areas to illustrate how we believe basic strategies we have outlined can be put into effect. Provision of 600,000 low and moderate income housing units next year and 6 million units over the next five years, an expanded and modified below-market interest rate program, an expanded and modified rent supplement program and an ownership supplement program, federal write-down of interest rates on loans to private builders, an expanded and more diversified public housing program, an expanded model cities program, a reoriented and expanded urban renewal program, reform of obsolete building codes, enactment of a national comprehensive and enforceable open occupancy law, reorientation of federal housing programs to place more low and moderate income housing outside of ghetto areas. The supply of housing suitable for low income families should be expanded. The commission recommends provision of 600,000 low and moderate income housing units next year and 6 million units over the next five years. Some 6 million substandard housing units are occupied in the United States today, and well over that number of families lack sufficient income to rent or buy standard housing without spending over 25% of their income and thus sacrificing other essential needs. The problem promises to become more critical with the expanded rate of family formation on the immediate horizon and the increasing need to replace housing which has been destroyed or condemned. In our view the dimension of the need calls for an unprecedented national effort. We believe that the nation's housing programs must be expanded to bring within the reach of low and moderate income families 600,000 new and existing units next year and 6 million units over the next five years. This proposal can only be implemented if present subsidy programs are extended so that a, a part of the existing housing inventory can be brought within the reach of lower income families and b, private enterprise can become a major factor in the low cost housing field both in terms of the construction capabilities of private developers and the capital of private institutional lenders. In the sections that follow we discuss specific programs that must be part of this expanded national effort. An expanded and modified below market interest rate program. The below market interest rate program which makes long-term low interest financing available to non-profit and limited profit sponsors is the best mechanism presently available for engaging private enterprise in the task of providing moderate and lower income housing. Several limitations however prevent the program from providing the quantity of housing that is needed. Funding levels are inadequate to launch a national program, non-profit sponsors are deterred by lack of seed money to finance pre-construction costs and limited profit corporations are deterred by the statutory prohibition on transfer or refinancing projects for 20 years without FHA permission. We recommend that funding levels of the program be substantially increased. We also recommend that legislation be enacted to permit interest free loans to non-profit sponsors to cover pre-construction costs and to allow limited profit corporations to sell projects to non-profit corporations, cooperatives or condominiums. Though the potential of the program is great, it presently serves few truly low income families. Current costs average $14,400 per unit, making the typical rental for a two-bedroom unit $110 per month, thereby in effect requiring a minimum annual income of $5,300. Only with rent supplements can poor families afford housing and commanding rents of this amount, but the amount of rent supplement funds which can be used in such developments is limited by statute to 5% of the total appropriation for the rent supplement program. In order to make below-market interest rate housing available to low as well as moderate income families, we recommend that the 5% limitation be removed and that the overall funding of rent supplements be greatly expanded. We also recommend that serious consideration be given to expanding the interest subsidy under the program in order to lower the rate for sponsors. An expanded and modified rent supplement program and an ownership supplement program. The rent supplement program offers a highly flexible tool for subsidizing housing costs because it permits adjustment of the subsidy according to the income of the tenant. The project financing is at market rates, so that tenants who do not qualify for supplements must pay market rentals. Potentially therefore these developments can provide an alternative to public housing for low income families while still attracting middle income families. We believe, however, that several changes are necessary if the full potential of this program is to be realized. First, we recommend that existing regulations restricting architectural design, imposing rigid unit cost standards, and limiting tenant income to amounts lower than required by statute be removed. These regulations diminish the attractiveness of the program to private developers and represent a major barrier to substantial expansion of the program. Second, the statutory limitation of rent supplements to new or rehabilitated housing should be changed to permit the use of rent supplements in existing housing. In many areas, removal of the restriction would make possible a major increase of the program without requiring investment in new construction. This option must be made available if the program is to be expanded to its fullest potential. Third, the rent supplement concept should be extended to provide home ownership opportunities for low income families. The ambition to own one's own home is shared by virtually all Americans, and we believe it is in the interest of the nation to permit all who share such a goal to realize it. Home ownership would eliminate one of the most persistent problems facing low-income families in rental housing, poor maintenance by absentee landlords, and would provide many low-income families with a tangible stake in society for the first time. The Senate Banking and Currency Committee recently approved a bill that would establish a program to pay a portion of the mortgage payments of low-income families seeking to purchase homes. As with rent supplements, subsidy payments would decrease as the purchaser's income rose. The income limits of the program, 70% of the below-market interest rate eligibility limits, would greatly impair its usefulness in our opinion, and should be eliminated. With that reservation, we strongly endorse the concept, urge that such a program of ownership supplements be enacted, and recommend that it be funded on a basis that will permit its wide use in achieving the goal of six million units for low and moderate income families over the next five years. Federal write-down of interest rates on loans to private builders To make private loan capital available, we recommend direct federal write-down of interest rates on market rate loans to private construction firms for moderate rent housing. This program would make it possible for any qualified builder to enter the moderate rent housing field on the basis of market rate financing provided that the project meets necessary criteria, the federal government would enter into a contract with the financing institution to supply the difference between the mortgage payment at the market interest rate and 20% of the tenant's monthly income to a specified maximum write-down which would make the interest rate paid by the tenant equivalent to one or two percent. An expanded and more diversified public housing program Since its establishment in 1937, the public housing program has produced only some 650,000 low-rent housing units, insufficient funding has prevented construction of a quantity more suited to the need, and unrealistic unit cost limitations have mandated that most projects be of institutional design and mammoth size. The resulting large concentration of low-income families has often created conditions generating great resistance in communities to new projects of this type. We believe that there is a need for substantially more public housing, but we believe that the emphasis of the program should be changed from the traditional publicly built slum-based high-rise project to smaller units on scattered sites. Where traditional high-rise projects are constructed, facilities for social services should be included in the design and a broad range of such services provided for tenants. To achieve the shift in emphasis we have recommended, we urge, first, expansion of present programs under which public housing authorities lease existing scattered site units. Present statutory restrictions on long-term leasing should be eliminated to provide incentives for private construction and financing. Families whose incomes increase above the public housing limit should be permitted to take over the leases of their units from the housing authority. We also urge expansion of present turn-key programs under which housing authorities purchase low-rent units constructed by private builders instead of constructing the units themselves. Here, too, families whose incomes rise above the public housing limits should be permitted to stay in the units at market rentals. An Expanded Model Cities Program The Model Cities Program is potentially the most effective weapon in the federal arsenal for a long-term comprehensive attack on the problems of American cities. It offers a unique means of developing local priorities, coordinating all applicable government programs, including those relating to social development, for example education and health, as well as physical development, and encouraging innovative plans and techniques. Its block-grant multi-purpose funding feature allows the city to deploy program funds with much greater flexibility than is possible under typical categorical grant programs, and the statutory requirement that there be widespread citizen participation and maximum employment of area residents in all phases of the program promises to involve community residents in a way we think most important. The full potential of the program can be achieved, however, only if, a, the Model Cities Program is funded at a level which gives the cities involved an opportunity and incentive to produce significant results, and, b, the various programs which can be brought into play under Model Cities, such as urban renewal, below-market interest rate housing, and health education and welfare programs, are independently supported at levels which permit Model Cities funds to be used for essentially innovative purposes. Appropriations must also be sufficient to expand coverage far beyond the 63 cities that currently are funded. The President has recommended that $1 billion be appropriated for Model Cities. We strongly support this recommendation as a minimum start, noting that a much greater scale of funding will ultimately be necessary if the program proves successful and if it is to be made available to all the cities that require such aid. A Reoriented and Expanded Urban Renewal Program Urban renewal has been an extremely controversial program since its inception. We recognize that in many cities it has demolished more housing than it has erected, and that it has often caused dislocation among disadvantaged groups. Nevertheless, we believe that a greatly expanded, though reoriented, urban renewal program is necessary to the health of our cities. Urban renewal is an essential component of the Model Cities program, and, in its own right, is an essential tool for any city attempting to preserve social and economic vitality. Substantially increased funding will be necessary if urban renewal is to become a reality in all the cities in which renewal is needed. A reorienting of the program is necessary to avoid past deficiencies. The Department of Housing and Urban Development has recognized this, and has promulgated policies giving top priority to urban renewal projects that directly assist low-income households in obtaining adequate housing. Projects aimed primarily at bolstering the economic strength of downtown areas, or at creating housing for upper-income groups while reducing the supply of low-cost housing will have low priority, unless they are part of a balanced program including a strong focus on the needs of low-income groups. With these priorities in mind, we recommend substantial expansion of the program. Reform of Obsolete Building Codes Approximately 5,000 separate jurisdictions in the United States have building codes. Many of these local codes are antiquated and contain obsolete requirements that prevent builders from taking advantage of new technology. Beyond the factor of obsolescence, the very variety of the requirements prevents the mass production and standardized design that could significantly lower building costs. Opinions differ as to whether a uniform national code is yet feasible, but it is clear that much greater uniformity is possible than presently exists. We urge state and local governments to undertake the task of modernizing their codes at once, and recommend that the Department of Housing and Urban Development design for their guidance a model national code. We can no longer afford the waste caused by arbitrary and archaic building codes. Areas outside of ghetto neighborhoods should be opened up to occupancy by racial minorities. The Commission recommends enactment of a national comprehensive and enforceable open occupancy law. The federal government should enact a comprehensive and enforceable open occupancy law, making it an offense to discriminate in the sale or rental of any housing, including single family homes, on the basis of race, creed, color, or national origin. In recent years various piecemeal attempts have been made to deal with the problem of housing discrimination. Executive Order 11063, issued by President Kennedy in 1962, provided that agreements for federally assisted housing made after the date of the order must be covered by enforceable non-discrimination pledges. Congress, in enacting Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, promulgated a broad national policy of non-discrimination with respect to programs or activities receiving federal financial assistance, including public housing and urban renewal. Eighteen states and more than forty cities have enacted fair housing laws of varying degrees of effectiveness. Despite these actions the great bulk of housing produced by the private sector remains unaffected by anti-discrimination measures. So long as this continues public and private action at the local level will be inhibited by the argument that local action produces competitive disadvantage. We have canvassed the various alternatives and have come to the firm opinion that there is no substitute for the enactment of a federal fair housing law. The key to breaking down housing discrimination is universal and uniform coverage, and such coverage is obtainable only through federal legislation. We urge that such a statute be enacted at the earliest possible date. Open housing legislation must be translated into open housing action. Real estate boards should work with fair housing groups in communities where such groups exist, and help form them in areas where they do not exist. The objective of voluntary community action should be, one, the full dissemination of information concerning available housing to minority groups, and two, providing information to the community concerning the desirability of open housing. Reorientation of federal housing programs to place more low and moderate income housing outside of ghetto areas. Enactment of a national fair housing law will eliminate the most obvious barrier limiting the areas in which non-whites live, but it will not deal with an equally impenetrable barrier, the unavailability of low and moderate income housing in non-ghetto areas. To date housing programs serving low income groups have been concentrated in the ghettos. Non-ghetto areas, particularly suburbs, have for the most part steadfastly opposed low income rent supplement or below market interest rate housing, and have successfully restricted the use of these programs outside the ghetto. We believe that federally aided low and moderate income housing programs must be reoriented so that the major thrust is in non-ghetto areas. Public housing programs should emphasize scattered site construction, rent supplements should whenever possible be used in non-ghetto areas, and an intensive effort should be made to recruit below market interest rate sponsors willing to build outside the ghettos. The reorientation of these programs is particularly critical in light of our recommendation that six million low and middle income housing units be made available over the next five years. If the effort is not to be counterproductive, its main thrust must be in non-ghetto areas, particularly those outside the central city. End of Section 58. Recording by Maria Casper. Section 59 of the Kerner Commission Report. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Betty B. Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. Kerner Commission Report. Conclusion. One of the first witnesses to be invited to appear before this commission was Dr. Kenneth B. Clark, a distinguished and perceptive scholar. Referring to the reports of earlier riot commissions, he said, I read that report of the 1919 riot in Chicago, and it is as if I were reading the report of the Investigating Committee on the Harlem Riot of 35, the report of the Investigating Committee on the Harlem Riot of 43, the report of the McCone Commission on the Watts Riot. I must again in candor say to you members of this commission, it is a kind of Alice in Wonderland with the same moving picture reshown over and over again, the same analysis, the same recommendations, and the same inaction. These words come to our minds as we conclude this report. We have provided an honest beginning, we have learned much, but we have uncovered no startling truths, no unique insights, no simple solutions, the destruction and the bitterness of racial disorder, the harsh polemics of black revolt and white repression have been seen and heard before in this country. It is time now to end the destruction and the violence, not only in the streets of the ghetto, but in the lives of people. End of section 59. Section 60 of the Kerner Commission Report. This is a LibriVox recording, all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, Kerner Commission Report. Supplement on Control of Disorder, The Police. Introduction. Chapter 12 on control of disorder focused on the problems of civil and police officials seeking to prevent disorder, dealing with incidents leading to disorders and responding to political, social and legal issues that arise at all stages of a disorder. In this supplement, we focus principally on controlling disorders that have escalated beyond immediate police capabilities and require a total community response to halt the violence. We also consider the rarer cases where state or federal forces are necessary to achieve control. Within this context, we assess the present capabilities and preparedness of public safety forces, military units, civil government and the community at large to cope with disorders of large magnitude and make recommendations to help assure adequate response at all levels. One, the police and control of civil disorders. The capability of a police department to control a civil disorder depends essentially on two factors, proper planning and competent performance. These rely and turn upon the quantity and quality of police mind power, the training of patrolmen and police commanders, and the effectiveness of their equipment. This portion of the supplement will review the adequacy of police planning, training and equipment to deal with civil disorders, together with the commission's recommendations for improvement. When underlying tensions are present and they exist in every American city with a large minority population, a small incident can turn a crowd into a mob. Less summer an appreciable number of incidents were triggered by police actions, some serious such as shooting a suspect, but usually by routine activities such as a simple arrest. The way policemen approach an incident often determines whether it is contained or develops into a serious disorder. Experienced police administrators, consulted by the commission, repeatedly stressed the need for good judgment and common sense among police officers called to the scene of an incident in a neighborhood where tensions exist. They warned against using sirens and flashlights that attract crowds. They cautioned against over responding to a small incident with too much visible force. Riot guns and helmets may only aggravate a tense situation, yet control has sometimes been lost because an insufficient number of police were on hand to control a disorder and its initial stages. Takes a seasoned senior officer to make the all-important initial assessments and decisions that will contain an incident. If an incident develops and a crowd begins to threaten lawlessness and acts of violence, the police must act properly and with a sufficient display of force to make clear their intent and capacity to suppress disorder and ensure the public safety. Planning. Effective preparation for disorder requires careful plans. Large numbers of police officers must be mobilized, deployed, and directed by senior officers. They must have adequate logistical support, particularly if extended operations are necessary. Mobilization planning. Defied and mobilized enough policemen to handle a riot emergency is difficult, even in large cities. The one major city with a population of more than one million, in area of 140 square miles and a police force of nearly 5,000 men, 192 patrolmen were on duty when a major civil disorder erupted. Of these, only 44 were in the riot area. The difficulties in mobilizing additional men were described by the police commissioner. Cannot be emphasized too strongly that mobilization is inherently a time-consuming operation, no matter how efficient. After a man is notified, he must dress and travel to his reporting point. Once he is checked in and has been equipped, he must be turned around and transported to a command post or an assembly point. There, he must be briefed on the situation that exists, the location of the riot area, his duties, and other details required to make him effective once he is deployed. He must then be actually committed to the area of involvement. The time lapse in this entire procedure ranges from one and one-half to two hours. By the time sufficient manpower was brought in, the disorder had developed beyond the control capability of the police department. Adding to this difficulty is the fact that the standard training for police operations is basically different from that required for riot control. Tradition of police training seeks to develop officers who can work independently and with little direct supervision. But the control of civil disturbances requires quite different performance. Large numbers of disciplined personnel comparable to soldiers in a military unit organized and trained to work as members of a team under a highly unified command control system. No matter how well trained and skilled a police officer may be, it will be relatively ineffectual to deal with civil disturbances so long as he functions as an individual. Thus, a major civil disturbance requires a police department to convert itself suddenly into a different organization with new operational procedures. To cope with the difficulties of this transition, a police department must have a specific mobilization plan that can mobilize and deploy needed manpower with a minimum deviation from established operating procedures and with minimum curtailment of essential police services. A study conducted for the commission by the International Association of Chiefs of Police of 30 major police departments found that all had some form of written mobilization plan. The quality of the plans varied greatly. Principal defects were inadequate attention to implementing the plan, inadequate relief of reserve forces after the plan had been activated, inadequate accounting for personnel dispatched to a disorder, inadequate pre-designated assembly areas or command posts in the various areas of the cities where trouble might be expected, inadequate logistical support of police and other law enforcement officers engaged in control activities, inadequate flexibility in planning to cope with disorders of varying natures and magnitudes in unnecessarily complicated planning that deviated excessively from normal operations. Because of these deficiencies in the mobilization plans of the leading police departments, the commission has prepared a model plan which can be adapted to local requirements currently used as training material in the conference on the prevention and control of civil disorders conducted by the Department of Justice in response to commission recommendations. The plan will be revised as additional information is developed by these conferences. The commission recommends that the Department of Justice disseminate the revised plan to police departments across the country and ensure that it is used in federally sponsored training on riot control methods. Operational planning. Operational planning, a necessary compliment to mobilization planning, tells the police command and the men what to do to control the disorder. It includes command and control mechanisms, communication, intelligence, means to combat inflammatory rumors and tactics. 1. Command and control and communications. Whether the shift from normal routine police operations to an emergency basis is smooth and effective depends on the success with which the police can provide unified command and control. Under ordinary conditions, a police dispatcher controls the movement of men and equipment from a central position to places where they are needed. In most police departments, the system works well enough so long as the demands on the dispatcher are within the capabilities of the man and his equipment. Many local police departments called upon to control civil disorders have had serious problems in commanding and controlling the large number of men required to work together as an effective coordinated team. The problem has been compounded by the shortage of on-duty supervisors and staff at certain periods of the day. It is one thing to assemble a large force. It is quite another to provide appropriate direction and leadership. 2. Effective command and control in a civil disorder depends upon communications, and communications is a function both of planning and of equipment. Relatively few police departments have adequate communications equipment or frequencies. 42% of all police departments studied by the commission had no special radio frequency for emergencies. The lack of emergency frequencies overloads normal frequencies. This may not only preclude effective command and control of police in the area of a civil disorder, but may also undermine the ability of the police to provide vital services to the remainder of the city. The absence of adequate communication facilities is particularly acute with respect to outside police assistance. Approximately 50% of all police agencies surveyed had inadequate means to coordinate with neighboring jurisdictions. Incompatible radio frequencies in one instance prevented effective use of men and equipment from a neighboring police department. When local and state police must cooperate with national guard units, the need for communications coordination is urgent. We believe that the critical communications and control problems arising from the present shortage of frequencies available to police departments require immediate attention. Accordingly, we recommend that the Federal Communications Commission make sufficient frequencies available to police and related public safety services to meet the demonstrated need for riot control and other emergency use. Footnote, this recommendation was previously made to the FCC in a letter from the commission, the copy of which is included in the appendix. The FCC has taken steps to make additional frequencies available. End of footnote, miniaturized communications equipment for officers on foot is critically needed for command and control and civil disorders, particularly if the riot commanders are to exercise effective command and control over police units in control operations. At the present time, police officers can generally communicate only to headquarters and only from a police vehicle. This commission therefore endorses the recommendations made by the Crime Commission that the federal government assume the leadership in initiating and funding portable radio development programs for the police. Footnote, this recommendation was previously made in a letter to the Department of Justice, a copy of which is included in the appendix. End of footnote. Two, intelligence. The absence of accurate information both before and during a disorder has created special control problems for police. Police departments must develop means to obtain adequate intelligence for planning purposes as well as on the scene information for use in police operations during a disorder. In intelligence, unit staff with full-time personnel should be established to gather, evaluate, analyze, and disseminate information on potential as well as actual civil disorders. It should provide police administrators and commanders with reliable information essential for assessment and decision making. It should use undercover police personnel and informants, but it should also draw on community leaders, agencies, and organizations in the ghetto. Planning is also necessary to cope with the ever-present problem of rumors. A rumor collection center will enable police and other officials to counter false and inflammatory reports by giving accurate information rapidly to community leaders and others in troubled areas. Evaluation of rumors can also provide important information about potential disorders. In Chicago, for example, a rumor central unit established in the Commission on Human Rights of Verdict Trouble when a Negro after an argument was shot to death by a white store owner who was placed in custody by the police, a rumor spread through the neighborhood that the white man would not be arrested. This false information was picked up by a radio station and broadcast, but rumor central, which receives some 500 telephone calls about the incident, obtained the facts from the police and gave those facts to community leaders in news media. This appreciably assisted the police in alleviating tension. How police intelligence units can be organized and can operate is set forth in a model operations plan discussed below. 3. Tactics In dealing with disorders, police have traditionally relied principally on the use of various squad formations and tactics to disperse crowds. These tactics have been of little or no value in some recent disorders marked by roving bands of rioters engaged in window breaking, looting, and fire bombing. Studies made for the Commission indicates that the police are aware of the deficiency. Many police departments admitted that traditional riot control methods and squad tactics were wholly ineffectual or only partially useful in the disorders, but no new and practical response to the recent type of disorders has emerged. Few departments have evolved new tactics against rioters. Even fewer have sent trained personnel to consult with officials in cities that have experienced civil disorders. The tactics effective in dealing with the type of disorders experienced last summer, as well as those that may develop in the future, are also presented in the model operations plan discussed below. 4. Recommendations for Operational Planning The Commission believes that model operations plans are needed now. They must provide guidelines for police departments and assist them in coping with civil disorders. The Commission also believes that more thought is needed about types of disorders that may develop in the future, together with the police responses that will be relevant and effective. Acting on these convictions, the Commission has developed a model operations plan after consultation with leading police officials. Like the mobilization plan, this plan is also being used in the Department of Justice training conferences. It would be revised from time to time. The Commission recommends that this plan be distributed to local and state police departments in the same manner as the proposed model mobilization plan. 5. Obtaining Outside Assistance When should a mayor or local police chief call for state assistance? The answer is difficult, partly because of the problem of determining when outside assistance is actually necessary, and partly because local officials may be understandably reluctant to admit that they cannot control the disorder. No amount of planning will provide an automatic solution to this problem. Sound judgment on part of mayors and police chiefs remains the only answer. Yet once the decision has been made, proper advanced planning will help speed assistance. Outside forces will need a relatively long lead time before response. A survey of National Guard capabilities, for example, shows that an average of four to six hours is required for the time of notification to the time of arrival of an effective compliment of men. Local authorities must not wait until the critical moment to alert a neighboring jurisdiction, the state police or the National Guard. Outside control forces will then be unable to mobilize and respond on time. All agencies that may be asked to help control the civil disturbance must be alerted at an early stage and kept informed. These problems will be further discussed in the section on the National Guard and state local planning. Logistical Planning Commission studies disclose serious deficiencies in police plans for logistical support. Many police departments simply assume that supplies and equipment are in hand, and in the amounts required, the moment of need is too late to find out whether they are. Regular police vehicles are usually inadequate for transporting and supplying large numbers of police, particularly since the men should be moved in units. Furthermore, a disorder extending over a long period of time will require the resupply of expended items and probably food and shelter for police personnel. In one city, when the failure to provide for these contingencies kept an entire police force on 24-hour duty, physical exhaustion seriously impaired police effectiveness. Commission studies indicate that few police departments are prepared for these exigencies. A major problem of the 1967 disorders arose from the large number of persons arrested, facilities to transport, detain, process, feed, and house them overwhelm the existing structure. Discussed in the chapter on the Administration of Justice under emergency conditions, the task of caring for large numbers of prisoners is also a matter of logistics. Training The Commission survey on the capabilities and preparedness of selected police departments show that the most critical deficiency of all is inadequate training. Practically no riot control training is provided for supervisory police officers. Recruits receive an average of 18 hours in departments offering anywhere from 62 hours to only two. Moreover, although riot control tactics require the work of highly disciplined and coordinated teams, almost all departments train policemen as individuals. Eleven of the thirty police departments surveyed reported no special or additional riot control training beyond the recruit level. Of the nineteen departments reporting some post-recruit training, five limit training to the use of firearms and chemicals. In many cases, the training program is built around traditional military formations that have little applicability to the kinds of civil disorders experienced by our cities. Yet 50% of all the department surveyed said they were generally satisfied with their training programs and planned no significant changes. Basic riot control should be taught in the recruit school and intensive unit training should be conducted subsequently on a regular or semi-annual basis. Without this kind of training, police officers cannot be expected to perform effectively in controlling civil disturbances. Training supervisory and command personnel in the control of civil disorders must also be a continuing process. Emergency plans and emergency operations must be reviewed in the classroom and practiced in the field. Yet few departments test their mobilization and operational plans. As a result, where carefully planned variations from the normal chain of command communication systems and unit assignments go into effect at a time of riot emergency, policemen are often unfamiliar with them. The most thoroughly developed emergency plan is useless unless all personnel fully understand it before it is put into effect. Of the 30 police department surveyed, not a single one reported coordinated training with fire units. Yet recent experience shows a clear need for police fire teamwork and riots. Even more revealing, only two of the department surveyed have undertaken coordinated training with other community agencies required in a riot emergency. Only two departments reported coordinating their riot control training with a National Guard and State Police. In order to strengthen police training, the commission recommends one, department should immediately allocate whatever time is necessary to reach an effective level of riot control capability. The need for training in civil disorder prevention and control is urgent. Two, training must include all levels of personnel within the police agency, specially commanders. Post-recruit riot training must be a continuing process for all personnel and build upon recruit training rather than duplicated. Three, riot control training must be provided to groups expected to function as teams during actual riot conditions. Required levels of teamwork can be achieved only through team training. All special riot control units must receive additional and intensive training in tactics and procedures, as well as in special equipment and weapons. Four, mobilization plans and emergency procedures must be reviewed in the classroom and practiced in the field. All members of the department must be familiar with riot plans at all times. Five, mayors and other civil officials must recognize the need and accept the responsibility for initiating regional training and coordination with military and state police personnel, as well as with other agencies of local government. Six, police agencies must review and become familiar with recent riot experience so that training programs can be realistically adjusted in the light of anticipated problems. Seven, in order to help law enforcement agencies improve their knowledge and strengthen their capabilities to prevent and control civil disorders, the National Center and Clearing House should be established to develop, evaluate and disseminate riot prevention and control data and information. This center should be part of the proposed National Institute for Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, recommended by the President and awaiting action by Congress. A suggestion has been made that national observer teams be established and assigned to the scene of incipient or developing disorders. These teams would study the effectiveness of control techniques in organization, recommend improvements and make this information available to public officials. The commission endorses the recommendation and suggests further that the disorder observer teams be made an integral part of the proposed National Center. Police control equipment, personal equipment, a serious hazard faced by police officers during disorders, is injury from bottles, rocks and other missiles thrown by rioters. Yet few police departments can furnish every man assigned to civil disturbance duty with proper equipment to protect head, face and eyes. The commission has found that protective clothing, boots and gloves are generally not available for the police, although most police administrators recommend their procurement and use. Police officers must have the proper personal equipment and clothing to safeguard them against the threat of bodily harm. Police weapons. On the basis of the surveys made of 30 major police departments, the commission found that many police forces are inadequately equipped or trained for use of even conventional riot control weapons in materiel. For example, although the police baton has proved to be a very effective weapon in situations where a low level of physical force will control the disorder, many police departments fail to instruct their men in the proper use of this controlled weapon. The value of the police baton should not be overlooked and police administrators should assure that proper training in its correct and most effective uses, given to all police officers. The most serious deficiencies, however, are in advance non-lethal weapons. Riot control authorities regard non-lethal chemical agents, such as tear gas, as the single most valuable and effective type of middle-range weapons and controlling civil disorders. Enlisting the priority of force to be applied in a disorder, the FBI manual on riot control, as well as Army and National Guard doctrine, prescribed the use of tear gas, CS and CN, before resorting to firearms. According to the FBI riot control manual, they are the most effective and most humane means of achieving temporary neutralization of a mob with a minimum of personal injury. While most of the police department's survey possessed some chemical weapons with varying degrees of supplies on hand, they lack sufficient gas mass to equip even 30% of their personnel properly. The lack of gas mass restricts use of gas by many police forces. Police and other civil officials have also been inhibited by the unfavorable psychological reaction to the use of any gas or chemical weapon. An additional restraint is created by the presence of large numbers of innocent people in the disorder area who would be affected by the traditional mass of use of tear gas. The recent development of new containers and projectile devices by the U.S. Army now makes it possible to use CS discriminately against small groups and even individuals. Police departments could use them to deal effectively and appropriately with looters and snipers. Some police departments have recently been equipping police officers with a liquid tear gas device. Initial reports indicate that, though less effective than CS, it provides a useful method of dealing with unruly and dangerous individuals. Use properly, it renders offenders harmless for 10 to 15 minutes. Projectors now in production promise to give police a means of acting against wallace small groups or individuals up to a distance of 30 feet. The use of distinctive colors and odors either added to the liquid tear gas or projected from a separate device may be an additional way to help police not only identify those engaged in vandalism and other illegal acts but also deter others. The exaggerated reports of sniping in many cities experiencing disorders created unwarranted apprehension among some police administrators. This concern has led to a belief in some communities that police officers should be armed with highly destructive implements of war. The commission believes that equipping civil police with automatic rifles, machine guns, and other weapons of massif and indiscriminate lethality is not warranted by the evidence. Chemical agents provide police forces with an effective and more appropriate weapon. If violence by riders goes beyond the capability of the police to control, trained military forces should be called in. We should not attempt to convert our police into combat troops equipped for urban warfare. The true source of police strength and maintaining order lies in the respect and goodwill of the public they serve. Great harm is likely to result from the use of military weapons of mass destruction by police forces which lack the command and control and firearms discipline of military units. Improper action could destroy the concept of civilian police as a public service agency dependent for effective operations on community cooperation and support. Overall recommendations. The development of modern non-lethal control equipment has languished because police departments lack the resources for tests and evaluation. The decentralized nature of law enforcement and the absence of standard criteria have also limited market opportunities. As a result, private industry has been reluctant to invest in research and development of new police equipment. Accordingly, the commission recommends the federal government should undertake an immediate program to test and evaluate non-lethal weapons and related control equipment for use by police and control forces. Federal support should be provided to establish criteria and standard specifications which would stimulate and facilitate the production of such items at a reasonably low cost. Federal funds should be used to develop appropriate tools and materiel for local and state law enforcement agencies. If these recommendations are adopted, the result will be better maintenance of law and order and better control of disorders with fewer risks to police and the public. You should be made at the technology and resources of the Department of Defense and other appropriate federal agencies. End of section 60.