 Yes. Well, I think they are. So the keynote speaker, Marcelo Neri, actually said that Brazil is like a snapshot of the world. I think that South Africa is right up there in one of the highest inequality countries in the world, as is Brazil, but Brazil's drifted down the world table. South Africa stayed right up there and obviously has a very distinctive history. Well, it was profound. I think that's the first point. It was profound in the sense that it was structural. It wasn't as though it was just a norm. When people think about South Africa apart from their think of racial discrimination as a sort of a norm. But it was profound. That influenced education expenditure, for example. It influenced spatial where people lived. Put the majority of the population in rural peripheries far away from the labour market. Gave them very bad education. And it's these legacies that continue to the present day. They take a long time to overcome those legacies, especially in the climate of what has been the world economy since then, since 1994. The world economy has been one in which competitiveness is the name of the game, fairly good skills, ability to create your own work. The legacies of apartheid were exactly the opposite. What dominates inequality? So the technical exercises that show that labour markets, the earnings distribution and employment creation dominate the overall household inequality story in South Africa. And that's easy to understand in the sense, again, of our legacy. If you think about South Africa with its mining legacy on which we built a manufacturing base. So quite a formal industrial structure, but one that was exclusionary or only used the bulk of the population to the extent it needed the population. Now, that's proved a huge problem in the country. The informal sector was actually stifled under apartheid. So it was very small. Then you've got this formal sector in which the mining industry, the manufacturing industry, when you open up to the world economy, they haven't grown. They haven't been the sectors that have grown. It's been the financial sector and the services sectors in South Africa that have grown. Again, the formal side of the economy, which are quite capital intensive, as you said. And these other sectors have not flourished and have hired less and less workers. And so the story of employment in the post-apartheid period has been very sluggish employment creation in the formal sector. The informal sector has started to grow a little bit, but hasn't sort of mushroomed. It's still very small by world standards, especially African standards, where it's almost like this residual sector picking up whoever's not hired in the formal sector. As a consequence, we have world-beating unemployment rates, as measured by the ILO, for example, because we don't have this informal sector that just picks up the slack with underemployment. And it's a problem. The growth of the formal sector has been towards capital intensive, higher-skilled employment and away from the population as a consequence, massive, massive. And so the two most vulnerable sectors of the economy, well, from the workers' point of view, are domestic work and agricultural work. And domestic work hasn't shrunk necessarily, and there's been some quite good legislation, extending basic labour market protection to domestic workers, et cetera. But it's not like a driver of employment creation. Nobody would think that. The agricultural sector has declined dramatically. So coming back to the Brazilian experience, what really started to turn inequality around in Brazil was the fact that the previously vulnerable or excluded started being included in the labour market and being employed and earning fairly decent wages. That's what we're battling to get right in South Africa. So government has taken on the notion, contentiously I think, that they're the employer of last resort, if you like. There has been quite a large expansion of their government public works programs. But measured in a climate in which government is trying to do evidence-based assessment and monitoring and evaluation, and they haven't been uniformly successful. There's been some real successes. For example, programs in rural areas to clear out alien vegetation have been remarkably successful, surprisingly. Everybody thought that was tinkering on the margins. Well, those are the ones that have really had some impact. The type of public works programs where you build roads with spades and rural labour rather than engineering companies, they happen, but they haven't been that successful at all. Well, that's what we've been talking about, I think. It's the legacy of apartheid to some extent. And then the way the economy, the world economy has played out with the skills twists. South Africa has been subject to a skills twist in a classic American or European sense. And that's what you get. You get the population. You know, government has done a few things right. Education levels have expanded. They were higher than Brazil to use a counterfactual. Even in 1994, they were higher than Brazil on average. They were around about seven years of schooling whereas Brazil was around about five. Since then, they've gone up to ten, just over ten years on average. That's a good thing. That's a success. If you look at water, electricity, those sorts of government services, they've rolled them out. But at the end of the day, unless the return on that in a narrow sense, in an income sense, is employment. If you don't get the employment, you don't see the return on that. And that's the problem.