 Good afternoon, welcome. My name is Lise Grande. I'm the head of the United States Institute of Peace. We are a national, public, nonpartisan institution. We were established by Congress in 1984. Our mandate is to help prevent, mitigate, and resolve violent conflict abroad. The Institute has been very honored these past months to host Nobody's Listening. It's a very important exhibition that includes art, testimony, documentation, and narrative on the impact of the Yazidi genocide, the impact that the genocide has had on the people who were its victims, the people who have survived, the people who bear responsibility for the genocide, and for people everywhere who need to know what happened to prevent it from ever happening again. It's been 10 years since the genocide. There have been steps toward justice, and these are important, but there are many obstacles. The UN's team that's been investigating the crimes committed by ISIL has less than a year to wrap up all of its work. Criminal proceedings against the perpetrators remain largely inaccessible to survivors. Efforts to secure reparations for the survivors are tied up in mind-numbing procedural requirements. And even after 10 years, many Yazidi communities are still living in displaced camps in Kurdistan reluctant to return to their homelands without security guarantees. In coming together today, our aim is to talk openly and frankly about the genocide and our shared commitment and responsibility to address its impact. It's an honor to host this event in partnership with the US Holocaust Memorial Museum and the Simon Scott Center for the Prevention of Genocide and to welcome the director of the center, Naomi Kickeler, who is going to be moderating today's discussion. Our panel includes the Ambassador at Large for Global Criminal Justice, Dr. Beth Van Schaak, Heider Elias from the Yazda Global Organization, Pari Ibrahim, of the Free Yazidi Foundation. USIP's director of Middle East programs, Tsar Hong Hamasaiid. It's a privilege to welcome Victoria Taylor, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Iraq and Iran in the State Department's Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, who is a career member of the Senior Foreign Service with postings in Croatia, Tunisia, Georgia, and Pakistan, and posts covering North Africa, Europe, Eurasia, the Balkans, Caucasus, and the Red Sea with your permission. Deputy Assistant Secretary, may we invite you to the stage. Thanks for that introduction. And thank you to President Grande and the US Holocaust Museum for organizing this event. And thanks to nobody's listening director, Ryan D'Souza, for putting such a wonderful exhibit together. I think the exhibit and your support really helps ensure that the ISIS genocide of the Yazidis and the other peoples of Iraq will continue to live on in our collective memory. And happy to be joined today by such a distinguished panel here. Your steadfast advocacy and efforts in the face of many obstacles has saved lives, and it continues to improve the quality of life of some of Iraq's most vulnerable communities. And your work has also helped to return thousands of Yazidis to their ancestral homeland. I particularly want to recognize Ambassador Beth Van Schaak, our Assistant Secretary for Global Criminal Justice, who is really a critical voice in ensuring support for Yazidis and ISIS accountability throughout the US government. I want to also recognize all the people who are gathered here in our audience today, the organizations and advocates for the partnership that we have enjoyed over these many years. I want to talk about that partnership across three main themes, restoration and re-establishment of justice, reconstruction, and building resilience. So as President Grande noted, in August this year we'll mark a solemn occasion, the 10th remembrance of the Yazidi genocide. The brutality against the Yazidi community by ISIS is really a dark chapter in our shared history and something that we must never forget. Over the past 10 years, we have accomplished much by working together and listening to the needs of the Iraqi people. Our hope is that Iraq can continue to serve as an example of religious and ethnic inclusion for the rest of the region. Yazidis have led the way, working with the Sunnis, the Shias, the Kurds, Turkmen, Shabbat, and Christians, and all of Iraq's communities to rebuild. Much remains to be done with more than 300,000 Yazidis still living in camps. Thousands more living in displacement outside of camps and 2,600 Yazidi women and girls who are still missing. So restoring justice for the communities of Iraq's multi-ethnic peoples means that we're ensuring that survivors are given a voice and a role in determining their future and in ensuring that there's real accountability for the crimes that were committed. Justice and accountability for ISIS atrocities remains an essential US policy goal in ensuring the enduring defeat of ISIS. Now the United Nations investigative team to promote accountability for the crimes committed by Daesh, UNITAD, and the UN assistance mission for Iraq continue to play an important role in achieving this goal. And the United States sports this critical work. UNITAD has performed crucial work and its evidence has informed investigations and prosecutions of alleged ISIS members around the world. And it's really critical in this time period that we hear your ideas for how we best preserve and protect the evidence that UNITAD has compiled so that it can be used to continue to hold ISIS accountable. We appreciate the Iraqi government's effort to draft a bill codifying the international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, and Iraqi law. And we hope that that's legislation the Iraqi parliament will take up this year. Now I think we're also want to make sure that the work done by UNITAD and UNAMI continues even after those missions conclude. And we welcome the support from the international community and the Iraqi government to ensure that we develop a responsible plan for that transition. Turning to reconstruction, the Yazidi homeland is a sacred place in the hearts of Yazidis wherever they reside. The US has contributed over 470 million to Iraq's post-ISIS stabilization and reconstruction. And we continue to urge the Iraqi government to take on this reconstruction effort and to our international partners as well to help support this ongoing effort. We are encouraged by the success of some of the State Department's humanitarian programs, some of them funded by our Population Refugees and Migration Bureau. There's a program, sorry, this is cutting in and out a little bit, I apologize. The International Organization of Migration's program facilitates the voluntary return of displaced persons. And through this program, thousands of Yazidis have been provided with information, return grants, livelihood, mental health, and housing assistance that enables them to return and reintegrate into their communities. And I think we need to see a lot more such programs. But after 10 years of living in tents, there is an urgent need to address the durable solutions for those Yazidis who do not feel safe returning home. We welcome efforts by the Kurdistan regional government to host and support Yazidis and other ISIS survivors in the Iraqi Kurdistan region, but more work must be done to provide long-term housing solutions for these many, many thousands of displaced. And as we support the restoration of justice and reconstruction of the Yazidi homeland, we recognize that we also need to work with the Yazidis to build resilience within these communities. We are working to ensure the survivor's a fair directorate, has resources, staff, and the location it needs to fulfill its mandate in addressing ISIS survivors' material needs and to provide psychological support well into the future. The US is also helping to supplement this support through our humanitarian programming, such as a State Department-supported Community Center in the Sharia village, where over 17,000 displaced Yazidis live. This community center provides mental health, emergency assistance, case management, education activities, and legal services to the community members who experience so much trauma that is stemming from the genocide. And we need to continue this work to ensure that we're providing adequate education and livelihood support. This is critical to ensuring that Yazidi youth do not become a lost generation and to ensuring the survival of these communities. Finally, all of this work really hinges on an Iraq that's sovereign and stable and that addresses the needs of its people. The government of Iraq and the Kurdistan Regional Government signed the Sinjar Agreement in October 2020. It was an important step. It's one that we support. But we've seen progress, and we need to see more. There's been progress in the recruitment and training of local security forces, but we know that there are militias outside state control that continue to exercise unlawful influence and have exerted violence upon those communities. So progress and implementing the Sinjar Agreement is really critical to improve the lives of the Yazidi community and to strengthen Iraq's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Now, we understand that restoring justice, reconstruction, building resilience, these are just some of the steps that are necessary to creating an Iraq in which all communities can thrive. It's a lot to accomplish in a very complex environment. And we recognize that none of it is possible without our Yazidi and international partners. I'm proud to be here with all of you today, and I look forward to hearing your ideas, your concerns, and know that we must do more to work together over this coming time period to ensure that in this 10th year that we're doing everything that we can, that we're redoubling our efforts to support these Yazidi people. Thank you. Thank you so much, Lise. It's an honor to be able to partner with you and your remarkable team. And thank you so much, Deputy Assistant Secretary Taylor, for your remarks and all of the work that your team and the entire US government is doing to support the Yazidi and other vulnerable communities in Iraq. I'm deeply honored to be here today and to be with panelists who have been so incredibly dogged in trying to help protect the Yazidi community and other vulnerable communities in Iraq. I also want to recognize the presence in the room of many people who have been instrumental in trying to advance the protection of these communities and members of those communities themselves, including Mirza Dinayi. I'm so sorry, Mirza, co-founder and director of the Arab Bridge Iraq and the many people that are watching right now. It's really humbling to be here for this conversation. We're now seven months until the anniversary of the 10th anniversary of ISIS's attacks on Iraq's minorities in the Nineveh Plains and in Sinjar. And the commission of the genocide against the Yazidi community that resulted in the murder of thousands, the displacement of hundreds of thousands, and the kidnapping, sexual assault of thousands of women, girls, the kidnapping of boys, the forced conscription of those boys. Today, as we have this conversation, it's important to bear in mind that over 2,000 Yazidi women and girls remain kidnapped and unaccounted for. We hope that they are alive, that there are hundreds of thousands of Yazidis who remain displaced. And as we'll get into the discussion, we have seven months in which there are concrete steps that can be taken at the local, national, and international level to try to help these communities and help all the people of Iraq. The focus of this particular conversation and the plight of the Yazidi communities in part timed with the remarkable exhibit that USIP has been hosting that has been put on by the organization Nobody's Listening, which is led by Ryan DeSousa. And it's really something that I encourage everyone to please be able to go see after this event. And for those who are watching, to please visit the website. And we'll talk a little further about the exhibit as we go on. The purpose in having this conversation and for the museum and USIP coming together with Ryan to host this event was really to try to ensure that this is a conversation about action. It's a conversation where we're trying to translate words into tangible outcomes that can help people and improve their lives. It's not just about the experiences of the Yazidi community, it's all of the vulnerable communities in Iraq. But there are very specific and unique needs that the Yazidi community is facing and that we hope to be able to unpack. And we realize that this conversation is happening at a time in which there are profound geopolitical shifts that are happening that have an impact on the ground. There is increase in sustained threats to not just Iraqis, but also to US personnel, to UN officials. And there are presence in the country. And I think that in the conversation we're going to be able to have a chance to unpack that. I'm really hoping, and I think we're all hoping, that what we're going to be able to do is talk about some tangible goals that we can collectively work towards and that we can take over the next seven months so that in the future we're talking about a situation in which these communities are afforded more physical security, more durable economic opportunities, that accountability. We've seen some significant advances in that and where there has also been a real effort in trying to promote social cohesion within the country. So with that in mind, I wanted to take this opportunity to start just with a little bit of framing by turning to Haider who's joined us and just came in from Dahuk to tell us a little bit about the context currently on the ground in terms of the security conditions in Sinjar. And Sinjar, of course, is the area that the majority of the Yazidi community was residing in in 2014 and have been displaced from. And then of course also for those who are living in IDP camps within the Kurdish-Regional government area. Thank you. Thank you. Well, it's really honored to be here. Thank you for the opportunity. Today, as Naomi said, I arrived yesterday from Dahuk. The, it's really tough to repeat myself as I have four hundreds of times, but I always hope that there are some of you who haven't heard updates that we can deliver those updates and get new information delivered to you as much as we can, as Taylor said, that we still have more than 300,000 Yazidis still have not returned. According to our estimates, 313,000 people still have not come back to Sinjar. Unfortunately, vast majority of these people are still living in the IDP camps. Overall, about 15 IDP camps in most of them are in very north part of Kurdistan is in a province called Dahuk. We have the smallest camps, it's about 100 families and largest is about close to 5,000 families. Those who have returned, unfortunately, not all of them have made it back to their own homes. A lot of them are still renting. A lot of them are still just occupying the vacant homes because those who have returned have not been able to afford the reconstruction of their homes. So they've been just living, even considered displaced yet because they have not lived in their own homes, unfortunately. As Naomi said also, we have more than 2,500 missing people and still hopeful to come back, trace their way back to their home, to their culture, to their community. Now, the recent updates from the Iraqi government are trying to form a committee that are going to create a mechanism that we proposed a couple of years ago to find those missing people starting from Syria and even Iraq and Turkey to verify the missing people people also in the what it's called Holi camp. It's a big refugee camps in Syria, holds about 70,000 refugees still in that area. So it's a very difficult process but the Iraqi government have announced already and asked for more help and more collaboration and more efforts from NGOs like Yazdan, others. Now, also the programs that are through either PRM or at least supported by the State Departments that are supporting the safe return. As Des Taylor mentioned, that it's a very incredibly important project. It's doing it through the IOM and we know that hundreds of families have reported they have resettled in their own homes in the past 12 months, which is very important. Now we have more families are registering through that project through IOM. We know also the Dutch government is trying to help through that project but it's a very small portion at least compared to the U.S. government support that we have. We also have the Iraqi government have started a process of registration in all the camps in the past seven days and even today they're still registering the IDPs in all these 15 camps. They are trying to support the and fast forward the safe return and ending the displacement camps. I think part of the mechanisms are just missing but at least they started supporting the idea that we are almost as Naomi said in six more months it will be 10 years that the Yazidis have been displaced. We're trying to end that in a good way not force them out of the camps but find a volunteer safe way for the Yazidis to come back. Now the pledges, I don't know if we call it pledged but they call it four million Iraqi dinars. Not sure how much is that in dollar about 2,500 plus maybe anywhere from 2,500 to 3,000 dollars would be given to each family hopefully at the end of the process that have successfully returns to Sinjar. But we know that the vast majority of these families have no homes. Their homes have been 100% total loss and it costs based on the prices of materials it costs way, way more than that to build or rebuild their homes so it's really unfortunate but we know some of the families are going to do that so those who are not in a large need. When it comes to the mass grave and also I think Naomi's question was mainly also about the security in the ground. The security situation since 2017 has almost been the same. We know as progressing was getting better started into late 2014 until the referendum of the Kurdistan government and then there was a conflict and things got better at worse and worse every day unfortunately, it was around October of 2017. Things have not gotten better. It's really difficult to talk about it because we have received death threats talking about the security situations because each militia group is thinking we're complaining against their presence but the situation here is that there is no coordination. People are worried about their left one my incidentally joined these militia groups or being brainwashed at least. We know we have more than eight groups or uncoordinated with one another. They don't kill one another but they do not also serve the population in a coordinated level. So if you go to a certain check points you find four different groups checking your ID, fortunately. And we also know that we have regional actors in the region that are serving the interest internationally, whether it's transportation, smuggling I should say of money or weapons or people. It's also going through Sinjar. I think a lot of you have read and I think it was the New York Times trying to remember what. But also the intelligence agencies have recently posted the routes from Iran all the way to Lebanon and through Gaza and other places and one of it, at least two or three of them are united in Sinjar and are becoming one route and go through Sinjar to Syria and Lebanon, fortunately. And so it's really difficult when it comes to the security situation. Also political did lack doesn't help that. So we know the root of all these problems is the political conflicts in the region. That's why they don't, they're not willing to solve these issues at least now. It's not in their best interest. The other situations when it comes to masquerades, we have had. Heider, do you mind on the masquerades? Maybe we'll talk about that when we talk about the accountability conversation. Absolutely, yes, yes. So we'll skip the masquerade for now. So I think that should be it for me and it comes to the security. More than 50% of the Yazidi families are concerned as part of the not being able to return in addition to, of course, lack of schools and healthcare facilities is the security that the reason that they won't come back on that. We know that, as some of you also know that when the Yazidis were displaced back in 2014, one family have become two or three families. So the numbers have grown and that the, when it comes to the infrastructure of the education in the region is no longer serving that 300 plus 1,000 people, we have more than that. And so the same thing with the healthcare facilities, we don't have women's centers, especially for lack of prenatal care and maternity facilities in Sinjar, we've reported. And a lot of families have reported to us recently that a couple of death cases have been reported that all driving all the way from Sinjar to nearest facilities in Kurdistan is really unfortunate. So yes, with that we will pose and wait for. Thank you, Haider. I don't think we've had a more comprehensive update on the conditions in the ground. And again, just to kind of add what you said, part of the challenge is also with things like accessing healthcare, of course, is that people have to go through so many checkpoints in order to get to the facilities that are located within the Kurdish regional government. Just picking up on one or two points too that you mentioned, one of the challenges with the deterioration in the security situation too is that it's made it much harder for there also to be an international presence in Sinjar and have people go to Sinjar. It was very disheartening when we undertook a trip there in August to not be able to go but also to realize that very few of the embassies and consulates were sending people to Sinjar. There was a very serious risk as there continues to be a Turkish drone strikes, which is cited as one of the main reasons for why people were not going at the time as well as the presence of Syrian militias. And of course that creates an environment where again, further insecurity can flourish. And just to pick up on one of your themes since you mentioned also the importance of Sinjar for different trade routes and trafficking routes. And of course, sadly, you mentioned missing people of which we're talking largely about women and girls that were kidnapped by ISIS. It is a transit route for many different forms of illicit goods as well. And it was also similar disheartening to hear many foreign officials note that when we would raise the importance of Sinjar and resolving the situation in Sinjar that the area was of little national security interest to their governments, which is an incredibly blunt thing to hear when you're talking about the lives of hundreds of thousands of people who are already some of the most vulnerable in Iraq. And I think you and others may pick up on some of the themes of why the region is so important. If the argument of caring about human beings is not sufficient, then what are the political and economic and other reasons that one can bring forth to explain the relevance of Sinjar to regional stability more broadly. I wanted to just turn to you, Pari, and just note that both Haider and Pari have built remarkable Yazidi organizations and there are others, and so much of the support that is being given to the local communities and a lot of the international advocacy is being led by Yazidi civil society, which is one of the silver linings that has come from sadly one of the most horrific crimes that we have seen perpetrated against the people, which is the commissioner genocide against the Yazidi community. So I want to acknowledge your leadership and Pari, you lead a female led organization, the Free Yazidi Foundation that focuses on helping women, but also others. One of the campaigns that you and other Yazidi organizations led at the ninth anniversary was a campaign for 1% of Iraq's budget to be dedicated to the reconstruction of Sinjar. And I was wondering if you could tell us a little bit about what the Iraqi government's response has been to that and what do you think needs to be done at this particular moment. Thank you, Naomi. Yeah, as Haider said, it's sad to say that we have to repeat ourselves for over like almost 10 years. But our advocacy continues, and I'm grateful that we can be here today to highlight once again what happened in 2014 and that the genocide is still ongoing in our own eyes. So what we really wanted to create last year for the ninth year commemoration is that we want to show the world that Yazidis stand together, that we're all one. No one is under the umbrella of any other organization. So we made sure that 26 Yazidi organizations all stood together on the stage in Baghdad to commemorate nine years since the genocide, but also to send a message. Iraq, you have $150 billion of that's your annual budget for 2023. Give 1% to the Yazidi community to rebuild Sinjar. Have it go through the prime minister's office. And I'm not saying give it to the Yazidi organizations so that they do whatever they want. No, have it go through the prime minister's office and make sure that we as Yazidi organizations can have oversight. Where does money go? Is there corruption? So we can ensure that Sinjar gets rebuilt. It is really astonishing that it's been 10 years and nobody cares. So we look out to the outside community, the international community. Can you help our community to rebuild? Because no one else cares. It has a lot to do, as Haider also said, like it has a lot to do with politics. It has a lot to do with what political party are you affiliated with. Who do you know in the government? If you don't know anybody or nobody's going to listen, you won't achieve anything. And I would like to say that if we had an opportunity where we could get $1.5 billion and rebuild Sinjar, maybe there would be a sense of, oh, the Iraqi government, the Kurdish government, they care about our people because we are from there. We are one of the first inhabitants of that area. So they should care. But unfortunately, after almost 10 years, you can say that nobody cares for us. This is also the main reason that our people are leaving Iraq. I think the numbers are over 100,000 Yazidis are fleeing Iraq because they don't see a future in Iraq. This is very unfortunate because this means that our community, ethnic and religious minorities, are being pushed out of Iraq. They are not accepted, get discriminated on a day-to-day basis. They are not cared for. Their voice doesn't matter. And that's a real concern because everybody talks about let's bring the Yazidis back to Sinjar. OK, let's bring them back where? Because as Haider just now said, hospitals, schools, work, jobs, employment, anything like that. But then I want to switch to, from a female perspective, women and girls. They do not have the choice of decision making whether they go back to Sinjar or not. This decision will definitely be made by a male member of the family. A lot of these girls and women are terrified because when ISIS came, some of them wanted to leave. But it was an overall decision by some that they had to stay and everything would be fine. So today, for the 10-year commemoration I'm telling you, we need to look after the women and girls as well. What do they want? How do they want to see a future in Iraq? Because it scares me if we're just going to say, let's just all bring them back, and that's the solution. Safety and security-wise, we hear a lot of different stories. I mean, I don't know, Naomi, if I can get into that a little bit from what's happening now with the US and PMF, and we know that the US and the coalition started to fight against the Islamic State. We know that the PMF did the same thing to start to fight against ISIS. And now they have both one common enemy, and now they are fighting against each other. What does that do to the region and the instability? It creates more concern for the people who are thinking of going back at some point. So we need to consider that as well while we talk about safe returns of people. And yeah, I mean, there's a lot to talk about, but I think I get the message. We will get into it, and there is a question and answer period for the panelists where you can go deeper on a lot of this as well. Just picking up on one of your themes around the need for a sense of security in order for people to be able to return. The Sinjar agreement was created to try to ostensibly bring political stability and security to Sinjar. And I wanted to ask both maybe Haider and Sahrhang for your perspective, Haider, from the viewpoint of the EZD community, many have expressed frustration that there wasn't consultation. I was wondering if you can share your thoughts on the Sinjar agreement, its viability, how to include EZD voices in that, and then turning to you, Sahrhang, if you're able to put that into kind of a, first share your perspective as well, but also put it into a broader Iraq context for us to understand. We'll start, Haider. Thank you for the question. Well, we all know a few things. Sahrhang is very well familiar with that process. Started at least four years ago, and a lot of people were happy about any sort on the agreement. Any type of agreement would be a good establishment, even if it's a very bad one, even if 25% of that agreement is acceptable, then we can start with that and modify it. So we were very positive at the beginning, even though, as Naomi said, a lot of EZDs weren't consulted about it and the justification for the politicians were, we want the votes in the region and we are able to make the decisions ourselves, even though this is not really accurate, but that was their justification. Now, almost we have more than four years of starting that process. Part of it, now we have 500 policemen been recruited out of potentially 2,500. We know that the number have been reduced, but at least 500 of them have been recruited now and appointed, directed to be serving in a portion or at least in a region in south of Sinchur at that point. That's the only part have been implemented at this case. They were, we all know also that there were several articles or at least parts of the agreements, at least the three main ones, who will appoint the mayor and the city council chief and also the members. Public service officers in general and how many security forces will be added to the region and who would manage the security and coordination would be mainly the Iraqi security forces that are tied or affiliated with the central government and also the security forces from the Kurdistan regional government, Peshmerga. And the third part is to kick, in their term, to kick out the militia groups in the region. So the third part was very, very difficult and it has been one of the most difficult part of the agreements and both government wants to do that part first before they do any other and it's politically motivated because they know this part is not doable. Politically, it's kicking or leaving or at least eliminating these groups. It has become almost impossible when it comes to the capacity of the Iraqi government because we're talking about the PMU and Hashid is more powerful than the Iraqi government, politically, so that's why first step is impossible and both government wants to start with the first step, unfortunately. Do you mind just explaining, just for those who may not be familiar with what the PMU and Hashid Shabi are? Yes, the PMU, as Peri said, was participating in liberating the region from ISIS. Hashid, at the beginning of 2013 and then 2014, there was a religious call to join the Iraqi government so the people's mobilizing forces started from civilians, mainly Shia and also other groups participated in forming this organized militia groups that is well established and tied to the Iraqi ministries when it comes to finance and also the Iraqi Department of Defense and also directly to the Prime Minister's office and this group was by almost hundreds of thousands of people and it was the largest force that it was religiously also motivated to beat ISIS and they viewed ISIS as a real terrorist and real evil group so it was a big reason also on the ground that the coalition were able to get rid of ISIS militarily and so it started with that as Peri said at the beginning, very good coalition, all together everybody's goal, we have common enemy, we will fight but now the liberator has become a dictator at this point, they don't want to leave, they also had other hidden agenda, not the people who joined but in a political level all the way to Iran, the groups didn't want to leave, they want to also establish a lot of additional shrines that belongs to Shia, it's not to serve the Shia people, unfortunately, but they want a political reason to stay there so that serves their political agenda and the region. The group itself has remained in the region, a lot of them are Yazidi members and we know that a lot of them are not harmful to their community but the leadership itself, the agenda for the leadership we don't know as we mentioned one of the smuggling lines and that region is also protected by that group, unfortunately. I don't know if I went too much to the side of the central line of I'm trying to come back to the highway. Appreciate that, I mean I think it underscores the complexity that a number of... Oh yeah, sorry, let me add a couple of points. Sinjar agreement, yes, I almost forgot where I was talking about. That's okay, I'll just say the challenge of having a conversation about crimes that were perpetrated 10 years ago and then the instability that happened in the aftermath and continues is that there are a lot of things that people forget or do not necessarily know and the lived reality that you're sharing right now, the fact that for the communities living on the ground they have to know which of the armed groups they may be encountering, who's running what, that is what defines and dictates whether or not they feel they can move home, whether or not they feel safe moving from one place to another, whether or not they have faith in the Iraqi government, the Kurdish regional government, so it is very important context. The Sinjar agreement and today and the implementation, your perspective on that. Yes, so I'm glad Mirza is here, he knows some about this because he also lives in that area like I am. We have four municipalities, as he knows. We have also four city councils and four mayors, so it's not just one Sinjar mayor, we have two in the south and also Sinjar itself and one in the north, so we have three sub districts and so these sub districts require mayor, city councils and municipalities. And what the opposing groups also are forming is a semi coalition, I should say, alliance and they demand that they share the power, the authority in the region and they ask that if we can have some of these sub districts administrations, at least the political appointees, then you can have the others, like the main one is in Sinjar itself, that is in charge of the other three. Now the Kurdistan regional government, represented by KDP, the Kurdistan Democratic Party, is not accepting that you should have that shared authority. That's the main reason, at least recently, that it's not being implemented, so we have now one element in the PMU groups that are opposing this because it's mainly appointed by both Iraqi government and Kurdistan regional government and the other one to get involved, especially at Hashit, the PMU wants to be part of it, so they are stopping that, that's one reason. Reason two, the regional forces and political parties want to share the power and they want to also have the ability to appoint the city councils, municipality directors and council members, I should say, and the mayors. So I'm going to take that as a jumping off point to turn to Yusar Hong to put Sinjar Agreement in the context of also larger Iraq dynamics. There's been references to a number of the religious minority communities, as many are aware here, Iraq's Christian community has been largely decimated over a million people a decade plus ago and today we've got 150,000, many left due to physical insecurity, lack of economic opportunity, but also a lack of a sense of faith in the actors that are supposed to provide governance, very similar to the ZD community, which has just been outlined just a really precarious situation in which they sit at this particular point, you've been doing really important work to try to track the attitudes of local communities and their perspective on governance and I was wondering if you could speak a little bit to that and what steps can be taken to try to strengthen those communities' faith in the elected officials and others. Thank you, Naomi, good afternoon. It is definitely an honor for me to be here with this distinguished panel and on this very important topic. We referenced the 10-year anniversary of genocide in Sinjar and attacks. We are in the lead-up 10-year anniversary of ISIS, basically in the month, around this time in 2014, I was one of those screaming that Mosul will be next. So I think the same, we were giving early warning that violence was coming to Iraq. I think this is around the time we're doing early warning and saying, okay, the anniversary is coming, so what action can we get going? And so it's not just a reflection on the moment when the anniversary comes out, actually, there's action. In what context ISIS rose, I think is important. So the AZD wound or AZD wounds is or are deep and fresh today, probably as they were in the summer of 2014. And they are so in measurable terms. The same, I think all the speakers gave you measurable terms in terms of how many people killed, how many still unable to identify their situation and the number of people unable to return. The list goes on and on. But coming back to the main picture, 2013, 2014, where there's a context of political division in Iraq, that there was disagreement on the course of the country, force was used to try to resolve those issues and it created the vacuum that led to the rise of ISIS. Ten years from that date, Iraq, the militarization that occurred in response to ISIS, be it more armed groups created, be it more arms in the hands of the people, that militarization continues. So that is something, so therefore the threat of ISIS is not just yesterday's problem. We still have some issues with that. The wounds that ISIS created are not yesterday's wounds. They are so fresh and they need to be addressed. That doesn't mean no progress has been made. That doesn't mean what happened in the past 10 years in terms of rebuilding and support were invaluable. Now that speaks to the depth of the wounds and not just of the Azzidis, as you mentioned, for the Christians, for the Shabbat, for the Tala'far, for the Kaka'is, for the Sabian Mendeans and the list goes on and on. So this is a broad spectrum that we are just highlighting today the focus on the Azzidis because it's tied to the exhibition that we are having here. So Iraq right now is in a political moment where the different communities of Iraq are not fighting with each other. There is a sense of fatigue with fighting. But the elements of fighting are there, in terms of arms and weapons and all of that. The nature of the focus now is dominated by the regional dynamics, so the Iraqis and especially the ethnic and religious minorities are concerned that the attention of the world has gone to the war in Ukraine and competition with China, the war in Sudan, the war in Gaza, and now these tensions in the aftermath of Gaza. So domestically Iraq had elections, a couple of elections, but it is not breaking through to the conditions that give us stability. It does the constitution. If you ask a large portion of the Iraqi society, whether Sunni, Shia, Kurdish, ethnic and religious minorities, they will tell you the constitution is not being implemented. So that, we have a moment of quiet and the government of Prime Minister Sudani is trying to present a positive image of the country, of stability and mega projects of a three-year budget to try to orient towards the economy and towards political stability of the country. But I don't think that Iraqi people are sharing that, because a smaller group is in control of the government. There is as evidenced by the recent elections and the low turnout of the people. And to try to give a degree of measure to what my colleagues Haider and Peri talked about, I refer you to the project you cited, the Conflict and Stabilization Monitoring Framework, which is a framework that USIP has developed. It looks at about 100 indicators on governance, on security, on social cohesion, on reconciliation. It has an interactive dashboard on the USIP website, seven waves of data directly from the people, directly from the people who are in that area. And if you look at it at the political level, they have very little confidence in the political leadership in government or outside government. So you can look at what is their faith in the parliament, in the prime minister's office, in the provincial government, they will tell you. So that faith in the political representation is not there. Second, look at what they are telling you. Yes, they say that economic people join armed groups and security position, which is the primary economic opportunity available. So there is a securitization of the situation, because that's the only primary game in town. So, and if you look at what are your concerns, they will say job opportunity and unemployment ranks very high in terms of what they need. And combined with, again, the numbers talk about unemployment and also lack of services. So security is not just, is ISIS there to shoot you or not? Security is your ability to have your life not threatened because of health reasons. And that is a problem that predates ISIS. It's a chronic issue that ISIS made it worse. Second, the ability to coexist with other communities, and that's what ISIS brought to the area. Social cohesion is a key challenge there. So if you are not, who do you trade with? Who do you sell to? Who do you get services from? That continues to need work. That is part of the feeling of feeling safe. And I can unpack more and more, but I'll stop with one last point on the Sinjar agreement, which is that there was a lot of help attached to the Sinjar agreement. And I think Haider eloquently gave you the breakdown that just I'm adding my voice to some of the points that he made from our work. And I've had the opportunity to discuss this matter for the past few years from the lowest level on the ground in the villages and the community all the way to the top leadership that you wish you could discuss this matter with. And across the board, you do see interest for resolving this matter. And you see senior leaders of the government of Iraq and the Kurdistan regional government and the United Nations and the United States and others trying to push this matter forward. And I believe that all of them are genuine and their intent to trying to solve. Yet it raises the question, why is this agreement so difficult to implement? And this is where it may be a simplistic answer, but sometimes a simplistic answer may give you the simple answer, is that for many people, Sinjar may be just this little dot on the border out of the key cities of Iraq, but it is a key geopolitical point for key actors who care about it. If you go to talk to the range of actors in the AZD community and in the Kurdistan region and with the KRG leadership, they will tell you there are elements in Baghdad that are powerful in the government and Iran do not want this agreement to be implemented for reasons that Haider went eloquently to talk about. It has a strategic value for whatever interest they have in that area. If you go and ask the question in Baghdad and a wide range of actors will tell you, no, it is the leadership in the Kurdistan region and Turkey who do not want this to be implemented and they will also cite strategic reasons. I think probably the common thread there is that neither side is wanting to share and it is attached to strategic interests they care about. Unless that strategic interest is resolved, if we go down that path, then we are dealing with a dead end. The alternative path that the AZDs themselves talk about, they said, okay, fine, you did not include us in the Sinjar agreement. The solution to the Sinjar agreement, at least on the Iraqi side, is in the constitution. The Iraqi, apply the Iraqi constitution and the law, then the mayor, the police, everything will be from the local community. And if you give it to the local community, then it is not Baghdad, it is not Irbil that is determining this. But this is where the other actors are also looking for their interests in the Iraqi constitution, where they created local groups and they recruit from the local community and they buy loyalty from the local community so they have an answer for you. I think, which is my last point, is that if negotiation has not solved this, if the actors want to break this, for example, all the names that have been exchanged between Baghdad and Irbil about who should be the mayor, clear they will not agree. Then they have to go to the people. They create a condition where the people vote for it and they accept that. Short of that, I am afraid that we will be in that vicious cycle or people will continue to negotiate and not reach an agreement. Thank you, Sahang, for that. And I'm going to come back to you on what else can be done. It seems that there's a role for the international community encouraging that. Ambassador Mousgak, I wanted to turn to you because the themes of governance and social cohesion, those are things that are in synergy with the efforts to advance accountability and are often raised as being a critical component of the addressing not just the crimes that were perpetrated against DZD and other communities in Iraq, but also creating more stability for the future, deterring future atrocities and allowing people to feel safe and live alongside their neighbors again. And I was just wondering if you could share both your reflections. There have been a number of really high watermarks in regards to what's been undertaken by the international community and by others, including by local DZD organizations and also some real low points in regards to the effort to advance accountability. And if you can talk a little bit about where you see there being opportunity in the time ahead. Happy to thank you so much. It's great to be here amongst friends and colleagues and thank you for your interest in this issue as we approach the tenure mark of the genocide. When I scan the ecosystem of international justice, there are very few pathways that are open here. And so that's I think the low point that you were alluding to. The international criminal court, which would be maybe a natural place to consider a genocide of this scale is foreclosed for jurisdictional reasons. Iraq has not ratified the underlying treaty. There may be some ISIS members who hail from ICC member states, which would give nationality jurisdiction to the court, but it's a smaller number than would be needed to reach the gravity thresholds. This is per the previous prosecutor who was confronted with proposals to take up the problem of ISIS through the nationality route. She noted that many of the leadership hailed from non-ICC member states such as Iraq as well. And so felt like she didn't have the ability to move forward. There have also been proposals for an ad hoc tribunal dedicated to ISIS or to the plight of the Yazidi people. And none of those has moved forward for lack of political will within the community of states. The security council is likely foreclosed for any activity here because of the likelihood of Russian veto, Russia indicating early on, even prior to this crisis in 2014, and China as well, that they were unlikely to support additional ad hoc tribunals in a way that they did support at the time, an ad hoc tribunal dedicated to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda. So those two natural international type institutions have not been available to hear. The other natural place for justice to be delivered, of course, would be in the courts of Iraq itself. It has a duty to deliver justice for its people. And yet we've seen limited ability to do this for the reasons that the deputy assistant secretary remarked upon, which is they don't have an operative legal framework that recognizes war crimes genocide or crimes against humanity as prosecutable crimes within the domestic system. So instead, to the extent that they do ISIS cases, these are done as terrorism cases. And so the victim of those charges is generally the state itself or violence against the civilian infrastructure. It doesn't necessarily focus on the plight of the Yazidi people and the fact that they were the victim of what has been determined by many authoritative sources as a true genocide. ISIS undertook an ideological and a theological exercise and determined that the Yazidis had to be eliminated. That is the definition of genocide, an attack on a protected group for the purpose and with the intent of eliminating that group in whole or in part. So because of these gaps in the Iraqi legal framework, cases have not been able to proceed in Iraqi courts that have focused on the harm to the Yazidi people. So where has that left us? What that has left us is cases in third states, states outside of Iraq and outside of the region who are able to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction under principles of universal jurisdiction or related theories of jurisdiction. The European states in particular have really stepped up and are very much in the lead here. I want to give a shout out to Germany, to Sweden, and others who have used their ICC implementation law, which makes international crimes prosecutable, but also principles of universal jurisdiction, which say, in essence, it doesn't matter the nationality of the perpetrator, the nationality of the victim, or the place of commission. Our courts have jurisdiction because these are international crimes. We are essentially deputized by international law to assert jurisdiction here. And so these courts have really stepped up. This phenomenon has been aided by the existence of dedicated war crimes units that many of these states have established so they can develop the internal expertise, a real understanding of the jurisprudence, how it has developed, what's happening in other courts around the world. They meet regularly through this Eurojust genocide network so they can share information, techniques, and strategies, and just learn from each other in a way that any community of practice will do. And they also are, I think, inspiring each other very much. We've seen an uptick in cases brought by our own human rights and special prosecutions unit. I think that's very much a part of feeling like they're part of a community and that these cases can actually be done. Now, undergirding what has been happening in these national courts, which is concededly episodic and opportunistic, it usually depends upon the existence of a perpetrator there and of survivors who are willing to undertake the incredibly difficult task of stepping forward and accusing a former perpetrator in open court with what may be very limited witness protection measures and willing to bring those people to court. And yet the Yazidi community has stepped forward and has done this, in part due to assistance from survivor-led, Yazidi-led, women-led organizations that have been able to accompany them through these justice processes. Undergirding these cases is UNITAD, which the deputy assistant secretary also mentioned. This was a very unique investigative body created by the Security Council in 2017, in part based upon the recognition that it couldn't take the next step and actually create a dedicated tribunal or to refer the matter to the ICC. So this was somewhat of a compromise and then, frankly, an experimental exercise. UNITAD is essentially a group of expert investigators who have been collecting evidence on ISIL and crimes by ISIL against the whole range of victim communities. They developed an internal expertise. They've taken witness statements under very sophisticated informed consent protocols. They've created refined analysis and research, sort of understanding the chain of command, doing a deep dive on particular attacks, understanding sources of support for ISIS. All of the things that a natural prosecutor who's maybe can't find Sinjar on a map would have to do on their own. And instead, UNITAD is able to hand them refined investigation and investigative materials, as well as dossiers on particular perpetrators. And so national systems have been increasingly going to UNITAD and asking for help. This person has been identified as within our territory. Some victims have come forward and has identified them as a perpetrator. How do we verify that, right? We have to prove that this person is who they say they were and that they did what these individuals are alleging that they have done. UNITAD has been there with a database to be able to assist national investigators and prosecutors with information that helps jumpstart their investigations. Now, that's the sort of good news story. The maybe bad news or unfortunate news is that UNITAD's mandate has now not been extended, in part due to resistance from the government of Iraq. And they've been upset about some things that, frankly, are understandable in a way, but have fixes that have not been undertaken. So one, they want more information sharing from UNITAD to the national system within Iraq. Now, there are two barriers to that. One, UNITAD is not designed to support terrorism prosecutions. It's designed to support the prosecution of atrocity crimes, including genocide crimes against humanity and war crimes. And yet, as I mentioned, Iraq does not have the legal framework to be able to do those cases. So there's a sort of a mismatch between what Iraq is able to do criminally and what UNITAD is collecting and able to support. And then second, of course, there is the problem of the death penalty and the policy within the United Nations of not supporting justice processes that might result in the death penalty. And so there are ways that I think these problems could be overcome through a negotiated process with the United Nations, with UNITAD principles, and with sort of supporters of justice generally to get assurances, for example, from the government of Iraq that it will not pursue the death penalty in some of these cases, to help the government of Iraq to enact the necessary legislation. I think in my estimation as an international lawyer, although I have not done the deep analysis, there are no retroactivity issues here because of the earlier work coming out of the prosecution of Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi High Tribunal. Everyone in Iraq was on notice that these were international crimes and so there's no concern about ex post facto prosecutions. Obviously that would be litigated within the national system of Iraq, but there are pathways to make new legislation retroactive so that it would cover 2014 and beyond. So it's a mixed bag, as you noted for sure, Naomi. The bright spots are what the European states are doing, stepping up and undertaking these sort of obligations as good standing members of the international community if they have the evidence available, perpetrators within their reach, victims that are now living within their communities, developing trusted relationships with those diaspora communities so that they can have this information sharing and then having the courage to bring these cases. One other bright spot and then I'll close is these public-private partnerships that we're seeing where national prosecutors and investigators are relying upon survivor organizations who have the sort of on the ground truth about what happened to them, such that they feel comfortable coming forward and then participating in a justice process. And that would not happen if groups, civil society actors were kept at a sort of arms length and I think we're really seeing a recognition that they have a lot of indigenous expertise that can help support justice processes. Thank you so much for that. Picking up on that theme, I wanted to turn to you, Pari, before we open up for some questions. Your organization and a number of organizations have been working to try to advance justice efforts and have been involved in exactly the type of documentation work that Ambassador Venskac was speaking to. You've also been working and trying to help with the efforts to find the missing. And I was wondering if you could just talk in a very kind of concrete way about what support can be given to Yazidi civil society to advance those efforts, especially in a moment where we're seeing, again, this very serious threat to UNITAD and a lot of questions about what will happen to the future possible prosecutions as it pertains not just to the Yazidis, but for Christians, she had turned men a whole host of communities. Thank you, Naomi, and thank you Ambassador Venskac to, I mean, we're grateful for the support that we've been receiving for many years from the Office of Global Criminal Justice. Just an accountability is so important for the victims to have some sort of closure and at the same time, also finding missing Yazidis. A lot of family members are unable to close that chapter of their life and move on, see a lot of need for mental healthcare. Because of this situation, you have to also understand that any time when a Yazidi is rescued, immediately the families think like, okay, maybe it's someone of my family. I know Haider, you have missing family members. I have, I know Mirza, I think everyone, how are you? I think everyone of our community has lost at least one, if not 17 or over 15 family members. For us, justice means that the perpetrators who committed the crimes are held accountable for the crime they actually committed. So I'm not talking about terrorism charges. It really doesn't mean anything to us because there's a variety of different terrorism acts. We really want to look for, okay, genocide, rapes, mass murders, those kind of things because that was done to us. We, in 2015, FIF, our organization, and Yaz, that we went to the ICC to ask for a preliminary investigation into Daesh fighters who were from member states. And unfortunately, it wasn't possible. So over the last years, we were able to work with triple IM, UNITAD, different public prosecutors to look and investigate like, what happened in different villages? Do crime scene analyses? What crimes were committed and by who? Can we identify them or not? We make special reports on that and we're able to share that, even here with Homeland Security and the FBI in other countries with the public prosecutors. But one of them being UNITAD and triple IM, but UNITAD specifically, we were talking with them to identify, okay, UNITAD, you do this and we will do this so that we wouldn't overlap. We gave in specific instances, like for example, the Hardan massacre. I think almost 90% of that information came from our organization. And that was so useful because then public prosecutors around the world understood what happened in Hardan and committed those crimes. But there's now one question that remains because now we have a bunch of different villages and massacre sites. And that information will be ready to be shared with these public prosecutors, triple IM and UNITAD. But UNITAD is a big question for us because a lot of the survivors say that they do not want to share anything with the Iraqi authorities. So then you come to a position and you talk to UNITAD and say, like, listen, we can't have it that all of a sudden Iraqis are coming in your office and are taking that evidence and material because our survivors said no. So we're now like waiting to see what is going to happen, but it is very upsetting to see that investigative mechanism that was set up to create some sort of investigation so that one day have justice and accountability is now going to not exist anymore. Also, it was also an advocate for ethnic and religious minorities in Iraq to ensure to everyone there needs to be justice. perpetrators need to be held accountable for the crimes that they committed. And I think with the loss of UNITAD, we really need to start thinking about, okay, what are we going to do next? I know YASDA does documentation, FYF does documentation. We have the ability to create good reports and investigations, but we need to have support to keep that going. I do want to say one thing that also comes to this point that even with COVID, a lot of international organizations all of a sudden left. But the ones that were remaining was civil society organizations that stayed on the ground and supported the community through the COVID situation. The same thing here, a lot of money was invested in UNITAD and good on the international community to do so because their work is good and they work with civil society. But now that the mandate is ending, all the energy, the money, the time that has been put into UNITAD is gone. From the beginning, a lot of the Yazidi community and FYF was one of them because I studied law myself, we said we do not want all of this investigation to end up in New York in a library. And now we're a few years later. Or worse, a basement. A basement, exactly. And now we're at that point, so we need to find a way to keep it going and have that information not end up in a basement. And hopefully we're going to move to the Q&A in a moment. Hopefully we'll be able to present some recommendations for what actually can be done and just drawing on your point what so many people want as they want prosecutions in Iraq for the actual crimes. And you mentioned one concrete recommendation which is pass the legislation. We've been hoping for years now that this legislation would be passed that would criminalize the crimes. And so I think we have to really think concertedly about what the international community can do. So just as we turn to Q&A and I think we'll take two or three at a time, I was hoping Sarhang, you could just speak a little bit. UNITAD and its creation was a innovation and a show of international support. And there were many lines of effort that were undertaken in the early days to show support for the government of Iraq, the people of Iraq in the immediacy of the attacks and in the immediate aftermath. Today, what can the international community do? How should we be thinking about what support looks like in a moment where, as you said, the government of Iraq is arguing, this is a middle-income country, we do not need your support, your presence in the same way. What tangible steps can be taken? Great question. So I think, again, going back to the data, the data directly, clearly, loudly points out that people see it as the responsibility of the government of Iraq to do certain things. But also the data clearly, loudly, measurably, and check it out for yourself, please, also shows lack of confidence that the Iraqi government would do that for them. So, okay, where does that leave us? And I can give it in specific numbers. On this very specific question of accountability, we asked, which actor do you think should bear the primary responsibility for making sure that accountability processes take place? More than 70% said the government of Iraq. 10% said the United Nations. So as a responsibility, they see it as an Iraqi responsibility. But we all know the reality of Iraq. So certain few things that the international community could do. I think maintaining international attention on this issue, not treating it as a problem of the past, and not losing attention on this issue as other complex problems emerge, like Ukraine and the war on Gaza and other things. So remaining involved. And second, focusing on where are those areas? So the people want to return to an area that they can trust to return to. And that trust is both in terms of the livelihoods, but also it's about coexistence. So I think there are very basic projects, like paving like six kilometers in an area that could connect some of the Arab villages with some of the AZD villages that would allow trade and all that, and the communities tell us. Please, if you support the AZD community as much as you need, you can, because it's worth it. But don't just focus on them and not the communities around them. Because when you see water provided to AZD villages and not to the Arab villages next door, that could create tension and add to the already existing problems. So these are some of the things that the community tell us. But bridging the relationship of the AZD community with their surroundings, because at the end of the day, they will never have the numbers to vote things through Iraq's democracy. They will need the support and protection and partnership and coexistence of the broader community. So investing in that relationship is key. And the AZD community, among the bravest people that I have met, I'm not talking in terms of a fighting force, but having the courage to speak and sit down with others whom they have been perceiving to be part of the attack on them. And we've done some dialogues, and we continue to have those. And for the privacy of those dialogues, I'm unable to provide specifics. But they are willing and sitting down and are willing to turn the page and move on and build positive relationships. And the same other ways, all the negative perception about this tribe, this and that, that they are sifting through, sitting quietly, privately. We need more of this, because that population that has not been able to return, we need to continue. So that's investment in social cohesion and coexistence is key. And that's not because the AZDs are holding grudge or because the AZDs are having high requirements. No, it's just the nature of the wound that you need to work through this. And in terms of that particular, it's doable. And it's practically doable. Then I would say the United Nations continuing to be engaged, because this has a geopolitical dynamics. I don't think you can make progress without engaging Iran on this. I don't think you can make progress without, let me rephrase, you can make progress, but I don't think you can resolve this without engaging Iran and Turkey on this. And this is a role that the United Nations need to do and fit it to do. So continuation on that path is key, but also the continuity of UNITAD or some other form of international support for that grievance is key. Thanks so much, Sarhang. And it also strikes me that every opportunity for governments to be raising in Baghdad and reveal the needs of this community and of other communities is of utmost importance that tends to fall down to priority number 2030 when we're talking about the complexity of what's happening in Iraq and it has to be part of every single conversation at the highest levels. I wanted to just turn, there are microphones, if there are questions from the audience, if you want to put your hands up for any questions. Philippe, in the back. Hi, thank you very much for organizing this event and to all the speakers for being here today, the panelists. My question is to the entire panel, whoever wants to respond on behalf of the other panelists and it's that if any of you had an audience with President Biden, what would be the two things you would ask him to do to move beyond the conflict phase into some sort of a resolution for the people of Northern Iraq, for the Christians and for the Yazidi communities that have been impacted by the Shennas? What are two things that President Biden and the United States government could tangibly do immediately? Such a great question because also President Biden has a long history in this particular issue, including having been vested with being tasked to try to address and resolve what we're referred to as the disputed areas and some of the constitutional articles. So why don't we start with Sarha? I was hoping that you'd defer to the voice of the people. I wanted to end with our Yazidi colleagues, but why don't we do this? We'll start with Haider. We'll end with Pari Haider, if you would start. Two questions for the President. Did I understand? Yeah. President Biden will ask. At least two requests. Two requests. Well, I should say three, maybe. Well, now you're getting greedy. Mainly the very first thing that you say, you know, you can leverage the Iraqi government and the government of the United States. I hope they still do that. You know, as Ambassador Van Schaak said, that getting Iraqi government involved in the justice system would be one, you know, great achievement for justice and accountability. That's number one, if the Iraq can just forget about this article for terrorism, you know, they call it a terrorism or terrorist act. And focus on, you know, on the crimes of genocides and crimes against humanity. That's one and two, a reparation and then, you know, future genocide prevention. So these are all three relatable and how could that practically be done is we leverage the Iraqi government to go through a right path to prosecute the right people. As Serhan was saying, the neighboring villages, making sure that the Yazidis and Christians and others feel that justice has been served. And at this case, reconciliation would be a lot easier for the communities because those who have been involved are getting punished. And then reparations start after that, you know, getting compensated and making sure the infrastructure of the city or the region in itself. I think Patty and Mirza and even Serhan knows about the reparation process very poorly done and occasionally mentioning Mirza to get him in trouble at least, in this case. But he knows that about at least 25,000 Yazidi families have registered for registration. We know that Patty was talking about 1% of the Iraqi budget. Unfortunately, nobody's listening to that. 1% would be a lot better than the current budget that we have says about $11 million. Fortunately, about 3,000 of these, 27,000 have received or their applications have been approved and 50% of the value have been cut due to no budget. So justice and accountability, reparation and working in a mechanism to prevent future genocide. And that could be really done through the, with partnerships with the Iraqis and the international community to include, one suggestion to include the Yazidis and minorities in a curriculum, you know. You've got to teach the society by the minorities. A lot of Iraqis, Mirza knows this very well that a lot of very, very close neighbors don't know anything about Yazidis. They're not learning through the curriculum. You know, here in the United States, our kids are learning about everything in the history, about slavery, about, you know, both good thing and bad thing in the past. So that education is not present, unfortunately. Thank you, Heather. Sarhan. I would say a political and an economic one. A political is that as I discussed, we discussed earlier, there is no solution to impose. If you ask the Yazidis, they want the U.S. troops to go and push every other force out and provide protection. That's the maximalist view. They have, of course, that is not in the realm of possibility. That's not what we are dealing with. But I think keeping it as an active political aim for the administration, because it has been fluctuating and one administration prioritized the issue and another administration may fall in the radar. So keeping it as a consistent political focus in diplomacy, that's one second resources for the area are going down. So I think while working with the government of Iraq to redirect from the wealth of Iraq to that region, but working as they continue to assist programs that the government Iraq would not support, but will be critical for the return and the safe return and sustainable return. And most of that is related to social cohesion, but also some economic employment. So working with the prime minister as Iraq's development road, the main road that is connecting to Turkey, thinking of ways that part of the economic revitalization of that area investment in the economic space so that those people do not have to go and work for the different armed groups that are the employment opportunity in the area. I'm going to save the ambassador from this particular question, because I know she uses every opportunity privately to advocate for the things that she was discussing. You're more than welcome to talk about what you'd like other governments to do, though, if you were to make, you know- Sure, yeah, I will take advantage of that, yeah. Thank you. I think it's really important, and this is implicit in Pari's remarks, to think about the next stage for UNITAD. This cannot simply be the end of the organization. Its archives go and sit in the basement of the United Nations and all of that knowledge and expertise that has been co-created, essentially, by survivors, survivor groups, national authorities, experts, academics, et cetera, just go for naught, right? That we have, as a government in the United States, but other governments have already invested considerably in UNITAD because we see value in it. We see value in its ability to undergird justice in our national systems, and so we cannot have that simply come to an end. And so what is the next phase for UNITAD? And I know my colleague, Susan, is here. She's thinking very hard about this as well, having worked on Iraq issues for many, many years, but how do we make those archives available to credible national legal authorities so that they can continue to benefit from the research? How do we do that, though, in a way that protects the informed consent of the survivors who spoke to UNITAD under certain conditions? And one of them was a recognition that their identities or their stories would not necessarily be shared with the government of Iraq that they have very little faith in. I'm sure your data revealed that as well. And so we need to be able to find a way to make this information continue to be useful, but not do so in a way that puts survivors in any jeopardy in terms of retaliation or just trusting their faith in institutions that when those institutions say, we will not share your information that they can trust that pledge. That's what informed consent is about. So we need to all think, I think creatively, about what a transfer of the archives would look like to make them still available. Pari mentioned the Triple IM, which is a kind of a sister organization that's dedicated to Syria created by the General Assembly as opposed to the Security Council. Could the Triple IM adopt the holdings and take over the functions of UNITAD when it comes to these cases? They're essentially playing the same role with respect to international crimes in Syria as UNITAD was playing with respect to crimes committed by Daesh. And so they have those preexisting relationships with national war crimes units, et cetera. They have a ability to hold archives and searchable and all of that stuff. So I think those are the kinds of creative ideas we need to really explore in order to have all of this investment in UNITAD not sort of come to a screeching halt because they're unable to extend its mandate. Thank you. And for final words, Pari. Thank you, Naomi. Thank you for the question. I mean, this is a question that makes you think because I never think about this, to be honest. One of the things I would say is the 1.5 billion push, the 1% of the Iraqi budget, I think that would help the Yazidi community a lot to recover, rebuild, and hopefully in the future go back home. I think another one is Yazidis just don't have political power and we need to start investing in the next generation so that they can have a seat at the table in Baghdad. I think this is so important and oftentimes it's not really on the agenda, but this is something that can create a much better Iraq in the future. If ethnic and minorities have a say in decision-making and I think that, especially for Yazidis because they suffered so much, they could show other people also how we can create a better Iraq that is in cohesion with all the communities that are living there. Another thing that I really think that I hope we will see more of in the future is that we have support to civil society organizations. There's a lot missing when I look at the Yazidi community and the services that are being provided, not enough. We're talking about over 250,000 Yazidis that are displaced. You can't help them with just a $100,000 grant. Or the US should push more, the Iraqi government more to support its people or we need funding from outside to support our people and create a better tomorrow. ISIS was created because there was an instable Iraq, a space for extremism to grow. This can happen tomorrow again. Everything, the root causes, the hatred against ethnic and religious minorities, the ideology of the Islamic State isn't gone and therefore if we just don't invest in these minorities that have suffered so much, we will see this repeat itself over the coming years. And I think that the US is very much invested in making sure that there is a stable Iraq because a stable Iraq could create a more stable Middle East. But unfortunately we hear constantly about the murders. We hear constantly about the genocides and constantly about the bombings. One last thing that I do wanna mention is that Turkey is creating an instable situation for the EZD community and we should not forget that as well. So I want to highlight that if I would see President Biden, I would say that as well because my people are under attack in Sinjar because of Turkey. Thank you so much for that, Pari. And thank you to everyone. I think it's really critically important that President Biden and others make the strategic case to other governments on why Sinjar matters and counters this narrative that it is simply just a dot on the border. In closing, I just wanted to say that this is the first of what we hope will be many conversations that need to happen and they need to happen not just in the run up to the anniversary but they need to be sustained in the aftermath for the benefit of the EZD community for all of the vulnerable communities within Iraq and Iraq writ large. Our goal and our hope is that this is a conversation that helps to support EZD organizations as they develop their plan of action that is underway in advance of the anniversary. And I wanted to just acknowledge that the exhibit that for those who are here will have the opportunity to see nobody's listening is really an unbelievably innovative approach to try to help people for even a small moment understand the pain and the suffering that the EZD community has experienced in that Pahri, that Haider, De'Kiel just came in, Mirza have had to endure and to try to use virtual reality and other ways of sharing the experiences of this community to elicit a sense of heart but also to instill in us a belief that each of us can do something to try to help. And so I would encourage everyone to please after this event go and join us at the reception see the exhibit. It'll be going to the University of Connecticut next and I know that the organization nobody's listening is very eager to ensure that this is taken to key capitals and elsewhere. So I would encourage you all to please look at that. I did want to just close and touch on something that Sarhan mentioned. In January 2014, you warned of ISIS's impending attack. Mosul would be next. Mosul would be next and that was June. In April, De'Kiel was in the State Department with members of his family and other people who are here and probably watching begging for your family's life. It has been an immense privilege for me and for many people who have been able to work with the Yazidi community to hear those accounts and their accounts that no one should ever have to endure or hear. And the notion that nobody is listening is something that you feel so deeply and so profoundly and our commitment has to be an enduring and collective commitment for everyone in the room, for everyone who is watching, for the governments, for the Iraqi officials, the Kurdish regional government officials to ensure that that term nobody's listening no longer has any meaning because we have to listen, we have to do something. It is simply unconscionable that the threats persist, that the conditions persist as they do. And of course our thoughts are with the over 2000 people who remain missing and we hope that their whereabouts are found and that for those who are alive that they're able to be returned to their families. So thank you, sincere gratitude to everyone on this panel and to those who've been involved in organizing the event. I hope you'll all join us downstairs for the reception, so thank you so much.