 May I, first of all, give a very warm welcome to our heads of states and government and to ministers of foreign affairs here in Brussels. NATO summits have always been special events for the Alliance. Never a matter of routine. As a matter of fact, only two others have taken post this decay and with this one mark a sense, a sense, the history of the Iron Man, the promising climate of East-West relations that we now have. And now, at the Third Summit, we meet at a time of achievement, though much remains to be done, and a time for charting the way ahead. And celebration of a success which is fundamentally good for our security might be considered sufficient reason in itself to meet here and frankly a refreshingly novel one given that summits are usually associated with problems or with crisis. But the Alliance will not rest on its laurels. One agreement which reduces some weapons and indeed one new Soviet leader who is ready to reduce some tensions however significant, do not in themselves remove the military capability and potential of the Soviet Union. NATO governments embarked many years ago on the search for better security at lower levels of forces. But it's only the first milestone that has now been reached. And the policy which has brought us where we are is simple enough. It depends on the combination of approaches, negotiation, and arms control coupled with adequate military effort both necessary and both mutually reinforcing. And the validity of this approach was affirmed through the INF process. Our collective determination to deploy and maintain a military capacity where necessary was what convinced the Soviet Union of the need to pursue the better route of arms control and disarmament instead. And this meeting takes place at a time of discussion and public interest in the work of the Alliance. But there can be little real doubt about the basic way ahead. Classic political and military principles of the Alliance are there to service as a guide. But the discussions which will take place over the next two days will I'm sure enable the Alliance to move forward with sustained impetus in a way which will explore all further opportunities for arms control while preserving fundamental security and in a way which will reflect the fundamental solidarity which unites us in transatlantic partnership. It's perhaps natural in the flow of current events to forget the underlying coherence of the Alliance's approach. The fact that NATO's initiatives come only after extensive consultations and debate is a sign of the inner strength of the democratic process amongst the 16 sovereign notions around this table. And when it comes to serious proposals for balanced and verifiable arms control, let's remember that it was the Alliance which has set the agenda, the Alliance which made the running and the Alliance which will continue to do so. And in this context I know that we wish President Reagan and his negotiators well in their efforts to secure an agreement on strategic arms reductions which has the Alliance's full support. Beyond that agreement we all look forward to a more serious engagement with the Warsaw Pact on the central problems of European security arising from the imbalances we face in the field of conventional forces and chemical weapons. We have proposed to open negotiations designed to remove capabilities for surprise attack and for initiating large-scale offensive action. A verifiable ban on chemical weapons remains high on our agenda. And the comprehensive concept for arms control on which we're working will ensure that all potential benefits which arms control might have for Alliance security are properly and energetically explored. And finally the presence of heads of state and government here today reminds us of the wider dimensions affecting the work of the Alliance. It reminds us that our main preoccupations, however much we may need defense, however much we want to proceed with disarmament, are dealing with the consequences of the East-West security problems and not the root cause. For most of us in the West that cause is the degree of mistrust created by the denial of basic human rights and freedom to the peoples of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. And this is not to call for interference in other people's internal affairs. It is simply to state the reality that our state treats its own citizens will affect the degree of trust it can expect to enjoy from its neighbors. And more progress therefore needs to be made at this human level and in particular through a balanced outcome to the the NACSC follow-up meeting if there is to be confidence and the confidence necessary to proceed with radical arms control agendas. In short, the INF milestone is still at the early stage of a long road. But I think we must agree that the Alliance has made a splendid beginning. And I for one look forward to the discussions which will follow on these issues. We now have reached the end of the opening plenary session and will resume our work in a closed session in room one down the passage. And I would like to ask heads of state and government, if they will, to join me and return to the lobby outside this room where we had coffee for the traditional family portrait session. And in order to avoid losing time, I would ask all the other delegates to remain seated until the heads of government and state have left the room and then to proceed to room one where we will begin the closed working session.