 The next item of business is a statement by Mary McCallan on the Edinburgh Tram Inquiry report. The cabinet secretary will take questions on the issues raised in her report at the end of her statement. Therefore, there should be no interventions or interruptions, and I call on the cabinet secretary for around 10 minutes, please. Thank you, Presiding Officer. I am grateful to have the opportunity to make a statement in response to the Edinburgh Tram Inquiry report. A comprehensive document totalling near the 1,000 pages that I received in the morning of publication on 19 September. The report was also laid in Parliament in line with the requirements of the Inquiries Act 2005. I believe that the report addresses the terms of reference that were set, namely to establish why the Edinburgh Tram project in curd delays cost more than originally budgeted for and through reductions in scope delivered significantly less than projected. I recognise the extensive work and efforts of the inquiry team in delivering the report. I thank all those who contributed to the inquiry, including the many witnesses who provided evidence. I am aware that the construction of the original tram line caused a great deal of disruption to the residents and businesses of Edinburgh. I believe that it is important that we recognise that frustration and ensure that lessons are learned and applied to future infrastructure projects, be those local authority or central government. As such, I can confirm that this Government has given very careful consideration to the full report, along with considering its recommendations, any actions required and lessons learned. I would like to be very clear that the primary objectives of this Government in establishing the inquiry and throughout the process have been to support delivery of valid findings and recommendations and to engage meaningfully and to co-operate fully and openly in the production of evidence at the inquiry's request. Significant resources were committed to diligently carrying out this endeavour, and all those who gave evidence on behalf of the Scottish Government did so in good faith, providing the inquiry with a comprehensive and accurate view of Scottish ministers' collective position throughout. Now, while I welcome the formal publication of the report, I understand and I empathise with the public's frustration at the length of time that it took to conclude, as well as the cost to the public purse. This is, of course, particularly disappointing, as it was this Government's concern for the prudent public spending that saw the commission of the inquiry in 2014. However, as an independent statutory inquiry, it would have been very much beyond the powers of government to seek to influence the proceedings, and any questions on the length of time and of the cost of the inquiry are rightly for Lord Hardy to answer. The report itself contains 24 recommendations. A minority of those are directed to the Government, and those mainly concern administrative processes and record management, including minute-taking and legislative and practical aspects of setting up inquiries. All recommendations, as I have said, are being considered in detail. The report also outlines 10 headline causes of failure, which contributed to the delays and cost overruns associated with the project. Nine of those relate directly to the actions of the City of Edinburgh Council and its arms-length delivery body, TAI, with the 10th and final cause only relating to the Scottish ministers. Indeed, the chair, Lord Hardy, is unambiguous, noting in a video statement that he produced alongside the report that, I quote, TAI's failures were the principal cause of the failure to deliver the project on time and within budget, and he adds that the City of Edinburgh Council must, I quote, also share principal responsibility with TAI for the delays in the design. That reflects the fact that responsibility for delivery of the project, including procurement and risk of any cost overruns, was solely and rightly for the City of Edinburgh Council. The only cause of failure attributed to the actions of ministers was the decision following the debate in Parliament on June 2007 to reposition Transport Scotland as a principal funder, as opposed to a project partner. Setting aside for a moment the fact that the Government was very clear at the time about the risks inherent with the project and that it was others who represented in this Parliament today who voted the project through, it is clear that the outcome of that vote transferred accountability to the City of Edinburgh Council and necessarily altered Transport Scotland's relationship with the project going forward. Indeed, any failure to clarify the role of Transport Scotland would have been an abdication of leadership, and it would have led to poor governance and confusion around roles. The decision to alter the governance arrangements was taken explicitly to avoid uncertainty about where leadership of the project lay, clarifying the Government's roles as principal funders and on that basis preventing further calls on the public purse. It was exactly because of that clarity and the clear setting of governance boundaries that Government funding for this project remained capped at the agreed £500 million and not a penny more. Following the parliamentary vote on the tram project, the decision to separate the roles of Transport Scotland as principal funder and City of Edinburgh Council as a project lead was in fact good governance, and it helped to avoid potential delay and increased risk. The report, as I have mentioned, identifies 24 recommendations, all of which I will address. There are 11 that are directed expressly at Scottish ministers. Of those, four refer to the establishment and delivery of public inquiries rather than to the Edinburgh tram project itself. Two are jointly for Scottish ministers in COSLA to consider a range of measures to ensure robust project delivery. One concerns record keeping and four relate to the provision of evidence and potential sanctions for providing any misleading evidence. We are working through all those recommendations, but I can report that additional guidance, similar to that that is suggested, is already in development with reference to the efficient establishment and delivery of public inquiries and has been shared with recent inquiries as they have been established. The Government is very aware of the impact of public inquiries and the importance of effectively supporting them, ensuring efficient and timely reporting. Robust and enhanced procedures regarding minute-taking and documentation management, as suggested, have already been embedded within the Government and the civil service for a long time. The permanent secretary recently appeared at the Finance and Public Administration Committee and reiterated that commitment to ensuring that robust systems and processes are in place to record and manage that critical information. Let me now turn to recommendations that involve collaboration with and working alongside COSLA and local authority partners. Effective collaboration sits at the heart of this Government, and the recently agreed Verity House agreement is testament to our commitment to embrace that collaborative approach to delivering our shared priorities for the people of Scotland. While responsibility for delivery of local authority projects must quite rightly remain with councils as project leads, I have absolutely no hesitation in championing close working with our local authority partners. The remaining 13 recommendations cover a range of areas relating to the governance and delivery of light rail projects. Whilst those recommendations are directed squarely at project leads and local authority officials, there is a link to much of the work being done by this Government and its agencies, including Transport Scotland. I am pleased to report that this Government and its public bodies, we already operate in line with those recommendations and the best practice suggested as evidenced by our excellent record of delivering major infrastructure projects, including the Borders Railway, the Edinburgh Glasgow Improvement programme, the Aberdeen Western Peripheral route and the Queensfury crossing over the fourth estuary, a complex engineering feat that has put our workmanship to the front and centre of global engineering. Furthermore, we follow detailed government guidance on procurement, on risk, on optimism bias, all as enshrined in the treasuries green book, the Scottish Government's client guide to construction projects and the Scottish public finance manual. Indeed, the identification and management of risk and adherence to best practice on business case production and the assessment rests at the heart of project and programme delivery within Transport Scotland and the wider government. Transport Scotland always follows published best practice guidance when setting up project government structures and has its own governance procedures for investment decision making, monitoring and review guidance. I emphasise that we will continue to very carefully consider each of the recommendations, noting where action has already been taken or has always been best practice, as well as crucially where we can go further. In conclusion, whilst acknowledging that we came into government with a manifesto commitment to abandon the project and to spend the £500 million of promised funding on other high-priority infrastructure programmes, once the will of Parliament was made clear, the Government endeavoured to ensure that our involvement with the project followed good governance practice at all times. It is for that reason that it was essential that we provide clarity around the roles following the vote in favour of the project, thereby providing a clear sponsorship structure that allowed us to assume the role of principal funder and ensure that public funds were monitored and grant conditions were applied in compliance with published guidance at all times. Whilst I reiterate the point that nine of the 10 lead criticisms in the report clearly lie within responsibility of City of Edinburgh Council and with TIE, I acknowledge that lessons must be learned from the report for all parties involved. I am clear that we are giving full consideration to recommendations and any actions that follow, ensuring that lessons are learned and best practice always followed for major project infrastructure. I thank all those who took the time to provide evidence to the inquiry and point again to the full co-operation of this Government. The provision of evidence that demonstrated a comprehensive, transparent and accurate view of events underpinned the approach taken to the inquiry by this Government, ministers and officials. I commend that approach to Parliament. The cabinet secretary will now take questions on the issues raised in her statement. I intend to allow around 20 minutes for that, after which we will need to move on to the next item of business. Members wish to ask a question that we have not already done so. I would encourage them to press the request-to-speak buttons. I call first Miles Briggs. I thank the cabinet secretary for advance sight of the statement. After almost 10 years and £13 million of taxpayers' money, there is very little in the statement to suggest that SNP ministers have accepted their role in the failures around the Edinburgh tram project. The former Deputy First Minister, John Swinney, is mentioned 156 times by name in the report, but not once today by the cabinet secretary in her statement. The cabinet secretary states that the only cause of failure attributed to the actions of Scottish ministers was the decision following the debate in Parliament in June 2007 to reposition Transport Scotland as a principal funder as opposed to project partner. That is the understatement of the century. Lord Hardy states, and I quote, The actions of Scottish ministers and the limitations imposed by them on the involvement of officials in 2007 was a serious error and resulted in the failure by the Scottish ministers to protect the public purse. Does she now accept that decisions to withdraw Transport Scotland was indeed a serious error and who in the Scottish Government is taking responsibility for that? Miles Briggs is absolutely right to point out that the cost of this inquiry and the time that it took to report are not satisfactory, although I have to say that these are matters over which Scottish ministers have no locus whatsoever and any interference in our part would have been rightly criticised. Questions of time, questions of cost, these are for Lord Hardy. I would caveat his comments about responsibility by being very clear that I and the Government have considered carefully all the recommendations and all the findings, but I point him again to the fact that one out of ten, the final out of ten, is attributed to Scottish ministers and a minority of recommendations are put to the Scottish Government as well. Many of those that apply to the Scottish Government were instituted years ago and Miles Briggs really ought to keep up. I want to focus on that point about that principal finding of failure to the Scottish ministers and about the separation of the roles. I narrated in my remarks that this Government came into Government 2007 not supporting the trams, but we were instructed to proceed by a vote in this Parliament led, I understand, by an Opposition amendment from Labour's Wendy Alexander. When we got that instruction to make the promised funding available, we did so, but that necessitated a separation of roles, where Transport Scotland had previously been part of project delivery into being the principal funder. I just want to quote Mr Heath of Partnerships UK, one of the only independent witnesses that commented on that point in the inquiry, and he said, I think that it was very sensible at the time. Complex projects require the simplest overall governance structure, and reporting to both City of Edinburgh Council and Transport Scotland, with inevitably different emphasis in their reporting requirements, would have been unnecessarily burdensome and introduced potential decision delay and risk. Therefore, I do not agree with the finding. I think that, first and foremost, it is important to acknowledge that, now that they have been delivered, the trams are running successfully and the feedback from the people of Edinburgh is largely positive. It is also clear that Edinburgh Council has recognised the errors that were made and have learned lessons from those errors in the successful delivery of phase 2 of the project. I would also have to say that Edinburgh Council has had the good grace to acknowledge their mistakes and apologise for something that this SNP Government seems incapable of doing. Even after the report and the statement today, I still pose the question, what lessons has the Scottish Government actually learned? The report was damning off the Scottish Government involvement or, indeed, non-involvement in the project throughout Transport Scotland's time. The question remains, is Transport Scotland fit for purpose, and does it have the capacity to provide oversight and support in the large-scale multi-partner infrastructure projects that Scotland so desperately needs moving forward? I think that Alex Rowley is right to reflect the proper running of the trams that people in Edinburgh now enjoy and the fact that the council did go on to produce successful additions to it. That probably underlines the fact that Transport Scotland's involvement was not required in those additional sections and probably undermined some of the findings from the report about our role at the time. Is Transport Scotland fit for purpose? Yes, it absolutely is. My colleague Fiona Hyslop and I have the pleasure of working with many experts every day who work exceptionally hard to deliver the running of our transport system and the development of major projects in Scotland. I was really proud, in my statement, to reel off a number of the successes that we have had in that regard. The Aberdeen western peripheral route, the Queensferry crossing, the Borders Railway, among many others. I have absolute faith in Transport Scotland. That ultimately is a historic piece of work, and while we have considered very carefully all the recommendations, so many of them are facets of the past, and the changes have been instituted years ago. The Scottish Government was clear in 2007 about the position on the Edinburgh trams and the Edinburgh airport rail link that some in this chamber also wanted to see happen at that time, which has taken even more millions away from the capital budget from other parts of the country. Can the cabinet secretary confirm that, after the Parliament voted to deliver the tram project, did the Scottish Government provide the assistance to those tasks to deliver the trams? As I have highlighted, the outcome of that vote in Parliament in 2007 was instructive. We respected it, we transferred accountability of the project in the City of Edinburgh Council, and that necessarily altered Transport Scotland's relationship with the council going forward. The decision to alter those governance arrangements was to avoid any uncertainty about where the leadership of the project lay and to ensure that the Scottish ministers' role was strictly as principal funders. I would go on to say that not only did it do that, not only was that reflected in the evidence that was the right governance decision, but it also arguably protected the public funds of the Scottish Government for being called upon in future years as the project languished. Graham Simpson, to be followed by John Mason. John Swinney is named throughout Lord Hardy's report, and most of it is criticism. Lord Hardy says this. Mr Swinney said that he would do nothing differently if doing the project again. The conclusion of what I have considered is that that would be an error. Is that a valid finding? I will open with one of the last remarks that I made in response to my last question, which was that the actions of John Swinney and the decisions that he took following the vote in Parliament, which I have to stress was not supported by the Government but by opposition in the Parliament today, that not only created the right governance structure with the separation of roles and everything that I pointed to in the comments from Mr Heath of Partnerships UK, but it also arguably ensured that when John Swinney said, £500 million and not a penny more that we were able to stick to that and the funds of the Scottish Government were protected. John Mason, to be followed by Daniel Johnson. This inquiry has taken a ridiculous amount of time and cost a ridiculous amount of money, and it does seem that some lawyers have no sense of urgency in keeping to time. I take the point that the cabinet secretary has made that they have to be independent, but surely going forward there is some way of putting a constraint on the length of time and cost of these inquiries. I do understand the sentiment behind Mr Mason's question. I agree, as I agreed with Miles Briggs, that the length of time this took, the costs that were mounted were not acceptable, frankly. However, I have to stress again that the time spent, the costs incurred, are not matters over which we have any say whatsoever it would be wrong for us to do so. Having said that, we are providing and we have already been developing guidance on public inquiries, not only for the operation of the inquiries themselves, but to support civil servants in supporting them. Of course, it is worth pointing out that the costs that can arise from public inquiries has to be one of the considerations that we make when deciding whether or not to convene one. The cabinet secretary's answer so far this afternoon has relied upon the fact that Transport Scotland had a reduced scope to that just funder. However, Lord Hardy's findings found that the Scottish Government provided inadequate oversight of that funding. Indeed, he describes the fact that the Scottish Government relied on my quote, covert influence with no record or minute keeping. Recommendation 12 outlines key improvements needed for transparency and accountability. Will the Government commit to accepting their recommendation of info and review its interactions both with Transport Scotland and delivery partners? Thank Daniel Johnson for the question. I have already pointed out that all of the recommendations have been considered and will continue to be considered by Scottish ministers, and the particular one that he mentions about record keeping and about miniting and document retention, were instituted years ago. That is capturing a period of time, which, frankly, is now very much in the past. The Scottish Government, Transport Scotland and the Scottish ministers committed ourselves to supporting the inquiry very fulsomly and in the best of faith, and that included written statements and oral statements from everybody involved. The Inveratram inquiry has to lead to good governance in urban infrastructure projects, and not to any future hesitation to invest in the public transport networks or cities in our towns need. What assurance can the cabinet secretary give that mass transit projects such as further Edinburgh tram expansion or even the proposed Glasgow metro will continue to be supported by the Government? It is apt to consider some of the learnings from the Inveratram project inquiry. As we embark on the Glasgow Clyde metro, I have mentioned a number of times that there are recommendations as to light rail projects and the engagement between Transport Scotland and local authorities. We will take all of that on board. One of the recommendations is about Transport Scotland's involvement in the delivery of projects, and I have to say that I have made quite clear this afternoon that my view that our decision to separate in 2007 was the right one, and I would like to see that continue to be instituted. On the Clyde metro specifically, since the publication of STPR2, we have a multi-partner group consisting of Transport Scotland, SPT, Glasgow City Council and Client Delivery Group to better define the scale of the work that the metro might represent and the associated governance, etc. Of course, we will take into account the findings of this inquiry as we take that work forward. Shopkeepers, business owners and residents in our nation's capital have all been denied answers for far too long by the length of time that it has taken for this inquiry to report. This inquiry is not happening in isolation either. There are other similar inquiries to which victims, particularly of Covid-19 and Professor Eljamill, will be looking to those inquiries for answers. What lessons can the Scottish Government learn from the time that this has taken and the mistakes that were made in the delivery of this inquiry? I understand the interest in the point about the time and about the costs, and I have noted that it is obviously something that the Scottish Government has to consider carefully when deciding whether to start an inquiry. However, once you have decided to institute it, once you have supported it, as in this case, to move to a statutory footing, you have to understand that, as ministers, we cannot be involved in dictating the time nor the cost. I note that one of Lord Hardy's recommendations was about only presenting the net costs of public inquiries less accommodation and less staff. I frankly do not agree with that recommendation. I think that full transparency on costs and the publication of that is in the public interest. There are serious questions to be asked about the value of the inquiry report's conclusions and whether they are sufficiently supported by the evidence. What process will the Scottish Government follow to ensure that it is able to identify the most valuable and evidence-driven recommendations in the report? As I have said, the report contains 24 recommendations and a minority of those are directed to the Government. Those that are related to the Government concern administrative processes, record management, minute-taking and some legislative aspects of setting up inquiries. We have considered all the recommendations, taking into account the length of time that has passed since the inquiry was originally set up, and the extent to which a number of those recommendations, as I have said, are already standard practice. That relates particularly to those about record management. The legislative and practical aspects of setting up inquiries and those relating to projects and programme governments. I have already said, but I will repeat for the member's sake, that we have already worked on guidance for public inquiries, and they are interacting with the Scottish Government's sponsor bodies but equally for several servants to help them to interact with inquiries. Mark Ruskell, to be followed by Sue Webber. In response to the inquiry, the charity Living Streets highlighted the accessibility challenges faced by those who are walking, wheeling and cycling and want to integrate their journeys with the tram. Are there lessons to be learned about how particular groups are engaged with and their needs are taken into account in the design and procurement processes of future transport projects? I think that there absolutely are. I would point out, just first of all for the sake of the record, that the design and the procurement were matters for the project leads, namely for City of Edinburgh Council and for Tire and not for Scottish Government, but I think that as a whole everybody has lessons to learn in the development of these matters. I would like to assure the member that suitable provision for all users, including pedestrian cyclists and wheelers, is a really important part of Scottish Government infrastructure projects. As is engagement with community and interest groups, we put that at the heart of the development of our projects. Impact assessments prepared at the early stages are evolved throughout the development of the policy and they always require engagement with those affected, and we will continue to practice that. Councils rely on the accuracy of reports to enable them to take informed decisions, but it is clear that councillors were misled by high-level officials at the council in Edinburgh. In the Edinburgh Tram Inquiry report, Lord Hardy blasts Mr Nick Smith of the City of Edinburgh Council's legal department for inaccurate reports to councillors. So can the minister lay out what action will be taken to hold those responsible to account and what reforms will be put in place to stop this happening again? I think that Mr Weber is absolutely right to highlight one of the parts of the report that stood out in particular for me. I am sure that this is something that the City of Edinburgh Council and local authorities throughout Scotland will be giving considerable thought to. In terms of what the Government can do, there were recommendations within the report made to us about the development of specific sanctions under the civil law of damages and equally a call for a criminal statutory offence. We are given really careful consideration to both of those recommendations. Our view just now is that there may already be provision for such developments under the civil law of intellectual liability and under the criminal common law of fraud, but we will continue to consider that. The time that it has taken for this inquiry to conclude, the previous SNP-led administration at the City of Edinburgh Council approved an extension of the tram lines to New Haven, which successfully opened to the public this summer on time and in budget. Edinburgh residents can take some satisfaction that lessons were clearly learnt from the first trams scheme. Does the Edinburgh trams inquiry report provide any further lessons for mass transit in Scotland that have not already been applied in the last nine years? Jackie Denbara is making a really good point. The extension of the tram line to New Haven was delivered on time and on budget, and I would add, thanks to the strong leadership and the hard work of SNP councillors. It also underlines that point about the principal finding of failure in the inquiry's view about the role of Transport Scotland and the appropriateness of separating those roles. I think that that was appropriate to separate the roles, and I think that the work to New Haven demonstrates that Transport Scotland's involvement was not required. However, as I have said to a number of members, there are a suite of recommendations, a minority of which apply to the Scottish Government. Many of them have been instituted years ago, but we will continue considering the remainder. This inquiry clearly shows that Scottish Government walked away from the major capital project. Recommendation 10, within the inquiry reports, advised Scottish ministers to consider a working group made up of Transport Scotland and COSLA to best take advantage of the necessary skills and expertise to deliver future projects on time within the budget. So can the Cabinet Secretary advise today if the Scottish Government will implement this recommendation in future large infrastructure projects? We will consider that recommendation on a case-by-case basis. I think that the recommendation itself applies only to light rail, and therefore that minimises the cases that it could apply to, but we will absolutely consider it. I must again reiterate that the inquiry heard evidence that the separation of the roles from Transport Scotland as going from a funder in principle to the principal funder was good governance. I have already quoted some independent witnesses to the inquiry. I would also point to the 2011 Audit Scotland report, which took note of that move and the separation of the roles, but made absolutely no adverse comment about it at the time. Thank you. That concludes questions on the statement point of order. Alex Rowley, you quite rudely stopped me there as I was trying to finish my question. Can you reflect on the time given for questions as opposed to the time that we spend debates in here? If we are going to hold the Government to account, we should be able to put questions and do so without being stopped. Mr Rowley, if you could resume your seat, that is not a point of order. I was not rude. I was exercising what was agreed in Buro in terms of the timings for the statement, which includes an opening question from the mean opposition party of 1 minute and 30 seconds. It allows for a minute for those from the Labour front bench. You have been in this Parliament sufficiently long, I would have said Mr Rowley, to know that. I think that you are coming pretty close to challenging the ruling of the chair. With that, there is going to be a brief pause before we move on to the next item of business to live from benches to chain.