 This program is brought to you by Emory University. Ladies and gentlemen, good morning. Welcome back to so many of you that were kind enough to be with us last evening. A warm welcome to those of you that were snarled up in traffic getting here or delayed by our first in three months rainfall last evening. It's wonderful, wonderful to have you all back. Welcome to this Silver Anniversary Conference. My role today is just a bit of a traffic cop role. I'd like to, as you get seated, address a couple of logistical details. Number one, would you be so kind as to turn off your cell phones so that when somebody's in the middle of his or her aria, a cell phone does not interrupt that. And secondly, we have a full house projected. And in this first session, I think we're fine. But in the course of the day, could we apply the Disney Ride rules, which is please occupy all of the seats beside you and the wall, so that we can get everybody crowded in. It's my pleasure to turn the chairing duties of this first session over to the founding director of the Law and Religion Center, Professor Frank Alexander. Thank you very much, John. And thank you all for being here to celebrate with us what we have been involved in for the past 25 years, what some of you have been involved in for 50 or more years. The goal is not just to celebrate what we have been involved in, however, is to wrestle with the questions of what is going to be on the table for the next 25 years. It's the Silver to Gold Conference. What will be the challenging issues and questions as we look out in the horizon for the next 25 years? And that indeed is the topic of this first session, the future of law and religion. We intentionally did this to set the stage for these two days of discussions. We have three of the most distinguished scholars, professors in the world addressing this topic today. Our first speaker is not with us this morning physically. In 1974, a young law professor who had been teaching legal history and contracts and international law, who had been teaching Soviet law, wrote a little book called The Interaction of Law and Religion. Gave a series of lectures and published it in that title in 1974. He shared copies of that text with his colleagues on the law school faculty, but none of them acknowledged receiving it. Not many law professors in the country in 1974 were willing to talk about law and religion. But in that little text in that group of essays, this scholar said, law and religion intersect, interact in many ways. They are common elements of the traditions. They share an emphasis on ritual, tradition, universality, and authority. That little book was read perhaps not by law professors, but it was read by students. It was read by practicing attorneys. It was read by persons of faith across the religious traditions who said, now I can see this book is speaking to the interaction of the disciplines for a whole generation of folks coming out of the 60s and early 70s who indeed believed in the possibility of a better world, a more just society. The interaction of law and religion provided that opening door. Now that individual, we were able to entice a few years later in 1985 to come to Emory Law School as the first Robert Woodruff professor of the university. Harold Joseph Berman joined us in 1985 and became both the foundation and the pillar of our law and religion program. Unfortunately, how Berman's body is weak this morning. He is at home recovering from illness in New York City. His mind is as sharp as ever, and he will be listening and observing these entire proceedings with us. His formal address has been presented and provided to you at the back of this book entitled Law and Religion in the Age of the Holy Spirit. So all of you have a copy of his full address, but I would now like to take a few moments, seven or eight minutes to share with you some reflections on the future of law and religion of our dear friend and mentor, Hal Berman. Those days, Harvard, like many other law schools, many other universities, had a policy of making people emeritus at a certain age. And at Harvard, you could stay on maximum to the age of 70, and then you could no longer teach. Congress had passed a law, by the way, making this illegal, but the university's got an exception for seven years, and I was in that seven-year period. And so I was going to be made emeritus, and I didn't want to be emeritus, I wanted to keep teaching. And I knew Frank Alexander well. He had been my student, and he had invited me to Emory, by the way, to give a lecture once, and I'd been down here. So I got in touch with him, and he got in touch with President Lainey, and they made me an offer of this Woodruff chair, which was a very, very good offer. Jim Lainey offered me an appointment for a lifetime. In fact, I had a letter from the dean of So Long as Your Energy, Interest, and Productivity Continued. I want to tell you in those days, religion was a sort of taboo subject in the law schools. It was just of no interest indeed today. It's not a major interest in most law schools. There are a few like Emory, which recognizes importance. Every legal system rests on a belief system, and what's been called civil religions. We believe in what? We believe in democracy or freedom with the same passion that in religious circles, people believe in God. We believe in America. I love America. Our religion is what comes from the heart, as well as the mind. It's the belief system. What you're committed to, what you're willing to fight for, even to die for. So we have deep in our tradition and deep in our constitutional law this concept of belief underlying legal rules. But most of the courses teach legal rules, and they're viewed from a political, from a policy orientation. What does the legislature want to accomplish by this rule? And not where did this rule come from historically and morally? My own interest now is above all in the coming together of the different cultures of the world. For the first time in the history of the human race, the entire population of the world is beginning to interact with one another all over into a kind of emerging world society. We have a world economy. We are developing a world society with a world law. And as we're concerned with that, we have to look at the different belief systems which underlie these various cultures. Perhaps instead of talking about religions, we should talk about spiritual values and common spiritual values and different spiritual values, differences and similarities. Two defects which I attribute to American legal education, the lack of a historical perspective and the lack of a, let's call it a universal or comparative perspective are very detrimental in preparing people for practice. If you go into a law firm today, in the first place you have clients in all countries, it's amazing the extent to which multinational legal practice and the law firms have to train the law school graduates in multinational legal practice because they don't get in law school. You're a better lawyer if you have a historical perspective. I think all the legal practitioners would agree. It's just the law schools that don't recognize the law professors who are each in his own way propounding his own legal perspective, which is not historical. My perspective is that we are undergoing a fundamental millennial change. We're changing from the, I like to say, from the second millennium of the Christian era to the third. We're now in a new thousand year period or a hundred century period of history where everything down the world is a new world. In my lifetime it all happened. I can't believe it. When I grew up we looked at England when we studied law. Well, I went pretty far starting to study French and German law. Then I suddenly had to realize there's also Russia. You know, I had to become a Russian specialist. And then China, I've just been invited to China. I mean it's been enormous transformation in my lifetime. We had two world wars. We're all in touch with each other with these computers and these emails and their travel and so forth. This is all happened in my lifetime. And I think it's helpful to youth to tell them that. I think they need to hear it because they grew up not knowing anything about the past. In my experience I'm amazed. At the consequences of a lack of a historical perspective legal education could help to bring the world together through the world economy, through world sports, through human rights, through intellectual property which is becoming more and more universal. We're told that there once were only 20,000 people in the whole world, in Africa mostly. They've spread little by little. They've traveled over thousands and thousands and thousands of years and they've filled the whole earth and now we're all in touch with each other everywhere. And I think this is providential and I think we have to find now common spiritual values to hold us together or we may destroy each other with our nuclear weapons. And I think we've got to go back to human nature, the common features, common spiritual values if we're going to give a legal foundation to this new world society, economy and this new world society that's emerging which someday will become a world I hope, a world community. It's going to take generations and centuries before this world, emerging world society develops finally into a world community and we have to avoid above all the dangers to this which are the destruction of the human race which is a possibility. We're faced with this incredible choice between self-destruction of the human race and they're coming together of all these cultures and law can play a particularly vital role and that's my world law. I was not quote the father, I'm the father of four children but I'm not the father of any discipline. Please join me in expressing appreciation to Hal Berman. Both brother John Witte and I seek to visit with Hal Berman on a regular basis in New York City and John will be delivering these entire proceedings to Hal in Brooklyn next week. It is my pleasure to introduce two of our additional commentators this morning. Our first commentator is Professor Kent Greenewalt. Professor Greenewalt is university professor at Columbia University. A clerk for Justice Harlan, an attorney working for civil rights in Jackson, Mississippi. Professor Greenewalt has focused throughout his career on some of the tough questions of law and morality. He has focused on constitutional law, he has focused on church state issues, he has focused on free exercise and fairness. The author of almost a dozen major works in the field of constitutional law, law and morality, law and religion. Kent Greenewalt is one of the most incisive analysts of our culture today. We are honored to have him with us, to share with us his perspectives on the future of law and religion. Please join me in welcoming Kent to the Emory stage. Well thank you Frank. It's wonderful to be part of this celebration of the center which has done such fantastic things in the 25 years of its being. Well, as I get older I go less and less confident about long-term predictions. Who would have guessed 100 years ago that we had in store a century of incredible brutality and inhumanity of diplomatic failures leading to history's two most destructive wars. But I think one thing we might have foreseen was continuing movement toward equality. In particular the notion that treatment by law, basic opportunities in society and respect for persons shouldn't depend on one's gender, race, national origin, ethnic background, sexual orientation, and most important for our purposes today, religion. Of course the idea of equality that I've sketched co-exists with great disparities in wealth and it has yet to dissolve personal prejudices that fit older notions of unequal status. Although I think in respect of even personal attitudes we've come a very long way in my lifetime which doesn't extend for a full century. The movement toward equality owes a great deal to religious understandings. It is centuries old and despite occasional setbacks it's going to continue. What it will signify for the law's treatment of religion is harder to say and this morning I'd like to reflect on some of the conundrums of that topic for the United States, both possibilities and sensible resolutions. Now in relation to what we heard last night and what we heard this morning from Professor Berman and what we're going to hear from Kathleen, I've got to say that this is an extremely prosaic talk where I'm going to give a much, much narrower in scope. The idea of equal respect for persons is complicated for religion. Many people are comfortable with the idea of religious pluralism believing either that religion is basically a personal matter or that most religions have profound insights into a complex and elusive spiritual truth that no one religion has got it right but many people in our country still believe their religion is true. Christians with this view may sincerely accept non-Christians as political and social equals still respect them as human beings but they think they're fundamentally unenlightened or they may think that way like someone who's ignorant about fundamental facts or correct moral views. Now non-Christians on the receiving end of messages that they are lost unless they recognize Jesus as their savior often don't feel that they're being regarded as equals whatever the person with that attitude may think. Now whatever individuals may feel about the uniqueness of their particular religions it's now widely understood that governments should not endorse the truth of any single religion. Following reform of our discriminatory immigration policies a large percentage of immigrants now come from Asia and the already substantial number of Muslims Hindus and Buddhists is going to continue to rise. Equality among religions and among citizens of diverse religious origins fits this pluralism well. This equality of religious points of view at least for the government is one facet of broader egalitarian developments in the realm of ideas. According to the modern law of free speech when a government establishes a public forum it cannot discriminate on the basis of viewpoint it can't welcome support of keeping troops in Iraq and reject speech urging their withdrawal. During the last 50 years more complex questions about equality of ideas and of personal convictions have emerged. If people believe they should behave in a certain way should it matter whether their religious whether their reasons are religious or not religious. This issue is posed most starkly in the case of conscientious objection. Now the scope of an exception matters most during a draft but it still retains importance as a basis for military personnel who become objectors during their term of service that they've signed up for. Now during the Vietnam War the Supreme Court made short work of the statutes requirements that an objection be based on grounds of religion involving belief in a supreme being. To oversimplify only a bit it said that a person who does not believe in a supreme being can count as believing in a supreme being and that someone who is not religious in any standard sense can count as religious. The court strained the statute beyond recognition but I believe the end result was right whether young men and women qualify as conscientious objectors should not depend on whether they are religious. Now this conclusion raises the broader question whether it should ever matter for how religious for how individuals are treated by the state whether their reasons are religious and should it ever matter whether organizations are religious and what about messages the state conveys should religious messages be sharply distinguished from other kinds of messages? Does a sweeping version of equality one that precludes not only distinctions among religions but also legal distinctions between religion and other categories of connections, ideas and organizations does that kind of sweeping version of equality best fit the conditions of religious pluralism including non-belief? Some scholars think so but one wonders whether ceasing to treat religion as distinctive represents the most healthy regime for religious pluralism. I want to explore these questions briefly in terms of some special aspects of the laws treatment of religion. So let me start with government speech. When they speak for themselves American governments may express all sorts of claims about both factual and normative matters. They do so both in public schools and in publications that are aimed at ad-hocs but a government can't make claims about religious truth and I'm putting aside here the complex question about when an official is speaking for the government. What would treating religious ideas equally with other ideas mean in this context? One possibility is that the government would be able to address religious ideas like other ideas and its power to express religious ideas would greatly increase. All levels of government could opine on religious questions as they now do on many historical, moral and political questions. Well given Christian dominance, this throwback to an earlier era is not likely to benefit minority religions and non-believers. A different possibility is that many other areas would be marked off with religion from assertions of truth by government agencies. Now one obvious candidate for such treatment is a ban on the government praising one political party to the detriment of another political party but that seems a very limited restriction. Presumably the government should be able to teach as true factual claims supported by techniques of science and social science. Should it refrain from broad suggestions about what's a good life or about moral right and wrong? Now some scholars have suggested that the government should be agnostic about what's a good life limiting itself to what are just relations among citizens. Separating questions about the good life from ones of justice isn't so simple and more to the point it's misguided I think in the extreme to suppose that public schools should stop teaching that healthy activity is preferable to indolence that excessive use of drugs and alcohol can destroy that an advanced education not only opens up other opportunities but can be enriching that art and literature have value. These are messages the government should be able to express in other fora as well. In fact there is no broader class of ideas in which ideas about religion fall that should be out of bounds for government in the manner of religious ideas. Governments are incompetent in respect to religion and government support of one set of religious ideas is at odds with an ideal and reality of religious pluralism. In this respect at least religion still warrants special treatment however hard it may be to say where and how religion differs from some other social phenomena. Now closely related to the principle that government shouldn't involve itself in the truth or falsity of religious claims is an approach that the courts have developed in disputes between factions of churches over property. Building on a 19th century decision the Supreme Court has consistently said that it's unconstitutional for courts to decide cases on the basis of which group is faithful to church doctrine. Rather courts must rely on neutral principles principles based on secular documents that set out the governing authorities or they have to defer to the highest adjudicative bodies within hierarchical churches and to the majority within churches organized congregationally. Now this abstention from resolving dispute and instances of doctrine and governance is well suited for religious pluralism. However ill suited most judges are to settle who's faithful to various Christian traditions they're going to be even less able to resolve similar disputes among Muslims or Buddhists. Groups are much better off having to get their own affairs in order according to secular documents than trusting the civil courts to sort things out. A second point is a bit more arguable. In respect to most other groups that are engaged in internal disputes over the control of property or resources say trust created to support modern art or cancer research courts may play a more active role in deciding if one faction or a set of leaders has deviated too far from underlying purposes. Again religion should be regarded as distinctive. One way to accommodate religious exercise is to allow people with religious reasons certain liberties that most other people are denied. During prohibition Roman Catholics and some other Christians wanted needed to use wine for communion. Members of the Native American church have needed to ingest peyote during worship in order to practice their religion. Some Amish communities have wished to withdraw their children early from standard schooling and some Muslim parents have wanted their children free to pray vocally at some time during the school day. Granting legal concessions to religious practice can benefit minority groups but there are some serious concerns. Concerns about tests of honesty about assessments of burden on religion and of public need and about unfairness to non-religious citizens who have similar claims. First honesty. If I figure out whether someone's telling the truth won't this work against unfamiliar minority religions? Members of the draft board may more easily understand a young Quaker who says he cannot fight than a member of an unfamiliar Eastern religion. The worry about honesty is not serious if a privilege is sought for all participants in a group activity or is one that few people would be tempted to lie about. Wine for communion qualifies on both counts. Only participants in a service get the wine and no outsider, I think, would bother to participate in order to get that small sip. But when it comes to avoiding being sent away from one's home to a dangerous war one believes the country should never have embroiled itself in in the first place this has no reference to present conditions people may lie. Some test of sincerity is needed. Any such test may work somewhat to the disadvantage of the unfamiliar. But what's the alternative? In 1990 the Supreme Court abandoned an approach to religious exercise it had adopted 27 years earlier the so-called compelling interest test. The court announced that the free exercise clause of the First Amendment conferred no privilege for special treatment on religious believers. The state law forbidding the use of peyote could be applied against members of the Native American church. If religious believers have no privileges to be relieved of legal obligations well then no test of sincerity is required. But this alternative is hardly favorable to minority religions. Congress responded to the Smith case by adopting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act reinstating the older approach by statute and some states have adopted similar laws. One might object that any such law is unfair to non-believers who also deserve respect and I agree with this critique up to a point. Indeed I think that equal treatment of non-religious conscientious objectors should be a constitutional requirement. But there are many claims that people are highly unlikely to make for non-religious reasons. Strong non-religious convictions that one needs a small sip of wine in a group or that one should withdraw one's children from school after eighth grade or that one must not work on Saturday are very rare. When the likelihood of similar non-religious claims is very slight or the danger of fraud is great limiting exemptions to religious claimants makes good sense. Even more troubling than the questions about honesty are ones about the degree of burden on a religious practice and the strength of the government's interest in not granting an exemption. If a legislature grants a specific privilege say to use peyote and worship services will then neither executive officials nor the courts have to delve into the practices of religion or try to figure out what the possible government interest denying an exemption would be. But when courts apply a general standard like that of RIFRA they do need to make these difficult inquiries. I'm going to say only a little about the strength of the government's interest. Suppose a tax is imposed and religious citizens claim a right not to pay it or members of a religion claim they should be able to build a church in an area zoned to be purely residential. If the government's interest in uniform application of the law is very great as it is with most taxes refusing to grant an exemption is all right. How the test of government interest should be formulated and applied is difficult but I'm going to focus instead on the burden for religious individuals or groups. The government should not have to accommodate every trivial religious claim. If the members' interest in building a church in a forbidden area is that they can purchase property a little more cheaply that is very different from an Orthodox Jewish congregation wanting to build near residences because their members must walk to worship services. How can administrators in courts possibly decide how important any particular activity is to a religious individual or congregation? And if officials make such judgments they're likely to work to the disadvantage of misunderstood minority religions. Yes, it is very difficult and minority religions may suffer by comparison but again, what's the alternative? If courts make such judgments judges should not decide which religious activities are really important or how any particular religion should really be understood. They must judge importance as it's taken to be by members of the religion itself. If the legal issue involves a claim of a particular individual say of a Jehovah's Witness not to work in a factory making war materials a court should focus on the convictions of that individual and that's what the Supreme Court has done. If the claim is that a group should engage in activity a court must do the best it can to discern how important the practice is for the members as a group. It should demand that an important religious practice be frustrated or that someone have a strong religious conviction that he perform an act that the government is discouraging. Now just stating this inquiry shows how debatable the answer is going to be in many cases. Will it be harder for members of minorities to make their claims? A distaste for the unfamiliar may cause judges and other officials to underrate claims of burdens on religions they regard as bizarre. The obvious alternative is for courts and administrators not to make judgments about importance. This could mean rewarding any religious reasons however trivial but that's not a likely scenario that every trivial religion religious reason is going to get legal protection. Not making any accommodations, any accommodations to religion is far more likely. The result of the Smith decision reaches about the First Amendment. That regime would be worse for members of minority religions than a preliminary investigation about burden. But wait, there is yet another alternative looking to see if a refusal to accept involves discrimination. According to this view the inquiry in a case like Smith should be whether members of the Native American church suffered discrimination from the law that forbade use of peyote and did not make an exception for them. Now one claimed advantage of this approach is precisely that it avoids questions of importance in government interest. You just look to see if there's discrimination. But unless the category of what counts as discrimination is very limited this approach admits through the back door what it shuts out in front. Here's what I mean. When the law itself is neutral on its face allowing no one to use peyote we could limit the idea of discrimination to circumstances in which the lawmakers intend to harm a religion or treat its members worse than other citizens. In that event the Native American church would lose unless it could show that state legislators had a wish, a purpose to treat their church badly. Now that's usually a hard showing to make. The protection against discrimination would become robust only if it included what we might call reckless or negligent disregard of the interests of a religion. If legislators know that a law will impinge badly on a religious minority but don't care, don't care in a way they would care about the effect on a more popular religion that would be reckless disregard. Negligent disregard is when legislators are unaware of such an effect although they should be. Thus the Native American church could argue that legislators would never have adopted a law with such drastic negative effects on a mainstream religion. Using a broad notion of discrimination is, I think, a promising method to give effect to ideals of equality. But we'd be fooling ourselves if we thought this was a way to avoid judgments either about burdens on religious practices or about the strength of government interests. Such judgments are implicated in the very process of assessing possible discrimination. Judges will rarely know exactly what legislators were thinking when they did not make an exception from some general prohibition. So judges will need to think about what reasonable legislators would have had in mind. If the religious activity was trivial or the government interest in stopping the activity across the board was very strong, a reasonable legislator would not write an exception into the statute. If the religious activity was very important and the government interest in stopping that particular manifestation of the prohibited action was slight, an astute, fair legislator would make an exception. Now that's just what I believe is true about the use of peyote which is the center of the worship service of the Native American church. But we can see that it's just our judgments about the importance to the religion and about the government interest that now underlie our judgment about discrimination. That's how these inquiries enter in the back door. I thus far neglected a final topic that concerns the treatment of religion, deciding what counts as religious. If religion is going to receive special treatment, whether it is receiving a benefit or being subject to special restrictions, courts must be able to say that practice or claim is religious or not. Now in most cases that's going to be an easy decision, but sometimes it isn't. A definition of religion might itself work to the disadvantage of the unfamiliar. That would be obvious for the old definition in terms of relating to a supreme being, which the Supreme Court used a long time ago. My own view is that rather than starting from a typical definition, courts should identify characteristics of what are undoubtedly religions in the world and ask whether the disputed instance shares many of the same characteristics. Instead of stating necessary and sufficient conditions, this approach, an approach used by Arlan Adams in a case deciding that a course in transcendental meditation could not be taught in New Jersey's public schools, this approach understands religion in the way that Ludwig Wittgenstein understood the category of games for those of you who are familiar with that writing. To be sure even this approach may be applied in a way that could be disadvantageous to the unfamiliar. But again, what is the alternative? There can be no concessions to religious claims and religious groups as such, and less courts are able to say what is religious. Now the laws method of categorization must be one that lawyers can feasibly use. This means it must be more or less close to how the boundaries of religion are understood in other disciplines. It may not track what the other disciplines treat as the boundaries of religion because the needs of the law may be somewhat different. Now in conclusion, the general lessons that I draw from these inquiries are the following. First, the special treatment of religion in comparison with other subjects is on balance, often usually beneficial to minority religions. Second, the law must often settle for something less than an ideal. Legal standards of all sorts are applied to favor dominant groups to the disadvantage of outsiders. Increased about sincerity, importance, and the boundaries of religion may work to the disadvantage of minority religious movements within a pluralist religious culture. But the alternative of not engaging these inquiries will leave members of these groups worse off. Some likely disadvantage in application is preferable, I've argued, to not using the standards at all. Third, one endeavor of the center, this wonderful center in the next decade, may be to study just when the law should treat religion as distinctive and how the necessary legal inquiries may be undertaken as consistently as is humanly possible with ideals of equality. Thank you. Thank you very much, Professor Greenewald. I failed to mention as I opened the session and we will proceed with presentations by both professors and then we'll have time for questions from the audience. We'll have time, 15, 20 minutes for questions after Professor Kaveney's address. Professor Kathleen Kaveney is the John P. Murphy Foundation Professor of Law and Professor of Theology at Notre Dame. A summa cum laude graduate from Princeton with a law degree and a PhD from Yale University. Professor Kaveney is one of those who cheerfully goes where others dare not tread. She teaches seminars at Notre Dame on mercy and justice. She teaches courses at Notre Dame on ethics and law at the edge of life. She uses in her teaching and her scholarship the author of over 40 articles on law, religion, ethics and morality. She draws upon these quickly to go to some of the toughest questions. So we're delighted that Professor Kaveney is able to be with us today and share her perspectives on the issues to be confronted in the decades to come. Professor Kaveney. Professor Kaveney. I think it's a good question whether there's going to be a podium that I can actually see over or not. Well, if you think of this introductory panel in theological terms, you might think of it as trying to embody the trinity of law and religion studies. We had the first piece, which was history, and Professor Berman's work. We had the second piece, a perspective on the relationship of law or more broadly morality in law in a pluralistic culture from the perspective of inside or religious tradition. So I'll be speaking to you today, not primarily as a lawyer, but primarily as a Christian theologian, developing some of these themes that we need to think about from within the tradition. Theologians and lawyers aren't all that much different from one another in the work we actually do. We carry on a tradition in a Macintyrean sense, thinking about the practices, thinking about the core ideas, thinking about the virtues that embody the practices, in one sense in a broader pluralistic culture, and then the other sense in the midst of a community which is guided by commitments of faith, but which also is attentive to the needs of living in a pluralistic culture. So that's the angle at which I'm going to come at the talk today. In his controversial new book, The Stillborn God, Columbia University professor Mark Liller writes, we have trouble letting God be. For believers in the biblical religions, the reason will be obvious. It is because God does not let us be. We in our world are bound to him in a divine nexus. He is our creator, our guide, our judge, and our redeemer. And because he is, we must know how he wants us to live. The biblical God is not a remote deity who abandoned his creation, nor does he walk silently among us. He is the speaking God who engages us with his word and expects a response. He declared his creation good and now heaven and earth declare his glory, but he also left creation incomplete. So we would turn to him for the key to right living, the comprehensive law, the one thing needful. If human beings seek God, it is because though fallen, we are made in his image and likeness. Now, for Lilla, the logical outcome of this ability to let God be threatens the fragile ecosystem of what he calls the great separation. The effort of modern philosophy and politics to disengage reflection about the human political realm from theological speculations about what might lie behind it. In his view, this great separation understands, underlies key elements of Western democratic polities that we all take for granted. Separation of church and state, individual rights to private and collective worship, freedom of conscience, toleration. He strongly implies that our heart's untamable yearning for a deep and intense relationship with the God revealed in the scriptures undermines or could undermine our deepest political values. Well, I'm not so sure. Other scholars have taken on and no doubt will continue to take on Professor Lilla's account of the intersection between political and religious history in the West which strikes me as highly selective and deeply flawed. But if we read the stillborn God not as history but as contemporary cultural commentary, it raises an important question about the state of religion and political life in the contemporary United States. Influenced as it is by the prophetic strand of biblical Protestantism. And it raises a query about its future that is of interest to many of us at this conference. Do we have to choose between deep religious commitment and a commitment to a liberal tolerant political sphere? Now I believe that Professor Lilla is correct about the resurgence of interest among religious believers in a confident full-bodied participation in their spiritual and religious heritage. But the problem as I see it is not that religious believers, at least Christian religious believers have too much confidence. The problem is that we tend to have the wrong sort of confidence or better a misplaced confidence. We have confidence in our own capacity to plumb the depths of the mind of God and to do God's will. Rather than in confidence in God whose depth and will and power we can never fully understand. I think some of the reason incidentally that we have this sort of misplaced confidence in our religious traditions, the majority does, the Christianity does, is due to the current state of church state jurisprudence. If we look at the question of law and religion and a pluralistic culture from the perspective embedded in First Amendment law to features, looking at it overall seemed to me very striking. First, it can easily seem as if religion and religious believers are rather like odd pieces of flotsam and jetsam bobbing around on the vast sea of American culture. The vast sea is the web of law, regulation, cultural practices and political practices. Religion is an isolated and odd set of preferences to smoke peyote, to take one's children out of school, to refuse blood transfusion that intrudes upon this vast sea from time to time. And secondly, the current constitutional framework overall seems increasingly designed to create a less need to pay too much attention to the intrusion of religion. Thanks to cases like Smith and the movement in anti-establishment law over the past 20 years, and here I'm drawing on Tom Berg's work, I guess you could say the peaks and valleys of religious belief have been to a great degree leveled by this movement toward non-discrimination and equality as its norm. Neither the particular benefits of religion, the free exercise clause, nor its particular dangers, the establishment clause concerns, are greatly acknowledged with too much special constitutional accommodation. In this context, religious belief starts to become and starts to act like one more odd little special interest group to promote their own vision when in power and to protect their interests politically when out of power. It may seem adamant, for example, the meetings of the Family Research Council are focused on the family from time to time about promoting its interests, but it is no more adamant than organizations like the American Medical Association or the American Association of Retired Persons or for that matter, and I guess important here, the ABA. So we seem to have a group that is adamant about protecting its interests in a political way. Maybe this is necessary, but it seems to me Christian believers need to be very wary about internalizing this picture. First, it makes religion too small. It becomes one more special political interest group active at one point in time in one small portion of the world rather than a comprehensive scheme for interpreting the whole of creation from the beginning of time to the end. Second, and this is more controversial, it functionally threatens to eliminate God from the picture. The term religion is from the Latin religare, which means to bind upon. What religious believers in the biblical tradition are bound upon or bound to is God whose reality spills beyond all finite frameworks for capturing divine existence. God in this system is simply the background sponsor for certain contentious judgments of law and policy. Thirdly and consequently, it encourages a misplaced certainty. To survive in the broad given take of American politics, political action groups need to be adamant about what they want. And what they want is important because they want it, not because it truly accords with the common good. They are voters and they can deliver votes. God is not a voter. This is the remedy. First, I think religious believers need to look to their own traditions for ways to conceptualize their activities in the broader world in a way that takes account of pluralism. We need to look to the tradition for new resources to frame life in a pluralistic society. In the riches of a full-bodied account of the role of believers acting in the world, consequently, we need to find some grounds for a little bit of humility. That humility, and I stress, this is not the same thing as relativism. It is grounded not in our uncertainty about God and the nature as the nature and source of all being, but in our own recognition that we are not capable of fully plumbing the depths of God's purposes. I would like to suggest that one avenue for Christian thinkers to consider in nurturing in their own communities the appropriate sort of confidence and humility, as well as more open attitude toward those who hold ideas different from their own, is by retrieving and renovating the idea, the old idea of the Munus Triplex, the triple work. The Munus Triplex is the articulation of the threefold work of Jesus Christ in the cosmos in terms of three roles firmly rooted in the Hebrew scriptures, prophet, priest, and king. It is applied by extension to Christians who, with their baptismal charism, are called to a share in these functions as they live out their lives as members of the body of Christ. Now these categories are originated, the origination of the categories is often attributed to Eusebius of Caesarea, 269 to 339, who included it in his first major history of Christianity, written as the church was in the flush of success of being the new favorite religion of the empire. His development of the categories, it must be said, has distinct imperialistic overtones for precisely this reason. But it is important to note that Eusebius was not in fact the first to think about the role of Christ in these categories. They were employed well before the church became entwined in the empire. They were employed when the church was a struggling minority religion in the empire. Furthermore, I think that the categories are helpful because there's some ecumenical suite to them. They've been used by both Erasmus of Rotterdam and John Calvin, who brought the categories to a new prominence in devoting an entire chapter of his institutes to the consideration of the role of Christ's three-fold office in our salvation. They make an appearance in both the catechism of the Council of Trent, the Catholic catechism, and in the Westminster catechism, Protestant catechism. They are in use, but not suffering from overexposure in 20th century theology. Karl Barth draws upon them, although vastly revises them in the church dogmatics, as does Pope John Paul II in his first, and in my view, one of his best encyclicals, Redemptor Hominess, the Redeemer of Mankind in 1979. My thesis here is, and I'll try to indicate briefly with each of these categories how they might work, is that by virtue of their baptism into the body of Christ, Christians believe themselves and rightly believe themselves to participate in these honorable functions. They capture the cosmic sweep of Christianity. There are, however, dangers associated with thinking of oneself in this way, and these dangers must be combated. First, Christians might tend to think that we have a claim to these roles independently of a connection to Christ because of something intrinsic to us. That's wrong. Secondly, we might interpret these roles in the very incorrect fashion, by which I mean by solely reference to their common meanings, prophet, priest, and king is understood in this worldly fashion, rather than by reference to the way they have been radically transformed by Christian thinkers in light of the person and work of Jesus Christ, Jesus of Nazareth, the anointed one. And third, and this is the more controversial aspect of my paper, we might fail to realize that there is a great deal of work to be done in continuing to reinterpret these roles to help us take our place in a pluralistic cosmopolitan society. I think in a nutshell, in the case of the first two roles that I'll discuss, the priest and the king, it is important to retrieve aspects of the broader tradition that have been particularly occluded by those invoking the category of the monistriplex, particularly in Christendom, the connection of the church and the state. But more work needs to be done in the case of the role of the prophet. Whereas the role of king and priest, as understood in the Old Testament Hebrew Bible, have been thoroughly transformed by Christian thinkers over the centuries in ways that can assist in life in a pluralistic and contentious society. Unfortunately, our role of the prophet has not undergone such transformation. I will suggest that there are resources available within scripture itself to take on this task, particularly the book of Jonah. So just briefly through the three categories and showing how we can use the categories both to richly root a commitment to Christianity at the same time to inculcate the sort of humility about our claims that's going to be necessary to go along peaceably in a pluralistic society. Let's start with the priesthood. The basic function of the Hebrew priesthood were two. This is a nutshell version. To maintain and enforce the system of the cult, including the cult of ritual or cultic purity, and to offer the prescribed sacrifices to God on behalf of the people interceding for their well-being and to turn away the wrath of God from their transgressions. It is an oversimplification, but not a gross one, to say that Christianity abolished the first function, the cultic function, and radically transformed the other thanks to the writings attributed to the man known as Paul of Tarsus. The Christian transformation of the priesthood is most began with the letter to the Hebrews in the New Testament, which many scholars view as written just before the destruction of the Jewish temple in the year 70. The author both draws upon and repurposes the conception of the priesthood developed in the Hebrew scriptures, shifting the focus from the many sacrifices that are carried out in the temple on earth to the one eternal sacrifice that is carried out in the heavenly temple. In this move, the temporal world is but a shadow of the real world of eternity. In doing so, he is actually echoing themes of Second Temple Judaism and themes seen earlier in the book of Ezekiel as well as Neoplatonic themes. But do later Christians make use of this imagery or how do they make use of it? Well, Eusebius himself emphasizes the spiritual nature of Christ's priesthood rather than its physical nature since he was not anointed with physical oil, but instead with the oil of gladness, quoting from Assam. Calvin stresses the unique efficacy of Christ's sacrifice. Lumen Gentium, the Catholic document on the church from the Second Vatican Council, emphasizes Christ's role as high priest which the lady ought to respond with the sacraments of the Eucharist and penance, prayer and thanksgiving, witness of holy life and self-denial. It seems to me, looking at this as an overall tradition, key aspects of this are very helpful for the role of Christians in a pluralistic society. The notion of priesthood preserves a reserve, as developed in the tradition, preserves the reversal. It emphasizes the notion of self-sacrifice and self-gift rather than gifts on the part of others. But there's also a need for a retrieval of a forgotten aspect of the tradition and forgotten unfortunately because of the anti-Jewish polemics that the Christian church engaged in in its early years and later by anti-Semitic and sometimes anti-Catholic polemics against legalism. But fortunately, critical scholarship has moved beyond this to some extent and I think helps us to retrieve an aspect of the priestly tradition that will more be of more use to us as we move to a more cosmopolitan society. For example, my colleague Joseph Blankensop demonstrates ways of interpreting the Hebrew priesthood that were lost in the first century of Christian anti-Jewish polemic. He situates the cult within a broader interest of the priestly or pea source in the biblical documents in terms of the themes of universal humanity. It is the pea source responsible for emphasizing the creation of each human being in the image and likeness of God and it is pea who stresses the Noah kind covenant, emphasizing that humanity was in a covenant relationship with God long before Israel appeared on the scene. In addition, Blankensop interprets the system of ritual purity, the distinction between clean and unclean as a human cooperation with the work of creation, continuation of God's work of orderly creation and organization. So the priestly role as understood I think in our context in the next 25 years has to move toward universality and care for all of creation. It also has something to tell us with respect to the holiness code. The function of the holiness code in conjunction with the mandate of sacrifice is to affirm that God is both different from humanity beyond all understanding yet also stands in some relation to us in ways with which we can cooperate if not fully understand. Holiness is dangerous. Inappropriate contact between the holy and the divine is deadly as the story of the sons of Aaron who incorrectly offered incense before God without being authorized to do so tells us God killed them by fire. Now we don't need to return to that very literal way of understanding this to recognize that a proper interpretation of the holiness code will help us believers to realize that our God is not a cozy God. Our God is not subject to our control and our God is in some sense only approached with awe. There are images of God as a kind of navigation system that are out there. God is my co-pilot. There's a country song called Jesus Take the Wheel that I think Carrie Underwood talked sang a while ago. The God of the biblical scriptures is not a GPS system. It's not our personal product that we can use to get us where we already want to know. I think for the majority religion for Christianity to move forward in a more pluralistic environment that's something we need to hold on to. The same thing can be done with respect to the notion of the kingship of Christ. In the Christian tradition, the notion of kingship is transformed in two ways. First, it is a spiritual kingship rather than a geographical kingship. And second, the normal notion of kingship as being lordship has been reversed or at least greatly qualified in the Christian tradition and its reinterpretation and connection with service. John Paul II emphasizes service as the context of one's vocation as the mark of a Christian participation in the kingship of Christ. In doing so, his understanding draws upon the so-called servant songs of Deutero Isaiah which Christianity interpreted as applying to Christ. The suffering servant despised by all is raised up by God to be a light to all the nations. To the extent that Christianity as a majority religion sees itself as participating in a broader secular government and therefore in the notion of ruling or kingship, it needs to retrieve both the relativization of what's going on by focusing on the eternal nature of Christ's kingship and a notion of kingship as service, not a question of straightforward ruling. But there's also a reversal or a retrieval rather that we need to make, I think. As most of you have all probably figured out, Christianity is a religion of many moving parts. People say that the tax code is a full employment act for lawyers. One might say that Christology is the full employment act for dogmatic theologians. Orthodox Christianity affirms that Jesus of Nazareth was both human, he walked among us as a man, at the same time he was that he was fully divine, the Christ, the Son of God, the second person of the Trinity. Figuring out how that operates, what that means and what that implies for the Christian life has consumed many, many, many pages and papyri. But how does that affect our topic? Well, you can ask in what way was Christ king in reference to his humanity or in reference to his divinity? Needless to say, I'm not the first person to have thought of this question. Well, it's not prominent in the modern and late modern discussions of the notion of the prophet, priest and king. It is prominent in the early Christian discussions of this. In essence, there were two ways to go. The Alexandrian theology connected the kingship of Christ for the most part to the divine logos to who rule the world at the behest of God as his son. The Alexandrians were indebted to the Hellenistic Judaism of Alexandria in Egypt and Philo in particular. Christ in Clement of Alexandria and in origin appears as the eternal logos of God, the power by which God directs and reveals his law to the whole world and in which all things cohere. So in this Alexandrian tradition, the kingship of Christ is associated with his universality, his role as the logos, as the ordering of the universe which Christians identified with the second person of the Trinity. The Antiochian theology, however, did things a bit differently. In their tradition, the kingship of Christ was connected with his humanity or with his human nature from the moment in which that nature became united with the divine. The Antiochian tradition was related most closely to the messianism of Palestinian Judaism. So they saw Christ not as the eternal logos as his role as king, but they saw the kingship of Christ as related to his particularity as the new David, as the king of the new Jerusalem which would only fully be inaugurated at the eschaton, not on this earth. Why should we retrieve these two abstruse ways of understanding the kingship of Christ in connection with his nature? Well, I think it will give us a new way of framing questions we've got now. Christianity now is deeply engaged with problems of universality, claiming to be the light of the world, claiming to be applicable to the whole planet, to every human being made in the image and likeness of God, and the particularity, the contingency of its own sources. One of the tasks in the next 25 years, I think, is to work better through, work through better the connection and the differences between understanding Christianity and its moral norms as the norms of a particular tradition on the other hand understanding it as norms available, this is where the natural law tradition comes in, and in some sense accessible to all humanity. One more category, profit. What is a profit? As it turns out, this is a difficult question. There is in my view no one who has gotten more inside the head of the major and minor prophets in the Hebrew scriptures than Abraham Joshua Heschel, who writes in his book on the prophets. The prophets was an individual who said no to his society, condemning its habits and assumptions, its complacency, its waywardness, its syncretism. This view is largely in accord with the historical literature produced by both Jewish and Christian scholars on the biblical prophets. It's the usage that has taken over in contemporary Christian thought as well. Martin Luther King, with whom Heschel collaborated, is called a prophet precisely because of the moral demands he impresses upon our community. But things aren't that simple. As John Barton argues in his marvelous book, Oracles of God, Perceptions of Ancient Prophecy in Israel, there were four conceptions of prophecy floating around the ancient nearest at the time of the birth of Christ and rabbinic Judaism. One had to do with the law, but the other had to do with either prediction of the future on the one hand, or the revelation of secrets of the cosmos held close in the mind and heart of God. Later thinkers drew upon both of these traditions. You'll see both the moral tradition, particularly in the American prophetic tradition, as well as the notion of prophecy as a type of seeing or revelation of truth. What we don't have, however, in the prophetic tradition anywhere is a reinterpretation, a revaluing of what it means to be a prophet. We don't have a way of understanding that our understanding is not exact. Where do we look for this? And I think this is also important because we're dealing with truth claims and truth claim about God. How do we understand we don't have access to the mind of God? My last comment, I'll suggest we turn to the book of Jonah. Jonah was the reluctant prophet who prophesied doom to Nineveh, a major city of the Assyrians, a great enemy of Israel, and he was not pleased when the Ninevites repented. He didn't get to call down destruction upon them, so he went off in a huff to the east of Nineveh and God gave him a gourd plant to provide him some shade. He pouted, you could call Jonah the pouty prophet. God made it wither and die to teach him a lesson. Jonah complained, and what did God say to Jonah? You are concerned over the plant which cost you no labor and which you did not raise. It came up in one night and in one night it perished. And should not I, God, be concerned over Nineveh, that great city in which there are more than 120,000 persons who cannot distinguish their right hand from the left, not to mention many cattle? This last verse from the book of Jonah, I think, shows us that no matter what certainty we have, what our faith teaches us about the ways of God, God has ways which we do not know, and God has ways of dealing with the others who are made in his image and likeness that we cannot capture within our systems and within our categories and within our frameworks. Thank you. Thank you, Professor Kaveny. Professor Kaveny and Professor Greenewalt have confronted the tough questions. They have identified the questions. They have suggested ways to respond and answer. They have both hit the theme of acknowledging the possibility of misplaced confidence and epistemology of humility rather than hubris. But in so doing they've invited all of us to engage in the dialogue. So now is the time we have a few moments for questions. I ask that you come because we are recording the proceedings, come to the microphones we have set up, and as you come forward just share your name, where you're coming from, and your question. I do ask that you try to keep your questions brief. We will have time throughout the next few days to ponder these issues. Are there questions? Yes. Scott Pryor from Regent University Law School in Virginia Beach. I guess a question primarily for Professor Greenewalt, picking up with your conclusion where you acknowledge the difficulties, the challenges in defining religion for purposes of your discussion there. I wonder if we shouldn't place the burden equally on the law to define itself. In other words, why should we have burden on religion for definition and not on law, in fact, not on the political order to justify itself. Political concepts such as equality are no more self-evident than some of the qualities associated normally with religion. Now, political choice theory would tell us, well, we're not going to challenge or the state that we have isn't gonna challenge itself, its own very existence, but as scholars shouldn't we be equally suspicious of all claims to political or public virtue, like equality as we are of religious claims with respect to issues like honesty. Okay, so one question is, what things should the law do as opposed to leaving not to law? Those are extremely important questions. Another question is, how authoritative should we take the law's assertions about what we should do and shouldn't do, and I don't think we should take them as finely authoritative. I think there are certainly situations in which it's proper for people to disobey the law. But the question I was addressing is, how in the law should religion be treated and the need to define religion for those purposes? I just think that's a totally different question. We have the law, the law is gonna treat many of these things one way or another. People are not gonna be allowed to smoke peyote, and the government is or is not gonna make claims about religious truth, and there is a question about how the law's going to treat these things. And I don't think these questions about what the status of law is in some deep sense are relevant. Well, and maybe I could just follow up. If we had a lot less law, there'd be a lot fewer problems. In other words, if there were no laws against the ingestion of peyote in the first place, well then the question of equal treatment would never arise. So perhaps we should question the extent to which we look to law to order society, amid humility about the powers of the political realm, and just retreat, generally speaking, from a legalized society, thus opening the opportunities for equality to develop, or perhaps not develop and take our chances. Well, that's certainly legitimate. So that's the question, but what I said as the first question in response to your question was what the range of law should be. And yes, it's certainly true that if we thought the range of law should be much less than it is now, that would take care of some of these problems. It might also, let's say, one area would be discrimination on religious, no discrimination on religious grounds. Of course, if the law withdrew from that, that would be less desirable from the standpoint of equal treatment of people regardless of religion, but one might think would be justified on other grounds. So that certainly is, those certainly are important questions about what the function of law should be. Are there other questions? Hi, I'm Fred Jonathan. I teach at the Barry University School of Law. Professor Greenwald, if I understood your talk, you said that, or I think suggested that when a court makes a decision about accommodation for a religion, that on balance, it's better for minority religions for the court to take up issues of the importance of the particular practice or belief that would be burdened on balance that would be better than not. And I'm just wondering, would this also be a problem for majority religions or indeed any religion where there's a disagreement within the religion about a given practice or a given belief that might have a burden placed on it by a general law? Yes, there is a problem that exists in respect to any religion. And the question is a very difficult one in respect to any religion. I was only suggesting that it might work more to the disadvantage of the minority religions that were less well understood, less sympathized with. And just this is to reiterate something that I said during the talk. If it's an individual claim, I think then the inquiry is supposed to be about what the individual actually thinks, like I gave the example of the Jehovah's Witness who doesn't want to work in a job making arms. And then the question about what the group thinks comes up as crucial only if the claim is for the group itself. I'm Tim Floyd, I'll teach at Mercer University Law School. This question is Professor Cavani. Your emphasis on humility, on the ultimate inaccessibility of God's mind, God's purpose has really resonated with me. I think that's a very welcome perspective in this intersection of law and religion. But then you got to the prophets and Heschel. And I've always loved Heschel's work on the prophets and particularly emphasis on the pathos, the passion of God and of God's prophets. To the extent we're always concerned about being humble, how does that reconcile with a passion for social justice, a passion for the poor and the oppressed? Very good question. And I'm sorry, that was probably in a sense the most important part of the talk but it was last. And when you only have 25 minutes, you can violate the big natural law commandment which is thou shalt not go over time. And I didn't want to do that. I think they're very hard in a way to reconcile. I actually think it's a very important question because if you look at the American rhetorical tradition of politics, religion and the political tradition, we've really used rhetoric in that way. If you read Berkovich's The American Jeremiah or a brilliant book by a guy named James Darcy, the prophetic tradition and radical rhetoric in America who talks about the use of the prophetic tradition in our American political system, you see that that type of moral indictment is very important. I think where the humility comes in is in recognizing the danger of that type of speech and in not using it inappropriately. I've argued elsewhere that prophecy is what I call moral chemotherapy. It goes after the sort of the cancerous elements in our moral discourse. Our normal moral discourse isn't prophetic. It's normal moral reasoning back by whatever theory you happen to read. It's almost like case law, casuistry. Prophetic rhetoric is appropriately used to go after fundamental threats to the integrity of that rhetoric such as slavery was, for example, the denial of the equal dignity of a human being. I think we need to come up with an ethics of prophetic discourse and that's what I'm trying to work on now which talks about when it's appropriate to invoke that rhetoric and when it's not. The cost of invoking that rhetoric is tremendous. I think of the prophetic rhetoric that's been around. It's actually rooted in the Catholic tradition but it's got wide sway now. The culture of life versus the culture of death. Once you call somebody the culture of death, there's really nowhere for the conversation to go. It's, you're pretty much done talking. And I'm not saying that that's not appropriate at certain points in time but you have to realize how this is going to be used. I sometimes think it's used inappropriately and without counting the cost. So the humility comes in and the recognition of the power and the danger of prophetic rhetoric and the sense that you might not have it entirely right. Thank you. Another question over here. I'm Elliot Dorf. I teach philosophy at the American Jewish University in Los Angeles. This is for Professor Kevney. I very much, as a religious Jew, I'm actually a conservative rabbi, very much resonated with your description of some of the meanings of religion that it's very difficult for a secular legal system to capture. But what would you do with the fact that we live in a really multicultural society? There was a survey by the Los Angeles Times which indicated that at Hollywood High School there are 70 different native languages among the students of Hollywood High School, right? And being on the Pacific Rim, we've got, I mean, it's the new Ellis Island. We've got people from all over the Pacific and not just the Western religions. So in that kind of context, the meaning of religion could be very different than it was for you and your presentation or for me if I were to give a similar presentation. And then I'm also concerned about what Professor Greenwell was talking about. What about secular Americans, avowedly secular Americans, who nevertheless have a conscience and who might wanna make claims against the law based upon that conscience? What would you do with that? Okay, I think there are sort of two separate issues here. Some people talk about the backlash of the religious right against the secular left as something that's taken place since the 2000 election. I mean, I think there's some truth to that. And one of the sort of motivating forces, I think, behind that is the sense that religious believers can't speak in their own language or that people don't want religious believers to speak in their own language in the public square. I understand that, but what I'm trying to do is call religious traditions to articulate not a view from nowhere, some sort of homogenized view of religion and the worth of other people and that every tradition is going to a comedy. What I believe that everybody needs to do from the perspective of the resources in their own tradition is to account for pluralism and account for the dignity of other people and account for this new cosmopolitanism. This can be tough sometimes and I don't know all the ins and outs of it, but for example, many of you maybe know of me, there's a theologian called Peter Fan who's at Georgetown who was trying to develop a notion of Christ that will be open to sort of the Buddhist cultures that will interact with that. Now that's obviously going to be dogmatically very challenging, but work of that sort needs to be done. Maybe the Vatican is not terribly happy with the way he's done it, but this is the kind of work we each need to do from our own perspective. So as a Christian, what I'm trying to do is to find the resources within the full-blown worldview that I hold to and open it up toward the other traditions. And the reason I like the triplex monus is because there are resources in Philo of Alexandria to deal with this. There are other resources even in the broader Pagan culture of that time to deal with this. And then I think other people need to move toward the center from their own traditions. That can't substitute for the work of the law, but if we're going to have a culture that supports religion and religious belief in a full-blown way, and that produces judges and doctors and lawyers and teachers who are open to this, but also open to pluralism, the theologians of every tradition have to do their work too. Thank you very much, Professor Tabany. Professor Greenewalt. Unfortunately, it's now my job to say it's time for a break. The questions, however, should not stop. The responses should not stop. We will take a break for until 11 o'clock when we'll begin our next session on the future of religious liberty. Please join me one more time in thanking Professor Kaveny and Professor Greenewalt. The preceding program is copyrighted by Emory University.