 You're welcome back. It's still the breakfast on plus TV Africa. And right now we're going to be talking about the failure of because it's diplomacy and it's reflection on Tino Boo's foreign policy. So we know that there has been a narrative going around about the involvement of the Wagner group in Nijesku and that this all plays into Putin's greater efforts to disrupt the West as part of his ongoing special military operations in Ukraine. How badly has Eko was miscalculated in dealing with the coup in Nijesku? And is there any room left for diplomacy between Eko was and Nijesku? Remember that Abu Salami, Abu Bakar and the Sultan have been sent to go and start to negotiate. Can Eko was make good on any of the threats that it has made? And are there any things available to them? How big a disaster is this for President Tino Boo as he faces his big test as the chairman of Eko was the Senate has opposed the deployment of Nigerian troops and they are there are options available to the President Tino Boo. How significant is this crisis to understanding the foreign policy of President Tino Boo's administration. These and more are the questions we are attempting to answer right now on this segment of the show. And we're glad to be joined by Mr. Adebayo Loa K a consulting research fellow African resource development center Lagos state. But today he's just here as a public affairs analyst. I'm sure I'm right about that. So good morning and welcome to the program. Mr. Loa K. Good morning. Good morning. Yes, we've always talked about this foreign policy. You and us here. We're concerned about what foreign policy this new administration should adopt. Right now we've seen the first test in this coup in Niger where our president eventually is the chairman of Eko was pronouncing a lot of things saying delivering speeches that did not even go well with so many other people, especially the country in question which is Niger and all that. So what does this say about the foreign policy direction that the present administration might take? What do you foresee if it is possible to foresee something? Because they say a dog that will know how to hunt, you will know it when it is still a little one. So tell us what you think. Okay. So I think first of all, we need to establish the fact that the policy is an equal as policy because it's going to be difficult for the chairperson of Eko was to single handedly, you know, initiate something if the other members of the authority of heads of state and government do not endorse it. Having said that, of course, the charisma of personal interest or foreign policy of the chairperson, you know, the foreign policy of his or her country will of course could be a driver in mobilizing the other heads of state. And I think it is in that regard that we have seen President Nubu championing the response to the coup in Niger. Now, I think there are lessons to be drawn from, you know, what has been done. The first is that Eko was demanded the release of President Bazoum and his reinstatement within one week. Before the expiration of the one week, Eko was imposed sanctions, closing the airspace of Niger to commercial aircraft, suspending Niger from all financial transactions within the Eko was region and then waiting for Niger to respond at the expiration of the deadline. Now, unfortunately, Niger, fortunately, unfortunately, Niger apparently stopped with guns. That is the junta Brigadier General Chiani, but Eko was also sent three delegations. The first delegation was led by General Derby, current President of Chad, that's Derby Junior. The second delegation was led by Director General of the National Intelligence Agency and that delegation also had the chief of the Air Staff of Nigeria in it. And then the third delegation was General Abdul Salami Abu Bakr and the Sultan of Sokoto. So there are those who will submit that these delegations, except for President Derby, who incidentally was the only one who met General Chiani and who met President Bazoum. The other two delegations never met Brigadier General Chiani nor did they meet President Bazoum. So that should tell us something, which is that perhaps, although Chad is not an Eko was member, maybe Eko was should have stuck with President Derby since he had access to General Chiani and he had access to President Bazoum to allow President Derby to continue the mediation, in which case he could be converted to the AU representative, concurrently AU and Eko was representative to continue the negotiations. But in any case, the junta stood its grounds. We have a stalemate and this is where we are at the moment. Perhaps maybe one more point I would like to make is that the way the response of possible military response of Eko was presented, especially in Nigeria, I think would also have been better because it was being presented as if the Nigerian armed forces would deploy a loan against the junta. And in the letter which the President sent to the Senate, that impression was also created. Whereas there are regional, what we call high readiness regional standby debates. There's one in West Africa, there's one in East Africa, there's one in Southern Africa. Nigeria and other Eko was members are contributors to the West African high readiness standby debate. And this is the instrument of coercion available to Eko was to effect compliance. So I find it rather strange that the impression was being created that Nigeria was going to unilaterally deploy its forces against the junta in charge if they do not comply with the alternative. Even if it would have been the Eko was high readiness standby debate, which I think would should have been deployed. I personally am one of those who feel that a military solution will not be applicable in the current circumstances. Okay, yeah, but you know, like I was asking the foreign policy, the President didn't seem to consider what effect it will have on Nigeria as a country. It is now that he's having meetings with the seven states, northern states of Nigeria who say that they are going to be affected and truly so by this war if it comes. And it is now that he's trying to do some consultation, which he didn't do before making that pronouncements as if Nigeria was at war with Niger. And what I'm looking at also is I'm asking myself if it were Buhari, for instance, that had relations as it were with Niger, would he allow this as a Eko was chairman to happen? Would he even allow this kind of pronouncements to be made by any other person, even though it is not himself? So that shows the power of the chairman of the Eko as at this moment. But Tunubu went ahead and made it. Does this not show that there may be problems when fashioning out foreign policy for Nigeria without, because this has shown that there was no much consideration about how it will affect Nigeria and the people of Nigeria. So doesn't it worry you that it may also be replicated when this foreign policy is being formulated, which I think may not have been done by now, because we would have seen the direction of it right now? Does it not worry you? Yamgu, you're asking me so many questions. I have too many, too many in my heart. Let me just try to be logical. Number one, regardless of whoever was Nigeria's president, we have the Eko as protocol, which says you cannot come to power through military means. When President Ayadema of Togo died, the military in Togo immediately pronounced his son, Forre Ayadema, as president. Eko was said no. Bobasundia was president at the time. And Eko was insisting, and the military in Togo said, we have put in there, there's nothing you can do. And Eko was said, fine, we will put our regional standby brigade on standby. And immediately the military set up an interim government, conducted an election, and Forre Ayadema was declared winner of that election. Okay. When President Buhari was head of state, President Ayademi of the Gambia lost an election, congratulated Adama Baru, who was the winner. And one month later, he changed his mind and said he was not going to leave office. Eko was immediately put his high readiness standby brigade on standby and actually declared it with Forre Ayademi to leave. So regardless of who the chairperson of Eko was is, the fact is that you cannot come to power according to the Eko as protocol through unconstitutional means. So I don't think President Inumu did anything out of the ordinary. The question is, were the right things done to give effect to the Eko as protocol? And that is where you may have different opinions. I feel that proper consultations may not have been made, including with the military chiefs, because several times, and I'm not, this doesn't have to do only with President Inumu. Several times we've seen leaders, and not just African leaders alone, leaders in other parts of the world take political decisions that they need to give vent to by deploying their military without consulting their military. The war in Ukraine is also an example. The leaders of the North Atlantic block, they took several decisions, including sanctions and so on and so forth, without consulting relevant people. And they had to begin to deal with the aftermath of those decisions. So that's the first thing, or rather the second thing. Next is the fact that, yes, internal consultations with Nigerians who are likely, not just Nigerians, even other Africans who are likely to be, West Africans who are likely to be affected by the decision of Eko as consultation with other Africans as well, who may be affected. Remember, a chart has borders with only three Eko as countries, if my geography is correct, Nigeria, Mali, Ben-Republic. It has borders as well with non-Eko as members, Algeria, Chad, Libya. So if you will impose sanctions on Niger, you needed Algeria, Chad, and Libya to be on board. The sanctions had been imposed before the Eko as now set up a committee, I remember Ambassador Babak and I can give you, was dispatched to Libya and Algeria, while General Abdul Salami and the Sultan were dispatched to Niger. That was way after the sanctions and a few days to the deadline. So, yes, I feel that certain consultations ought to have been made because Niger is not Burkina Faso or Guinea, which is surrounded by Eko as countries, which therefore makes it easier to impose sanctions which Eko as members will affect. In the case of Niger, that is very difficult. Okay, let's look at what Eko was trying to lose. What is risking with inability to solve this problem, especially now that there's a, there appears to be a stalemate. They issued a warning and even threatened military action yet their words and movements and actions or inactions have not been able to bring the desired result. What did they stand to risk in terms of their reputation as a group or as an organization? Very good question. I think first of all, Eko as might lose its credibility in the sense that the junta in Niger has been able to spin a narrative that France is threatening to attack Niger. They were not even saying Eko as is coming to attack Niger. They said France is coming to attack Niger and you will see the effect of that. The way Nigerians reacted, they went to the French Embassy, they destroyed the French Embassy. So invariably, they are suggesting that Eko as could be an instrument in the hands of France to carry out the invasion of Niger, which is not good for Eko as. I also think that the comments from leading, especially the foreign minister of France, you know, in the lead up to the expiration of the deadline, in my own opinion did not help Eko as his position in the sense that knowing fully well that France is not popular at the moment, whether in English-speaking Africa or in French-speaking Africa, the foreign minister of France kept saying we are supporting Eko as, we are with Eko as, thereby reinforcing the narrative of the junta that Eko as might be the instrument of France to carry out the new colonial action on the citizens of Niger. The second thing is that last year I wrote an academic paper where I argued that Eko as needed to rethink its response to coups because Eko as is so predictable. If there's a coup, it just imposes sanctions, it suspends the country from financial transactions in the region and then it gets the AU and the U.N. to pass resolutions endorsing its action. And I felt that because of the effect of the coronavirus pandemic, which created a devastation on the economy of many countries around the world, including developing countries, because of the security vacuum in media, following the removal of Connell Gaddafi, and because of poor governance in most of the countries in the South region, worsened by the effects of COVID-19 on the economies, we were likely to have a lot of stress on the political architecture of the region. And therefore we might see attempts at unconstitutional changes, which meant that Eko as should rethink its strategy and its diplomacy. I don't think that was done. I think a few people also echoed similar sentiments, but nothing in that direction has been done, as we can see in Niger, because they went the same way they went previous. But now Niger is too critical strategically for this kind of military response to be initiated. Well, I'm afraid for the future of Eko as, because this is one fifth of the members of Eko as that have gone out, Mali was there, Burkina Faso, now Niger, and there is a possibility that another state might join. I don't know how you see this playing out in the nearest future. Does it mean Eko as is weakening, or there's a possibility they can bounce back stronger than ever? They would not need Eko as, because these countries need Eko as, more than Eko as needs them. If you look at the aggregate, I mean, okay, because of time, but if you look at the aggregate economies of these countries, really, the Eko as has been more of a benefit than a negative, you know, for them. If you look at the Kone Lassimi Goita in Mali, Captain Ibrahim Traure, Burkina Faso, Kone Dumbuya in Guinea, not one single one of them until this Niger crisis ever said they would meet Eko as. Eko as demanded that the more certain transition of governments, and Asimi Goita is the president of the transitional council of Mali. Ibrahim Traure is the president of the transitional council of Burkina Faso, Kone Dumbuya is the president of the transitional council of Guinea. So they are complying with Eko as. They see benefits in Eko as, and they accept that military rule is not acceptable. They have argued that for some extreme reasons they have to take power, but they are complying nonetheless with the transition plan. I think that it is the failure of the Eko as leadership to rethink its diplomacy and its strategy that is making these three countries threatened to leave, but I don't think they would leave. And I think there's a brighter future for Eko as. Okay, let's look at the importance of Eko as. Eko as since it was created in 1975, how useful, you said they benefited more from Eko as, but how useful would you say Eko as has been to the region, especially when you take into cognizance all that France is said to be doing to the countries that they colonized. How effective would you say, or what have been the usefulness of Eko as? And would you say that Eko as has succeeded in building the region that they represent? Eko as has been extremely useful. Eko as is the West African sub region is started to be a model of regional integration in the world. Eko as was the first to introduce free movement of persons long before the Europeans talk of Schengen. Eko as countries have been moving about without visas. Eko as has worked towards harmonization of telecommunications, harmonization of communications, including we all drive on, you know, we have similarity in our driving patterns. We have integration in root network, even if some of our roads are bad now. Eko as has also enhanced community bonding and to strengthen the various economies. But what about security though? Yeah, time will not permit us to actually spend more time on this, but what about security? When you look at the security in the Sahara region, how successful would you say Eko as has been in dealing with the issues of security which is on the rise and which is one of the reasons why the military boys are coming in? For security, states still have their sovereignty. States have not surrendered their entire sovereignty to Eko as. So if Eko as is not invited, it cannot provide security. Do you remember when Captain Sanogo came to power in Mani? Eko was offered immediately to help contain the Tuaregs. He said, no, because the American sealant pleaded with Secretary of State. She told him, no, we don't want Eko as to come here. Much later, of course, Eko as had to deploy and they successfully convinced the Tuaregs not to fight anymore. Unfortunately, Islamic in the Maghreb filled the vacuum that was created. But Eko as has been succeeded in terms of security, like Benioff's global success is for Eko as. But if a state does not invite Eko as, there's nothing Eko as can do. So in the case of Nijie, who invited Eko as? Nijie is a member of Eko as, which made the Nijie accepted the Eko as protocol which says that there can be no unconstitutional change of power. And the consequences are known if there is an unconstitutional change of power. So up to that point, Eko as is right. The question that I have said is, Eko as did not strategize properly, or rather, Eko as could have better strategized and could have better analysis diplomacy. We haven't seen diplomats, for example, talking to people in Nijie. Rather, we have seen former leaders who have military backgrounds. We have seen intelligence people. But we have not actually seen diplomats. And some people are asking the question, why did Eko as not set up a delegation comprised of diplomats to go and negotiate? Why sending people who do not have any diplomatic leverage? Some have even said that if this was what Eko was going to do, why didn't they send President Buhari to Nijie? They would listen to President Buhari in Nijie. Yeah. Okay. Well, just to round off, I'd like you to speak on what the takeaways can be for Nigeria from this. When formulating our foreign policy, what are some of the things that we should learn a lesson from this ongoing crisis in Nijie and help us formulate that foreign policy that will be beneficial to us? Just a few things, and then we're up. Okay. We have a foreign policy. The question is to tweak it to conform to the changing dynamics of the international system. And our foreign policy has to have maybe a three-concentric dimension. One is our south region. Two is our continent. And then three is the world. Second point is that I think it hasn't helped the president of Nigeria trying to respond to diplomatic issues without an ambassador, sorry, without the minister of foreign affairs. And there's no minister of foreign affairs. So the quality of advice that the president has been receiving could be suspect in the absence of a foreign minister. And I think going forward, given the dynamics in the international system right now, whoever would be the foreign minister of Nigeria, that job should not be given to just anybody. The international system now is extremely dynamic. Whoever would be appointed foreign minister, in my opinion, has to be young, probably from a former ambassador, a former diplomat, and must be able to travel regularly and consistently. Because the times now are extremely dynamic. And then I think lastly, the opinion of Nigerians should be filtered in the tweaking of our foreign policy so that our core national interests are not jeopardized. Okay. Mr. Oluwake would like to say thank you so much for coming on the show and helping us make sense of this topic. Thank you for your time. Thank you for having me. Thank you. We've been talking with Mr. Adebayo Oluwake, Consulting Research Fellow, African Resource Development Center, Lagos State. We were talking about foreign policy. We were talking about the issue in Nigeria and all that. This is where we intend to draw the curtain for today. We do hope that you had a wonderful time watching this program today. My name is Nyam Gul Agaji. And I am Maureen Menon-Wazigwe. Thank you for being there. Have a great day.