 Hello, and welcome to the United States Institute of Peace event today, countering the coups in the Greater Sahara. I am Joseph Sani, Vice President of USIP Africa Center. For those of you who may be new to USIP, we are a national nonpartisan independent institute founded by the US Congress. We are dedicated to the proposition that a world without violent conflict is possible and essential for US global security. Like many of you, we at USIP have been tracking closely the coup d'etat in the Greater Sahara region as the rise in military rule puts an already fragile region in greater risk of generalized instability. Army officers have seized power in Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Sudan, and Chad. Co-makers have taken advantage of weak governments struggling to provide basic services in expansive countries. This is due to underlying factors made worse by stressors such as COVID-19, climate change, and violent extremism. Poor security and weak governance are major problems. Despite international support, governments in the Greater Sahara have largely failed to tackle the rise of armed groups which have led to great human suffering. Despite these feelings, though, popular support for democracy remains strong in the region and throughout Africa. That is certainly the case in Sudan, where there have been popular uprisings since the coup. At the Africa Center, we recognize that each country is different, but they are common drivers of instability. Today, we will hear from our distinguished panel some policy recommendations to address instability and reverse this worrisome trend of course. We are delighted that Ambassador Kamisa Kamura will learn her expertise in navigating this timely conversation. Kamisa is a senior visiting expert for the Sahara year at USIP and has served as Mali's foreign minister among other high-level positions. Kamisa, the floor is yours. Thank you. Thank you very much, Sunny, for setting the scene. I am delighted to be joined by such esteemed panelists to think through possible and practical options for responding to the coups we've observed in the Greater Sahara. I will start by introducing the discussants. Vemba, good morning and welcome. Vemba is a senior fellow and director of the Africa program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, CSIS. He's also a lecturer in African studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Cameron Hudson is a non-resident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council's Africa Center. He previously served as the senior strategic advisor at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. Thank you so much for joining us, Cameron. Joshua Miservy is the senior policy analyst for Africa and the Middle East at the Heritage Foundation, where he focuses on geopolitics, counter-terrorism and refugee policy. And last but not least, Dr. Joe Siegel leads the research program at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, where he produces excellent written products with the aim of generating policy-relevant analysis that contribute to addressing Africa's security challenges. At this point, I would like to invite the audience to join the conversation we're about to have with the hashtag countering coups on social media or posing questions for the panel directly in the chat box on the event web page. We'll turn the discussion towards those questions for the final portion of the conversation. But first, I would like to kick us off with a question for all panelists. What are ways the international community can become more constructively engaged in response to the coups? We've had many coups over the past couple of years and have been asking questions about what the international community can do, what their responses have been, what their responses could have been. Cameron, how about you, Stipe? Well, thanks, Kamissa, and thanks to USIP for this conversation and for all the great work that you've been doing over the course of the months as these coups have, you know, unfolded. I think that one thing that we have to think about just to start this conversation is when we talk about what should we do, I think maybe a better way to pose that question is what shouldn't we be doing? And part of what we shouldn't maybe be doing is what we have been doing, right? I think that what strikes me when I look back at the course of the last six months or a year that we've seen these coups emerge and frankly the storm clouds were on the horizon, you know, well before that, you haven't seen a great pivot in international policy towards the Sahel region in either response to these coups or as the sort of storm clouds were gathering. And I think that we, as part of the international community, but certainly as sort of the western, you know, a leader of the western security alliance that has been, you know, very heavily engaged, literally with boots on the ground across this region for the better part of the past decade, we really need to rethink our own approach to this. You know, looking beyond the kind of local drivers of conflict, which I know we'll talk about, I think we in the west have to, you know, turn the gaze on ourselves a bit and really interrogate the role that our security approach, our security relationships have played. And I think undermining both civilian rule across the region but also I think playing into what has emerged as a very kind of dysfunctional power dynamic across the region where you have, you know, France, the United States and other European partners essentially going in and pursuing a set of very hard strategic interests which I don't think are particularly well balanced with the values that we espouse related to democracy and civilian rule. And I know, you know, we often talk about this kind of values and interests, you know, argument and tug of war, but I think you're really seeing it play out across the region in fairly dangerous ways. And I think we're now starting to see some of the kind of second order and third order effects of that, this sort of rising anti-western sentiment, certainly rising anti-French sentiment across the region, you know, anti-state sentiment whereby the security partners that we have been engaging with are themselves in many cases the worst violators of civilian rights and the worst, you know, committers of atrocities in the region, even more in some cases than the jihadist groups that we're claiming to combat. And so I think we have to really look hard at ourselves at how can we better balance our, you know, very real and very legitimate security concerns and strategic concerns in the region with the kind of the values approach to supporting democratic rule, supporting state institutions, and how can we better, I think, rebalance our relationships so that we are not putting so much in the, you know, in the basket of security services. I think there's just two data points that I would make very clearly. One is we have General Hometi and Sudan going to Russia today in the midst of a huge crisis, you know, reaching out to Russia at a moment when Russia is commanding the attention on the world stage. And then secondly, we have Operation Flintlock going on across the continent right now, getting lots of media attention. It's our biggest, you know, military security operation on the continent annually. And it just strikes me that we never talk about the work that we're trying to do to build democracies and to build sustainable institutions in the same way that we talk about the military partnerships that we have. And I think that has to change. That's a good point. Thank you very much. Josh, any thoughts? Yeah, thank you. And I'll echo Cameron's thanks to you, Kamissa and to Dr. Sani and USIP, both for hosting this panel, but also the work you've been doing on the coups. Yeah, so I'll make maybe a few obvious points right at the very beginning here. One, these are hugely complex issues. And I think we need to be very careful about trying to reduce them to a few causal factors. You know, you could probably, if we all sat down, we'd probably come up with a hundred different reasons why these things have happened. And some of them are unique to each situation. We also need to have some humility, I think, about what the US can actually accomplish in some of these areas. You know, every time there's a coup, there is a lot of introspection as well. There should be. And I totally endorse Cameron's comments about taking a much harder look at how we do security assistance, for instance, and ensure that we are not creating a very competent branch of the military while the civilian elements do not keep pace. The civilian elements should be at least as competent as the military components. But my analysis of this is that coups are a symptom of a problem. Coups are a symptom of bad governance. And I really think that's what so many of these problems boil down to. And the harsh reality here is that the West has not figured out yet, or anyone else has figured out yet how to effectively build legitimate institutions in some of these countries. And I would argue it's something we can't do anyways. It's at the very best we can come alongside partners on the ground who are involved in this work. And that would be maybe my first recommendation here is that as we approach this problem, our laser focus must be on local actors who have some legitimacy themselves, who are fighting the good fight. There's a lot of brave people fighting for better governance and democracy and everything else in some of these countries. That's really where we should be focused and coming alongside them and not trying to impose some sort of blueprint for governance that might have worked elsewhere but is not necessarily appropriate to the exact conditions in those places. This is not a defense of we should absolutely be promoting democracy. That's not what I'm saying. But the idea that in some of these places, a very strong central government is the right form of government. But I'm not sure that's true. Actually, think about Molly and just the sheer physical distance between Bamako and the north where some of these problems are sort of festered for so many years and then spread south. I think the US needs to think more creatively about more highly federalized systems where you devolve power to local constituencies. Again, this goes back to my point about coming alongside local actors who are working really hard to deliver governance that is legitimate and brings a certain level of security to local people. Again, very difficult to do and would require sort of a shift, I think, in how we view some of these situations. Because when we tackle governance problems, at least the US always comes at it from, well, we're going to go through a central government. We need to figure out a way to strengthen the central government, et cetera, et cetera. And sometimes that's totally appropriate. But other times it's unclear to me if that's really where we should be putting all of our focus and energy. And maybe we should be thinking more about, okay, how do we empower local actors who have some legitimacy with their people already? Cameron made the excellent point. Some of these militaries we talk about are just as feared, not more feared than some of the terrorist organizations. So, you know, we need to, if we put all of our eggs in that basket, we may just be starting off on the back foot from the very beginning. Again, it's hard, right? And it would take a lot of very in-depth analysis and understanding of the local situations in all of these places. But it's not working what we're doing by and large. I'm not one of these people who thinks it's all the West's fault. It's absolutely not. People launch coups because they want to launch coups. These men have taken power because they want power. Ultimately it's their responsibility. But clearly we're not as effective as we want to be in promoting democracy and good governance. So, you know, we were tasked to come up with some sort of practical recommendations. And I'm going to be trying to be a little provocative in my recommendations. That would be my first one. Like think more about federalized systems, maybe, and how do we prop up local actors who already have some level of legitimacy with people, with the locals, who ultimately will determine the fate of governments. If a government is illegitimate with its own people, it will not survive. Thank you very much. So, both you and Cameron actually agree on the fact that we haven't been doing our best or what we've been doing up until now hasn't really worked, and that these situations are very complex. So, let me actually turn to Vemba, because we're talking about the international community, but at the regional and continental level, we have the ECOWAS, the Economic Community of West African States. We have the African Union who've been very involved in the response to the coups. And so, over the past few months, we've had coups in Mali, in Guinea, in Burkina Faso, a coup attempt in Guinea-Bissau. So, Vemba, what can we say about the current and future role, I should say, of both organizations in preventing coups from happening? Again, they've been very involved, very vocal. They've applied sanctions here and there. The EU has physically been present in some of those countries to mediate some of the consequences of these coups. So, we're all very curious about what the current status of their effectiveness is, and then maybe what their future role will be in the region. Thank you very much, Camisa, and thank you to USIP, Dr. Sani, for all the work you do and for hosting this event. I think the issue and the question about the EU, the African Union, and ECOWAS are actually very pertinent in the sense that I think both organizations have a lot of internal problems. And I'm not sure they're well equipped to handle these issues in part because of things that they did themselves. The EU has not particularly upheld its charter when it comes to democracy and putting the aspirations of the African peoples ahead of the interests of the people in power. We need to admit that the EU primarily is a club of presidents, and those presidents often are not doing particularly a good job in meeting the aspirations of their own people. I've always had a soft spot for ECOWAS. I think ECOWAS was one of the few regional economic organizations that actually worked. I know ECOWAS is a track record of challenging coups and abuses of power by leaders, but that is fallen by the wayside in the last few years, or last several years, actually. So on one hand, we saw ECOWAS take a firm stand in the Gambia, for instance, when Yahya Jameh was trying to stick around. That leadership is no longer there. So we saw in places like this dichotomy that we see where they're so focused on military coups as if this is like the ultimate aberration that can happen in that space, when in fact the main, there's a spectrum of aberrations that are happening in that space. One of them that get a free pass all the time, it's constitutional coups. And constitutional coups, by this I mean a leader in power who seeks to manipulate the constitution so he can stay longer than originally elected in form. We saw this in Côte d'Ivoire. We saw this in Guinea. And when that happens, it's actually an alarm. It should be a red flag. And I think the international community, in this case ECOWAS, should come strongly on that as they come as much as they do on military coups. So I think the ECOWAS particularly has become quite ineffective in the region. We see of course whether we agree with coups or not that the last coups we've seen have been pretty popular. And that's a question that we need to look at closely. So the idea that just because it's a coup, we have to oppose it. Okay, fair. But a coup is a coup, whether it's constitutional or not. And I think countries like Nigeria in the case of ECOWAS and the case of ECOWAS need to step up and play the role that they've played traditionally, which we know taking the leadership in the sub-region. The AU, in my view, in my humble opinion, has become problematic. The AU, while they have commissions that are trying to do impressive work like peace and stability and so on. But when it comes to really serving the aspirations of the African peoples, the AU has failed. So the military coups, military officers, while military coups are not the solution to the problems, I think it's time we should consider them just as an expression of public discontent as they have the expression of public discontent. So my recommendation in this case will be to go back to the drawing board especially for ECOWAS since we're talking about Sahel and starting holding government accountable as per their charter. African people are not dupe. We can call it whatever we want. They know that the needs are not being met. So that, I think, is the context that we need to keep in mind as we look at this. Back to you. Thank you very much. So are you saying that both the ECOWAS and the AU have lost some sort of legitimacy in the region? Absolutely. But they're not being perceived as credible organizations anymore, like at least the ECOWAS used to back in the early 2000s. Absolutely. I think both organizations do not have credibility in the eyes of the populations. And we saw this with the sanctions on Mali. Right after it happened in Mali, we saw protests in the streets. In Senegal, in neighboring countries, it was very counterproductive. Senegal is the largest trading partner to Mali. So when you do a sanction, you are not just punishing the transitional government in Mali as they call themselves, but you're literally stifling trade on both sides of the border, just one example. So what is the purpose of that? And then the reality of a military government comes to power when we say you need to step down, you need to organize elections within six months, within a year. Is that credible in the sense that a country like Mali, faced a lot of problems? Whether the military took over or not? It's not clear when the election would have been organized in any meaningful way. So how do we engage that group of officers in a way that is really practical? That they want to stay longer obviously is not acceptable, but is 13 months, one year, is that enough? Those are also questions that I think do not really face the reality or reflect the reality on the ground. Thank you very much, Remba. Joe, let me ask you this. So we're talking about the international community. We're talking about regional and continental organization in Africa. Now I want to take a look at U.S. military assistance. Both Cameron and Josh did say that something went wrong there. So where the U.S. has been the leading force is arguably in hard security and training and equipping militaries in the region. And in fact, three of the five successful coups we're discussing today were led by officers when we see training by U.S. forces. Sometimes I wonder if it's just an anecdote or if that's even relevant. But are there any lessons to learn from how U.S. security assistance was prioritized in the Sahel? Thanks, Camisa. And let me echo my appreciation for being part of the panel today. I would start by just trying to be clear we need to be careful about not confusing the fact that there are problems, problems that there have been problems in these Sahelian countries, whether it be corruption, whether it be security, and the fact that then we are seeing these coups. The one doesn't justify the other. And I think we need to just continue to remind ourselves these coups are purely about opportunistic mid-level officers trying to seek power. They're not trying to advance democracy. They're not conducting reforms. They're not addressing the needs of the people. They're not doing anything in terms of innovations about addressing the security threats that these countries face. It's a pure and simple power grab. And therefore, in terms of international response, I think it's absolutely imperative that these coup makers be condemned and isolated. So I think the international community has a very essential role to play in not recognizing these coups. And I think it's important to remember these coups are all still in process. They haven't been consolidated. It's important to push back. It's important not to recognize. It's important not to give them legitimacy. They need that legitimacy in order to be sustained. And so it's a very fluid situation still. We shouldn't look at these just as in the past tense. And these coups, who leaders are all politically isolated, they're economically isolated. And it is important that international community supports aqueous in continuing that isolation so that they do hand over power to a transitional civil authority so that we can move forward towards elections and some sort of democratic process. In terms of the question about security cooperation, clearly the fact that we've had these mid-level officers sees power reflects a problem in the way these security institutions are operating. But I would suggest that it isn't... We need to be careful when we don't generalize. This is an entire military in these countries that have been dysfunctional. These are factions within the military. Power-seeking factions that have seized power. And so I think we want to focus on what broke down rather than offering broad-stroke criticisms of the entire military structures, which I believe there have been very genuine and constructive steps forward in terms of building military professionalism and effectiveness. Obviously, they haven't been sufficient. But I think really what we're looking at with these coups is the problem of having elite forces that are operating outside the standard command and control structures that were able to mobilize a small group of well-armed and well-organized colleagues to seize power. These came from the middle hierarchy of the command structure. These were not the generals. In the case of the Helian governments in Sudan, it's a different situation. And therefore, I think one of the lessons is that we need to make sure that any of these special forces that are created to try to deal with the insurgencies are part of the ordinary army that are responsive to the command and control. We've seen problems with these elite factions in that they get disproportionate amount of resources, training arms, and so it creates frictions within the rest of the military structures that are out there. So I think better to be working and trying to strengthen the capacity and effectiveness of the entire military institutions and the command and control structures rather than just focusing so much on these elite forces. There's a lot more to say. I guess the last point I'll throw in at this point is it is imperative that we recognize the role that militaries play in democratic processes. And I think that has been overlooked, that unless the militaries are coming along and they support and recognize the importance of having civilian-led democratic leadership, they're always going to be a source of vulnerability to successful democracies. And so we need to redouble our efforts to strengthen the norms of civil military relationships and the importance of controls and strictures on the huge responsibility given to militaries and the bearing of arms in these societies which are explicitly intended to defend citizens and defend constitutions. So I think there's a lot more work that needs to be done on strengthening those norms of democracies and the norms of civil military relationships within these military institutions. But I would say there's a lot there to build on. There's a lot of good work that has been done. And we want to recognize that and work with that. Thank you so much for this, Joe. So we're here to talk about or to make policy recommendations about how to counter coups, what are the strategies to counter coups. And in your remarks, you did say that the coup makers should be somehow isolated. So my question to you would be, do you think that sanctions, like the ones that the ECOWAS applied, are actually an effective measure to counter coups? I do support the sanctions. And yes, there are going to be costs, but these are costs that these coup makers have taken upon themselves and taken upon their countries. They are the ones who step forward and decided that they are going to be the sovereign representatives of their states. They do not have legitimate embassy. They do not have popularity. Sure, there were some peoples on the streets, but many more people oppose these regimes. And we have seen in Mali, how the Ogaite and the coup leaders there have been sponsoring youth militias to attack opponents. We've seen opposition politicians speaking out against the coup. Same thing in Burkina Faso. These guys did not win elections. They decided for themselves to take on those authorities. And they're acting in their interest. They're not acting on the interest of the general population. So yes, sanctions, cutting these guys off, they should not have access to the sovereign accounts of these states. And it recognizes their vulnerability, their fragility in trying to hold on to power. And I think that has been a miscalculation on the part of Aqwas and the international community to give them too much rope, to give them too much leeway, to expect that they're going to lead a transition. That is not their intention. And the longer we play this out, the more troublesome it's going to get. So yes, they need to be isolated. And the pressure point here should be they need to transition to some sort of civilian-led interim government that's technocratic that can host a genuine transition process that's leading to elections and a restoration of civilian-led government. Thank you, Joe. Cameron, I see you nodding. Do you agree with what Joe just said about sanctions being an important and maybe an effective measure to counter coups? Well, I think we have to look at where those sanctions are coming from. And I do think that with respect to what Joe said, I think that sanctions that are coming from Aqwas, coming from African peers are effective. I think that they send both an effective signal and given the kind of trade patterns that exist within the sub-region, I think they can be very powerful, especially when you look at a landlocked country like Mali, for example, the region can play an important part in putting pressure, economic pressure on coup makers. But I think, you know, from, you know, we're sitting in Washington, many of us and so from the perspective of international sanctions, I'm starting to question really the value of beyond the signal. And obviously, a sanction from the EU or from Washington is a signal of discontent. But at the end of the day, I think what we haven't talked about is the sort of the changing geopolitics of the region and the fact that you now have a much more important role that Russia is trying to play, China has been playing, and a host of kind of middle power countries from Turkey, Qatar, the Emirates, the Saudis across the region. And so I think that the power and effectiveness of international sanctions on coup makers is eroding, both the more we use them, but also the more we see these kind of new entrants who are in fact, I think, taking advantage of the fact and seeing an opportunity and an opening where there are gaps between the U.S. and Western governments and local governments, they're filling that vacuum and creating new relationships in a way that I think will continue to erode the utility of some of the sanctions that we've been relying upon up till now. So I think we need to expand the toolkit beyond just economic sanctions because there are ways around them now and these countries are getting very, very good at avoiding the worst effects of them. Thank you. Josh, we need to expand the toolkit. That's what Cameron Saad said. I didn't. Any ideas about what tools we can come up with? Yeah, and I'll just endorse what Cameron just said. I am more and more hesitant about sanctions. I think they're totally appropriate in some situations, but I also think people have baked these into their calculations now. They know sanctions will come and they have a plan for avoiding them. Now, that doesn't mean they've calculated correctly and there is, again, virtue to demonstrating our discontent with what's going on and we don't do sectoral sanctions. We only do targeted sanctions. But even those can have, let's be honest, those can have a chilling effect on other types of economic activity in these countries which hurt ordinary people. Again, sometimes that's appropriate and sometimes that's what must be done. I would like us to be a little bit more cautious before we reach for that hammer. Now, as far as what other tools we have, yeah, I think there are some other ones. I like visa bans, like travel bans. That really hurts some of these elite families and who like to jet off, especially if you can coordinate this with our European friends and others. Everybody comes to Unga, right? The United States is under no obligation to allow people who come to Unga to wander the city or go beyond the limits of the perimeter of the UN. So if you really want to start putting the screws to these folks, you can say, we can't stop you from coming to Unga but you're only allowed within this very small perimeter. Some of these ruling elites, they have family members, adults, I would only focus on adults. I would never look at children or minors but they have adult children or other family members who are living large off of the oftentimes stolen money and other resources. And you can say, sorry, we have to revoke your visa. You might even be a 23-year-old in college but I'm sorry, you have to go because you have to focus on the elites themselves because they don't care in many cases what happens to their people. I'm going to say it very openly here. Joe is exactly right, I think, on the people who have seized power in these coups, it's about themselves and their power. Let me interrupt you, sorry. Sure. But the people who seize power are not elites. Sometimes they didn't even have passports before they actually seized the coup. So how are the visa bans effective on them? Because they're not, it's not even part of their lifestyle to just travel the world. Yeah, it won't work for everyone but some of them are elites. Some do go off to Dubai and Doha all the time or New York. So you'd have to make it, obviously it would only work for those who do like to travel about. And I'm always, you know, so there's, you know, there are financial tools. Again, I want us to be cautious about sanctions but if we're going to go that route, we need to make them as pointed as possible and try to avoid those types of sanctions that have larger societal effects and really home in on the perpetrators themselves. And we should be willing to go up to the top on some of it. You know, we've, I think of, this wasn't a coup situation but I think of South Sudan a lot where we put sanctions on a few sort of mid to like low upper level people but we never, we never touched the people who were really driving the violence. So I think sometimes we have to be willing to make that decision. It's hard because again, a lot of these people have baked this into their calculations. They know this is coming and they've protected themselves in some ways. So I said at the very beginning, we need to have some humility about what we can accomplish. But the U.S. is not the decisive actor in many of these places anymore. There are other countries with much greater influence than us and we should coordinate with them as much as we can to try to have some sort of united effort. But at the end of the day, we can throw the kitchen sink at some people and they're not leaving. I think the situation in Sudan is a really good example of this. Thank you, Josh. Let me turn to you. So I've seen on social media some local reactions to international responses to coups. Could be a French response to the coups in Guinea or Burkina or Mali and then the U.S. response or non-response. And some citizens in some of those countries do think that coups are extremely local, that they should be dealt with at the national level and that the international community should not even be involved. What do you say about that? I think this is the challenge, Camisa, about how we handle these coups. I mean, we're here trying to find recommendations. It's really contextualized that every coup is very different. In the context of the Sahel today, the coups are happening within the context of heightened terrorism and violence. If you're a regular citizen and this is happening to you, it doesn't really matter what Paris or Washington thinks because if you can identify with the people in power especially we need to remember whether this is rhetoric, whether it's true, a lot of the military systems that military leaders have taken over in the Sahel have all pointed to the lack of support they get from the civilian leadership. We need to contextualize to dismiss them and say they're all grabbing power for the sake of power. That may be the case, but it is a specific context that gives them cover for what they're doing. We cannot decouple those. It is impossible. Sanogo walked from the field to headquarters to do his school because he had some grievances in Burkina Faso. Whether this is again just a question of public relations but the population identifies with that to a certain level. So we cannot dismiss that. Therefore, the local element becomes very important. When we talk about stability, whose stability are we talking about? That remains not just a philosophical question. It's a real question. The farmers who cannot go to the field because there's terrorism, how do they relate to the situation? Which is totally different from me sitting in Washington DC. So there's that element, but I also want to go back a little bit to extending the toolkit. We mentioned earlier that our engagement, the international community engagement, has been primarily state focus or military focus. What I'd like to see more of, we just heard a few weeks ago that United States, for instance, had decided to become a full active member of the Sahel Alliance. I think the U.S. has the clouds and the gravitas and the coordination and the money capability to start asking to carve a bigger space for civil society. Civil society is much more representative of the need of the people than the military. However, we look at the military. And often, unfortunately, civil society is not around those tables. And when they are at the table, it's very minimal. I think that role needs to be expanded. And we also need to have a longer horizon. The notion that we can just put pressure on people, then the problem will go away. It's absurd. And we've seen this over the years. The other element, again, I'm going to focus on Mali, because it's the bigger country in the region. And what's happening there is a lot of impact. Mali, if we remember, used to be one of the leaders in democracy. And when they did what they did to be the leader in democracy, they barely got any support from the same countries that are making noise today. So we need to start increasing our democratic engagement. Here I'm speaking from the U.S. perspective. Democracy is an important pillar of U.S. foreign policy. Flame talk is all good for whatever set of reasons that it serves. But I think the India's of the world, the IRA of the world, the NED of the world, they're doing tremendous work with really little means. I think we need to engage with civil society. And I think to me, and for me, that's an important toolkit that need to be elevated. Other countries don't work in that space. France doesn't work in a democracy space. So for an African, when they look at France, they see the same thing they've been seeing for the last 50 years. That means military operations, military operations, military operations. Any African of a certain age can rather, at least half a dozen, military operations. So what are they leading to? And so to me, that's just what I wanted to put out there. I think it's important that we handle those within the context. Thank you. So let me, so again, we're here to talk about recommendations and, you know, countering coups. One of the more complex questions that some of us have in mind is how do you actually recover from a coup? And on what terms? Who should the coup makers count on? Who should the international community work with? Van Bae, you talked about the civil society. But this is a question to all of you. How do we move forward? We've had many coups. And actually West Africa was coined a coup belt. I think it was maybe in the in the 60s, because the region was so prone to coups after independence. And so, yeah, the big question is how do we move forward from here? The Atlantic Council Africa Center. We're talking here to CSIS. We have the ACSS. We have the Heritage Foundation. How do we all work together? And how do we move forward? Maybe Joe. Thanks. Well, I think the way we move forward depends on how we respond in the present and to the extent that coups become an acceptable means of transition, then we're going to see more coups. So I think it's very important that we do take a hard line with these coup makers. I do think I would reiterate, you know, they are politically very vulnerable. And this is where the role of regional international actors is important, because if they get that recognition, then they'll have the foundation. They'll be able to consolidate their coup and they'll stay in power. And once they're there, they have no intention of giving up that power. So we're going to be dealing with the dysfunctions that they bring for years to come. So I think it's imperative that we take a very strong stance against these individuals and try to move, again, to a civilian-led transitional authority that can then lead to elections. We should not be looking at the coup makers to be transitioning that isn't their goal and they haven't taken any steps in that direction. In terms of other things that we can be doing, I do think it's important to recognize and understand that these coups are happening in fragile states and with weak institutions and countries that haven't been on a democratic path for very long. And so it shouldn't be surprising that they're weak and they're vulnerable to different challenges, especially with the stresses we've talked about with COVID and with these jihadist insurgencies that are out there. And so I think it is important that we are more supportive of these countries. And I think we need to be more strategic as I think some of the other panelists are also suggesting, you know, our engagement needs to be institutionally based. It is that institutional resiliency, which is going to be the most important thing for a coup poofering over the longer term. And Mmeva mentioned civil society. I think that's really important. We're seeing the value of active civil society in Sudan and maintaining the domestic pressure on the coup there. I would focus on the justice sector, you know, the independence of the justice sector is important when either coup makers or incumbent regimes try to manipulate constitutions so they can stay in power longer to the extent that you have a judiciary that can act independently. That's an important bulwark against those sorts of actions. I think we want to be investing more in independent electoral commissions so that when votes are held, they're valid. And we've seen a deterioration in the independence of these electoral commissions and therefore it's easier to manipulate the outcomes of these elections. I think we want to be focusing on the, you know, on legislatures, which have often failed to provide a counterbalance to the over empowered executive branches in many of these weak federal systems. That is a means of getting popular representation into the democratic process. And I would then also highlight the importance of protecting media. You know, media are the guardians of debate and opposition voices. You can't have accountability. You can't have debates if you don't have freedom of expression, freedom of the press. And again, we've seen a deterioration in these freedoms in recent years. More needs to be done to back that up in many ways. The freedom of the press is the canary in the coal mine. And when you don't have that, then it makes a lot easier to manipulate other parts of these democratic processes. So what I'm saying is we need to invest across a whole series of democratic institutions, recognizing that this is a decade or two long process. And to recognize that, you know, there has been progress in some places, but it has to be sustained. And, you know, we're starting at a weak and at a fragile place in many of these countries. So it's going to be a sustained effort, but it's that resiliency that will be important. You know, there will always be problems in any country even in wealthy democracies today. There are economic problems. There are political problems. There are security problems. Those do not provide a justification for coups. And I think that's where we want to be getting at in Africa, that yes, there will be problems even under democracies that does not then excuse militaries stepping in. And we can help buffer against that impulse when we strengthen this plethora of democratic institutions on the ground. Thank you, Joe. Cameron, how do you move forward? Well, listen, I think Joe has laid out a number of really good recommendations and suggestions, and I would just, you know, associate myself with all of those. I think, frankly, a lot of those are captured under some tools that we already have that we haven't been using. I think, namely, of the Global Fragility Act. I think, you know, there are a lot of what I would call early warning indicators, right, of coup behavior. And we can identify those countries if Freedom House does a great job of ranking many of those indicators already. And so there's an actionable, you know, set of indicators that we can be looking at and trying to either arrest the deterioration in those indicators or, you know, turn them around through various USG initiatives. I think also of USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives, right, which we're using right now in a place like Sudan. But I think we also have to get better at engaging at the sort of local level, the sort of non-elite level. And I, frankly, I struggle with how to do that. BEMBA mentioned the IRIs, the IFASs, the NDIs, the NEDs. I think those are organizations that are doing incredible work at a local level that need to be built up and sustained. But I look at a place like Sudan right now, which I've spent a lot of time on, where you have, in fact, a very organized counter-coup protest movement that has emerged and really been the backbone of the revolution for the past three years in Sudan. And still, I think we struggle with how to engage with that community of activists on the ground. I think our diplomats, not just in Sudan, but across the board, are not set up. They're not purpose-built for engaging with, you know, mass protest movements or even with kind of broad-based civil society. And I think we need to be better. Our diplomats need to be better trained in how to do that and how we can kind of tap into that. Again, I think Dr. Sani mentioned at the beginning, you know, there's a certain irony here that despite having all these coups, you know, the Afrobarometer polls all demonstrate that, you know, for 65 to 75% of respondents in the Sahel think that, you know, democracy is the best form of government. Similar percentages reject military rule and military coups. And if you just look at sort of the demographics of the region, this is not a problem that's going away. Those poll numbers are even higher for younger people in these countries. And so given the fact that you have this enormous youth bulge that is going to continue to make these demands for change, I think we have to be better at understanding and tapping into and engaging with not just the non-elites, but the youth who are driving these conversations. I think many, you know, internally in these countries, many of the political parties, you know, they don't have youth wings anymore. They are not rejuvenating their thinking, right? I mean, you look at many of these countries where they, you know, you have these communist trained, you know, octogenarians, you know, you know, trying to lead a political party based upon, you know, sort of 1960s thinking of, you know, of economics and politics really feeling very disconnected from, I think, the youth in those countries. And so we have to understand that there are generational shifts at play and how we can position ourselves in engaging and understanding what is to come. Because again, I think this is, as Joe said, this is a 20-year plus transformation of trying to prevent these things from happening. But we have to be on the leading edge of the response. Thank you. So, yeah, I agree with everything that you said. And, you know, before we go to Q&A, I really wanted to ask one question that is an important one, human rights violations. We don't necessarily talk about human rights violations a lot when coups happen and when exceptional measures are put in place. But how do we ensure that these are respected and not violated in this exceptional period? Because that's a coup period. It's an exceptional period. So I think we should be, Josh, in two minutes. Sure. I can probably do it in less than two minutes because it's, I'm not sure I have any great ideas beyond some of what we've already discussed here because you're right. Human rights violations are inherent in these types of political upheavals. And it's, I think, Sudan maybe is the best example of this right now where we've really struggled to have any sort of meaningful influence over how the security services are responding to mass protests in that country. Obviously, we have to condemn it when it happens. I think we have to document it very closely. And so we should be in really close contacts, of course, with folks on the grounds. Civil society has been a theme of this conversation, and I'll keep going on that theme, you know, because they often have some of the better information that you can get. And then some of, perhaps one of the best things we can do is after the fact, honestly, we want to prevent it, but it happens. And so it is important how we respond to it after the fact in the sense of are there accountability measures that we can support? So is there a truth and reconciliation process that we can support or something along those lines? There's no satisfying answer here. At least I don't have a satisfying answer even for myself. Because, again, beyond what we've talked about, sanctions and other creative means and condemnation, it's very difficult. That's good. That's a good answer. Can I add one thing? Please go ahead. To the audience. I agree with all the nuances and all the perspectives that my colleagues have shared. One thing that always stands out for me is when there is a coup, the international community always calls for a return to the constitutional order. And the question that comes next is which constitutional order? Typically, this condition that leads to a coup is a broken order. That's why things are happening the way they're happening. So I just want to underscore the point that when country actually struggling towards democracy, towards good governance, that's the time the international community needs really to buttress them with all the support they need. The problem is, during that time, again, to stay with Mali, we had a transition from in 1990 with Atete and others. Mali did not get the full support of the international community at that time. So the problem that existed before continued to exist throughout and gotten even worse as time went by. So the international community, whatever that is, the donor countries, in this case the Sahel Alliance and others really have to invest in that space. Not to wait because we put so much burden on these countries that the transition to democracy expecting them to behave like Norway, when in fact they need all the support that they need. The way we gave Eastern European countries that were transitioning, no country in Africa received that level of support. And I think if we want to see less cause, that's an element that we need to put on the table. Thank you. Thank you very much. I'm back on these words of wisdom. We are going to turn to some of the questions that have come from our audience. First question here. What are the strategic concerns in the region and how does the West balance supporting democracies in Africa while working with others led by entrenched leaders who wants to take on this one? Josh, you're smiling, so. Or Joe. Yeah, just to move this forward. I think what the question is getting at is a point alluded to earlier that you have other external actors like Russia that is trying to opportunistically fill the vacuum created to expand its regional influence. And so what should the U.S. regional actors do? I would say it is important to recognize that Russia is pursuing what I call an asymmetric strategy in Africa. It isn't investing a lot of resources. But it is pumping up disinformation in Mali, in Burkina Faso, in Sudan to try and prop up its proxies there. And so by co-opting these co-leaders, they are trying to gain outsized influence given their minimal investments in these countries. Similarly with what they're doing with the Wagner mercenaries, they're sending them there not to provide security but to help protect and sustain the co-actors. And so in the process, displacing the French and Western influence, disparaging democratic norms, which is all part of the disinformation campaign. And so I would say from a geopolitical standpoint, we want to make sure Russia incurs cost for their destabilizing actions. They should be exposed and held accountable for this I think it goes to all the more importance for why we need to support and incentivize democracy where we have to underscore why it's important to maintain constitutional order and have legal successions to the extent that we support and tolerate any lawless seizure of power, we're going to see more of that. And that plays into the hands of the Russians of the world. They cannot compete on a level playing field where countries are operating according to the rule of law. They don't have a lot of investment or trade that they can offer Africa. And so they're trying these asymmetric means to try to expand their influence. So I think the U.S. can assert its geostrategic interest by supporting democracy, supporting stronger institutions and sustaining them over time so that we have the long-term relationships that are going to be beneficial to our economic and security interest in Africa. Thank you. Joe, I am looking at a question for Josh. In context with a weak central state, how can foreign actors empower local actors without contributing to power fragmentation and local power grabs? That's a good question. Yeah, it's a very good question. And of course, it's challenging. You do need a framework that has a role for a central government, obviously, right? And that central government plays a coordinating role, plays an organizing role. And within the structure has a formal relationship with these local entities. There's going to be, there will be local power grabs in this scenario. That will happen. And of course, people will try to elevate themselves beyond what they should. The concept behind the evolution of power, though, is that the stakes aren't as high because we have power grabs at the central government level that are much more ferocious and much fiercer because the stakes are so much higher. You get control of an entire country if you get the central government and you get control of their treasury more to the point for a lot of folks. So by devolving power, you're not getting rid of any of these actors who are going to, you know, who want to have an outsized role and outsize influence in, you know, the power dynamics of the country, but you're involving more people in decision-making. You are making it harder for any one actor or small group of actors to wield damaging power. So, you know, it's, it will, it would really have to be based on organic, legitimate entities like locally, right? You could try to set them up, but you really want to look for, like I say, entities that have some level of legitimacy already with the local people. And you still want to do this in a democratic framework. You want to make sure you have elections even at the local level, of course. But I, and this is not the appropriate answer for all of these situations, but depending on some of these countries that are so fractured already, I think it's a more realistic approach for some of these countries. Thank you. A question for, for Vemba. Looking at Latin America, military coups occurred frequently in response to perceived failures of democratic, democratic governments to effectively respond to national crisis. Are circumstances in Africa different? Thank you for the question. Of course, every situation is different. No situation is alike. Even in, even in the Sahel, Burkina Faso is not Mali. Every situation is different. I think I would like to reiterate, reiterate that the military, as small as they can be in the country, they still represent an important segment of that society. So the grievances are just as important as the grievances of any other segment of society. And in the case of Latin America, and in the case of Africa, all coups are not created equals. The coups of the 70s were ideological. It was in the context of the Cold War, and typically you had no more decline of popularity. The coups that we're seeing today are totally different, especially the coups that we're talking about in Burkina Faso. They're happening within a specific context, the heightened insecurity, the discontent of the military that is not getting support from the civilian leadership in addressing the causes, or just getting the support to, to prosecute the war. Terrorism is a very tricky situation. Even strong countries, rich countries, struggle with this. The U.S. struggle with terrorism, and it was not pretty, but it's not been pretty when we deal with terrorism. France and so on. So to burden a developing nation in the Sahel with the cost of handling terrorism when institutions are weak, it's very, it's a, it's a tall order. So I'm not here to defend coups, but I'm just, I want to insist that context, context, context. And the history of Africa is replete with coups that went crazy and just took countries down. But there also have been moments of guys who came to a coup and took the countries in different direction. Jerry Rollins, brutal coup and a few of them, but we, without Jerry Rollins, they will not have been a transition to democracy, not at the point that it's happening in Ghana. They might celebrate it, Thomas Ankara was from Burkina Faso. He came through a coup. So I just would like to say context, context, context. Again, I'm not here to defend coups, but I would like to say as analysts, we need to take them within the context. Thank you, Vemba. Cameron, you have a question. The U.S. State Department has special envoy offices for a handful of complex issues and regions, including for the Sahel, though that envoy post is not yet filled. This is unique role offer operational or diplomatic advantages in a crisis situation that we've learned from the previous envoy for the Sahel posting. Great. Well, I do think that there's a lot that can be said about how the U.S. government organizes itself around these issues, matters, and personnel is policy as people say. And so the fact that we don't have someone filling the role of a special envoy to the Sahel is a gap in our policy. That one that should be fixed, I think we should be, we treat the Sahel as a region and we treat many of the problems as transnational problems in the Sahel. And so I think we need to be structured in a way internally. If you look, it cuts across, the Sahel region cuts across the Horn of Africa, Central Africa, West Africa in our bureaucratic structure. And so I think we need to have a kind of operational structure that allows for us to more effectively respond. But also I think to be a part of the wider international community who is engaging on these issues. So when there are other special engoys that the U.N., the E.U., European partners, the A.U. have designated, and there is a process, just as there has been a policy process for decades now. And now there is an increasingly visible Horn of Africa process underway. I think we need to be at the table diplomatically with respect to the Sahel. And I think that having a Sahel envoy deployed as we did under the Trump Administration was a really important signal. I think more importantly than just the diplomatic aspect, I go back to the sort of the security aspect. The security engagement that we have in these countries is very visible. And I think our diplomacy needs to be just as visible. And so if only to counterbalance how we are perceived and how our values and interests are perceived locally, I think it makes a ton of sense to have that kind of diplomatic representation. And I think there are ways to do it within the State Department. You can have a Deputy Assistant Secretary who carries the title of Special Envoy. So you don't have to have an additional person in that role. But having someone there who is identified publicly as a point person on that policy, I think it elevates the policy internally. And so I think that's a really important part of what the U.S. is doing. And so I think just sends a signal locally into international partners that the United States is engaged. Yep. Thanks so much. A question for Joe. Joe, you rightly mentioned that the co-makers are a faction of the military. We may make a mistake by generalizing and putting all the information on the military. But the fact that the training and equipment model is the appropriate model to address the functionalization of the army and strengthen the democratic norms you talked about. Thanks for the question. No. Simply. Training equipment is not sufficient. You know, it misses completely the governance values that are so central to an effective democratic professional military. And I think it's the democratic professional military element that we need to be spending more time thinking about, you know, just building up capabilities of militaries may, you know, improve their lethal capacity. But if it isn't grounded in some democratic norms, some understanding that the role of a military is to protect the population, that it should be citizen-centric and looking at citizen security, unless those norms and values are in place, then that lethal capacity can be used against the civilians. And so I think we need to do a lot more in thinking about how to strengthen those norms and culture of military professionalism, accountability, respect for civilian rule. You know, in the end, this is going to have to come from within the individual countries. But many military professionals in Africa, I know really embrace those values. And it, you know, it is extremely disappointing to them to see these coups and the breakdown of the growth and the inculcation of those values that we've seen over the years. And so it is something that needs to be done in partnership with host government institutions. It needs to be done in partnership with civil society. You know, civil society has a very important role for oversight of the security sector. As I mentioned before, it has to do with the partnership with parliaments, legislatures who need to do more in terms of overseeing military budgets and making sure that those norms are being inculcated within these institutions. But you can't just leave it to the executive branches, you just can't leave it to the ministries of defense. And for that matter, it gets to the Ministry of Finance too. What's the Ministry of Finance's role in overseeing how budgetary expenditures are being used to making sure they're for the right things. So training equip is important, but it has to be built on a foundation of what is that training equipping that's going to be a fundamental question that we really need to be spending more time on and reorienting our efforts towards. Thank you, Joe. A question from Vemba. Thinking about a return to constitutional order, how many years does it take for a successful transition period and are free and fair elections a priority at this point in time? Again, it's relative. I think it's relative. I will continue harming on the Mali example. Mali was a success story until he was no longer a success story. And it was a success story because Malians, including the military that had taken power in I think 1991, whatever year that was, there was enough pressure on them to stand down. They kept their word, they would keep their word. They were in power for a long time in one year. And Mali went on forward as a democracy. Mali, when at the time you read the report of the State Department, there were no political prisoners in Mali. Human rights. It was a good bill of rights, that good bill of health that Mali had. But Mali did not get the bill from the sky. In the international community just did not engage Mali. Mali never got any props, never got any applause for what it was doing. U.S. presidents, other presidents rather go to other countries that were in the grip of dictators than to go to Mali. Not a single U.S. president ever stopped in Mali, doing the glorious years of Mali as a world sending. People rather stop in Kampala, Kigali and other places. Nobody gave Mali any love. So it takes a while to have democracy, but democracy does not grow on to itself. Democracy is expensive, very expensive. All the institutions that Joe mentioned early, the courts, civil society organization, political parties and others to help build those takes a lot of money. So I think that Mali is not going to get that money overnight. So to me, the transition should take as long as it needs, but with the support otherwise there's no transition we're going to revert to authoritarianism. A question to all of you. Good one. We have mentioned democratic institutions, but we seem to forget the private sector. What is your role for the business sector in strengthening democratic norms and how can the U.S. support? Josh. Yes, it is my answer. Absolutely. I think private sector is really important part of this. There's very strong correlation between economic freedom and good governance. And I think having a vibrant entrepreneurial private sector that and obviously the U.S. private sector can help with this through investment and trade and et cetera is critical both because it addresses some of these issues such as a lack of jobs that fuel so much frustration on the continent, particularly on the youth and we're all familiar with the youth explosion happening there now. They have to get their economies going some of these countries or they are going to face severe societal unrest for the foreseeable future I think and private sector is the only answer to that. And I think there is something about people involving themselves in business and entrepreneurial activity and having some control over their own economic fates that lends itself to a more democratic environment. I think that if you can and this is somewhat low hanging fruit for some of these countries because you look at the regulatory environments and a lot of them and they are irrational and onerous and everything else and if you could just rationalize some of that and some of those regulatory environments you could make really significant gains not just economically but again as I say I think in strengthening the legitimacy of governments and buttressing institutions to good governance there is a lot of positive knock-on effects. Thank you Josh we are slowly coming to the end of our discussion and Can I just jump in for two minutes? Sure go ahead. I think it is such an important question that does get often overlooked and I would say it is really ironic we are in this period where there is this democratic recession in Africa but it is a place where there is a larger middle-class there are more people in middle-class more educated Africans never before and so this huge paradox of why aren't there more domestic constituents and institutions that are pushing back for the democratic norms and so I think it is a really critical role that the private sector can play. These middle-class professionals, entrepreneurs have a lot to lose if we see the return of coups and military governments because the whole concept of rule of law goes out the window and with that investment dries up as the saying goes capital is a coward and if there is instability if there is political instability that international capital on which new investment and it depends won't be there and so a lot is at stake for Africa's private sector that to see these coups reversed and a restoration of rules-based government that ties into property rights access to credit access to certifications that often are politicized in unaccountable governments. Unfortunately the reality is autocracies, political autocracies turn to economic autocracies and so we can expect to see the same things with these military governments so it's a really important issue for right now when we're looking at how you push back but it's also an important issue for looking forward in terms of how you sustain democratic governments and how do you tap into the synergies between a vibrant private sector and a participatory accountable democratic government. Thank you. Thank you. Cameron do you want to add anything to the question? No just to underline I think again we have these US government institutions already in place I mean we have the Millennium Challenge Corporation which is intended to reinforce countries that are on a democratic path right and to give them that kind of transformational economic boost that they need to unlock their democratic potential and economic potential. Similarly we have the Development Finance Corporation which is now I think you know merged multiple organizations of the US government to try to streamline our ability to focus private sector capital in places that that are deserving of it and that can benefit from it but I think we just have to remember that at the end of the day these companies that are going in there they're not benevolent they're going in there to mine to take things out of the earth or to sell products on the ground and I do think that there's an indirect effect of having US companies which have to ascribe to US law on corruption and transparency bringing those business ideals to these countries but we have to remember that there has to be first and foremost a welcoming environment for the private sector to be able to go in and to make those commitments. Thank you Cameron so to all of you I think you all agreed on one thing we need to expand our toolkit to be able to counter COOS in Sub-Saharan Africa and some of the key points that I noted down the first one is that the US should carve a bigger space for civil society in the region. The ECOWAS and the EU should take a hard line with constitutional COOS and should abide by their respective charters in order to regain the legitimacy that they once had in the region the US needs to rethink its security approach in the region train and equip that doesn't work anymore or is not sufficient Joe mentioned a hard line that is needed with co-makers because they are politically vulnerable and sanctions are a way of taking a hard line and Cameron you insisted on working with non-elite local level authorities or authorities or people who believe in democracy like Afrobarometer confirmed any last words of wisdom before we close in two minutes I'll be briefer than 30 seconds I was just going to say I think our consistency across the board matters you know I'm struck by something that the Mali and your successor said Mali and Foreign Minister said recently which was you know France applaud COOS when it's in their interest and it condemns COOS when it's not in their interest and I think that we have to be consistent about how we respond to these COOS because Africans see how we're responding and they see the hypocrisy in our policies when we engage in Chad because it serves our interests and we don't engage in Mali because we don't like the flavor of the COOS there and so I think we have to have consistency in how and why and where we are responding and in the manner in which we're responding because we will be we will be called out and lose credibility to the people who we're trying to influence on the ground there. Thank you Cameron. All right Africans want democracy they've been working on democracy for a long time COOS happen in the process we need to stick with them they are the example South Korea which is a power now was not a piece of cake in its day they had COOS the US never relented on them they stuck with them I think the time has come for the international community particularly the US since I mean the US to take to pick a few countries support them all the way through until they make it so we need to stop putting our money where our principles are Thank you so much. Josh final words? Yeah I would just reiterate the importance of local actors I think that's been a theme here civil society absolutely critical building these institutions that are the protectors of democracy and that can defend it against things like COOS that's a long it's a long road and I agree totally agree with them but I think Joe made the same point we need to stick with it we need to have a much longer time horizon on solving some of these problems we can't even solve any ways we need to again come alongside local actors who are fighting this fight Thank you Joe can you be as short as George? Yeah I'll be very succinct I think our strategy should be to link up with domestic actors so bring the combination of domestic pressure and international pressure and don't just try to work this through elite level formal structures I think in that way we can most leverage our influence and get these things back on track Thank you so much to all of you for this very rich discussion and for providing response options to COOS in the in the greatest I would like to also thank our audience for joining us for those interested in following USIP's work more closely after today I encourage you to follow USIP on social media sign up for our email newsletter and tune in for more virtual events Thank you and goodbye