 Chapter 1.2 of the 9-11 Commission Report. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to find out how you can volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Chapter 1.2 Improvising a Homeland Defense. Recording by Eugene Smith. The FAA and NORAD. On 9-11, the defense of U.S. airspace depended on close interaction between two federal agencies, the FAA and the North American Aerospace Defense Command, NORAD. The most recent hijacking that involved U.S. air traffic controllers, FAA management, and military coordination had occurred in 1993. In order to understand how the two agencies interacted eight years later, we will review their missions, command, and control structures, and working relationship on the morning of 9-11. FAA Mission and Structure. As of September 11, 2001, the FAA was mandated by law to regulate the safety and security of civil aviation. From an air traffic controller's perspective, that meant maintaining a safe distance between airborne aircraft. Many controllers work at the FAA's 22 Air Route Traffic Control Centers. They are grouped under regional offices and coordinate closely with the National Air Traffic Control System Command Center, located in Herndon, Virginia, which oversees daily traffic flow within the entire airspace system. FAA headquarters is ultimately responsible for the management of the national airspace system. The operations center, located at FAA headquarters, receives notifications of incidents, including accidents and hijackings. FAA control centers often receive information and make operational decisions independently of one another. On 9-11, the four hijacked aircraft were monitored mainly by the centers in Boston, New York, Cleveland, and Indianapolis. Each center thus had part of the knowledge of what was going on across the system. What Boston knew was not necessarily known by centers in New York, Cleveland, or Indianapolis, or for that matter by the command center in Herndon, or by FAA headquarters in Washington. Controllers track airliners such as the four aircraft hijacked on 9-11 primarily by watching the data from a signal emitted by each aircraft's transponder equipment. Those four planes, like all aircraft traveling above 10,000 feet, were required to emit a unique transponder signal while in flight. On 9-11, the terrorists turned off the transponders on three of the four hijacked aircraft. With its transponder off, it is possible, though more difficult, to track an aircraft by its primary radar returns. But unlike transponder data, primary radar returns do not show the aircraft's identity and altitude. Controllers at centers rely so heavily on transponder signals that they usually do not display primary radar returns on their radar scopes. But they can change the configuration of their scopes so they can see primary radar returns. They did this on 9-11 when the transponder signals for three of the aircraft disappeared. Before 9-11, it was not unheard of for a commercial aircraft to deviate slightly from its course or for an FAA controller to lose radio contact with a pilot for a short period of time. A controller could also briefly lose a commercial aircraft's transponder signal, although this happened much less frequently. However, the simultaneous loss of radio and transponder signal would be a rare and alarming occurrence and normally indicate a catastrophic system failure or an aircraft crash. In all of these instances, the job of the controller was to reach out to the aircraft, the parent company of the aircraft, and other planes in the vicinity in an attempt to reestablish communications and set the aircraft back on course. Alarm bells would not start ringing until these efforts, which could take five minutes or more, were tried and had failed. NORAD Mission and Structure NORAD is a binational command established in 1958 between the United States and Canada. Its mission was and is to defend the airspace of North America and protect the continent. That mission does not distinguish between internal and external threats, but because NORAD was created to counter the Soviet threat, it came to define its job as defending against external attacks. The threat of Soviet bombers diminished significantly as the Cold War ended and the number of NORAD alert sites was reduced from its Cold War high of 26. Some within the Pentagon argued in the 1990s that the alert sites should be eliminated entirely. In an effort to preserve their mission, members of the air defense community advocated the importance of air sovereignty against emerging, quote, asymmetric threats, end quote, to the United States. Drug smuggling, quote, non-state and state-sponsored terrorists, end quote, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile technology. NORAD perceived the dominant threat to be from cruise missiles. Other threats were identified during the 1990s, including terrorists' use of aircraft as weapons. Exercises were conducted to counter this threat, but they were not based on actual intelligence. In most instances, the main concern was the use of such aircraft to deliver weapons of mass destruction. Prior to 9-11, it was understood that an order to shoot down a commercial aircraft would have to be issued by the National Command Authority, a phrase used to describe the President and Secretary of Defense. Exercise planners also assumed that the aircraft would originate from outside the United States, allowing time to identify the target and scramble interceptors. The threat of terrorists hijacking commercial airliners within the United States and using them as guided missiles was not recognized by NORAD before 9-11. Notwithstanding the identification of these emerging threats, by 9-11 there were only seven alert sites left in the United States, each with two fighter aircraft on alert. This led some NORAD commanders to worry that NORAD was not postured adequately to protect the United States. In the United States, NORAD is divided into three sections. On 9-11, all the hijacked aircraft were in NORAD's Northeast Air Defense sector, also known as NEEDS, which is based in Rome, New York. That morning, NEEDS could call on two alert sites, each with one pair of ready fighters, Otis Air National Guard Base in Cape Cod, Massachusetts, and Langley Air Force Base in Hampton, Virginia. Other facilities, not on, quote, alert and vote, would need time to arm the fighters and organize crews. NEEDS reported to the continental U.S. NORAD region, Connor headquarters in Panama City, Florida, which in turn reported to NORAD headquarters in Colorado Springs, Colorado. Interagency collaboration. The FAA and NORAD had developed protocols for working together in the event of hijacking. As they existed on 9-11, the protocols for the FAA to obtain military assistance from NORAD required multiple levels of notification and approval at the highest levels of government. FAA guidance to controllers on hijacked procedures assumed that the aircraft pilot would notify the controller via radio or by, quote, squawking, end quote, a transponder code of, quote, 7500, end quote, universal code for a hijack in progress. Controllers would notify their supervisors, who in turn would inform management all the way up to FAA headquarters in Washington. Headquarters had a hijack coordinator who was the director of the FAA Office of Civil Aviation Security or his or her designate. If a hijack was confirmed, procedures called for the hijack coordinator on duty to contact the Pentagon's National Military Command Center, NMCC, and to ask for a military escort aircraft to follow the flight, report anything unusual, an aid search and rescue in the event of an emergency. The NMCC would then seek approval from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to provide military assistance. If approval was given, the orders would be transmitted down NORAD's chain of command. The NMCC would keep the FAA hijack coordinator up to date and help the FAA centers coordinate directly with the military. NORAD would receive tracking information from the hijacked aircraft either from joint use radar or from the relevant FAA air traffic control facility. Every attempt would be made to have the hijacked aircraft squawk 7500 to help NORAD track it. The protocols did not contemplate an intercept. They assumed the fighter escort would be discreet, quote, vectored to a position five miles directly behind the hijacked aircraft, end quote, where it could perform its mission to monitor the aircraft's flight path. In sum, the protocols in place on 9-11 for the FAA and NORAD to respond to a hijacking presumed that the hijacked aircraft would be readily identifiable and would not attempt to disappear. There would be time to address the problem through the appropriate FAA and NORAD chains of command. And the hijacking would take the traditional form. That is, it would not be a suicide hijacking designed to convert the aircraft into a guided missile. On the morning of 9-11, the existing protocol was unsuited in every respect for what was about to happen. American Airlines Flight 11, FAA Awareness. Although the Boston Center Air Traffic Controller realized at an early stage that there was something wrong with American 11, he did not immediately interpret the plane's failure to respond as a sign that it had been hijacked. At 8-14, when the flight failed to heed his instruction to climb to 35,000 feet, the controller repeatedly tried to raise the flight. He reached out to the pilot on the emergency frequency. Though there was no response, he kept trying to contact the aircraft. At 8-21, American 11 turned off its transponder, immediately degrading the information available about the aircraft. The controller told his supervisor that he thought something was seriously wrong with the plane, although neither suspected a hijacking. The supervisor instructed the controller to follow standard procedures for handling a, quote, no radio, end quote, aircraft. The controller checked to see if American Airlines could establish communication with American 11. He became even more concerned as its route changed, moving it into another sector's airspace. Controllers immediately began to move aircraft out of its path and asked other aircraft in the vicinity to look for American 11. At 8-24, 38, the following transmission came from American 11. American 11, we have some planes, just stay quiet and you'll be okay. We are returning to the airport. The controller only heard something unintelligible. He did not hear the specific words, quote, we have some planes, end quote. The next transmission came seconds later, American 11. Nobody move, everything will be okay. If you try to make any moves, you'll endanger yourself and the airplane. Just stay quiet. The controller told us that he then knew it was a hijacking. He alerted his supervisor, who assigned another controller to assist him. He redoubled his efforts to ascertain the flight's altitude. Because the controller didn't understand the initial transmission, the manager of Boston Center instructed his quality assurance specialist to, quote, pull the tape, end quote, of the radio transmission, listen to it closely and report back. Between 8-25 and 8-32, in accordance with the FAA protocol, Boston Center managers started notifying their chain of command that American 11 had been hijacked. At 8-28, Boston Center called the command center in Herndon to advise that it believed American 11 had been hijacked and was heading toward New York Center's airspace. By this time, American 11 had taken a dramatic turn to the south. At 8-32, the command center passed word of a possible hijacking to the operation center at FAA headquarters. The duty officer replied that security personnel at headquarters had just begun discussing the apparent hijack on a conference call with the New England regional office. FAA headquarters began to follow the hijack protocol, but did not contact the NMCC to request a fighter as court. The Herndon command center immediately established a teleconference between Boston, New York, and Cleveland centers so that Boston Center could help the others understand what was happening. At 8-34, the Boston Center controller received a third transmission from American 11. Nobody move, please. We are going back to the airport. Don't try to make any stupid moves. In the succeeding minutes, controllers were attempting to ascertain the altitude of the southbound flight. Military notification and response. Boston Center did not follow the protocol in seeking military assistance through the prescribed chain of command. In addition to notifications within the FAA, Boston Center took the initiative at 8-34 to contact the military through the FAA's Cape Cod facility. The center also tried to contact a former alert site in Atlantic City, unaware it had been phased out. At 8-37-52, Boston Center reached needs. This was the first notification received by the military at any level that American 11 had been hijacked. FAA. Hi. Boston Center, TMU, Traffic Management Unit. We have a problem here. We have a hijacked aircraft headed towards New York, and we need someone to scramble some F-16s or something up there to help us out. Needs. Is this real world or exercise? FAA. No, this is not an exercise, not a test. Needs ordered to battle stations the two F-15 alert aircraft at Otis Air Force Base in Fulmouth, Massachusetts, 153 miles away from New York City. The air defense of America began with this call. At Needs, the report of the hijacking was relayed immediately to battle commander Colonel Robert Marr. After ordering the Otis fighters to battle stations, Colonel Marr phoned Major General Larry Arnold, commanding General of the 1st Air Force in NORAD's continental region. Marr sought authorization to scramble the Otis fighters. General Arnold later recalled instructing Marr to, quote, go ahead and scramble them and we'll get authorities later, end quote. General Arnold then called NORAD headquarters to report. F-15 fighters were scrambled at 846 from Otis Air Force Base. But Needs did not know where to send the alert fighter aircraft, and the officer directing the fighters pressed for more information. Quote, I don't know where I'm scrambling these guys to. I need a direction, a destination, end quote. Because the hijackers had turned off the plane's transponder, Needs personnel spent the next minutes searching their radar scopes for the primary radar return. American 11 struck the North Tower at 846. Shortly after 850, while Needs personnel were still trying to locate the flight, word reached them that a plane had hit the World Trade Center. Radar data show the Otis fighters were airborne at 853. Lacking a target, they were vectored toward military controlled airspace off the Long Island coast. To avoid New York area air traffic and uncertain about what to do, the fighters were brought down to military airspace to, quote, hold as needed, end quote. From 909 to 913, the Otis fighters stayed in this holding pattern. In summary, Needs received notice of the hijacking nine minutes before it struck the North Tower. That nine minutes notice before impact was the most the military would receive of any of the four hijackings. United Airlines Flight 175. FAA awareness. One of the last transmissions from United Airlines Flight 175 is, in retrospect, chilling. By 840, controllers at the FAA's New York Center were seeking information on American 11. At approximately 842, shortly after entering New York Center's airspace, the pilot of United 175 broke in with the following transmission. UAL 175. New York UAL 175, heavy FAA UAL 175, go ahead. UAL 175. Yeah, we figured we'd wait to go to your center. We heard a suspicious transmission on our departure out of Boston with someone. It sounded like someone keyed the mics and said, everyone stay in your seats. FAA. Oh, okay. I'll pass that along over here. Minutes later, United 175 turned Southwest without clearance from air traffic control. At 847 seconds after the impact of American 11, United 175's transponder code changed and then changed again. These changes were not noticed for several minutes, however, because the same New York Center controller was assigned to both American 11 and United 175. The controller knew American 11 was hijacked. He was focused on searching for it after the aircraft disappeared at 846. At 848, while the controller was still trying to locate American 11, a New York Center manager provided a following report on a command center teleconference about American 11. Manager, New York Center. Okay, this is New York Center. We're watching the airplane. They also had conversations with American Airlines. They told us they believe that one of their stewardesses was stabbed and that there are people in the cockpit that have control of the aircraft. And that's all the information they have right now. The New York Center controller and manager were unaware that American 11 had already crashed. At 851, the controller noticed the transponder change from United 175 and tried to contact the aircraft. There was no response. Beginning at 852, the controller made repeated attempts to reach the crew of United 175. Still no response. The controller checked his radio equipment and contacted another controller at 853, saying that, quote, we may have a hijack and, quote, and that he could not find the aircraft. Another commercial aircraft in the vicinity then radioed in with, quote, reports over the radio of a commuter plane hitting the World Trade Center, end quote. The controller spent the next several minutes handing off the other flights on his scope to other controllers and moving aircraft out of the way of the unidentified aircraft believed to be United 175 as it moved southwest and then turned northeast toward New York City. At about 855, the controller in charge notified a New York Center manager that she believed United 175 had also been hijacked. The manager tried to notify the regional managers and was told that they were discussing a hijacked aircraft, presumably American 11, and refused to be disturbed. At 858, the New York Center controller searching for United 175 told another New York controller, quote, we might have a hijack over here, two of them, end quote. Between 901 and 902, a manager from New York Center told the command center in Herndon, manager, New York Center. We have several situations going on here. It's escalating big, big time. We need to get the military involved with us. We're involved with something else. We have other aircraft that may have a similar situation going on here. The, quote, other aircraft, end quote, referred to by New York Center, was United 175. Evidence indicates that this conversation was the only notice received by either FAA headquarters or the Herndon Command Center prior to the second crash that there had been a second hijacking. While a command center was told about this, quote, other aircraft, end quote, at 901, New York Center contacted New York Terminal Approach Control and asked for help in locating United 175 terminal. I got somebody who keeps coasting, but it looks like he's going into one of the small airports down there, center. Hold on a second. I'm trying to bring him up here and get you. There he is right there. Hold on. Terminal. Got him just out of 9,500. 9,000 now. Center. Do you know who he is? Terminal. We're just, we just, we don't know who he is. We're just picking him up now. Center at 902. All right. Heads up, ma'am. Looks like another one coming in. Controllers observed the plane in a rapid descent. The radar data terminated over lower Manhattan. At 903, United 175 crashed into the South Tower. Meanwhile, a manager from Boston Center reported that they had decided what they had heard in one of the first hijacker transmissions from American 11. Boston Center. Hey, you still there? New York region. Yes, I am. Boston Center. As far as the tape, Bobby seemed to think the guy said we have planes. Now, I don't know if it was because it was the accent or if there's more than one, but I'm going to, I'm going to reconfirm that for you and I'll get back to you real quick. Okay. New England region. Appreciate it. Unidentified female boys. They have what? Boston Center. Plains as in plural. Boston Center. It sounds like we're talking to New York that there's another one aimed at the World Trade Center. New England region. There's another aircraft? Boston Center. A second one. Just hit the trade center. New England region. Okay. Yeah, we got to get, we got to alert the military real quick on this. Boston Center immediately advised the New England region that it was going to stop all departures at airports under its control. At 905, Boston Center confirmed for both the FAA command center and the New England region, the hijackers aboard American 11 said, quote, we have planes, end quote. At the same time, New York Center declared, quote, ATC zero, end quote, meaning that aircraft were not permitted to depart from, arrive at or travel through New York Center's airspace until further notice. Within minutes of the second impact, Boston Center instructed its controllers to inform all aircraft and its airspace of the events in New York and to advise aircraft to heighten cockpit security. Boston Center asked the Herndon command center to issue a similar cockpit security alert nationwide. We have found no evidence to suggest that command center acted on this request or issued any type of cockpit security alert. Military notification and response. The first indication that the NORAD air defenders had of the second hijacked aircraft, United 175, came in a phone call from New York Center to needs at 903. The notice came at about the time the plane was hitting the South Tower. By 908, the mission crew commander at needs learned of the second explosion at the World Trade Center and decided against holding the fighters in military airspace away from Manhattan. Mission crew commander needs. This is what I foresee that we probably need to do. We need to talk to FAA. We need to tell them if this stuff is going to keep on going. We need to take those fighters, put them over Manhattan. That's the best thing. That's the best play right now. So coordinate with the FAA. Tell them if there's more out there, which we don't know. Let's get them over Manhattan. At least we got some kind of play. The FAA cleared the airspace. Radar data show that at 913, when the Otis fighters were about 115 miles away from the city, the fighters exited their holding pattern and set a course direct for Manhattan. They arrived at 925 and established a combat air patrol cap over the city. Because the Otis fighters had expended a great deal of fuel and flying first to military airspace and then to New York, the battle commanders were concerned about refueling. Needs considered scrambling alert fighters from Langley Air Force Base in Virginia to New York to provide backup. The Langley fighters were placed on battle stations at 909. NORAD had no indication that any other plane had been hijacked. American Airlines Flight 77, FAA Awareness. American 77 began deviating from its flight plan at 8.54 with a slight turn toward the south. Two minutes later, it disappeared completely from radar at Indianapolis Center, which was controlling the flight. The controller tracking American 77 told us he noticed the aircraft turning to the southwest and then saw the data disappear. The controller looked for primary radar returns. He searched along the plane's projected flight path and the airspace to the southwest where it had started to turn. No primary targets appeared. He tried the radios, first calling the aircraft directly, then the airline. Again, there was nothing. At this point, the Indianapolis controller had no knowledge of the situation in New York. He did not know that other aircraft had been hijacked. He believed American 77 had experienced serious electrical or mechanical failure, or both, and was gone. Shortly after 9, Indianapolis Center started notifying other agencies that American 77 was missing and had possibly crashed. At 9.08, Indianapolis Center asked Air Force Search and Rescue at Langley Air Force Base to look for a downed aircraft. The center also contacted the West Virginia State Police and asked whether any reports of a downed aircraft had been received. At 9.09, it reported the loss of contact to the FAA Regional Center, which passed this information to FAA headquarters at 9.24. By 9.20, Indianapolis Center learned that there were other hijacked aircraft and began to doubt its initial assumption that American 77 had crashed. A discussion of this concern between the manager at Indianapolis and the command center in Herndon prompted it to notify some FAA field facilities that American 77 was lost. By 9.21, the command center, some FAA field facilities and American Airlines had started to search for American 77. They feared it had been hijacked. At 9.25, the command center advised FAA headquarters of the situation. The failure to find a primary radar return for American 77 led us to investigate this issue further. Radar reconstructions performed after 9.11 reveal that FAA radar equipment tracked the flight from the moment its transponder was turned off at 8.56. But for 8 minutes and 13 seconds between 8.56 and 9.05, this primary radar information on American 77 was not displayed to controllers at Indianapolis Center. The reasons are technical arising from the way the software processed radar information as well as from poor primary radar coverage where American 77 was flying. According to the radar reconstruction, American 77 reemerged as a primary target on Indianapolis Center radar scopes at 9.05 east of its last known position. The target remained in Indianapolis Center's airspace for another 6 minutes then crossed into the western portion of Washington Center's airspace at 9.10. As Indianapolis Center continued searching for the aircraft, two managers and the controller responsible for American 77 looked to the west and southwest along the flight's projected path, not east, where the aircraft was now heading. Managers did not instruct other controllers at Indianapolis Center to turn on their primary radar coverage to join in the search for American 77. In some, Indianapolis Center never saw Flight 77 turn around. By the time it reappeared in primary radar coverage, controllers had either stopped looking for the aircraft because they thought it had crashed or were looking toward the west. Although the command center learned Flight 77 was missing, neither it nor FAA headquarters issued an all-points bulletin to surrounding centers to search for primary radar targets. American 77 traveled undetected for 36 minutes on a course heading due east for Washington DC. By 9.25, FAA's Herndon Command Center and FAA headquarters knew two aircraft had crashed into the World Trade Center. They knew American 77 was lost. At least some FAA officials in Boston Center and the New England region knew that a hijacker on board American 11 had said, quote, we have some planes, end quote. Concerns over the safety of other aircraft began to mount. A manager at the Herndon Command Center asked FAA headquarters if they wanted to order a, quote, nationwide ground stop, end quote. While this was being discussed by executives at FAA headquarters, the command center ordered one at 9.25. The command center kept looking for American 77. At 9.21, it advised the Dulles Terminal Control Facility and Dulles urged its controllers to look for primary targets. At 9.32, they found one. Several of the Dulles controllers, quote, observed a primary radar target tracking eastbound at a high rate of speed, end quote, and notified Reagan National Airport. FAA personnel at both Reagan National and Dulles airports notified the Secret Service. The aircraft's identity or type was unknown. Reagan National controllers then vectored an unarmed National Guard C-130H cargo aircraft, which had just taken off en route to Minnesota, to identify and follow the suspicious aircraft. The C-130H pilot spotted it, identified it as a Boeing 757, attempted to follow its path. And at 9.38, seconds after impact, reported to the control tower, quote, looks like that aircraft crashed into the Pentagon, sir. Military notification in response. NORAD heard nothing about the search for American 77. Instead, the NEEDS air defenders heard renewed reports about a plane that no longer existed, American 11. At 9.21, NEEDS received a report from the FAA. FAA. Military Boston Center. It just had a report that American 11 is still in the air, and it's on its way towards, heading towards Washington. NEEDS. Okay. American 11 is still in the air. FAA. Yes. NEEDS. On its way towards Washington. FAA. That was another, it was evidently another aircraft that hit the tower. That's the latest report we have. NEEDS. Okay. FAA. I'm going to try to confirm in the ID for you, but I would assume he's somewhere over either New Jersey or somewhere further south. NEEDS. Okay. So American 11 isn't the hijack at all then, right? FAA. No. He is a hijack. NEEDS. He? American 11 is a hijack? FAA. Yes. NEEDS. And he's heading into Washington? FAA. Yes. This could be a third aircraft. The mention of a, quote, third aircraft, end quote, was not a reference to American 77. There was confusion at that moment in the FAA. Two planes had struck the World Trade Center and Boston Center had heard from FAA headquarters in Washington at American 11 was still airborne. We've been unable to identify the source of this mistaken FAA information. The NEEDS technician who took this call from the FAA immediately passed the word to the mission crew commander who reported to the NEEDS battle commander. Mission crew commander. NEEDS. Okay. American Airlines is still airborne. 11, the first guy. He's heading towards Washington. Okay. I think we need to scramble Langley right now, but I'm going to take the fighters from Otis. Try to chase this guy down if I can find him. After consulting with NEEDS command, the crew commander issued the order at 923, quote, Okay, scramble Langley, head them towards the Washington area. If they're there, then we'll run on them. These guys are smart, end quote. That order was processed and transmitted to Langley Air Force Base at 924. Radar data show the Langley fighters airborne at 930. NEEDS decided to keep the Otis fighters over New York. The heading of the Langley fighters was adjusted to send them to the Baltimore area. The mission crew commander explained to us that the purpose was to position the Langley fighters between the reported Southbound American 11 and the nation's capital. As a suggestion of the Boston Center's military liaison, NEEDS contacted the FAA's Washington Center to ask about American 11. In the course of the conversation, a Washington Center manager informed NEEDS, quote, We're looking, we also lost American 77, end quote. The time was 934. This was the first notice to the military that American 77 was missing and it had come by chance. If NEEDS had not placed that call, the NEEDS air defenders would have received no information whatsoever that the flight was even missing. Although the FAA had been searching for it, no one at FAA headquarters ever asked for military assistance with American 77. At 936, the FAA's Boston Center called NEEDS and relayed the discovery about an unidentified aircraft closing in on Washington. Quote, latest report, aircraft VFR, visual flight rules, six miles southeast of the White House, six southwest, six southwest of the White House deviating away, end quote. This startling news prompted the mission crew commander and NEEDS to take immediate control of the airspace to clear a flight path for the Langley fighters. Quote, okay, we're going to turn it, crank it up, run them to the White House, end quote. He then discovered, to his surprise, that the Langley fighters were not headed north toward the Baltimore area as instructed, but east over the ocean. Quote, I don't care how many windows you break, he said, damn it, okay, push them back, end quote. Langley fighters were heading east, not north, for three reasons. First, unlike a normal scramble order, this order did not include a distance to the target or the target's location. Second, a quote, generic, end quote, flight plan, prepared to get the aircraft airborne and out of local airspace quickly, incorrectly led the Langley fighters to believe they were ordered to fly due east, 090, for 60 miles. Third, the lead pilot and local FAA controller incorrectly assumed the flight plan instruction to go, quote, 090 for 60, end quote, superseded the original scramble order. After the 936 call to needs about the unidentified aircraft a few miles from the White House, the Langley fighters were ordered to Washington, D.C. Controllers at needs located an unknown primary radar track, but, quote, it kind of faded, end quote, over Washington. The time was 938. The Pentagon had been struck by American 77 at 937-46. The Langley fighters were about 150 miles away. Right after the Pentagon was hit, needs learned of another possible hijacked aircraft. It was an aircraft that, in fact, had not been hijacked at all. After the Second World Trade Center crash, Boston Center managers recognized that both aircraft were transcontinental 767 jet lighters that had departed Logan Airport. Remembering the, quote, we have some planes, end quote, remark, Boston Center guests that Delta-1989 might also be hijacked. Boston Center called needs at 941 and identified Delta-1989 a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas as a possible hijack. Needs warned the FAA's Cleveland Center to watch Delta-1989. The command center and FAA headquarters watched it, too. During the course of the morning, there were multiple erroneous reports of hijacked aircraft. The report of American 11 heading south was the first, Delta-1989 was the second. Needs never lost track of Delta-1989 and even ordered fighter aircraft from Ohio and Michigan to intercept it. The flight never turned off its transponder. Needs soon learned that the aircraft was not hijacked and tracked Delta-1989 as it reversed course over Toledo, headed east and landed in Cleveland. But another aircraft was heading toward Washington, an aircraft about which NORAD had heard nothing. United 93. United Airlines Flight 93. FAA Awareness. At 927, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. This was the last normal contact the FAA had with the flight. Less than a minute later, the Cleveland controller and the pilots of aircraft in the vicinity heard, quote, a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin, end quote. The controller responded, seconds later, quote, Somebody call Cleveland, end quote. This was followed by a second radio transmission with sounds of screaming. The Cleveland Center controllers began to try to identify the possible source of the transmissions and noticed that United 93 had descended some 700 feet. The controller attempted again to raise United 93 several times with no response. At 930, the controller began to pull the other flights on his frequency to determine if they had heard screaming. Several said they had. At 932, a third radio transmission came over the frequency, quote, Keep remaining sitting, we have a bomb on board, end quote. The controller understood but chose to respond, quote, Calling Cleveland Center, you're unreadable. Say again, slowly, end quote. He notified his supervisor who passed the notice up the chain of command. By 934, word of the hijacking had reached FAA headquarters. FAA headquarters had by this time established an open line of communication with the command center at Herndon and instructed it to pull all its centers about suspect aircraft. The command center executed the request and a minute later, Cleveland Center reported that, quote, United 93 may have a bomb on board, end quote. At 934, the command center relayed the information concerning United 93 to FAA headquarters. At approximately 936, Cleveland advised the command center that it was still tracking United 93 and specifically inquired whether someone had requested the military to launch fighter aircraft to intercept the aircraft. Cleveland even told the command center it was prepared to contact a nearby military base to make the request. The command center told Cleveland that FAA personnel well above them in the chain of command had to make the decision to seek military assistance and were working on the issue. Between 934 and 938, the Cleveland controller observed United 93 climbing to 40,700 feet and immediately moved several aircraft out of its way. The controller continued to try to contact United 93 and asked whether the pilot could confirm that he had been hijacked. There was no response. Then, at 939, a fourth radio transmission was heard from United 93. Ziajara. This is the captain. Would like you all to remain seated. There is a bomb on board and are going back to the airport and to have our demands unintelligible. Please remain quiet. The controller responded, quote, United 93 understand you have a bomb on board, go ahead, end quote. The flight did not respond. From 934 to 1008, a command center facility manager provided frequent updates to acting deputy administrator Monty Belger and other executives at FAA headquarters as United 93 headed toward Washington, D.C. At 941, Cleveland center lost United 93's transponder signal. The controller located on primary radar matched its position with visual sightings from other aircraft and tracked the flight as it turned east, then south. At 942, the command center learned from news reports that a plane had struck the Pentagon. The command center's national operations manager Ben Sliny ordered all FAA facilities to instruct all aircraft to land at the nearest airport. This was an unprecedented order. The aircraft control system handled it with great skill as about 4,500 commercial and general aviation aircraft soon landed without incident. At 946, the command center updated FAA headquarters that United 93 was now, quote, 29 minutes out of Washington, D.C., end quote. At 949, 13 minutes after Cleveland center had asked about getting military help, the command center suggested that someone at headquarters should decide whether to request military assistance. FAA headquarters. They're pulling Jeff away to go talk about United 93 command center. And do we want to think about scrambling aircraft? FAA headquarters. Oh, God, I don't know. Command center. That's a decision somebody's going to have to make probably in the next 10 minutes. FAA headquarters. You know, everybody just left the room. At 953, FAA headquarters informed the command center that the deputy director for air traffic services was talking to Maddie Belger about scrambling aircraft. Then the command center informed headquarters that controllers had lost track of United 93 over the Pittsburgh area. Within seconds, command center received a visual report from another aircraft and informed headquarters that the aircraft was 20 miles northwest of Johnstown. United 93 was spotted by another aircraft. And at 1001, the command center advised FAA headquarters that one of the aircraft had seen United 93, quote, waving his wings, end quote. The aircraft had witnessed the hijackers efforts to defeat the passengers counterattack. United 93 crashed in Pennsylvania at 100311, 125 miles from Washington, DC. The precise crash time has been the subject of some dispute. The 100311 impact time is supported by previous national transportation safety board analysis and by evidence from the commission staff analysis of radar. The flight data recorder, the cockpit voice recorder, infrared satellite data, and air traffic control transmissions. Five minutes later, the command center forwarded this update to headquarters. Command center. Okay, there is now on that United 93 FAA headquarters. Yes, command center. There's a report of black smoke in the last position I gave you, 15 miles south of Johnstown. FAA headquarters. From the airplane or from the ground? Command center. They're speculating it's from the aircraft. FAA headquarters. Okay. Command center. It hit the ground. That's what they're speculating. That's speculation only. The aircraft that spotted the quote black smoke, end quote, was the same unarmed Air National Guard cargo plane that had seen American 77 crash into the Pentagon 27 minutes earlier. It had resumed its flight to Minnesota and saw the smoke from the crash of United 93 less than two minutes after the plane went down. At 1017, the command center advised headquarters of its conclusion that United 93 had indeed crashed. Despite the discussions about military assistance, no one from FAA headquarters requested military assistance regarding United 93, nor did any manager at FAA headquarters pass any of the information it had about United 93 to the military. Military notification and response. Needs first received a call about United 93 from the military liaison at Cleveland Center at 1007. Unaware that the aircraft had already crashed, Cleveland passed to Needs, the aircraft's last known latitude and longitude. Needs was never able to locate United 93 on radar because it was already in the ground. At the same time, the Needs mission crew commander was dealing with the arrival of the Langley fighters over Washington, D.C., sorting out what their orders were with respect to potential targets. Shortly after 1010, and having no knowledge either that United 93 had been heading toward Washington or that it had crashed, he explicitly instructed the Langley fighters, quote, negative, negative clearance to shoot, and quote, aircraft over the nation's capital. The news of a reported bomb on board United 93 spread quickly at Needs. The air defenders searched for United 93's primary radar return and tried to locate other fighters to scramble. Needs called Washington Center to report. Needs. I also want to give you a heads up Washington. FAA, D.C. Go ahead. Needs. United 93. Have you got information on that yet? FAA. Yeah, he's down. Needs. He's down. FAA. Yes. Needs. When did he land? Because we have got confirmation. FAA. He did not land. Needs. Oh, he's down. Down? FAA. Yes. Somewhere up northeast of Camp David. Needs. Northeast of Camp David. FAA. That's the last report. They don't know exactly where. The time of notification of the crash of United 93 was 1015. The Needs air defenders never located the flight or followed it on their radar scopes. The flight had already crashed by the time they learned it was hijacked. Clarifying the record. The defense of U.S. airspace on 9-11 was not conducted in accord with preexisting training and protocols. It was improvised by civilians who had never handled a hijacked aircraft that attempted to disappear, and by a military unprepared for the transformation of commercial aircraft into weapons of mass destruction. As it turned out, the Needs air defenders had nine minutes notice on the first hijack plane, no advance notice on the second, no advance notice on the third, and no advance notice on the fourth. We do not believe that the true picture of that morning reflects discredit on the operational personnel at Needs or FAA facilities. Needs commanders and officers actively sought out information and made the best judgments they could on the basis of what they knew. Individual FAA controllers, facility managers, and command center managers thought outside the box in recommending a nationwide alert in ground-stopping local traffic, and ultimately in deciding to land all aircraft and executing that unprecedented order flawlessly. American Airlines Flight 11, AA-11, Boston to Los Angeles. 759, take off. 814, last routine radio communication, likely take over. 819, flight attendant notifies AA of hijacking. 821, transponder is turned off. 823, AA attempts to contact the cockpit. 825, Boston center aware of hijacking. 838, Boston center notifies Needs of hijacking. 846, Needs scrambles Otis fighter jets in search of AA-11. 846-40, AA-11 crashes into one WTC, North Tower. 853, Otis fighter jets airborne. 916, AA headquarters aware that flight 11 has crashed into WTC. 921, Boston center advises Needs that AA-11 is airborne heading for Washington. 924, Needs scrambles Langley fighter jets in search of AA-11. United Airlines Flight 175, UA-175, Boston to Los Angeles. 814, take off. 842, last radio communication. 842 to 846, likely take over. 847, transponder code changes. 852, flight attendant notifies UA of hijacking. 854, UA attempts to contact the cockpit. 855, New York center suspects hijacking. 903-11, flight 175 crashes into two WTC, South Tower. 915, New York center advises Needs that UA-175 was the second aircraft crashed into WTC. 920, UA headquarters aware that flight 175 had crashed into WTC. American Airlines Flight 77, AA-77, Washington DC to Los Angeles. 820, take off. 851, last routine radio communication. 851 to 854, likely take over. 854, flight 77 makes unauthorized turn to South. 856, transponder is turned off. 905, AA headquarters aware that flight 77 is hijacked. 925, Herndon command center orders nationwide ground stop. 932, Dulles Tower observes radar a fast moving aircraft later identified as AA-77. 934, FAA advises Needs that A-77 is missing. 937, 46, AA-77 crashes into the Pentagon. 1030, AA headquarters confirms Flight 77 crash into Pentagon. United Airlines Flight 93, UA 93, Newark to San Francisco. 842, take off. 924, Flight 93 receives warning from UA about possible cockpit intrusion. 927, last routine radio communication. 928, likely take over. 934, Herndon command center advises FAA headquarters that UA 93 is hijacked. 936, flight attendant notifies UA of hijacking. UA attempts to contact the cockpit. 941, transponder is turned off. 957, passenger revolt begins. 1003, 11, Flight 93 crashes in field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania. 1007, Cleveland center advises Needs of UA 93 hijacking. 1015, UA headquarters aware that Flight 93 has crashed in Pennsylvania. Washington center advises Needs that Flight 93 has crashed in Pennsylvania. More than the actual events, inaccurate government accounts of those events made it appear that the military was notified in time to respond to two of the hijackings, raising questions about the adequacy of the response. Those accounts had the effect of deflecting questions about the military's capacity to obtain timely and accurate information from its own sources. In addition, they overstated the FAA's ability to provide the military with timely and useful information that morning. In public testimony before this commission in May 2003, NORAD officials stated that at 916, Needs received hijack notification of the United 93 from the FAA. This statement was incorrect. It was no hijack to report at 916. United 93 was proceeding normally at that time. In this same public testimony, NORAD officials stated that at 924, Needs received notification of the hijacking of American 77. This statement was also incorrect. The notice Needs received at 924 was that American 11 had not hit the World Trade Center and was heading for Washington D.C. In their testimony and in other public accounts, NORAD officials also stated that the Langley fighters were scrambled to respond to the notifications about American 77, United 93, or both. These statements were incorrect as well. The fighters were scrambled because of the report that American 11 was heading south, as is clear not just from tape conversations at Needs, but also from tape conversations at FAA centers, contemporaneous logs compiled at Needs, Continental Region Headquarters, and NORAD, and other records. Yet this response to a phantom aircraft was not recounted in a single public timeline or statement issued by the FAA or Department of Defense. The inaccurate accounts created the impression that the Langley scramble was a logical response to an actual hijacked aircraft. In fact, not only was the scramble prompted by the mistaken information about American 11, but Needs never received notice that American 77 was hijacked. It was notified at 934 that American 77 was lost. Then minutes later, Needs was told that an unknown plane was six miles southwest of the White House. Only then did the already scrambled airplanes start moving directly toward Washington DC. Thus, the military did not have 14 minutes to respond to American 77, as testimony to the Commission in May 2003 suggested. It had at most one or two minutes to react to the unidentified plane approaching Washington, and the fighters were in the wrong place to be able to help. They had been responding to a report about an aircraft that did not exist. NORAD and the military have 47 minutes to respond to United 93, as would be implied by the account that it received notice of the flights hijacking at 916. At the time the military learned about the flight, it had crashed. We now turn to the role of national leadership in the events that morning. End of Chapter 1.2 Chapter 1.3 of the 9-11 Commission Report This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to find out how you can volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Bob Siebold The 9-11 Commission Report, Chapter 1.3 National Crisis Management When American 11 struck the World Trade Center at 846, no one in the White House or traveling with the President knew that it had been hijacked. While that information circulated within the FAA, we found no evidence that the hijacking was reported to any other agency in Washington before 846. Most federal agencies learned about the crash in New York from CNN. Within the FAA, the administrator, Jane Garvey, and her acting deputy, Mati Belger, had not been told of a confirmed hijacking before they learned from television that a plane had crashed. Others in the agency were aware of it, as we explained earlier in this chapter. Inside the National Military Command Center, the Deputy Director of Operations and his assistant began notifying senior Pentagon officials of the incident. At about 9 o'clock, the senior NMCC Operations Officer reached out to the FAA Operations Center for information. Although the NMCC was advised of the hijacking of American 11, the scrambling of jets was not discussed. In Sarasota, Florida, the Presidential Motorcade was arriving at the Emma E. Booker Elementary School, where President Bush was to read to a class and talk about education. White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card told us he was standing with the President outside the classroom when Senior Advisor to the President Carl Rowe first informed them that a small twin-engine plane had crashed into the World Trade Center. The President's reaction was that the incident must have been caused by pilot error. At 8.55, before entering the classroom, the President spoke to National Security Advisor Condoleesa Rice, who was at the White House. She recalled first telling the President it was a twin-engine aircraft, and then a commercial aircraft, that had struck the World Trade Center, adding, That's all we know right now, Mr. President. At the White House, Vice President Dick Cheney had just sat down for a meeting when his assistant told him to turn on his television because a plane had struck the North Tower of the World Trade Center. The Vice President was wondering how the hell could a plane hit the World Trade Center when he saw the second aircraft strike the South Tower. Elsewhere in the White House, a series of 9 o'clock meetings was about to begin. In the absence of information that the crash was anything other than an accident, the White House staff monitored the news as they went ahead with their regular schedules. The agencies conferred. When they learned a second plane had struck the World Trade Center, nearly everyone in the White House told us they immediately knew it was not an accident. The Secret Service initiated a number of security enhancements around the White House complex. The officials who issued these orders did not know that there were additional hijacked aircraft, or that one such aircraft was en route to Washington. These measures were precautionary steps taken because of the strikes in New York. The FAA and White House Teleconferences. The FAA, the White House, and the Defense Department each initiated a multi-agency teleconference before 9.30. Because none of these teleconferences, at least before 10 o'clock, included the right officials from both the FAA and Defense Department, none succeeded in meaningfully coordinating the military and FAA response to the hijackings. At about 9.20, security personnel at FAA headquarters set up a hijacking teleconference with several agencies including the Defense Department. The NMCC officer who participated told us that the call was monitored only periodically because the information was sporadic, it was of little value, and there were other important tasks. The FAA manager of the teleconference also remembered that the military participated only briefly before the Pentagon was hit. Both individuals agreed that the teleconference played no role in coordinating a response to the attacks of 9.11. Acting Deputy Administrator Belger was frustrated to learn later in the morning that the military had not been on the call. At the White House, the video teleconference was conducted from the Situation Room by Richard Clark, a special assistant to the president long involved in counter-terrorism. Logs indicate that it began at 9.25 and included the CIA, the FBI, the Departments of State Justice and Defense, the FAA, and the White House Shelter. The FAA and CIA joined at 9.40. The first topic addressed in the White House video teleconference at about 9.40 was the physical security of the president, the White House, and federal agencies. Immediately thereafter, it was reported that a plane had hit the Pentagon. We found no evidence that the video teleconference participants had any prior information that American 77 had been hijacked and was heading directly toward Washington. Indeed, it is not clear to us that the video teleconference was fully underway before 9.37 when the Pentagon was struck. Garvey, Belger, and other senior officials from FAA headquarters participated in this video teleconference at various times. We do not know who from defense participated, but we know that in the first hour none of the personnel involved in managing the crisis did. And none of the information conveyed in the White House video teleconference, at least in the first hour, was being passed to the NMCC. As one witness recalled, it was almost like there were parallel decision-making processes going on. One was a voice conference orchestrated by the NMCC, and then there was the White House video teleconference. In my mind, they were competing venues for command and control and decision-making. At 10.03, the conference received reports of more missing aircraft, two possibly three aloft, and learned of a combat air patrol over Washington. There was discussion of the need for rules of engagement. Clark reported that they were asking the President for authority to shoot down aircraft. Confirmation of that authority came at 10.25, but the commands were already being conveyed in more direct contacts with the Pentagon. The Pentagon Teleconferences Inside the National Military Command Center, the Deputy Director for Operations immediately thought the second strike was a terrorist attack. The job of the NMCC in such an emergency is to gather the relevant parties and establish the chain of command between the National Command Authority, the President and the Secretary of Defense, and those who need to carry out their orders. On the morning of September 11th, Secretary Rumsfeld was having breakfast at the Pentagon with a group of members of Congress. He then returned to his office for his daily intelligence briefing. The Secretary was informed of the second strike in New York during the briefing. He resumed the briefing while awaiting more information. After the Pentagon was struck, Secretary Rumsfeld went to the parking lot to assist with rescue efforts. Inside the NMCC, the Deputy Director for Operations called for an all-purpose significant event conference. It began at 9.29, with a brief recap. Two aircraft had struck the World Trade Center, there was a confirmed hijacking of American 11, and Otis fighters had been scrambled. The FAA was asked to provide an update, but the line was silent because the FAA had not been added to the call. A minute later, the Deputy Director stated that it had just been confirmed that American 11 was still airborne and heading toward D.C. He directed the transition to an air threat conference call. NORAD confirmed that American 11 was airborne and heading toward Washington, relaying the erroneous FAA information already mentioned. The call then ended at about 9.34. It resumed at 9.37 as an air threat conference call, which lasted more than eight hours. The President, Vice President, Secretary of Defense, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Deputy National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley all participated in this teleconference at various times, as did military personnel from the White House underground shelter and the President's military aid on Air Force One. Operators worked feverishly to include the FAA, but they had equipment problems and difficulty finding secure phone numbers. NORAD asked three times before 10.03 to confirm the presence of the FAA in the teleconference. The FAA representative, who finally joined the call at 10.17, had no familiarity with or responsibility for hijackings, no access to decision makers, and none of the information available to senior FAA officials. We found no evidence that, at this critical time, NORAD's top commanders in Florida or Cheyenne Mountain coordinated with their counterparts at FAA headquarters to improve awareness and organize a common response. Lower-level officials improvised. For example, the FAA's Boston Center bypassed the chain of command and directly contacted NEADS after the first hijacking, but the highest-level Defense Department officials relied on the NMCC's air threat conference in which the FAA did not participate for the first 48 minutes. At 9.39, the NMCC's Deputy Director for Operations, a military officer, opened the call from the Pentagon, which had just been hit. He began. An air attack against North America may be in progress. NORAD, what's the situation? NORAD said it had conflicting reports. Its latest information was of a possible hijacked aircraft taking off out of JFK and route to Washington, D.C. The NMCC reported a crash into the mall side of the Pentagon and requested that the Secretary of Defense be added to the conference. At 9.44, NORAD briefed the conference on the possible hijacking of Delta 1989. Two minutes later, staff reported that they were still trying to locate Secretary Rumsfeld and Vice Chairman Myers. The Vice Chairman joined the conference shortly before 10 o'clock. The Secretary shortly before 10.30. The Chairman was out of the country. At 9.48, a representative from the White House shelter asked if there were any indications of another hijacked aircraft. The Deputy Director for Operations mentioned the Delta flight and concluded that that would be the fourth possible hijack. At 9.49, the commander of NORAD directed all air sovereignty aircraft to battle stations, fully armed. At 9.59, an Air Force Lieutenant Colonel working in the White House military office joined the conference and stated he had just talked to Deputy National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley. The White House requested, one, the implementation of continuity of government measures, two, fighter escorts for Air Force One, and three, a fighter combat air patrol over Washington, D.C. By 10.03, when United 93 crashed in Pennsylvania, there had been no mention of its hijacking and the FAA had not yet been added to the teleconference. The President and the Vice President The President was seated in a classroom when, at 9.05, Andrew Card whispered to him, a second plane hit the second tower. America is under attack. The President told us his instinct was to project calm, not to have the country see an excited reaction at a moment of crisis. The press was standing behind the children. He saw their phones and pagers start to ring. The President felt he should project strength and calm until he could better understand what was happening. The President remained in the classroom for another five to seven minutes, while the children continued reading. He then returned to a holding room shortly before 9.15, where he was briefed by staff and saw television coverage. He next spoke to Vice President Cheney, Dr. Rice, New York Governor George Pataki, and FBI Director Robert Mueller. He decided to make a brief statement from the school before leaving for the airport. The Secret Service told us they were anxious to move the President to a safer location, but did not think it imperative for him to run out the door. Between 9.15 and 9.30, the staff was busy arranging a return to Washington, while the President consulted his senior advisors about his remarks. No one in the traveling party had any information during this time that other aircraft were hijacked or missing. Staff was in contact with the White House situation room, but as far as we could determine, no one with the President was in contact with the Pentagon. The focus was on the President's statement to the nation. The only decision made during this time was to return to Washington. The President's motorcade departed at 9.35 and arrived at the airport between 9.42 and 9.45. During the ride, the President learned about the attack on the Pentagon. He boarded the aircraft, asked the Secret Service about the safety of his family, and called the Vice President. According to notes of the call, at about 9.45, the President told the Vice President, Sounds like we have a minor war going on here. I heard about the Pentagon. We're at war. Somebody's going to pay. About this time, Card, the lead Secret Service agent, the President's military aide and the pilot were conferring on a possible destination for Air Force One. The Secret Service agent felt strongly that the situation in Washington was too unstable for the President to return there, and Card agreed. The President strongly wanted to return to Washington and only grudgingly agreed to go elsewhere. The issue was still undecided when the President conferred with the Vice President at about the time Air Force One was taking off. The Vice President recalled urging the President not to return to Washington. Air Force One departed about 9.54 without any fixed destination. The objective was to get up in the air as fast and as high as possible, and then decide where to go. At 9.33, the Tower Supervisor at Reagan National Airport picked up a hotline to the Secret Service and told the Service's operation center that an aircraft is coming at you and not talking with us. This was the first specific report to the Secret Service of a direct threat to the White House. No move was made to evacuate the Vice President at this time. As the officer who took the call explained, I was about to push the alert button when the Tower advised that the aircraft was turning south and approaching Reagan National Airport. American 77 began turning south, away from the White House, at 9.34. It continued heading south for roughly a minute before turning west and beginning to circle back. This news prompted the Secret Service to order the immediate evacuation of the Vice President just before 9.36. Agents propelled him out of his chair and told him he had to get to the bunker. The Vice President entered the underground tunnel leading to Shelter at 9.37. Once inside, Vice President Cheney and the agents paused in an area of the tunnel that had a secure phone, a bench, and television. The Vice President asked to speak to the President, but it took time for the call to be connected. He learned in the tunnel that the Pentagon had been hit, and he saw television coverage of smoke coming from the building. The Secret Service logged Mrs. Cheney's arrival at the White House at 9.52, and she joined her husband in the tunnel. According to contemporaneous notes, at 9.55 the Vice President was still on the phone with the President, advising that three planes were missing and one had hit the Pentagon. We believe this is the same call in which the Vice President urged the President not to return to Washington. After the call ended, Mrs. Cheney and the Vice President moved from the tunnel to the Shelter Conference Room. United 93 and the Shootdown Order On the morning of 9.11, the President and Vice President stayed in contact, not by an open line of communication, but through a series of calls. The President told us he was frustrated with the poor communications that morning. He could not reach key officials, including Secretary Rumsfeld, for a period of time. The line to the White House Shelter Conference Room and the Vice President kept cutting off. The Vice President remembered placing a call to the President just after entering the Shelter Conference Room. There is conflicting evidence about when the Vice President arrived in the Shelter Conference Room. We have concluded from the available evidence that the Vice President arrived in the room shortly before 10 o'clock, perhaps at 9.58. The Vice President recalled being told just after his arrival that the Air Force was trying to establish a combat air patrol over Washington. The Vice President stated that he called the President to discuss the rules of engagement for the CAP. He recalled feeling that it did no good to establish the CAP unless the pilots had instructions on whether they were authorized to shoot if the plane would not divert. He said the President signed off on that concept. The President said he remembered such a conversation and that it reminded him of when he had been an interceptor pilot. The President emphasized to us that he had authorized the shoot-down of hijacked aircraft. The Vice President's military aide told us he believed the Vice President spoke to the President just after entering the conference room, but he did not hear what they said. Rice, who entered the room shortly after the Vice President and sat next to him, remembered hearing him inform the President, Sir, the CAPs are up. Sir, they're going to want to know what to do. Then she recalled hearing him say, Yes, sir. She believed this conversation occurred a few minutes, perhaps five, after they entered the conference room. We believe this call would have taken place sometime before 10.10 to 10.15. Among the sources that reflect other important events of that morning, there is no documentary evidence for this call, but the relevant sources are incomplete. Others nearby who were taking notes, such as the Vice President's Chief of Staff, Scooter Libby, who sat next to him and Mrs. Cheney, did not note a call between the President and Vice President immediately after the Vice President entered the conference room. At 10.02, the communicators in the shelter began receiving reports from the Secret Service of an inbound aircraft, presumably hijacked, heading toward Washington. That aircraft was United 93. The Secret Service was getting this information directly from the FAA. The FAA may have been tracking the progress of United 93 on a display that showed its projected path to Washington, not its actual radar return. Thus, the Secret Service was relying on projections and was not aware the plane was already down in Pennsylvania. At some time between 10.10 and 10.15, a military aide told the Vice President and others that the aircraft was 80 miles out. Vice President Cheney was asked for authority to engage the aircraft. His reaction was described by Scooter Libby as quick and decisive. In about the time it takes a batter to decide to swing. The Vice President authorized fighter aircraft to engage the inbound plane. He told us he based this authorization on his earlier conversation with the President. The military aide returned a few minutes later, probably between 10.12 and 10.18, and said the aircraft was 60 miles out. He again asked for authorization to engage. The Vice President again said yes. At the conference room table was White House Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua Bolton. Bolton watched the exchanges and, after what he called a quiet moment, suggested that the Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order. Bolton told us he wanted to make sure the President was told that the Vice President had executed the order. He said he had not heard any prior discussion on the subject with the President. The Vice President was logged calling the President at 10.18 for a two-minute conversation that obtained the confirmation. On Air Force One, the President's Press Secretary was taking notes. Ari Fleischer recorded that at 10.20 the President told him that he had authorized a shoot-down of aircraft if necessary. Minutes went by and word arrived of an aircraft down in Pennsylvania. Those in the shelter wondered if the aircraft had been shot down pursuant to this authorization. At approximately 10.30 the shelter started receiving reports of another hijacked plane, this time only 5 to 10 miles out. Believing they had only a minute or two, the Vice President again communicated the authorization to engage or take out the aircraft. At 10.33 Hadley told the Air Threat Conference call, I need to get word to Dick Myers that our reports are there is an inbound aircraft flying low 5 miles out. The Vice President's guidance was, we need to take them out. Once again, there was no immediate information about the fate of the inbound aircraft. In the apt description of one witness, it drops below the radar screen and it's just continually hovering in your imagination. You don't know where it is or what happens to it. Eventually, the shelter received word that the alleged hijacker 5 miles away had been a Medevac helicopter. Transmission of the authorization from the White House to the pilots. The NMCC learned of United 93's hijacking at about 10.03. At this time, the FAA had no contact with the military at the level of national command. The NMCC learned about United 93 from the White House. It in turn was informed by the Secret Services Contacts with the FAA. NORAD had no information either. At 10.07, its representative on the Air Threat Conference call stated that NORAD had no indication of a hijack heading to DC at this time. Repeatedly between 10.14 and 10.19, a Lieutenant Colonel at the White House relayed to the NMCC that the Vice President had confirmed fighters were cleared to engage inbound aircraft if they could verify that the aircraft was hijacked. The commander of NORAD, General Ralph Eberhardt, was en route to the NORAD Operations Center in Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado when the shoot-down order was communicated on the Air Threat Conference call. He told us that by the time he arrived, the order had already been passed down NORAD's chain of command. It is not clear how the shoot-down order was communicated within NORAD, but we know that at 10.31, General Larry Arnold instructed his staff to broadcast the following over a NORAD instant messaging system. 10.31, Vice President has cleared to us to intercept tracks of interest and shoot them down if they do not respond per General Arnold. In upstate New York, NEADS personnel first learned of the shoot-down order from this message. Floor leadership. You need to read this. The region commander has declared that we can shoot-down aircraft that do not respond to our direction. Copy that? Controllers. Copy that, sir. Floor leadership. So if you're trying to divert somebody and you won't divert, controllers. Director of Operations is saying no. Floor leadership. No? It came over the chat. You got a conflict on that direction? Controllers. Right now, no, but floor leadership. Okay? Okay, you read that from the Vice President, right? Vice President has cleared. Vice President has cleared us to intercept traffic and shoot them down if they do not respond per General Arnold. In interviews with us, NEADS personnel expressed considerable confusion over the nature and effect of the order. The NEADS commander told us he did not pass along the order because he was unaware of its ramifications. Both the mission commander and the senior weapons director indicated they did not pass the order to the fighters circling Washington and New York because they were unsure how the pilots would or should proceed with this guidance. In short, while leaders in Washington believed that the fighters above them had been instructed to take out hostile aircraft, the only orders actually conveyed to the pilots were to ID, type and tail. In most cases, the chain of command authorizing the use of force runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary to the combatant commander. The President apparently spoke to Secretary Rumsfeld for the first time that morning shortly after 10 o'clock. No one can recall the content of this conversation, but it was a brief call in which the subject of shoot-down authority was not discussed. At 10.39, the Vice President updated the Secretary on the Air Threat Conference. Vice President. There's been at least three instances here where we've had reports of aircraft approaching Washington. A couple were confirmed hijacked. And pursuant to the President's instructions, I gave authorization for them to be taken out. Hello? Secretary of Defense. Yes, I understand. Who did you give that direction to? Vice President. It was passed from here through the operation center at the White House from the shelter. Secretary of Defense. Okay, let me ask the question here. Has that directive been transmitted to the aircraft? Vice President. Yes, it has. Secretary of Defense. So we've got a couple of aircraft up there that have those instructions at this present time? Vice President. That's my understanding they've already taken a couple of aircraft out. Secretary of Defense. We can't confirm that. We're told that one aircraft is down, but we do not have a pilot report that did it. As this exchange shows, Secretary Rumsfeld was not in the NMCC when the shoot-down order was first conveyed. He went from the parking lot to his office, where he spoke to the President, then to the Executive Support Center, where he participated in the White House teleconference. He moved to the NMCC shortly before 1030 in order to join Vice Chairman Myers. Secretary Rumsfeld told us he was just gaining situational awareness when he spoke with the Vice President at 1039. His primary concern was ensuring that the pilots had a clear understanding of their rules of engagement. The Vice President was mistaken in his belief that shoot-down authorization had been passed to the pilots flying at NORAD's direction. By 1045 there was, however, another set of fighters circling Washington that had entirely different rules of engagement. These fighters, part of the 113th Wing of the District of Columbia Air National Guard, launched out of Andrews Air Force Base in Maryland in response to information passed to them by the Secret Service. The first of the Andrews fighters was airborne at 1038. General David Worley, the commander of the 113th Wing, reached out to the Secret Service after hearing second-hand reports that it wanted fighters airborne. A Secret Service agent had a phone in each ear, one connected to Worley and the other to a fellow agent at the White House, relaying instructions that the White House agent said he was getting from the Vice President. The guidance for Worley was to send up the aircraft with orders to protect the White House and take out any aircraft that threatened the Capitol. General Worley translated this in military terms to flying weapons free, that is, the decision to shoot rests in the cockpit, or in this case, in the cockpit of the lead pilot. He passed these instructions to the pilots that launched at 1042 and afterward. Thus, while the fighter pilots under NORAD direction who had scrambled out of Langley never received any type of engagement order, the Andrews pilots were operating weapons free, a permissive rule of engagement. The President and the Vice President indicated to us they had not been aware that fighters had been scrambled out of Andrews at the request of the Secret Service and outside the military chain of command. There is no evidence that NORAD headquarters or military officials in the NMCC knew during the morning of September 11th that the Andrews planes were airborne and operating under different rules of engagement. What if? NORAD officials have maintained consistently that had the passengers not caused United 93 to crash, the military would have prevented it from reaching Washington DC. That conclusion is based on a version of events that we now know is incorrect. The Langley fighters were not scrambled in response to United 93. NORAD did not have 47 minutes to intercept the flight. NORAD did not even know the plane was hijacked until after it had crashed. It is appropriate therefore to reconsider whether United 93 would have been intercepted. Had it not crashed in Pennsylvania at 10.03, we estimate that United 93 could not have reached Washington any earlier than 10.13 and probably would have arrived before 10.23. There was only one set of fighters circling Washington during that time frame, the Langley F-16s. They were armed and under NORAD's control. After any ADS learned of the hijacking at 10.07, NORAD would have had from 6 to 16 minutes to locate the flight, receive authorization to shoot it down and communicate the order to the pilots who in the same span would have had to authenticate the order, intercept the flight and execute the order. At that point in time, the Langley pilots did not know the threat they were facing, did not know where United 93 was located and did not have shoot-down authorization. First, the Langley pilots were never briefed about the reason they were scrambled. As the lead pilot explained, I reverted to the Russian threat. I'm thinking cruise missile threat from the sea. You know, you look down and see the Pentagon burning and I thought the bastard snuck one by us. You couldn't see any airplanes and no one told us anything. The pilots knew their mission was to divert aircraft but did not know that the threat came from hijacked airliners. Second, any ADS did not have accurate information on the location of United 93. Presumably, FAA would have provided such information but we do not know how long that would have taken nor how long it would have taken any ADS to locate the target. Third, any ADS needed orders to pass to the pilots. At 10-10, the pilots over Washington were emphatically told negative clearance to shoot. Shoot-down authority was first communicated to any ADS at 10-31. It is possible that NORAD commanders would have ordered a shoot-down in the absence of the authorization communicated by the vice president. But given the gravity of the decision to shoot down a commercial airliner and NORAD's caution that a mistake not be made, we view this possibility as unlikely. NORAD officials have maintained that they would have intercepted and shot down United 93. We are not so sure. We are sure that the nation owes a debt to the passengers of United 93. Their actions saved the lives of countless others and may have saved either the Capitol or the White House from destruction. The details of what happened on the morning of September 11th are complex, but they play out a simple theme. NORAD and the FAA were unprepared for the type of attacks launched against the United States on September 11, 2001. They struggled under difficult circumstances to improvise a homeland defense against an unprecedented challenge they had never before encountered and had never trained to meet. At 10-02 that morning, an assistant to the mission crew commander at NORAD's northeast air defense sector in Rome, New York, was working with his colleagues on the floor of the command center. In a brief moment of reflection, he was recorded remarking that, this is a new type of war. He was and is right, but the conflict did not begin on 9-11. It had been publicly declared years earlier, most notably in a declaration faxed early in 1998 to an Arabic-language newspaper in London. Few Americans had noticed it. The fax had been sent from thousands of miles away by the followers of a Saudi exile gathered in one of the most remote and impoverished countries on earth. End of Chapter 1.3, Recording by Bob Siebold Chapter 2.1 of the 9-11 Commission Report This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. This reading by Carl Manchester 2008 The 9-11 Commission Report Chapter 2. The Foundation of the New Terrorism 2.1 A Declaration of War Note. Islamic names often do not follow the western practice of the consistent use of sur names. Given the variety of names we mention, we choose to refer to individuals by the last word in the names by which they are known. Now Afal has me as has me, for instance, emitting the article al that would be part of their name in their own societies. We generally make an exception for the more familiar English usage of bin as part of a last name, as in bin Laden. Further, there is no universally accepted way to transliterate Arabic words and names into English. We have relied on a mix of common sense, the sound of the name in Arabic, and common usage in source materials, the press or government documents. When we quote from a source document, we use its transliteration. For example, al QIDA instead of al QAEDA. End note. In February 1998, the 40-year-old Saudi exile Usama bin Laden and a fugitive Egyptian physician, Ayman al-Zawahiri, arranged from their Afghan headquarters for an Arabic newspaper in London to publish what they termed a fatwa, issued in the name of a World Islamic Front. A fatwa is normally an interpretation of Islamic law by a respected Islamic authority, but neither bin Laden, Zawahiri, nor the three others who signed this statement were scholars of Islamic law. Claiming that America had declared war against God and his messenger, they called for the murders of any American anywhere on earth as the quote, individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it. End quote. Footnote. Text of World Islamic Front's statement urging jihad against Jews and Crusaders. Al Quds al-Arabi, February the 23rd, 1998, translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, which was published for a large Arab world audience and signed by Usama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, emir of the Egyptian Islamic jihad, Abu Yassir Rifi Ahmed Taha, leader of the Egyptian Islamic group, Mir Hamza, secretary of the Jamiat al-Ulama i Pakistan, and Fazl Rahman, head of the jihad movement in Bangladesh. End footnote. Three months later, when interviewed in Afghanistan by ABC TV, bin Laden enlarged on these themes. Footnote. Hunting bin Laden, PBS Frontline, broadcast May 1998. End footnote. He claimed it was more important for Muslims to kill Americans than to kill other infidels. It is far better for anyone to kill a single American soldier than to squander his efforts on other activities. He said. Asked whether he approved of terrorism and of attacks on civilians, he replied, We believe that the worst thieves in the world today and the worst terrorists are the Americans. Nothing could stop you except perhaps retaliation in kind. We do not have to differentiate between military or civilian. As far as we are concerned, they are all targets. Though novel for its open endorsement of indiscriminate killing, bin Laden's 1998 declaration was only the latest in the long series of his public and private calls since 1992 that singled out the United States for attack. In August 1996, bin Laden had issued his own self-styled fatwa, calling on Muslims to drive American soldiers out of Saudi Arabia. The long, disjointed document condemned the Saudi monarchy for allowing the presence of an army of infidels in a land with the sites most sacred to Islam and celebrated recent suicide bombings of American military facilities in the kingdom. It praised the 1983 suicide bombing in Beirut that killed 241 US Marines, the 1992 bombing in Aden, and especially the 1993 firefight in Somalia after which the United States, quote, left the area carrying disappointment, humiliation, defeat, and you're dead with you. End quote. Footnote. Usama bin Laden, declaration of war against the Americans occupying the land of the two holy places, August the 23rd, 1996. Translated. End footnote. Bin Laden said in his ABC interview that he and his followers had been preparing in Somalia for another long struggle, like that against the Soviets in Afghanistan, but quote, the United States rushed out of Somalia in shame and disgrace, end quote. Citing the Soviet army's withdrawal from Afghanistan as proof that a ragged army of dedicated Muslims could overcome a superpower, he told the interviewer, quote, we are certain that we shall, with the grace of Allah, prevail over the Americans, end quote. He went on to warn that, quote, if the present injustice continues, it will inevitably move the battle to American soil, end quote. Footnote. Hunting bin Laden, PBS Frontline, broadcast May 1998. End footnote. Plans to attack the United States were developed with unwavering single-mindedness throughout the 1990s. Bin Laden saw himself as called, quote, to follow in the footsteps of the messenger and to communicate his message to all nations, end quote. Footnote. Hunting bin Laden, PBS Frontline, broadcast May 1998. End footnote. And to serve as the rallying point and organiser of a new kind of war to destroy America and bring the world to Islam. End of chapter 2.1.