 to talk to you today and hear from you because I only want to talk for a little bit and then I want to hear from you because what you find fascinating, what you find interesting I find fascinating. But I have learned over a period of time that when you talk to an audience it's important to establish your bona fides. Is that right Barry? Right? And so I just want you to know for a fact, I am a shoe. Alright? You can find it on YouTube. You can find it on YouTube. I actually wear it, but it makes me walk with a hitch. This piece of wood on the bottom is really problematic. But I do want to talk to you today and I want to talk to you about the Optimized Fleet Response Plant. Now people are going, hey that's the FRP. How many times have we done the FRP? It's about the fourth time I've done the FRP. So I haven't gotten it right. So I'm now trying it on the fourth time. And this is what we want to talk to you. And it's important we talk to you because we're rolling it out formally for the first time to understand what this optimized FRP and what it is not. This slide is one of my favorite pictures I've seen in a long time. It's the Bush Strike Group. It wasn't very good weather out there. But what I like about this, there's a LA class and a Virginia class. You just can't see it in there. And there's a P8 that the weather's so bad. But that's what makes our Navy the best Navy in the world is the combination of that capability that's out there. And it's great to be able to hear. And I wish you could have gone out there and seen that. We've done so much with our advanced phase. Let's take the slide first. Of course I have to talk about the readiness kill chain. I want to bring you up to speed. We rolled the readiness kill chain out here a year ago at SNA. And I want to talk to you a little bit about the differences. I'm sure everybody understands the readiness kill chain, has a tattooed on their chest. I know that the Sea Lord does. But I want to talk to you, it has evolved over the last year. And I want to talk to you about how we changed it. The first change that we made on the readiness kill chain is we moved the ends all the way over here to the deployability and the sustainability phase. If there's one thing that's really important about the kill chain, it's all about means, ways and ends. And it's aligning the whole Navy to the same end state, to the same set of ends, which is the CNO sailing directions, whore fighting forward ready. And it's our deployability and our sustainability. Everything we do is to get things on point, to get them deployed and use them in a sustained so they can do the nation's bidding. The next thing is, so everything else now in the ways piece is all aligned up over here. So all the elements of the FRP and everything starting back at resources and policy coming out here is all part of the ways. The next thing we did is we've added a bunch of our means. If you look in there, everybody's familiar with the Pesto Pillar, the stuff that you need in order to produce readiness. We have added to it because we learned that there are a lot more means than just the Pesto Pillars. First is our networks. We can't communicate. We can't plan a party without our networks, right? So that tells you how important our networks are. The networks are part of it. Our installations. Naval installations command are absolutely critical because they not only sustain our families and our sailors, they have the fields, the airfields, the ports, the piers. We can't do our job without installations. And over the past budget years, we were trying to take money out of our budget, what little we had to fill those gaps in that Naval installations command as they were taking, we think, too much risk and it was affecting our ability to produce readiness. Yeah, is that Bill French out there or somebody from? Yeah, I did get a Christmas card from him. I tell you, that was quite a shock. Anyway, but the community, the community is a part of the means. We come from the community. We are the school teachers. We are the Little League coaches. We are children go to schools. The community is a key part. They take care of our families while we're on deployment and reaching out to our community and telling them how important it is is absolutely critical. Industry, how many people in industry raise your hand here. You are a part of our means. You know, we cannot you are you are the second great secret behind how effective soldiers, sailors, airmen's, marine and Coast Guardsmen are is because you all give us terrific product. And then we have the very best of the youth of America. We give them the necessary training, which is our which is our strategic advantages, our training that we're able to go forward. So you are a mean on how we do business. And finally, we added our elected leadership on there. And why did we do that? They're the bankers. And so, you know, we got to remember that most of our elected leadership have never been in the military. So it's our job to educate them, not to wank, not to, not to do it, but to educate them on our needs, what we do, and why they're so important to us. And so all of that are part of the means. The last thing is the weapon system. You saw two key pieces of the weapon system on the previous slide. The weapon system isn't your early Burke, it isn't your F 18. It isn't your joint strike fighter. It's the compilation of all the things that you see over there. It's the ships, it's the airplanes, it's the submarines, it's our C four ISR on our cyber, it's Navy expeditionary combat command. And it is our operational and tactical headquarters. It's the compilation of those capabilities and the training of those capabilities that makes our weapon system make our Navy effective. None of none of our Navy can do any of that without each other. Okay. And so educating people, especially our force, it's great that we're raised in tribes, but you are a part of a larger tribes United States Navy. We were all naval officers before we were naval aviators or surface warriors, embrace that fundamental fact of life. I want to talk about operational and tactical headquarters. Some people call those staffs, but we in the Navy hate staffs. We really do. We think staffs are bad. But it's but we but the operational and tactical headquarters operational starting at the naval, naval component. Okay, our numbered fleet commanders and pack fleet all the way down to our all the way down to our unit for our strike group staffs, our composite warfare commanders and their staffs. They're the operational and tactical headquarters because it doesn't matter how good the individual ship or airplane it is. It's those staffs that do the planning, execution and assessment that put the plan together that take that weapon system and make sure that the stuff and the sailors can do their nation's bidding. Reggae skill chains really important. We've learned a lot this past year, most of it, looking at areas where we've had barriers and the brakes in the kill chain and and how what barriers we need to knock down. No one has embraced the kill chain harder in the Navy than the surface warfare community and see Lord thank you very much for that. It's really going after and we need to go after right now, though we're still looking too much as we have a problem. We look at what are the barriers we look at the root cause. We look at the horizontal and vertical communication required all the way back on where an issue may start. We need to start using the kill chain in predictive fashion. Where will those barriers be if we don't go close those close those next down? Okay, slight please. I also talked a lot about the work that that the surface warfare community has put in place to make themselves better. And this is the progress that's occurred over the last year. Incredible effort. Once again, everything they do taking the kill chain analysis for every single the top every single one of your war fighting platforms. Where are the barriers? What are the common barriers? And we're going after them in a big way to try and fix them. None of them can come quick. All the low hanging fruit. We've done that. This is this is going to take a lot of hard work over many years to get us where we need to be. You see the increased enlisted enlisted leadership. We're returning put put in sailors at the right place at the right time on the waterfront into the school houses into our intermediate maintenance efforts. We're trying to huge improvement to in serve and aligning our inspection process the FRP more on that later. The class maintenance plan the surf the surf map unbelievable effort. You could you just have to be on a ship that's gone through that particular cycle and see the improvement and you can see it the quantitative improvements through the in serve inspections. And then a war fighting focus putting WTIs on your ships training WTIs the the school house that the the the the the the governance structure that develops sailors surface warriors sailors and officers in the future it's going to be unbelievable. And then integrated life fire and we'll show you some of that report and the successful introduction of LCS on its first deployment as we replace all of our small craft because we've had a high low mix our entire Navy and LCS is going to do great things for us. All right that's that's what we want to talk about. But now let's move on. I want to talk to you about optimized FRP. But first we have to give you the prototypical slide that has the CNO sailing directions. It's really important for you junior officers out there. This is this is but snorkeling that works. Okay. I mean look. All right. I mean I don't put up a slide that I don't put this up there. But I really like it because it's about today's Navy's and investments in today's Navy's to make sure that tomorrow's Navy's can fight and win 65 to 70% of today's Navy of the Navy of 2025 whether it floats or flies we already own. So we need to make investments today in today's readiness or investments and modernization in today's Navy is going to make sure that that Navy can fight and win in 2025. Now we're going to operationalize this is his commanders intent. You know you get two things right. You get commanders intent and you get a clean chain of command. Most things will work out for it will work out. Okay. As far as I know that this is the best commanders intent I've ever received that simple I understand it and we're going to go out to it. We operationalize that through the fleet response plan and what we're going to call it what we call now the optimized fleet response plan and we do that using the kill readiness kill chain process. You can see in his position report of 2013 on page three he talked about we developed the optimized fleet response plan when I read it I said boy I wonder what that is. But no really we worked pretty hard on it for a long time and now we're going to talk to you about the optimized fleet response plan. Very pay attention. This is really important next slide please. Are there any questions. No. Okay next slide. You know the first thing you need to do when you want to look at look at something is analyze and agree on what the problem is you're trying to fix. So in every one of my briefs everybody has to come to me with what's the problem we're trying to fix. All right. Are we trying to do change for change's sake or are we trying to fix and we all have to agree on what the problem statement is. And we tried to capture of problems and how we produce readiness and the fleet response plan. It's not necessarily that what's the free fleet response plan is just a name that we use today. We used to call it the inter deployment training cycle. We used to call it 20 the turn around training plan. What else did we used to call. I mean it's been a ton of names today we call it the fleet response plan and it is the force generation model. The radius force generation model for the United States Navy. The Marine Corps has one that looks just like it. It's the BCT. BCT force generation model. It's how we produce readiness. And what's happened here over time is that we've lost the single biggest problem that I see out there is that we've lost predictability in the way we generate readiness. And it's cost predictability for our sailors. It's lost predictability for our families. Our industrial base doesn't have the predictability it needs that he'd give us the best product for the best cost. For the least cost. And for those of us that are in the production of readiness we've lost that predictability. And I used to be a consumer of readiness. I'm here to tell you it was a lot more fun to be a consumer. But or the product to be honest. But for both the producers and the consumers of readiness they we've locked our ability to give them that predictability. So the one thing we want to put in here is that we want to put predictability back into our force generation model. The next thing the length. The length has grown over time. It's always going to grow over time. Given the complexity of our of our combatants that we have out there today. But between the maintenance and training on our ability to generate an acceptable ASO with a good purse tempo for our sailors is lacking. Okay. It's got a misaligned chain of command predominantly because our the units of the weapon system the elements of the weapon system all are on different f rp lengths. Okay. So if you try and schedule to align people to the same focus area it doesn't work because they haven't been on the same force generate the weapon system. Or the element of the weapon system that that work up and train together. Are not all on the same f rp cycle. Lastly largest readiness to greater that we have out there is manning. Okay. Doesn't matter how good the stuff is if the people aren't there and they're not properly trained. Okay. And not only do they have to be on the ship. Or in the squadron they have to be there at the right time. If they show up after the training occurred just before deployment it's not. It's not going to work and that's where we are today. Second. The next one is the maintenance and modernization. I'll tell you we're not executing on time on budget we're not getting them in on time we're not getting them out on time this the planning effort is not a synchronized nearly as much as well as it should be. And we're going to have to go out there and fix that. The next one is the speck the spares. If I don't have the spares on the shelves if I have an order two years ago or three years ago in many cases five years ago they're not going to be there. So we got to get the spares right. The inspection process is completely unconstrained. And at the operational tactical headquarters there is no standardized. Academic synthetic and live training at the operational tactical it is by happenstance and is not at the discipline that we and in this time and time and place in the world that we know we have the ability to put in. So that's the problem statement that we're trying to fix is everybody agree with this problem statement. Anybody want to take issue with it glad free shot at a four star if you don't. Is there anybody who wants to add anything to it. I could add another two or three pages but we try and capture it in that. Okay. So now that we all agreed on the problem let's go see how we're going to go out and fix it. Slide please. What are the potential drivers to the readiness production. Now we're starting to optimize the F. R. P. with the carrier strike group. Now why are we doing that. Because if we get the carriers the air wings. And all the squadrons and all of the crude is that support that. That's eighty five percent of our Navy. So we put the right stuff in place. We're going to be OK. But up an upper left hand self the upper left hand shelf is the traditional. Divo definition of an F. R. P. cycle that's the way it should look we're down in maintenance we work up and we go on deployment and readiness declines as we go down there. That's theory. That's not reality. But that's what we try to achieve. But if you look there's different drivers to this and if you look on the upper right hand side it's the Truman strike group where because of budget. We trained her. And then we didn't deploy her. And we kept her ready for deployment and then we pushed her out to pull out the door and she's right about right here. She didn't fit within the traditional cycle but we invested in her in the readiness. They were actually two days away from deployment. And we delayed them because we made a secretary made a decision because of sequestration. On the lower left hand side is another one it's a Nimitz one and this cost driver was maintenance and schedule problems. This was supposed to be the cycle. She's working up but then she had a reactor cooling pump. Yeah reactor cooling pump which very I guess that's bad right. I don't know it's just I don't understand it's just boiling water as far as I know. But the I guess not boiling water right. Yeah yeah anyway so we had to delay her and then we pushed pushed Nimitz out and then we put her out the door and then right about here what happened. She's supposed to be coming home her and her crew days are supposed to be coming home. Syria flared up to a point where we had the crisis and we kept them on deployment we surged them. They're the crew days and the carrier and the air wing and kept them on deployment and they just got back. The other one is the Ike because of this Ike was on deployment and then because of this reactor cooler pump we brought her back renonskitted her for Christmas. I got a ton of thank you notes and then we pushed her out after Christmas for another four month or which is the perfect deployment like as far as I'm concerned four months all tax free by the way. And I didn't get a single thank you note on that one from all the thank you notes for but that's a function. Those are all cost drivers where where the where the theory of your of our readiness generation machine had to be adapted because of different real world events in the case of Nimitz's extension maintenance problems cost drivers all of them. So our FRP cycle is not as adaptable as it needs to be. Slight please. OK. So what is the optimized FRP. It really came about starting back in November two November's ago. Deputy Secretary of Defense Carter said hey how what would it take to get four carrier strike groups out and about. The COCOMs don't really want surge. They want presence. We've been trying to trip how many years have we been trying to tell this story. Right. They want presence. Right. They want to be able to respond. They're phase zero phase one and responds to crisis. So how do we get for how do we give up surge and keep for out and about. And that was called the enhanced carrier plan. And I think between Omnab and FFC we did the best. That was that. That was a great staffing effort and came up with we think the best cost to do that. It was based on a 36 month FRP cycle where that you were going to do your maintenance train go on deployment for seven months have a one point out 12 come home for seven months and go back out for another seven month deployment. OK. So for the sunk cost of maintenance and training get two pumps. OK. Two deployments. And that had about a forty eight percent home tempo your home about forty eight percent of the time. We were generating a lot of a sub oh we didn't quite get to four point oh but we had a lot of a sub oh a lot of forward presence but trip how much stuff were we using up. Yeah we're using a lot of stuff we're using twice the number of deployments and our ships and our squadrons and our airplanes and it was a pretty healthy build it came with it and then sequestration happened and we didn't get another card or letter asking about E. C. P. I don't know why. OK. But from what we learned from that effort is where we have developed the idea of optimized F. R. P. it is a thirty six month F. R. P. OK. And it's got a single eight month deployment in it and we're starting with the Harry S. Truman strike group when she goes into her maintenance availability when she gets back from this deployment and it's for her entire strike group. It has for the sunk cost of maintenance and training acceptable as a bow with an acceptable purse tempo or really good purse tempo. OK. With a clean chain of command fixed strike group composition the band is put together at the beginning of the maintenance phase we already know who's in it ships and squadrons plus independent employers and BMD ships are all going to be aligned in the Truman strike group. It's underneath a single chain of command. OK. For that entire three three year period it's got a stable maintenance plan that is in work that the planning is ongoing. We're going after quality of service quality of work enhanced quality of life for our sailors. Let me spend some time there. You know I've been a consumer most of my life especially the last twelve years and I never heard about when I'm out there on point when I was out there in Bahrain people were never complaining about deployment length. They had long deployment lengths. They didn't have very good port visits. It wasn't glamour spots but they were doing what they joined the Navy to do and they were happy about it and they were compensated pretty well between IDP and tax free. OK. I come back here. I'm working with squadrons and ships that are going through the work up cycle and I don't hear about deployment length that's not what I'm hearing. What they're concerned about is the quality of life left of deployment. It's the maintenance. It's not having the it's not having a man power. The maintenance not done right. The training not done right. So with this we're trying to go after that reduce the stress improve the quality of life quality of service left at deployment. OK. We are embedding into the syllabus EMMW getting back to doing what we used to do what we grew up with and NIFCA Naval Integrated Fire Control from the air counter air from the air from the sea embedded it into our war fighting culture into our syllabus and everybody that we train is trained to the same standard. They're trained together and they go through an advanced phase of training that will not be called comp 2x. We've got a special OPT deciding on what that advanced phase of training is going to be called because none of us really know what comp 2x stands for today. But an advanced phase of training where all the prerequisite training is done and it is focused on the high end fight. Slide please. All right. This is not a very fancy slide. This is our layer cake slide and it's our lines of effort that goes into optimized FRP. It starts at the bottom and works its way to the top. It's a calendar across the top of when we are implementing the different lines of effort of the optimized FRP. As we knock down, you're getting some knee board cards which has the kill chain on one side and the optimized FRP on the other and it's filled in on what the goal is on each one of these lines of effort. On this slide that no one with no eyesight can see, it not only has what the line of effort is, it also has who has point on that line of effort. We'll talk about that here in just a second. And we as we lay in a piece, we're fixing it and we will try it out, we will beta test something and then we'll pick it up with the next strike group. The first is the FRP length on the very bottom, starting with Harry S. Truman as I said. And every strike group after that will be realigned to a 36 month FRP and when you get assigned, when a crudest gets assigned to that strike group at the beginning of that FRP, their surface force readiness manual goes to 36 months from 32 to 36. We can't do this with a flick of the switch. You'll see that it's fairly aggressive and there's a lot of policy changes and we're moving a lot of people around and we have to take this one bite at a time and we're doing it as one strike group at a time. The next one is that alignment of the strike group. We did 90 percent of that with a stroke of a pen. Right here we're not waiting for Harry S. Truman. We started it with the Bush strike group. There'll be iterative changes just like there is within every FRP. You won't be with the same strike group for two FRP cycles in a row, but when you get assigned one you'll be with them for three years. Okay? Hearing a pack fleet have moved out on it as well. The next thing is manning. Manning and it's manning and individual training. We are, I'll show you in detail on the manning piece, what we're doing there, but that is to get 90 to 92, 90 to 92 fit fill and NEC fill coming out of maintenance. Every shipping squadron will be manned to those levels when they come out of the maintenance phase and they'll be manned during the maintenance phase for the workload that they need to do in that maintenance phase. Okay? The next one on top of that is the maintenance and modernization. You'll see Willie is on point there, decoy done away for Navair for the airplane piece of this, have on point to pull across this maintenance piece. On top of that is the parts piece. On top of that next one is the inspection process. Okay? So we've got the cycle right, we've got the chain of command right, we've got the manned power right and the training before they get there. We get the maintenance done correctly now that we get a maintenance done, all the parts they need, they've been on board long enough. Now we inspect them at the right time and then we go into the unit level training and then we go into the advanced phase of training, which as far as I'm concerned is eight phase of training. You start at one end and you end up the other one. It's one continuous training, it builds on the other and then we go up and do the operational and tactical headquarters. Those are the layer cakes and if you'll ever see us give IPRs on this, we go to this slide and we drill down from this slide on how we're doing. This is how we are making sure that we're working. It's fairly complex, they're all intertwined, but it starts from the bottom. Slide please. Let's go with the FRP length. Why 36 months? Because it's better than 37. But it's based on, that's where the carriers are today and it's a good model because it gives us what we think predictability and adaptability. It's supply-based. Now what does supply-based mean? Supply-based means this is how much ASEBO we're going to be able to generate for you. This is how much Ford presents. If you want more, you've got to buy more. Now what's important about this is that only us in the Navy are talking supply-based. And it will never be successful and it only being supply-based. There's always going to be demand-based because the world gets a vote. Syrias are going to happen. Crisis is going to happen. So what needs to occur is is that when it goes to demand-based, we have a readiness generation model that is adaptable enough that we don't disrupt that readiness generation model and the means and the ways that goes into generating that readiness. Does that make sense? Because this is what's occurred for about the last six years. To meet the ASEBO, to meet the demand cycle, we just adapted the cycles. That's why the carrier cycle is between 36 and 48. It's whatever it takes. We just, to make the ASEBO, we would rewrite the entire what we call slider for the carriers and the ships. And we would just make, do whatever changes. And that drove into that, that's where predictability went out the window. So with this 36-month cycle we're going to show you how that makes it supply-based. It's going to generate, it's going to meet right now with the existing force structure that we have, the 2.0 out and about, that means two carriers out and about, they're out and about doing their thing with a 27 Crudez, which is the GIF map schedule between 14 and 16, based on the force structure that we have today. It has a fixed maintenance cycle. You can see where the Crudez fit inside the carrier cycle. When they go through the basic, they finish up basic, they go through integrated together, they get a POM cycle. Last time we did a POM before deployment, we're doing it with Bush, first time we've done it in about six years. And then there's an eight-month deployment and there's an eight-month deployment in there, that we can add more ASABO should someone want to buy it. Okay? In the upper right-hand corner and font so small, I can't even see it from here. You have some of the comparison between ECP. It's based on an eight-month cycle because we think for the long haul, an eight-month deployment is about what sailors and families can take, and it's right at the ragged edge, to be honest with it. When I came in at my first two at sea periods, it was about a 24-month cycle. We had a 24-month cycle and it was about a six-month deployment. But in a three-year period, we think an eight-month is going to be sellable because in that time, your total time away from home, the total time at home is 68% of that three-year period. And that's your total time at home. That includes all your time away from home for training, for Fallon, for group sale, for any time strike groups are out there. It's not I-tempo, but that's how long those ships, they'll be home 68% of the time. It generates instead of ECP, it generates a .22, but the math works out and our schedule has worked out that as we transition, we'll be able to get to this. Now, I will tell you, it's going to take us a while to get to eight-month deployments. We're doing this one strike group at a time and we're averaging these ships and quite frankly, everybody is somewhere between eight and ten months and it's closer to the nine to ten point. And that is not sustainable over the long haul. It's not going to work, so we have to come up with a new model. So the bumper sticker is this for the sunk cost of maintenance and training, maximum ace of O with a clean chain of command and acceptable purse tempo. Slide. It's a build for me. Go back because that schedule is the schedule. Once you migrate to that ECP to this 36-month FRP cycle, that's it. And we start the maintenance on time. We want it to finish on time and you'll start your next maintenance on time. We're not changing the cycle. That's the stability and industrial base. You know when you're going to be gone, you know how long your deployment unless the world gets a vote. Now, this is what's adaptable about it. It is. As in the case of Nimitz, if there's a demand signal and we need and turns into a demand-based ace of O, we can extend you if necessary. Or if you're out here in sustainment, we can put you out here for another deployment much like we did with Ike. Get you back in on port into maintenance on time. Start your next FRP cycle on time. So it is adaptable. If we can't sustain a supply-based model. Any questions on the FRP length? Okay. Next slide. The alignment. I tell you, the reason the alignment has been so bad is because we haven't had the same FRP cycles. We've got Deserans that are training up with destroyers that are not in their Deseran. They're attached to another Deseran. And so we need to fix this. So by aligning the same one, aligning to choke con. I call it choke con. Okay. That's fit rep con. All right. Aligning the chain of command from the strike group from the strike group commander on down so that everybody is now knows who their boss is and this is the dirty little secret. Everybody's aligned to the same point and focused on the same point within that FRP cycle. So when they're all in maintenance, they're all in maintenance. Okay. And so those Deserans can do what they get me, dress me up in my flight suit and crawl through all my DDGs before they're in-served through their bilges to understand what goes on in that. That necessary focus. I will tell you, every Tuesday in our battle rhythm, we do our battle room with future ops, current ops, future plants, future ops and an assessment. But on Tuesday we do readiness and it's divided between the staff talks to us for a couple weeks and I see forest. Tycom's brief during their two week period and I see forest and some trees but on the other two weeks, the strike group commander's brief, everybody in their in their strike group and I see nothing but branches. Okay. And it's very, very effective and they are talking about everybody in their strike group and how well they're progressing, whether they're going to deploy with them or they're an independent deployer. It's going to take change. Sure it's going to change. It's going to change every FRP cycle. We're going to have to adjust. We always do that but fixing this to the 80% solution will go a long way. Slide please. Manning. Once again, 92, 95 and 1 which is 92% fit, 92% fill and one critical NEC coming out of maintenance. You see the actions that are going in there. Billy Moran, CNP has point on delivering this. Okay. And this is 100% behind this and what the CNO finds interesting again we find fascinating, right? And we are going after this. Now this is the long pole. This is the first long pole in optimized FRP. We've got to get this manning right and it's why we're and we have we're over manned to shore. We're under manned at sea. We have too much friction in the training pipeline and we are going after through a kill chain approach, fixing that. We're putting the policies in place the necessary policy changes the unnecessary adjustments to sea shore rotation the incentive incentivizing sea duty to become a sea-centric Navy again. We're we're on and running on this particular on this particular effort. When we brief it at our fleet commanders readiness council every month, CNP briefs it to pack fleet all of the AFNAF staff, all of the SISCOMS and myself. We have a monthly battle rhythm demanding actions that will get us there. If we could, the level of detail if you could go to the backup slide real quick which is 25 enter. There you go. This is the slide that we're using today and Truman's on deployment. It's a very busy slide but it's how we're tracking and how far out we're tracking the fit fill, any sea fill and where they are to where they need to be so that they come out of maintenance. Okay, you can go on back. It's just an example of the fidelity that we're pulling as we pull the tribes which are N1, Millington, Netsie and the fleet don't ever think that we think we work for the same person pulling them together to deliver on this particular product. Okay, absolutely critical. Sailor with the right individual training at the right time to the ship, to the squadron with the proper training and then we take the whole unit through the training cycle together. Rotation as we do this. Yeah, he made you ask that question, what do you need? Yeah, yeah. Yeah, you know and you know, I can't talk about BA. It makes no sense to me. It makes my head hurt. Do I got them on board my ship or do I not? Okay, and I believe this is BA, right? They're doing it against BA. Yeah, I will go with you on that one. I'll agree with you. Yeah, I'll agree with you on it. I'll agree with you on it. Where are we today in achieving these numbers? We don't. We're lucky to hit it a couple weeks before deployment. Okay? And then we start taking them right off the ship once they go on deployment. Okay? And having the wrong sailor at the wrong time. I'm going to give you a sea story. This one happens to be true unlike anything you hear from Barry. But I was down visiting a ship on the waterfront. I forget which ship it was. Truxton, I think it was who on an eight month deployment dropped her anchor on her sonar dome. Okay? And she's Norfolk based, but we didn't have the industrial base in Norfolk. The docks were full and we had to, but we did down in Mayport and we had to put her in the dock down in Mayport. Thank God we got Mayport. So they're on a long deployment. They're down in Mayport for four months getting their sonar dome fix. I told the captain helps not to be stupid. The, it was his line, not mine. And he's having his first family FRG meeting talking with the spouses there when they get back up to Norfolk after any month deployment four months down in Mayport. First question was from a third class wife, the wife of a third class petty officer. When is my, my husband going to get his supervisor like he's supposed to have on the ship? It wasn't about a long deployment. It wasn't about why did you take us off long deployment and put us down and put the ship down in Mayport. It was about not having the right leadership on the team at the right time. It's a pretty telling story. Okay. Slide please. Next thing is maintenance and modernization for the ships. Willie Hill artists took point on this one for the aircraft decoy did and done away and it's getting the availability is done right and it's it's starting at the two year period. Both. Okay. And it's having the right people in the planning process to do maintenance and modernization. It includes a fleet scheduler during during this entire process. So we put the heat of the calendar on it and it includes the fleet maintenance officers and it includes the ship. And the importance of who talks when and the prioritization of activity is already prioritized. We do the planning the planning correctly. Okay. We have to get the modernization better into there right now. We don't it's not there right now and this is an effort that has to occur as part of the FRP cycle. I'm really worried the one long the long pull after manning is the industrial base to do the availability inside the carrier availability. We we have studied that hard all for the strike group those maintenance availabilities in time to carrier strike group inside the carriers availability timeline. And once again the ship will adjust its SFRM when you transition to the FRP. Stable predictable integrated maintenance and modernization that also aligns to the strike groups capabilities as we are delivering new capability in the fleet as in the case of NIFCA it is a full package here the air wing the crudes that are on there that have this they all have to have the right equipment they all have to have the right training to deliver that capability and in the case of NIFCA it is fundamentally changing basic phase training. Okay. Slide please. This is an example. This was off of this morning's readiness brief from Sir Flant at the capstone and Keynes install the synchronization manager of this center of this. This is combat. Okay. Complex capstone really complex Keynes plus joint strike fighter modifications. Okay. And we didn't do our planning right. Okay. Anybody want to go back into there? All right. Slide please. Spares. You got to have the parts. We're going to make it work we got to have the parts and the parts have to be reoccurring. We have to put the money against them because if we don't order today's the parts today they're not going to be here two, three, five years down. Putting great money into this thank you very much trip. In order to do this we got to have the spares on the ship and we have to have the spares on the ship at the right time in the training cycle. Because as we go through the elements of the basic and training event we will never recover that training event. We invest a lot of money in adversaries under the water in the air and in cyberspace and there's a lot of reps and sets and we have to have we have to plus up the parts so that we don't miss those training opportunities that we are investing in to get them to the right level. It's really important everybody knows what their cost looks like and they validate that. I told CNO if we get this right I want my coin back. And the as is in carriers and surface combatants in an existing FRP cycle there are 466 different inspections. 466. They are not aligned to any particular FRP cycle. They are multiple inspections by multiple inspection entities. Some of them the source document that generated the requirement came for places like Sinclair and Fleet I don't even know what that is. Okay. And so we're taking a really deep dive on this to get this under control. CNO's designated FFC is the executive agent for fleet assessment. I'm the executive agent for a lot of things which means there's no one else in charge so please go take this and solve this particular problem but we ask for this and we are challenging we've got the working groups working down road is it being done once is it being done twice and where can we focus these inspections at the right time in the FRP cycle once the sailors are on board they've had the proper training they've maintained it correctly and then we do the inspection and if and if Pete's doing the inspection inserves okay with that inspection because we're inspecting the same standards and we trust each other that we're doing it and we're effectively doing it anyway with the TICOM inspection so this is where we really want to go and it's it shows great promise okay I do not I am not the EA for fleet assessment for anything that has to do with the reactor plant funny thing but they didn't want to give me that I don't know why but that's that's okay given how that process works within an FRP cycle okay slide please and here's about out the insert down here we've already reduced the first insert five to three days and put and put in operational risk management into the process looking at more data over a broader period of time trusting who the inspectors are take that inspector data and it's linked to readiness events one of the big things in insert is shoot all guns and so they go out and shoot all guns meaningless to me because the only shoot all guns that I care about through a live fire exercise that's from another ship yes it was but that is an end to end test and you're not going to achieve that end to end test unless the captain shoot all guns every time they get an opportunity but the only one that I want to inspect to is that sort of test that the end machine worked and that gun fired and it put a warhead on a forehead fused when it needed to slide please alright okay training you know we are really we are really merging basic and advanced phase of training Pete everybody knows my tie comes on my coast no not to say we're through basic phase because it's all got to build it's a training continuum that builds on the previous training and we're going to train everybody to the same standard because when we push them out the door east coast or west coast we don't know where they're going to fight they just got to fight and win do the nations bidding ready on arrival when they get there okay and that's the high end fight alright we have we understand the entitlements I don't like to term entitlement but the things that you need to do that we know you need to do whether it's ordinance range parts whatever happens to be aligned and part of that entitlement we're in our basic phase and he kept beating me down he was sending me notes posted notes calling me all hours I caved six six I mean what is it 24 yeah that's six months anyway so we caved on it so the time is there but another piece of this we're going to be training a lot of ships at the same time through that cycle and a resource they need are trainers okay so we have to synchronize it so that the trainers are there and everybody gets the reps and sets with the proper training and oversight that happens to be there and then they're assessed at the right time basic the group sale is a scripted event now I'm telling you it's a syllabus and it's a scripted event to prepare people for the advanced phase of training of comp 2x no longer strike group commanders get to go out and just decide what they're going to do it is a scheduled for the advanced phase of training we do two DG sets now one in that basic phase and one at the advanced phase invest in that necessary investment to make sure that we can talk and squawk and share the picture together correctly okay slide please lastly is the operational and tactical alignment standardizing at the high level at the naval component commanders level at the numbered fleets to the task force level that the task force is done correctly that the strike group commanders are done correctly that the warfare commander staffs are trained correctly all to the same syllabus to the same standards and a training track for all of the key leadership we just put the strike group commanders P strike group commanders through the beta test of a of their training track before going out to deployment I mean mine was a half day visit the naval reactors say not to a far more structured we had the next strike commander on bush out on bush for com 2x for three weeks everybody gets a com 2x slide please okay here's the timeline here's the timeline that we're implementing these things into and once again as soon as we're ready to go we either beta test it and put it in so that we can adapt it for the next for the next strike group that goes through there slide please here's how they align in the FRP cycle what's important to note is that there's a lot of the whole kill chain is aligned in a lot of these issues I can't fix manning in the fleet I can't fix maintenance just in the fleet we need to go all the way back to the resourcing to the policy issues on many of these things in order to fix the optimized FRP so if you're a member in a kill chain you are either a product of readiness you're a producer readiness or you're a consumer of readiness you all know where you are where you are and how you're going to help us with the optimized FRP slide please and finally this is on the back of your knee board guard those are the elements that we call the lines of effort that happen to be out there and our goal are in state for each one of those lines of effort slide please floor is open for your questions another awesome picture from that com2x yes ma'am afternoon sir lieutenant commander G. Murray Sullivan special assistant to CNO my question goes back to the supply-based demand-based you talked about real-world events get a vote but often the co-coms have no incentive to not ask for the world in terms of what they need from the Navy and is there any effort underway or thoughts about how do we sort of because we have to keep providing providing presents how does that get balanced in terms of demand from the co-com and what we're able to provide well it's the secretary of defense that does that balancing and he does it for through a process that the global force management process the GFM process is actually a supply-based model every year the secretary of defense signs off and deploy and on what each one of the surfaces is able to produce in a 365-day period for the next year that is a supply-based and the part that's not supply-based is the RFF process and that's where we need some discipline in because that's demand-based that's in addition to that's out there and within the process there is a there is a a force allocation decision model that has a matrix in it that we worked real hard on when Jay Paxson and I were on the joint staff together and we're really happy not to be there that builds into that fatum the prioritization of not only location but the health of the force and the long-range health of the force we have to use that we have to use that fatum that happens to be out there and it's not the COCOM's fault that they're asking for capability they are given end states and they have to meet those end states they own the risk if they fail okay and so we need to us as force providers need to understand risk to mission which is what the COCOM has to understand and the COCOM's also need to have to understand risk to the long-term health of the force which is a service chief and we have so the COCOM staffs and the service staffs have to work together to understand that what is acceptable risk to mission what is acceptable long-term risk to the force and it's a dialogue that we have to occur that has to occur that said the world will still always get a vote and so if we don't come up with a model that when the world gets a vote or say the secretary votes against long-term health of the force because he thinks it's important then we don't want to have to break our force generation model and we think that will answer the question okay you know that risk is an interesting question who owns risk we say that a lot now we can accept that risk I'm going to give you my philosophy on who owns risk okay and it's and I know the social security numbers of everybody that owns risk the first is John Greenert's social security number and the second are the combatant commanders and in the Navy's case the naval component commanders that are out there they own the risk we don't own risk okay if naval forces fail they're the ones that are responsible cobar towers who talk cocom commander or the chief of staff of the air force Cole who talked to congress was it the chief was it the was it the cocom or was it the chief of naval operations service chiefs own that risk they know it okay the other thing so you got to be real careful about risk so when I talk to my staff when we talk about what's acceptable risk I say who owns that risk and did we ask them the other thing about risk is it's really important in my mind it's not risk unless there's a memorial service potentially involved okay that's real risk there if you're going to have someone's going to have to speak at a memorial service that's real risk if no one's going to have to speak there it's not risk it's not risk to career it's not that those are the things you got to be able to define risk put it in the right context next question please good afternoon Admiral my name's Mark van der Hoff I'm at the naval and I was curious you mentioned clean you're curious to find out you're in charge of some of this aren't you I would be what you would call a provider of readiness there you are I provide my favorite kind of readiness I'm the DDG 51 new construction program manager I love my product the and so my question is related to that product you talked about clean chain of command and standardized training across the carrier strike group but you also talked about that for independent employers and in the future I think we're seeing now the future a lot of ships specifically DDGs are going to be out independently on BMD stations are you including is there somewhere in that clean chain of command and standardized training for the individual deployers how do you maintain their clean chain of command and standardized training while making sure that they're ready for a particular mission that could be different from the rest of the carrier strike group as you move through the optimized fleet replacement plan they're part of that carrier strike group so when we train non-FDNF forces CONUS based forces are part of their a part of that carrier strike group and they move through that FRP cycle with the rest of the strike group they know who their boss is they're trained to the same standards as the carrier strike group they're also going to be training that they're going to need if it's a unique mission be it a BMD ship or a scan eagle deployment for AFRICOM but they're going to move through that particular cycle and on the east coast with the four deployer the four to Rota we're able to make that work we're also working on an optimized FRP we started just last week when we realized the need for FDNF forces what does their FRP look like it's not going to look like this FRP but all the pieces they have to have pieces that happen to be out there unique to their unique to their particular four deployed location and so we started that effort as well I will tell you I thought when I was told to come up with an idea back as a one star as the three and the five come up with an idea to generate more forward presence for our crew des so we came up with the idea we saw where we thought we had some excess capacity and we came up with the idea of GWAT surge the independent deployers it was a great idea we changed it to MSO surge it was a great idea we can generate more forward presence and for less cost and generate more forward presence and so we did that it was a terrific idea until I was a naval component commander and I had 60% of my force were these GWAT surge ships and they had not gone through an advanced phase of training not a very good idea I'm not going to do that because if they go out the door this isn't the south this isn't a FIG or a joint high speed vessel to south com if they go out the door they got to be able to fight and win wherever they go and they got to be able to fight and win on arrival and so that's why aligning them and going through that advanced phase of training when Rick and I were out at fifth fleet together we actually broke out our crew des of everybody that deployed to us who had gone through a comp 2x and who did not and we apportion mission accordingly okay hope that answered your question and we love your product thank you next question please good afternoon sir chief Bradshaw first I have a question but first I have a statement I'm not sure if you intended with a comment that you made when you differentiate you said officers and sailors kind of sense that makes it because I think we're all sailors at the end of the day now for my question now as far as the FRR your FRP is concerned we speak about the deserans and the strike groups but very little about our args and muses our amphib guys is there a similar plan set up for them also yep first off let me talk to your comment because I say officers and sailors because as we align the manning to the ships from the FRP they have different policies career path and we have to come up with a model that fits the sailors our chiefs and our officers that's why we say it the way we do I'm a sailor I love salt waller the only person who likes salt water more than me is Buzz Buzzby alright sir and I like salt there more than he does okay so we started with the carrier strike group because that's 85% of a Navy we are now in work with the arg muses because we have to do that with the Marine Corps we can't come up with an FRP cycle that the that the Marine Corps can't support if that makes sense it's got to be that team so we're in that effort and the key piece is starting at the bottom layer cake the first layer of the layer cake and that's the FRP cycle everything else that you see on the left side of those lines of effort match to what we do for the arg mu the personnel the parts the manning the maintenance the modernization that's already in work we first have to get that FRP length correct with the Marine Corps and we're working real close we're working hand in hand with mar 4 com on that one we're also doing it for our MPA we have to make sure the MPA is right and we have to do it for our our our our submariners our submarine force make sure we get that right and again I talked to about our FDNF force for each area of our FDNF force we have to figure out what does that mean next question please I know I'm standing between you and the sea lord putting money on the bar I know that yeah good afternoon Admiral Chief of Officer Breakville with the Agents Training and Readiness Center down in Dahlgren got a question you mentioned a 68 percent home port tempo and you said that was in port at home and school houses and the school house and the way I look at it if you're using eight month deployment is 22 percent of that time so that leaves you a 10 percent gap so how are you going to squeeze in unit level training in-serve under ways all the training that goes into your FRP into that 10 percent let me give you what I need is Mark get his e-mail address you have a Simpernet account we will show you our fish bone we call it the fish bone of everything within that FRP cycle all of the time that we account for our crew as specifically for our crew as for you and for the carrier and the squadrons that comes up with that number thank you sir slide next question I'm Rick Easton I'm the chief operating officer of AVT simulation I don't want to use the word risk but what are the things that you are most concerned about that will sub-optimize your optimized FRP plan first one is manning okay we have to get the manning right and we get to get the manning right and when we do that as we move sailors of sailors from shore to sea we have to make sure that we do the manned power scrub ashore correctly we are prioritizing our maintenance and our trainers ashore at the same level as we are to deployed assets we don't want to empty out our maintenance and our school houses in order to do that so the manning has got to work and you can see to get that work do we have the right is that going to work the next thing is the training for those sailors I can get them there but if their school houses aren't correct and they're not being taught what they need to be taught in their training pipeline I have to do that training on the waterfront okay the tycoms have to do that particular training is the next piece if you're in simulation I think we are woefully under resourced and surface warrior simulation on the waterfront it's one of the sea lords key initiatives in order to do that to be able to do that we have to it's fairly inexpensive and it's huge return on investment this is coming from an aviator who's been doing it all his life so the next one again is can we get the maintenance done correctly you know you saw what wasp is like right and I have to adjust the GFM schedule she will make her deployment on time whether or proper training we have time in the schedule to do that but it's not going to be a flick of the switch and I have to work my way through in order to do we have to work our way through the challenges that come up to get the maintenance right and the industrial piece in order to inside the maintenance phase of that FRP for that entire strike group we have to micromanage it there's a fine line between micromanagement and oversight depending on where you live in the food chain and we'll be micromanaging it you're welcome okay well thank you Admiral from a retired captain's perspective I think I've seen more structure than I have ever seen counting my entire career and my civilian last seven years so well done to the guys that put this together thanks it was a great staff effort both Pacfleet, FFC and Opnav and the Tycoms in order to do it I will tell you though when I look at it we go back a slide and we look at the layers of the wedding of the layer cake only the very top I think is really new everything else we got away from and like in most things you know we need to if we're going to move away if we're going to move away for something clearly understanding what the problem why are we moving it away are we creating a second or third order effect is important