 So, I pick up some comments, some questions, yes, that's you, and I... Thank you. I find it difficult to think with the representative agent framing what are the risks that are associated with allowing credit to be abandoned in a sector which has essentially fixed supply. I mean, I think it's impossible to reason about the evolution of house prices without taking into consideration their impact driven by availability of credit. So, the fact that the policy makes it more difficult for people to pay for young people to buy houses ignores the fact that house prices may be even higher if there were more credit. So, I find it a bit puzzling that that's not even considered. They also say, I believe Sweden is similar to the Netherlands in many things, including a funded pension system. In the Netherlands, as Dirk said, running five households end up in negative equity. There are, even if the economy does well, you can have all sort of idiosyncratic shocks and redistributive shocks are happening throughout the working class sort of ability to, I think in the Netherlands, we had a major transition between permanent employment and much more temporary employment. I think the risk build up exactly when you allow individual income to become more and more leveraged. So, quite frankly, I don't think the representative agent is particularly useful way to think about a problem we create. The Netherlands, like Sweden, need to finance this massive amount of mortgage funding by banks by borrowing all international wholesale market because, indeed, the households are relatively have good savings but they're all locked into the pension system. So all in all, I don't see, I don't find that this representative agent notion particularly assuring. I also disagree that in a crisis, you would expect interest rate to fall. It depends what the nature of the crisis is. Yes, Laura, some things. Okay. I mean, importantly, the mortgage market report, the commendable mortgage market report that the FSA is doing every year, which I think is a model for the rest of the world. It uses individual data, not a representative agent. And the stress tests done there are done on that individual data. And the result is that the households are extremely resilient and the resilience is growing over time. When you look at the numbers, it's quite amazing. And the mortgage market report is also monitoring the lending standards. And the reason, the resilience and the debt service capacity is so high is that the lending standards have been very high over the years before the tightening that happened the last couple of years. So even when I showed the case of the person who earned 26,000, he could actually, he or she could actually pay a 6% interest rate. So that was the discretionary income calculation interest rate use in that case. But it is not that credit is abandoned. It is not that credit standards have been falling. They have been rising over time, but they have been taking to an extreme level with the last couple of actions by that. That is my point. If you see lending standards falling over time, then you'll probably have a problem. They need to be high and preferably somewhat rising. And you have to look at the individual data and the whole distribution of households. You take to an expose level, I understand. Sorry? A loader? No. Can I raise the point on pension funds? You're completely right there, Enrico. As economists, we have argued for a long time, take a bit of your pensions as equity for your housing. It would make a lot of sense if on both sides, smaller balance sheets like Germany and you're less sensitive to financial shocks. What happens in practice? Mortgages are from the Ministry of Housing and Finance. Pension is from the Ministry of Social Affairs and then we have the usual government in Earthsea that nothing happens, but it will be a huge improvement without any cost to use your pension fund as down payment, as equity for your mortgage, for your house. Other interventions? Yes? Yeah. Isn't there scope for basic collaboration between the fiscal authorities and the monetary authority? In Denmark, in 2001, they made the big mistake of stopping the linkage between the market price of housing and property taxes, and they're now reintroducing that linkage because of the aftermath of the financial instability that the removal of that stabilizing force led to. The two questions here. So this is a question for anyone on the panel really. So there's a theme I've noticed in a lot of the talks this morning that have to do with either housing or stock market wealth, and we've seen quite a bit of evidence that wealth is important in the financial cycle. In the United States, wealth is roughly two-thirds held in the form of factories and machines through the stock market, and the rest is housing. In the UK, it's the other way around. I'm not quite sure how it is in Holland or any of these other countries, but the question or the sort of thought I have is do people on the panel think that these effects are coming through demand effects, or are they coming through the things that John Stress in his talk, which is collateral, which would be more of a supply side view. I think that's an important question to be thinking about going forward. Do you want to take this? There's a paper in Economic Policy which shows that banks have about two-thirds of their loans are in mortgages, so confirming your story and businesses anyway moving to services where you don't need money, and housing keep on rising, as Ada Turner is saying, because of lack of land supply, this is only going to increase. So housing becomes, if anything, housing gets bigger in Europe because they are on the balance sheet, and in the US, they are getting off the balance sheet collateralized, not here. So housing is here to stay, and I think the collateral mechanism, so the value of a house decides your consumption is extremely strong, and I think that's where the consumption effect comes in good and in bad times, because now we start to over-consume in the Netherlands because we feel rich with our house in Amsterdam, because we can consume again, and that's why the Netherlands is at the top of economic growth in Europe again, while we were at the bottom in 2012. Yes. A quick comment on Dirks, a very nice discussion. I think again one has to be careful drawing conclusions from one country to another, because the housing markets are very different. The Netherlands are quite different from Sweden, much higher loan-to-value ratios. The average loan-to-value ratio now is 63% for new mortgages in Sweden. That's a huge buffer on average. Very few borrowers now have over 85% loan-to-value most. That is really an LTV cap that is being maintained, but the important thing is to look at the detailed resilience. If I would see that those measures of resilience going down, I would be worried in Sweden. As long as they are high and even increasing over time, I feel much better. I think we have come to the ground. What really is the issue when I studied Ireland with Filaine and up to the crisis in Ireland in the last few years in the run-up, you got these LTVs above 90%. In the Netherlands, in 2008 we had to turn, so it's all in the five years buying before. That was the problem cases. All the people who had already the house were not getting a problem, so it is really the ones who enter the market at the latest time and at the high LTV. This combination is poison. All the others are fine. That's why you cannot look at the average. You really have to look at the individual people who come on the market. Can I say one? Yes, very quickly. However, in Sweden we actually had a real-time stress test. We had the financial crisis and house prices fell and unemployment went up quite a bit but actually consumption was maintained. Export and investment collapsed, but consumption kept the economy up during the crisis, so at least, of course, interest rates fell too. The cash flow improved for borrowers. Only a short remark. I think psychological factors also play a role in addressing, especially in Germany, people don't like debt. And in 10 years ago in Berlin you could buy, in the very center of Berlin, you could buy an apartment with about 1,000 euros per square meter. But people didn't buy it. In Berlin the home owner ratio is about 18%. Yeah, no, it's true. The concept of good and bad doesn't exist. All that is bad. No, just before we finished. I think that was, I mean, the conclusion here on that little exchange here, it's very difficult. It's macro-pudential instruments to implement. That's the first conclusion. It's always difficult. You always find arguments in favor or against. The second thing, I mean, Lars is on the data you have. I think it's quite unique. When you presented all your ratios, you know, debt to assets, this is really per households or per category of households or you take macro figures. Because for many you can really point to individuals, to households. But I'm not sure in all the statistics you show you can do that, you see. That was the comments we had also from the room. I mean, is it the representative agent or to what extent you have very detailed information. The graphs I showed were actually aggregates. Yeah, no, so I think we need to dig a little bit more into that. Because if you don't have to, I mean, the comments we understand, of course, but at least also to the question, how can you implement these measures? All, you know, responsible in financial stability, know the difficulties in household. I think Victor, these were very interesting presentations. I hope you are satisfied by this first day of conference. Thank you. We look forward Jean-Claude for your comments this evening. Thank you. Thank you, all of you. You have my email.