 Hello everybody. I'm very happy to be here today to talk to you about a political philosophy of Hans Hoppe. But I must confess that I do so with some anxiety because I'm afraid that if I don't get things right, I might be physically removed from the Mises Institute. First, I'd like to tell you a little bit about Hans Hoppe's background because I think this will give you a clue to understanding where he's coming from and it might help you in understanding the context of some of his arguments. Hans was born in West Germany in Saxony in 1949 and he attended his, he got his undergraduate degree from the University of Bazaarland. Then he did his graduate work at the Goethe University, which is in Frankfurt. Now this is, was considered one of the liberal or the left wing university of the various German universities. And in fact, his major professor under whom he got his doctorate and then also his higher doctorate, which is called a habilitation in German, was Jürgen Habermas, whom I imagine a good many of you will have heard. Habermas was a leading member of the Frankfurt School, which was a group of Marxists with rather original views on Marxism. They were particularly interested in applying Marxism to culture and they produced a number of controversial and influential studies in that area. Habermas, as I say, although somewhat of a dissident Marxist was a Marxist. And when Hans was his student, he was first, although he was never a Marxist, he was favorable to a democratic socialism. He was in the generation of the students of 1968, the famous student revolts all over Western Europe, so he was one of that group. But after he had been held those views for a while, he first started to read Friedrich Hayek and then later Ludwig von Mises and Murray Rothbard, and after that he became, he changed his political views much to the dismay of Jürgen Habermas. He had been one of Habermas's favorite students, but after he switched his political views they were no longer close because although Habermas was no longer in favor of Marxist Revolution, he's always maintained his hatred of the free market, so it was not very likely that they'd be continued on a close relationship. Hans came to the United States to study with Murray Rothbard. Rothbard was then teaching at Brooklyn Polytechnic and he, Hans, sat in on all his classes. And then when Rothbard was offered a position at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, Hoppe joined him and became Professor of Economics there. And for a number of years with the two of them in that department in Las Vegas, that was, I should say, the leading center in the United States for the study of Austrian economics of Rothbardian sort. And Hans continued to be a professor at the University of UNLV for a number of years, but since he retired and he's now living in Turkey. And in 2006, he started the Property and Freedom Society. He believed that the Montpelerin Society had made undue concessions to government intervention that it wasn't a genuinely free market organization anymore. There was too much of a compromising group. And one thing about Hans, if you know him, he would have adopted for himself the line from the main character in Ibsen's play, Brandt. The level is compromised. Hans is the leading successor to Murray Rothbard in political philosophy and he's made major contributions in a number of areas. What I'd like to do this afternoon is discuss three of these argumentation ethics, the criticism of democracy, and the theory of social evolution. Depending on the time, I'm not sure I'll be able to get to all of these, but I'll try. The one that interests me the most is argumentation ethics, but I won't spend all the time on that unless I get carried away, which sometimes happens. That can be carried away, can be taken in two senses there. An idea that Hans has, which is quite similar to that of Murray Rothbard, is that conflict, Mises has this view also, that conflicts between people over resources arise because of scarcity. Because the economic goods are not super abundant, it can happen that people want to use the same resource. So in order to resolve these conflicts, we need rules that assign control of each resource to one person, so there won't be any fights about it or for our fights. And they can be settled according to the agreement. And he takes the further view, which also comes from Rothbard, that all rights are property rights, so that if we can settle who owns the various resources, then we've resolved all questions of rights. Now, if that's the case, we want to get the rules to settle these conflicts, how do we come up with the rules? And here Hans developed argumentation ethics from the work of Jürgen Habermas, who was his teacher, and also another very influential German philosopher, Karl Otto Appel. I should say that when we're talking about argumentation ethics, this is not something that Hans invented. This is an idea he took over from Habermas and especially Karl Otto Appel. But what his contribution, his original contribution, was to take argumentation ethics in a libertarian direction, in a narco-capitalist direction, and this is something neither Habermas nor Appel would have approved of. If, according to argumentation ethics, if we're trying to establish what are the correct rules, what are the rules that we ought to have to resolve disputes, so we must be able to support these rules through argument. If somebody says this is the right rule and somebody says no, it isn't, we ought to be able to give reasons that this rule we suggest is the correct one. And one point Hans raises in this connection, he says, you can't argue that you can't argue, at least, well, at least it would be very difficult to argue that you can't argue, even if you could, which if he's right, you can't. But that, as I'll explain in shortly, I think this, there's quite a bit of plausibility in this starting point, the starting point being that if we need to support what we're saying by argument, we should use the conditions, we should ask what are the conditions for having a rational discussion with somebody, and those conditions would, if we can say what those are, those should tell us what the rights are that people have. Now, to one criticism that's sometimes raised at this point, I think rests on a misunderstanding or at least people not grasp the structure of the argument. Supposing we can show that discussion, in order to have a rational discussion with someone, we need to recognize certain rules of procedure during the discussion. Some people have objected, why doesn't that show only that people have these rights during the process of discussion, but not outside the discussion as soon as they stop talking, maybe they lose their rights. Sometimes we can push, some people have pushed this objection even further, saying, well, maybe these discussion, having been discussion just shows you have rights over your vocal cords, or I won't go into that because it's obviously an absurd claim to make. I mean, when somebody's that stupid, there's no point in arguing with him, even if you can't argue that you can't argue, at least there are some cases where you might have to make an exception. So what I think people are missing is that the argument says, well, once you've established what the conditions are for rational discussion, there's the additional premise that those conditions should be the ones that hold generally. So the view is that in order to, the rights people have in all circumstances are the rights we have to postulate for people to engage in rational discussion. So one point I hope will motivate this line of thought, perhaps make it plausible, would, I didn't put this on my PowerPoint because it's just something that I've been thinking of quite recently, that we can appeal to a notion from the great philosopher HP Grice, who wrote about what's called implicatures, and these aren't strict logical implications of something, but there's something that's understood from the context. For example, supposing you go into McDonald's and order a hamburger, and then the person brings out a hamburger, but it's encased in cement. It would be an implicature that when you order a hamburger, you have in mind a hamburger that you can eat. This wouldn't qualify. Another example of an implicature would be supposing you're taking a walk and you see someone standing by his car and the person says to you, I've just run out of gas. Is there a gasoline station near here? And you say, yes, there's one just around the block. It would be an implicature, although not strictly logically implied by what you said, that you believe the gas station around the corner has gasoline for sale. You were aware that the station had run out of gas, so it wouldn't fit the context of a conversation if the person says, is there a gasoline station? Around here to answer, yes, there is, even though what you would be saying would be true, because in that context, what was meant was a gasoline station where gas is available. So the application here, I think, to the conditions for argument is that if we're engaged in an argument with someone, the implicature, the presupposition is that we're renouncing force. So if I ask you for your reasons or you ask me for my reasons, although it's not logically implied by asking for reasons, we're having the implicit presupposition that we won't use force. And this, I think, is a quite plausible idea. So this is the standpoint of argumentation ethics as developed by Habermas and Apel. And now we have to ask, what about Hans's innovation? His innovation was to take, as I say, to take argumentation ethics in an anarcho-capitalist direction. So he says, in his answer to what are the conditions for argument, is different from that of Habermas and Apel. He says, in order to argue, you must own yourself. And if you deny that, that involves what he calls a performative contradiction. I'm glad he called it that because that gives me a chance to go into all sorts of interesting material about what the difference is between a performative contradiction and a straightforward logical contradiction is. I'm sure you'll all be fascinated to find out about this. Supposing I say I've never in my life spoken an English sentence making that statement in English, my making the statement would show that the statement is false. So that would be an example of a performative contradiction. You're very making the statement shows its falsity. You wouldn't be able to make the statement you did unless your statement was false. For example, another example, suppose I said I am now completely unconscious. If that were true, I wouldn't be able to say I am completely unconscious. So my making the statement shows the statement is false. Now, that has to be very distinguished from a logical contradiction. And I should say for some of you, those of you who are planning to take the final exam, if you make it to the final stage, this is sometimes a question I ask. Many people have missed this. So if you're planning to get into the final, this would be something to take note of. Suppose I say 2 plus 2 equals 5. That's logically contradictory. It's a priori true that 2 plus 2 equals 4. But by saying 2 plus 2 equals 5, my saying 2 plus 2 equals 5 doesn't show that 2 plus 2 equals 4. It isn't the case that I could say 2 plus 2 equals 5 only if 2 plus 2 equals 4. So it's a quite different concept. And so I've given an example there where something is logically a priori true 2 plus 2 equals 4. But denying it doesn't involve in a performative contradiction. This works the other way. Also, we can have something that is a performative contradiction, but doesn't involve any... The denial of what I've said is not a priori true. So supposing I say I've never spoken an English sentence in English. That's a reformative contradiction. But the statement, I've never spoken an English sentence, is not a priori true. That's just something one would have to find out by seeing which languages I knew. Did I know English? That isn't something we would be able to know a priori just by thinking about. So there are two very different concepts. So to return from those rather arcane realm of epistemology to political philosophy, Hans has said if you say you don't own yourself as a performative contradiction. So in addition to being showing that one needs to be a self-owner in order to engage in argument, he says we also have to own resources in order to argue. We must be able to at least have some place to stand on or sit down while we're arguing. So we need to have a rule for how we acquire resources. And Hans's argument there, he says well there are only two possible rules. One is that the first user resource acquires it and the other is you could just own resources by claiming them. But if you could own a resource just by claiming it, he says you would then be able to claim other people, but we've already established that each person owns himself so that rule would lead to a contradiction and you're left only with the first user rule. And remember when we talk about rules, these rules are universal. They hold not just for individuals engaging in argument, but for everyone at all times. Now I want to go on in the time remaining to the second topic I want to discuss which is Hans's criticism of democracy. Many people, although probably fewer in this room than in the general population, assume that democracy is a good thing. They would say if someone questions democracy they would say isn't it better that people rule themselves rather than be subject to a dictatorship. And if we don't have a dictatorship isn't it better to accept the results of a fair election rather than just have people fight it out among themselves. What would be the alternative to a democracy? Now Hans rejects these pro-democracy argument. He does so in a book I hope many of you will read if you haven't done so already called Democracy the God that Failed. Now the title of that is quite significant the God that Failed because in 1949 there was a very influential collection by six writers who had been former members or sympathizers with the Communist Party called just the God that Failed. And the God that Failed was Communism. So by using that title Hans is intending to suggest that there is a parallel between democracy and Communism in that an idea that was taken very seriously by intellectuals at one time is really not a good one. It is fallacious. His fundamental objection to democracy is that it ignores rights. If people have rights of self ownership and property through acquisition by the first user there's really no room for disputes about how to resolve conflicts. The only disputes would be on who has the property rights in question. So anyone who interferes with your property rights is guilty of aggression including majority voters. So supposing say there was an election and people said they wanted to say you couldn't establish certain businesses in your property were having zoning laws and you must obey these laws. Even if the great majority of people voted for that that wouldn't abolish your property right you would still have the right to do what you wanted with your property rights as long as you didn't violate the rights of others. So Hans then rejects democracy and in a very interesting way he says that the anti-democracy argument can be used to support anarchism. The way he argues for that is he says a right that stems from self ownership is your right to self defense. That's a fundamental right and this can't be given up even to a supposed minimal state that claims to be limited to protecting rights. In Hans's view if you get if you said well we're going to have a just a minimal state. This will be limited to protection and justice and save a type favored by Robert Nozick in Anarchy State and Toby. Hans said well there's no once the state has control of the all the use of force in a particular society or nation then there's no stopping point. There's no way to limit it because people have surrendered to it the right of self defense. So he says he's using the he says even in a democratic state you're still surrendering your right to self defense and this holds for any state no matter how limited. As you will see Hoppe's view of democracy is different from that of Mises. According to Mises, Mises is in favor of political democracy but he says that the free market is much more democratic than the political democracy because the consumers are always voting with their dollar votes. They're always deciding what's being produced. So Mises is really giving an argument from democracy to support for capitalism which he calls mass production for the masses. And this differs very much from Hans Hoppe's rights based approach. One argument that's gotten him into some difficulties controversy is he says that democratic politicians need to get majority support to gain power and stay in office. So what counts for them is what will get people to support them now even if as invariably happens they're unable to fulfill their promises that doesn't matter to them as long as they can stay on through their term of office. And since in a democracy the time at least the chief executive is in power is generally limited there won't be the politicians won't care for the long run. But Hans contrasts this with monarchies which he thinks tend to adopt a long run perspective and by monarchy he doesn't mean monarchies the way some countries such as the United Kingdom or Norway or Sweden. And the Netherlands have them today where the monarch is just the ceremonial head of state although sometimes they have a good deal of influence. Hans has in mind a monarchy where the monarch has real power. Now in the short time remaining I want to say a little bit about Hans views of social evolution. He uses the two parts of his views that I discussed so far his theory of rights and his criticism of democracy to develop a whole theory of how societies involved. So he's engaging in what we call conjectural history. That's to say he's using social theory in order to offer a rational reconstruction of history. And the account of the origin of money by Carl Menger and Ludwig von Mises is an example of conjectural history in which they said because of certain facts about how money must develop it would have to have facts about the nature of money it would have to develop in a certain way. Hans has a similar view of social evolution in general. And one thing in Hans's account is different from many versions of social evolution that they're very tend to be very optimistic. They'll say well we start off at a very low level but then we're gradually getting better and better. There may be points that were times have not gone so well but the general trend is upwards. People who say this say well history starts with a war of all against all somewhat of a Hobbesian state of nature but then absolute rule put an end to this and then this was eventually replaced with democracy. So although Hans really knowledges and even insists on economic takeoff after the industrial revolution his view of social evolution is downwards not upwards. Things are gotten worse so in that respect he was like the famous gloomy dean of St. Paul's William Ralph Ng who gave a famous lecture on progress and came out against it. Hans is of that school. Hans denies that history started off as a war of all against all. He says this is a falsehood defended by pro state intellectuals. Instead people naturally accepted the self ownership and first appropriate appropriate accounts of rights. So these aren't made up theories but he thinks these are a natural way people would have of looking at disputes. In settling disputes based on these principles people would tend to gravitate to natural leaders or aristocrats and feudalism developed from that. Then over time one aristocrat would tend to become stronger than others and become the king but his power was strictly limited by the other nobles. Now I'm sure you'd like to hear the rest of this how this continues into democracy going on and how terrible that is but fortunately for those of you who would like to hear the rest of it I need to stop the lecture here because we're going to have a five minute break now so people can get ready for the faculty panel so I'll conclude my lecture at this point. Thank you very much.