 Part 2 Propositions 41 to 45 of The Ethics by Spinoza This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org Recording by Ernst Patinama The Ethics by Benedict the Spinoza Translated by R. H. M. Elvis Part 2 Propositions 41 to 45 Proposition 41 Knowledge of the first kind is the only source of falsity. Knowledge of the second and third kinds is necessarily true. To knowledge of the first kind, we have, in the foregoing note, assigned all those ideas which are inadequate and confused. Therefore, this kind of knowledge is the only source of falsity. Part 2 Proposition 35 Furthermore, we assigned to the second and third kinds of knowledge those ideas which are adequate. Therefore, these kinds are necessarily true. Part 2 Proposition 34 Quaterrat demonstrandum Proposition 42 Knowledge of the second and third kinds, not knowledge of the first kind, teaches us to distinguish the true from the false. Proof This proposition is self-evident. He who knows how to distinguish between true and false must have an adequate idea of true and false. That is, Part 2 Proposition 40, note 2, he must know the true and the false by the second or third kind of knowledge. Proposition 43 He who has a true idea simultaneously knows that he has a true idea and cannot doubt of the truth of the thing perceived. Proof A true idea in us is an idea which is adequate in God insofar as he is displayed through the nature of the human mind. Part 2 Proposition 11, corollary Let us suppose that there is in God insofar as he is displayed through the human mind an adequate idea A. The idea of this idea must also necessarily be in God and be referred to him in the same way as the idea A by Part 2 Proposition 20 or of the proof is of universal application. But the idea A is supposed to be referred to God insofar as he is displayed through the human mind. Therefore, the idea of the idea A must be referred to God in the same manner. That is, by Part 2 Proposition 11, corollary the adequate idea of the idea A will be in the mind which has the adequate idea A. Therefore, he who has an adequate idea or knows a thing truly Part 2 Proposition 34 must at the same time have an adequate idea or true knowledge of his knowledge. That is, obviously, he must be assured. God errat demonstrandum Note I explained in the note to Part 2 Proposition 21 what is meant by the idea of an idea. But we may remark that the foregoing proposition is in itself sufficiently plain. No one who has a true idea is ignorant that a true idea involves the highest certainty. For to have a true idea is only another expression for knowing a thing perfectly or as well as possible. No one, indeed, can doubt this unless he thinks that an idea is something lifeless like a picture on a panel and not a mode of thinking, namely the very act of understanding. And who, I ask, can know that he understands anything unless he do first understand it? In other words, who can know that he is sure of a thing unless he be first sure of that thing? Further, what can there be more clear and more certain than a true idea as a standard of truth? Even as life displays both itself and darkness, so is truth a standard both of itself and of falsity. I think I have thus sufficiently answered these questions, namely, if a true idea is distinguished from a false idea, only insofar as it is said to agree with its object, a true idea has no more reality or perfection than a false idea since the two are only distinguished by an extrinsic mark. Consequently, neither will a man who has a true idea have any advantage over him who has only false ideas. Further, how comes it that men have false ideas? Lastly, how can anyone be sure that he has ideas which agree with their objects? These questions, I repeat, I have in my opinion sufficiently answered. The difference between a true idea and a false idea is plain. From what was said in Part 2, Proposition 35, the former is related to the latter as being is to not being. The courses of falsity I have set forth very clearly in Part 2, Proposition 19 and Part 2, Proposition 35, with the note. From what is there stated, the difference between a man who has true ideas and a man who has only false ideas is made apparent. As for the last question, as to how a man can be sure that he has ideas that agree with their objects, I have just pointed out with abundant clearness that his knowledge arises from the simple fact that he has an idea which corresponds with its object. In other words, the truth is its own standard. We may add that our mind, insofar as it perceives things truly, is part of the infinite intellect of God. Part 2, Proposition 11, Corollary Therefore, the clear and distinct ideas of the mind are as necessarily true as the ideas of God. Proposition 44 It is not in a nature of reason to regard things as contingent, but as necessary. It is in the nature of reason to perceive things truly. Part 2, Proposition 41, namely Part 1, Axiom 6, as they are in themselves. That is, Part 1, Proposition 29, not as contingent, but as necessary. Quaterrat demonstrandum. Corollary 1 Hence it follows that it is only through our imagination that we consider things, whether in respect to the future or the past, as contingent. Note how this way of looking at things arises I will briefly explain. We have shown above Part 2, Proposition 17 and Corollary that the mind always regard things as present to itself, even though they be not in existence, until some courses arise which exclude their existence and presence. Further, Part 2, Proposition 18, we showed that if the human body has once been affected by two external bodies simultaneously, the mind, when it afterwards imagines one of the said external bodies, will straightaway remember the other. That is, it will regard both as present to itself, unless there arise courses which exclude their existence and presence. Further, no one doubts that we imagine time from the fact that we imagine bodies to be moved some more slowly than others, some more quickly, some at equal speed. Thus, let us suppose that a child yesterday saw Peter for the first time in the morning, late noon and Simon in the evening, then that today he against his Peter in the morning. It is evident from Part 2, Proposition 18, that as soon as he sees the morning light, he will imagine that the sun will traverse the same parts of the sky as it did when he saw it on the preceding day. In other words, he will imagine a complete day and together with his imagination of the morning, he will imagine Peter, with noon he will imagine Paul and with evening he will imagine Simon, that is, he will imagine the existence of Paul and Simon in relation to a future time. On the other hand, if he sees Simon in the evening, he will refer Peter and Paul to a past time imagining them simultaneously with the imagination of a past time. If it should at any time happen that on some other evening the child should see James instead of Simon, he will, on the following morning, associate with his imagination of evening sometimes Simon, sometimes James, not both together. For the child is supposed to have seen at evening one or other of them, not both together. His imagination will therefore waver and with the imagination of future evenings he will associate first one, then the other, that is, he will imagine them in the future, neither of them as certain, but both as contingent. This wavering of the imagination will be the same if the imagination be concerned with things which with us contemplate, standing in relation to time past or time present. Consequently, we may imagine things as contingent, whether they be referred to time present, past or future. Corollary 2 It is in the nature of reason to perceive things under a certain form of eternity, subquadam eternitatis spezie. Proof It is in the nature of reason to regard things not as contingent, but as necessary. Part 2, Proposition 44 Reason perceives this necessity of things. Part 2, Proposition 41, truly. That is, Part 1, Axiom 6, as it is in itself. But, Part 1, Proposition 16, this necessity of things is the very necessity of the eternal nature of God. Therefore, it is in the nature of reason to regard things under this form of eternity. We may add that the basis of reason are the notions Part 2, Proposition 38, which answer to things common to all, and which Part 2, Proposition 37, do not answer to the essence of any particular thing, which must therefore be conceived without any relation to time under a certain form of eternity. Proposition 45 Every idea of every body or of every particular thing actually existing necessarily involves the eternal and infinite essence of God. Proof The idea of a particular thing actually existing necessarily involves both the existence and the essence of the said thing. Part 2, Proposition 8 Now particular things cannot be conceived without God. Part 1, Proposition 15. But inasmuch as Part 2, Proposition 6, they have God for their cause and so far as he is regarded under the attribute of which the things in question are modes, their ideas must necessarily involve Part 1, Axiom 4, the conception of the attributes of those ideas. That is, Part 1, Proposition 6, the eternal and infinite essence of God. Quaterrat demonstrandum. Note By existence I do not hear mean duration. That is, existence insofar as it is conceived abstractly and has a certain form of quantity. I am speaking of the very nature of existence which is assigned to particular things because they follow in infinite numbers and in infinite ways from the eternal necessity of God's nature. Part 1, Proposition 16. I am speaking, I repeat, of the very existence of particular things insofar as they are in God. For although each particular thing be conditioned by another particular thing to exist in a given way, yet the force whereby each particular thing perseveres in existing follows from the eternal necessity of God's nature. Part 1, Proposition 24. Corollary. End of Part 2. Propositions 41 to 45. Recording by Ernst Patinama. Part 2. Propositions 46 to 49 of the Ethics by Spinoza. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. The Ethics by Benedict de Spinoza. Translated by R. H. M. Elves. Part 2, Propositions 46 to 49. Proposition 46. The knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God which every idea involves is adequate and perfect. Proof. The proof of the last proposition is universal. And whether a thing be considered as a part or a whole, the idea thereof whether of the whole or over part by the last proposition will involve God's eternal and infinite essence. Wherefore that which gives knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God is common to all and is equally in the part and in the whole. Therefore, Part 2, Proposition 38, this knowledge will be adequate. Quodere demonstrando. Proposition 47. The human mind has an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God. Proof. The human mind has ideas Part 2, Proposition 22 from which Part 2, Proposition 23 it perceives itself and its own body Part 2, Proposition 19 and external bodies Part 2, Proposition 16, Corollary 1 and Part 2, Proposition 17 as actually existing. Therefore, Part 2, Propositions 45 and 46 it has an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God. Quodere demonstrando. Note. Hence we see that the infinite essence and the eternity of God are known to all. Now as all things are in God and are conceived through God we can from this knowledge infer many things which we may adequately know and we may form that third kind of knowledge of which we spoke in the note to Part 2, Proposition 40 and of the excellence and use of which we shall have occasion to speak in Part 5. Men have not so clear knowledge of God as they have of general notions because they are unable to imagine God as they do bodies and also because they have associated the name God with images of things that they are in the habit of seeing as indeed they can hardly avoid doing being as they are men and continually affected by external bodies. Many errors in truth can be traced to this head namely that we do not apply names to things rightly. For instance, when a man says that the lines drawn from the center of a circle to its circumference are not equal he then at all events assuredly attaches a meaning to the word circle different from that assigned by mathematicians. So again, when men make mistakes in calculation they have one set of figures in their mind and another on the paper. If we could see into their minds they do not make a mistake. They seem to do so because we think that they have the same numbers in their mind as they have on the paper. If this were not so we should not believe them to be an error any more than I thought that a man was an error whom I lately heard exclaiming that his entrance hall had flown into a neighbor's home for his meaning seemed to me sufficiently clear. Very many controversies have a reason from the fact that men do not rightly explain their meaning or do not rightly interpret the meaning of others. Or as a matter of fact as they flatly contradict themselves they assume now one side now another of the argument so as to oppose their opinions which they consider mistaken and absurd in their opponents. Proposition 48 In the mind there is no absolute or free will but the mind is determined to wish this or that by a cause which has also been determined by another cause and this last by another cause and so on to infinity. Proof The mind is a fixed and definite mode of thought. Part 2, Proposition 11 Therefore it cannot be the free cause of its actions. Part 1, Proposition 17, Corollary 2 in other words it cannot have an absolute faculty of positive or negative volition but by Part 1, Proposition 28 it must be determined by a cause which has also been determined by another cause and this last by another, etc. Cordera demonstrandum Note In the same way it is proved that the reason in the mind no absolute faculty of understanding, desiring, loving, etc. and it follows that these and similar faculties are either entirely fictitious or are merely abstract and general terms such as we are accustomed to put together from particular things. Thus the intellect and the will stand in the same relation to this or that idea or this or that volition as lapidity to this or that stone or as man to Peter and Paul. Because which leads man to consider themselves free has been set forth in the appendix to Part 1. But before I proceed further I would here remark that by the will to affirm and decide I mean the faculty, not the desire. I mean I repeat the faculty whereby the mind affirms or denies what is true or false and the desire where with the mind wishes for or turns away from any given thing. After we have proved that these faculties of ours are general notions which cannot be distinguished from the particular instances on which they are based we must inquire whether volitions themselves are anything besides the ideas of things. We must inquire I say whether there is in the mind any affirmation or negation beyond that which the idea insofar as it is an idea involves. On which subjects in the following proposition and Part 2 Definition 3 lest the idea of pictures should suggest itself. For by ideas I do not mean images such as are formed at the back of the eye or in the midst of the brain but the conceptions of thought. Proposition 49 there is in the mind no volition or affirmation and negation save that which an idea in as much as it is an idea involves. Proof there is in the mind no absolute faculty of positive or negative volition but only particular volitions namely these of that affirmation and these of that negation. Now let us conceive a particular volition namely the mode of thinking whereby the mind affirms that the three interior angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. This affirmation involves the conception or idea of a triangle that is without the idea of a triangle it cannot be conceived. It is the same thing to say that the concept A must involve the concept B as it is to say that A cannot be conceived without B. Further, this affirmation cannot be made part 2 axiom 3 without the idea of a triangle. Therefore, this affirmation can neither be nor be conceived without the idea of a triangle. Again, this idea of a triangle must involve this same affirmation namely that its three interior angles are equal to two right angles. Therefore, and vice versa, this idea of a triangle can neither be nor be conceived without this affirmation. Therefore, this affirmation belongs to the essence of the idea of a triangle and is nothing besides. What we have said of this volition in as much as we have selected it at random may be said of any other volition namely that it is nothing but an idea. Quarter Demonstrandum Corollary Will and understanding are one and the same. Proof Will and understanding are nothing beyond the individual volitions and ideas. Part 2, Proposition 48 and Note but a particular volition and a particular idea are one and the same by the Fogauian Proposition. Therefore, Will and understanding are one and the same. Quarter Demonstrandum Note We have thus removed the cause which is commonly assigned for error for we have shown above that falsity consists solely in the privation of knowledge involved in ideas which are fragmentary and confused. Therefore, a false idea in as much as it is false does not involve certainty. When we say then that a man acquiesces in what is false and that he has no doubts on the subject we do not say that he is certain but only that he does not doubt or that he acquiesces in what is false in as much as there are no reasons which should cause his imagination to waver. Part 2, Proposition 44 and Note Thus, although the man be assumed to acquiesce in what is false we shall never say that he is certain for by certainty we mean something positive part 2, Proposition 43 and Note not merely the absence of doubt. However, in order that the Fogauian Proposition may be fully explained I will draw attention to a few additional points and I will furthermore answer the objections which may be advanced against our doctrine. Lastly, in order to remove every scruple I have thought it worthwhile to point out some of the advantages which follow therefrom. I say some, for they will be better appreciated from what we shall set forth in the fifth part. I begin then with the first point and one my readers to make an accurate distinction between an idea or conception of the mind in the images of things which we imagine. It is further necessary that they should distinguish between idea and words whereby we signify things. These three, namely images, words and ideas are by many persons either entirely confused together or not distinguished with sufficient accuracy of care and hence people are generally in ignorance how absolutely necessary is the knowledge of this doctrine of the will both for philosophical purposes and for the wise ordering of life. Those who think that ideas consist in images which are formed in us by contact with external bodies persuade themselves that the ideas of those things whereof we can form no mental picture are not ideas but only figments which we invent by the free decree of our will. These are regard ideas as though they were inanimate pictures on a panel and filled with this misconception do not see that an idea inasmuch as it is an idea involves an affirmation or negation. Again, those who confuse words with ideas or with the affirmation which an idea involves think that they can wish something contrary to what they feel, affirm or deny. This misconception will easily be laid aside by one who reflects on the nature of knowledge and seeing that it in no wise involves the conception of extension will therefore clearly understand that an idea being a mode of thinking does not consist in the image of anything nor in words. The essence of words and images is put together by bodily motions which in no wise involve the conception of thought. These few words on this subject will suffice. I will therefore pass on to consider the objections which may be raised against our doctrine. Of these, the first is advanced by those who think that the will has a wider scope than the understanding and that, therefore, it is different therefrom. The reason for their holding the belief that the will has a wider scope than the understanding is that they assert that they have no need of an increase in their faculty of ascent, that is, of affirmation or negation, in order to ascend to an infinity of things which we do not perceive, but that they have need of an increase in their faculty of understanding. The will is thus distinguished from the intellect, the latter being finite and the former infinite. Secondly, it may be objected that experience seems to teach us especially clearly that we are able to suspend our judgment before ascending to things which we perceive. This is confirmed by the fact that no one is said to be deceived so far as he perceives anything, but only in so far as he ascends or descends. For instance, he who feigns a winged horse does not therefore admit that a winged horse exists, that is, he is not deceived unless he admits in addition that a winged horse does exist. Nothing, therefore, seems to be taught more clearly by experience than that the will of faculty of ascent and the different from the faculty of understanding. Thirdly, it may be objected that one affirmation does not apparently contain more reality than another. In other words, that we do not seem to need for affirming that what is true is true any greater power than for affirming that what is false is true. We have, however, seen that one idea has more reality or perfection than another for his objects are some more excellent than others so also are the ideas of them some more excellent than others. This also seems to point to a difference between the understanding and the will. Fourthly, it may be objected if man does not act from free will, what will happen if the incentives to action are equally balanced as in the case of Burdan's ass? Will he perish of hunger and thirst? If I say that he would, I shall seem to have in my thoughts an ass or the statue of a man rather than an actual man. If I say that he would not, he would then determine his own action and would consequently possess the faculty of going and doing whatever he liked. Other objections might also be raised, but as I am not bound to put in evidence everything that anyone may dream, I will only set myself to the task of refuting those I have mentioned and that as briefly as possible. To the first objection I answer that I admit that the will has a wider scope than the understanding if by the understanding be meant only clear and distinct ideas. But I deny that the will has a wider scope than the perceptions and the faculty of forming conceptions. Nor do I see why the faculty of volition should be called infinite any more than the faculty of failing. For as we are able by the same faculty of volition to affirm an infinite number of things, one after the other, for we cannot affirm an infinite number simultaneously, so also can we by the same faculty of feeling fail or perceive in succession an infinite number of bodies. If it be said that there is an infinite number of things which we cannot perceive, I answer that we cannot attain to such things by any thinking nor consequently by any faculty of volition. But it may still be urged if God wished to bring it about that we should perceive them he would be obliged to endow us with a greater faculty of perception, but not a greater faculty of volition that we have already. This is the same as to say that if God wished to bring it about that we should understand an infinite number of other entities, it would be necessary for him to give us a greater understanding but not a more universal idea of entity than that which we have already in order to grasp such infinite entities. We have shown that will is a universal entity or idea whereby we explain all particular volitions in other words that which is common to all such volitions. As then our opponents maintain that this idea common or universal to all volitions is a faculty, it is little to be wondered that they assert that such a faculty extends itself into the infinite beyond the limits of the understanding. For what is universal is predicated a like of one, of many and of an infinite number of individuals. To the second objection I reply by denying that we have a free power of suspending our judgment. For when we say that anyone suspends his judgment we merely mean that he sees that he does not perceive the matter in question adequately. Suspension of judgment is therefore strictly speaking a perception and not free will. In order to illustrate the point let us suppose a boy imagining a horse and perceive nothing else. And as much as this imagination involves the existence of the horse prior to proposition 17 corollary and the boy does not perceive anything which would exclude the existence of the horse. He will necessarily regard the horse as present. He will not be able to doubt of its existence although he be not certain thereof. We have daily experience of such a state of things and dreams and I do not suppose that there is anyone who would maintain that while he is dreaming he has the free power of understanding his judgment concerning the things in his dream and bringing it about that he should not dream those things which he dreams that he sees. Yet it happens notwithstanding that even in dreams we suspend our judgment namely when we dream that we are dreaming. Further I grant that no one can be deceived so far as actual perception extends. That is I grant that the mind's explanations regarded in themselves do not involve error. Part 2 proposition 17 note. But I deny that the mind does not in the act of perception make any affirmation. For what is the perception of a winged horse savor farming that a horse has wings? If the mind could perceive nothing else but the winged horse it would regard the same as present to itself. It would have no reasons for doubting its existence nor any faculty of descent unless the imagination of a winged horse be joined to an idea which precludes the existence of the said horse. Or unless the mind perceives that the idea which it possess of a winged horse is inadequate in which case it will either necessarily deny the existence of such a horse or will necessarily be in doubt on the subject. I think that I have anticipated my answer to the third objection namely that the will is something universal which is predicated of all ideas and that it only signifies that which is common to all ideas namely an affirmation whose adequate essence must therefore in so far as it is thus conceived in the abstract be in every idea and be in this respect alone the same in all not in so far as it is considered as constituting the idea's essence. For in this respect particular affirmations differ one from the other as much as do ideas. For instance, the affirmation which involves the idea of a circle differs from that which involves the idea of a triangle as much as the idea of a circle differs from the idea of a triangle. Further I absolutely deny that we are in need of an equal power of thinking to affirm that that which is true is true and to affirm that that which is false is true. These two affirmations if we regard the mind are in the same relation to one another as being and not being. For there is nothing positive to the ideas which constitutes the actual reality of falsehood part to proposition 35 note and proposition 47 note. We must therefore conclude that we are easily deceived when we confuse the universals with the singular and the entities of reason and abstractions with realities. As for the fourth objection I am quite ready to admit that the man placed in the room described namely as perceiving nothing but hunger and thirst a certain food and a certain drink each equally distant from him would therefore hunger and thirst. If I am asked whether such and one should not rather be considered an asset than a man I answer that I do not know neither do I know how a man should be considered who hangs himself or how we should consider children and fools, madmen etc. It remains to point out the advantages of the knowledge of this doctrine as bearing on conduct and this may be easily gathered from what has been said. The doctrine is good one. Inasmuch as it teaches us to act solely according to the decree of God and to be partakers in the divine nature and so much the more as we perform more perfect actions and more and more understand God. Such a doctrine not only completely tranquilizes our spirit but also shows us where our highest happiness or blessedness is namely solely in the knowledge of God whereby we are led to act only as love and piety shall be thus. We may thus clearly understand how far astray from a true estimate of virtue are those who expect to be decorated by God with high rewards for their virtue and their best actions as for having endured the direct slavery as the virtue and the service of God were not in itself happiness and perfect freedom. 2. Inasmuch as it teaches us how we ought to conduct ourselves with respect to the gifts of fortune or matters which are not in our power and do not follow from our nature. For it shows us that we should await and endure fortune's smiles or frowns with an equal mind seeing that all things follow from the eternal decree of God by the same necessity as it follows from the essence of a triangle that the three angles are equal to two right angles. 3. This doctrine raises social life inasmuch as it teaches us to hate no man neither to despise, to derive to envy or to be angry with any. Further, as it tells us that each should be content with his own and helpful to his neighbor not from any womanish pity, favor or superstition but solely by the guidance of reason according as the time and occasion demand as I will show in part 3. 4. Lastly, this doctrine confers no small advantage on the Commonwealth for it teaches how citizens should be governed and led not so as to become slaves but so that they may freely do whatsoever things are best. I have thus fulfilled the promise made at the beginning of this note and I thus bring the second part of my treatise to a close. I think I have there been the nature and properties of the human mind at sufficient length and considering the difficulty of the subject with sufficient cleanliness. I have laid a foundation whereon may be raised many excellent conclusions of the highest utility and most necessary to be known as well in what follows be partly made plain. End of part 2 Propositions 46 to 49 End of part 2 Part 3 Definitions and Postulates of the Ethics by Spinoza This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org The Ethics by Benedict de Spinoza translated by R. H. M. Elvis Part 3 Opinions and Postulates Part 3 On the Origin and Nature of the Emotions Most writers on the emotions and on human conduct seem to be treating rather of matters outside nature than of natural phenomena following nature's general laws. They appear to conceive man to be situated in nature as a kingdom within a kingdom for they believe that he serves rather than follows nature's order that he has absolute control over his actions and that he is determined solely by himself. They attribute human infirmities and fickleness not to the power of nature in general but to some mysterious flaw in the nature of man which accordingly they bemoan, deride, despise or as usually happens abuse. He who succeeds in hitting off the weakness of the human mind more eloquently or more acutely than his fellows is looked upon as a seer. Still, there has been no lack of very excellent men to whose toil and industry I confess myself much indebted who have written many noteworthy things concerning the right way of life and have given much sage advice to mankind. But no one so far as I know has defined the nature and strength of the emotions and the power of the mind against them for their restraint. I do not forget that the illustrious Decart though he believed that the mind has absolute power over his actions strove to explain human emotions by their primary causes and at the same time to point out a way by which the mind might attain to absolute dominion over them. However, in my opinion he accomplishes nothing beyond the display of the acuteness of his own great intellect as I will show in the proper place. For the present I wish to revert to those who would rather abuse or deride human emotions than understand them. Such persons will, darkless think it strange that I should attempt to treat a human vice and folly geometrically I wish to set forth with rigid reasoning those matters which they cry out against as repugnant to reason frivolous, absurd and dreadful. However, such is my plan. Nothing comes to pass in nature which can be set down to a flaw therein. For nature is always the same and everywhere one and the same in her efficacy and power of action. That is, nature's laws and ordinances whereby all things come to pass and change from one form to another are everywhere and always the same. So that there should be one and the same method of understanding the nature of all things whatsoever namely through nature's universal laws and rules. Thus the passions of hatred, anger, envy and so on, considered in themselves follow from this same necessity and efficacy of nature. They answer to certain definite causes through which they are understood and possess certain properties as worthy of being known as the properties of anything else whereof the contemplation in itself affords us delight. I shall therefore treat of the nature and strength of the emotions according to the same method as I employed heretofore in my investigations concerning God and the mind. I shall consider human actions and desires in exactly the same manner as though I were concerned with lines, planes and solids. Definitions 1. By an adequate cause, I mean a cause through which its effect can be clearly and distinctly perceived. By an inadequate or partial cause, I mean a cause through which by itself its effect cannot be understood. 2. I say that we act when anything takes place either within us or externally to us whereof we are the adequate cause. That is, by the foregoing definition, when through our nature something takes place within us or externally to us which can through our nature alone be clearly and distinctly understood. On the other hand, I say that we are passive as regard something when that something takes place within us or follows from our nature externally, we being only the partial cause. 3. By emotion, I mean the modifications of the body whereby the active power of the said body is increased or diminished, aided or constrained and also the ideas of such modifications. Note a beanie. If we can be the adequate cause of any of these modifications I then call the emotion an activity, otherwise I call it a passion or a state wherein the mind is passive. 4. Postulates. 1. The human body can be affected in many ways whereby its power of activity is increased or diminished and also in other ways which do not render its power either greater or less. Note a beanie. This postulate or axiom rests on postulate 1 and lemmas 5 and 7 which see after part 2 Proposition 13. 2. The human body can undergo many changes and nevertheless retain the impressions or traces of objects. Confer part 2. Postulate 5. And consequently the same images of things. See note part 2 Proposition 17. End of part 3 Definitions and Postulates. Part 3 Propositions 1 to 5 of the Ethics by Spinoza. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org The Ethics by Benedict Spinoza. Translated by R.H.M.Ls Part 3 Propositions 1 to 5 Proposition 1. Our mind is in certain cases active and in certain cases passive. Insofar as it has adequate ideas it is necessarily active and insofar as it has inadequate ideas it is necessarily passive. Proof In every human mind there are some adequate ideas and some ideas that are fragmentary and confused. Part 2 Proposition 40 Those ideas which are adequate in the mind are also adequate in God and as much as he constitutes the essence of the mind Part 2 Proposition 40 Corollary And those which are inadequate in the mind are likewise by the same corollary Adequate in God not in as much as he contains in himself the essence of the given mind alone but as he at the same time contains the minds of other things. Again from any given idea some effect must necessarily follow Part 1 Proposition 36 Of this effect God is the adequate cause Part 3 Definition 1 Not in as much as he is infinite but in as much as he is conceived as affected by the given idea Part 2 Proposition 9 But of that effect where of God is the cause and as much as he is affected by an idea which is adequate in a given mind of that effect I repeat the mind in question is the adequate cause Part 2 Proposition 11 Corollary Therefore our mind Part 3 Definition 2 Is in certain cases necessarily active This was our first point Again whatsoever necessarily follows from the idea which is adequate in God not by virtue of his possessing in himself the mind of one man only but by virtue of his containing together with the mind of that one man the minds of other things also of such an effect Part 2 Proposition 11 The mind of the given man is not an adequate but only a partial cause Thus Part 3 Definition 2 The mind in as much as it has inadequate ideas is in certain cases necessarily passive This was our second point Therefore our mind etc. Corollary Hence it follows that the mind is more or less liable to be active upon in proportion as it possesses inadequate ideas and contrary wise is more or less active in proportion as it possesses adequate ideas Proposition 2 Body cannot determine mind to think neither can mind determine body to motion or rest or any state different from these if such there be Proof All modes of thinking have for their cause God by virtue of his being a thinking thing and not by virtue of his being displayed under any other attribute Part 2 Proposition 6 That therefore which determines the mind to thought is a mode of thought and not a mode of extension That is Part 2 Definition 1 It is not a body Again The motion and rest of a body must arise from another body which has also been determined to a state of motion or rest by a third body and absolutely everything which takes place in a body must spring from God insofar as he is regarded as affected by some mode of extension and not by some mode of thought Part 2 Proposition 6 That is it cannot spring from the mind which is a mode of thought This was our second point Therefore body cannot determine mind etc. Note This is made more clear by what was said in the note Part 2 Proposition 7 Namely that mind and body are one and the same thing Conceived first under the attribute of thought Secondly under the attribute of extension Thus it follows that the order or concatenation of things is identical whether nature be conceived under the one attribute or the other Consequently the order of states of activity and passivity in our body is simultaneous in nature with the order of states of activity and passivity in the mind The same conclusion is evident from the manner in which we proved Part 2 Proposition 12 Nevertheless though such is the case and though there be no further room for doubt I can scarcely believe until the fact is proved by experience that men can be induced to consider the question calmly and fairly so firmly are they convinced that it is merely at the bidding of the mind that the body is set in motion or at rest or performs a variety of actions depending solely on the mind's will or the exercise of thought However no one has hitherto laid down the limits to the powers of the body that is, no one has as yet been taught by experience what the body can accomplish solely by the laws of nature insofar as she is regarded as extension No one hitherto has gained such an accurate knowledge of the bodily mechanism that he can explain all its functions Nor need I call attention to the fact that many actions are observed in the lower animals in human sagacity and at some nimbulus do many things in their sleep which they would not venture to do when awake These instances are enough to show that the body can by the sole laws of its nature do many things which the mind wonders at Again no one knows how or by what means the mind moves the body nor how many various degrees of motion it can impart to the body nor how quickly it can move it Thus when men say that this or that physical action has its origin in the mind which latter has dominion over the body they are using words without meaning or are confessing in specious phraseology that they are ignorant of the cause of the said action and do not wonder at it But they will say whether we know or do not know the means whereby the mind acts on the body we have at any rate experience of the fact that unless the human mind is in a fit state to think the body remains inert Moreover we have experience that the mind alone can determine whether we speak or are silent and a variety of similar states which accordingly we say depend on the mind's decree But as to the first point I ask such objectors whether experience does not also teach that if the body be inactive the mind is simultaneously unfitted for thinking for when the body is at rest and sleep the mind simultaneously is in a state of torpor also and has no power of thinking such as it possesses when the body is awake Again I think everyone's experience will confirm the statement that the mind is not at all times equally fit for thinking on a given subject but according as the body is more or less fitted for being stimulated by the image of this or that object so also is the mind more or less fitted for contemplating the said object But it will be urged it is impossible that solely from the laws of nature considered as extended substance we should be able to deduce the causes of buildings, pictures and things of that kind which are produced only by human art Nor would the human body unless it were determined and led by the mind be capable of building a single temple However I have just pointed out that the objectors cannot fix the limits of the body's power or say what can be concluded from a consideration of its sole nature whereas they have experience of many things being accomplished solely by the laws of nature which they would never have believed possible except under the direction of mind which are the actions performed by some nameless while asleep and wondered at by their performers when awake I would further call attention to the mechanism of the human body which far surpasses in complexity all that has been put together by human art not to repeat what I have already shown namely that from nature under whatever attribute she be considered infinite results follow As for the second objection I submit that the world would be much happier if men were as fully able to keep silence as they are to speak Experience abundantly shows that men can govern anything more easily than their tongues and restrain anything more easily than their appetites When it comes about that many believe that we are only free in respect to objects which we moderately desire because our desire for such can easily be controlled by the thought of something else frequently remembered but that we are by no means free in respect to what we seek with violent emotion for our desire cannot then be allayed with the remembrance of anything else However, unless such persons had proved by experience that we do many things which we afterwards repent of and again that we often when assailed by contrary emotions see the better and follow the worse there would be nothing to prevent their believing that we are free in all things Thus an infant believes that of its own free will it desires milk an angry child believes that it freely desires vengeance a timid child believes that it freely desires to run away Further, a drunken man believes that he utters from the free decision of his mind words which when he is sober he would willingly have withheld Thus, too, a delirious man a garrulous woman, a child and others of light complexion believe that they speak from the free decision of their mind when they are in reality unable to restrain their impulse to talk Experience teaches us no less clearly than reason that men believe themselves to be free simply because they are conscious of their actions and unconscious of the causes whereby those actions are determined and further it is plain that the dictates of the mind are but another name for the appetites and therefore vary according to the varying states of the body. Everyone shapes his actions according to his emotion Those who are assailed by conflicting emotions know not what they wish Those who are not attacked by any emotion are readily swayed this way or that All these considerations clearly show that a mental decision and a bodily appetite or determined state are simultaneous or rather are one and the same thing which we call decision when it is regarded under and explained through the attribute of thought and a conditioned state when it is regarded under the attribute of extension and deduced from the laws of motion and rest This will appear yet more plainly in the sequel For the present I wish to call attention to another point, namely not act by the decision of the mind unless we have a remembrance of having done so for instance, we cannot say a word without remembering that we have done so again it is not within free power of mind to remember or forget a thing it will therefore the freedom of the mind must in any case be limited to the power of uttering or not uttering something which it remembers but when we dream that we speak by the decision of the mind yet we do not speak or if we do it is by a spontaneous motion of the body again, we dream that we are concealing something and we seem to act from the same decision of the mind as that whereby we keep silence when awake concerning something we know Lastly, we dream that from the free decision of our mind we do something which we should not dare to do when awake we would like to know whether there be in the mind two sorts of decisions one sort elusive and the other sort free if our folly does not carry us so far as this we must necessarily admit that the decision of the mind which is believed to be free is not distinguishable from the imagination or memory and nothing is more than the affirmation which an idea by virtue of being an idea necessarily involves part two proposition 49 where for these decisions of the mind arise in the mind by the same necessity as the ideas of things actually existing therefore those who believe that they speak or keep silence or act in any way from the free decision of their mind do but dream with their eyes open proposition 3 the activities of the mind arise solely from adequate ideas the passive states of the mind depends solely on inadequate ideas proof the first element which constitutes the essence of the mind is nothing else but the idea of the actually existent body part two propositions 11 and 13 which proposition 15 is compounded of many other ideas where of some are adequate and some inadequate part two proposition 29 corollary part two proposition 38 corollary whatsoever therefore follows from the nature of mind and has mind for its proximate cause through which it must be understood must necessarily follow either from an adequate or from an inadequate idea but insofar as the mind part three one has inadequate ideas it is necessarily passive where for the activities of the mind follows solely from adequate ideas and accordingly the mind is only passive insofar as it has inadequate ideas quad erit demonstrandum note thus we see that passive states are not attributed to the mind except insofar as it contains something involving negation or insofar as it is regarded as a part of nature which cannot be clearly and distinctly perceived through itself without other parts I could thus show that passive states are attributed to individual things in the same way they are attributed to the mind and that they cannot otherwise be perceived but my purpose is solely to treat of the human mind proposition four nothing can be destroyed except by a cause external to itself proof this proposition is self evident for the definition of anything affirms the essence of that thing but does not negative it in other words it postulates the essence of the thing but does not take it away so long therefore as we regard only the thing itself without taking into account external causes we shall not be able to find in it anything which could destroy it without edit to monster them proposition five things are naturally contrary that is cannot exist in the same object insofar as one is capable of destroying the other proof if they could agree together or coexist in the same object there would then be in the set object something which could destroy it but this by the foregoing proposition is absurd therefore this is a and of part three propositions one to five part three propositions six to ten of the ethics by spinosa this is a liberal walks recording all liberal walks recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit liberal walks dot org the ethics by benedict the spinosa translated by our h.m. Elvis part three propositions six to ten proposition six everything insofar as it is in itself and a verse to persist in its own being proof individual things are modes whereby the attributes of God are expressed in a given determinant manner part one proposition 25 corollary that is part one proposition 34 there are things which express in a given determinant manner the power of God whereby God is and acts now nothing contains in itself anything whereby it can be destroyed or which can take away its existence part three proposition four but contrary wise it is opposed to all take away its existence part three proposition five therefore insofar as it can and insofar as it is in itself it endeavors to persist in its own being quad errat demonstrandom proposition seven the endeavor where with everything endeavors to persist in its own being is nothing else but the actual essence of the thing in question proof from the given essence of anything certain consequences necessarily follow part one proposition 36 nor have things any power save such as necessarily follows from their nature as determined part one proposition 29 where for the power of any given thing or the endeavor whereby either alone or with other things it acts or endeavors to act that is part three proposition six the power or endeavor where with it endeavors to persist in its own being is nothing else but the given or actual essence of the thing in question quad errat demonstrandom proposition eight the endeavor whereby a thing endeavors to persist in its own being involves no finite time but an indefinite time proof if it involved a limited time which should determine the duration of the thing it would then follow solely from that power whereby the thing exists that the thing could not exist beyond the limits of that time but that it must be destroyed but this part three proposition four is absurd where for the endeavor where with a thing exists involves no definite time but contrary wise since part three proposition four it will by the same power whereby it already exists always continue to exist unless it be destroyed by some external cause this endeavor involves an indefinite time proposition nine the mind both in so far as it has clear and distinct ideas and also in so far as it has confused ideas endeavors to persist in its being for an indefinite period and of this endeavor it is conscious proof the essence of the mind is constituted by adequate and inadequate ideas part three proposition three therefore part three proposition seven both in so far as it possesses the former and in so far as it possesses the latter it endeavors to persist in its own being and that for an indefinite time part three proposition eight now as the mind part two proposition 23 is necessarily conscious of itself through the ideas of the modifications of the body the mind is therefore part three proposition seven conscious of its own endeavor note this endeavor when referred solely to the mind will when referred to the mind and body in conjunction it is called appetite it is in fact nothing else but man's essence from the nature of which necessarily follow all those results which tend to its preservation and which man has thus been determined to perform further between appetite and desire there is no difference except that the term desire is generally applied to men in so far as they are conscious of their appetite and may accordingly be thus defined desire is appetite with consciousness thereof it is thus plain from what has been said that in no case do we strive for wish for long for or desire anything because we deem it to be good but on the other hand we deem a thing to be good because we strive for it wish for it long for it or desire it proposition ten an idea which excludes the existence of our body cannot be postulated in our mind but is contrary there too proof whatsoever can destroy our body cannot be postulated therein part three proposition five therefore neither can the idea of such a thing occur in God in so far as he has the idea of our body part two proposition nine corollary that is part two propositions eleven thirteen the idea of that thing cannot be postulated as in our mind but contrary wise since part two propositions eleven thirteen the first element that constitutes the essence of the mind is the idea of the human body is actually existing it follows that the first and chief endeavor of our mind is the endeavor to affirm the existence of our body thus an idea which negatives the existence of our body is contrary to our mind etc. quad errat demonstrandom end of part three propositions six to ten part three propositions two to fifteen of the ethics by spinotsa this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recording by Morgan Scorpion the ethics by Benedict Dispinotsa translated by R. H. M. Ellis part three propositions eleven to fifteen proposition eleven whatsoever increases or diminishes helps or hinders the power of activity in our body the idea thereof increases or diminishes helps or hinders the power of thought in our mind proof this proposition is evident from part two proposition seven or from part two proposition fourteen note thus we see that the mind can undergo many changes and can pass sometimes to a state of greater perfection sometimes to a state of lesser perfection these passive states of transition explain to us the emotions of pleasure and pain by pleasures therefore in the following propositions I shall signify a passive state wherein the mind passes to a greater perfection by pain I shall signify a passive state wherein the mind passes to a lesser perfection further the emotion of pleasure in reference to the body and mind together I shall call stimulation titillatio or merriment the emotion of pain in the same relation I shall call suffering or melancholy but we must bear in mind that stimulation and suffering are attributed to man when one part of his nature is more affected than the rest merriment and melancholy when all parts are alike affected what I mean by desire I have explained in the notes to proposition nine of this part in these three I recognize no other primary emotion I will show as I proceed that all other emotions arise from these three but before I go further I should like here to explain at greater length proposition ten of this part in order that we may clearly understand how one idea is contrary to another in the notes to part two proposition seventeen we showed that the idea of mind involves the existence of body so long as the body itself exists again it follows from what we pointed out in the corollary to part two proposition eight that the present existence of our mind depends solely on the fact that the mind involves the actual existence of the body lastly we showed part two proposition seventeen eighteen and note that the power of the mind whereby it imagines and remembers things also depends on the fact that it involves the actual existence of the body whence it follows that the present existence of the mind and its power of imagining are removed as soon as the mind seizes to affirm the present existence of the body now the cause why the mind seizes to affirm this existence of the body cannot be the mind itself part three proposition four nor again the fact that the body ceases to exist four by part two proposition six the cause why the mind affirms the existence of the body is not that the body began to exist therefore for the same reason it does not cease to affirm the existence of the body because the body ceases to exist but part two proposition seventeen this result follows from another idea which excludes the present existence and consequently of our mind and which is therefore contrary to the idea constituting the essence of the mind proposition twelve the mind as far as it can endeavors to conceive those things which increase or help the power of activity in the body proof so long as the human body is affected in a mode which involves the nature of any external body the human mind will regard that external body as present part two proposition seventeen and consequently part two proposition seven so long as the human mind regards an external body as present that is part two proposition seventeen note conceives it the human body is affected in a mode which involves the nature of the said external body thus so long as the mind conceives things which increase or help the power of activity in our body the body is affected in modes which increase or help its power of activity part three postulate one consequently part three proposition eleven the mind's power of thinking is for that period increased or helped thus part three proposition seven and proposition nine the mind as far as it can endeavors to imagine such things proposition thirteen when the mind conceives things which diminish or hinder the body's power of activity it endeavors as far as possible to remember things which exclude the existence of the first named things so long as the mind conceives anything of the kind alluded to the power of the mind and body is diminished or constrained cf part three proposition twelve nevertheless it will continue to conceive it until the mind conceives something else which excludes the present existence thereof part two proposition seventeen that is as I have just shown the power of the mind and of the body is diminished or constrained until the mind conceives something else which excludes the existence of the former thing conceived therefore the mind part three proposition nine as far as it can will endeavor to conceive or remember the latter called irate demonstrandom corollary hence it follows that the mind shrinks from conceiving those things which diminish or constrain the power of itself and of the body note from what has been said we may clearly understand the nature of love and hate love is nothing else but pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause hate is nothing else but pain accompanied by the idea of an external cause we further see that he who loves necessarily endeavors to have and to keep present to him the object of his love while he who hates endeavors to remove and destroy the object of his hatred but I will treat of these matters at more than hereafter proposition fourteen if the mind has once been affected by two emotions at the same time it will whenever it is afterwards affected by one of these two be also affected by the other proof if the human body has once been affected by two bodies at once whenever afterwards the mind conceives one of them it will straight away remember the other also part two proposition eighteen but the mind's conceptions indicate rather the emotions of our body than the nature of external bodies part two proposition sixteen corollary two therefore if the body and consequently the mind part three definition three has been once affected by two emotions at the same time it will whenever it is afterwards affected by one of the two be also affected by the other proposition fifteen anything can accidentally be the cause of pleasure pain or desire proof let it be granted that the mind is simultaneously affected by two emotions of which one neither increases nor diminishes its power of activity and the other does neither increase or diminish the said power three postulate one from the foregoing proposition it is evident that whenever the mind is afterwards affected by the former through its true cause which by hypothesis neither increases nor diminishes its power of action it will be at the same time affected by the latter which does increase or diminish its power of activity that is part three proposition eleven it will be affected with pleasure or pain thus the former of the two emotions will not through itself but accidentally be the cause of pleasure or pain in the same way also it can be easily shown that a thing may be accidentally the cause of desire called errat demonstrandum corollary simply from the fact that we have regarded a thing with the emotion of pleasure or pain though that thing be not the efficient cause of the emotion we can either love or hate it proof for from this fact alone it arises part three proposition fourteen that the mind afterwards conceiving the said thing is affected with the emotion of pleasure or pain that is part three proposition eleven note according as the power of the mind and body may be increased or diminished etc and consequently part three proposition twelve according as the mind may desire or shrink from the conception of it part three proposition thirteen corollary in other words part three proposition thirteen note according as it may love or hate the same called errat demonstrandum note hence we understand how it may happen that we love or hate a thing without any cause for our emotion being known to us merely as a phrases from sympathy or antipathy we should refer to the same category those objects which affect us pleasurably or painfully simply because they resemble other objects which affect us in the same way this I will show in the next proposition I am aware that certain authors who were the first to introduce these terms sympathy and antipathy wished to signify thereby some occult qualities in things nevertheless I think we may be permitted to use the same terms to indicate known or manifest qualities end of part three propositions eleven to fifteen part three propositions sixteen to twenty of the ethics by Spinoza this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recording by Morgan Scorpion the ethics by Benedict de Spinoza translated by R. H. M. Ellwes part three propositions sixteen to twenty propositions sixteen simply from the fact that we conceive that a given object has some point of resemblance with another object which is wont to affect the mind pleasurably or painfully although the point of resemblance be not the efficient cause of the said emotions we shall still regard the first named object with love or hate truth the point of resemblance was in the context by hypothesis when we regarded it with pleasure or pain thus part three proposition fourteen when the mind is affected by the image thereof it will straight way be affected by one or the other emotion and consequently the thing which we perceive to have the same point of resemblance will be accidentally part three proposition fifteen a cause of pleasure or pain thus by the foregoing corollary although the point in which the two objects resemble one another be not the efficient cause of the emotion we shall still regard the first named object with love or hate called erat demonstrandom proposition seventeen if we conceive that a thing which is wont to affect us painfully has any point of resemblance with another thing which is wont to affect us with an equally strong emotion of pleasure we shall hate the first named thing and at the same time we shall love it poof the given thing is by hypothesis in itself a cause of pain and part three proposition thirteen note in so far as we imagine it with this emotion we shall hate it further in as much as we conceive that it has some point of resemblance to something else which is wont to affect us with an equally strong emotion of pleasure we shall with an equally strong impulse of pleasure love it part three proposition sixteen thus we shall both hate and love the same thing called erat demonstrandom note this disposition of the mind which arises from two contrary emotions is called vacillation it stands to the emotions in the same relation as doubt does to the imagination part three proposition forty four note vacillation and doubt do not differ one from the other except as greater differs from less but we must bear in mind that I have deduced this vacillation from causes which give rise through themselves to one of the emotions and to the other accidentally I have done this in order that they might be more easily deduced from what went before but I do not deny that vacillation of the disposition generally arises from an object of the efficient cause of both emotions the human body is composed part two postulate one of a variety of individual parts of different nature and may therefore axiom one after lemma three after part two proposition thirteen be affected in a variety of different ways by one and the same body and contrary wise as one and the same thing can be affected in many ways but also in many different ways affect one and the same part of the body hence we can easily conceive that one and the same object may be the cause of many and conflicting emotions proposition eighteen a man is as much affected pleasurably or painfully by the image of a thing past or future as by the image of a thing present proof so long as a man is affected by the image of anything he will regard that as present even though it be non-existent part two proposition seventeen and corollary he will not conceive it as past or future except insofar as its image is joined to the image of a time past or future part two proposition forty four notes where for the image of a thing regarded in itself alone is identical whether it be referred to time past time future or time present that is part two proposition sixteen corollary the disposition or emotion of the body is identical whether the image be of a thing past future or present thus the emotion of pleasure or pain is the same whether the image be of a thing past or future called erat demonstrandom note one I shall call a thing past or future according as we either have been or shall be affected thereby for instance according as we have seen it or are about to see it according as it has recreated us or will recreate us according as it has harmed us or will harm us for as we thus conceive it we affirm its existence that is the body is affected by no emotion which excludes the existence of the thing and therefore part two proposition seventeen the body is affected by the image of the thing in the same way as if the thing were actually present however as it generally happens that those who have had many experiences vacillate so long as they regard a thing as future or past and are usually in doubt about its issue part two proposition forty four note it follows that the emotions which arise from similar images of things are not so constant but are generally disturbed by the other things until men become assured of the issue note two from what has just been said we understand what is meant by the terms hope fear confidence despair joy and disappointment footnote five conscientiae morse thus rendered by Mr. Pollock end of footnote five hope is nothing else but an inconstant pleasure arising from the image of something future or past whereof we do not yet know the issue fear on the other hand is an inconstant pain also arising from the image of something concerning which we are in doubt if the element of doubt be removed from these emotions hope becomes confidence and fear becomes despair in other words pleasure or pain arising from the image of something concerning which we have hoped or feared again joy is pleasure arising from the image of something past whereof we have doubted the issue disappointment is the pain opposed to joy proposition nineteen he who conceives that the object of his love is destroyed will feel pain if he conceives that it is preserved he will feel pleasure proof the mind as far as possible endeavors to conceive those things which increase or help the body's power of activity part three proposition twelve in other words part three proposition twelve note those things which it loves but the conception is helped by those things which postulate the existence of a thing and contrary wise is hindered by those which exclude the existence of a thing part two proposition seventeen therefore the images of things which postulate the existence of an object of love help the mind's endeavor to conceive the object of love in other words part three proposition eleven note affect the mind pleasurably contrary wise those things which exclude the existence of an object of love hinder the aforesaid mental endeavor in other words affect the mind painfully he therefore who conceives that the object of his love is destroyed will feel pain etc quad iraq demonstrandom proposition twenty he who conceives that the object of his hate is destroyed will also feel pleasure proof the mind part three proposition thirteen endeavors to conceive those things which exclude the existence of things whereby the body's power of activity is diminished or constrained that is part three proposition thirteen note it endeavors to conceive such things as exclude the existence of what it hates therefore the image of a thing which excludes the existence of what the mind hates helps the aforesaid mental effort in other words part three proposition eleven note affects the mind pleasurably thus he who conceives that the object of his hate is destroyed will feel pleasure quad iraq demonstrandom end of part three propositions sixteen to twenty part three propositions twenty-one to twenty-five of the ethics by spinutza this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recording by Morgan Scorpion the Ethics by Benedict Vispinozza translated by R. H. M. Ellers part three propositions twenty-one to twenty-five proposition twenty-one he who conceives that the object of his love is affected pleasurably or painfully will himself be affected pleasurably or painfully and the one or the other emotion will be greater or less in the lover according to which it is greater or less in the thing loved foothed the images of things as we showed in part three proposition nineteen which postulates the existence of the object of love help the mind endeavor to conceive the said object but pleasure postulates the existence of something feeling pleasure so much the more in proportion as the emotion of pleasure is greater it is proposition eleven a transition to a greater perfection therefore the image of pleasure in the object of love helps the mental endeavor of the lover that is it affects the lover pleasurably and so much the more in proportion as this emotion may have been greater in the object of love this was our first point further in so far as a thing is affected with pain it is to that extent destroyed the extent being in proportion to the amount of pain part three proposition eleven therefore he who conceives that the object of his love is affected painfully will himself be affected painfully in proportion as the said emotion is greater or less in the object of love quad errat proposition twenty-two if we conceive that anything pleasurably affects some object of our love we shall be affected with love towards that thing contrary wise if we conceive that it affects an object of our love painfully we shall be affected with hatred towards it proof he who affects pleasurably or painfully the object of our love affects us also pleasurably or painfully that is if we conceive the love object as affected with the said pleasure or pain part three proposition twenty-one but this pleasure or pain is postulated to come to us accompanied by the idea of an external cause therefore part three proposition thirteen if we conceive that anyone affects an object of our love pleasurably or painfully we shall be affected with love or hatred towards him quad errat demonstration proposition twenty-one explains to us the nature of pity which we may define as pain arising from another's hurt what term we can use for pleasure arising from another's gain I know not we will call the love towards him who confers a benefit on another approval we will call indignation we must further remark that we not only feel pity for a thing which we have loved as shown in part three proposition twenty-one but also for a thing which we have hitherto regarded without emotion provided that we deem that it resembles ourselves as I will show presently thus we bestow approval on one who has benefited anything resembling ourselves and contrary wise are indignant with him who has done it an injury proposition twenty-three he who conceives that an object of his hatred is painfully affected will feel pleasure contrary wise if he thinks that the said object is pleasurably affected he will feel pain each of these emotions will be greater or less according as its contrary is greater or less in the object of hatred foof foof insofar as the object of hatred is painfully affected it is destroyed to an extent proportioned to the strength of the pain part three proposition eleven note therefore he part three proposition twenty who conceives that some object of his hatred is painfully affected will feel pleasure to an extent proportioned to the amount of pain the object of his hatred this was our first point again pleasure postulates the existence of the pleasurably affected thing part three proposition eleven note in proportion as the pleasure is greater or less if anyone imagines that an object of his hatred is pleasurably affected this conception part three proposition eight will hinder his own endeavour to persist in other words part three proposition eleven note he who hates will be painfully affected quad erat demonstrandum note this pleasure can scarcely be felt unalloyed and without any mental conflict four as I am about to show in proposition twenty-seven insofar as a man conceives that something similar to himself is affected by pain himself be affected in like manner and he will have the contrary emotion in contrary circumstances but here we are regarding hatred only proposition twenty-four if we conceive that anyone pleasurably affects an object of our hate we shall feel hatred towards him also if we conceive that he painfully affects that said object we shall feel love towards him proof this proposition in the same way as three twenty-two which sees note these and similar emotions of hatred are attributable to envy which accordingly is nothing else but hatred insofar as it is regarded as disposing a man to rejoice in another's hurt and to grieve at another's advantage proposition twenty-five we endeavour to affirm concerning ourselves and concerning what we love everything that we can conceive to affect pleasurably ourselves or the loved object contrary wise we endeavour to negative everything which we conceive to affect painfully ourselves or the loved object proof that which we conceive to affect an object of our love pleasurably or painfully affects us also pleasurably or painfully part three proposition twenty-one but the mind proposition twelve endeavour as far as possible to conceive those things which affect us pleasurably in other words part two proposition seventeen and corollary it endeavour to regard them as present and contrary wise part three proposition thirteen it endeavour to exclude the existence of such things as affect us painfully therefore we endeavour to affirm concerning ourselves and concerning the loved object whatever we conceive to affect ourselves or the love object pleasurably end of part three for positions twenty-one to twenty-five part three for positions twenty-six to thirty of the ethics by Spinoza this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recording by Morban Scorpion the ethics by Benedictus Spinoza translated by R. H. M. Ellers part three for positions twenty-six to thirty for position twenty-six we endeavour to affirm concerning that which we hate everything which we conceive to affect it painfully and contrary wise we endeavour to deny concerning it everything which we conceive to affect it pleasurably Fou this proposition follows from part three for position twenty-three as the foregoing proposition followed from part three, proposition twenty-one note thus we see that it may readily happen that a man may easily think too highly of himself or a loved object and contrary wise too mainly of a hated object this feeling is called pride in reference to the man who thinks too highly of himself and is a species of madness wherein a man dreams with his eyes open thinking that he can accomplish all things that fall within the scope of his conception and therefore accounting them real and exulting in them so long as he is unable to conceive anything which excludes their existence and determines his own power of action pride therefore is pleasure springing from a man thinking too highly of himself again the pleasure which arises from a man thinking too highly of another is called over esteem whereas the pleasure which arises from thinking too little of a man is called disdain for position twenty-seven by the very fact that we conceive a thing which is like ourselves and which we have not regarded with any emotion to be affected with any emotion we are ourselves affected with a like emotion affect us proof the images of things are modifications of the human body whereof the ideas represent external bodies as present to us part two proposition seventeen in other words part two proposition ten whereof the ideas involve the nature of our body and at the same time the nature of the external bodies as present if therefore the nature of the external body be similar to the nature of our body then the idea which we form of the external body will involve a modification of our own body similar to the modification of the external body consequently if we conceive anyone similar to ourselves as affected by any emotion this conception will express a modification of our body similar to that emotion thus from the fact of conceiving a thing like ourselves to be affected with any emotion we are ourselves affected with a like emotion if however we hate the said thing like ourselves we shall to that extent be affected by a contrary and not similar emotion called irate demonstrandom note one this imitation of emotions when it is referred to pain is called compassion cf part three for position twenty two when it is referred to desire it is called emulation which is nothing else but the desire of anything endangered in us by the fact that we conceive that others have the like desire corollary one if we conceive that anyone whom we have hitherto regarded with no emotion pleasurably affects something similar to ourselves we shall be affected with love towards him if on the other hand we conceive that he painfully affects the same we shall be affected with hatred towards him this is proof from the last proposition in the same manner as part three proposition twenty two is proved from part three proposition twenty one corollary two we cannot hate a thing which we pity because its misery affects us painfully if we could hate it for this reason we should rejoice in its pain which is contrary to the hypothesis corollary three we seek to free from misery as far as we can a thing which we pity proof that which painfully affects the object of our pity affects us also with similar pain by the foregoing proposition therefore we shall endeavour to recall everything which removes its existence or which destroys it cf part three proposition thirteen in other words part three proposition nine note we shall desire to destroy it or we shall be determined for its destruction thus we shall endeavour to free from misery a thing which we pity called irat demonstrandom note two this will or appetite for doing good which arises from pity of the thing where only would confer a benefit is called benevolence and is nothing else but desire arising from compassion concerning love or hate towards him who has done good our harm to something which we conceive to be like ourselves c part three for position twenty-two note for position twenty-eight we endeavour to bring about whatsoever we conceive to conduce to pleasure but we endeavour to remove or destroy whatsoever we conceive to be truly repugnant there too or to conduce pain proof we endeavour as far as possible to conceive that which we imagine to conduce to pleasure part three proposition twelve in other words part two proposition seventeen we shall endeavour to conceive it as far as possible as present or actually existing but the endeavour of the mind or the mind's power of thought is equal to and simultaneous with the endeavour of the body or the body's power of action this is clear from part two proposition seven corollary and part two proposition eleven corollary therefore we make an absolute endeavour for its existence in other words which by part three proposition nine note come to the same thing we desire and strive for it this was our first point again if we conceive that something which we believe to be the cause of pain that is part three proposition thirteen note which we hate is destroyed we shall rejoice part three proposition twenty we shall therefore by the first part of this proof endeavour to destroy the same or part three proposition thirteen to remove it from us so that we may not regard it as present this was our second point wherefore what will ever conduces to pleasure etc quad errat demonstrandom proposition twenty nine also endeavour to do whatsoever we conserve men footnote six by men in this and the following propositions I mean men whom we regard without any particular emotion end of footnote six to regard with pleasure and contrary wise we shall shrink from doing that which we conceive men to shrink from proof from the fact of imagining that men love or hate anything we shall love or hate the same thing part three proposition twenty seven that is part three proposition thirteen note from this mere fact we shall feel pleasure or pain at the things presents and so we shall endeavour to do whatsoever we conceive men to love or regard with pleasure etc quad errat demonstrandom note this endeavour to do a thing or leave it under solely in order to please men we call ambition especially when we so eagerly endeavour to please the vulgar that we do or omit certain things to our own or another's hurt in other cases it is generally called kindness furthermore I give the name of praise to the pleasure with which we conceive the action of another whereby he has endeavour to please us but of blame to the pain wherewith we feel aversion to his action proposition thirty if anyone has done something which he conceives as affecting other men pleasurably he will be affected by pleasure accompanied by the idea of himself as cause in other words he will regard himself with pleasure on the other hand if he has done anything which he conceives as affecting others painfully he will regard himself with pain he who conceives that he affect others with pleasure or pain will by that very fact himself be affected with pleasure or pain part three proposition twenty-seven but as a man part two proposition nineteen and twenty-three is conscious of himself through the modifications whereby he is determined to action it follows that he who conceives that he affect others pleasurably will be affected with pleasure accompanied by the idea of himself as cause in other words he will regard himself with pleasure and store Mutatus Mutandis in the case of pain called Iraq Demonstrandum note as love part three proposition thirteen is pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause and hatred is pain accompanied by the idea of an external cause the pleasure and pain in question will be a species of love and hatred but as the terms love and hatred are used in reference to external objects we will employ other names for the emotions now under discussion pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause footnote seven we will style honour footnote seven so van Vloten and Ruder the Dutch version and camera read an internal calls honour equals Gloria and the emotion contrary there to we will style shame I mean in such cases as where pleasure or pain arises from a man's belief that he is being placed or blamed otherwise pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause is called self complacency and it's contrary pain is called repentance again as it may happen part two proposition twenty-seven corollary that the pleasure wherewith a man conceives that he affects others may exist solely in his own imagination and as part three proposition twenty-five everyone endeavors to conceive concerning himself that which he conceives will affect him with pleasure it may easily come to pass that a vain man be proud and may imagine that he is pleasing to all when in reality he may be an annoyance to all end of part three propositions twenty-six to thirty