 Professor Sirina Slakish will now change that geographical focus to Ireland and our final speaker for this session is Assistant Professor Ed Brick from the University of Nottingham. He's going to speak to us on the Irish sovereignty, cybersecurity and counterintelligence in the 21st century. So thank you, Professor Ed Brick. Thank you very much and thanks for the invitation today. It's nine years ago I was seconded by this department as a civilian to a CSTP mission in Afghanistan, the EU police mission. And I had the great pleasure there. Obviously it was a very Nordic-led mission at the time. And in terms of small states asserting themselves, I can tell you that when you watch a Finnish general have a serious meeting with a four-star American general in Asana, there are certain advantages that the Finns have in terms of getting their way. However, in terms of cultural differences, their Irish members of the mission can suffer a little bit in terms of note-taking and concentration. But I want to start with a historical anecdote and it's a slightly provocative one since I'm the last speaker before coffee. So in September 1974, not far from here, there was a rather awkward exchange between the head of the Anglo-Irish section of the Department of Foreign Affairs and the head of Chancery, the British Embassy. And the British have been caught. Essentially they shifted the course of HMS Ark Royal and aircraft carrier and they basically sent reconnaissance aircraft over Irish airspace to try and seek out IRA, Irish Republican Army, arms dumps in the Irish state. And of course Dublin Airport detected that, right? So that created an awkward moment. Now the British had even more awkward news. They wanted to do it again because they believed it had been quite successful. Now this created obviously serious concerns between the Department of Foreign Affairs in terms of sovereignty. On the one hand, you know, when it comes to the classic way of sort of looking at threats, they had detection had worked, detection. But in terms of deterrence and punishment, the options for Ireland at that point weren't great. I mean there was, essentially they were looking at, well, the Irish Air Corps had didn't have the aircraft intercept 30,000 feet over the over Irish airspace. And it was an embarrassing diplomatic incident for two allies really in the United Kingdom and Ireland in terms of sort of cooperating on counterterrorism within the island of Ireland. And so they looked at, you know, various options looking at kind of in terms of punishment. And obviously the EU wasn't an institution you could appeal to even clandestinely, you know, sort of covertly or otherwise to try and intervene. Ireland wasn't a member in NATO. So they ultimately decided that simply a rather secret diplomatic protest was kind of the best way to do things. And then Charles Whelan in this building said to the head of the chancellor, he said, look, if you're going to do it again, we can't stop it. Quote on quote. Right? So the British did do it. And actually inadvertently it proved quite useful in terms of intelligence for Ireland as well that were gathered by this, really was an, was a clandestine, initially at least a clandestine violation of Irish airspace. And that was done by an ally. So that goes to the heart of kind of small states dilemma, right, that comes to dealing with even very friendly largest states is that to what extent do we have the capacity to deter and even punish when sometimes even even not even friends or states that are in between sort of do things that we're not too pleased with when it comes to our sovereignty. And I suppose that's I really want us to go back to the theme of focusing on these themes of deterrence, detection and punishment. Today, these three elements are of course very back, very much back in sort of as a pressing priority, including for Ireland. Sovereignty in the digital era is obviously much, much harder to measure than it was in the 1970s. And so in terms of detection was easier, obviously in the Irish case in 1974. Right. So even today, in terms of sort of occasional Russian, or violations of Irish airspace, for example, you know, that can be detected reasonably. Other things such as cyber now is much more difficult to finding exactly who the author of a violation of Irish cyber security is are those of our partners in the NBA is extremely, it can be very, very difficult to deny ability is much more easier when it comes to cyber violations, including even from individuals or institutions that are based in Russia, for example. And so, of course, so whereas intelligence activities in the Cold War could be more readily comprehended, if not always detected, and did have some discernible patterns today, obviously, as some of the previous speakers, and indeed, the permanent secretary from Iceland also referred to in his intervention, and it is it is much more difficult sometimes to identify the fingerprints on certain actions when it comes to cyberspace. And we've seen really Ireland has seen a proliferation of threats to its security on three unconventional fronts over the last 10 years. First, there has been a significant escalation of the threat from international jihadist terrorism, including from returning fighters from the wars in Libya and Syria. And of course, friends from Finland and Sweden can attest very sadly and tragically that neutrality doesn't exempt you from these type of threats. These attacks do happen and have happened in those countries. And indeed, Ireland and Cardi Shikhauna and others here are having to work very, very hard to ensure that such a situation, you know, will not or hopefully will not arise within the Irish states. And we're seeing extra resources from the commissioner being put towards that. And of course, there have always been there have been a number of cases of Irish nationals traveling to associate with Islamic states in Syria as well. So we're very lucky here to have a long standing Irish Libyan population and only a very tiny proportion of Libyan nationals or Libyan Irish nationals will have traveled to Libya, for example, to associate with Islamic state. But it isn't it is very much a prominent concern, of course. And for those charged with our security and that has proliferated. And it's something which we're having to work very closely with our allies in Europe, particularly in the EU, but also in terms of the native countries as well, to the native itself to try and to try and deal with that. And I would say that when it comes to looking at this this escalating threat, there was a lot that we can discuss and engage with when with our NBA allies with with our Nordic partners, who have, of course, also grappled with the dilemma of dealing with communities that add a huge amount to the country. But also within those communities, there is a there is this very small number of people who may be planning extreme activities. And how to do that is very, very difficult. There's no easy way of doing that. Of course, one of the key lessons that we learned from countries such as Denmark and wonderful work by Danish academics on radicalization, for example, is that, of course, it is very important not to try and sort of fit, describe a community as as being a sort of single diaspora to understand that there is therefore there is no self appointed or even state appointed leader of that community. And actually doing that type of activity, saying that this voice represents the Muslim community in Ireland, that can be counterproductive. And so we need to understand the diversity that lies within the sort of the Muslim communities that exist within our state. And when it comes to counter radicalization and counterterrorism, of course, the EU, JHA, not least the CNA system remains will be absolutely vital in the future for Ireland's counterterrorism and efforts. However, similarly, and here's the the Brexit conundrum. Obviously, we share a common travel area. We're not in Shengen. We share a common travel area with the United Kingdom. And Five Eyes will obviously remain indispensable to our security in the future. And in terms of trying to you know, Ireland is having to will have to look at ways to keep the CTA the common travel area secure after Brexit. That's quite complex. That's quite difficult. If the UK pulls out of various data sharing mechanisms, various JHA mechanisms, and what do we do at the bilateral level will be a very interesting, difficult question. And their models of Nordic security cooperation can help. I mean, hopefully the UK will go the way of Iceland and Norway and link up to EU JHA in a very constructive way. But that's that certainly cannot be taken for granted. Just moving on to cyber, the second threat then. Well, if you look at in terms of contagion in terms of attacks, Ireland has suffered major cybersecurity attacks in recent years. And indeed, Ciaran Martin, a Northern Irishman who is also the head of the UK National Cyber Security Centre, has said that, you know, a category one attack on the UK is highly probable in the next few years. And the risk of contagion then to Ireland is clearly evident. We're very linked up with the UK. It's very difficult to detach yourself in cyberspace. And we've already seen with ESB as well attacks on ESB how potentially damaging that can be. So what can we do about this? Well, at the Nordic Council cyber initiatives and wider NBA cyber cooperation is quite instructive. It's quite very useful. I would urge the government, it's also in Ireland to look at cybersecurity university partnerships with Nordic states that already do wonderful work in cybersecurity. In Ireland, we have some of the best minds in the world when it comes to cybersecurity, we need to tap into that as a state to an unprecedented degree if we are to sort of, I would say deter, detect and even look at collectively trying to punish those who would violate our cybersecurity. Our global importance as a centre of industry really depends on that. And I would also say that in terms of, you know, there's a lot of good things being done in terms of the Ireland's National Cyber Security Centre, the National Security Analysis Centre in the Department of the Tisha. This is a government that's taking these issues seriously. But the resources are still not quite there. And so as we build up our infrastructure, we need to, we can look at other European states who've also gone through this experience, not least in terms of looking at NATO-led initiatives and EU-led initiatives in Estonia, for example. And I would say that the EU and NATO can only go so far. Obviously, there are some things within the EU and NATO that are very, very sensitive and that will not be shared by the UK, France or others. And we need to understand ourselves as well that even with our closest allies, we also need to be able to, you know, some things do need to remain secure even from our dearest friends, right? That there are interests that are different even sometimes from our closest allies. And so having our own capacity, like, you know, in fact, this is an argument very much made in Norway as well, for example. That's really important, too. We shouldn't underestimate the need to do that. So we move from airspace to cyberspace. The two need to be protected and how we do that. And if you look at what the MBAs we're looking at in terms of Icelandic airspace, for example, but also cyberspace, really working in small countries in Europe to try and maximize lessons, opportunities, and even working collectively. I mean, the northern group of defence ministers that is operated by the Northern Council and often includes MBAs as well, is an interesting dimension of this. The UK has joined the northern group of defence ministers. I think we need as many sort of post-Brexit, we need to be in the room with the UK as much as possible in various regional organisations, not least to protect our very valuable common travel area. And so I think moving to engage the Northern Council and wider MBAs and initiatives on that is a very worthy and highly recommendable thing to do. So I better stop now. But just to sum up and say that we have huge mental capacity here in terms of our digital economy. Clearly Ireland is the centre of the world. If you look at the Silicon Valley, if you look at the people who are working leading on cyber security, many of them are Irish nationals. We have a lot to offer in terms of our universities and the state is building up its institutions to deal with cyber security. So on all these areas, counter radicalisation, in terms of cyber and even the old traditional stuff, such as looking at the increase in foreign, major increase in foreign intelligence activity in this state, we need to work very closely with our Nordic partners who have experienced a lot of experience in dealing with all these things, including the traditional espionage activities and trying to move to sort of to basically make sure that smaller states such as Ireland, that in the 21st digital century, that we are very much able to exert our own interests, protect our own sovereignty and work closely and add, which I think we can, immense value to our European partners. Thank you very much.