 Welcome everyone. I'm Andrew Wilder, I'm the Vice President of the Asia Center here at the US Institute of Peace and thanks for taking time out of your busy schedules to come join us and thanks also for those who are joining us online. This session is on the record. So when you do ask questions and we get to the question and answer portion, please do identify yourself and give your name so those who are listening online know who's asking questions. Before beginning, I wanted to start on a sad note and just recognize the loss of a true Pakistani hero. I think one of the bravest women ever knew. I think many of you know Asma Jahangir passed away yesterday and I just wanted to note that. She was a fearless advocate for women, minorities and the weak and oppressed in Pakistan. She also didn't hesitate to speak truth to power as many of Pakistan's military dictators discovered firsthand. At a time of growing intolerance of diversity, not only in Pakistan but in many countries of the world, she was a fearless advocate for promoting tolerance and diversity in Pakistan. So I just wanted to give my condolences to her family and friends but also to Pakistan who really did lose a real hero today. So with that I wanted to move on to the topic of the day which it's good to see there's lots of interest in in this town on US-Pakistan relations, quite a roller coaster relationship. I thought I'd start by giving a few, set the scene with a few comments both from the US policy statements but also tweets and some of the responses we've gotten from Pakistan just to give a little flavor for the current state of the relationship. Perhaps beginning with President Trump's August announcement about the new Afghanistan South Asia strategy in which he said quote, we can no longer be silent about Pakistan's safe havens for terrorist organizations, the Taliban and other groups that pose a threat to the region and beyond. Pakistan has much to gain from partnering with our effort in Afghanistan. It has much to lose by continuing to harbor criminals and terrorists. That was followed up in December when Vice President Pence was visiting Afghanistan and was at Bagram Air Base where he said, for too long Pakistan has provided safe haven to the Taliban and many terrorist organizations but those days are over. President Trump has put Pakistan on notice. And then we all woke up on New Year's morning to the President's first tweet of 2018 in which he said the United States has foolishly given Pakistan more than $33 billion in aid over the last 15 years and they have given us nothing but lies and deceit, thinking of our leaders as fools. They give safe haven to the terrorists we hunt in Afghanistan with little help, no more. Pakistan's official response to the Trump speech was given by the foreign office spokesperson in which he said this US strategy was quite disappointing. It did not take into account Pakistan's enormous sacrifices in the war against terrorism. We have been cooperating and collaborating with the US in the fight against terrorism. Instead of relying on the false narrative of safe havens, the US needs to work with Pakistan to eradicate terrorism. Chief of Army Staff, General Bajra, also his spokesperson issued a statement saying, we are not looking for any material or financial assistance but trust, understanding and acknowledgement of our contributions. We have done a lot towards achieving peace in Afghanistan and shall keep on doing our best not to appease anyone but in line with our national interest and national policy. And then finally, the Pakistan National Security Committee headed by Prime Minister Shahid Gokhan Abbasi stated, we would like to see effective and immediate US military efforts to eliminate sanctuaries harboring terrorists and miscreants on the Afghan soil, including those responsible for fomenting terror in Pakistan. The Afghan war cannot be fought in Pakistan. So this gives a little flavor of where we are in terms of this relationship, a little bit of a dialogue of the deaf. But with us today, we have a fantastic panel to discuss this current state of relationships. We're gonna start with some opening remarks of for five minutes each and then quickly go to a discussion amongst the panelists and then we'll leave about a half an hour at the end for a question and discussion with the audience. But we're gonna start off with Ambassador Richard Olson, who's retired from the US Foreign Service in November 2016 with the rank of career minister. His final assignment was as the US Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. But before that from 2012 to 2015, he was the US Ambassador to Pakistan and is no stranger in dealing with the ups and downs of that relationship. Our second speaker will be David Sidney, who's a senior associate with the International Security Program at CSIS, where he's looking at national security and foreign policy issues. For about nine months or seven or eight months in 2016, 17, David served as the acting president of the American University of Afghanistan. Prior to that, he served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asia from 2009 to 2013. And as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia prior to that. And prior to that, he also did a stand as the DCM in Kabul, which is I think where we first met. Next with Tanvi Madan, he's a fellow at the Project on International Order and Strategy in the Foreign Policy Program at the Brookings Institution. And she's also the director of the India Project. Tanvi's work explores Indian foreign policy, focusing in particular on India's relations with China and the United States. And last but not least, our very own Muid Yusuf, who's the associate vice president here of the Asia Center at the U.S. Institute of Peace. I thought I'd give a plug to Muid. He has a new book coming out. And undoubtedly you'll be invited to another event on Brokering Peace and Nuclear Environments, U.S. Crisis Management in South Asia by Stanford University Press. So he's done a lot of work looking at that issue and a wide variety of other issues. We just returned on the weekend from about three weeks in Pakistan and so we'll be sharing some perceptions of what he heard in Pakistan about the current state of U.S.-Pakistan relations. And with that, I think I'll turn it over to you, Rick. Okay, thanks. Thank you, Andrew. Is this working? Yeah, it's fine. It's for the webcast. Okay, fine. Well, thanks to USIP for hosting the event today and let me add my condolences as well on the passing of Asma Jhangir, who's been a great interlocutor for anyone concerned about human rights in Pakistan. Andrew already mentioned that the cliche about the U.S.-Pakistan relationship is that it's a roller coaster. It seems always to be going up or going down and lately I think the amplitude of the, if I'm saying that right, amplitude of the oscillations has been increasing. And in the time that I've been involved in Pakistani affairs from about 2012 to 2016, we went through a sort of partial up and down cycle with relations improving between 2012 and 2015 after the bad year of 2011. But by 2015, that is to say with the Nawaz visit in October of 2015, even for the Obama administration, which had attempted to build a strong strategic partnership with Afghanistan, the underlying discordance on strategic realities had made it apparent that the relationship was going to go downhill. And the discordance is about the two core issues that have bedeviled our relationship for decades, the nuclear issue and Afghanistan. And specifically Pakistan's support intermittent but support nonetheless for the Taliban. And I think that we are now obviously in a stage where a much tougher line is being described and implemented apparently with regard to Pakistan, especially on the Afghanistan issue. It seems to me that the Afghanistan issue now is essentially from the perspective of Pakistan, two different issues. One is the overall strategic question, that is to say, is Pakistan gonna make a strategic shift with regard to Afghanistan and to deny, in principle, safe haven to the Taliban and the Hakami network? And is it going to bet on US and Afghan success in the Afghan conflict? But the second question is, are they actually going to move operationally and now in the way that we would want them to do against the Hakamis and the Taliban? That is to say, are they in effect going to resort to armed conflict on their own territory against the Afghan Taliban? And I think that it seems to me the statements that Andrew mentioned are suggest that that's a pretty resounding no. So in that sense, I have to say that I'm a little bit skeptical that the harder line with Pakistan will actually work as US policy. So I'd like to go through a couple of the points of leverage that we have and that Pakistan has. And then maybe some thoughts on what US policy ought to be and a conclusion. So in terms of the relative leverages, first of all, I don't think that our cutting assistance to Pakistan generates a huge amount of leverage for us. Pakistan has been there before during the 1990s, during the Pressler period when they were actually, not only were we not providing assistance, but in some sense, Pakistanis would say they were actually under sanctions. I also think there are some specific reasons why the type of assistance that we've been delivering over the past 16 or so years, 17 years, are not, don't generate all that much leverage. First of all, ESF, that is to say the Development Assistance Pot. This is project assistance. It doesn't necessarily flow directly into the government coffers. It doesn't flow into government coffers by and large. And so when Prime Minister Abasio the day said he was unaware of any development assistance over the past decade, he may well have been speaking the truth from his perspective even though we wouldn't see it that way. The foreign military financing, that is to say the assistance that we pride to the Pakistan military is important, but I would say it has already been pretty well discounted, especially after the 2016 discussion about F-16s in the United States in which the United States declined to provide the financing for the F-16s to Pakistan, which of course has resonances to earlier disputes with the US over F-16s. I think that CSF, Coalition Support Fund, actually does generate leverage for the United States. That is a cash injection in which we reimburse Pakistan for its expenses in support of our war in Afghanistan. But that has also been, it has been clearly signaled for quite some time that that was in a problematic account, so I suspect again it has been somewhat discounted. By contrast, in terms of Pakistani leverage over us, as long as we are fighting a war in landlocked Central Asia, we have to fly over somewhere to get there, and Pakistan is really to the best of my knowledge about the only real option for the United States in terms of flying over or driving through to get to our war in Afghanistan, unless the administration can identify and reactivate the Northern Distribution Network, which may be possible, there may be some signs that they are doing that, and if they do, I applaud them, but that would seem to require an accommodation with Russia and Russia interests that are probably difficult to obtain right now. So all of that leads me to think that we somewhat overstate our own leverage with regard to Pakistan to compel them to do things that they do not believe to be in their national interest. That said, anyone who takes that position has to say that the other approaches have also not worked, and I certainly have tried other approaches, and the Obama administration did, and it's very difficult to say that a softer approach relying on blandishments worked either. So I would draw a few lessons from this. If we are embarked on a harder line approach to Pakistan, the first thing is if we're gonna take a tough line, we have to stick to it. Now that may be obvious, but in a practical terms, it tends not to happen. It is very difficult for the U.S. government to deliver a consistent message. All agencies of the U.S. government have to deliver in private a very difficult and tough message to the government of Pakistan. In my experience, that rarely actually happens, and you would be surprised at some of the agencies that went out. They're not the ones you would expect, but they are the ones that have the biggest equities in some other areas. So I think there has to be a complete consistency of messaging on that. I think the messaging needs to be private, not public. Public messaging simply undercuts the probably number of people in Pakistan who are sympathetic to the idea of Pakistan turning and evicting the Afghan Taliban. They don't wanna be seen as American stooges. The third thing is I would really eschew playing the Indian card with regard to Afghanistan as unfortunately the president did on the 21st of August. That is the most counterproductive approach towards Pakistan, arguing that we are shifting in India-centered policy in Afghanistan is really bound to drive the Pakistanis towards more in ways that we would regard as counterproductive. And I think we should continue. India is certainly a valued partner in Afghanistan, but we should continue to de-hyphenate the relationship. I think I'll leave it at that, but let me just say that since I'm skeptical about the efficacy of a hardline approach, what do I see as the way out of this difficult situation? I think with regard to Afghanistan, we should be actively pursuing a political settlement. That is, we should be taking the diplomatic initiative to launch discussions with the Taliban and to bring about an Afghan-owned peace process. I think that would have enormous beneficial effects on our relationship with Pakistan, but that's not why I argue for it. I argue for it for purely Afghan reasons as well. I personally don't see any other alternative to accept a very long and inconclusive war in a landlocked country in Central Asia, but why don't I stop there, and back to you. Yeah, thank you. Over to you, David. Thanks very much, and thank you, Andrew, your colleagues for your continued focus on this conflict in South Asia, not just the Afghan war, but I expand it. It might be a larger conflict in South Asia, and I think it's really important for the American people to get the kind of debate that I think they're gonna get here because Ambassador Olson, Rick Olson, and I have been colleagues for probably 20-plus years since we both served in the Operations Center at the State Department, but I'm gonna disagree almost entirely with everything he said. So, and this is good for Andrew because he wants a conflict. It's 30 years. 30 years. Yeah. I was never the math guy. We do an objective conflict, we just don't want it to become violent, so. But before I take on some of the policy issues that Rick has raised, really eloquently actually, I want to say a word about what Pakistan is, because a lot of times discussions about Pakistan are taken by the audiences, whether they're American or Pakistani or elsewhere, is that we're lumping all of Pakistan into one unvariated whole. And as both Rick and Andrew mentioned, the recent, the passing the other day of Ashma Jhangir, shows another part of Pakistan that really few Americans know and understand. There are so many Pakistanis that I know personally and know of who are deeply cultured, who don't fit the image of Muslim extremists that many Americans have, and really a whole country of nearly 300 million that is, I'm sorry, 200 million, right? Yeah, 200 million. 200 million. They're getting there. I told you the math is not my strong point. But I'm gonna read a quote from a book that was published last week that I can really recommend to everybody who's interested in this, because it gives you the kind of background that you really need to, especially the younger students in this audience, and the book is called Directorate S by Steve Cole, one of the really great journalists of our time. And I'm gonna read a quote from him. He said, if the army in ISI did not misrule Pakistan, its alliance with corrupt political cronies, the country's potential to lift up its own population and contribute positively to the international system might today rival India's. And I have to associate myself very strongly with that. There still is very strongly in Pakistan the potential to be much more than it is now. But misrule by the ISI and the military has led it into a state where it is very difficult, and I agree with Rick on that, very difficult to see a way out. So I will beg people's pardon when I say Pakistan. Most of what I'm talking about is that small coterie of ISI and military leaders who over the decades have seized control of the core of Pakistan's national security policy. It's no accident when you read this book or others about Pakistan that when US officials want to speak about serious issues in a serious way, they speak to the chief of army staff and the head of ISI. They don't speak to the elected people. They don't respect to the people in parliament. They don't talk to ministers. They talk to the people who occupy those two positions. That's happened repeatedly over the last 40 years. And it appears to me it's happening even more now than even 10 or 15 years ago that the control of that small group of people over Pakistan continues, is greater, and it's gonna be harder and harder to make any progress while that continues. The result is that the people of Pakistan are subject to an incredible, almost brainwashing. Pakistan has a very active media, but that active media is severely circumscribed just in the past three months. You can read open source reporting of Pakistani journalists who've been threatened by, the Pakistani military and ISI who have been threatened with abduction, with killing, with the bonds to their families. And this has been the case over and over again. Pakistani military uses the vehicle of its public relations arm to shape the opinions of the Pakistani people. So the Pakistani people believe a lot of things about the United States that I would say are absolutely untrue and we have no real means of combating that. And so I again will stress that when I'm talking about Pakistan, I'm not talking about Pakistanis in general. I'm not talking about the bulk of the Pakistani people. That said, the reason I support the administration's hard line is because I was part of the Richard Holbrook led Outreach to Pakistan, the creation of a new strategic partnership that offered all kinds of blandishments, including military and civilian aid, high level respect discourse between Pakistani ministers. It was an amazing effort led by an amazing diplomat, Richard Holbrook. It totally failed. And it failed because at heart US and Pakistani strategic aims are different. And they're different in ways that are actually in conflict. Pakistan once in Afghanistan that is subservient to Afghanistan and that can not only not be used as a weapon by India against Pakistan, but that actually can be used by Pakistan as a vehicle against India. And that has been, I'm gonna get these decades wrong, something that the Pakistani against small group of leadership that I'm talking about has been wedded to for the last 30 years really. And if you look at the history, for example, the famous ultimatum from the US, the witherser against us to the Pakistanis and the then president and dictator of Pakistan, General Musharraf, saying okay, we're with you, but actually what he said was if you look at the historical record, he said we're with you, but. And the but basically was almost all the things that were really important to the United States. And that but has continued until now. I don't think that the administration's so-called hardline has any prospect of immediate success. I don't think there's any way to have an immediate success with altering the course of another nation's policies. I do think it holds out the prospect of changing that over time. And this is where I agree with Ambassador Olson. Hardline has to be maintained. While I was at the Pentagon from 2009 to 2013, we cut off, suspended, held off coalition support funds for periods ranging for three months to over a year, but we always gave it back. And when we gave it back, we always ended up where we started. We didn't make any progress as a result of these holdups. So Pakistan, just from that one example, and there are many other examples people will have, has learned that the United States is not likely to stick to any one policy. And as long as we don't stick to one policy, as long as we have that cycle that Ambassador Olson described, we're not gonna have any change. However, I think the administration does have the potential to lay out a path for Pakistan of increasingly stiffer penalties, such as withdrawing Pakistan's non-natal ally status, such as targeted sanctions against leaders of the military and ISI and their families who want to travel to the United States, who have investments in the United States, and perhaps the most powerful tool that we have in our non-military toolkit would be the designation of Pakistan as a state sponsor of terrorism. If you look at the definition in US law of a state sponsor of terrorism, Pakistan meets every test for a variety of political reasons. Over the last 20 years, we haven't done that. And I think for many good reasons, but this is the time we should start doing that. So I'm advocating not just a tough policy, but a tougher policies. My concern about the administration is so far all they've done is hold up the military assistance, which I think particularly the coalition support funds has some impact on the Pakistanis, but they've lived through it before and they're prepared to live through it again. Another area where I disagree with Ambassador Olson is on the role of India. As I said, this is a South Asian war. It's not an Afghan war. The war takes place as theaters and the active theater where most of the killing goes on in Afghanistan, but the support theaters where money is raised, where weapons and explosives are collected and shipped, and where the political decisions are made actually extends all throughout South Asia, including in India. The reason, in my view, and others will have a different reason, the reason the Pakistani military and ISI have the level of control they do over Pakistan is India. They portray India in Pakistani school textbooks and media. They describe in India bent on the destruction of the state of Pakistan. As long as that's the case, then the Pakistani ruling elite that I've described will continue in power. That is where India has the power to make changes, but it will be really hard, and I'm sure Tanvi Madan will explain why it's probably so hard. It will never happen, but maybe not. Maybe she'll give me some hope there. But as long as that stalemate between Pakistan and India, a very violent stalemate that includes, that were included at tax just yesterday, where I think the press reports are that several Pakistanis were injured in the last six weeks. By my count, over 20 soldiers on both sides have been killed. As long as that tension between Pakistan and India remains, the war in Afghanistan is not going to be resolved. With that, I'll close and look forward to the discussion and the questions. Thank you, David. What were you and Tanvi, okay, you have one, okay. Good job, Mr. Disagree with both of them. Thank you. I'm going to do none of the above. Thank you, Andrew, and thank you to USIP. I'd also like to express my condolences about the passing of Asma Jahangir. She's not just a last for Pakistan, but for all of South Asia, and also particularly amongst the many other great things about her. She was an amazing role model for young women in the region. I was asked to talk about how US-India relationship, and particularly defense and security cooperation might be shaping US-Pakistan relations and what we've been talking about today. I'm not going to talk too much about that kind of US-India defense and security relationship, just to say that it has been quite consistent from previous administrations, essentially the Trump administration, while it has a new name in terms of the Indo-Pacific strategy, it's essentially following the strategic framework that the Bush administration and the Obama administration laid out, which is kind of strategic, economic, and values-based reasons supporting and enabling the rise of India. And this is particularly in the shadow of the rise of China, but not just because of that. And so we have seen Secretary Mattis, Secretary Tillerson go out to India, Prime Minister Modi come here. We'll see in April the first two plus two dialogue, which will be held here as well, which will reflect some of those kind of, some of the cooperative aspects on the defense and security side. The, in terms of kind of the question of does the approach that this administration is taking to Pakistan, has it kind of helped the US-India relationship? Or is it an irritant in the US-India relationship? I think the answer is yes. But if you ask the question of, is the US-Pakistan or the administration's approach towards Pakistan shaped or driven by US-India relations, the answer is more complicated. And I'll highlight why, and I think they're different. You can answer this differently in different spaces. So I think in some areas, you do see kind of US-India relations shaping US policies in ways that kind of implicate Pakistan's interests. And I think you see this, for example, on the stance that US has taken in supporting Indian membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, or being supportive of efforts that India has been making at the UN to designate some Pakistani-based terrorists, as terrorists at the UN Security Council. You've also seen perhaps India have get more of a hearing for its views on Afghanistan and Pakistan. I think reportedly there was a, I think it was a Wall Street Journal report about Prime Minister, President Trump being affected by Prime Minister Modi, essentially telling him that the US was getting a raw deal in its Pakistan relationship. But what you can even see in this aspect is it's not necessarily something, this might be that's how Modi is shaping his message, because in terms that President Trump likes or understands, but if you look back at everything President Trump has said, even as candidate Trump, or even before he was candidate Trump, he's had this view that the US is getting this raw deal. And so in some ways, this is maybe Delhi more reinforcing the view he already has rather than creating it. Another area where you can see US-India relations kind of shaping the US-Pakistan picture is this kind of, it might make the US and has made perhaps the US reluctant to push India on Pakistan-related issues as some in Pakistan and arguably in DC want, but having said that, even if the US did push, I doubt it would be very effective on issues, for example, of kind of trying to push India to talk India-Pakistan relations, that's a decision that Delhi will make likely bilaterally. And what kind of China and the USA will have limited impact in some ways. There are two other areas which have got more kind of attention recently. One is kind of the Trump administration's pushing Pakistan on the counterterrorism part, and of course kind of on Afghanistan policy. I think here the answer is a little bit more complicated. I think you do see kind of there has been some hope generated in Delhi about the administration speaking out not just about the Harkani network, but also groups based in Pakistan like Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad and urging and pressuring Pakistan to do more on that front. Having said that, Delhi sees this approach not driven by kind of Indian concerns about this, but driven by direct American interests. And so we very much notice that the emphasis tends to be much more on the Harkani network and they're quite realistic that that is what is driving the frustration in the US, that the lack of progress on US demands not Indian ones is what is driving kind of the frustration in the administration. And frankly, there's still skepticism or at least questions about whether the US will actually follow through. I think somebody mentioned the word cycle because there have been many cycles of this that we've seen in the past. And so I think there's some that people are watching, but there's some expectation that the US will not necessarily follow through on this approach. I think on India playing a role in Afghanistan, we've seen administration since 2001 go through different views on what the extent of India's role and what kind of role India should be playing. I think initially after 2001, you did see the Bush administration urging Indian restraint, not wanting India to play too much of a role lest it exacerbate Pakistan's concerns. But you did see, and you saw in the first few years the Obama administration the same thing, but then you did see towards the second half of the administration, the Obama administration calling for a larger India role, pushing, in fact, India to do more. And in many ways, despite it being mentioned in the particular speech, Delhi has seen kind of the call that the Trump administration made, which was we want them to help us more with Afghanistan, especially in the area of economic assistance and development as more continuity rather than change. They liked the public endorsement of India's role, but other than that, we're very particular, the foreign minister and defense minister both were about India will not put troops on the ground, this will be more economic and development assistance, will be more kind of nation building sort of assistance. Yes, there's been kind of more military equipment provided, but it's essentially will not, that red line of not putting troops in the ground, partly for its own military reasons, but also partly because it realizes the reaction that Pakistan will have. So I think there too, it's a little more kind of complex. Two things to watch for, I think in the space in terms of where the US-India and kind of US-Pakistan relations might overlap. One involves kind of China, and I think this is increasingly we are gonna have in these South Asia discussions of China kind of aspect, because frankly, at least in reality, it is largely, it is a major actor in this area now. I think India will watch very closely what US-China cooperation and consultation on Pakistan or Afghanistan and Pakistan will be. In some ways, India, the US and China have, particularly as China gets more concerned about the security situation within Pakistan, as there are some recent indications that they are, that in some ways, if you look at US-India and China, have shared interests in terms of Pakistan combating extremism, countering terrorism, in not just Pakistan, but in Afghanistan as well, and the broader region for China's interests in its own West. But the details of that cooperation in terms of US-China cooperation, what the quid pro quo might be, is where I think you might, you'll see India watching very carefully. I think the other area, the second thing to watch is, the administration has laid out a South Asia strategy and an Indo-Pacific strategy. But for India, which kind of is in both or in kind of the center of both, both regions matter and they actually do overlap in terms of their strategic framing, and what happens in one area will shape the others. And I think the other aspect of this is beyond even India, if you actually look at the reality on the ground, with kind of things like CPEC, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, but also China's maritime interests going into kind of the Western Indian Ocean region, but also the development of Gwadar et cetera, potentially its military implications. These aren't separate regions. And so I think these two aspects will kind of bleed over into the Afghanistan-Pakistan discussion as well, and I'll stop there. Thank you. Thanks. Thanks, Andrew, and it's good to be back. I've just sort of come back after three weeks. So the challenge I was given was to summarize three weeks of conversations in five minutes, but looking at the time of the day, my biggest challenge is to keep myself awake. So I'm gonna give it a shot, and to do that... You need to keep us awake too, sir. Make it. Everyone for their own. But yeah, I am gonna be provocative, and that's my way of keeping myself awake, and Andrew. But I think the way I approach this, and sort of every conversation and trip I have to Pakistan looking at the situation, is where do we go from here? I think it's less important to me who's right, who's wrong, who got, you know, x-ting, right? And so in that vein, let me offer first what I think Pakistan is thinking. And this is my interpretation of what I heard. And based on that, say, where I think we could go if we wanna make this work in terms of the conflict in Afghanistan. So let me just begin by saying that I do find nervousness in Pakistan. I do find that the Trump factor is real. I do find that people are concerned on where this may go. I also find that people recognize that this is not a typical U.S. administration that's worked with Pakistan for the past 10, 15, 20, 30 years. And so if the idea is that the madman theory works, to the extent that people are paying attention to this going horribly wrong possibly, I think that conversation is taking place and people are nervous. That said, the whole idea of that nervousness is to then get certain things that people have talked, I mean, colleagues have talked about on the panel. And there I would argue that everything I picked up tells me that it has become more difficult, not less difficult for the U.S. and Pakistan to find a way out given the current U.S. strategy that was unveiled in August. And let me give you reasons for why I say that. So the first thing I picked up is there is, across the board belief in Pakistan, military, civilian, street, whatever you wanna call it, that Afghanistan is doomed and the war is lost for the U.S. Again, please take everything I say as what I have heard and interpreted and not possibly, not particularly my analysis. I'll hold my analysis back and we can come back to that in the conversation. But the view is that Afghanistan's situation is getting to a point where it's irreversible, irrespective of what Pakistan may or may not do. If you're in that mindset, then the first question that is asked and I was asked often or at least posed a question even though it was an answer more than a question is why do I at this point do what you're asking me? If I know that I'm gonna end up on the losing side by doing that. Second, if things don't work out, I'm still gonna take the blame. So I should have something in hand that is important enough that I will get in return if I'm gonna do certain things that are being asked of me. And there the second sort of consensus point I found was that there is a real risk of the Taliban and the Harkani network turning inward against Pakistan, joining hands with the TTP, the Pakistani Taliban and turning inward if Pakistan were to open this quote unquote front against them. The idea that they would do so I think is debatable, at least in my view it's exaggerated. But the question that is one to answer is that Pakistan's view is coming from the interpretation of history. Which is that once this front opens and Pakistan has to confront this internally, the US is essentially gonna turn around and say thank you very much, we're done whether we succeed or not in Afghanistan. But it's the 1990 syndrome. For those of you who know history of this relationship when essentially we walked away after the Afghanistan war was won. And so if you get into that mindset, the question is what do I get by opening this, potentially opening this front against me when the US is essentially gonna leave me in a lurch again? Again, the idea is not whether the US will or not. But just keep adding this up and I'll come back to why I think it becomes more difficult rather than less to work this out. Third, Pakistan's view for the longest period was I want a peace process. I want the Taliban brought into the system through some peace process reconciliation. I mean Ambassador Olson alluded to this. And now the view is that the US is simply not interested in this. And even though the strategy says that a peace process is the end goal, this is really a military strategy to defeat the Taliban on the battlefield. That's the internalization in Pakistan that I've picked up. And if that is so, and if I also accept that the US cannot win militarily, which is the view I think largely in Washington as well, then what am I actually signing up for? Unless I know that a peace process is really serious and going to follow after the US has weakened the Taliban, why would I actually take this step in terms of going in the direction that the US is asking? Fourth, if the US is not gonna win militarily and if the peace process is not on the table anymore, then is this strategy really about Afghanistan? Or should I, i.e. Pakistan, go and read the national security strategy again and see that the US is demoted terrorism in favor of strategic competition with China and Russia? I.e. is this really now about a long-term US military presence to keep Russia, China, Iran, and Pakistan's nuclear weapons in check rather than about Afghanistan? This is another point that I picked up across the board. And if that is so, then why should I, Pakistan, facilitate a 100-year US presence as was put to me pretty much quote-unquote by a very senior Pakistani official? Fifth, and I think this is the elephant in the room, which I think we really do need to talk about, which is the ideal US future of Afghanistan vision is continuation of the same without the conflict, continuation of the constitution, continuation of the system, the governance, the governance, the actors that are present there. And if I, Pakistan, see the current Afghanistan dispensation as pro-India, closer to India, India influence, whatever it is, then what do I get by perpetuating that situation on my western border? So what I've summarized for you here are five points that I think are the strongest narrative in Pakistan right now. And each one of them makes it more or less difficult for the US and Pakistan to find a way forward. Finally, on China, than we mentioned China, China comes up often. I found a very interesting, I mean my sort of conversations before I went seem to suggest that there is this view in Pakistan that now we have China, we don't need the US. I actually found a very nuanced conversation among people who really matter. Almost to the point of saying I actually do not want to put my eggs in the Chinese basket. I need to find a way out of this. And I think that's a leverage that the US has and we haven't really thought through completely. At the same time, I think the US, we've grossly exaggerated the Chinese appetite to press Pakistan to deliver on the Akhani network, et cetera. And so I found this to be an interesting paradox and how we open that up, I think we have to think through. Let me just end by saying that if the US and Pakistan have to work together on Afghanistan going forward. And I put an if because there are many in this town who think that good riddance, enough is enough, we're done with this. I personally am one of those who's constantly argued that the cost of a ruptured US-Pakistan relationship is astronomically higher than even a bad relationship. But let me just say and by saying that if this has to work out for Afghanistan's benefit, there are four things we have to do. None of them are easy. But I want to be provocative here intentionally and leave it at that. Number one, I think it is high time we stop pretending, both sides stop pretending that the disconnect over Afghanistan is about the Akhani network. I think the Akhani network and Taliban are essentially incidental to this because they are the tools of the larger problem, which is the India factor. And I think we need to think about this, take this head on and figure a way out on what is going to be an amicable way for India and Pakistan to coexist in Afghanistan. I don't care how difficult this is, but the more we say this is not about that, the more I'm convinced that that's really where this is going to end up. And I can talk about what I think it will be, but we can come back to that. Second, whatever arrangement US and Pakistan make on quote-unquote sanctuaries, safe havens, Akhani network, Taliban, Pakistani Taliban on the other side, expectations have to be realistic and agreements have to be verifiable. The mistrust in this relationship is so deep now that unless both sides can verify actions, I think we'll continue to play this mudslinging game to both detriment. Third, I just want to endorse Ambassador Olson. We have to talk peace process. And that's going to open up the space to have the conversation of US and Pakistan working together wherever that may end up. And that's also going to assort some of the regional concerns, quite frankly, including in Delhi, that the US is not going to stick to its line for too long. And so, I mean, I think that's crucial. And finally, China has to be brought into the conversation. I have thoughts on where, but the conversation needs to be expanded in a way that China, US, Pakistan and Afghanistan feel interdependent on each other in terms of finding a solution in Afghanistan rather than looking to compete with each other. Last line, none of this is going to happen. Unless, there is an unless here. None of this is going to happen unless the US and Pakistan can revive communication channels that involve trusted interlocutors. I was completely shocked. I've been shocked, I was shocked before I went when I was talking to people here. And I was even more shocked when I went there. And I'll just say one line on this. No matter what both sides say, they have zero trusted channels of communication right now. Absolutely none. And with that, to overcome the kind of mistrust they have, I think it's impossible. Let me stop there. Thank you, there you have it. So I'm going to open up first to the panelists if any of you want to agree with or preferably disagree with or comment on any of the, what you heard from other panelists right now. So I mean, it was more with, I had a question for me, Moide, in terms of the five things you laid out. Frankly, I don't know, but you said, you know, the conversations you had, these five things struck you in terms of how they're different from what would have struck you three or four years ago or six or seven years ago. They sound quite similar in terms of the arguments about why not to take action. I'm going to remind myself what I said. Okay, so some of them, yes, I think you're right, in terms of the distrust in the ultimate intentions, you know, where this may end up. But I think the two that are different. One, the view that the peace process is dead before it starts. I think both the US and Pakistan had tried hard to figure a way out to move in that direction. And I found this time a bit of a resigned kind of view that this is no longer about that. That's one. And the second one, I think, is this belief that now, what the US was really up to has been codified in the national security strategy. So this is really about the region. This is about a hundred year presence or whatever there is. That was always in the conversation, but I think policy was never dictated by that view. And this time I found that people are beginning to say that this is about the larger picture. And if it's about the larger picture, my goal of helping the US at least get out of here. No longer works because the US is not gonna get out of here no matter what. So I think those two I think are a bit more jaundiced, if you will. Yeah, so first of all, let me say that I actually don't disagree all that much with my friend, David Sedney, especially on his characterization of the role of ISI. And I think it's a good proviso. All of us should be saying that the quarrel we have with Pakistan is with the Pakistani deep state with the establishment. And it is not with the Pakistani people. And in most cases, not even with the civilian government. Although the civilian government at the end of the day tends to take the line that is handed to it by Pindi so they're complicit. But at the end of the day, this all comes out of Pindi and Aparra. And I agree with that. But the question is what are we going to do about it? And what is going to be an efficacious US policy? And what I worry about is that the attempt at the hard line, given some of the leverages and respective leverages that I perceive without even talking about China, I didn't talk about China, but that's a huge factor. And the China, Pakistan economic corridor, I think we're simply going to wind up with a train wreck in our relationship between the US and Pakistan without necessarily being able to resolve the core strategic difference. And this is one of the reasons that I believe we do have to pursue a peace element and just to follow up on Moeid's point. And I don't want to get too far into Afghanistan, which is a totally separate conversation. But there are three dimensions, it seems to me, to the Afghan conflict. There is a domestic Afghan conflict, which goes back probably in some ways to the April of 1978, 40 years of civil war. And you have an international dimension, especially since 2001, which the US and NATO and others have played a role. And you have a regional dimension. And it seems to me that any peace process has to address those three baskets of issues. There has to be an intra-Afghan dialogue. There has to be a dialogue with the international community and the Taliban and Afghans. And there has to be a regional dimension, and that's critical. And that has to, I think, include India as well as Russia, China, Iran, and the Stans. And I think that as well as obviously Pakistan. And I think that's really the only way that I see to move forward with attaining both peace in Afghanistan and some kind of regional understanding that will bring an end to the South Asian wars that David described. I'll try and ignite a little controversy and maybe disagree a little more with Rick. And that's actually on the really the core issue of the peace process. Like everyone, I'm in favor of peace. However, actually, and there are other people in this room who probably spent more time than I have looking at insurgencies, civil wars, however you want to call them around the world. And peace processes, outside brokered peace processes, have a very small record of success. Because when people go to war and the Taliban have been fighting for over a decade now. When people go to war and start dying for a cause, they do so because they really believe in something. And to stop them from fighting, to have them to stop fighting themselves, there has to be a fundamental change in the way they approach. The signals from the Taliban over the last three weeks, the attacks in Kabul that helped lead not just to the tweet from President Trump that Andrew mentioned, but also from some very, very strong, very direct statements by Afghan President Ghani and by all the leading Afghan political figures that I know of that they couldn't imagine having talks with the Taliban who'd carried out these attacks that killed so many civilians in Kabul and elsewhere. Those attacks, to me, as an analyst of not just Afghanistan, but of insurgencies is a signal that the Taliban still believe in military victory. So to say that we should prioritize the peace process, to my mind, is a miracle. You can't prioritize something that doesn't really exist in the minds of one of the key actors. I do know, I've talked directly as Ambassador Olson has with the leading Afghan politicians, the current president, former president, other ones, Afghans want peace. They would prefer peace to war overwhelmingly. But those Taliban, the messages from the Taliban over and over again that they believe that military victory is their chosen path. So for them to change from that military victory is not gonna come about by the US walking around saying we wanna have peace, come meet with us here and gutter our Turkey or wherever. All those are sideshows until the core of the Taliban decides it's one's peace. A peace process is not gonna happen. Secondly, let me just mention tangentially the issue of China having spent a lot of my career in China working with China. I think there's a constant hope that by many in the US somehow China will step in. I agree entirely with, I think you said, no, it's always dangerous to quote you because you're so deeply analytical that the Chinese just aren't gonna do it. And if you look at China's other border with North Korea and see how the Chinese have behaved with respect to North Korea, the hope that China will pull the US eggs out of the basket with Pakistan, it's something we shouldn't even be thinking about although we should be talking to the Chinese, we should be working with the Chinese, we shouldn't count on them to do anything that can damage their, under any pressure of their relationship with China. Finally on the issue of, I have many other thoughts but I'll finish by comment here and here, on the issue of leverage. I think Moeid hit on this a bit. I think the biggest leverage that the US has with Pakistan is that the people of Pakistan, the real state of Pakistan doesn't wanna do it. Pakistan doesn't wanna have a break with the United States. They don't want to align with China. They don't wanna throw in their future with the Chinese and have a rupture with the United States. That, the goals of the possible partnership that I mentioned in that quote from the Steve Cole's book at the beginning is something that's very, I think broadly held in Pakistan, if you look at the numbers of Pakistanis that are here in the US, if you look at the kind of people-to-people connections, they're much stronger and much deeper than anything that Pakistan has developed with China over the last 70 plus years of a relationship deeper than lips and teeth and higher than the highest mountain and deeper than the deepest seas. These are all phrases the Chinese use about that relationship. So that's our big leverage, isn't it? Sweetest than the sweetest mountain. Sweetest than the sweetest mountain, sorry, okay. But that's the biggest leverage we have. One, another area where I think I disagree with Rick is on the issue of lines of communication. I really don't think the Pakistanis have much leverage. I was at the Pentagon when the Pakistanis cut off the ground lines of communication. They thought the Pakistani military thought they had us over a barrel. We were able to continue to supply at much greater expense. Actually supplies were better when we stopped relying on the Pakistani land routes than they were before. And the Pakistanis found they didn't really have that much leverage and we ended up coming to an agreement to reopen those lines of communication that basically ended up where we started. There was no real advantage gained by either side, although people who subcontracted air made a lot of money. The alternative of the Northern Distribution Network exists and I think the recent changes in Uzbekistan or maybe something on Central Asia here, I think there's a lot of potential there. It doesn't depend on Russia. You don't need to go through Russia to use the Northern Distribution Network and go through the Caucasus. For example, that's the main route. You can potentially go through China. China's recently sent a number of trains through Kazakhstan, not going through Russia to Afghanistan, so there's a lot of possibilities there. So I think the lines of communication leverage is something that is way overplayed both in Pakistan and outside. Actually hold on to that. Yeah, if I could just quickly follow up a question. You had mentioned your belief that we should actually be tougher on Pakistan and that the problem in the past is we weren't tough enough or weren't tough for long enough. And so I guess if you play that out, so why don't we test that? What if at the end of that, you end up with no relationship and no change in behavior? I could actually see the benefit. There's a feel-good factor that we've actually punished Pakistan for we're giving them money and they're supporting our enemies in Afghanistan. But if it doesn't actually lead to any change in the policy and we've ended up with no relationship, I wanna link that a little bit to an issue that Mouid's written about is, and we haven't talked much about it, I mean Rick mentioned in passing is the nuclear issue. That was always a big issue in terms of our relationship with Pakistan. Now we seem to, the entire relationship has come down to Afghanistan and yet the nuclear issue I think remains there and having some influence on Pakistan on that issue has been important in the past. So I guess maybe a question for you and Mouid is if we take this relationship to a breaking point, if we do have another Indo-Pac crisis that could escalate and is not out of the question, could go nuclear. In the past, US has come in to mediate and de-escalate those crises. If we no longer have a relationship, is there a risk of us no longer being in a position to have that role? Yes, is there a risk, yes, and is it a serious risk, yes, and are the consequences as dire as you point them out, are the possible consequences as dire as you point out? I would say yes, but on the other hand, the question is what are the consequences of not doing things? Are they better? Mouid has laid out I think a mood of skepticism and questioning in Pakistan and I am sure that's the case. However, if we go back to the same cycle that we had before, are we actually facilitating the descent of Pakistan into a failed state? A couple of years ago, the Council on Foreign Relations did a future study on Pakistan where they predicted by 2025 Pakistan would collapse. But nobody could figure out how that would happen, but that was the prediction. I don't agree with that, but there are a lot of very worrying signs in Pakistan. One of the things that those who've lived and worked in Pakistan or traveled there over the last 20 or 30 years will recognize there's been a huge closure of the space in Pakistan for discourse across many intellectual frontiers. The ability to speak about certain subjects is circumstried by things such as the blasphemy law. Many Americans are surprised when they hear that the Nobel Prize winner Maulai Yusufzai is seen as a villain by a majority of the Pakistani population, not as a hero. There's a lot of things going on in Pakistan that if we don't do anything, will the harder line work? I don't know, but I think it's better bet than sitting back and continuing doing nothing of before. But is there any guaranteed path to success? Yeah, one last question from Weed, then you can answer that question too, but then we'll open it up. But I just actually wanted to give it one of, in the last few days, lots of people have been retweeting many of Usma Jahangir's tweets. And one of them was, why are we isolating ourselves in defensive militant groups? So you actually laid out, why are we isolating ourselves, this is a tweet from Usma Jahangir, in defensive militant groups? So I guess, can you explain a little bit what you think the calculus goes based on some of your discussions in Islamabad that, okay, let's not follow, be pressured into, by the US into cracking down on the Taliban, and all these clever rationales for maintaining the status quo, given the fear of failure. But if at the end of that, Pakistan, I mean, Pakistan is very skillful at maintaining very strong strategic relationships with the US and China. But to give that up to end up, basically with a strategic relationship just with China, but isolating just about everyone else, including the US, for the sake of having these relationships with militant proxy groups, you know, ultimately, is that a winning strategy for Pakistan? So let me first just make one point on David's comment on the peace process. David, I don't think anybody's saying that the peace process is gonna be easy or it's figured out or we know where we're going. The point is, it's not like we're winning the war. So if you can argue that a military victory is a realistic path, okay, we can have that conversation. But if not, then what's the third option here? It's either status quo and a war for the next 30 years or military victory or peace process. That's, I think that's really, to me, it's a question of alternatives more than what's right or what's wrong. On the question that you asked, Andrew, I mean, the nuclear part, et cetera. Look, I mean, let me answer this in a broader sort of sense. I mean, nuclear, yes, I'm worried because everybody needs to buy my book, but more than that, I think it's, there has been an elephant in the room throughout since 9-11. Actually, Steve Cole captures that in a couple of discussions that he narrates. That Pakistan ultimately is more important than Afghanistan. That's been the back of the mind of policy makers. And so every time you go to the brink, somebody sort of reminds everybody, hola, hola, hola, what happens if this falls apart? The question we have to answer, and that's where I think the harsher policy, you know, you determine what that looks like, are we willing to move away from that position? If we are, then I think, you know, there are options that David talks about. If we are not, then I think your question is pertinent. You may end up with a no relationship, no benefit in Afghanistan, and actually probably worse sort of situation in Afghanistan. And to me, I've always been on this line that this relationship has become so emotive that we are unable to look for ways where the two sides can work together while both Afghanistan and Pakistan are partners. And the four things that I laid out, I think really are possible in terms of a conversation on India, a conversation on a peace process. And by the way, when I say peace process, the argument is not that tomorrow the Taliban are gonna sit and negotiate, a conversation about the peace process, even that is important in getting a constructive dialogue with Pakistan on where to go and maybe lessening some of the pressure, negative pressure on that side. And your final point, I mean, I think it's entirely pertinent, and that's the real question. There are people and there are critics in Pakistan who are asking the exact same question. Is it between the militants and the U.S.? Is that more important than the U.S.? I think the answer I'll give you is nobody thinks that the U.S. relationship should voluntarily be given up. But the India factor is so important in Pakistan's mindset that if the conversation is given to what the U.S. is saying while losing out to India, whatever that means, then maybe the choice is don't give in to the U.S. But short of that, calibrated in a way that you can have both, you can have a conversation. I quite frankly think we are also calibrating. It is untrue to say that this administration does not care with this relationship course. I think everybody cares. The difference is that I think this administration's risk appetite is higher. So they think that the room between the Obama policy and where things will break off is quite wide. And we're gonna test that. The issue, of course, is that if you reach that brink and nothing changes, what do you do? Do you pull back or do you go over the precipice? I think it'll be crazy to go over the precipice, but if you pull back from that, the strategy is dead. So I think that's sort of the never-ending debate. If I can just circle back. I think the India issue that Moita's mentioned as I, and I think I mentioned in my remarks, really is the key. And I don't think it's about having a discussion about Afghanistan with India and Pakistan. It's about having a discussion between India and Pakistan on India and Pakistan. Until that happens. You never solved that. Well, if you never solved that, then you're going to have a nuclear war at some point. So I think you do need to try and solve it. I mean, in relation to Pakistan, it's all that. Okay, last word and then we'll open up for questions. I think going back to Asma Jhangri's question, this shouldn't be, and I think this is something you've heard Pakistanis asking and has to be going back to kind of the deep state question is related, which is at some point, there has to be a question within Pakistan, not acting against these groups because the US wants it to, but because this is in Pakistani interest, at the end of it, if you look at a cost-benefit analysis, what exactly have these militant groups got, even vis-a-vis India? What exactly have they got Pakistan? Look at the per capita income of India and Pakistan 50 years ago and today. In some ways, Pakistan has already lost out to India economically in terms of reputationally, in terms of, I think the isolation thing is exaggerated, but there has to be that fundamental question. And I think this is where it would be interesting because I think what's changed about the China factor, and I don't think anybody should expect it to carry water for the US. I think it's going to be interesting to see what they do for themselves. We've already seen them put pressure on Pakistan, and actually effectively put pressure on Pakistan when it comes to groups that affect their interests. We have now got to see something in the next few years, thanks to CPEC, that has never been true in the history of the China-Pakistan relationship, which for the first time, China actually cares what happens inside Pakistan. With groups, that frankly, the lines are blurring between the LET, JUD line between that and between the Hakanis and between the Hakanis and others, those lines are going to get blurred. It's going to start affecting China's interests, not the US's. This is where it's going to be interesting. On the flip side, CPEC gives Pakistan more leverage with China than it's ever had. So I think we should still watch the dynamic without expecting China to do anything for the US. If they do anything, it'll be for their own interests. Okay, we're going to go ahead. Can I just make one comment? A very quick comment, then we're going to question that. Really, it'll be quick. I agree with what you just said. The question is, there are two aspects to this. The strategic shift that Pakistan would need to make with regard to militants. But there's a second question, which I think is equally important. They're riding the tiger. How do they get off the tiger? After 70 years of riding the tiger, with regard to process. Okay, we're going to go to, take three questions at a time and ask you to identify yourself and be short and concise in your questions so we can squeeze in as many as possible. And we're going to go till 10 past four. I'm going to use my moderator's privilege. We'll start with the gentleman in the front. Then we'll go to the very gentleman in the very back. My name is Sufi Lagari. I'm with the Sindhi Foundation. Pakistan considers Taliban, Harkhani, network, Tashkar-e-Taiba and half his size as their assets. And they are using as a proxy against Afghanistan and India. And I believe they will never stop that their assets you are. I just want to ask Mr. Sindhi that at what point the US will declare Pakistan as a sponsor of terrorism? Thank you. In the very back. Hello. Hello, my name is Utsav. Even behind you, sorry. The very back row, yes. My name is Utsav and I'm with the World Hindu Council. My question is for Mohi. Since you were on the ground and you made a cross-section of people that were not just ISI and state people, my question is how many people in Pakistan genuinely believe that the use of the jihadi networks will actually be able to counter India? And the second part to my question is how many? One question at a time, because we really don't have time. The gentleman in front of you there, yes. I'd be interested. Can you give your name? Yes, it's Dana Marshall, Transnational Strategy Group. Thanks for this conversation. I'd like to see if I could get from the panel. And Andrew, you were starting to hint at this a bit about what's the opportunity cost for continuing a policy that seems not to be working very well and could end up rupturing the ratio beyond the nuclear point, which is so important that you raise, Andrew. What else might we be missing or losing by continuing this? In other words, what's the opportunity cost of our president trajectory? Okay, I'll go back to, first one is directed to you. Do you want to take that one, Andrew? Well, what I was recommending was that the administration hold out beginning the process of deciding whether to designate Pakistan as a state sponsor of terrorism. So your question was when will it happen? Right now, the administration has not publicly stated that that's part of their potential arsenal of non-military moves. I'm advocating that it do so. How long that process would take? I would urge that that be something that be calibrated to the response of Pakistan. Does it do things that are measurable? Does it cut the flow of arms, ammunition, and fighters across the border from Afghanistan into Pakistan, for example? So I can't answer your question. And I don't think we should be looking for a specific time, but I think we should be putting that on the agenda as one of the possible tools we have to influence Pakistan. Wait, did you want to? No one. Sorry, remind the question. Question was who thinks that the jihadi groups can counter India, and the answer is no one. And anyone want to talk about Dana's question about? Sorry, if I can just respond to that, because I actually have spoken to Pakistani officials over the years who do believe that the- So the question was non-state. Non-state. Okay, I'm sorry. You was talking about- You were talking about non-state, okay, I apologize. Yes. Let me just say that that highlights the control that Pakistan, these military, has over the public domain. Moeid made the point about the overwhelming consensus in Pakistan that the war in Afghanistan is lost. I've just come back from spending nearly a year in Afghanistan, and I stay very close in touch with my students and others, and really from all over the country. In Afghanistan, that's not the dominant thing. In fact, the dominant theme is that Pakistan is the source of all evils, and if we just handle Pakistan, that the war would go away. So you have two countries, neighboring countries, that have completely diametrical views of each other and what's going on, and that is a recipe for continued conflict, unfortunately. No, but how is that a narrative question? I don't understand, what is the link? Well, the link to that is that the Pakistani deep state is able to continue its policies because it's convinced the people of Pakistan of essentially a false narrative. Okay, on the opportunity cost of the present policy trajectory, I think there are a number of things that one could address. I mean, one that immediately comes to mind in kind of an operational perspective is we have had a good deal of counter-terrorism cooperation with Pakistan over the course of the past 17 years when it's not related to the Afghan Taliban, in other words, when it's related to al-Qaeda. In other words, the decimation of core al-Qaeda on Pakistani territory has largely been accomplished through cooperation between CIA and ISI to be very frank. So that's an area that presumably, as with other areas of cooperation, that might be endangered. Perhaps not, I mean, the Pakistanis presumably don't want al-Qaeda to come to power either, so maybe that will continue. I think the broader issue is the issue that David raised, the question of whether or not Pakistan is a failing state and whether over its long-term trajectory it is. And I tend to think not because I think actually Pakistan kind of bottomed out in 2014 and has begun to address domestic questions of terrorism, not the international proxies, but domestic questions, and has put its economic house in order, more or less, at least its financial house in order. But there are some real questions about how Pakistan is gonna deal with the additional 100 million people that are coming down the line. It's 200 million, but you're right, it's on a trajectory to be a population, to have a population of 300 million in the course of probably about a decade and a half. 45% of Pakistani kids are stunted. And especially in certain parts of upper sinned, it's unbelievable the level of poverty. Pakistan is facing a water crisis. All of these things are issues that we are not addressing, and if we cut our assistance, we're not gonna be in a very good position to address, and they are going to create long-term problems that will be a real challenge for us. Just one more kind of thing of the opportunity, Goss, which doesn't get enough discussion, particularly kind of in the Indian media discussion, but it is true, which is that even a New Delhi does not want to see a rupture between the US and Pakistan, because that kind of leaves the only country with any leverage on Pakistan, China, which is not the country that India necessarily thinks it has its interests in mind, though it obviously has interests in Pakistani stability. And partly for the question about nuclear weapons, but also in terms of a crisis, having said that they want the pressure because the scenario that they think most likely leads to India-Pakistan conflict is a terrorist attack based in, conducted by groups based in Pakistan that will then lead to a broader conflagration. So it's obviously a fine balance, but again, there is a pressure, yes, but not a rupture, and that balance is, of course, something that people have been struggling with for ages. Another round of three quick questions here in the front row. Thank you, with note of thanks to USIP and the panel. I'm Aitmar Parwala, World Bank Retiree. My question is to Ambassador Olson. How would you prioritize? Let's focus on win-win model. What are your priorities, strategic thrust in all the avenues that we have highlighted? Would you consider, given that, I should have, whether it doesn't control more than 50% of Afghanistan, and given the perception that there is a failed strategy in the region, and also, do you see any silver lining on Kashmir conflict? Thank you. Jamal, behind you. Thank you, sir. This is Ahmad Khan from Pakistan. My question to David is that in two, three years back, a resolution was presented in Indian parliament to declare Pakistan a terrorist state, but it was failed, and even throw out of the parliament by the BJP government. Even our enemy recognized that declaring Pakistan a terrorist state will not able to achieve their objective in the region. So the question is that, who is responsible of the loss of 70% territory in Afghanistan at the moment? And then, Brad Friesen. And then I'm hoping the next round I'll get some less-dived BQs being left wing, or right wing, depending on your probias, so next time we need some questions from the south. So, Brad. Okay, Brad Hansen, retired U.S. diplomat. A couple days ago, the Christian Science Monitor published a very interesting, fairly detailed article, and its basic thesis was that the three recent, very lethal terrorist attacks in Kabul, and the one in Jalalabad against the Save the Children office, were Pakistan, meaning the ISI, Pakistan military's direct response to the Trump administration's decision to suspend assistance. Do you find this thesis plausible? And if so, what should the U.S. government be advising the Kabul government and how to react? And how should the U.S. government be reacting if you find it plausible? Okay, back to the panelists, would anyone like, do you want to start Rick with me? Sure. So, on the question of win-win models for Afghanistan, first of all, I guess, I would, David and I were discussing before we came in, you know, this question of what territory is controlled by the Taliban and what control by the government is highly contentious, and I don't think we should fall for the Taliban narrative that they are controlling huge amounts of territory. I think there's no doubt that, first of all, the Afghan government is controlling population centers. It controls the five great cities of Afghanistan and most of the major urban populations. The Taliban continue to hold chunks of desert and mountains. And they are, of course, rural traditionalists, so for them, maybe that's their base, but I think that the best that one can hope for from their perspective is kind of a deteriorating stalemate. And that's why I think I would be somewhat cautiously optimistic about the possibility of some kind of political settlement at some point. I've been supportive of the administration's mini-surge in Afghanistan because I think that the Taliban does have to see the costs, the military costs to their actions if they are to come to the table. And so I'm not in favor of any kind of unilateral concessions early on. We have to be negotiating both the U.S. government and the Afghan government from a position of strength. If I may, just quickly on Brad's question, I have no idea on whether there was a degree of direct Pakistani involvement. What I can say is when I was in a position to read the intelligence, and I read it assiduously for four or five years, I never saw any indications of direct Pakistani control over specific operations. I think if there had been, that would have been something like a smoking gun that would have caused in the even greater degree of outrage than there was on the generalized support for these operations. So I would not think that's a very plausible thesis, but I'm not reading the intel, so I really can't say. On the question regarding state-sponsored terrorism, what I was referring to was U.S. law, which lays out criteria for designating a state-sponsored terrorism and then lays out a whole series of consequences under U.S. law in terms of sanctions that need to be applied if a state is designated as a state-sponsored terrorism. Over the last 10 years, there are a number of states that are designated as state-sponsored terrorism. North Korea was designated, designation was taken away, and the Trump administration has put it back, for example. That's one example of that. I'm not familiar with what Indian law is and Indian parliaments, so I really don't think there's much comparison to what the Indian parliament did and what I was talking about. I was talking about something that's very specific under U.S. law that carries really with it a great amount of consequences which are very difficult to undo, which is one reason that no administration has actually started the process of examining that. In terms of your question, Brad, I'll go along with Rick. I don't know whether that's the case. I do know it's very much the belief in Afghanistan that that's the case, including ordinary people and people in elite circles believe that this is a direct response from Pakistan. My own personal analysis is that the turnaround time was too quick, the planning and the logistics that are necessary for the putting in place of the ability to take these kind of actions or such that I really can't see that that direct connection is likely. But I also don't think it's, to be frank, very important. The bottom line is hundreds of innocent people were killed. They were killed for what reason? Going back to the point that Tommy might have mentioned, what is gained by killing all these civilians? What is a strategic objective? Why does Pakistan continue to give haven and support, those are the questions that I think really need to be looked at even more closely than we're looking at them here today. Gentleman in the back there. Yeah, yes, you, put your hand on the sweater. Hi, my name is Iqtodar and I'm a student. My question is with regards to this 2000, December 2016 sanctions that the US Department of Commerce placed on almost six Pakistani entities that were related to manufacturing of its missile components and parts. And the statement said that these organizations were somewhat, and again I'm paraphrasing, we're acting against the US national security interests in the region. So I was wondering if you could properly, Ambassador Alson and maybe Mohit could talk a little about it, what are those interests that the statement was referring to, thank you. In the very back, there was a question. Thank you. I'm a student at the Georgia Washington University and my question was addressed to Mohit. I wanted to ask how pertinent is the issue of border dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan in this entire dynamic of mistress and antagonism and if we talk about the logic conflict in South Asia where no party can come on the table over any interest, is it a matter of treating the disease rather than the causes, which is the border dispute, which is basically the origin of the entire mistress between the two countries, thank you. And so I promise this side of the room and last but not least Malcolm. Here. A Malcolm O'Dell in and out of Pakistan for about 50 years now, since I hitchhiked through there in 67 and very interested, I'm involved with conflict resolution and community mobilization. And you raised something, almost in passing, which I wonder if isn't really the elephant in the room and that's the nuclear issue. We've got a finger on nuclear button over in North Korea and we've got all kinds of focus on that. Nobody's talking about Pakistan and India and the nuclear situation there but the Russians, one leading Russian diplomat, central guy close to Putin said just the other day in the post, the chances of something going wrong and triggering a nuclear conflict or a nuclear accident is enormous. It's impossible that it won't happen. And is there any way that there's either a basis of a dialogue since nobody's pointing fingers at Pakistan and India right now, that we could get a dialogue going around that less contentious issue than Hakanee Networks where we could get the South Asian countries to look at the nuclear issue and begin to broaden the dialogue and that would take the heat off this more immediate situation. Is there an opening there of any kind? I think I'm gonna go back, we're gonna start with Moeid and go down, work our way back to Rick, answering some of the questions and any concluding remarks you wanted to make. Okay. Are you gonna take the sanctions one or? Yeah. So I'll skip that. On the border dispute. Well, feel free. You'll have more authentic information if it was during your time. I mean, I can explain what happened, but I think you'll be better. No, no, go ahead. No, I have two other ones. So let me, one on the border dispute, if you're talking of the Duran line. I think we can create an issue out of it, but the reality is it hasn't really been the issue that's driven the conflict. Afghanistan is never gonna accept the Duran line under any sort of circumstance that I can foresee, but it's never really been raised as a conflict issue between the two sides beyond the point that it exists and it's there. Where it does play in is, yes, that Pakistan wants a quote-unquote metaphorically hardened border so that this Pashtun nationalism idea doesn't come back and that conversation doesn't start. You'll often hear Pakistani officials say that the Pakistani Pashtuns should look to Islamabad and the Afghan Pashtuns to Kabul, but I think that's metaphorical. The idea that the Duran line is really the driver of conflict, I think we can create one out of that, but it's not really central to my mind. On the nuclear part, if you think it's less contentious, I'll go with you, but I think it's anything but. That's the more permanent kind of contentious issue that remains because neither India nor Pakistan want to open up that conversation with the third party. There's some communication, some cooperation that's happened on nuclear safety and security on both sides, but beyond that, they would not let anybody have that conversation. So I think the only way to come at that is to continue a relationship with both sides so that crisis management at least can occur in a way better than perhaps North Korea's example. We've seen North Korea's example. The only concluding remark I'll make is the two countries that I look at every single day and the relationship I focus on just completely makes everybody depressed. And I do not, either I'm completely wrong or I think we're just missing the point here in this relationship. I think on the Pakistani side, my argument throughout is that the quintessential definition of policy failure is that what you yourself want to achieve, you are not achieving. And the two things I put on the table, one is what Tanvi mentioned. India Pakistan differential is growing in India's favor and will continue to grow. So if that's where you want to go, clearly the current policy is not working, whatever the merits of that may be. And second, you choose which the adversary or the opponent here is. But if both actors you are trying to balance off the Taliban slash that space and the US, if both are upset at you because they feel you're too far on the other side, there is a problem. Right, and the Taliban think Pakistan ditched them. The world thinks Pakistan is in bed with the Taliban. What else is a definition of policy failure? So in Pakistan, that's my argument that this really needs to be rethought, it's not working. On the US side, I've just struggled with this over and over again. But I do not think the India conversation is that difficult. I really don't. And the cost we are paying for not having that conversation is a loss in Afghanistan. What would happen if the US and Pakistan quietly were to sit down and talk about what is it that Pakistan ultimately will accept in terms of Indian presence? Is it that the South and East is no go for India? Is it the subversive activities that Pakistan complains about? Is it that North and West India can do whatever it wants? Is it that Pakistan wants every Indian out? At least let's have a conversation figure out if there is coexistence possible. Because I continue to keep coming back to this point. The Hakani network, Taliban are incidental to the problem. If Pakistan were to find actor X today, that would do its bidding vis-a-vis India, however it feels, it'll go with actor X. But the real elephant in the room is the India-Pakistan problem. And I think we can have that conversation, we may fail. But to not test that proposition, to me is a self-fulfilling prophecy than at the end of the day, which is a break of the relationship between US and Pakistan. On the nuclear point, I think this conversation is also complicated by the fact that it's not just an India-Pakistan dyad. My colleague, Bob Einhorn, is doing quite a bit of work on this. But the reality partly is in terms of how the programs have developed, not just on the nuclear side, but the missile side, is that Pakistan's reacting to India's program to some extent. India's perception is not just Pakistan-related, but China as well. China is thinking about the US. So in some ways, it is kind of a, I don't know, dominoes or whatever, but it's all linked and that makes it harder that you can have, I think the good thing about the bilateral India-Pakistan dynamic is even when there's been problems the last two years, they've continued to exchange lists on the nuclear side, et cetera, they're continuing to have conversations. So that is a good aspect. Just on the kind of concluding side, just responding to something Moid said, one thing I think in kind of these discussions, we shouldn't forget Afghan interests and Afghan agency. The US and Pakistan can have a discussion about what Pakistan's red lines or needs are in terms of where India should be or not. But shouldn't Afghanistan have a say? It is, after all, a sovereign country. That should have its own reflection of where it would like. Now you can have a discussion, but I think that it has to involve Afghanistan about what kind of actions, presence there should be. But I don't think this can be, I mean, this would be like India and the US having a conversation about Pakistan would complain that the US and India were talking about this in the sense of something domestically in Pakistan. So I think we have to be careful. And this goes back to the point about labeling Afghan governments pro-India or not. Ashraf Ghani came in. The Indians were quite upset with him because they thought, listen, this guy is a pro-Pakistan guy. And Pakistan, within kind of what was it, a year or so? Three months. Three months, took three months. So I think, you know, we shouldn't forget that the Afghans can make up their own mind. They're not, I mean, they have interests that are distinct from India's. There is a way for Pakistan to shape Afghan behavior that might actually create that space between India and Afghanistan if it really wanted to. I do want to respond to this because this is important. Look, the point here is completely, the Afghan government ultimately will decide. There's no question about that. But the problem is between the US and Pakistan on the Ghani network. And that conversation has to be framed in a way where both sides find a way to get out of it and declare victory. And the important point here is that the war in Afghanistan is costing everybody. And if US and Pakistan can have a conversation that can come up with a formula that ultimately the Afghan government would have to agree or disagree with on how India and Pakistan can get out of their proxy situation in Afghanistan, I do not think it's politically incorrect to say that the start has to be a bilateral conversation, but not about Ghani network, Taliban, India separately. A conversation about what is it ultimately, where there's a package deal where Pakistan says, OK, this is my problem with India. Can we or can we not resolve it? Start a conversation, bring Kabul in. But if you're going to wait for the four countries to sit together and have this conversation, I'm afraid the war in Afghanistan is going to be lost in the political correctness of it. I'm clearly feeling as a moderator here. So do you want to respond? I'm going to respond to your response. On to you, David. First of all, I couldn't agree more with Tanvi on the importance of recognizing that it's Afghans that are the key actor here. It's Afghans who are by and large who are dying. And it's Afghans who have to be part of any solution. I respectfully disagree with Moeid. I think the Akhani issue is not an issue between the US and Pakistan. It's an issue between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Akhanis, and I apologize for this little bit of diversion, the Akhanis are currently holding two professors from the American University of Afghanistan where I'm on the board of trustees and was the president. They've held these two professors, Kevin King and Tim Weeks and American Australian for 18 months. I really urge the Pakistani government to get the Akhanis to release these two professors right away. This is one small thing. The attacks in Kabul last week were very clearly, and people who know better than I do about the intelligence done by the Akhanis, the people who they're killing are Afghans. And that's why the Afghans have to be put in place. And then the final point is the distrust between the United States and Pakistan is deep. The distrust between Pakistan and Afghanistan is even greater. Yesterday, an Afghan foreign ministry delegation was in Islamabad, and the talks were so bad, they couldn't even agree on what to not say about their discussions. And both sides had to have absolutely no progress. Afghanistan and Pakistan need to build a relationship, or else things will descend into even more problems. OK, very briefly. First on the sanctions question, I wish Moide had answered it, because I don't know the answer. It was actually after my time, as that's wrapped. My guess is it probably has to do with MTCR, is it missile technology enforcement of the missile technology control regime. But that's just a guess. OK, on the Durand line, I kind of disagree with Moide. I think that is, in fact, a core issue between Afghanistan and Pakistan. We are all aware of the suffering that Afghanistan has endured over the past 40 years, in part because of Pakistan's safe havens. But we do have to recognize that part of the fundamental problem between the countries is that Afghanistan has never accepted the Durand line as an international boundary, and in fact, refused to accept the creation of Pakistan in 1947. And Pakistanis do remember that. And indeed, I have not heard it as part of the public discourse, but as part of the private discourse at GHQ. I have certainly heard a lot about it. And I think that has to be, mind you, my sense is that Pakistan is not looking at this point for formal recognition, but they are certainly looking for a de facto greater recognition of the boundary, which Afghans, again, are not without blame on that issue. Certain Afghan leaders at various times have expressed very irredentist views. And some of them seem to think that their natural boundary is at the end. Finally, on the question of nukes, I don't think there's much prospect for further discussion at the strategic level, but it seems to me that there is a real need, and perhaps an opening, for discussions that are more small scale in nature. And what I'm thinking about is that the situation along the line of control and elsewhere throughout the Indo-Pac border is very much like the situation along the inter-German border during the Cold War. And in the late Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union and NATO developed a whole series of protocols and procedures for transparency on questions related to nuclear signaling, but also for how they deployed and what they did with their conventional forces. And I think some kind of exploration of the possibility of that between India and Pakistan, perhaps with US mediation, I think would be enormously valuable. Because the danger on that front, and I think that is the greatest likelihood of nuclear war in the world, is there, I'm precisely at that front, is from miscalculation resulting from lack of transparency, questions on the Pakistani side about Cold Start, all kinds of things. So I think measures that could be undertaken to increase transparency, including conventional deployments, would actually do go a long way towards de-escalating the situation. Thank you all for coming. I apologize for going over time, but it was too interesting a discussion just to end ruthlessly at 4 o'clock. So thank you, and please join me in thanking our panelists.