 Mae'r gael atod eich hofod, oedda, o'r gwbl yn gweithio i fyfyniadau yma o'r sgwrs. Ond mae'r gweld yn defnyddian nhw hefyd. Yn roi, mae'n gweithio i'r bobl i'r part 3. Dyna'r fan Betsi Gель i'r part dwylo'r credu o dwylo. Yn roi'r pwlu mwylo, mae'n hoffod ar gynnwys i'r partig beth dweud o rhai o'r tablau adegun o'r partig. The vast majority of that comes from book one part three. And the later works in particular the inquiry concerning human understanding Is crucially built around the central spine of book one part thrie. So Gathering we are going to have a look at relations again, we have already seen something about relations in an earlier lecture And we will see a the root that human follows in the streopleys of the treatise. Yng Nghym sy'n gwneud y gallai gynnig wedi cyfaint a'r drwg. Y rhai twyd ddwyllwch y Llywodraeth Book 1, 3, eisiau unig a'r bwysig. Dwi'n gwybod eich trefio, mae'r ddweud yw'r gweithwyr gwybodaeth gwybodaeth, ddweud o'r gweithwyr gwybodaeth gwybodaeth. Mae'r ddweud â'r ddweud. Dyna yw'r zelfs o'r oedd ddweud. Dwi'n gweithwyr gwybodaeth, yw'r ddweud yn ddweud. y rhwng y dimonstrwynt, y gwybod yn ymddiol. Ond oherwydd, yn ddim yn cyd-dweithio, ychydig yn gweithio yn ymddiol, yn ymddiol, o'r sechshon 2, a'i ddweithio ar y cael ei gwybod yn ymddiol. O'r byd yn ymddiol? Mae'r byd yn ymddiol yn ymddiol yma y Ff1 P3 yn ymddiol o gwasiwn a'r gwasiwn. Ond yw'r cwm, fel y gallwn i, yn fawr yn cyfwyr i'w gweithio'r rŵt. Yn ystod o gyfnod y sefydliadau, wrth gwrs dywedigaeth, byddwn i'n gweithio arall, ac mae'n gwneud o'r gwneud o'r gwneud o'r gwneud, ac mae'n ddangos iawn i gael ei gweld. four constant relations and three inconstant relations. But then what he does is argue that these relations have special links to particular mental operations. So resemblance, contrariety, degrees in quality are discoverable at first sight. Whereas proportions of quantity or number are susceptible of demonstration. So, if you read these paragraphs, you'll see he's effectively arguing that only proportions of quantity or number can give rise to complex mathematical reasoning. And the other things, resemblance, contrariety, degrees in quality, they're discoverable at first sight. We've seen that's a problematic claim. There are all sorts of different types of resemblance. Some of them are discoverable at first sight no doubt, but many others aren't. They can involve considerable investigation. Moving to the other group of relations, Hume wants to say that identity and relations of time and place are matters of perception rather than reasoning. Another dubious claim. Causation remains as the only relation that can be traced beyond our senses to existences and objects which we do not see or feel. So, we get a taxonomy which looks just a bit too good to be true. It reminds me of some of Kant's stuff. Great philosophers love shoehorning everything into some neat taxonomy. And it seems to me that's what Hume is doing here. The real result he's after and this is probably a genuine result or at least it looks close to being one. Is that probable reasoning, that is reasoning beyond what we immediately perceive or remember. Reasoning from observed to unobserved does seem to have a pretty intimate connection with causation. That does seem to be a genuine truth. But the rest of it really is not terribly convincing. At least I don't find it so. So what Hume's doing, he started the treatise trying to give a very systematic account of our ideas. Amongst the ideas he comes to complex ideas. He then divides up the complex ideas, a very important subset of complex ideas of relations. He then sets out to analyse our relations and gives a taxonomy. And he knows roughly where he's heading and he finds this a neat way of leading to where he wants to go. But it's all a little bit artificial and it doesn't quite work. Fortunately, however, this doesn't vitiate most of book one part three. Okay, we want to understand reasoning to the unobserved. And here we get the real nub of Hume's interest. Now in the inquiry concerning human understanding this is completely explicit. Much more so than in the treatise. In the treatise we get this, if you like, charade of investigating all these different ideas. And the focus is on the origin of our ideas. In the inquiry, section four, Hume proceeds in a very different way. He says, well there are relations of ideas, matters of fact. Remember Hume's fork, which I mentioned in an earlier lecture is a replacement for his theory of relations of the treatise. Okay, we've got relations of ideas. That's things that are true, if you like, by definition. All bachelors are unmarried. Or things that we can know by demonstration, mathematical truths. There's not too much of an epistemological problem about how we come to know those because those are a priori. On the other hand there are matters of fact. That's a different matter. How do we come to know any matter of fact beyond the immediate testimony of our memory and senses? That's the big question. And in inquiry section four, that's the question he sets out to answer. In the treatise, he's looking for the origin of the idea of causation. He's argued that causation is intimately bound up with probable reasoning. And he twists it so that we end up discussing the basis of probable reasoning. So I think this is where his real interests lie. But he's inserting it within the context of a discussion of the idea of causation. I'm not meaning to suggest that the discussion of the idea of causation isn't also very important to him. But the theory of probability of belief plays a much larger role than you might expect if the discussion were actually principally founded on the origin of our ideas. But at any rate, the origin of ideas is how Hume structures it. We're looking for the nature of our idea of causation and the light that the origin can shed on that. So we look at causes and effects and what do we see? Do we see any uniform property that causes an effect having common? No, we don't. All sorts of things can be causes, all sorts of things can be effects. It must be some relation between the cause and the effect that makes them cause an effect. Well, what relations? Well, if we look at things, take two things that cause an effect, what do we find? We find, first of all, that they're contiguous in space and time. They're close together. We always find, Hume suggests, that causal relations act locally. You might think, hang on, what about gravity? That doesn't make an entrance at this point. One thing that does make an entrance at this point via a footnote is Hume's observation that we can have causal relations between things that are not spatially located. Later in the treatise at 145 of the Immateriality of the Soul, Hume is going to point out that many of our perceptions do not have a spatial location. So it looks like the requirement of spatial contiguity cannot apply to those. They're obviously causally active. So notice that although contiguity is signalled as a part of our idea of causation, Hume himself via this footnote is actually saying, well, it doesn't matter that much. What about priority? We find causes to be prior to their effects. And Hume gives a rather unsatisfactory argument for the conclusion that causes must always be prior to their effects. It goes a bit like this. If causes and effects could be simultaneous, then all of time would collapse. Therefore, they can't be. OK. Well, if this argument appears satisfactory, that's fine. If not, don't worry, it doesn't matter too much. It seems a slightly odd attitude to take, but there it is. So what Hume is really after, what he really does care about, is not the contiguity or the priority, it's the idea of necessary connection. Famous quotation, often misunderstood. Shall we then rest contented with these two relations of contiguity and succession as affording a complete idea of causation? By no means, an object may be contiguous and prior to another without being considered as its cause. There is a necessary connection to be taken into consideration, and that relation is of much greater importance than any of the other two above mentioned. So, Hume is saying that the causal relation is not just a matter of contiguity and priority, it involves some sort of necessary connection. And what he's now going to do over the rest of book 1, part 3, though, as I say, in a rather circumlocutory way, is to find out the origin of that idea of necessary connection. So what's Hume looking for when he's looking for the idea of necessary connection? He's looking for the extra ingredient besides what? Contiguity, priority. Just notice for future reference, he's said nothing yet at all about anything like constant conjunction. It's single instance contiguity and priority. That's all he's got so far, and he's looking for the extra thing. He'll find the extra thing when he's discussing induction, as we shall see. But for the moment, he has no idea where to go. How do I find this elusive necessary connection? Well, I might think of something like power of production. Oh, but that just seems the same thing. I want to know what this power is, this necessity that governs causes. Where am I going to find that? Oh, I haven't a clue. What should I do then? Well, I better proceed like those who are not being able to find what they want, just beat around the neighbouring fields, and just hope that something will turn up. All right, I'll do that. I'll go and hope that something turns up. Very strange way of proceeding, but that's what he does. The first neighbouring field is the causal maxim. It is a general maxim in philosophy that whatever begins to exist must have a cause of existence. Well, here's an interesting question. Why do we believe the causal maxim? Well, many philosophers say that it's intuitively certain or demonstratively certain. Hume argues that it is neither. And we've actually seen part of that argument before. Do you remember in the theory of relations, I mentioned that in drawing his dichotomy, part of Hume's aim seems to have been to show that the causal maxim can't be intuitively certain, because he says intuitive certainty can only involve the constant relations, causation is an inconstant relation, therefore the causal maxim can't be intuitively certain. More securely, he appeals to the conceivability principle. It's perfectly conceivable to have something beginning into existence without a cause. Therefore, it cannot be intuitively or demonstratively certain that every beginning of existence must have a cause. Since it's not from knowledge, remember Hume is using knowledge in the strict sense. When Hume talks about knowledge in the treatise, he almost always means demonstrative knowledge, absolute certainty. So it's not from knowledge or any scientific reasoning that we derive this opinion, the causal maxim, it must necessarily arise from observation and experience. The next question then should naturally be how experience gives rise to such a principle. How from experience do we get a belief in the causal maxim? But as I find it will be more convenient to sink this question in the following, why we conclude that such particular causes must necessarily have such particular effects and why we form an inference from one to another, we shall make that the subject of our future inquiry, twill perhaps be found in the end that the same answer will serve for both questions. Well, an intriguing passage because not only does he sink the causal maxim at this point, it sinks without trace. It never reappears, he never comes back to it. So we have the appearance here that he's interested in the origin of the causal maxim, he says, that's very interesting, I'm going to sink it in this other question, he goes off and discusses the other question, never comes back. Now many people have supposed that Hume is not a believer in the causal maxim. This does not seem to be the case. I suppose it's quite natural that people would think that because he's argued that the causal maxim is not intuitively or demonstratively certain, he's attacked various philosophers' arguments, notably those of Hobbes, Locke and Samuel Clarke, for the causal maxim, but bear in mind he's said quite explicitly that it arises from experience. Here he's saying, the next question is how it arises from experience. There are two main lines of evidence for the claim that Hume does believe in the causal maxim beside those hints. First of all, we will see that Hume seems to be a pretty committed determinist. If you're a determinist, then inevitably you're going to believe in the causal maxim. It's an interesting question why he's a determinist and whether he's justified in being one, but I think it's pretty clear that he is. I was going to say, we'll come back to that later. Secondly, we've got some letters. This is the letter from a gentleman to his friend in Edinburgh. Written in 1745, he's been attacked by the local clergy as an atheist for denying the doctrine of causes and effects. They're saying, Hume, in the treatise, denies that every event has a cause or that every beginning of existence has a cause. This is the foundation of, for example, Samuel Clarke's cosmological argument for the existence of God. Therefore, Hume's an atheist. Hume is saying, no, I didn't say that in the treatise. What I said was that the causal maxim is not founded on demonstrative or intuitive certainty. Instead, it's founded on moral evidence, probable evidence, inductive evidence, evidence from experience. It's followed by a conviction of the same kind of these truths that all men must die and that the sun will rise tomorrow. Now, if that is written sincerely, then Hume seems to be thinking out there in the country as tutor to a madman without his books. Here he is writing from memory and he seems to be thinking that in the treatise he had asserted that the causal maxim is derived from experience and is as certain as these things, as certain pretty much as anything. Again, we have a letter to John Stuart. John Stuart had written that Hume denied the doctrine of causes and effects and here he is saying, no, I didn't deny that at all, saying much the same as in the letter from a gentleman. OK, so much for the causal maxim. Hume discusses it, takes the opportunity to attack some attempts to prove it, then says, I'm going to go on to talk about causal inference and as I've suggested, I think that's where his interests really lie. So the next few sections are structured around this and it is a very systematic structure. In treatise 134, Hume argues that causal reasoning, if it's going to result in belief, must start from something that we perceive or remember. So that gives us an agenda. Here, therefore, we have three things to explain. First, the original impression, that's the thing from which we reason. Secondly, the transition to the idea of the connected cause or effect. So when we draw an inference from what we perceive to something that we don't perceive, thirdly, the nature and qualities of that idea. And we'll see. In the rest of this part of the treatise, he does discuss the original impression, the transition to the idea of the connected cause or effect, that's the argument concerning induction of the inference from the impression to the idea and then he goes on to discuss the nature of belief. So the next few sections of the treatise are all structured accordingly. 135 has an odd title of the impressions of the senses and memory. That's a bit peculiar because the memory does not present impressions. The memory presents ideas. So what's he doing here talking about the impressions of the senses and memory? Well, I think it's a slip, but it's a fairly natural slip. Because what he's doing here is contrasting the senses and memory with the imagination. And what he's saying is that the impressions of the senses and the ideas of the memory have a force and vivacity, a strength, a liveliness beyond those of the imagination. And that seems to be what enables us to found an inference from them. When we infer beyond what we have perceived or remembered to something unobserved, it seems to be that extra force and vivacity over the mere ideas of the imagination that enables us to actually draw an inference from it. Thank you.