 In a strange turn of history, the threat of global nuclear war has gone down, but the risk of a nuclear attack has gone up. The Defiant Pakistan today conducted another nuclear test, a second set of tests, in three days. China's Congress today voted to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. This is the annual reality check on nuclear non-proliferation and arms control. This astonishing community of experts. We've grown from 20 or 30 people gathering over dinner to approximately 700 who have registered for the conference. The logic of the Terrence could easily become outdated. And this would definitely be the case if a criminal or terrorist group had to acquire a weapon of mass destruction. It is, as always, an enormous pleasure for me to welcome you again. Great timing for this event. I really do think some big things are going to come out of here. Good morning. My name is Toby Dalton. And I'm James Ackton. And together we direct the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. And we are also the stewards of the International Nuclear Policy Conference, or hashtag NUCFEST for those of you wanting to tag the conference on Twitter. So as you've probably noticed from our branding, this is the 30th anniversary of the conference. From a small gathering of a few non-proliferation experts, started by Sandy Spector in 1989. It has now grown to this spectacle that you'll participate in over the next couple of days, as we saw in the welcome video. We are the stewards of this event, but we are indebted to Sandy as well as to other past organizers of the conference. Josir and Sione, John Wolfstahl, George Perkovich, and Deepti Chubi in particular, for sustaining this important gathering of the nuclear policy field. We'll show a few more videos today and tomorrow that look back at major nuclear stories through the lens of the conference, featuring people that you know and love who have been frequent participants in the conference throughout its history. So it appears that 30 years of the conference hasn't dimmed its appeal. This year's edition actually is the largest ever. So in addition to the over 800 of you that registered to attend, we created for the first time a digital participation option and had an additional 400 people who said that they were interested in that option, and also others who would be watching on live stream. This is just one aspect of our effort to make the conference more inclusive and to broaden the field. More on that in a moment. I think that the conference continues to grow in participation, both validates its continued relevance, and also tells us something about the salience of the issues before us. In crafting an appropriate 30th anniversary agenda, we first aimed at what we thought of as the big issues, the big questions confronting the field today, such as how to enforce international nuclear agreements, the implications of technological changes for arms control and international security, and what effects might the Nuclear Prohibition Treaty have on the nuclear order. We also wanted to revisit themes that have been nearly ever present in Carnegie conferences as far back as 1989, such as U.S.-Russia arms control, the future of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the prospect of conflict in South Asia, and nuclear negotiations with North Korea. And we'll hear perspectives on key issues from theory senior officials this morning under Secretary of State Andrea Thompson and Special Representative for North Korea Stephen Began, and then tomorrow Representative Adam Smith, Chair of the House Armed Services Committee. Organizing a conference on this scale is, well, there's not a nice way to put it. It's heavy and costly, right? It's a big lift for us. So we are incredibly appreciative of the generous support from a number of foundations and governments without which we literally could not convene this conference. So if you'll indulge me, let me thank them here. First, I want to thank our boss Bill Burns at the Carnegie Endowment for continuing to support this, their willingness to use, draw from the Carnegie Endowment to make up the sizable gap between the revenue and the costs. The Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Edgerton Foundation, the German Federal Foreign Office, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Newland Foundation, the Prospect Hill Foundation, the Skoll Foundation, Nagasaki University, and last but by no means least, Stone Brewing, official beer sponsor of New Fest. I could probably use one now. So if you see representatives of these organizations around the conference, please give them your thanks as well. We'd also like to thank and welcome our exhibitors. These organizations are working at the cutting edge of nuclear policy, generating new understanding, pioneering the use of new technologies, and strengthening our field by educating future experts and promoting inclusion. You can find out more about these organizations in the atrium. For our part, Carnegie is also committed to education and inclusion. I'm very proud to be able to say that of the 61 panelists at this year's conference, 31, that's 51%, are women. And for the second time, we're running a dedicated track for the many young professionals here today, including a half-day workshop yesterday, a mentorship lunch tomorrow, and a writing workshop on Wednesday. To help everyone remain fully engaged in what can be an exhausting 48 hours, I'm delighted to announce the return of our free coffee bar upstairs in the Oculus. Toby is less delighted. His preference was not to declare it in the hope of limiting access. But when I pointed out to him that the typical Nukefest audience member could geolocate it from our Twitter feeds in about 15 seconds, he relented. Last, but not least, the app. To get the most out of this conference, we strongly suggest that you download and use the conference app. If you're having trouble, then our solutions desk just outside in the atrium is here to help you. The app is your best way to navigate the conference by viewing the schedule, participants lists, and maps. It also allows you to communicate with other participants and participate in real-time polling during the proliferation prognostication plenary tomorrow. This year, however, the app will serve a new function. It will allow you to ask questions to panelists during sessions in this room. As experience conference goes, we'll doubtless remember we've always facilitated Q&A in this room with fixed microphones there and there. As such, people who sat on the aisle near the front had an insurmountable head start in the microphone steeple chase, which wasn't entirely fair. So this year, if you want to ask a question in this room, please use the app. We recognize that not everyone can use the app. So for you, there are blue question slips at the back of the room over there. Write your question on the blue slip, hold it aloft, and Carnegie staff will collect it and type it into the system for you. You must include your name on these question slips or your question will be rejected. That said, if you can use the app, please, please do so. It's very, very straightforward as I'm hopefully now about to demonstrate. Okay, so what you should be able to see on the screen now is a mirror of my phone. All you're going to do is you're going to navigate to the program page for this session. So at the top left, you can see there's an icon that says programs. You're going to click on that. We are in the welcome introduction session, and you can see it says this is an interactive session live. That's going to go live about five minutes before we start Q&A. You won't be able to type in questions before that. If you click on that, and then you just click ask, then at the bottom of the screen, you can type in a question. And then you submit it there. Okay, it is as simple as that. Obviously, there's no point submitting a question in this panel because we're not taking Q&A, but that's how the app works. As I said, if you experience any difficulties at all, please just see the solutions desk outside. Anyway, enough metadata. It is time for some actual data. It is my huge pleasure to welcome the moderator for the opening plenary who's going to introduce the keynote. Our moderator is Mark Fitzpatrick. Mark has a well-owned reputation for being the nicest guy in nuclear policy, but he's also a distinguished diplomat who spent 26 years in the Foreign Service and a further 13 at the International Institute for Strategic Studies as a singularly effective thinker, writer and doer. He's one of my role models in the field, and it's great to mark his retirement by putting him back to work today. So let me introduce our moderator who will introduce our keynote speaker. Thanks very much, James. It's an honor to be here. And a great honor for me to introduce this conference as an introductory keynote speaker, the honorable Andrea Thompson. Andrea is the Undersecretary for Arms Control and International Security, a position she's held since last April. She's been on the job for a little under a year, but she's been on the team a little longer than that. She was at the White House as Deputy Assistant to the President and as National Security Advisor to the Vice President. These positions of heavy responsibility have capped Andrea's long service to the public in the field of military intelligence where she served in a lot of difficult positions, not least of which was on the Hill as the Senior Advisor to the Chairman of the House Committee on Homeland Security and the Senior Military Advisor to the Chairman of the House Armed, House Foreign Affairs Committee. But Andrea served even more difficult roles than these when she was in combat missions in Afghanistan, in Iraq, leading military intelligence efforts for nearly 28 years. So, you know, whatever the tough reputation of this audience, she has been in more trying theaters and faced more formidable foes in her career. And I really look forward to engaging with her and with you at this nuclear policy conference. So, Andrea, if we could bring you to the stage now. Oh, and the last thing I forgot to say, Andrea is from South Dakota, a part of the United States, where niceness is a virtue. And her staff have confirmed to me that that is indeed the case. They like you as a boss. So, thanks guys. So, the format of this introductory presentation is a discussion format, and I'm going to pose some questions to Andrea. And after a while, we'll get to the audience for the Q&A for the last 30 minutes. If we could start in the non-proliferation field with the NPT review conference coming up in a little more than a year, there's a lot of concern about how that's going to go given the breakdown in some areas of non-proliferation. But on the positive side, the P5 had what I understand was to be a productive meeting in Beijing in late January, where they talked about not just the glossary of nuclear terms, but how to promote non-proliferation, how to deal with elements in the arms control agenda. And I wonder, building on that, if you can tell us a little bit about preparations for the review conference, and what do you hope to see on the non-proliferation agenda? Yeah, absolutely. Thanks, Mark. And if I may take just a couple of quick minutes up front, I want to allow quite a bit of time for the Q&A. But I'd be remiss if I didn't thank everyone here in the room for taking time on a gorgeous D.C. Monday. You have options and you're here. Some familiar faces in the room, friends and allies from around the world and here in Washington, D.C. So thanks for making the time. Again, I hope this is a candid dialogue. The team will tell you and for those folks that have met me before, I am an open door type of leadership. And this is a great opportunity to get your insight and hands on way ahead and some of the very important topics that we're working in the T family portfolio. I'd also like to thank Carnegie Happy Anniversary for 30 years and incredible accomplishment and to continue this important endeavor. And just two other quick points. I was telling Mark, I watched some of the points yesterday with the young professionals. And the addition of that to the agenda and to the Carnegie program, I think is incredibly important. One of my top couple of priorities, I sat down with the team early on after kind of assessed where we were in the T family, took the first 30 to 60 days to make some assessments on where we want to go. And one of the incredibly important things that I have a professional obligation to uphold is a leader of the T family as a recruiting and retention for the next generation of leaders. We have an incredible group of experts and we'll talk about that when we talk about DPRK, when we talk about some of the very challenging problems that we're facing today, we've got incredible individuals that have been on the State Department team for years. And we also have some new young folks coming in and it's incredibly important to recruit folks in, encourage that, educate on what we do and what we don't do. The secretaries started off some domestic travel in the last couple of days for that. I'll be going back to the great state of South Dakota later this week, again, to tell the story, but I would encourage all of you. If you're here in the room, it means you're passionate about arms control and international security and I would just encourage you, if you're not a mentor to someone in the field, become a mentor to someone in this field, reach out. Today is a great opportunity but we have other forms as well and lead and develop. So 30 years forward, someone that's in this room will probably be a young person and will then be moderating the next panel. So that's an incredible part. I just would like to start with that. And then the second note on gender balance. I give kudos to the team for establishing that, again, to celebrate International Women's Day. Last Friday it was meeting with a group of international security leaders in London. So it's great to be able to sit on the panel and uphold that for starting it with the 50%. Although I must be bigger because it's 51%. So thank you for that initiative as well. To tee off the session and the importance of the NPT, we did have a successful P5 in Beijing. We had had an initial engagement up in New York after the first committee that kind of set the stage for that. But the trip then to January, the beginning of February, again, I tell folks not to make too much of my South Dakota Midwestern background. But I believe in candor. I believe in transparency and I believe in getting things done. So I pulled my counterparts. I said we've met multiple times over many administrations with different leaders. And we've flown a long way. We're in Beijing. If we're just going to sit around the table and continue to use our playbook and our talking points for hours and go back and forth, we should probably just go home now. Instead we have an opportunity to be transparent, to share ideas, to recognize that there's going to be topics where we don't agree. Sometimes it's a P2 and a P3 making up the P5. But there are going to be areas that we don't agree, but there are areas that we agree, and how do we build upon that? And the safety and security of our nuclear programs is exactly that. And talking about how, what do we do now to build to 2020? What do we need to be doing as a P5 to lead to set the standard in that area? So we did have a very candid discussion. I think we made some headway. Again, I've got a great team of senior advisors that have been through quite a few P5 engagements, so their insight and feedback is incredibly important. And they said, yeah, this one was different. So as we look towards 2020, and I challenge the folks to reassess, let's look back a little bit where we've been. What have we done? What's worked and what hasn't worked? So reassess where we are, but then look forward and recommit. And the things that make the NPT what it is as we celebrate the anniversary next year, recommit, commit to the standards, commit to that, that we've developed the NPT early on and make sure that we are removing those obstacles, working together. Then there will be some obstacles. I'm clear-eyed about that. I know that it'll be a tough road ahead, but that's what we do. That's what diplomacy is. It's when you sit down across the table from one another and exchange ideas. So we have some opportunities in the near term. We've got the key meetings coming up at the end of next month. But this is an important piece, so I would encourage the folks in the room that can help shape that as well. Again, it's for the safety and security and to uphold the standards that we established years ago to make that a successful PREPCON and REPCON. Thanks very much, Andrea. So at the Beijing meeting, there obviously was some discussion of arms control issues. And if I could hone in on that a little bit, one of the areas of disagreement among members of the P5 obviously was the INF Treaty. In this room, I guess there's a lot of concern about the imminent demise of the INF. And then coupled with the President's expressed disinterest in extending New START, a lot of people draw the conclusion that strategic arms control is, if not dead, nearly so. It's part of your title, but are you going to have to change your title if there's no strategic arms control? How do you respond to these concerns about the INF and New START non-extension? Yeah, no, thanks for that, Mark. And I would actually push back on that assessment. Again, those that know me know my leadership know that I am standards-based. And this is incredibly important in our mind, folks, that the underlying foundation of our arms control agreement when we sign it is the safety and security of the American people. That's the foundation of this agreement. And so when folks are like, oh, the demise of the INF Treaty, I remind folks, across two administrations we've had these discussions. For many, many, many years we've had these discussions on showing Russia where they violated the Treaty, continuing to present that intelligence and information, working with partners and allies. And so I remind folks, I said, if you sign for a treaty, but you're not willing to uphold the standards of that treaty, what kind of leadership is that? What kind of arms control regime is that? And so I counter the narrative, and again, I am a truth in lending. I have not spent most of my adult life in arms control. I have spent most of my adult life defending democracy and the Constitution of the United States. I have spent most of my adult life in international security with partners and allies. And if you see that there's a violation of that standard, in this case, the SSC-8 being developed and fielded in multiple battalions, and you don't hold the other treaty partner accountable, you've now set a new standard. You have now allowed the violation of that arms control treaty to become the norm. And so what has that set the precedent for future arms control treaties? So yes, I'm very passionate about what we're doing with arms control, and very passionate on upholding the standards of treaties. And again, with open dialogue. The President made the announcement in October. The Secretary subsequently made the announcement in December, reached out. The Russians had sent, again, offers to meet, and I did. Flew to Geneva in the middle of January and sat across the table with the Deputy Foreign Minister and his team. We brought a team represented from State Department, NSC, DOD, and the joint staff, and had a candid dialogue. Didn't make movement because the Russians still didn't admit to violating the treaty, but we, what we talked. We've met with the Ambassador here in D.C. We also met, we were on a panel, many of you might have been in the Security Conference. I was on a panel with the Deputy Foreign Minister where we discussed it again. So the demise of the INF Treaty isn't a Trump administration. The Russians violated this years ago. We're finally upholding the standards and holding them accountable. Again, the safety, security of the American people. We haven't conducted the R&D. We haven't fielded missiles of these, of the treaty violating systems, while Russia has. So I will continue to always fight what's, invest interests of safety and security of the American people. I'd also counter the narrative that the President isn't interested in New START. We've had discussions. We're in an interagency process now. We've had the discussions on the extension, what it means, where we are. We continue to abide by the treaty. We met the central limits as did our Russian counterparts last year. We continue to meet at the expert's level. We continue to have the BCCs. And so it's really in the discussion. And I think the other point is, much like what we've done with the nuclear posture review, we engaged early and often with partners and allies. This was a transparent process. So I just got back from London where I had engagement with some partners and allies on next steps. And getting their feedback and getting their input and working together, it's an important part as we formulate our policy. Again, the foundational element of that is what's in the best interest for the United States and with our partners and allies. So we'll continue to work through New START. We've had, again, two years to make that decision on the extension. But the foundational element is what's upholding the safety and security. But again, I'll welcome the input. I think there's some folks in the room that we've met on this topic. So I'm sure it'll get up in the Q&A as well. Okay, thanks very much. That's promising, I think. Changing the topic a bit. I recently participated in a double I, double S, tabletop exercise in which artificial intelligence was manipulated by malevolent actors to impede nuclear command and control. And I know you've been giving a lot of thought to new technologies and how the State Department should get a handle on them. Can you share some of your thinking on how to address new challenges in the field of nuclear threats in new technologies? Yeah, absolutely, Mark. And it started this morning talking about one of the top priorities with retaining the expertise and recruiting the next generation. The other priority that I established early on was on cybersecurity and emerging technologies. I think it's an incredible part of, well, obviously it's here. Whether it's in the defense field, but in the national security arena. And I've had discussions, again, with experts within the government and with our private industry partners. And I think this is an area, I use some analogies where we were in the 80s. I tell some of the young leaders as they sit down, they say, this is an incredible era in arms control and international security where you see the nexus of technology, where you see the capabilities in cyberspace, where you see the quickly evolving technologies in artificial intelligence. Whether it's hypersonics, as we've seen with some of our adversaries, whether it's quantum computing and the uses of quantum computing, is it advanced manufacturing and 3D printing? These are all technologies that have applications to what we do in international security. But we need to have those discussions now. I tell folks, I said, there's the rate of policy and the rate of technology. We've got to get better with our rate of policy. Otherwise, we're always going to be behind the evolution of these next steps. So I think it's an incredible part. I'm, again, very interested. And I find that as I travel the globe, more and more of our partners are having the same discussion. So how do we harness that intellect, harness those ideas? Because there are similar applications. The challenges of AI and non-proliferation in the United States is the same to our Asian partners or European partners across the globe. So let's share those best practices without confining the technology and innovation that makes it great. I tell folks, in the United States, we lead the world in innovation and the energy and entrepreneurial spirit. You don't want to harness that. Where we continue to have the applications, whether it's the digital economy and free flow of information and using it for all the positive aspects, whether it's healthcare, again, there's just a myriad of applications, but ensure that those same technologies aren't used maliciously. So how do you establish norms of responsible behavior? How do you have the responsible nation-sates that say, yes, I have the cyber application. I won't hack your election. I'm building AI for this healther application. I'm not going to use it to manipulate your nuclear control systems. So we're starting those discussions now. Again, I think it's a fascinating part of the portfolio and a fascinating part of where we are in this kind of generational line. And the decisions that we make now, I think, will shape arms control and the non-proliferation world for years to come. Incredibly important. Thanks very much, Andrea. That also sounds very promising. Can I go back to the INF issue? I think everyone here would agree on the importance of commitment to norms and upholding those norms. I think everyone would also agree on the importance of protecting, you know, your responsibility to protect the American people. If the Russian cruise missiles are a threat to U.S. national security interests, I imagine would be a plan for how to ensure that there's no further expansion in deployment of these 9M729 missiles in addition to upholding the norm. What do we do actually with the issue of the deployment of these missiles? Can you share any thinking on this? Yes. I mean, we've had discussions with my Russian counterparts on, in the early months of what does it mean to be treaty compliant. Again, I told the Deputy Foreign Minister, you know what the standards are and you know what it means to get back to be compliant with the treaty. The truth of the matter is they don't acknowledge that it's a violation so they'll continue to field these. So again, the decision made by the President and announced by the Secretary on now that we've suspended and moving out that the Department of Defense can start those research and development actions that they haven't done at all because of the World Treaty Compliance. So DOD is looking at that for next steps. The R&D, what does it mean, the fielding of systems and so they've just now commenced that. Okay, thanks very much. You're very game to let me jump around issue to issue here. Compliance is so important in all aspects of arms control and non-proliferation. One of the issues involves Iran's compliance with the JCPOA and its overall commitments under the NPT. A lot of questions have been raised recently with the trove of documents that the Israel government revealed to the world and provided to the IAEA about Iran's previous possibly ongoing development of nuclear weapons technologies. And questions have been raised about whether these documents are being utilized with the speed and devotion that they should be, particularly by the IAEA. Given the T family's role in compliance and incorporating with the IAEA, can you say anything about how you see the IAEA moving forward, are they moving fast enough to assess and utilize these documents in holding Iran to its commitments? I mean the IAEA is, again, no surprise to the folks in this room, an incredible and important partner to the United States, and again to upholding those standards and taking next steps. I would also say much like we all do as we evolve and we modernize. And so the IAEA, again, is looking at that, what are their responsibilities and how do they apply the actions to pursue that. They have taken next steps, they are working diligently, not to give a shout out to the IAEA, but again when you talk about opportunities to serve, that is another opportunity to serve, it's incredibly important. They have to have access and be able to confirm or deny what's going on across the world, in this case in Iran. Just in Israel for the joint political-military engagement and you talk not to delve too much into the JCPOA and their activities, but it was pretty incredible to me as you study it from here and their outreach and the malign activity and the funding with their proxies, whether it's the Houthis, Hamas or I guess I was in Israel with Hezbollah and going up to the northern border and going down into the tunnels. They said they thought approximately 12 years to digging through stone, a kilometer long to be able to infiltrate and attack the people of Israel. So this is where the money of Iran is going towards. So again the President has been very clear, the Secretary has been very clear on next steps with Iran to have a plan and a deal that actually encompasses the whole range of that malign activity. So again very moving to me to see that on the ground in Israel just a couple of weeks ago. That's great, I wish I had that opportunity myself. I kind of miss being in government for those reasons, but not other reasons. Just keeping to the Middle East and we'll get to audience questions pretty soon. Saudi Arabia is intent on developing nuclear power. They've been in negotiations with the United States, with key officials in the T family about a nuclear cooperation agreement. We haven't heard very much recently about those negotiations. Many of us in this room have been hopeful that the Saudis would agree to the gold standard to forego enrichment and reprocessing. There doesn't seem to be much interest on the part of the Saudis in that. And they haven't even yet signed up to the modified small quantities protocol or taken any other steps to demonstrate transparency in their nuclear intentions. And given all that, is the gold standard still something to which we can aspire in the United States in reaching nuclear cooperation agreements with nuclear wannabe states? The short answer is yes. And I tell folks, again, I think people have a tendency to maybe misinterpret. So I'd like to clarify it here again today. Last year in February, during my confirmation hearing, I was very clear to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on my obligations, if confirmed, as the Under Secretary, is to uphold the standard, again, for the safety and security of the American people. And that would work always towards the gold standards in our 123 agreement. I reaffirmed that subsequently after being confirmed. We had an arms control hearing. Gosh, I lost track of the dates, but I had an arms control hearing after the confirmation. Again, I put the SFRC and stated that again. That will always be my going in position, always, is the gold standard. I would add that with that I would also add, as we've seen other countries fill the gap, that I always want an American company to be the first one in line in those systems. So we are working diligently with that to make sure that the American, we know it makes the best equipment in the world with the best standards. And if we're not there, the Chinese will be there among others. So yeah, I will always go with the gold standard, and I would always stand up for what's best for the economic prosperity of the American people. Well, I'm very glad to have that on the record. Probably a couple of folks are. I think if I could have the indulgence of the conference organizers, if we could get to audience Q&A a little bit earlier than had been planned, because I've run through most of the prepared questions that I had, and I think many of you would like to pose them. So maybe in about five minutes if we could do that, and maybe you've got this app that you can pretty soon start posing your questions. Before we do that, can we return to the Beijing meeting? And this is a closed-door meeting, so you can't tell us everything that happened there. But I wonder if among the areas of agreement and engagement among the P5, whether efforts to protect against nuclear terrorism were on the agenda there, or whether they will be on the agenda in other meetings coming up. I mean, nuclear terrorism written big in preventing North Korea from selling its nuclear technology to malevolent non-state actors. And then nuclear terrorism prevention efforts in the form of developing norms and standards and rules, including, for example, the amended convention for the physical protection of nuclear material, where I think there's an upcoming review conference on that and what the U.S. position will be in seeking to further strengthen the rules of protecting the nuclear materials and other ways that nuclear terrorists, nuclear wannabe terrorists, might get their hands on the wrong materials. We did discuss it as far as the responsibilities as P5 leaders on seeking out bad actors upholding our standards as the P5 members to ensure that those technologies and systems are not proliferated, that they not only are used responsibly by those that have them, but they don't get into the wrong hands. So we did discuss that in, again, the responsibilities, the importance of being the P5 and back to action, not just words, that we didn't just come to talk and leave, that we have a professional obligation. If you're in the P5, uphold those standards. We also talked about how we could work together. Again, transparency measures, address a little bit on our NPR. And so we talked about it's important to share those best practices. It's important to be transparent about what you're doing. Then I used the United States, our NPR as an example. Again, we worked with partners and allies. We worked here internally to form that incredibly important document, but that it continues that there's also next step. So at first committee this past year, we briefed. I said I will come up, bring my joint staff counterpart, and we went up on the dais at the UN, spent about an hour and briefed the NPR and then took questions from the field. And again, opened it to everyone in attendance. And I think that's important. And I did call out to some of my P5 colleagues and said that's transparency, gentlemen. That's what it means to have a program and a policy and to be able to explain what it is and what it isn't and have a few holes poked in it. And we look forward to the other members of the P5 doing the same. So again, positive development in Beijing and we look forward to continue to moving that ball down the field. Great. And when you said gentlemen, I presume that's because they were all gentlemen and the gender balance that we're seeing here doesn't prevail in every other field of our activity. It was on the U.S. team. To include your advisors as well. The question and answer from the audience session I'd like to now begin and I'm already getting some good questions and they're better than the questions I was thinking of, so be on your guard. So I know that in Beijing, I presume there must have been some discussion on how to deal with the BAM, the BAM Treaty. And Dr. Rebecca Gibbons is asking, what is the status of the creating conditions for nuclear disarmament working group? Great question. So again, talking about feedback and you'll see a theme here. Feedback and input. So we did some initial engagement with allies and members of the P5 and the word conditions, there was a bit of a rub with the word conditions. What does this mean? What are you talking, what are you trying to do? So we sat down and said, okay, we're really creating the environment. And so it's now CEND, so creating the environment. We find that we're getting positive feedback on it. Again, as we formulate this and get input on what it is and what it isn't. But we think it's a bit more, I don't want to say informal, but I think there's an opportunity to have some more candor and more inclusiveness. So we're on the early stages. So again, for folks that are involved with this, welcome your feedback. As CEND continues to evolve, Chris Ford, my assistant secretary for ISN, will be here on a panel tomorrow afternoon. Really one of the many great ideas that Chris has had in his leadership as assistant secretary. So I'd encourage to ask him to keep this theme throughout the day. So we're very excited about CEND and welcome the feedback so we can make sure it is as robust and inclusive as it needs to be. Thanks very much, Andrea. I've got good questions here about South Asia, about INF, about New START. Can we... You're ready to field all of these, right? Hit me, yeah, hit me. Okay, good. So on INF, INF, Dr. Susan Martin asks, sitting aside for the moment, the need to avoid normalizing violations, can you explain the military significance of the Russian violations of the INF? Well, I would normally leave the military assessments to the military, but I will address one portion of that when you say the military significance. The fact that there are multiple battalions of this system, and that's, again, in the education process, I use maybe my parents and my family as a benchmark when we have these discussions and my dad and we talk about the treaty, and I'm like, dad, you know these systems are already fielded? He's like, what? No, these are prototypes, and they're just starting... I'm like, no. These are systems that have researched, developed, manned, equipped, and are now multiple battalions across the Russian Federation that can range partners and allies today. They can range partners and allies today. So, again, we have a responsibility to ensure the safety and security, and it can range American citizens abroad. So we have... I think that's incumbent in our responsibilities to make sure that we're protecting ourselves and partners and allies, so incredibly disconcerting, not only from the treaty violation and what it means for arms control, but from the military standpoint. And then I always caveat that after wearing the uniform for 28 years. I tell folks, I know that the U.S. equipment, our soldier, sailors, airmen, marine, and Coast Guardsmen are the best in the world, and I always have the full faith and confidence of our U.S. military. Great. Thank you. Darrell Kimball notes that Russia's ambassador to the United States, who I think we'll be speaking later in this conference, says that if the United States and the Russian Federation allow strategic arms control treaties to collapse, the NPT review conference next year is going to be a disaster. Would you agree with that assessment? And then related, would you agree with General Haydn that the New START provides transparency and predictable predictability that's valuable for U.S. security? I'll start with New START and then go back to the ambassador's statement and Darrell, give him a shout out. So with, I would agree with the assessment that New START, again, we have capabilities to meet, capabilities to inspect and that does give insight to what the Russians are and are not doing. It does also allow an opportunity to exchange information and have dialogue. So I would agree with the commander's assessment. I also had a great opportunity to get out to off at Air Force Base and sit down with General Haydn and his incredible team. For those of you that don't know but it's absolutely incredible. He's a great leader. So yes, the short version is it does allow us to have insight to programs. On Darrell's question and with the ambassador's statement about what was the quote of the... He said that if we allow strategic arms control to collapse, the treaties to collapse, the NPT Rebcon is going to be a disaster and I think he said and I wouldn't want to be there. You want to be there? I do want to be there. That's what leadership and responsibility is. Shurking that and saying it's a disaster two years away, I think is a telling indicator of Russia's commitment to it. I am committed to making it a success. I think many in this room are as well. The collapse of the INF Treaty the catalyst for that was not the United States of America. The catalyst for that was the Russian Federation. So again, they don't acknowledge the steps that they've taken. They don't acknowledge the mistakes that they've made. They don't acknowledge the violations that have been incurred and so I don't give much credence to his assessment for the NPT. He hasn't shown much success with his recent events. I'll continue to work hard for the NPT and continue to work with partners and allies to make sure that we're doing everything today to make sure 2020 is a success. Somehow I didn't think you were going to agree with him. We agree on some things. One question from one of the organizers so I feel obliged to pose it. This is from Toby Dalton. Over the last three weeks there was a major crisis in South Asia and just adding to his question when there are major crises in South Asia and talk about war, talk about nuclear war is on our minds. What role did the United States play in trying to prevent the crisis from escalating? Many steps taken and again when you talk about crises and the engagement in Kashmir to prevent a crisis you have to work beforehand and so strong relationships and engagements to set that dialogue in motion to build those relationships. I tell folks again another important part of what we do at the State Department the first time you're picking up a phone with a counterpart shouldn't be you're shooting at one another. We build those relationships early and often and continue to build on those relationships so when the time when there is a moment of crisis you can pick up the phone or have your representative of the embassy go in person and have to make sure that cooler heads will prevail. So was the Secretary engaged? Absolutely. Were we engaged? Absolutely. Was the NSC engaged? Absolutely. To ensure that both India and Afghanistan do not want a nuclear war and that have cooler heads prevail returning to the pilot mirrored the steps taken between the two but again then you look at next steps so it's not a one and done. Bullets were exchanged a mortar fire was exchanged shooting an aircraft was exchanged we need to continue to work those relationships to make sure that not only those nuclear programs but that the relationships have other parties that can reach out and have those conversations which we have done and I would imagine we'll continue to build on those relationships. Okay, thanks. One of our foreign participants asked a question about disarmament so going back a little bit from California Scott Sagan okay not really foreign so Scott asks he notes because the Senate ratified the NPT the Article 6 commitment to work in good faith toward nuclear disarmament is the law of the land Scott says and this commitment he says was glaringly absent in the 2018 nuclear posture review he challenges you convince us as you try to convince the review conference that the United States is making good faith efforts toward nuclear disarmament today. Well, you look at the steps that we've taken I would challenge you to reread the NPR but that we remain committed to it and again there are opportunities to engage and Scott I look forward to sitting down and engaging with our team and engaging with our counterparts over at DOD on what the NPR is and what the NPR is. Okay, that's fair enough, thanks I've avoided questions about North Korea because we've got the speaker we've got to save some good ones for students since a lot of people are posing questions I think I ought to put two of them to you and these I think are from foreigners at least people with foreign-sounding names like Professor Wynn Bowen Welsh so he asks will there be a third nuclear summit with the DPRK, what are the prospects for this and then actually I think this is more interesting even Alexander Sheikhov asks many experts began arguing mostly Twitter, albeit that it's time for discussing arms control with the DPRK rather than denuclearization that might be a question for Steve Biggan but anyway, he asks are we entering a new era in thinking about North Korea or does denuclearization remain the priority? Well, is there a third summit again the Secretary and the President have been very clear that they haven't come to the dialogue they haven't obviously put a date on the calendar but our teams continue to work towards that again just a shout out to Steve but is it the incredible expertise and again maybe selfish toot in the horn here between the bureaus in the T family that are supporting Steve and the Secretary and the President the leaders in the ABC and in ISN and I tell the Secretary this at every opportunity I know when he sits across the table and says I'm in Kim but he has the best technical advice bar none folks within the ranks that they have been to Pyongyang multiple times they have been in these discussions multiple times those men and women are in our ranks today working this every day I'm very passionate about this the unsung heroes if you will the quiet professionals behind all the work that's been done my mom got to do a South Dakota show again but my mom says are you going to the summit are you going to the summit I said mom if I do my job right I don't have to go the Secretary has everything he needs to make those decisions and to give the best advice to the President so is there a next summit well I think there will be because I know the Secretary I know the President and I know Steve Began and I know this team at ISN and ABC and we'll continue to push it I hope your mom has a chance to watch this you should be proud I've got to ask an Iran question and this is a good one let's see who posed this question yes Stephen Young notes under Secretary US allies in Europe continue to disagree with the United States over the Iran agreement while according to press reports the United States is seeking to aggressively punish US allies and businesses that are working within the agreement allies in Europe and elsewhere were also surprised and shocked really by the US early announcement of the withdrawal from the INF though they came around okay so this is more than Iran this is about US relations with Europe sorry and now there's the quote cost plus 50 debate for allies on cost sharing so he says tell us what you're hearing from US allies in these key issues so violate diplomatic confidentiality and what are you hearing from the allies? totally my style well I would encourage again the allies in the room to express their own opinions what I will tell you is I got back from London on Saturday meeting with partners and allies I got back from Brussels I've been to Geneva to Bailat so we are engaged early and often with our European partners not to mention hosting them here at the State Department so again it's about relationships it's about being able to share that candid information to pick up the phone when you need to to clarify when you need to and I've had that with my counterparts and I tell them and I'll save to this room as well I have one of my European counterparts or any counterpart for that matter that has a question or sees something in the press or hears something that a guy told a guy told a guy to say hey Andrea is this what you meant? or is this what the US is doing? and they do they'll pick up the phone and be like no this is what we're doing or yeah this portion is right that's an important part of diplomacy is to have those relationships so again another telling indicator from Secretary General and his team at NATO I reflect back when we talk about the demise of the INF and you look at the strong statement in December from NATO and I would argue maybe the even stronger statement after the announcement in February 29 countries came forward and said we get it Russia violated this treaty this is not what we're about and we support the decision so we'll continue to work those relationships but again I'd like to have my counterpart speak from themselves but look forward to the next trip abroad there was a related question that I probably should have posed concurrently with the last one because it again involves discussions with allies and it's from Joshua Pollock who notes that the Russian INF class missiles primarily threaten US allies and he notes that we're surprised when national security advisor John Bolton announced the intention to withdraw from the INF how are we approaching consultation with allies on matters affecting their core security concerns as Joshua I would argue if anyone was surprised that the INF treaty wasn't working as it was intended we probably need a better assessment because again after year after year so this wasn't something that the Russians did in October that triggered a decision it was something that was done across two administrations the people engaged with this for arms control both in government and in think tanks what candidly knew that Russia was violating the treaty this isn't new news the news is the president made the decision and said wait a minute this isn't in the best interest of the American people our adversaries are building systems that were not able to conduct our R&D and with allies so again have their input and we'll continue to get their input as we talk next steps in some of these arms control treaties thanks very much and thanks for bearing with me as I jump around here I finally figured out that there's a way I can group questions so let me group three questions all about the gold standard and the Saudis for example Ambassador Nobiyasu Abe asks well notes that there are countries who do not bother to pursue the gold standard I'd say actually every other country besides the United States and his question is how can we persuade them to actually Japan does otherwise suppliers of the United States and Japan and other countries will suffer so how to persuade other countries to try to apply the same standards the United States does second related question from Michael Gordon is is the gold standard the going in position with the Saudis or is it a firm requirement for a nuclear deal and would it be time limited Michael Gordon is with Wall Street Journal so whatever you say you'll be quoted on this and then Matthew Golub asks a more broader question but still on the same theme saying that with 30 countries planning considering or actively constructing nuclear power programs what challenges and opportunities do you see for the United States to mitigate the risk of proliferation and maintaining a position of leadership great now great questions and again ISN and well across the interagency we do this every day wake up every morning and engaging with partners and allies and thinking through what are the best practices whether it's the gold standard and I won't discuss the direct details with our engagements with another country that's just a breach of trust across the board since they're in dialogue but I'll tell you that we talk about the importance of those standards and preventing the proliferation of these technologies while also giving the opportunity for American companies so whether it's you whether it's a one two three agreement but working with and we're across across the globe that's the other thing that I think many perhaps on the outside of international security recognize that we're engaged across the globe every day sharing standards sharing training opportunities best practices that maybe one or two folks from from our bureau out with partner governments working through expist programs you know when you look at the footprint of where we're helping shape of the best practices and control mechanisms to make sure that things don't go across borders that things don't transit from country to country so the great work that's being done with the team and again educate inform reinforce and call out quite honestly when there is a breach when there is a consequence to make sure that it doesn't happen again okay thanks very much I talked about China and I was looking to see if there are any questions about China Dr. Manpreet Sethi asked a simple but important very important one is the United States pushing for any nuclear arms control with China what kind and what are the prospects I can tell you that I've had some discussions with my Chinese counterparts and we've made no new headway but again working with them closely in the P5 but many have asked it was China be open to engagements they talk about the INF and next steps and could you multilateralize that and I can tell you that based on the discussions I've had with Chinese counterparts or been on panels with Chinese counterparts there's no interest in that from the Chinese side but I would let them answer they would have to destroy a large part of their arsenal which I don't foresee happening yeah I would have to agree although we could have talks about strategic stability I suppose okay there are a lot of questions about Russia and so let me go through a couple of these Professor William Potter notes that the United States and Russia have long been partners on non-proliferation it was recently a very good book about this that I think Bill had something to do with he was a co-author what aspects of this partnership remain today the partnership again kind of go to some of my earlier statements on having continue to have dialogue and continue to have access and exchange of information I think is incredibly important and I tell folks that the deputy foreign minister Sergei Repkoff has been a professional counterpart we have had candid discussions with one another we have had exchange of ideas we have been have been toe to toe a couple of times now but at the end of the day I respect him as a career professional and he gives a respect for me and our team but we continue to have that dialogue we have partnership here with the embassy again to continue to have that open door we will disagree on most things but we are working together to ensure that they have the information whether it is news start and BCCs whether it is arms control whether it is regional regional topics and working together through the P5 so we need to continue to have those relationships it is an important piece of what we did I have got some questions that I think would be in the category of hostile fire but you have been under hostile fire before so you won't mind I shouldn't have prefaced it with this but Joseph Incioni in his gentle way notes that Ronald Reagan worked for six years to get the Soviets back into compliance with the ABM treaty he never walked away from the treaty he upheld the norms by getting them to finally admit their violation and tear down the violating radar I am not going to try to put his accent but why are you abandoning Reagan's tenacious approach well I would caution that again across two administrations two teams have done this for six years in dialogue and having that engagement this isn't again this isn't six weeks this isn't six months two administrations multiple years I won't worry well I may I will get a kick out of this analogy maybe a bit yogi-bara but I call it in a partnership or a marriage you sign a treaty it takes two to that agreement and in your marriage over the course of six years you knew that your partner was being unfaithful and you had intelligence and information and what have you and you continue to engage and you continue to meet and try to reconcile at some point after six years you go you know what I don't think this marriage is going to work Russia has been cheating at the INF Treaty for years and years and years and we have we have tried we have sat at the table the Obama administration and the Trump administration at the table technical experts senior officials showing them the information providing them transparency measures providing them input on what they're doing and after years that has not worked at the same time frame they've continued to develop systems well we have not I know as an American I always want what's best for the safety and security of the American people always reread my oath of office and when I see an adversary or a partner violating a treaty that has a direct impact on American citizens abroad and at home and our partners and allies I'm just not going to stand for it right okay that's good well I feel it this is a similar question and your answer will be similar but I'm going to pose it from Steven Schwartz how does withdrawing from the INF Treaty hold Russia in your words accountable when someone commits a crime society holds them accountable by prosecuting them sometimes literally making them pay for their crime the Trump administration decided to walk away from the INF Treaty rather than working diplomatically to bring Russia back into compliance effectively rewards Russia for its violations by allowing it to retain its currently prohibited missiles and to deploy as many as it desires in the future with no legal repercussions to the detriment of the security of our NATO allies and his question is how is that holding Russia accountable well I would go back to the answer I gave to the previous question a couple questions before on calling out the violation and then recognizing after multiple years of engagement that they're not going to change their behavior to allow those systems and processes to take place of the United States can engage in the R&D efforts so at least start to make those steps to be on a level playing field in that sense so keep the answer short because I think we've addressed it yeah I think so thanks going back to that third question we talked about at the beginning your bureau was doing Dr. Heather Williams asks do you see opportunities to discuss emerging technology potentially to include emerging technical arms control in the context of P5 meetings is this an area for multilateral cooperation? it may be I think it's too early to make that assessment on where we want to go with the P5 I can tell you we've had discussions both in the 1.5 track 2 to get academics and other leaders to come in and say what does that look like but I'm very interested and again I'll put that marker down I'm very interested this is a field where quite candidly the private sector will lead in some of the expertise so I welcome your insight I talk about building the digital diplomats and what we're doing at the State Department to ensure that every post has he or she that has that person that has that technical expertise that knows how to integrate these technologies into our diplomatic endeavors it's an incredibly important part we've started to field that across across the globe again I was just in London meeting with my UK counterparts they've done the same where they're introducing training to make sure folks are out at the post that have that but I think it's a very interesting part in the evolution of diplomacy we'll be rolling out hopefully in the near term a new bureau at the State Department for cyber security and emerging technologies the Secretary we have assessed that that is a requirement you've seen it from the Hill you've seen legislation from the House just passed in the Foreign Affairs Committee we have a bit of difference on where it gets placed the Secretary has made a decision that it will fall under T because it is a national security challenge we'll continue to maintain our economic endeavors in EV to make sure that we have the digital economy and everything that makes that run but how do we integrate that what do we do for AI and I'm very sincere I welcome that whether I'm engaged with think tanks I was just at actually at your sister post I was at double I double S for a round table on where I welcome that as well so people are thinking about it but we need to harness that and get it into place so it's not three four years from now we're still talking about how AI can affect arms control thank you and on behalf of my institute with which I'm still associated thank you for joining that discussion in London I got some good feedback about that I got a couple questions about North Korea I'll group them together here Mr. Timothy Westmire asks any interest in encouraging North Korea to join the CTBT as part of talks and efforts to limit improvements to their existing arsenal and then Ambassador Yasik Bilica asks on North Korea how to make sure that in the end Pyongyang is not rewarded for breaking out of the NPT so if I can share a couple of things and I do want to leave some I think Steve has come in later today I think after this to leave some nuggets for him but I'll tell you the incredible importance of when you say the final and fully verified and we underscore that in every engagement again as we shape the discussions and give the technical information to the secretary so we can give advice to the presidents that it has to be verifiable and so the big hand wave isn't going to cut it we've seen this playbook before many in this room probably in previous administrations where they know what the regime is doing they've seen it time after time where it says grandfather is father and now him so we're ensuring that doesn't happen again the other piece I'd like to emphasize that's incredibly important again with the great work done with partners with our partners and allies is upholding the UN Security Council sanctions incredibly important that we hold that standard and appreciate all the support from across the globe Asia, Europe and everything in between as we're finding those ship to ship transfers and interdicting the illegal work that's being done with North Korea as he continues to fund the regime so appreciate that they've held fast the international community has held fast on upholding those sanctions and the work that's been done at the UN and the secretary and the president were very clear that we'll continue to hold the Kim regime responsible for those actions that he said he would do when they met the first summit but we're not letting the foot off the gas we're going to continue with the pressure campaign we're going to continue to uphold those sanctions and continue to work with the team abroad to make sure that they'll see in place good thanks very much and again thank you for your willingness to take every and all questions is there an option well yeah you signed up for it several questions about China including a couple from Tongzhou and you've already addressed part of his question when he asked is the United States seeking a new or modified INF treaty to include China but he also asks how much of the US decision to withdraw from the INF is because of China's intermediate range missiles and then Tongzhou also asks a question about missile defense and notes that the 2019 missile defense review report commits more missile defense deployment in East Asia what measures does the United States plan to take to mitigate Chinese concerns about US missile defense impact on China's nuclear deterrence and efforts by the United States to maintain US China's strategic stability yeah so if we can start with the INF decision the INF decision was clearly about Russia's violation of the treaty okay again worked with them across the board so when we suspended with the treaty it was clearly related to Russia when you talk about the engagement China let the Chinese representatives speak on their own behalf but again I can tell you in my engagement on the P5 the bilateral engagement and then subsequent panels with some senior leaders that there's not much of an appetite for any arms control treaties from the Chinese side thank you Rose Tanyotkina poses a question that's directly related to what you just said about Chinese lack of interest in pursuing this what about the CTBT and she says asks could ratification in parallel by China and the United States how do you foster trust between the two countries you know it's an interesting question again I don't see that the environment being where it is today and the global security situation where it is today where that would be something that would be doable but again there's opportunities to engage with Chinese counterparts and I look forward to the next P5 okay good sticking to East Asia Dr. Joshua White the Trump administration has been publicly skeptical of multilateral solutions to non-proliferation challenges but do you see any specific opportunities to advance our non-proliferation or strategic stability objectives through so-called mini-lateral for trilaterals or quadrilaterals from where you sit how do you think about this new architecture particularly in the Indo-Pacific well the beauty of this is you get to engage at many different levels bilateral discussions again just came back from a quad occasionally we have a trilat and then we have engagement with whether it's with NATO whether it's with ASEAN and others there are opportunities where we can do track 1.5 there are opportunities where we can do other discussions so I would say the solution really depends on the problem but there are opportunities to engage at multiple levels I also tell the team that at the State Department I'm a sports fan it's March Madness so bear with me I should play an away game by and large I hold a lot of meetings here at headquarters but I think it's a responsibility to meet on their ground as well and it's important part of what we do and getting folks together in those opportunities whether again whether it's government to government whether it's with a key think tanks across the region so I take the opportunity to do that engagement as well so a bit of a challenge out there for folks from abroad I do welcome the opportunity to meet with my counterparts to meet with academics to meet with young people and to meet with the think tanks to continue with that messaging that last point is probably the answer to the the latest question that came in so you might have to rephrase it a little bit but Dr. Ky Henry Barth asks to what extent can scientists be effective track 2 diplomats on nuclear arms control matters he says thinking of Pugwash CISAC NRDC I don't know why he didn't mention double I double S in his question but he should have in the past decades you know it's an important they're important partners the track 2 dialogue we've had multiple opportunities I would also just do a shout out there we have opportunities for internships and fellowships at the state department that some are widely advertised and some quite candidly we need to better with putting that information out there whether it's you know consultations whether it's fellowships whether it's coming out and meeting organizations if it's not to paid advertising whether it's Stanton fellows or whether it's with Carnegie the wide range within the DC area and quite candidly across the US if there's opportunities to bring folks together I get incredible feedback and insight whether it's 10 15 to 20 senior fellows I took a trip up to up to Harvard and MIT again to sit down and see the work they're being done with artificial intelligence and others and these are many of these are PhD candidates am I doing a recruiting research absolutely to try to get them into the fold and say this is how you can contribute and give back to your country serving at the state department or other you know whether it's DOE or out at the lab so it's a great opportunity and I rely heavily on the on scientists very good very good I like that answer so we're drawing toward a close here and you've been answering the questions with such clarity and not trying to draw out the clock so we may end a few minutes early looking ahead to the next two years or the next six years or however long you are in the job a couple people have posed questions about this immediate future so I'll group two of these questions together Madeline Creeden asks if the new start treaty is in the US's best long-term strategic interest why not go for a clean extension and continue with further separate discussions on other matters including non-strategic nuclear weapons and kind of related to that Alex Bednarak asks after withdrawal from the JCPOA and the INF and serious interagency discussions about whether or not to extend new start how do you define success in arms control over the next two or six years great question so with the new start we are currently in their interagency process on next steps we've engaged across the NSEA and agencies on what's worked what's not working what are those next steps what are the options again I've had some discussions with allies on their input on ideas so I don't want to say it's early on because we are moving this forward there might be some options available for that next steps until then we'll continue to abide by the treaty important piece to remember we do have you know we have obligations by the treaty and we'll continue to do that we'll continue to when when the teams ask and get together for the VCC's we'll continue to support that as well so it's an important treaty we'll continue to work hard to move that forward okay great I'm gonna call a ceasefire in another minute maybe this would be the last question and it's a futuristic question too Lindsay Breedup asks can you let us know the future of arms control and space well I've told folks 28 years as an intel officer predicting the future is incredibly hard I try not to do it in groups of 400 but what I can tell you the future of arms control and we talk about norms of responsible behavior we're talking about groups of like-minded the initiative and efforts that are being done again whether it's in cyber and space for AI those discussions are happening now we're engaged at the assistant secretary technical expert level my level on what do those look like and we again we don't want to hinder the innovation we don't want to prevent private industry or different companies from doing the amazing things that we can do but that there is an acknowledged norm of behavior and how do we work together with allies on what that is what I'd also like to add is this is a and I mentioned it before but again this is an area where quite candidly within the state department you know we don't have a ton of depth when it comes to the artificial artificial intelligence experts we have some but we don't have the depth that's required and so it's really important to have that outreach with think tanks with industry with leaders in the field so again it drives the staff mad but I tell folks my door is open this is a great forum but if there are ideas that people have the technical experts will have a paper that they've written I'm on the plane quite a bit I do I have some time to read and it's usually one on aircraft so if you have some ideas let's be part of the solution not part of the problem and that's what I tell folks this is the forum where there's I thank you Mark as most of the questions today were actually questions which is not always the case many times you get statements so I think we did those out so thanks for the folks that asked the questions but I am very again passionate about this I may sit in the chair behind the desk at tea the tea is bigger than me and the responsibilities that I incurred is the under secretary is bigger than me this is a national security issue these folks that this is about American prosperity and American security so I welcome your input I welcome your feedback again we're gonna agree and disagree at home as well but we will be a better problem solvers if we contribute to this effort together so thank you for that opportunity thank you so much Andrea you've kicked off this conference on a very good note you've made it so easy for me as a moderator by answering all the questions answering them with precision clarity and positivity I really appreciate the way you have committed yourself to upholding norms not least of which that norm of niceness so it is your citizenship in south Dakota if you're not nice thanks very much please join me and thank you and under secretary Andrea Thompson thank you very much so I think we need