 CHAPTER 18 SEAPORT PROBLEMS The problems confronting fire departments in seaport towns in America are of a nature so widely divergent from those needing solution in Europe that a few explanatory words are rendered necessary. As a general rule, tidal influences and depth of water play so important a part in Europe that it has been obligatory to construct docks which shall always be possessed of a certain depth of water. There is no need to labour the obvious point that this has entailed harbour construction on a gigantic scale, involving in many cases the expenditure of millions of money. In this respect the Atlantic seaboard of the United States has been peculiarly fortunate, and it is possible, with rare exceptions, to berth the average steamer alongside a wharf projecting directly from the shores of the river, bay, or estuary. This of course spells cheapness, celerity in dealing with cargo, and a certain amount of convenience for passengers in transit. And on the other hand, it has tended most distinctly to increase fire risks. In the designing and building of docks the greatest of care and forethought is naturally exercised in the safeguarding of buildings from fire, if for no other reason than the difficulty that must be experienced in successfully mastering outbreaks in congested areas dependent upon their ingress and egress for the state of the tide. No draft fire-floats have been constructed for this special purpose, but their capacity and radius of action are obviously limited, and hence any comparison between American practice and European methods is out of the question. The sheds or wharves common to America form about the most dangerous structures of their kind in existence. Based on wooden piles, with wooden superstructures, they are comparable to nothing but horizontal flues, through which flames rush with a lightning-like rapidity, rendering abortive any efforts on the part of the fire department unless the greatest promptitude is shown by all concerned, and demanding the use of fireboats with specially designed and extraordinarily powerful equipment. All these sheds, with every sort of combustible material imaginable, hogs-heads of resin, bales of cotton, crated furniture, barrels of pitch, stacks of dry goods, and such unconsidered trifles as a few boxes of celluloid toys and novelties, and can the mind of man conceive a collection of heterogeneous merchandise more calculated to provide the wherewithall for a conflagration, and matter enough to assuage the thirsty pens of all the newspaper reporters in the town. Yet this represents an everyday condition in an American port, and it is perforce necessary not only to guard this property, but to calculate the even more important risk, namely should fire occur the danger of its spreading to adjacent dwellings. Hence, even the inexperienced lay mind can easily grasp the vital significance of fire prevention under such circumstances. But incidentally there is yet a further consideration demanding attention, the possibility of a fire occurring in a vessel moored alongside one of these piers. Fire risks on ship-board are appreciably greater in harbor than at sea. Discipline is relaxed, and sailors and stevedores are human. After a hard morning's work a pipe of tobacco or a cigarette is a welcome solace to the most ascetic of individuals, and a carelessly thrown match or the residue of a finished pipe is all that is necessary to start a blaze which shall in one fell swoop destroy ship, cargo, wharf, and men. In addition, though this may be scarcely credited, merchandise, particularly cotton, is often on fire before it is loaded, in which case it is absolutely a matter of luck where the outbreak occurs. Therefore it behooves wharf-masters and captains to exercise the most stringent supervision over the goods they are handling. These are some of the complexities which face the master mind of the fire department, and be it remembered that no matter who's the initial responsibility, if a fire gets out of hand, criticism and perhaps blame will be apportioned liberally to the department whose services have been requisitioned to overcome the errors in carelessness of others. To meet such contingencies the first essential is a flotilla of well-equipped fire-boats, numerically sufficient for the demands of the harbour they are to defend. Much depends upon the architect chosen to design them, and he should be given a free hand and be untrammeled by petty restrictions, though needless to add he should be a master of his craft. While too much emphasis cannot be placed upon the prohibition of untried innovations, these latter may result in serious loss of life and property. It is commonly held that fire-boats should be of the twin-screw type, this as rendering them more handy for manoeuvring in narrow crowded channels. But the twin-screw boat is more expensive to maintain and operate, and since economy is the watchword of municipalities, it has been found expedient to evolve a design the turning circle of which, with a single screw, approximates to that obtained by two screws. Shorn of scientific formulae, this consists in constructing the keel of the vessel from the midship section aft along a rising gradient, thus bringing the turning point well a midships, so that the boat can answer her helm almost as though she were on a pivot. In practice this type of construction has proved eminently successful, eminently economical, and in all respects satisfactory. The writer has had little experience with the turbine engine as a method of propulsion, but at present, while excellent for driving pumps, certain difficulties over a satisfactory reversing gear render this system in its existing state of development useless for propelling fireboats. Naturally of greatest interest to firefighters is the question of the pumps, their style and capacity. For as long as the driving engines are of the best compound type, engines of this construction are more easily heated than those of triple expansion, and hence are of more general use in fireboats, there is no particular specification of propelling machinery to be recommended. Many boats of old design are fitted with reciprocating pumps and have done and are doing excellent work, but it is almost impossible to obtain boilers capable of operating the latter at their full capacity, say of ten thousand gallons a minute. It resolves itself into a question of piston speed, and it has been found that under working conditions the steam supply estimated to obtain the same as predetermined rarely accomplishes its task. Now centrifugal pumps can do the same work with half the steam, and hence with care this should enable a boat to maneuver and at the same time to run her water battery to full capacity. The total volume of the streams per minute in the opinion of the rider should amount to seven thousand five hundred gallons of sea water at a pressure of one hundred eighty five pounds per square inch. As far as actual deck equipment is concerned the main feature is the emplacement of two circular turrets, each operating nine separate streams of water and surmounted by a turret pipe, through which a powerful jet of from two to three inches can be thrown. The old style of running a water circuit around a boat represents considerable weight, causes confusion and adds to labor. The turret concentrates the work and is better adapted for the supervision of the officer in charge. Provision for a water tower can be arranged by constructing the mast on the military lattice girder system surmounted with a fighting top platform, so designed that not only can two turret pipes be operated there from, but also a number of smaller jets, which may not in aptly be compared with the machine guns of the battleship. This system has been found most effective in fighting warehouse and pier fires. Boats should be kept under steam at all time in order that there be no delay in starting. In New York, where there is a large fire flotella, it has been found necessary to organize the same into a homogeneous unit, the better to ensure its efficient cooperation. The chief of this marine battalion responds to fires in a steam launch and commands on the water side. A code of signals has been established by means of the siren whistle, and in this way orders are transmitted from the chief over a considerable distance, even though the smoke be heavy and the boat's invisible. Above all, the personnel of these craft should be accustomed to the handling of boats, if not actually sailors. They must be alert, active, and intelligent. While it is obvious for economical reasons that the engineers and their assistants should be highly qualified, otherwise constant repairs will keep the boats out of commission and entail vexatious expense. One of the most terrible disasters which well exemplifies the perils of wharf fires occurred on Saturday, June 30, 1900, at the Jersey side piers of the North German Lloyd in New York Harbor. At four in the afternoon on that eventful day, while hundreds of curious visitors were inspecting the four latest additions to the German line, a fire broke out amongst some merchandise on Pier 3, alongside of which the steamer sail was moored. The origin of the outbreak is obscure, but it was probably caused by some unconsidered act of carelessness, either on the part of an employee or of one of the sightseers. Be that as it may, in less than fifteen minutes the flames fed by stores of cotton, turpentine, and oil, which were lying unprotected on the docks, swept with inconceivable speed from pier to pier, and before the immensity of the outbreak could be realized an area a quarter of a mile square had been devastated, a strong breeze was blowing from the southward at the time, and to this the staggering rapidity of the conflagration was no doubt partially due. Now it must be clearly understood that owing to a curious anomaly, the New York Fire Department, including its fireboats, had at that time no jurisdiction in the state of New Jersey, and hence was unable to afford any assistance to the vessels in distress until they were in the open stream and upon, so to speak, neutral waters. Then everything was done which science skill and daring could suggest. In view of the disastrous turn of subsequent events this fact should be borne in mind. The first intimation of something wrong reached visitors in the Kaiser Wilhelm de Groce, the then ocean greyhound, through the appalling noise of hundreds of barrels filled with pitch exploding from the heat, like salvos of heavy artillery. A wild rush for the gangways followed, but the ship's officers with consummate coolness averted a panic by announcing that the vessel would proceed immediately into mid-stream, happily having a sufficient head of steam to accomplish this maneuver. The seamen hastily cast off, but so intense was the onrush of the fire that one man, slackening a stern hauser, found the wire already glowing from the heat. With her decks ablaze, her woodwork crackling, and clouds of steam roaring through her exhaust pipes, she presented a terrifying spectacle as she made her way slowly to safety. Tugs immediately went to her assistance, her guests were rapidly transferred and the fire was extinguished, but not before considerable damage had been done to her splendid and luxurious cabin appointments which had been the talk of both sides of the Atlantic. Alas, not so fortunate were her sisters, who, not having their steam up, were powerless to escape. To depict exactly what occurred upon these vessels, at such a time of confusion and horror, would in any case be almost impossible, and in addition of the few survivors none could give a coherent narrative, since practically imprisoned upon the lower decks they were able only to realize that death in some form was threatening them. The sail, in the very heart of the flames, was cast loose and drifted slowly into the stream, a menace to shipping and a veritable funeral-pire to those on board. Hundreds of desperate creatures jumped overboard and were picked up by passing boats. But hundreds of others were less lucky and were roasted to death in the depths of that floating inferno. Little could be seen of their plight, but as fire-boats surrounded the smoking hull faint cries from the lower ports attracted attention. Suddenly a naked arm shot out through the murk, and a voice cracked with terror screamed for help. Rescuers placed a hose-line in the grasp of the quivering hand, and as the water brought temporary relief the crazed sufferer was understood to say that with him were forty odd men and women awaiting their doom. A desperate effort was made to haul him through the port, but his shoulders prevented his escape. And even as he was making one supreme attempt to dodge death a wisp of flame shot wickedly out from behind him and branded him with its fiery tongue. With a shriek of demoniacal laughter he surrendered himself to his agony and fell back to be seen no more. Another belch of smoke from the port and then a horrid silence. The little band of prisoners were beyond human aid and had journeyed to that borne from which no travellers return. Slowly the sail drifted down the Hudson, a moving emblem of the vanity of life and the evanescence of all things. Before it finally grounded off Ellis Island another incident replete with painful tragedy was to occur. A woman's voice was heard calling from one of the ports of the main deck cabins and rescuers could plainly see and converse with its owner, a stewardess. Again the narrowness of the ports spelled her death. A death so supremely horrible in its essentials that it scarcely bears narration. The fire was just eating its way through the paneled door of the cabin and with the aid of a hose-length from a tug the woman fought gamely for her life. Needless to say the odds were all on one side. To escape was impossible, but nonetheless the unequal contest continued until with her hands blistered, eyes blinded, clothes burning, with a cry for mercy to her creator, this brave soul passed to her reward. The case of the main was equally desperate. Although a thousand feet away from the outbreak she caught fire almost instantaneously and her decks were swept bare as though in the path of some giant tornado, there was no time even to cast off and until the flames had eaten through the connecting hausers she weltered in a whirlpool of fire. A few persons had jumped overboard at the first alarm and were seen clinging to her propellers. Then one by one they were overcome and dropped off into the muddy eddy which lapped the dock wall. Thus she lay for some hours and it is indeed surprising to relate that even sixteen persons out of her complement of one hundred and fifty managed to escape. And the story of their escape is indeed miraculous. They were all coal-passers or engineers engaged in their professional duties about the engine room. Upon the alarm being given they had found all means of exit to the deck cut off by the flames. They had consequently retreated to one of the coal bunkers, the door of which they closed. For eight hours they remained there uncertain of their fate, ignorant of what was happening, and in a temperature which made it painful to breathe. For some considerable time the electric lights burned steadily. A sardonic reminder that a supernatural stoker had taken charge of their duties and was generating the steam necessary to keep the dynamo running. Then came a flicker, the lights shone with an uncanny brilliancy and then there was darkness. The silence was still broken by the monotonous hum of the ammonia pumps connected with the refrigerator plant. It seemed as though their speed were being increased by some ghostly mechanic, for the hum developed into a mighty roar, culminating in an explosion, and then there was silence. It was eleven thirty that night that the poor helpless maine was grappled by a fire-boat, the crew of which hearing voices located these prisoners and succeeded in hauling them one by one through a coal-port. Their condition was desperate, but ultimately they all recovered with the exception of one man who had been partially blinded by steam and died in hospital. The plight of the fourth liner, the Bremen, was not quite so critical as the fire did not succeed in getting a good hold below decks. She was, however, crammed with visitors, which would account for the fact that seventy-four persons perished aboard her. Like the others she drifted away from the burning docks, and it was some considerable time before tugs and fire-boats had succeeded in getting her under control. Meanwhile she was acting as a veritable torch to all shipping and wharves with which she came in contact. Carried by the current toward the New York shore, she imperiled all the docks from thirty third street to the battery. In fact, so serious was the menace that alarms were sent into the city fire-stations, and men in apparatus stood by ready for all eventualities. One lighter passed her, caught fire, and drifted alongside the Baltimore and Ohio Wharf, which promptly in its turn took fire. Fortunately this outbreak was quickly suppressed. But the same thing occurred at several points, a sufficient indication of the peril which was threatening the whole river-front. However the danger was averted and the Bremen secured and later beached in shallow water. On the Jersey side of the river the desperate work of the firefighters had had its effect, and the Scandinavian American line docks, which adjoined the North German Lloyd, escaped with the inevitable injury caused by burning embers starting subsidiary fires. At one moment it was seriously feared that they, the Hamburg American line, the Holland America line, and the Wilson line sheds would all become involved, together with the vessels moored alongside, which would have constituted one of the greatest disasters in the history of maritime conflagrations. Happily, however, such a catastrophe was avoided, and in spite of the enormous damage the fire was practically under control within six hours of its inception. But to the day of their death, those who saw the Hudson River in that summer twilight will never forget its fantastic appearance, the four great liners vomiting flames in smoke and surrounded with puffing tugs and busy fire-boats, while a couple of dozen smaller craft floated hither and thither on the most congested waterway of the world, a flame from stem to stern, and reminiscent of nothing so much as an armada of old-time fireships intent upon destruction, doubtless human forethought, energy, and determination in no small degree vanquished this enemy. But Providence must have been watching over New York that day. The actual extent of the pecuniary loss entailed by this conflagration has been assessed at six million dollars, a mere bagatelle in comparison with the four hundred lives which were sacrificed. There have been, of course, bigger disasters of the same nature financially, such as that of Hamburg, where it is estimated that fire destroyed forty-five million dollars' worth of property, but none has approximated to this in its sheer horror, and in bringing home to the lay mind just what may occur as the result of a small outbreak upon a wharf. It is almost as though human nature required the sacrifice of life, grief-stricken homes and the poignant realization of the grimness of death in order to be stir itself towards the adoption of fire prevention in its most simple forms. Even the uninitiated will realize readily that the methods of coping with fires on board ships must differ radically from the systems commonly invoked on land. In the first place, the construction of a ship is such that successfully to deal with an outbreak bespeaks a rough general knowledge of naval architecture without which the most intelligent officer must be hopelessly nonplussed. But under any circumstances it is the business of the fire chief upon arrival alongside the vessel to consult with the captain, or whoever may be in charge, with a view to ascertaining, if possible, the location of the fire and the nature of the cargo upon which latter much depends. In addition, on all large steamers, a plan of the vessel is placed in the charthouse, and this will show, in diagrammatic form, the various holds, with distances from one bulkhead to another, the ventilator shafts, and other details of the greatest value in deciding upon the plan of attack. The location of the outbreak having been ascertained, which should only occupy a few minutes, all hose lines should be stretched and in readiness before removing the hatches. Also, if steam is being already used to hold the fire, a common method on board ships, it should be shut off as soon as the preparations outlined have been made, as it seldom happens that men can enter either the holds or the tween decks of vessels where resort has been made to this plan without allowing time for the atmosphere to cool. A matter of moments, perhaps, but in such cases it is the second saved which count. Everything will now depend upon the location of the blaze. If it is in the lower holds, the best thing to do is to remove a hatch in the lower deck, drop the hose line through the opening, and simply flood the compartment. Should the fire, however, be tween decks, a different means of attack may be successfully employed, providing there be portlights in the ship's side. These should be stove in about twelve feet apart, a fire-boat should be run alongside, and should bring into play her lines armed with distributing nozzles, which latter should be forced through the ports, water being pumped in at a pressure sufficient to give about fifty pounds to the sprays. If it is possible to reach the ports on the other side of the ship, similar tactics should be adopted, and in most cases the fire will quickly be under control. Then a ladder should be placed down the hatch. As a rule there is a built-in ladder in every hatch, but failing this a regulation fire ladder should be used, providing solid foundation can be discovered for it. Further, all men employing the same should have a line around them in order that they may be hauled out to safety in the event of any accident. Ventilators leading from the deck on fire should be utilized for dropping down hose with distributing nozzles into the affected area, which will render valuable assistance in cooling down the compartment. Finally, amongst preliminaries, if the pipes used for sub-seller work are long enough to operate, they should be utilized down the hatchway. An important point to be remembered now is that all cargo ports must be closed. This is rendered absolutely necessary since the water being pumped into the vessel is bound to give her some list, and if the ports are left unclosed there is the strong possibility that she may heal over and consequently fill and sink. But this by no means concludes the long list of precautions to be taken or naughty problems to be solved. Since such great volumes of water are being steadily and persistently pumped into the ship, it stands to reason that her draft will rapidly increase, and if she takes to the ground she will instantly list heavily and probably endanger the lives of everyone assisting on board, let alone rendering the actual firefighting ten times more difficult. To keep her on an even keel is the primal necessity of the situation, and this demands as much scientific diagnosis of the needs of the moment as ever a medical man was called upon to expend over an unknown patient suffering from an obscure complaint. To those who know them ships are almost human in their idiosyncrasies, and the slightest mistake in their treatment may spell irretrievable disaster. First and foremost if the vessel seems likely to take to the ground by hook or crook get her off into deeper water, and should she be light fill her ballast tanks. An expedient at times resorted to, but by no means to be recommended under ordinary conditions, is to flood the lifeboats on the weather side, thus, so to speak, levering her back into position. But this is obviously dangerous in the extreme and should never be resorted to unless those superintending the operation are experts and understand shipcraft from A to Z. Again, should the fire be gaining ground and it seem as though it were getting out of control, it is impossible to avoid heroic methods, and she must be towed to shoal water and beached, care being taken that her decks will no more than lie awash. Admittedly this is a last expedient, but it will save her from total destruction providing she is sunk in shallow water, which will of course make it possible to pump her out and float her again. It might be imagined that such total immersion would subdue any fire known to man, yet the fact remains that cotton is so obstinant in its resistance that the writer has seen bales which have been a whole week underwater at a depth of forty feet, that upon being examined shortly after coming to the surface were not only smoldering inside, but upon being prodded burst into flame. This gives some idea of the stubbornness to be encountered in dealing with some cargoes, and it is small exaggeration to hazard the statement that raw cotton requires as much attention as gun cotton from the skipper's point of view, that is the safety of his crew and himself. A vessel reaching port already on fire and which has signaled for assistance offers again a rather different aspect of affairs with which to cope. In this instance steam should be kept playing on the affected area and the hatches kept batten down until all the passengers have been taken off. Anything likely to cause a panic would be fatal and quite unnecessary. Under the conditions named there would be no danger of an immediate and fatal spread of the outbreak, such as in the case of a building where it might cause the loss of life within a few minutes. As mentioned elsewhere in this volume it cannot be emphasized too strongly that in the opinion of the writer steam alone will rarely extinguish a fire. In itself it has already absorbed a great quantity of heat, and its transformation from a liquid state into vapor has been due to just such elemental activity as it is now called upon to subdue. Hence how can it be expected to exercise a cooling effect, which after all is what is needed when itself is overboiling point? All that can be expected is some temporary check, consequent upon the moisture, but as a permanent and real state of flames it is comparatively useless. It seems almost needless to say that in bringing fireboats alongside steamers unmanageable on account of fire or whose steering gear is in danger owing to its becoming affected by great heat. The former should take up a position on the quarter from which it is possible to control and steer the latter. In addition in all open waters care should be taken so to handle the burning vessel that the flames may be prevented from sweeping the decks, as undoubtedly would occur where she forced head on into a strong breeze, the fire being forward or vice versa. In either case she should be kept before the wind, thus minimizing the area open to attack, and at least giving the operators some deck room upon which to organize their defense. Though strictly perhaps not within the scope of this chapter, the writer is strongly of the opinion that the time has arrived when all ships should be compelled to carry some simple and effective form of automatic fire-preventive apparatus. The sprinkler system would appear to offer many advantages and to be easy of installation in vessels of new construction. This might be controlled either from the Chart House, where exists at present the smoke pipe designed to warn the officers of a fire in any hold, when upon being definitely located the system might be brought into operation, the flow being controlled by the ship's pumps, or alternatively the installation might be arranged on lines broadly similar to those in use at theaters. This would demand a fusible plug, which at a certain temperature would melt, allowing a heavy and constant stream of water over a certain defined area, the pressure, of course, being constantly maintained by the ship's pumps, as in the other case. No doubt expense would be urged as a deterrent to the introduction of any such appliances, but it does seem passing strange that when precautions without number are now being taken to save the careless from the comparatively rare peril of the iceberg, so little attention is given to the ever present menace of that most ghastly enemy at sea, the flames. Or can it be, as has been suggested, that what is wanting is the lurid lesson of a great fire in mid-ocean? In conclusion, a few words may not be amiss and that the position the fireboat may conceivably play in any municipality boasting of a waterway, without which the necessity for such a costly accessory could not exist. It is commonly presumed that a fireboat as such must confine its attentions to its own element, and can, in no wise, be regarded as amphibious. This is an error which has been practically demonstrated by the writer. Properly handled the fireboat becomes a most powerful and useful auxiliary to land apparatus. During the San Francisco Conflagration it is reported that from a government revenue cutter a line of hose was run for half a mile and that its cooperation even then was valuable. The words even then are inserted, since with the limited pressure available from the pumps of such a vessel, and with no natural aid such as gravity, the nozzle-power of such a stream could not be seriously considered as of particular importance, unless water was altogether lacking, as in the case mentioned. But from tests made in New York it was conclusively proved, recently, that it was feasible and caused no undue strain on apparatus to discharge a jet through a one and an eighth inch nozzle at about two-thirds of a mile from the fireboat acting as a pumping station, the nozzle pressure approximating fifty pounds to the square inch. There were two relay engines in the shape of two ordinary steam firepumps, and when the pressure on the fireboat registered 280 pounds, the further engine maintained a nozzle pressure of fifty-nine pounds, giving two hundred ninety-one gallons a minute. Not a great stream, but considering the conditions of the experiment sufficient to show the possibilities attendant upon the introduction of the fireboat as a land auxiliary. The distance for effective relay of water can be proportionately increased by multiplying initial fireboat lines and siamizing them. One New York fireboat can furnish twelve three and a half inch lines sufficient to supply twenty-four engines under conditions similar to the test. That in itself is sufficient for the handling of a large fire. Thus it will be seen that in great emergencies here is an auxiliary to the fire force on land which is at least impervious to the breaking of mains, climatic or seismic interruptions, and hence not lightly to be neglected. CHAPTER 19 FIRE STRATEGY IN THE HOMES OF THE PEOPLE To prevent a fire is one thing. To fight it is another. And since this volume deals with all aspects of the subject, some consideration must be given to firefighting in its active sense. That is, how to deal with outbreaks when an alarm is turned in, and the best method of using apparatus. This may sound to the lay-reader, stale and unprofitable reading. But if he will take his courage in both hands and dip into the subject, in ever so small a degree, he will find much to give him thought, much that will be of value to him, and a certain number of useful hints which should be of assistance to him should he ever be unfortunate enough as to be involved in a fire. The fire risk becomes more apparent as soon as it is realized that it is a menace to the home, and that the flames are no respecters of persons, and are as likely to visit the mansion or the tenement as the factory or the warehouse. It is hard to realize when reading newspaper reports of some great conflagration quite what it all means. It seems so far away, so remote from the happenings of daily routine, that it is perused with passing interest and forgotten. Then comes the day when suddenly the menace appears in all its lurid horror, and behold, the occasion when an ounce of knowledge regarding fire and its usual course of progress may be the means of preventing the advance of the enemy and of saving human life. Of course prevention is better than cure, but even as the hypochondriac occasionally falls a victim to the ills the flesh is heir to, and has to invoke scientific aid in order to regain his health, so it is with fire. With all the precautions in the world it is impossible to guarantee that an outbreak will never occur, but it is within the can of man what then to do, and though the professional will be needed to fight with the sufferer as the doctor does with his patient, the individual who is prepared for the onset, and knows just what course the attack will probably take, is doubly armed against the foe. It is for this reason that the writer is hopeful that the general reader will persevere and glance through the following pages. Certainly if a person of discernment the previous chapters will have shown him how life has often been unnecessarily sacrificed at fires when well directed action would have saved the situation. In all countries responses to fire calls, particularly those turned in from street boxes, are usually very prompt. As a rule about twenty seconds is consumed in hitching up and getting the apparatus out of quarters, horses are trained to come to their places at the pole on a gallop, and all harness is hung with an open collar which locks with a snap. Commonly three engines and two hook and ladder companies are designated to respond on the first alarm, and in making the assignments the company nearest the spot from which the call was sent in is expected to be the first to reach its destination. In forwarding reports of operations at fires the officers must state the order of their arrival and also which company gets to work quickest. It will be easily deduced that this creates a spirit of the keenest rivalry, and to be beaten in a dash to an outbreak at which a company is first due is considered a humiliation. If it happens twice in succession the commander of the defeated company is asked for an explanation, allowances being made for gradients and traffic, and should it appear that the company is lacking in energy or vim caused in any way by indifference on the part of officers or men a reorganization is sure to follow. This then is the primal step towards the formation of a good company, which is the unit of organization. Horses must be carefully trained, for a few seconds lost in getting away from quarters cannot be made up en route, particularly when the other companies have had a better start. The driver is as important as his animals, and should be a man trained to the hour, and one who knows every inch of the streets, and every fire hydrant in the district to which his company may be called. Many an occasion can be recalled by the writer when on the way to a fire he reviewed the whole district surrounding the box whence the alarm was received, and had the hydrants clearly in mind as the engine approached its destination, often pulling up in front of one completely shut off from view by obstructions, secure in his knowledge of its existence. The engineer should be equally well informed, and should know the size of the main on which the hydrant is situated, and how much water can be drawn therefrom. This prevents the mistake of having too many engines located on small mains with low pressure. When approaching the fire, the engineer should jump from his engine, run ahead, and have the cap off the hydrant as the apparatus pulls up. With the change from horse to motor as a means of propulsion, the department has been shorn of some of the spectacular features which in the old days added to the picturesqueness of the proceedings, but the dangers of injury in responding to a call through crowded thoroughfares are greatly increased. Stretching in hose lines at fires has been the subject of many orders and lectures, but when celerity is paramount, hose cannot be measured by the foot, as can be done in a classroom. However, when the location of the fire has been ascertained, the commanding officer should have a fairly good idea of the number of lengths required, and it is slovenly and shows but poor judgment to see hose coiled in the streets in front of the site of the outbreak. Controlling nozzles should be used for inside work, in order that the stream may be shut off from this point, and at fires in tenements and private dwellings the greatest care should be exercised in the use of water, as the floors are not filled. In such cases the water runs through the floorboards, destroying the ceilings beneath and the furnishings of the lower floors. The best way to illustrate these rules is to assume an outbreak in an old-style tenement, where the blaze has started in a store on the ground floor. In addition to the main entrance and show window, the store has a door opening from the rear into a hallway where are situated stairs which lead to the apartments above. In this type of building there are usually six floors, including the store, with from three to four families on each. The stairs are of wood, and all partitions are stud covered with wooden lath and plaster. The ingenuity of man could scarcely devise a better fire-trap than that which is afforded by this style of construction. To prevent the fire from reaching the stairwell, and by this means ascending to the top only to mushroom on the highest floor, is the first thing to be done. A line of hose should be taken into the hall to cover the rear door and transom to stop the fire spreading up the stairs, whereby that means of escape from the upper stories would be cut off. The second line should attack the fire from the front through the main door, while ladders should immediately be raised to the front fire escapes and the floors over the store should be examined to make sure that the blaze has not mounted through pipe recesses or other vertical openings. Should the alarm have been sent in with promptitude, a fire of this nature can, and in all probability will, be confined to the store where it originated. But if there has been delay and the fire has burned through the doors communicating with the hallway and stairs, and by means of these latter has swept through a crowded tenement, a very different problem awaits the officer in command upon his arrival. As in the former instance the first line should operate in the hall to drive the fire back through the door leading into the store, and when that has been accomplished the nozzle should be directed up the stairwell, which is usually about twelve inches wide. A stream sent up this opening will deaden the fire down on the upper landings, which at present it is impossible to reach in any other way. The second line should be opened on the fire in the store from the front, and the flames subdued to prevent them ascending on the outside of the building and enveloping people who by this time would be crowding onto the fire escapes. A few seconds should suffice to quell this portion of the outbreak when the line should be taken to the hall in order to cover the first company, which by now should be ascending the stairs. In the meantime hook and ladder companies would have placed ladders on the street side of the building and would have begun the work of rescue from fire escapes and windows. In cases of this nature events move swiftly, and in far less time than it takes to right a line would be rushed to the top floor by front or rear fire escapes, generally by the ladder, as the landings are in most cases nearer to the back of the structure. This line is of the greatest importance, and if the position is reached quickly the fire should be prevented from spreading on the top floors. One man should be sent by way of adjoining buildings to open the bulkhead door, which is found in all places of this type, and which leads from the highest story onto the roof in order to assist in accomplishing this purpose. All possible efforts should be made to force the advance line up the stairs, and here is where men must take their medicine if need be. Life depends on their grit, determination, and endurance, for work of this kind often entails severe trial. By this time the second line in the hall should have killed the fire in the store, and should immediately follow in the rear of the other line on the stairway, in order to prevent the flames coming out behind them and cutting them off or rendering their efforts abortive. It is essential in firefighting as it is in battle that companies or columns be supported, or in firemen's parlance covered. To detach a column from the main army and direct it to attack a well-entrenched enemy without proper support would seem to the writer to be a tactical error, and similarly to order an unaided company into a position where its retreat is cut off by fire would be a very dangerous proceeding. In war the column would in all probability fall into the hands of the enemy and become prisoners, but fire takes no prisoners, and the battle cry is death or victory. Therefore it will be understood that companies must support each other, the more advanced being always assisted and covered by the other coming up the stairs or on the floors below. There is one more essential point to be guarded, namely the light shaft, which is usually between two of these buildings, and the windows opening into this space should be protected in order that the fire should not extend upwards on the outside or cross the shaft and ignite the adjoining buildings. This disposition of forces should successfully deal with a fire of such a character without loss of life, for during the operations described the two hook-and-ladder companies would have been engaged in conveying all the residents to a place of safety. Every action or order cannot be foretold, nor would the writer attempt to say in what respect a commanding officer might find it necessary to deploy his forces, but he should use all possible efforts to outflank the fire. He should never neglect when the flames have control of the stairway to take a line to the top floor by way of the fire escape. In outbreaks of this character there is always danger of loss of life, and the risk is greatest on the top floors, but with a line following the fire and a stream above it the enemy is placed between two batteries and his doom is sealed. The opening of the bulkhead door in the roof allows the heat and flame to escape, gives the men coming up the stairs a living chance, and permits the other company to effect an entrance from above in order to finish the work already well in hand. In dealing with an old-style tenement it is important to look carefully around all pipe vents and also the partition's near-folding doors, as every stud partition is a vertical flue and there are few fire stops. The lath should be stripped until it is satisfactorily proven that there are no nests of fire concealed behind the plaster. Above all things a search should be made as soon as possible in every room for persons who might have been overcome by smoke, and the floors under the beds should be carefully inspected, for, as already stated, children will invariably take refuge in these places, and if not found and carried out at once to the open air will die of suffocation. This is a brief outline of a fire presupposed to have started in a store, but it may have originated in the cellar, when, as the building has an inside stairway, this latter should immediately be covered to prevent the flames from mounting, should it succeed the outbreak is similar to the one described. Therefore the first object, as stated above, is to confine the blaze, and then the cellar should be entered by the front or rear doors. When the outbreak has been located, distributing nozzles should be used through the floor over the section which shows the greatest heat. Rapid action is the keynote of success, and as fire spreads like lightning through these old buildings, a few seconds delay may mean loss of life. By quick stretching in and with good engines to give water to the lines, the fire will be suppressed, and it is just these qualities of prompt action and swift decision which have saved thousands of persons in New York City. Each year ten thousand fires occur in these homes of the working population, making up sixty-four percent of the total number of outbreaks recorded. Much more might be written on old-style tenement house fires, though should such an occurrence originate on any floor and spread to the stair hall, the effect would be the same and should be combated in a like fashion. It is not the intention of the writer to lay down specific rules or to attempt to tell the chief in command at a fire that this or that should be done, since local conditions alter cases. For the same reason no rule is given for life-saving beyond the raising of extension and other ladders on the front and, if it be possible, on the rear of the tenement in order to remove the occupants at different points. Extraordinary cases of peril, when all human ingenuity seems exhausted, often result in daring feats of rescue accomplished in a way that no one could foresee. In new-style tenements the stair halls are enclosed in brick walls, the ground floor is fire-proof, and the hall doors leading to the different apartments are calamine. There is usually a long private hall running the full length of individual flats, which, should a fire break out, would soon be heavily charged with heat and smoke. Should the fire originate at the end farthest from the door through which the firemen enter, great hardship is entailed in crawling the length of this narrow passage dragging a line of hose. Water should not be started until the blaze is located, so that the stream may be played directly on the flames, instead of doing unnecessary damage by opening the nozzle when no fire is visible. In order to relieve the men with the line, hook and ladder companies should be active in ventilating the apartment, and if there be a fire escape on the front or rear, the windows should be opened. In circumstances where the fire has gained considerable headway, a second line should be taken up one of the fire escapes. Should a heavy flame belch forth from windows on the lower floors, there is always danger of the heat breaking the glass in those overhead, and in this way communicating the fire from floor to floor. This should be met with heavy streams from the outside to drive the fire back, using a water tower, mast, deck, or turret pipe, or if none of these be available, a streak pipe may be employed, though these should be shut off when the flames have ceased to spread on the exterior. To locate and confine a fire to the smallest possible area is one of the first great principles of firefighting. As it is the tendency of flames to burn upwards, care must be exercised and attention given to the floors above the outbreak. Though it should be understood that the floors below should not be neglected, firebrands often fall through an elevator shaft or other vertical openings, and start ablaze in the story below, so that attention must be given to all parts of the building involved, and even to adjoining houses. Before leaving the scene of an outbreak, the greatest care should be taken to see that all fire is really extinguished, since sometimes there is a tendency to overlook odd corners, resulting in a recall to the scene later in the day, an incident all firefighters regard as in some degree a reflection on their skill, and often causing embarrassing questions. A new style of apartment house is being erected in New York City and elsewhere, divided into so called duplex flats. Each of these has one main entrance from the stair and elevator hall, while its upper floor is reached by an inner staircase with no means of direct exit to the main hall outside. In other words, it resembles a two-story house within another house. There are no outside fire escapes, no means of reaching the upper floor, except by way of the inside stairs. And should a fire occur, the heat and smoke would immediately ascend, and all escape from the upper floor would be cut off. Firemen would be obliged to enter the apartment by the one door leading to the elevator, and would find that the flames had already extended to the floor above. Two lines would be stretched either up the stairs, or if it be a building more than eighty-five feet high and the fire is above the fourth floor, from the stand pipes, the engine being connected to the Siamese at street level. The first line should be opened on the fire to clear the way to the inner stairs. The second line should also be brought into play to kill the fire on the lower floor and to cover the first line which should try to ascend. This may be almost impossible, as the heat and smoke will be confined above, unless the outbreak is of sufficient magnitude to melt the windows or blow them out, and if this occurs the contents of that apartment will be destroyed. To ventilate the upper floor is the problem before the officer in command, and the only method of so doing is to use the hook of a scaling ladder or a telescope hook which has recently been designed for just such cases. When this has been done it will be possible to get the lines up the stairs. Should the fire occur on the upper story it would back down and charge the lower floor with smoke, with a similar result. This type of building, while admittedly convenient for tenants, is most dangerous in case of fire, and people may be trapped twelve stories above the street. Personal risk can be obviated to a great extent by connecting each floor by means of a balcony fire escape on the inner court. In cases where it is impossible to attack the upper floor by way of the stair, the terracotta partition dividing the apartment from the hall should be broken through on a level with the upper story. This is not a very difficult matter, and a hole large enough to admit a man would soon be made, and a charged line should be introduced. After the room is cooled it may then be possible to affect an entrance when the line should be directed towards the stairs in order that communication with the floor below may be re-established and a thorough search for possible occupants should be made. It is remarkable how much more latitude is allowed in designing private dwellings than is given architects in plans for tenements, apartment houses, and hotels, and many disastrous fires, often attended with loss of life, occur in such structures. A common defect is the large open stairway. Elevators have recently been introduced, reaching usually to the top floor and capped with a four or six inch stone slab, which from the standpoint of fire control is an extremely dangerous form of construction, as should an outbreak occur the flames will quickly ascend the shaft, and having no outlet through the roof will inevitably mushroom on the upper floors, thereby entailing possible loss of life. Such a thing as fire in any part of a house except in the furnace is not thought probable or even possible. So when the unexpected happens, great masses of draperies, carpets, and heavily upholstered furniture soon turn the building into a roaring volcano of flame. Many dwellings of the wealthy stand in an enclosure often surrounded by high iron railings, making it particularly difficult to get any kind of ladder near enough to be of service. This class of structure has no outside fire escapes, which increases the peril of people trapped on the upper floors. In such a case a person should never attempt to descend the stairs, but should, if possible, reach a front window or any that can be found smoke-free and call for help. Every minute of waiting may seem an hour, but someone in the neighborhood will assuredly turn in an alarm. Above all remember that jumping is the last resort of the desperate, and if driven to that final extremity, sheets, curtains, or blankets will provide some sort of assistance towards reaching the ground. On his arrival the commander of the fire forces should at once stretch a line, taking it in through the main entrance and driving the fire away from the stairs. If by this time the flames have forestalled such an attempt, all speed should be used to follow in their path, and should there be a back stairway this should be covered in the same manner. It takes but a few seconds to make a survey and to see in which direction the fire is spreading, when it should be outflanked with all rapidity and its progress stopped. The building should at once be covered with ladders, for while no persons may be visible some may appear at any moment, an extension ladder should immediately be raised if the fire has control of the stairway, in order that a line may be taken in through an upper floor window to cut off the advance of the flames. Men should be sent to the upper floors to ventilate the rooms and to search for persons who may have been overcome. The size of the house and the extent of the fire should be the guide to achieve on his arrival in summoning additional aid, and no time should be lost in sending in further alarms where conditions are dangerous. It is earnestly suggested that owners should equip their homes with a few fire extinguishers to be used pending the arrival of the firemen, and it may be added that draperies are a prolific source of danger. The first floor at least should be fire-proof, and in case of an outbreak in the living rooms, curtains should be torn down, and the fire trampled out or beaten with rugs, using any means to hold it in check until the arrival of the trained firefighters. Telephones, as a means of sending in alarms, are untrustworthy, as under such circumstances excitement is liable to cause the message to be misunderstood. In the case of townhouses there is nearly always an alarm box in the vicinity. The most dangerous fires in private dwellings usually occur at night after the occupants have retired, and as the bedrooms are generally on the upper floors the premises should be thoroughly searched the last thing at night by the owner or some responsible person, and if electricity is used as a means of lighting the wiring should be frequently examined. Both owners and architects are loath to extend an elevator shaft above the house because of the inartistic effect of having an unsightly object protrude through the roof. But the shaft could be connected by a fire-proof flue to one in the chimney, which would carry smoke and fire over the roofs and ventilate the floors, thus giving the occupants a chance of escape. There also appears no reason why the sprinkler system should not be installed in houses which possess elevators, in order that in the event of a fire sprinkler heads might operate in the shaft and prevent the upward trend of the blaze. In all the foregoing classes of buildings fire is always necessarily a great menace to their tenants, and deaths may result from the smallest of outbreaks in a crowded tenement or in a great mansion. It seldom happens, however, that the life lost is that of a fireman, with the possible exception that he may be suffocated by escaping gas in cellars, here lies one of the greatest dangers to the force, and gas should be promptly shot off from the building involved, especially when the fire has begun in or spread to the basement. The above instructions are not difficult to comprehend or to carry out, that is to say as applied to the laymen, all that is demanded is a minimum of coolness and the avoidance of panic amongst strangers who may be on the scene and are unaccustomed to the realization of the dangers of unconsidered action. Of course, in large country-houses remote from any professional firefighting force, a private brigade should always be formed from workmen on the estate. It is not difficult to instruct them in the efficient use of simple apparatus, while prompt and timely action would in many cases save fine old mansions of historic interest, which alas are annually lost by fire. Granted, their construction is faulty, and that the architects of three centuries ago neglected to consider fire risks. Still, even so, it is an error to give up the battle as lost before firing a shot. CHAPTER XX. QUICK BURNERS In Europe no less than three hundred fifty years have been spent in building some churches, while in America three hundred fifty churches are built in one year. There, in succinct form, lies the cardinal difference between European and American construction, and it is this latter which possesses a profound significance for the firefighter. In the ancient cities of the old world, from time immemorial, stone has played a chief part in the erection of buildings, with brick in recent years as a good second. But in America use has naturally been made of that material most ready to hand, wood, and thus it is that the fire risk has grown proportionately to the population and the birth of new towns, both of which have been inordinately rapid and necessitating, in their turn, celerity of construction to meet the ever-increasing demands of the situation. Further, a man will decide to build a mansion for himself, premises for his business, or a factory for the production of some commercial article. He buys a plot of ground, selects an architect, chooses a set of plans and specifications, lets out the contract, and is in occupation one hundred twenty days after he first conceived the idea. Hustle with a capital H is the key note of the scheme, and any questions of fire control, appropriateness of design or structural stability, are all swamped in one wild desire for haste and the speedy completion of the order. Contrast this picture with European methods, where the individual breaks fresh ground only after months, maybe years, of careful consideration, and where the great grandson places the finishing touches to the conception of his forebears. Again, take the ingredients commonly in use for the mixing of mortar, that most essential adjunct to building operations. The writer has seen in Europe pales of animal blood and hair combined with the finest lime and sand, yet having long ago been recognized that the binding qualities of this compound are unsurpassed. In America it is often thought sufficient to employ mud with a sprinkling of cement, which may be cheap, but distinctly savers of jerry building. It has sometimes happened that whole rows of buildings have collapsed because of the inferiority of the materials used in their erection, and often, weeks after bricks have been laid in this mud mortar, two fingers would suffice to pull them from the wall. True, some improvement has taken place of late, but buildings of the type mentioned, carelessly finished, within and without, provide that class of construction generally described as quick burners. While on the subject it may also be remarked that when a stipulation is made in a building contract for fire-proof wood and finishings, the prospective owner of the premises seldom realizes that wood so treated loses its fire-resistant qualities from atmospheric moisture in a few years, while hardwood will only absorb thirty-five percent of the solution and maple none at all. In discussing fire strategy in lofts and commercial buildings, entirely new conditions present themselves to those previously considered under the title fire strategy in the homes of the people. The structures have large floor areas, usually heavily stocked with what may prove to be combustible material, and in many cases open stairways and elevator shafts, added to light shafts between two buildings, enhanced the danger and the difficulty of efficient fire control. Bold indeed would be the officer who would attempt to lay down a set of strategic rules for fighting fires in places of this type, as so many factors enter into the problem that a pre-arranged attack is impossible. The fate of nations has often been decided by a successful or a disastrous campaign worked out by a military genius of the headquarters staff, and it is related of field Marshal Moltke that on war being declared between France and Germany, he sent a telegram and went to bed, every possible detail of the war having been prepared, months or possibly years in advance, even to the number of cups of coffee required at Cologne Railway Station for the arriving troops. Fire chiefs must evolve their plans on the instant, for they cannot calculate beforehand the strength of the enemy. Furthermore, fire is the only adversary which on the battlefield steadily increases in strength in the exact mathematical proportion of the resistance it meets, until the point is reached when it is actually held in check. This emphasizes the part played in modern firefighting by promptness of decision, good judgment, and rapid action on the part of those in command. Hence it can be realized that the mere theoretician stands a poor chance of acquitting himself creditably, and that it is practice which tells. But notwithstanding these factors there are a few general rules which can and must be applied under any conditions. On arriving at the scene of an outbreak in a commercial building of the quick burner type, the officer in command should be able to tell at a glance its height, width, depth, and style of construction, and for this one moment should be sufficient. Here is a most important point. For no matter to what part of the building the commander may be obliged to go thereafter, he has a correct map of it and its surroundings in his mind's eye. The next step is correctly to locate the seat of the fire, which can only be done by an instinct fostered by long training and experience, which becomes a sort of sixth sense and is therefore outside the boundary of rules and regulations. Some possess this faculty to a marked degree, while others seem to lack it utterly, and like an ear for music it cannot be acquired, though it may be enhanced and quickened by practice. Approaching the problem under consideration from a broad standpoint, the plan of attack depends upon the condition of the building and the extent of the fire upon the arrival of the first assignment. If the outbreak is on one floor only, a line forced up the stairs to its origin may be sufficient, and it should be added that this line usually extinguishes more fires than the three or four which follow. In fact, it may be hazarded that seventy-five times out of a hundred this will be all that is necessary. Should the flames be found to have control of several floors, the force should be deployed in such a manner as to confine the fire to the area it has already invaded, and should it be impossible to enter the building a water tower may be brought into action to cover the front, though the street is usually wide enough to obviate all danger of fire crossing and igniting structures on the other side. The rear also must be covered, as there is infinitely more risk of the flames spreading to adjoining premises at that point, for such buildings are often within ten feet of each other. Should a fire burst out of the rear windows it will instantly cross this narrow space, and if not driven back by lines in the buildings behind they too will ignite. Should a condition of this nature confront the chief on his arrival he should immediately summon additional aid, and a common fault with some subordinate officers which may cause fatal delay is to postpone the transmission of further alarms. Precious moments are consumed before the fresh assignments can reach the scene and the fire has gained control. Therefore it must be reiterated that a correct estimate of conditions to be met is of vast importance. Once the rear of the building is covered the side exposures must be protected, as there are four sides to a fire, and the one to Leeward is naturally the most dangerous, seldom does a fire work to Windward as it did in the case of the equitable, and hence a line or two should be stretched to Leeward the probable root of the flames. When control of the outbreak is assured, with front rear and sides covered, it may be possible to enter the building unless it be old and heavily stocked. Should there be fire escapes on the front lines can be sent up by this means under cover of the water tower and turret pipes, and if lines are sent up the stairs the roof should be opened. This latter is a prime requisite to relieve the building of accumulated heat and gas which might explode and would certainly seriously hinder the actions of the firemen. As soon as the lines ascending the stairs and fire escapes have gained a foothold in the structure the tower and turret pipes should be shut off, as there is no object in flooding the floors if the inside lines can control the flames. At this time the force in the rear should be advanced across the space and effect an entrance. Everything now would depend upon the condition of the building, for as a physician skillfully prescribes to suit the strength of his patient, so must the chief cautiously advance according to the strength of the structure. If it is weak and tottering, after a fire such as has been described, and furthermore contains stock that has absorbed a quantity of water thereby adding greater weight than perhaps the supports were intended to stand, men should pick their way. And if there is great doubt of its stability lives should not be risked until floors are relieved of all possible weight. Many deaths have been caused by the collapse of weakened buildings during what firemen technically term washing down. As the first word was celerity, so the last word must be caution. For since the fire is practically extinguished at this point there is no necessity to risk valuable lives. The fire protection of bonded warehouses offers a curious problem. They may not in aptly be described as quick burners, since their construction the world over is on the same lines and apparently framed with no consideration of fire risks. For obvious reasons outside fire escapes are barred, the presumption being that their presence might encourage the enterprising burglar or smuggler. Similarly the floors are of limited height, often with insufficient ventilation, economy of space counting for more than economy of fire risk, which all seems futile and the reverse of far sighted, though it has grown to be a common place that governments are far behind municipalities in dealing with these common sense features which are so largely responsible for the safety and convenience of modern life. In Germany it is true the matter has received consideration, and warehouses are constructed in such a manner that the minimum of damage is done to bonded goods in the event of a fire by having the floors raked and by the structures themselves being built upon the most approved designs, but this refers only to recently erected warehouses, notably in Hamburg and Bremen. Now it goes without saying that as a rule the contents of these buildings are highly inflammable, and hence every scientific nerve should be strained toward the adoption of some form of fire control which shall meet the immediate demands of the situation. The sprinkler system naturally suggests itself as the remedy, but here questions of space step in, since the nozzles of sprinklers are always of a certain length, and hanging from the ceiling would take up valuable room, let alone being peculiarly liable to damage during the shifting of goods. An alternative scheme has been evolved by the writer, which if not perfect at any rate offers some feasible method of meeting the danger of fire, and in construction is of a simplicity which speaks for itself. It has been christened the manifold system. Near the front entrance should be located a number of valves equal to the sum of the stories in the building. These should have pipe connections to each floor, the nozzles of the same being finished just below the level of the ceilings, and furnished with revolving sprays operated by water pressure. Most laymen are acquainted with the ordinary spray used on tennis lawns and grass plots. The principle is precisely similar. Upon an alarm of fire, all that would be necessary would be for the officer in charge to ascertain the location of the outbreak, and in case he could not reach it with a line of hose promptly to turn on the valve controlling the nozzles of that particular floor. The pressure would naturally be obtained from fire engines, high pressure mains, or if sufficient from the street mains, though in cases where there was an installation of the high pressure system the latter would be advantageous. In any event the fire would speedily be damped down, admitting of the access of firemen to the building, while in many instances such means might in itself be sufficient to prevent further mischief. This system of automatic firefighting is only in its infancy, and the march of science will undoubtedly bring in its train increased efficiency of apparatus employed, and the lessened possibility of its operating out of season, which sometimes occurs with the sprinkler installation. There is a crying need for the perfection of the self-acting firefighter, since in spite of modern fire-resistive tactics the enemy has itself kept abreast of the times, and each new preventive method is offset by the introduction of some fresh element which promises a splendid stimulant to the appetite of the flames. Thus the introduction of the automobile has led to the common use of gasoline in itself highly inflammable and demanding special methods of storage. Scarcity of coal has turned the mind of the inventor toward the use of liquid fuel, while the advance of the photographic art has been responsible for the introduction of the cinematograph with its celluloid film. Most assuredly has this form of amusement come to stay, but equally its advent has not been an unmixed blessing to the firefighter, since the dangers connected with its operation are so diverse and ever-present that special precautions to meet the same have ever to be framed, and thus it is along all lines of advance. If the human brain is never idle, then most assuredly the fire-fiend is never quiescent and is prompt to seize upon fresh opportunities of attack. Hence, in considering quick burners as a whole, it may not be inappropriate to include a few words and ent the moving picture peril, since in all truth this strikes at the foundations of the social system owing to the number of children who habitually frequent such places of amusement. Now in the first place, if a panic in a theater is a tragedy, then a panic in a moving picture hall is doubly so, since it is hopeless to appeal to the self-control of the young audience, and the strong chances are that once a rush for the exits begins nothing will prevent confusion and crushing. Idle guards can accomplish little if the principles concerned are not in the bulk amenable to the dictates of reason, and if old heads are not to be found on young shoulders, and if amongst the former panic is not uncommon, then what can be expected from the latter? Hence it is that the picture palace should be as fire-secure as human knowledge can make it, which in spite of municipal regulations is seldom the case. From the nature of the entertainment, apart from the actual apparatus, all that is required is a white sheet upon which the pictures are displayed, and thus practically any sort of hall will meet the case. Old churches, disused stables, deserted chapels, in fact any building which is good for nothing else, is impressed into the service, and with a coat or two of paint blossoms forth under a new guise as a picture palace. So long as the requirements of the municipality have been fulfilled, there is no cause for interference, and so it continues to thrive until the day comes when fire sweeps along, laying it low like so much match wood, and demanding a heavy death toll of women and children. Now there is one point in this connection, which, small in itself, is really the kernel of the situation. Ninety percent of film fires occur in the immediate vicinity of the operator, and yet the observant will have noticed that nearly always the box containing the apparatus is over the entrance door, or where there are several doors at the end of the hall where the entrances, which also serve as exits, are situated. There is no sufficient reason for this, and it would be just as convenient from a managerial point of view were the position reversed, and the apparatus located at the end of the structure remote from the entrance. The reason for this alteration is obvious. In the event of a fire at present the audience is obliged to pass out either alongside or underneath the probable seat of the outbreak, an unpleasant and dangerous task for grown people, an impossible one for children of tender years. Now it will be argued that the adoption of such an arrangement would spoil the performance, since the shadows of incoming patrons using the center aisle would be reflected upon the picture curtain. The answer to this objection is apparent. It would be an excellent move if the center aisle should be used solely as an emergency exit, sufficient width being allowed to the side aisles to render both ingress and egress easy. There are, of course, many other structures, which from the nature of the trade carried on within may be well said to merit the epithet Quick Burner. In fact, in such cases it is a question of contents rather than construction, and in this connection a special chapter has already been devoted to the consideration of the storage of gasoline and the garage peril. There are, however, apparently harmless factories which provide the wherewithal for dangerous explosions, and it will be well to give some slight consideration to these. For the benefit of the layman, the simplest course will be to supply an illustrative parallel, take an ordinary log, and try to burn it. Short of placing it in a furnace, it is next door to impossible to incinerate it. Even after a severe fire, hardwood beams of some thickness are rarely burnt through, though naturally their outside surface is charred, perhaps to a depth of an inch or two. But split the log, and its component parts will burn more readily, while the smaller it is chopped, the easier it catches a light, until the point arrives when it makes excellent kindling. Reduce the log still further, and it becomes sawdust, which is not only highly inflammable, but under certain conditions actually explosive. Hence it follows that the greatest precautions must be adopted in all factories or warehouses in which large amounts of sawdust are liable to collect. This doctrine may be extended and might not in aptly be termed the dust danger. Flower, ground grain of any kind, all belong to the same category and offer the same risks. Therefore let every manufacturer or warehouse man beware of accumulated dust, which, should the slightest outbreak of fire occur, will become a potential explosive. Incidentally, there is no reason why factories of the nature mentioned should not be kept clear of this menace, as in so many other instances of aggravated fire risks they are as often as not directly accountable to the element of carelessness inherent in human nature. It may come as something of a shock to the lay reader to know that drug stores, or chemist shops as they are called in England, are amongst the most difficult problems the firefighter has to handle. Heavily stocked, with all sorts of acids and alkalis, no chemist on earth can precisely foretell what results may not follow upon some unforeseen chemical combination. An explosion may occur capable of raking a whole block of buildings, as was the case in the Tarrant Building in New York in the year 1902, or poisonous fumes may be generated, which will render it almost impossible for firemen to operate within a considerable radius of the spot, unless equipped with smoke helmets. It is no exaggeration to say that the harmless-looking little drug store at the corner of the street is a factor of such danger that in New York City special regulations have been framed for fire prevention in such establishments. For consider the perilous possibilities of such a common chemical as chlorate of potash, an excellent remedy for sore throats and coughs, and under certain conditions of the greatest medicinal value. Yet the following details of the peculiar activities of this substance cannot fail to supply food for thought, when it is remembered that its characteristics are not uncommonly met with in other articles usually supplied by the local drugist. Chlorate of potash is a white crystalline body found in commerce in crystals or in a powdered form. It consists of the metal potassium and the gases chlorine and oxygen chemically combined to form a potassium salt of chloric acid. The proportion of oxygen is large, as compared with that ordinarily present in salts, and is very weakly held in the combination. This makes chlorates as a class dangerous compounds, as heat alone will liberate the oxygen, leaving behind potassium chloride, a compound similar to table salt. Danger arises from chlorate of potash in four ways. One, when mixed or in contact with combustible substances and ignited, an explosion results, which proceeds with tremendous energy and fierceness, making a bad fire and one dangerous to fight. This violence of action is due to the liberation of pure oxygen, which immediately attacks any explosives present. Two, when mixed or in contact with combustibles such as charcoal, sulfur, or sugar, particularly if both be finely divided and abraded or struck, the result will also be an explosion. Spontaneous explosions may also occur, and near contact between chlorate and yellow or stick phosphorus is frequently followed by a violent explosion. Three, strong sulfuric acid in contact with a chlorate will cause it to decompose and to give off heavy yellow gases, which are explosive by even slight shocks or by contact with easily oxidizable material. These gases will spontaneously inflame phosphorus, terpentine, and other substances. Four, from the inherent character of the salt itself. Chlorates, for theoretical chemical reasons, are in one sense unstable compounds. The danger from the third source is obvious, although it is not imminent from the third and fourth as it is from the first and second. In the first case it will be seen that the presence of any considerable quantity of chlorate in a building is a source of danger. It would give such impetus to a fire when once reached as to make the destruction of the property almost certain. When heated alone it gives up its oxygen quietly, but in the presence of combustibles an explosion will result from the rapid generation of highly heated gases. A fall of floors or of shelves might scatter the chlorate over a large surface already hot, or might mix it with highly combustible materials such as are usually present in drughouses. In either case disastrous explosions will occur. In the case of the disastrous fire already mentioned at Terentine Company's warehouse, one of the great wholesale chemical houses in New York, this is probably what occurred, since tons of chlorate and sulfur were stored on one floor, and the ensuing explosion consequent upon the fire completely destroyed the building and several others adjacent to it. In the second case there is danger from intimate mixtures of chlorate and combustibles. These will be found almost exclusively in torpedo and fireworks factories, and have the explosive force of dynamite and gun-cotton, and in fact may be placed in the same category. The explosion is propagated through the mass by shock and is practically instantaneous, while in gunpowder there is simply a very rapid combustion generated by flame or heat alone. For full effect a chlorate powder must be confined, or in such quantity as to produce the effect of confinement in the mass. In case of carelessness such mixture could occur in small amounts in any drugstore or chemist shop, and if stepped upon would ignite. The danger is that while the explosion in unconfined portions of such mixture takes place usually only in the part under pressure, the action is continued in the remainder of the mass as a fierce and very rapid combustion resembling that of red Greek fire. The danger in the fourth case is a doubtful quantity, but there seems to be some grounds for believing that chlorate will of itself decompose with explosive violence if exposed to heat and shock at the same time. Alone, an unmolested chlorate is a perfectly safe and stable compound. The peril arises from surrounding circumstances. This brief description of one of the commonest of chemical commodities will give the layman some idea of the precautions which should be adopted to prevent fire in all drugstores, wholesale, and retail, and in New York this fact has led to the adoption of a detailed standard as to the amounts of dangerous chemicals which may be stored on licensed premises. In the first place, those entering the chemical business must obtain a permit from the fire commissioner, who with the municipal explosives commission considers each application upon its individual merits. In the event of any disregard of regulations, licenses may be immediately revoked. The following are some of the details of the regulations regarding retail drugstores. Firstly, it is unlawful to manufacture compound dispense or store upon such premises any of the following substances. Colored fire in any form, flashlight powders, liquid acetylene, acetylide of copper, fulminates or fulminating compounds, gun-cotton, gunpowder, chloride of nitrogen, amide or amine explosive, picrates or rubber shoddy. Potassium chlorate in admixture with organic substances, phosphorus or sulfur, is forbidden. But this restriction does not apply to the manufacture or storage of tablets of this chemical when intended for medicinal purposes. Much the same applies to nitroglycerin, which is rigidly barred, except in medicinal form, as approved by the National Pharmacopia. A schedule has been arranged limiting the amount of combustible chemicals and fibers, some of which it may be of interest to quote. Thus, carbonic acid, one hundred pounds, collodion, five pounds, turpentine, one barrel, essential oil, one hundred pounds in all, phosphorus red and yellow, three ounces, magnesium powder and ribbon, sixteen ounces in all, powdered charcoal, ten pounds, rosin, ten pounds, lint, ten pounds in closed boxes, potassium permanganate, five pounds, silver nitrate, one pound, glycerin, five hundred pounds. Hence it will be seen that a limit is set upon the storage of even the commonest commodities, due regard being taken of their possible combinations in the event of accident or fire. The next official regulation might well find a place in chemist shops the world over. It shall be unlawful for any person to store or accumulate broken wood, waste paper, or waste packing material of any kind in any part of the premises where goods are packed or unpacked. Such materials shall be removed at the close of the day. In addition, the following restriction is an admirable one and might well be extended. It shall be unlawful for any person to smoke or to carry a lighted cigar, cigarette or pipe or any lighted substance within a packing room, cellar, storeroom, or that part of the laboratory where volatile, inflammable oil or liquid is used or handled. And a notice bearing in large letters the words, smoking unlawful, together with a copy of this section in smaller letters, shall be conspicuously displayed in one or more places on each floor. Furthermore, basements and cellars must be properly lighted by electricity, and persons neglecting this and the above regulations are guilty of misdemeanor. It may seem to some that these ordinances are stringent to the extent of being irksome, but it cannot be too strongly emphasized that the everyday fire risks of a community are in themselves amply sufficient with which to deal, and that those exceptional hazards demand exceptional precautions owing to the unknown character of the outbreak which may result from accidents there too. There is one last example of the genus Quick Burner that the writer would like to mention. There is a craze nowadays in all parts of the world for the small suburban home which, with its ornamental exterior, tessellated pavement and brightly painted front door, appears to the average purchaser an epitome of desirability. By the firefighter, however, these rows of Jerry-built cottages, hastily run up by an unscrupulous contractor, are rated at their true value. As a rule, examination will show that there is a common bearing wall between each two houses, rarely, if ever, extending to the top of the attic. Thus the whole length of these attics, unpartitioned off in any way, forms a huge horizontal flue and an excellent ally to the flames. In dealing with an outbreak of fire under such circumstances, it is therefore necessary to take lines in six or seven houses away from the actual scene of the blaze in order to fight the flames back and to prevent them from gaining complete control and sweeping all before them like so much waste-paper. The structural disabilities of such a system are vexatious enough, since tenants are unable to affect any architectural alterations, but the fire risks are tremendous. It is another example of that get-rich-quick policy which does not concern itself with such elemental factors as fire risk and human safety, and is occupied solely with its own selfish ends. In fact, it is no exaggeration to say that the greater portion of fire legislation is concerned with the protection of the individual against the egotistical indifference of those who are ready to exploit him. Fire-resistive construction costs little, if any more, than gerry-building, due regard being taken of durability, security, and reputation, though apparently the latter counts but little in comparison with lightly earned gold. The public, however, is happily commencing to take an intelligent interest in fire control, and the day is drawing to a close when it will be possible to gull the unwary by means of cheap ornamentation and a prolific use of paint, or perhaps a hint might be taken from Germany, where owner and occupier are held jointly responsible for outbreaks of fire. End of section twenty-one. Recording by Maria Casper.