 CHAPTER 24 A SHORT LIFE OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org Recording by Jude Cader A SHORT LIFE OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN by John G. Nicolay Chapter 24 Criticism of the President for His Action on Slavery Lincoln's Letters to Louisiana Friends Greeley's Open Letter Mr. Lincoln's Reply Chicago clergyman urge emancipation Lincoln's Answer Lincoln issues preliminary proclamation President proposes constitutional amendment Cabinet considers final proclamation Cabinet discusses admission of West Virginia Lincoln signs edict of freedom Lincoln's Letter to Hodges The secrets of the government were so well kept that no hint whatever came to the public that the president had submitted to the cabinet the draft of an emancipation proclamation. Between that date and the battle of the Second Bowl run intervened the period of a full month during which, in the absence of military movements or congressional proceedings to furnish exciting news both private individuals and public journals turned to a new and somewhat vindictive fire of criticism upon the administration. For this they seized upon the ever ready text of the ubiquitous slavery question. Upon this issue the conservatives protested indignantly that the president had been too fast while contrary wise the radicals clamored loudly that he had been altogether too slow. We have seen how his decision was unalterably taken and his course distinctly marked out but that he was not yet ready publicly to announce it. Therefore during this period of waiting for victory he underwent the difficult task of restraining the impatience of both sides which he did in very positive language. Thus under date of July 26 1862 he wrote to a friend in Louisiana. Yours of the 16th by the hand of Governor Sheppley is received. It seems the Union feeling in Louisiana is being crushed out by the course of General Phelps. Please pardon me for believing that this is a false pretense. The people of Louisiana, all intelligent people everywhere, know full well that I never had a wish to touch the foundations of their society or any right of theirs. With perfect knowledge of this they forced a necessity upon me to send armies among them and it is their own fault, not mine, that they are annoyed by the presence of General Phelps. They also know the remedy, know how to be cured of General Phelps, remove the necessity of his presence. I am a patient man, always willing to forgive on the Christian terms of repentance and also to give ample time for repentance. Still I must save this government if possible. What I cannot do, of course I will not do, but it may as well be understood once and for all that I shall not surrender this game leaving any available card unplayed. Two days later he answered another Louisiana critic. Mr. Durant complains that in various ways. The relation of master and slave is disturbed by the presence of our army and he considers it particularly vexatious that this in part is done under the cover of an act of Congress while constitutional guarantees are suspended on the plea of military necessity. The truth is that what is done and omitted about slaves is done and omitted on the same military necessity. It is a military necessity to have men and money and we can get neither in sufficient numbers or amounts if we keep from or drive from our lines slaves coming to them. Mr. Durant cannot be ignorant of the pressure in this direction nor of my efforts to hold it within bounds till he and such as he shall have time to help themselves. What would you do in my position? Would you drop the war where it is? Or would you prosecute it in future with elder stalk squirts charged with rose water? Would you deal lighter blows rather than heavier ones? Would you give up the contest leaving any available means unapplied? I am a no boastful mood. I shall not do more than I can and I shall do all I can to save the government which is my sworn duty as well as my personal inclination. I shall do nothing in malice. What I deal with is too vast for malicious dealing. The President could afford to overlook the misrepresentations and invective of the professedly opposition newspapers but he had also to meet the overzeal of influential Republican editors of strong anti-slavery bias. Horace Greeley printed, in the New York Tribune of August 20, a long open letter ostentatiously addressed to Mr. Lincoln, full of unjust censure all based on the general accusation that the President and many army officers as well were neglecting their duty under pro-slavery influences and sentiments. The open letter which Mr. Lincoln wrote in reply is remarkable not alone for the skill with which it separated the true from the false issue of the moment but also for the equipoise and dignity with which it maintained his authority as moral arbiter between the contending factions. Executive Mansion, Washington, August 22, 1862. Honorable Horace Greeley, Dear sir, I have just read years of the nineteenth addressed to myself through the New York Tribune. If there be in it any statements or assumptions of fact which I may know to be erroneous, I do not, now and here, if there be in it any inferences which I may believe to be falsely drawn, I do not, now and here, argue against them. If there be perceptible in it and in patience and dictatorial tone, I wave at indepence to an old friend whose heart I have always supposed to be right. As to the policy I seem to be pursuing, as you say, I have not meant to leave anyone in doubt. I would save the union. I would save it in the shortest way under the constitution. The sooner the national authority can be restored, the nearer the union will be, the union it was. If there be those who would not save the union unless they could at the same time save slavery, I do not agree with them. My paramount object in this struggle is to save the union. And it is not to either save or destroy slavery. If I could save the union without freeing the slave, I would do it. And if I could save it by freeing all the slaves, I would do it. And if I could save it by freeing all the slaves, I would do it. And if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also do that. What I do about slavery and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps to save the union. And what I forbear, I forbear because I do not believe it would help to save the union. I shall do less whenever I shall believe what I am doing hurts the cause. And I shall do more whenever I shall believe doing more will help the cause. I shall try to correct errors when shown to be errors. And I shall adopt new views so fast as they shall appear to be true views. I have here stated my purpose according to my view of official duty. And I intend no modification of my oft-expressed personal wish that all men everywhere could be free. Yours, A. Lincoln. It can hardly be doubted that President Lincoln, when he wrote this letter, intended that it should have a two-fold effect upon public opinion. First, that it should curb extreme anti-slavery sentiment to greater patience. Secondly, that it should rouse dogged pro-slavery conservatism and prepare it for the announcement which he had resolved to make at the first fitting opportunity. At the date of the letter, he very well knew that a serious conflict of arms was soon likely to occur in Virginia. And he had strong reason to hope that the junction of the armies of McClellan and Pope, which had been ordered and was then in progress, could be successfully affected and would result in a decisive union victory. This hope, however, was sadly disappointed. The second battle of Bull Run, which occurred one week after the Greeley letter, proved a serious defeat and necessitated a further postponement of his contemplated action. As a secondary effect of the new disaster, there came upon him once more an increased pressure to make reprisal upon what was assumed to be the really vulnerable side of the rebellion. On September 13, he was visited by an influential deputation from the religious denominations of Chicago, urging him to issue at once a proclamation of universal emancipation. His reply to them, made in the language of the most perfect courtesy, nevertheless has entered a tone of rebuke that indicates the state of irritation and high sensitiveness under which he was living from day to day. In the actual condition of things, he could neither safely satisfy them nor deny them. As any answer he could make would be liable to misconstruction, he devoted the larger part of it to pointing out the unreasonableness of their dogmatic insistence. I am approached with the most opposite opinions and advice, and that by religious men who are equally certain that they represent the divine will. I am sure that either the one or the other class is mistaken in that belief, and perhaps, in some respects, both. I hope it will not be a reverent for me to say that if it is probable that God would reveal his will to others on a point so connected with my duty, it might be supposed he would reveal it directly to me. What good would a proclamation of emancipation from me do, especially as we are now situated? I do not want to issue a document that the whole world will see must necessarily be inoperative, like the Pope's bowl against the comet. Understand I raise no objections against it on legal or constitutional grounds, or, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy in time of war, I suppose I have a right to take any measure which may best subdue the enemy, nor do I urge objections of a moral nature in view of possible consequences. I view this matter as a practical war-measure to be decided on according to the advantages or disadvantages it may offer to the suppression of the rebellion. Do not misunderstand me, because I have mentioned these objections. They indicate the difficulties that have thus far prevented my action in some such way as you desire. I have not decided against a proclamation of liberty to the slaves, but hold the matter under its control. And I can assure you that the subject is on my mind by day and night more than any other. Whatever shall appear to be God's will, I will do. Four days after this interview the battle of Antietam was fought, and when, after a few days of uncertainty, it was ascertained that it could be reasonably claimed as a Union victory. The President resolved to carry out his long-matured purpose The Diary of Secretary Chase has recorded a very full report of the interesting transaction. On this ever-memorable September 22, 1862, after some playful preliminary talk, Mr. Lincoln said to his cabinet, Gentlemen, I have, as you are aware, thought a great deal about the relation of this war to slavery, and you all remember that several weeks ago I read about the war and you all remember that several weeks ago I read to you in order I had prepared on this subject, which, on account of objections made by some of you, was not issued. Ever since then my mind has been much occupied with this subject and I have thought all along that the time for acting on it might probably come. I think the time has come now. I wish it was a better time. I wish that we were in a better condition. The action of the army against the rebels has not been quite what I should have best liked. But they have been driven out of Maryland and Pennsylvania is no longer in danger of invasion. When the rebel army was at Frederick, I determined, as soon as it should be driven out of Maryland, to issue a proclamation of emancipation, such as I thought most likely to be useful. I said nothing to anyone. But I made the promise to myself and, hesitating a little, to my maker. The rebel army is now driven out and I am going to fulfill that promise. I have got you together to hear what I have written down. I do not wish your advice about the main matter for that I have determined for myself. This I say without intending anything but respect for any one of you. But I already know the views of each on this question. They have been here to forexpressed and I have considered them as thoroughly and carefully as I can. What I have written is that which my reflections have determined me to say. If there is anything in the expressions I use or in any minor matter which any of you thinks had best be changed, I shall be glad to receive the suggestions. One other observation I will make. I know very well that many others might, in this matter as in others, do better than I can. And if I was satisfied that the public confidence was more fully possessed by any one of them than by me, and knew of any constitutional way in which he could be put in my place, he should have it. I would gladly yield it to him. But though I believe that I have not so much of the confidence of the people as I had sometimes since, I do not know that all things considered any other person has more. And, however this may be, there is no way in which I can have any other man put where I am. I am here. I must do the best I can and bear the responsibility of taking the course which I feel I ought to take. The members of the cabinet all approve the policy of the measure. Mr. Blair only objecting that he thought the time inopportune, while others suggested some slight amendments. In the new form in which it was printed on the following morning, the document announced a renewal of the plan of compensated abolishment, a continuance of the effort at voluntary colonization, a promise to recommend ultimate compensation to loyal owners, and that on the first day of January, in the year of our lord 1863, all persons held as slaves within any state or designated part of a state, the people whereof shall then be in rebellion against the United States, shall be then thenceforward and forever free, and the executive government of the United States including the military and naval authorities thereof will recognize and maintain the freedom of such persons and will do no act or acts to repress such persons or any of them in any efforts they may make for their actual freedom. Pursuant to these announcements, the President's annual message of December 1, 1862 recommended to Congress the passage of a joint resolution proposing to the legislatures of the several states a constitutional amendment consisting of three articles, namely, one providing compensation in bonds for every state which should abolish slavery before the year 1900, another securing freedom to all slaves who, during the rebellion, had enjoyed actual freedom by the chances of war also providing compensation to legal owners, the third authorizing Congress to provide for colonization. The long and practical argument in which he renewed this plan, not in exclusion of, but additional to, all others for restoring and preserving the national authority throughout the Union concluded with the following eloquent sentences we can succeed only by concert, it is not can any of us imagine better, but can we all do better object whatsoever is possible still the question recurs, can we do better, the dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present, the occasion is piled high with difficulty and we must rise with the occasion as our case is new, so we must think anew and act anew we must disenthrall ourselves and then we shall save our country fellow citizens, we cannot escape history, we of this Congress and this administration will be remembered in spite of ourselves no personal significance or insignificance can spare one or another of us the fiery trial through which we pass will light us down in honor or dishonor to the latest generation we say we are for the Union the world will not forget that we say this we know how to save the Union the world knows we do know how to save it we even we hear hold the power and bear the responsibility and giving freedom to the slave we assure freedom to the free honorable alike in what we give and what we preserve we shall nobly save or meanly lose the last best hope of earth other means may succeed this could not fail the way is plain peaceful generous just a way which if followed the world will forever applaud and God must forever bless but Mr. Lincoln was not encouraged by any response to this earnest appeal either from Congress or by manifestations of public opinion indeed it may be fairly presumed that he expected none perhaps he considered it already a sufficient gain that it was silently accepted as another admonition of the consequences which not he nor his administration but the civil war with its relentless agencies was rapidly bringing about he was becoming more and more conscious of the silent influence of his official utterances on public sentiment if not to convert obstinate opposition at least to reconcile it to patient submission in that faith he steadfastly went on carrying out his well matured plan the next important step of which was the fulfillment of the announcements made in the preliminary emancipation proclamation of September 22 on December 30 he presented to each member of his cabinet a copy of the draft he had carefully made of the new and final proclamation to be issued on New Year's Day it will be remembered that as early as July 22 he informed the cabinet that the main question involved he had decided for himself now as twice before it was only upon minor points that he asked their advice and suggestion for which object he placed these drafts in their hands for verbal and collateral criticism in addition to the central point of military emancipation in all the states yet in rebellion the president's draft for the first time announced his intention to incorporate a portion of the newly liberated slaves into the army of the Union this policy had also been under discussion at the first consideration of the subject in July Mr. Lincoln had then already seriously considered it but thought it inexpedient and productive of more evil than good at that date in his judgment the time had now arrived for energetically adopting it on the following day December 31 the members brought back to the present meeting their several criticisms and suggestions on the draft he had given them perhaps the most important one was that earnestly pressed by secretary chase that the new proclamation should make no exceptions of fractional parts of states controlled by the Union armies as in Louisiana and Virginia save the 48 counties of the latter designated as West Virginia then in the process of formation and admission as a new state which on this same December 31 was elaborately discussed in writing by members of the cabinet and affirmatively decided by the president on the afternoon of December 31 the cabinet meeting being over Mr. Lincoln once more carefully rewrote the proclamation embodying in it the suggestions which had been made as to mere verbal improvements but he rigidly adhered to his own draft in retaining the exceptions as to fractional parts of states and the 48 counties of West Virginia and also his announcement of intention to enlist the freedmen in military service secretary chase had submitted the form of a closing paragraph this the president also adopted but added to it after the words warranted by the constitution his own important qualifying correction upon military necessity the full text of the weighty document will be found in a footnote it recited the announcement of the September proclamation to find its character and authority as a military decree designated the states and parts of states that day in rebellion against the government ordered and declared that all persons held as slaves therein are and hence forward shall be free and that such persons of suitable condition would be received into the military service and upon this act sincerely believed to be an act of justice warranted by the constitution upon military necessity I invoke the considerate judgment of mankind and the gracious favor of Almighty God the conclusion of the momentous transaction was as deliberate and simple as had been its various stages of preparation the morning and midday of January 1 1863 were occupied by the half social half official ceremonial of the usual New Year's Day reception at the executive mansion established by long custom at about three o'clock in the afternoon after full three hours of greetings and handshakeings Mr. Lincoln and perhaps a dozen persons assembled in the executive office and without any prearranged ceremony the president affixed his signature to the great edict of freedom no better commentary will ever be written upon this far-reaching act than that which he himself embodied in a letter written to a friend a little more than a year later I am naturally anti-slavery if slavery is not wrong nothing is wrong I cannot remember when I did not so think and feel and yet I have never understood that the presidency conferred upon me an unrestricted right to act officially upon this judgment and feeling it was in the oath I took that I would to the best of my ability preserve, protect, and defend the constitution of the United States I could not take the office without taking the oath nor was it in my view that I might take an oath to get power and break the oath in using the power I understood too that in ordinary civil administration this oath even forbade me to practically indulge my primary abstract judgment on the moral question of slavery I had publicly declared this many times and in many ways and I aver that to this day I have done no official act in mere deference to my abstract judgment and feeling on slavery I did understand however that my oath to preserve the constitution to the best of my ability imposed upon me the duty of preserving by every indispensable means that government, that nation of which that constitution was the organic law was it possible to lose the nation and yet preserve the constitution by general law life and limb must be protected yet often a limb must be amputated to save a life but a life is never wisely given to save a limb I felt that measures otherwise unconstitutional might become lawful by becoming indispensable to the preservation of the constitution through the preservation of the nation right or wrong I assume this ground and now avow it I could not feel that to the best of my ability I had even tried to preserve the constitution if to save slavery or any minor matter should permit the wreck of government country and constitution all together when early in the war general fremont attempted military emancipation I forbade it because I did not then think it an indispensable necessity when a little later general Cameron then secretary of war suggested the arming of the blacks I objected because I did not yet think it an indispensable necessity when still later general hunter attempted military emancipation I again forbade it because I did not yet think the indispensable necessity had come when in march and may in july 1862 I made earnest and successive appeals to the border states to favor compensated emancipation I believe the indispensable necessity for military emancipation and arming the blacks would come unless averted by that measure they declined the proposition and I was in my best judgment driven to the alternative of either surrendering the union and with it the constitution or of laying strong hand upon the colored element I chose the latter footnote by the president of the united states of america a proclamation whereas on the 22nd day of september in the year of our lord 1862 a proclamation was issued by the president of the united states containing among other things the following to wit that on the first day of january in the year of our lord 1863 all persons held as slaves within any state or designated part of a state the people whereof shall then be in rebellion against the united states shall be then thence forward and forever free and the executive government of the united states including the military and naval authority thereof will recognize and maintain and will do no act or acts to repress such persons or any of them in any efforts they make for their actual freedom that the executive will on the first day of january after said by proclamation designate the states and parts of states if any in which the people thereof respectively shall then be in rebellion against the united states or the people thereof shall on that day be in good faith represented in the congress of the united states by members chosen thereto at elections wherein a majority of the qualified voters of such states shall have participated shall in the absence of strong countervailing testimony be deemed conclusive evidence that such state and the people thereof are not then in rebellion against the united states now therefore I president of the united states by virtue of the power in me vested as commander in chief of the army and navy of the united states in time of actual armed rebellion against the authority and government of the united states and as a fit and necessary war measure for suppressing said rebellion do on this first day of January in the year of our lord 1863 and in accordance with my purpose so to do publicly proclaimed for the full period of 100 days from the day first above mentioned order and designate as the states and parts of states wherein the people thereof respectively are this day in rebellion against the united states the following to it harkensaw texas louisiana except the parishes of saint bernard plekhamins jefferson st john st charles st james ascension assumption leforte st mary st martin and orleans including the city of new orleans mississippi alabama florida georgia south carolina north carolina and virginia except the 48 counties designated as west virginia and also the counties of berkeley akamak elizabeth city york princess an and norfolk including the cities of norfolk and and which accepted parts are for the present left precisely as if this proclamation were not issued and by virtue of the power and for the purpose effort said i do order and declare that all persons held as slaves within said designated states and parts of states are and hence forward shall be free and that the executive government of the united states including the military and naval authorities thereof will recognize and maintain the freedom of said persons and i hereby enjoin upon the people so declared to be free to abstain from all violence unless in necessary self defense and i recommend to them that in all cases when allowed they labor faithfully for reasonable wages and i further declare and make known that such persons of suitable condition will be received into the armed service of the united states the garrison forts positions stations and other places and to man vessels of all sorts in said service and upon this act sincerely believed to be an act of justice warranted by the constitution upon military necessity i invoke the considerate judgment of mankind and the gracious favor of almighty god in witness whereof i have herein to set my hand and cause the seal of the united states to be affixed done at the city of washington this first day of january in the year of our lord 1863 and of the independence of the united states of america the 87th abraham lincoln by the president william h seward secretary of state end of footnote end of chapter 24 chapter 25 of a short life of abraham lincoln this is a livervox recording all livervox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit livervox.org recording by john leader a short life of abraham lincoln chapter 25 by john g nickley negro soldiers fort pillow retaliation draft northern democrats governor seymour's attitude draft riots in new york valandigham lincoln on his authority to suspend writ of habeas corpus knights of the golden circle jacob thompson in canada on the subject of negro soldiers and many other topics the period of active rebellion in civil war had wrought a profound change in public opinion from the foundation of the government to the rebellion the horrible nightmare of a possible slave insurrection had brooded over the entire south this feeling naturally had a sympathetic reflection in the north and at first produced an instinctive shrinking from any thought of placing arms in the hands of the blacks when the chances of war had given practical or legal freedom during the year 1862 a few sporadic efforts were made by zealous individuals under apparently favoring conditions to begin the formation of colored regiments the eccentric senator lane tried it in canesus or rather along the Missouri border without success general hunter made an experiment in south carolina but found the freed men too unwilling to enlist and the white officers too prejudiced to instruct them general butler at new orleans infused his wanted energy into a similar attempt with somewhat better results he found that before the capture of the city governor more of louisiana had begun the organization of a regiment of free colored men for local defense butler resuscitated his organization for which he thus had the advantage of confederate example in precedent and against which the accusation of arming slaves could not be urged early in september butler reported with his usual biting sarcasm quote i shall also have within ten days a regiment one thousand strong of native guards colored the darkest of whom will be about the complexion of the state mr. webster end of quote all these efforts were made under implied rather than expressed provisions of law and encountered more or less embarrassment in obtaining pay and supplies because they were not distinctly recognized in the army regulations this could not well be done so long as the president considered the policy premature his spirit of caution in this regard was set forth by the secretary in a letter of instruction dated july 3rd 1862 he is of opinion that under the laws of congress they the former slaves cannot be sent back to their masters that in common humanity they must not be permitted to suffer for want of food, shelter or other necessaries of life that to this end they should be provided for by the quarter masters and commissaries departments and that those who are capable of labor should be set to work and paid reasonable wages in directing this to be done the president does not mean at present to settle any general rule in respect to slaves or slavery but simply to provide for the particular case under the circumstances in which it is now presented all this was changed by the final proclamation of emancipation which authoritatively announced that persons of suitable condition whom it declared free would be received into the armed service of the united states during the next few months the president wrote several personal letters to general dicks commanding at fortesman row to andrew johnson military governor of tennessee to general banks and to general hunter in the department of the south urging their attention to promoting the new policy and what was yet more to the purpose a bureau was created in the war department having special charge of the duty and the adjutant general of the army was personally sent to the union camps on the mississippi river to super intend the recruitment and enlistment of the negroes where with the hearty cooperation of grant and other union commanders he met most encouraging and gratifying success the confederate authorities made a great outcry over the new departure they could not fail to see the immense effect it was destined to have and their prejudice of generations greatly intensified the gloomy apprehensions they no doubt honestly felt yet even allowing for this the exaggerated language in which they described it became ludicrous the confederate war department early declared generals hunter and felps to be outlaws because they were drilling and organizing slaves and the sensational proclamation issued by jefferson davis on december 23rd 1862 ordered that butler and his commissioned officers quote robbers and criminals deserving death be whenever captured reserved for execution end of quote mr. lincoln's final emancipation proclamation excited them to a still higher frenzy the confederate senate talked of raising the black flag jefferson davis's message stigmatized it as the most execrable measure recorded in the history of guilty man and a joint resolution of the confederate congress prescribed that white officers of negro union soldiers shall if captured be put to death or be otherwise punished at the discretion of the court the general orders of some subordinate confederate commanders repeated or rivaled such denunciations and threats fortunately the records of the war are not stained with either excesses by the colored troops or even a single instance of such proclaimed barbarity upon white union officers and the visitation of vengeance upon negro soldiers is confined so far as known to the single instance of the massacre at fort pillow in that deplorable affair the confederate commander reported by telegraph that in 30 minutes he stormed fort manned by 700 and captured the entire garrison killing 500 and taking 100 prisoners while he sustained a loss of only 20 killed and 60 wounded it is unnecessary to explain that the bulk of the slain were colored soldiers making due allowance for the heat of battle history can considerably veil closer scrutiny into the realities wrapped in the exaggerated boast of such a victory the fort pillow incident which occurred in the spring of 1864 brought upon president Lincoln the very serious question of enforcing an order of retaliation which had been issued on july 30 1863 as an answer to the confederate joint resolution of may 1 Mr. Lincoln's freedom from every trace of passion was as conspicuous in this as in all his official acts in a little address at Baltimore while referring to the rumor of the massacre which had just been received Mr. Lincoln said we do not today know that a colored soldier or white officer commanding colored soldiers has been massacred by the rebels when made a prisoner we fear it believe it I may say but we do not know it to take the life of one of their prisoners on the assumption that they murder ours when it is short of certainty that they do murder ours might be too serious to cruel a mistake when more authentic information arrived the matter was very earnestly debated by cabinet but the discussion only served to bring out in stronger light the inherent dangers of either course in this nice balancing of weighty reasons two influences decided the course of the government against retaliation one was that general grant was about to begin his memorable campaign against Richmond and that it would be most impolitic to preface a great battle by the tragic spectacle of a military punishment however justifiable the second was the tender hearted humanity of the ever merciful president Frederick Douglass has related the answer Mr. Lincoln made to him in a conversation nearly a year earlier I shall never forget the benignant expression of his face the tearful look of his eye and the quiver in his voice when he deprecated a resort to retaliatory measures once begun said he I do not know where such a measure would stop he said he could not take men out and kill them in cold blood for what was done by others if he could get hold of the persons who were guilty of killing the colored prisoners in cold blood the case would be different but he could not kill the innocent for the guilty amid the sanguinary reports and crowding events that held public attention for a year the wilderness to Appomattox the Fort Pillow Affair was forgotten not only by the cabinet but by the country the related subjects of emancipation and Negro soldiers would doubtless have been discussed with much more passion and friction had not public thought been largely occupied during the year 1863 by the enactment of the conscription law and the enforcement of the draft in the hard stress of politics and war during the years 1861 and 1862 the popular enthusiasm with which the free states responded to the president's call to put down the rebellion by force of arms had become measurably exhausted the heavy military reverses which attended the failure of McClellan's campaign against Richmond Pope's defeat at the second bull run McClellan's neglect to follow up on battle of Antietam with energetic operations the gradual change of early western victories to a cessation of all effort to open the Mississippi and the scattering of the western forces to the spiritless routine of repairing and guarding long railroad lines all operated together practically to stop volunteering and enlistment by the end of 1862 thus far the patriotic record the glorious one almost 100,000 three months militia had shouldered muskets to redress the fall of Fort Sumter over half a million three years volunteers promptly enlisted to form the first national army under the laws of Congress passed in August 1861 nearly half a million more volunteers came forward under the tender of the governors of free states and the president's call by 1862 to repair the failure of McClellan's peninsula campaign several minor calls for shorter terms of enlistment aggregating more than 40,000 are here omitted for brevity's sake had the western victories continued had the Mississippi been opened had the army of the Potomac been more fortunate volunteering would doubtless have continued at quite or nearly the same rate with success delayed with campaigns thwarted with public sentiment despondent armies ceased to fill an emergency call for 300,000 nine months men issued on August 4th 1862 produced a total of only 86,860 and an attempt to supply these in some of the states by a draft under state laws demonstrated that mere local statutes and machinery for that form of military recruitment were defective and totally inadequate with the beginning of the third year of the war more energetic measures to fill the armies were seen to be necessary and after very hot and acrimonious debate for about a month Congress on March 3rd 1863 passed a national conscription law under which all male citizens between the ages of 20 and 45 were enrolled to constitute the national forces and the president was authorized to call them into service by draft as occasion might require the law authorized the appointment of a provost marshal general and under him a provost marshal, a commissioner and a surgeon to constitute a board of enrollment in each congressional district who with necessary deputies were required to carry out the law by national authority under the supervision of the provost marshal general for more than a year passed the democratic leaders in the northern states had assumed an attitude of violent partisanship against the administration their hostility taking mainly the form of stubborn opposition to the anti-slavery enactments of Congress and the emancipation measures of the president they charged with loud denunciation that he was converting the maintenance of the union into a war for abolition and with this and other clamors had gained considerable successes in the autumn congressional elections of 1862 though not enough to break the republican majority in the house of representatives general mclellan was a democrat and since his removal from command they proclaimed him a martyr to this policy and were grooming him to be their coming presidential candidate the passage of the conscription law afforded them a new pretext to assail the administration and democratic members of both houses of congress denounced it with extravagant partisan bitterness as a violation of the constitution and subversive of popular liberty in the mouths of vindictive crossroads demagogues and in the columns of irresponsible newspapers that supply the political reading among the more reckless elements of city populations the extravagant language of democratic leaders degenerated in many instances into unrestrained abuse and accusation yet considering that this was the first conscription law ever enacted in the united states considering the multitude of questions and difficulties attending its application considering that the necessity of its enforcement was and the nature of things unwelcome to the friends of the government and as naturally excited all the enmity and cunning of its foes to impede, thwart and evade it the law was carried out with a remarkably small proportion of delay, obstruction or resulting violence among a considerable number of individual violations of the act in which prompt punishment prevented a repetition only two prominent incidents arose which had what may be called a national significance in new york the partial political reaction of 1862 had caused the election of Horatio Seymour a democrat as governor a man of high character and great ability he, nevertheless permitted his partisan feeling to warp and color his executive functions to a dangerous extent the spirit of his antagonism is shown in a phrase of his fourth of july oration quote they look upon their opponents as men who would do them wrong in regard to their most sacred franchises end of quote believing perhaps honestly the conscription law to be unconstitutional he endeavored by protest argument and administrative noncompliance to impede its execution on the plea of first demanding a supreme court decision as to its legality to this president Lincoln replied quote I cannot consent to suspend the draft in New York as you request because among other reasons time is too important I do not object to abide a decision of the united states supreme court or of the judges thereof on the constitutionality of the draft law in fact I should be willing to undertake the obtaining of it but I cannot consent to lose the time while it is being obtained we are contending with an enemy who, as I understand drives every able-bodied man he can reach into his ranks very much as a butcher drives bullocks into a slaughter-pen no time is wasted no argument is used this produces an army which will soon turn upon our now victorious soldiers already in the field if they shall not be sustained by recruits as they should be end of quote notwithstanding Governor Seymour's neglect to give the enrolling officers any cooperation preparations for the draft went on in New York City without prospect of serious disturbance except the incendiary language of low newspapers and hand-bills but scarcely had the wheel begun to turn and the drawing commenced on July 13 when a riot broke out first demolishing the enrolling office the crowd next attacked an adjoining block of stores which they plundered and set on fire refusing to let the firemen put out the flames from this point the excitement and disorder spread over the city which for three days was at many points subjected to the uncontrolled fury of the mob loud threats to destroy the New York Tribune Office which the inmates vigorously prepared to defend were made the most savage brutality was wreaked upon colored people the fine building of the colored orphan asylum where several hundred children barely found means of escape was plundered and set on fire it was notable that foreigners of recent importation were the principal leaders and actors in this lawlessness in which two million dollars worth of property was destroyed and several hundred persons lost their lives the disturbance came to an end on the night of the fourth day when a small detachment of soldiers met a body of rioters and firing into them killed thirteen and wounded eighteen more Governor Seymour gave but little help in the disorder and left a stain on the record of his courage by addressing a portion of the mob as my friends the opportune arrival of national troops restored after maintained quiet and safety some temporary disturbance occurred in Boston but was promptly put down and loud appeals came from Philadelphia and Chicago to stop the draft the final effect of this conscription law was not so much to obtain recruits for the service as to stimulate local effort throughout the country to promote volunteering whereby the number drafted was either greatly lessened or in many localities were entirely avoided by filling the state quotas the military arrest of Clement L. Volandigum a Democratic member of Congress from Ohio for incendiary language denouncing the draft also grew to an important incident arrested and tried under the orders of General Burnside a military commission found him guilty of having violated general order number thirty-eight by quote bearing disloyal sentiments and opinions with the object in purpose of weakening the power of the government in its efforts to suppress an unlawful rebellion end of quote and sentenced him to military confinement during the war Judge Levitt of the United States Circuit Court denied a writ of habeas corpus in the case President Lincoln regretted the arrest but felt it imprudent to annul the action in the military tribunal conforming to a clause of Burnside's order he modified the sentence by sending Volandigum south beyond the Union military lines the affair created a great sensation and in a spirit of party protest the Ohio Democrats unanimously nominated Volandigum for governor Volandigum went to Richmond held a conference with the Confederate authorities and by way of Bermuda to Canada from whence he issued a political address the Democrats of both Ohio and New York took up the political and legal discussion with great heat and sent imposing committees to present long addresses to the president on the affair Mr. Lincoln made long written replies to both addresses of which only so much needs quoting here as concisely states his interpretation of his authority to suspend the privilege of the writ of the rabious corpus quote you ask in substance whether I really claim that I may override all the guaranteed rights of individuals on the plea of conserving the public safety when I may choose to say the public safety requires it this question divested of the phraseology calculated to represent me as struggling for an arbitrary personal prerogative is either simply a question who shall decide what nobody shall decide what the public safety does require in cases of rebellion or invasion the constitution contemplates the question is likely to occur for decision but it does not expressly declare who is to decide it by necessary implication when rebellion or invasion comes the decision is to be made from time to time and I think the man whom for the time the people have under the constitution made the commander and chief of their army and navy is the man who holds the power and bears the responsibility of making it if he uses the power justly the same people will probably justify him if he abuses it he is in their hands to be dealt with by all the modes they have reserved to themselves in the constitution end of quote forcible and convincing this legal analysis a single sympathetic phrase of the president's reply had a much greater popular effect quote must I shoot a simple-minded soldier boy who deserts while I must not touch a hair of a wily agitator who induces him to desert end of quote the term so accurately described the character of a landigum and the pointed query so touched the hearts of the union people and whose favorite soldier boys had volunteered to fill the union armies that it rendered powerless the crafty criticism of party diatribes the response of the people of Ohio was emphatic at the October election the landigum was defeated by more than 100,000 majority in sustaining the arrest of the landigum president Lincoln had acted not only within his constitutional correctly within his legal authority in the preceding march congress had passed an act legalizing all orders of this character made by the president at any time during the rebellion and accorded him full indemnity for all searches, seizures and arrests or imprisonments made under his orders the act also provided quote that during the present rebellion the president of the united states the judgment the public safety may require it is authorized to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in any case throughout the united states or any part thereof end of quote about the middle of September Mr. Lincoln's proclamation formally put the law in force to obviate any hindering or delaying the prompt execution of the draft law though valindigum and the democrats to prevent or even delay the draft they yet managed to enlist the sympathies and secure the adhesion of many uneducated and unthinking men by means of secret societies known as knights of the golden circle the order of american knights order of the star sons of liberty and by other equally high sounding names which they adopted and discarded in turn as one after the other was discovered and brought into undesired prominence the titles and grips and passwords of these secret military organizations the turgid eloquence of their meetings and the clandestine drill of their oath bound members doubtless exercised quite as much fascination on such followers as their unlawful object of aiding and abetting the southern cause the number of men thus enlisted in the work of inducing desertion leaders fomenting resistance to the draft furnishing the confederates with arms and conspiring to establish a north western confederacy in full accord with the south which formed the ultimate dream of their leaders is hard to determine valindigum the real head of the movement claimed five hundred thousand and judge halt in an official report adopted that as being somewhere near the truth though others counted them at a full million the government cognizant of their existence and able to produce abundant evidence against the ring leaders whenever it chose to do so wisely paid little heed to these dark lantern proceedings though as was perhaps natural military officers commanding the departments in which they were most numerous were inclined to look upon them more seriously and governor Morton of Indiana was much disquieted by their work in his state Mr. Lincoln's attitude toward them was one of good humored contempt nothing can make me believe that one hundred thousand Indiana Democrats are disloyal he said and maintained that there was more folly than crime in their acts indeed though prolific enough of oaths and reasonable utterances these organizations were singularly lacking in energy and initiative most of the attempts made against the public peace in the free states along the northern border came not from resident conspirators but from southern emissaries and their Canadian sympathizers and even these rarely rose above the level of ordinary arson and highway robbery Jacob Thompson who had been secretary of the interior under President Buchanan was the principal agent of the Confederate government in Canada where he carried on operations as remarkable for their impractic ability as for their malignity one plan during the summer of 1864 contemplated nothing less than seizing and holding the three great states of Illinois Indiana and Ohio with the aid of disloyal Democrats where upon it was opposed Missouri and Kentucky would quickly join them and make an end of the war becoming convinced when this project fell through that nothing could be expected he placed his reliance on Canadian sympathizers and turned his attention to liberating the Confederate prisoners confined on Johnson's Island in Sandusky Bay and at Camp Douglas near Chicago but both these elaborate schemes which embraced such magnificent details as capturing the war steamer Michigan on Lake Erie came to naught nor did the plans to burn St. Louis and New York and to destroy steamboats on the Mississippi River to which he also gave his sanction succeed much better a very few men were tried and punished for these and similar crimes despite the valuable protest of the Confederate government but the injuries he and his agents were able to inflict like the acts of the Knights of the Golden Circle on the American side of the border amounted merely to a petty annoyance and never reached the dignity of real menace to the government End of Chapter 25 Recording by John Leader Bloomington, Illinois Chapter 26 of A Short Life of Abraham Lincoln This is a LibriVox recording All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Recording by John Leader A Short Life of Abraham Lincoln by John G. Nicolet Chapter 26 Burnside Fredericksburg A Tangle of Cross Purposes Hooker succeeds Burnside Lincoln to Hooker Chancellorsville Lee's Second Invasion Lincoln's Criticisms of Hooker's Plans Hooker Relieved Mead Gettysburg Lee's Retreat Lincoln's Letter to Mead Lincoln's Gettysburg Address Autumn Strategy The Armies Go into Winter Quarters It was not without well-meditated reasons that Mr. Lincoln had so long kept McClellan in command of the Army of the Potomac. He perfectly understood that Generals' defects, his want of initiative, his hesitations, his delays, his never-ending complaints, but he had long foreseen the difficulty which would and did immediately arise when, on November 5, 1862, he removed him from command. Whom should he appoint as McClellan's successor? What officer would be willing and competent to play a better part? That important question had also long been considered. Several promising Generals had been consulted, who, as gracefully as they could, shrank from the responsibility even before it was formally offered them. The President finally appointed General Ambrose E. Burnside to the command. He was a West Point graduate, 38 years old, of handsome presence, brave and generous to a fault, and McClellan's intimate friend. He had won a favorable reputation in leading the expedition against Roanoke Island and the North Carolina coast, and, called to reinforce McClellan after the peninsula disaster, commanded the left wing of the Army of the Potomac at Antietam. He was not covetous in the honor now given him. He had already twice declined it and only now accepted the command as a duty under the urgent advice of members of his staff. His instincts were better than the judgment of his friends. A few brief weeks suffice to demonstrate what he had told them, that he, quote, was not competent to command a large army. End of quote. The very beginning of his work proved the truth of his self-criticism. Rejecting all the plans of campaign which were suggested to him, he found himself incapable of forming any very plausible or consistent one of his own. As a first move he concentrated his army opposite the town of Fredericksburg on the lower Rappahannock, but with such delays that generally had time to seize and strongly fortify the town and the important adjacent heights on the south bank. And when Burnside's army crossed on December 11th and made its main and direct attack on the formidable and practically impregnable Confederate entrenchments on the 13th, a crushing repulse and defeat of the Union forces with a loss of over ten thousand killed and wounded was the quick and direful result. It was in a spirit of stubborn determination rather than clear, calculated courage that he renewed his orders for an attack on the 14th, but, dissuaded by his division and corps commanders from the rash experiment, succeeded without further damage in withdrawing his forces on the night of the 15th to their old camps north of the river. In manly words his report of the unfortunate battle gave generous praise to his officers and men and assumed for himself all the responsibility for the attack and its failure. But its secondary consequences soon became irremediable. By that gloomy disaster Burnside almost completely lost the confidence of his officers and men and rumors soon came to the President that a spirit akin to mutiny pervaded the army. When information came that on the day after Christmas Burnside was preparing for a new campaign, the President telegraphed him. Quote, I have good reason for saying you must not make a general movement of the army without letting me know. End of quote. This naturally brought Burnside to the President for explanation and, after a frank and full discussion between them, Mr. Lincoln, on New Year's Day, wrote the following letter to General Hallick. Quote, General Burnside wishes to cross the Rappahannock with his army, but his Grand Division commanders all opposed the movement. In such a difficulty as this you do not help, you fail me precisely in the point for which I sought your assistance. You know what General Burnside's plan is, and it is my wish that you go with him to the ground, examine it as far as practicable, confer with the officers, getting their judgment and ascertaining their temper. In a word, gather all the elements for forming a judgment of your own, and then tell General Burnside that you do approve or that you do not approve his plan. Your military skill is useless to me if you will not do this. End of quote. Hallick's moral and official courage, however, failed the President in this emergency. He declined to give his military opinion and asked to be relieved from further duties as General-in-Chief. This left Mr. Lincoln no option and, still having need of the advice of his General-in-Chief on other questions, he endorsed on his own letter quote, withdrawn because considered harsh by General Hallick. End of quote. The complication, however, continued to grow worse, and the correspondence more strained. Burnside declared that the country had lost confidence in both the Secretary of War and the General-in-Chief. Also, that his own generals were unanimously opposed to again crossing the Rappahannock. Hallick, on the contrary, urged another crossing, but that it must be made on Burnside's own decision, plan, and responsibility. Upon this, the President, on January 8th, 1863, again wrote Burnside, quote, I understand General Hallick has sent you a letter of which this is a copy. I approve this letter. I deplore the want of concurrence with you in opinion by your general officers, and do not see the remedy. Be cautious, and do not understand that the governmental country is driving you. I do not yet see how I could profit by changing the command of the Army of the Potomac, and if I did, I should not wish to do it by accepting the resignation of your commission. Once more Burnside issued orders against which his generals protested, and which a storm turned into the fruitless and impossible mud-march before he reached the intended crossings of the Rappahannock. Finally, on January 23rd, Burnside presented to the President the alternative of either approving an order dismissing about a dozen generals, or accepting his own resignation, and Mr. Lincoln once more had before him the difficult task of finding a new commander for the Army of the Potomac. On January 25th, 1863, the President relieved Burnside and assigned Major General Joseph Hooker to duty as his successor, and in explanation of his action wrote him the following characteristic letter. I have placed you at the head of the Army of the Potomac. Of course I have done this upon what appeared to me to be sufficient reasons, and yet I think it best for you to know that there are some things in regard to which I am not quite satisfied with you. I believe you to be a brave and skillful soldier, which of course I like. I also believe you do not mix politics with your profession, in which you are right. You have confidence in yourself, which is a valuable, if not an indispensable quality. You are ambitious, which within reasonable bounds does good rather than harm. But I think that during General Burnside's command of the Army you have taken counsel of your ambition and thwarted him as much as you could, in which you did a great wrong to the country and to a most meritorious and honorable brother-officer. I have heard, in such a way as to believe it, of your recently saying that both the Army and the government needed a dictator. Of course it was not for this but in spite of it that I have given you the command. Only those generals who gain successes can set up dictators. One of you is military success and I will risk the dictatorship. The government will support you to the utmost of its ability, which is neither more nor less than it has done and will do for all commanders. I much fear that the spirit which you have aided to infuse into the Army of criticizing their commander and withholding confidence from him will now turn upon you. I shall assist you as far as I can to put it down. Nor Napoleon, if he were alive again, could get any good out of an Army while such a spirit prevails in it. And now beware of rashness. Beware of rashness, but with energy and sleepless vigilance go forward and give us victories." Perhaps the most remarkable thing in this letter is the evidence it gives how completely the genius of President Lincoln had by this, the middle of his presidential term, risen to the end of his great national duties and responsibilities. From beginning to end it speaks the language and breathes the spirit of the great ruler, secure in popular confidence and official authority, equal to the great emergencies that successively rose before him. Upon General Hooker its courteous praise and frank review, its generous trust and distinct note of fatherly warning, made a profound impression. He strove to redeem his past indiscretions by devoting himself with great zeal and energy to improving the discipline and morale of his army, recalling its absentees and restoring its spirit by increased drill and renewed activity. He kept the President well informed of what he was doing, and early in April submitted a plan of campaign on which Mr. Lincoln endorsed on the eleventh of that month. My opinion is that just now, with the enemy directly ahead of us, there is no eligible route for us into Richmond, and consequently a question of preference between the Rappahannock route and the James River route is a contest about nothing. Hence our prime object is the enemy's army in front of us, and is not with or about Richmond at all, unless it be incidental to the main object. End of quote. Having raised his effective force to 230,000 men and learning that Lee's army was weakened by detachments to perhaps half that number, Hooker, near the end of the month, prepared and executed a bold movement which, for a while, was attended with encouraging progress. Sending General Sedgwick with three army corps to make a strong demonstration and crossing below Fredericksburg, Hooker with his remaining four corps made a somewhat long and circuitous battle at which he crossed both the Rappahannock and the Rappahadon above the town without serious opposition, and on the evening of April 30th had his four corps at Chancellorsville, south of the Rappahannock, for months he could advance against the rear of the enemy. But his advantage of position was neutralized by the difficulties of the ground. He was in the dense and tangled forest known as the Wilderness, and the decision and energy of his brilliant and successful advance were suddenly succeeded by a spirit of hesitation and delay in which the evident and acknowledged chances of victory were gradually lost. The enemy found time to rally from his surprise and astonishment to gather a strong line of defense and finally to organize a counter-flank movement under Stonewall Jackson, which fell upon the rear of the Union right and created a panic in the eleventh corps. Sedgwick's force had crossed below and taken Fredericksburg. But the divided Union army could not affect a junction, and the fighting from May 1 to May 4 finally ended by the withdrawal of both sections of the Union army north of the Rappahannock. The losses suffered by the Union and the Confederate forces were about equal, but the prestige of another brilliant victory fell to General Lee, seriously balanced, however, by the death of Stonewall Jackson, who was accidentally killed by the fire of his own. In addition of his evident, very unusual diminution of vigor and will, Hooker had received a personal injury on the third, which, for some hours, rendered him incapable of command, and he said in his testimony before the committee on the conduct of the war, quote, When I returned from Chancellorsville I felt that I had fought no battle. In fact, I had more men than I could use, and I fought no general battle for the reason that I could not get my men in position to do so, probably not more than three or three-and-a-half corps on the right were engaged in the fight," end of quote. Hooker's defeat at Chancellorsville had not been so great a disaster as that of Burnside at Fredericksburg, and while his influence was greatly impaired, his usefulness did not immediately cease. The President and Secretary of War still had faith in him. The average opinion of his qualities has been tersely expressed by one of his critics who wrote, As an inferior, he planned badly and fought well. As a chief, he planned well and fought badly. The course of war soon changed so that he was obliged to follow rather than permitted to lead the developments of a new campaign. The brilliant victories gained by Lee inspired the Confederate authorities and leaders with a greatly exaggerated hope of the ultimate success of the rebellion. It was during the summer of 1863 that the Confederate armies reached, perhaps, their highest numerical strength and greatest degree of efficiency. Both the long dreamed-of possibility of achieving southern independence and the newly flushed military ardor of officers and men elated by what seemed to them an unbroken record of successes on the Virginia battlefields moved generally to the bold hazard of a second invasion of the North. Early in June Hooker gave it as his opinion that Lee intended to move against Washington and ask whether in that case he should attack the Confederate rear. To this, Lincoln answered on the fifth of that month, In case you find Lee coming to the north of the Repahonic I would by no means cross to the south of it. If he should leave a rear force at Fredericksburg and send you to fall upon it, it would fight in entrenchments and have you at disadvantage, and so, man for man, worst you at that point, while his main force would in some way be getting an advantage of you northward. In one word, I would not take any risk of being entangled upon the river, like an ox jumped half over a fence and liable to be torn by dogs front and rear without a fair chance to gore one way or kick the other. Five days later, Hooker, having become convinced that a large part of Lee's army was in motion toward the Shenandoah Valley, proposed the daring plan of a quick and direct march to capture Richmond, but the president immediately telegraphed him a convincing objection. Quote, If left to me, I would not go south to the Repahonic upon Lee's moving north of it. If you had Richmond invested today, you would not be able to take it in twenty days. Meanwhile, your communications and with them your army would be ruined. I think Lee's army and not Richmond is your true objective point. If he comes toward the Upper Potomac, follow on his flank and on his inside track, shortening your lines while he lengthens his. Fight him too when opportunity offers. If he stays where he is, fret him and fret him. End of quote. The movement north of Lee's army, effectually masked for some days by frequent cavalry skirmishes, now became evident to the Washington authorities. On June 14, Lee can telegraphed Hooker. Quote, So far as we can make out here, the enemy have Milroy surrounded at Winchester and Tyler at Martinsburg. If they could hold out a few days, could you help them? If the head of Lee's army is at Martinsburg and the tail of it on the Plank Road in Hendricksburg and Chancellorsville, the animal must be very slim somewhere. Could you not break him? End of quote. While Lee, without halting, crossed the Potomac above Harper's Ferry and continued his northward march into Maryland and Pennsylvania, Hooker prudently followed on the inside track, as Mr. Lincoln had suggested, interposing the Union army effectually to guard Washington and Baltimore. But at this point a long standing irritation and jealousy between Hooker and Halleck became so acute that on the general in chiefs refusing a comparatively minor request, Hooker asked to be relieved from command. The president, deeming divided counsel at so critical a juncture more hazardous than a change of command, took Hooker at his word and appointed General George G. Meade as his successor. Meade had, since Chancellorsville, been caustic a critic of Hooker as Hooker was a burnside at and after Fredericksburg. But all spirit of insubordination vanished in the exciting stress of a pursuing campaign, and the new and retiring leaders of the army of the Potomac exchanged compliments in general orders with high chivalric courtesy, while the army continued its northward march with undiminished ardor and unbroken step. When Meade crossed the Pennsylvania region, Lee was already far ahead, threatening Harrisburg. The Confederate invasion spread terror and loss among farms and villages and created almost a panic in the great cities. Under the president's call for one hundred thousand, six months militia, six of the adjoining states were sending hurried and improvised forces to the banks of the Susquehanna under the command of General Couch. Lee, finding that stream Meade turned his course directly east, which, with Meade marching to the north, brought the opposing armies into inevitable contact and collision at the town of Gettysburg. Meade had both expected and carefully prepared to receive the attack and fight a defensive battle on the line of Pipe Creek. But when, on the afternoon of July 1st, 1863, the advanced attachments of each army met and engaged in a fierce conflict for the possession of the town, Meade, on learning the nature of the fight and the situation of the ground, instantly decided to accept it and, ordering forward his whole force, made it the principle and most decisive battlefield of the whole war. The Union troops made a violent and stubborn effort to hold the town of Gettysburg, but the early Confederate arrivals taking position in a half circle on the west, north, and east drove them through and out of it. The seeming reverse proved an advantage. Half a mile to the south it enabled the Union detachments to seize and establish themselves on Cemetery Ridge and Hill. This, with several rocky elevations and a crest of boulders making a curve to the east at the northern end, was in itself almost a natural fortress and, with the entretements thrown up by the expert veterans, soon became nearly impregnable. Beyond a wide valley to the west and parallel with it lay Cemetery Ridge on which the Confederate army established itself with equal rapidity. Lee had also hoped to fight a defensive battle but thus suddenly arrested in his eastward march in a hostile country could not afford to stand still and wait. On the morning of July 2 commanding generals were in the field. After careful studies and consultations Lee ordered an attack on both the extreme right and extreme left of the Union position meeting some success in the former but a complete repulse in the latter. That night, Meade's Council of War coinciding with his own judgment resolved to stand and fight it out while Lee against the advice of Longstreet his ablest general decision determined to risk the chance of a final and determined attack. It was Meade who began the conflict at dawn on the morning of July 3 but only long enough to retake and hold the entrenchments on his extreme right which he had lost the evening before. Then, for some hours an ominous lull and silence fell over the whole battlefield. But these were hours of stern preparation. At midday a furious cannonade began from 130 Confederate guns on Seminary Ridge which was answered with promptness and spirit by about 70 Union guns from the crests and among the boulders of Cemetery Ridge and the deafening roar of artillery lasted for about an hour at the end of which time the Union guns ceased firing and were allowed to cool and to be made ready to meet the assault that was sure to come. There followed a period of waiting then in its intense expectancy. And then across the broad, undulating and highly cultivated valley swept along attacking line of 17,000th Rebel infantry the very flower of the Confederate army. But it was a hopeless charge. Thinned almost mowed down by the grape-shot of the Union batteries and the deadly aim of the Union riflemen behind their rocks and entrenchments the Confederate assault wavered, hesitated, struggled on and finally melted away before the destructive fire. A few Rebel battle flags reached the crest only, however, to fall and their bearers and supporters to be made prisoners. The Confederate dream of taking Philadelphia and dictating peace and separation in Independence Hall was over forever. It is doubtful whether Lee immediately realized the full measure of his defeat or mead the magnitude of his victory. The terrible losses of the battle of Gettysburg over 3,000 killed, 14,000 wounded and 5,000 captured or missing of the Union army and 2,600 killed, 12,000 wounded and 5,000 missing of the Confederates largely occupied the thoughts and labors of both sides during the national holiday which followed. It was a surprise to mead that on July 5 the Confederate army had disappeared, retreating as rapidly as might be to the neighborhood of Harper's Ferry. Unable immediately to cross because the Potomac was swollen by heavy rains and mead having followed and arrived in Lee's front on July 10, President Lincoln had the liveliest hopes that mead would again attack and capture or destroy the Confederate army. Generous praise for his victory and urgent suggestions to renew his attack and end the rebellion had gone to mead from the President and General Halleck. But mead hesitated and his Council of War objected, and on the night of July 13 Lee recrossed the Potomac in retreat. When he heard the news Mr. Lincoln sat down and wrote a letter of criticism and disappointment which reflects the intensity of his feeling at the escape of Lee. The case, summarily stated, is this. You fought and beat the enemy at Gettysburg and, of course, to say the least, his loss was as great as yours. He retreated and you did not, as it seemed to me, pressingly pursue him. But a flood in the river detained him till, by slow degrees, you were again upon him. You had at least twenty thousand veteran troops directly with you and as many more raw ones reporting distance, all in addition to those who fought with you at Gettysburg, while it was not possible that he had received a single recruit and yet you stood and let the flood run down, bridges be built and the enemy move away at his leisure without attacking him. Again, my dear General, I do not believe you appreciate the magnitude of the misfortune involved in Lee's escape. He was within your easy grasp upon him would, in connection with our other late successes, have ended the war. As it is, the war will be prolonged indefinitely. If you could not safely attack Lee last Monday, how can you possibly do so south of the river when you could take with you very few more than two-thirds of the force you then had in hand? It would be unreasonable to expect and I do not expect that you can now affect much. Your golden opportunity is gone and I am distressed immeasurably because of it." Clearly, as Mr. Lincoln had sketched in deeply as he felt Lee's fault of omission, so quick was the President's period of forgiveness and so thankful was he for the measure of success which had been gained that he never signed or sent the letter. Two memorable events are forever linked with the Gettysburg victory. The surrender of Vicksburg to grant on the same 4th of July, described in the next chapter, and the dedication of the Gettysburg battlefield as a national cemetery for Union soldiers on November 19, 1863, on which occasion President Lincoln crowned that imposing ceremonial with an address of such literary force, brevity and beauty that critics have assigned it a high rank among the world's historic orations. He said, Four score and seven years ago our fathers brought forth on this continent a new nation conceived in liberty and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal. Now we are engaged in a great civil war testing whether that nation or any nation so conceived and so dedicated can long endure. We are met on a great battlefield of that war. We have come to dedicate a portion of that field as a final resting place for those who here gave their lives that that nation might live. It is altogether fitting and proper that we should do this. But in a larger sense we cannot dedicate, we cannot consecrate, we cannot hallow this ground. The brave men living and dead who struggle here have consecrated it far above our poor power to add or detract. The world will little note no longer remember what we say here, but it can never forget what they did here. It is for us, the living, rather, to be dedicated here to the unfinished work which they who fought here have thus far so nobly advanced. It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us, and on these honored dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion. That we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain, that this nation under God shall have a new birth of freedom, and that government of the people by the people for the people shall not perish from the earth. Having safely crossed the Potomac, the Confederate Army continued its retreat without halting familiar camps in Central Virginia it had so long and valiantly defended. Mead followed with alert but prudent vigilance, but did not again find such chances as he lost on the Fourth of July, or while the swollen waters of the Potomac held his enemy as in a trap. During the ensuing autumn months there went on between the opposing generals an unceasing game of strategy, a succession of moves and countermoves in which the opposing commanders handled their great armies with the same consummate skill with which the expert fencing master uses his foil, but in which neither could break through the other's guard. Repeated minor encounters took place which, in other wars, would have raided as heavy battles, but the weeks lengthened into months without decisive results, and when the opposing armies finally went into winter quarters in December 1863 they again confronted each other across the Rapidan in Virginia, not very far south of where they lay in the winter of 1861.