 Right. Well, welcome everybody. Good evening. You're welcome. Very, very welcome. A big welcome on behalf of the British Commission for Maritime History to this. The final Kings Maritime History seminar of 2021, organized as you know by the British Commission for Maritime History, but with the support of the Society for Nautical Research and Lloyds register and hosted by the Lawton Naval Summit here in the Department of War Studies and as part of the Sir Michael Howard Center for the History of War, all at Kings College London. Thank you all for joining and such numbers, again, on line with any luck with this new variants, we will be able to proceed as planned in the new year by meeting in a room, and with a glass of wine that I can share rather than just have to to myself. But I'm hoping also that when we do that will be able to take advantage continue to take advantage of the online format and one of the benefits of that is, of course, that we can have people from overseas join us and I'm really pleased to say that tonight. We have Alan Anderson with us. You might recognize him. He's spoken to us to this group before seems to me if memory serves correctly somebody had stolen one of the cables that connected the computer to the projector or something like that we couldn't see your slides if. We won't have that problem tonight because we met earlier with practice everything's ready to go. And Alan is a former PhD student and graduates of the Department of War, War Studies here at Kings works on the laws of naval warfare and strategy in Britain and 1899 to 1909. He makes most of his filthy looker. He pays for his private library, I think, as an attorney, but we can forgive that because he's also teaches military history at March University in the United States and today. We have a focus on 1909 the conference in London. The effect of that and the difficulties I think that it encountered so it's with the great thanks that I hand over to you Alan. Well, thank you Alan. You who have a glass of wine. I just have a bottle of water, which is kind of there and gone from my background but and as I told Alan my unfortunately my background is not my library. It's the library which Anyway, I am going to hopefully if this works well share my screen and give you my talk with the benefit of some slides PowerPoint slides. Today, if you have any questions along the way if you don't want to wait until the end. I'm going to raise your hand using the little function at the bottom of your screen, and we'll try to answer them. Otherwise, hopefully if I do the timing correctly there will be time at the end for some question and answers. So, without further ado, let me see if I can do this and share the screen. And there is that working. Alan. Yes, it is. Excellent. So, I am going to be talking about the London naval conference of 1909 and the last chance of regulating naval warfare. The 1909 London naval conference was the last of the three major international conferences. The first being the pre First World War, the first being the 1899 hate conference followed by the 1907 hate conference and then the London naval conference of 1909. All of them, in one form or another addressed questions relating to the law of naval warfare. And this was the very last one. So, I'm going to start sort of near the end, actually, and see if I can go there we go. So, June 24, 1914. Imperial Germany told England that it had accepted in essentials the new proposals of the British government relating to two phrases that had been an issue between the two governments, since the 1909 conference declaration had been signed. There was a lot of back and forth and give and take Imperial Germany said, Well, we've accepted it. So, Arthur, Arthur Zimmerman, the acting Secretary of State for foreign affairs asked England to confirm that it would now ratify the declaration. This was a significant diplomatic achievement for Britain. It had been trying for more than five years to obtain ratification of the declaration. The other signatories to the declaration had agreed to the terms except for these two phrases that were in dispute between Britain and Imperial Germany. England had asked and wanted the pronouncement on the agreed principles of international naval law, and it seemed like they had achieved it. So the question is, how did they get to this parent diplomatic breakthrough, why did it takes a long and what happened after that. And that's what I hope to explore very briefly today. And I will tell you that on a lot of the topics, you know, we can do a deep dive as we go along here because there's a lot of back stories and, and things like that that were involved. So this is a to a great extent a somewhat superficial review. And last question like that, you know, I'm certain that I would be that we could go on for hours and hours and hours and Alan would have to consume the entire bottle of wine that he has, in order to get to the end but, you know, that way, but that may not be the best thing for for Alan at least. So, where did the, going to start with how the 1909 London naval conference came about. And where rose, because Britain was unable to conclude an agreement at the 1907 hate conference on subjects of blockade and contraband. Those were critical issues for Britain and the Admiralty at the 1907 hate conference. There was an agreement identifying specific items as either absolute contraband. Those are items that clearly have military uses that are subject to be seized, whether at sea, they're being in ship, being shipped, or conditional contraband. There are other items that may or may not be of military value. And it was a real issue, because at the in the 1904 1905, Russia, Japanese war. Russia had declared as contraband items that for many, many years had been thought to be not absolute contraband raw materials such as cotton, which of course was a big thing for British industry. And so England wanted to have an agreement on specific items of absolute contraband, and it also had questions regarding the scope of a blockade, how, you know, far out from a port, could a blockade be conducted and be considered effective. That was a major issue and then lastly there was the doctrine of continuous voyage, which first came out of the 18th century, the doctrine basically that if you're a ship in your but you're carrying products to a neutral port, but then going to go from the neutral port is your first port of call to a an enemy port. And it's still subject to seizure because they're going to look at what's the continuous voyage. Now during the American Civil War that doctrine had been expanded in in US courts to include that even if you unloaded the products at a neutral port but then they were going to be trans shipped by land to the enemy. They would still be subject to seizure so they wanted to have a clear definition of the concept of continuous voyage. Britain as I said, indicate here they wanted to abolish conditional contraband, but at least get the agreed list of what was or was not contraband, because that was important to Britain's trade. If they were a neutral, and I should point out that Britain at this time thought that if there was any future European conflict, chances are they were going to be a neutral, as opposed to a belligerent. There's more historical background. This is the group picture at the 1899 hate conference, and having looked at this extensively, there's Jackie Fisher in the back. I'm quite confident of that. He was the British technical Royal Nate technical naval delegate. Interestingly, despite looking at this over and over again I have not been able to identify Alfred Thayer. I'm a hand, who was a corresponding technical counterpart, naval counterpart for the United States delegation, the US delegation, I don't know if you can see my pointer here but there are the other four members are right here in the front row, but not. Here is the group picture for the 1907 hate conference. I put these up in part because for the 1909 London naval conference I have not been able to find any group portrait or photograph that was taken during the conference, which kind of tells you, you know how little it was considered to be significant at the time, although I think it was much more significant. So anyway, during the 1907 hate conference in September 1907. And keep in mind that the hate conference had been ongoing since June so it had been going on a long time, much longer than it was anticipated. Admiral Otley, who was the British naval delegate told the Foreign Office that look, we can probably work out a deal with Imperial Germany, but it's going to be too late to get all the necessary questions everyone attending. And so he wanted approval to tell delegates from the principal naval powers that blockade and a couple of other topics, all relating just to naval issues would be discussed at a small conference in London in the spring of 1908. The reaction at the Foreign Office and this is a picture of Edward Gray was, you know, we're sick and tired of all these conferences and so we'd really like to work this out now. At the same time, you know they recognize that this was an important issue because this was important, you know how blockade would be described or defined or limited was it would otherwise be left for determination by the International Prize Court, a convention on which had been agreed previously at the 1907 hate conference. It was an important issue. And even though they were tired of conferences, you know, Gray was like okay, we can, you know, continue on later. At the conference in 1907 Germany had tied agreement on blockade and contraband to abolition of the doctrine of continuous voyage. It wanted it completely abolished. And the first reason for that is they realized that in any future continental war, where they were going to be able to continue to get have trade is through neutral ports in the Netherlands or Belgium. It also wanted to limit the area in which a merchant ship trying to avoid a blockade could be seized. And to, you know, say that basically if it's carrying contraband but heading for a neutral port next to a blockade report can't stop it. So they wanted they went to what they wanted at the conference, obviously very significant positions for Imperial Germany that would favor it in any future war. And finally the Admiralty, oh by the way, back here at this slide, that is Bill Helm, the second in the uniform of a Royal Navy Admiral the fleet. The monarchies in Europe at the time were very fond of giving each other honorary ranks and positions in their militaries and Bill Helm the second very much enjoyed dressing up in uniforms you can see him wearing the ribbon of the order of the garter there. Anyway, the Admiralty wanted to be able to seize a new ship carrying contraband anywhere within an area of 800 miles of blockaded port. That was and they view that as a real concession. In the Admiralty's view, international law at the time enabled them to capture a vessel, even at Yokohama it's in Japan. If the vessel was proceeding to a European blockaded port. So it didn't matter how far away they were they could seize a vessel halfway, almost the entire way around the world. And this is Reginald McKenna, who was the first Lord of the Admiralty at the time. However, Gray decided to defer further attempts to reach an agreement. Because he wanted an understanding on those subjects that would be clear because under Article seven of the International Prize Court Convention. If there wasn't an applicable treaty, then the prize court would apply rules of international law. And if there was no generally recognized rule in existence. There was a judgment according to general principles of justice and equity, and Britain did not want to leave this very important subject open for interpretation by some international prize court, they wanted a generally recognized rule. So they knew what the ground rules would be in any future war. So, having deferred discussion and agreement. These naval issues at the 1907 Hague Conference which finally adjourned in October of 1907. In February of 1908, Britain invited nine major sea powers to a conference in London. And the nine powers were Austria, Hungary, France, Germany. Great Britain, of course, Italy, Japan, Russia, Spain, and the United States. Now, later on, the Netherlands. They were invited to play in because they asked, hey, we should be invited. We've always been considered, we already consider ourselves a major sea power. The US said sure invite them so Britain said okay fine. So there were 10 countries then that attended the conference. The conference Britain asked all of them to send us a memorandum on what the correct rule of international law was in eight maritime warfare topics so it was more than just the two or three, plus blockade that oddly had first raised back in September of 1907. Those that eight topics were rules relating to contraband blockade, the doctrine of continuous voyage. The destruction of neutral vessels prior to condemnation by a prize court rules relating to neutral ships or persons rendering unneutral service. The nationality of converting merchant ships to warships, the transfer of merchant ships from a belligerent state to a neutral flag during or anticipation of hostilities, and whether the nationality or domicile of the owner of a vessel should be the the dominant the dominant factor in deciding whether property was enemy property subject to seizure. Germany responded but said, hey, we think we ought to work toward a treaty on a greed treaty in Germany asked the United States to agree to this approach. Now, I think they asked they assume that the US would agree because the US had worked very closely and had cooperated with Germany on a number of issues at the 1907 hey conference, such that great Britain viewed the US as increasingly allied with Imperial Germany. However, somewhat surprisingly, at least for Imperial Germany, the US said, yeah, we're not going to even respond on this to your request for our positions. See our naval war court of 1903, which had not been enforced since 1905. But that's all we're going to do. Every other country except for Spain sent in a memorandum of their positions ultimately. Russia also preferred creating treaties to establish laws but Great Britain insisted that what it wanted was a statement of here's what the recognized naval law is that everyone is in agreement with, even if we've got to make some modifications to those rules. That was the, you know, the ground, if you will, the foundation for calling the conference to start. So, December four 1908. The conference is opened in London with what was described as a rather colorless speech by gray. A week later it adjourns for the holiday period until 11 January, and then it starts up again and it finishes finally on February 26. Rear Admiral Edmund Slate, he is one of England's delegates. He thinks that the US is going to support England's views. But he thought that Germany was going to take a very uncompromising attitude, and would give Great Britain a great deal of trouble. He was wrong. He was wrong. This by the way is Slade here in the corner has a very interesting mustache I don't know if you can see but he's wax the ends out to points. It's a little bit different than your normal handlebar mustache they're not curled. They're just straight out. Anyway, the US delegation, which is rear Admiral Charles Stockton and George Wilson an international law professor. Go into the conference with no specific instructions on most issues. As a result, the US turns out to be the biggest impediment throughout the 1909 naval conference. They have to ask for directions back from the United States at every, every time something comes up. And sometimes that results in a change in position where they would have said in the conference well we believe that this is our position and so this is what we think. You know the couple of days later they say oops sorry, we have a different position. The US is very adamant that it's not going to give up the doctrine of continuous voyage, not going to give it up at all. This is also as we talked about as I mentioned an important issue for Britain, but for the US they are just absolute forget it. We're going to give up the doctrine of continuous voyage in any any way shape or form. Interestingly, Germany is willing to agree to England's proposed lists of absolute and contraband absolute conditional contraband, but it wants England to give up continuous voyage. And that obviously would be a significant concession for England, indeed Slade recognizes that that's going to, if we're belligerent in a future war. It's going to prevent us from stopping German trade by sea because it's going to continue through neutral Belgian and Dutch ports. But he concludes that you know the doctor really isn't that worth isn't worth that much to us because it really isn't going to impact the enemy that much. And second, in the South African war, Britain's experiences militated against it now during the South African war. Britain had taken a very aggressive stand or position on the doctrine of continuous voyage. Both of neutral ships were heading toward neutral ports around the edges of the Boer republics and they seized both American and German vessels under the doctrine of continuous voyage, and that resulted in a really significant diplomatic row between Britain and the United States. It got to the point where the US is basically saying, look, you either stop this or else. Germany was sending all sorts of very strongly worded diplomatic messages, ultimately Britain had to back off and stop their aggressive use of the doctrine of continuous voyage so, given that experience. They had to fight against it and by the same token in the Russian Japanese war. Among other things there had been a lot of consternation when Russia declared various products that had long thought to be not subject to seizure as contraband conditional contraband. They declared a lot of products, which the British economy depended on as contraband subject to seizure. And so Slade recognizes this and determines, you know, this isn't that significant of a benefit to us. And so Britain and Germany reach an understanding on what's contraband in terms of absolute and conditional, and they agree to eliminate the doctrine of continuous, continuous voyage should be except for absolute contraband. And that's, you know, seems a reasonable splitting of the baby if you will, it was conditional contraband there's no doctrine of continuous voyage but if it's absolute contraband, it's subject to seizure, even if it's only ultimately going to get to into the hands of the enemy. So it seems like they've got a deal. Everything's going to go through swimmingly, except for the US, the US refuses to agree. And they refuse to agree, even if it risks breaking up the entire conference. And they're warned, look, this is going to ruin the US reputation, if it maintains its position. And the American delegate, Admiral Stockton, who pleads with the Secretary of State to look except this contraband compromise because continuous voyage isn't that big of a deal for blockade. But conditional contraband is secondary and occasional, you know, the German British compromise is conditional contraband is not subject to the doctrine of continuous voyage. And he points out that hey, this is going to be a real value to the US in terms of its trade as a neutral in any future war, because that's where we're going to be as a neutral trading, and we want to be able to have our ships sending and trading at neutral ports, and so that's going to be important to us. Finally, after much, you know, you know, sort of discussion, the US finally concedes says okay fine will agree to this when Stockton makes the announcement, there's great applause, everyone thinks okay finally we're going to get this declaration done, but it doesn't happen. The US continues to nitpick on wording on various parts of the declaration. Slade writes in his diary, the Americans are impossible and there is a strong probability of the wrecking everything so there is no love loss between the US and Britain, as the conference seems to be grinding to a dissolution with nothing no agreement being reached. And there's various issues that are being nitpicked by the US. Finally, Gray meets with the US ambassador to the court of St. James in mid February 1909, and basically says look, make a deal here. You know, we can work through any other issues just between us, but let's get this deal done. And so finally, they signed the declaration concerning the laws of maritime war on February 26. This is a not a treaty, it is not a, here's what we think the laws of naval warfare are, or should be, or excuse me what they should what they should be. This is what everyone here, these 10 C major C powers have agreed that the rule the laws of maritime warfare are. It's a big deal. Internally in England the Admiralty views the results favorably and I should say that there has been a lot of research and a lot of things written suggesting that the Foreign Office and Gray hoodwink the Admiralty that the Admiralty really wasn't in favor of the declaration. And all sorts of things that there was all sorts of skull duggery and that the Foreign Office, you know sabotage the Admiralty's position on my research, I think that is simply incorrect. The Admiralty went in to the conference, eyes wide open, they understood what the issues were, they did a careful analysis of what the benefits were to various positions. At the end of the day, they realized that they had to balance much more than had been in previously the case they had to balance the role of Britain as a belligerent in warfare versus Britain as a neutral in warfare. And so, unlike even 10 years earlier at the 1899 paid conference, where the Admiralty's views were very much on the world called pro belligerent side of the, of the stadium. In 1909, after the South African war and the Russian Japanese war they realized that look we have to balance our, our views with what we would want if we're neutral, because again as I mentioned, they viewed it, the most like that they're that Britain's position in the next continental war would be as a neutral. So the Admiralty is favorite views the results favorably the director of naval intelligence views it as favorably the Admiralty secretary is very effusive. And he wrote that we gain as a neutral and as a belligerent we lose something. You know, we actually gain, because we've got a clear definition of what the, what our powers are under national law, and what we'll be able to do is against neutral trade with an enemy. Without having difficulties arise, which happened in South Africa that that those experiences are really out you know hang in there and they're quite quite a role in what they're determining. So, the Admiralty is very happy about this. The foreign secretary is very positive about it. He congratulates the delegation on what has been achieved. And, you know, on the critical issues, there was an agreed itemization of what absolute and conditional contraband is, you know, by product. In conditional contraband and in contraband that was not subject to seizure Britain had gotten basically everything at one in terms of raw materials not being subject to seizure food, not being subject to seizure. And that was a, that was important to Britain because of course most of the food is important. And they also have to keep on getting in the raw materials for British industry continuous voyage. And unless that is, you know, no longer or is abrogated, but it's still applicable to absolute contraband. So the worst, if you will materials products that are clearly of military value, still subject to seizure under continuous voyage doctor. So, in order to blockade the scope of an effective blockade is a very vague into, you know, I'm, I'm not good at French so I'm certain I'm going to mispronounce this the rayon Dachshund is basically the scope of an effective blockade which is it's just basically the reason their area of action it's elastic. It varies according to circumstances so unlike basically when the Admiralty thought if we agree to 800 miles as a limit. That's a big concession, they get a vague phrase, which is going to vary. And so it could be in some instances, you know, a couple hundred miles or it could be 1000 miles. You know, however, the, the blockade ships or the blockade line is running. And it means that you don't really have to have that many ships if you've got a naval vessel cruising back and forth, you know 900 miles outside of a potential port. That's going to be enough to, to if you run into a neutral vessel to be able to seize it and see what's going on. So, you know, on paper this seems to be a really good result for England. Other nations agree. The General Board of the Navy approves the declaration. The US Congress approve ratifies the International Prize Court Convention. They approve the declaration of London. But President Taft doesn't sign it because everybody's waiting to make sure that all of the other nations ratified as well. So it's kind of in limbo, at least in the United States as of 1912. In Britain, however, there's a lot of criticism. And this is my pitch for the Corbett 100 project that the department is doing. The critics claim that the declaration unduly restricts England's rights as a belligerent unreasonably limits neutral rights and expands belligerent rights to the detriment of Britain's ability to maintain its food supply during war. Now Corbett, pre the start of the 1907 Hague Conference had written an article that was published in a edited volume that Mahan edited basically arguing against any rules that would limit Britain's maritime warfare rights. The big, the primary criticism comes from Maurice Hankey, who writes a number of papers, suggesting that the 1909 declaration is bad. That results in the counter arguments by members of the British delegation who reviewed it. Desart says no, this isn't true. So there's a lot of back and forth. My own analysis is that Hankey was just trying to gain political points in the debate. Ultimately, however, ratification in Britain falls victim to the concert of House of Lords. There was a veto ratification and it occurred after passage of the Parliament Act of 1911, which removed their ability to veto money bills. But despite that, despite that occurring, England keeps trying to gain acceptance. The focus shifts to let's get agreement from Germany, because everybody else is basically fine with it. And they're not going to, you know, you know, object, if we get a kind of a, if we work out a deal with Germany on the two remaining areas of issue. There's no meaning of the scope and interpretation of the phrases and I'm not going to try it in French, but it's a fortified place in base in article 34 of the declaration that article presumes that conditional contraband is destined for use by the enemy, which would make it subject to the seizure if it's consigned to a fortified place belonging to the enemy or other place serving as a base for the armed forces of the enemy. And that is an issue for Great Britain, because so many of its naval bases are right next to ports, trading ports where there's a lot of neutral trade. And so they're concerned that unless they've got a clear understanding with Germany of what those two phrases mean. They're right under the declaration start seizing vessels that are, you know, heading for the neutral side of the port as opposed to the naval base side. And that's what goes back and forth. And I will tell you that over the years between 1911 and 1912 and then the late June of 1914. There is a lot of back and forth. There was a interpretation Germany comes back, Germany proposed an interpretation Britain says no and comes back, it is back and forth back and forth over the years. Until finally in on June 27. They reach a deal, they reach an agreement, and it is the agreement that Britain have or the interpretation that Britain has proposed. So Britain seems happy. Germany is now satisfied. It's like, great, this is now finally Britain is going to get or obtain what it set out to achieve in the 1909 London naval conference. A clear agreed statement by the major sea powers of here's the laws of naval warfare, as they exist. Not something that we need to have treaties about. That is, you know, basically generally accepted international law that will govern naval warfare. However, for those of you who were perceptive to pick up that the agreement was reached on June 27 of 1914. Very quickly overcome by events, the very next day, June 28, when Franz Ferdinand that air to the Austro Hungarian throne is assassinated in Sarajevo. A pitch for the Austrian military museum in Vienna. The photograph of the actual car he was writing in which miraculously survived both the first and second World War is on display in the Austrian military museum in Vienna. This is rarely visited. I have been fortunate enough to be there several times. And there's generally nobody around. And if you pretend you don't speak English very or speak German, you can take a lot of pictures. This is a photograph the actual car there's actually two bullet holes where bullets entered, as you can see, you can see one is there. Another one is right there in the door, but Franz Ferdinand is assassinated along with his wife. Initially, no one thinks it's going to be a big deal. In fact, the first story about it in the times of London is buried in the paper. To the extent there are new stories about it. Everyone's basically saying gee this is really too bad for the Archduke and his kids. They're now all orphans, but nobody thinks it's going to be a big deal. However, you know, they're starting things start to move. There are miscalculations and foolish decisions made pretty much everywhere in the capitals of Europe. By July 30, the Foreign Office realizes that hey this is getting to be really serious here and so it tells the Admiralty look, we need to get this thing. It's been enacted. It was going to be done through the Naval Prize Procedure Bill. We got to do this right away or else we're going to miss this opportunity, but unfortunately, it doesn't happen. The looming World War dooms further action and implementation of the Declaration of London. However, that's not the end of the story for the declaration. So three days after Great Britain declares war on Germany, the United States sends a diplomatic note to the main bligerence Austria, Hungary, Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain and Russia and says hey, are you going to adhere to the rules of the Declaration of London during the war. I want to know, because the US now want some certainty is what the rules of the game are going to be. France immediately says much, much really to England surprise, sure. Austria, Hungary and Germany say, we'll adhere to it if everybody else adheres to it. So it seems like, yeah, it's still going to the Declaration of London is still going to have some vitality, despite the existence of the war. However, and this is what's, you know, interesting is, even though they had been working so hard for this declaration and for its, you know, implementation. They're like, geez, I don't know and they first put off the US and basically say we're thinking about it. There's a lot of debate about how they're going to what they're going to do. And finally, on August 19, they have a conference. Great foreign minister. Head of the Home Secretary Winston Churchill is First Lord of the Admiralty others from those departments and they discuss what they're going to do in terms of adhering or not adhering to the Declaration of London and they decide that well we'll adhere to it except we're going to make some changes on the issues of conditional contraband basically forget what we agreed that the doctrine of continuous voyage is gone for conditional contraband. And we're going to throw into the scope of conditional contraband products that we previously had wanted to be not contraband and not subject to seizure, and we're going to modify what a blockade is in terms of being enforceable. And so there is an announcement of the Crown and Council, and then Britain formally tells the US, well, we're going to, they try to put a good spin on it, we're going to generally adopt the rules of the Declaration of London. So big to certain modifications and additions which we think are indispensable to the efficient conduct of our naval operations to say that the US didn't appreciate the responses and understatement. There is a diplomatic note in the US archives, which is very strongly worded, even for diplomatic language object Germany objects, not surprisingly because, you know, they thought that they were in good shape under the declaration. So they object but England says nope, nope, we're going to have these modifications. What occurs over the next two years or nearly two years of the First World War is that when Germany starts to violate the laws of warfare on land. Britain retaliates by saying okay, we're going to change the rules of naval warfare. We're basically cutting back further on the declaration of London, and it is a tit for tat back and forth over the next two years into finally in July of 1916. England says, that's it, we're not going to follow any of the provisions of the Declaration of London at all. It's done. And that was the end of of it in terms of, you know, it's vitality in the First World War. Let me conclude from this very brief overview. I think first that the Declaration of London was a hard fought consensus on the laws of naval warfare as they existed at that time they provides a real picture of what the major sea powers at least thought the laws of maritime warfare were in 1909, and they were unanimously approved. They were approved for ratification despite internal political concerns because in the country, because there's really everyone for an office Admiralty, the government says this is going to be favorable for us in the long run. But ratification is overtaken by the assassination of Franz Ferdinand as Europe blunders into war. And even the first one war the US position on the declaration is much like its current position on the UN Convention on the law of the sea. It's not ratified but most of it is accepted as customary international law. Arguably, the US position is hey, this is customary international law that's been accepted because everyone's agreed to it. And they asked why they asked for everyone to say to confirm that they're going to comply with its terms, but it doesn't happen. So once war starts the declaration statements of generally accepted principles of naval warfare fail due to the inherent uncertainties and vicissitudes of war. No belligerent is willing to even appear to tie it all its Navy's hands in the conduct of naval warfare, certainly Britain backs away because they're concerned about what's going to happen in the war. So in this respect, I would say that the declaration is an underappreciated predictor of the eventual failure of the far more ambitious international naval conferences in London and in Washington in the interwar years which attempted even more more significant issues of disarmament. And the conclusion then is that it's easy to accept relatively easy to accept limitations in the conduct of war in the abstract. It's much more difficult when armed conflict looms on the horizon, or is actually a risen. Thank you. And wow, I think my timing is pretty well perfect. I'm pleased with that. So, I'm now going to stop screen sharing. I think your timing was impeccable. Yeah, and I've got a question I see. Yes, that's really in Stafford so what I'm going to do is give him permission to talk. Ian, you might want to ask your question you can even turn your camera on a few, if you like, should be on. Oh, there we are you're coming. Go ahead we see your name not your face but but we can hear you. Sorry, I would assume my camera would have come on automatically. I don't want to be too, too picky but I am intrigued as to what what the House Lords was voting on because, although you've used the term modification what happens in the houses of parliament is not ratification. To my knowledge, the Ponsonby rule which says the government does not normally proceed to ratification if the document laid before the House is voted down within so many days but that the doctrine came in in the 1920s so I'm rather slightly miffed whether it was just a resolution that the government decided not to proceed on, in which case the parliament tax would have been of relevance one way or the other. You are quite right and if my memory serves correctly what they were actually voting on was the naval prize bill. That embody the principles of the Declaration of London. And that's why later on, after there was agreement, there was the rush to try to get the naval prize bill enacted that I mentioned in 1914. But it was the, I mean interestingly the naval prize bill was that was what was being debated. The Admiralty had gone ahead and had created a new manual for naval prices for the Royal Navy. And then when the prize bill came up, it was the House of Lords that that was the problem that was the issue that seemed to kill it at the time but the government pressed on. That's your question. Yeah, and the other one was whether the treaty was meant to be only come into effect if everybody ratified. No, but very quickly, it was clear that, you know, no one was going to ratify it or put it into effect unless everybody put it into effect. And I say everybody, it was that everyone was looking at the real players here, Britain and England. That was what was, you know, Britain in England said okay fine we've got a deal, everyone else is going to say okay great. Because I think everyone realized that that was where this was really going to come into play for the US as I said, they were like great. And it was all ready it was just waiting for the president to sign off. Okay, and there's another question from Neil Datsun who I will give permission to speak if you'd like. Hello, can you hear me. Yes, sir. Unfortunately, my mind is very unstable I keep on losing. So I may have missed something. Can you hear me, I get the impression from the talk Alan that the principle of the, shall we say the British negotiating position from 1999 to 1914 was it anticipated being a neutral in any conflict. When it came up to the start line. They, you know, it was a kind of national backtracking thing. Oh well hang on we're not neutrals after all. We've really just got to work to our own advantage. Would you get your comments on that if, if you could hear me better than I can hear you. Sorry. I've got my volume turned up so can you can you hear me sir. Yeah, I just sometimes. Okay, unfortunately, blame it on the the ethers between England and the United States presently, maybe it's COVID related. Anyway, you know I can hear you, and I think that's a fair description or summary. You know, certainly there was a great deal of discussion. And it's out, you know, you know, from, from post, well, three 1907 hate conference, all the way through to the beginning of the war there was a great deal of discussion and analysis over what should the, you know, laws of maritime warfare be and what positions would be acceptable or not and it's very clear to me that what you what is happening is a growing recognition or realization that the Britain cannot just take the most pro belligerent stance because it will come back to haunt them. And the next conflict if as they believe they're just going to be a neutral. And I think it's true. I mean, they, you know, when push comes to shove and all of a sudden, they're a belligerent they're like hang on. Is this what we really want, even though the analysis that had been done previously was very much hey this is all right for us as a belligerent even. It's okay because, you know, they're getting, you know, it works both ways as a belligerent because under the rules of the belligerent food stuffs aren't subject to being seized that non contraband and the various raw materials that England wants for their country is not subject to being seized and, and, you know, I look at the the ray on action scope of a blockade is basically it's whatever you can, you know, argue or show it's pretty loosey goosey. I think it's much better than 800 nautical miles, which is a you know bright line no one's going to spray paint a red line in the ocean. So, you know, it seems like Britain has come out ahead and the negotiation and then when the war comes it's like, hang on, do we really want to do this and you know I think it's interesting that Britain and Austria hungry have said said, we'll adhere to this if you adhere to it it's basically couple you know it's there for the for the taking for the offering. So instead it's like, yeah, just not so sure about this and that's where things, you know, go haywire. Hope that answers your question sir. Yeah, yeah, more or less, I think so thank you. And, you know, if there are further questions, you can stick your hand up and we'll invite you to speak and there are a couple of been typed typed in so Michael Keegan for example you've written a question and if you would, if you'd like to speak. And you may you may ask a question live if you prefer. Okay, great. Can you hear me now. Yes. Yeah, thank you Alan. I guess my question was, let's assume that this had been implemented this declaration for the 1914 18 war, what difference would have made, would it be right to think for example that the blockade of Germany which the Admiralty imposed on the outbreak of war would have been even more difficult to make stick. Then it was, or were there nuances in the declaration which would have actually assisted Britain in its blockade of Germany during the during the conflict. And obviously that's that's hypothetical. I think it probably would have made it more difficult, because, you know, you know, the Royal Navy won the war with the blockade on food to a great extent, and that was not subject to seizure under the 1909 London declaration, but you know when you go from a limited war to total war, you know in total war, you know, all bets are off. And I think, ultimately, it's likely that ultimately Britain would have gotten to the same point in terms of, you know, what they were seizing and the scope of the blockade, but it may have taken longer been more difficult. It does work both ways once England starts to back away then Germany really is Imperial Germany is freedom okay fine we're going to start, you know, seizing neutral vessels bound for England, regardless of what they're transporting. So, but no I think that it would have made the, the ultimate effectiveness it would have probably delayed it I think ultimately, they would have gotten to the same point, simply because it was total war. But, you know, I think it would have gotten there. That's my own view anyway. Okay, and there's a question from Graham eldest spin, it's been written but you might wish to speak. Once I find your name on the list I will give you permission Graham okay. Okay, go ahead if you if you'd like. And thank you very much for, well, to both islands but thank you very much for your talk and I'm very much enjoyed reading your thesis as well. I query though whether it's appropriate to put the failure of the naval prize bill in 1911 in the House of Lords down to a grumpy bunch of Tories in the House of Lords voting it down. The Liberal government had 120 majority on paper in the Commons and they only ever managed 70 on the second reading and less than that on the third reading so it was already struggling in the Commons. And what the House of Lords did was simply vote to put it off for three months. The Liberal government could have pushed on if they wanted to, but they didn't. And they didn't because of the debate that had gone on principally about the setting up of an international prize called. And certainly there's an argument in the UK that it was the House of Lords that saved Britain when it came to war, because it had not allowed us to be bound by the declaration of London and an international prize. The House of Lords. And that's often used now as a reason for keeping with the House of Lords, which is our rather peculiar constitutional piece. But one of the things right now I'll trade you. But one of the things is often said about the House of Lords is that it saved Britain from failure in the First World War. You know, I know that the context is that but, you know, trying to look at it objectively, which is what I'm trying to do I mean the, the criticisms that were being raised against the declaration I think are were inaccurate and unfair. I think that, you know, given the, in my own view is the pronouncements or the, you know, here's the agreed principles I think they were just fine would have been just fine for England. I think that part of it what my own view is I think the House of Lords was reasserting a hey you can't just ignore us, even though you've now taken away our ability to veto money bills. You know, do I, yeah, I don't I don't I wouldn't agree that the House of Lords save England by not adopting the declaration in the First World War. I think that if the declaration had been fully ratified or adopted and put into a fort into force by all of the 10 signatories, which generally then I think would have resulted in everyone recognizing what it stated as generally accepted principles of international law. I think it would have been fine, in part because fact the matter is once the First World War becomes clearly total war, as we would now describe it once it's total war. All bets are off. I mean, as a practical matter. You know, the it's a misnomer to say international law but you know that generally accepted principles of either maritime warfare or land warfare, where they're really applicable and where they're really, you know, considered is in much more limited war, or, you know, obviously the current big issues are, you know, conflicts involving non state actors, you know, does it apply doesn't apply how do you do it I mean, and you know, now there is a, you know, alternative to basically think that well we can sanitize war and make it, you know, very surgical, which I think is nonsense. It's my own view anyway. But I don't think that it would have. I think that at the beginning, it, you know, I said it might have lengthened the war. Ultimately, I think because once it was clear that this was a, you know, war to the demise of somebody, you know, one of the belligerents, once total war comes, they would have gotten there the same way. Okay, that's my view. Right. One sea shanties. That's Alan. Yeah, that's the one. Yeah, that's where we're headed to next. So Christopher Serge, I think he liked your attempts at French so much that maybe the sea shanties wanted to hear but there's also a serious question. So Christopher Serge, I've just given you permission to speak if you if you'd like. No attempt of sea shanting on my part, I swear. I had a question regarding the kind of future conferences that were taking place in the 1920s, enable conferences were there any effects of the 1909 conference that made their way into future conferences. The first I think is not much because those conferences were so focused on disarmament and reducing the size of certain classes of vessels and the number that that people could have, I will say this, that a lot of the principles, in the naval warfare, even from 1899 are still out there it's still in existence. The you the current manual of international law for naval officers in the United States. There are provisions that are word for word, virtually unchanged from 1903. It's, you know, and I haven't looked at the current recently at the current manual for the Royal Navy, but I suspect that there are a lot of provisions that are quite similar to the manuals that the Royal Navy put out and in particular the one that was in 19, in 1911 I think it was, which conformed to the declaration of London. So there is, you know, continuing dual vitality of the work that was done in between 1899 and 1909. I hope that answers your question. Yes, thank you. Thank you. Now, Neil Datsun, I, I think I never removed your permission to speak so I think you're, you're free to ask your question because I think you've got another one do and, and this is to everybody you know don't feel, feel free to turn your microphone or your, sorry, your cameras as well, if you like. But Neil Datsun again. Or did you not have a second question. You're muted. Did I mute it? No. There you go. Sorry. Alan, have you come back to me? Yes, I have. I'm afraid this crashes out so much at the moment. I see. Thank you. There's no, it's not your fault. It's just circumstance. It was really more of a kind of observation is that I believe in 1960 and Alan, Alan speaker Alan, you use the expression about total war. And of course, in 1916. I'm pretty confident to say that Lord Lorber who was the next Lord Chancellor argued that we shouldn't be blockading Germany at all. Because we weren't at war with German people but with the German government. Which is a kind of interesting thought about how men of that age thought about things. And the, shall we say the revolution in thought, there was it certainly in this country on account of the first world war and that the first world war experience. I wonder if that seems relevant to you and have you got any comment. Well, I do have this comment in that, you know, there are a lot of, you know, scholars out there who take the view that, you know, this was, you know, maritime law naval laws of naval warfare are all, you know, who cares, and that they weren't tied to anything. And they a lot of folks focus on the, you know, various statements of Jackie Fisher, you know about you know, boiling prisoners and oil and that sort of thing. Now I have my own, you know, from based on the research I think that a lot of that was after the fact statements that Fisher put into his, you know, autobiographies and stuff or later on. There's a whole discussion about that and particularly, you know what he did at the 1899 conference. But you know, these were, you know, you have to keep in mind in the, in the era, these are all gentlemen. And the word of a gentleman matters in international law matters, and nobody, I don't think in any country wanted to be seen as a scoff law of naval of international law. Germany didn't want that. I mean you can't go through this whole process, the way that all of these countries did without believing that it matters. And I think that it really did matter, and that that's why there was such a discussion and why they're what why Britain, you know spent so much time with internal analysis and discussion and why everybody was, you know, taking their time to try to come up with okay this is these are the rules of the game because they was a real thought that people would adhere to him because you know there was not a, you know, all of the previous law wars had been much more limited in scope, and you know, international law was a big issue in the South African War, nearly led to conflict between the US and Britain, it was a big issue in the Russian Japanese war. And those are the most recent experiences really and so they were taken this seriously and yeah I think that, I think the view was going in that, you know, they did hear to him, people would follow these generally. Yes. I've read somewhere that somebody's contemporaries didn't think the issue was exactly a gentleman. Sure is an interesting character there's no doubt about that. No doubt about that. But, but, you know, you want to see an interesting character or someone who really didn't think much of the laws of international law it's Alfred they are Mahat, who very nearly from my analysis very nearly led to the first aid conference, falling apart. Single handedly. I mean it was because of the efforts that because of his efforts the poison gas was not outlawed. No, so it wasn't because they passed the port the wrong way anyway. I'm sorry what. No it wasn't because he passed the port the wrong way. Yeah, yeah. I wonder if I can ask a follow on question they're not about the port but about, you know, international law and the importance of it and once word and so I actually pin you down to the moment when, when the 1909 agreement collapsed because you don't know about the, you know the British in 1914 saying, you know that they'll they'll accept it, but with amendments and obviously this was this unacceptable. But I just wonder where you will I wonder, you know, how significant those modifications were, and whether Britain was effectively just tearing it up and knew that they were tearing it up or whether there was actually even even a tiny bit of hope on Britain's side that their modifications would be would be recognized. I suspect I know the answer. Well I would say the latter that they did, they were hoping that these modifications would be recognized and that you know it would go along and I think the fact that it sort of continued in some form for nearly two years. You know, indicates that I mean it really was. If you look at the modifications that they were making in one respect it was quite a backtracking from what they had agreed to on blockade and conditional contraband and continuous voyage. But at the same time, it's, you know, it's kind of going back to what they what Britain thought the rules were before the 1909 conference although, interestingly and I didn't discuss this but in advance of the conference. They did a massive analysis of international law to try to determine, you know, did what they think the law what they thought the law was, was it really supported by, you know, customary international law and the fact that matter is most of the most extreme positions that they had thought were well established that they adhered to for a long time, there was basically no, it wasn't. They were standing alone. And they didn't go back to all to the extremes but I think they, they were hoping that some of the stuff because the things that they left in were favorable to them. Yeah, the things they left in were favorable and, you know, obviously, you've even got, you know, Germany to a great extent and hearing to international law because they didn't go to, you know, unrestricted submarine warfare. And they went on off on, you know, finally they said okay we got to do this that's when things clearly have gotten reached the level of total war because everyone's like okay this is a battle for the death and there's no, there's no rules now. Very good. Okay, thank you. Christopher has his hand up. Yes he does yeah. So go ahead. We talked a lot about sort of diplomatic and political interests. I had a question about the more capitalist and industrial side of it thinking of like JP Morgan owning the international mercantile marine company and these huge international shipping companies. How much of an influence or an impact or lobby at all in concern to this conference to get more favorable terms for their companies. The answer is that there that is yes. Well, certainly organizations various maritime organizations in England would submit, you know, position papers to the foreign office or to the home office or the colonial office about here's what they thought was favorable or not favorable. Or they would attack the parts of there were submissions post 1909 declaration saying, you know, saying this is bad for us as traders, traders, the RAD er s, you know, and for our maritime trade. So they, most of those positions though were just dismissed from what I can tell internally. You know, but they certainly made an effort to have to exert some influence all the way along throughout this entire process I mean pre 1907 hate conference. You know certainly pre 1909 post 1909 they're trying to put in there. They're trying to lobby. That's for sure. We'd have time for one more question and if one doesn't come up. I will ask you how sure you are that you identified Jackie Fisher in that picture from the 1907 picture and and how long it took you to do that. Okay. If I can, I wonder if I can zoom. Let me just see this I'm going to see if I can share my screen. These are the days of miracle and wonder I'm sure I'm sure you can. All right, so let's see. There you got my screen I think. Yeah, you're on the final slide. Yeah. Okay. Now, can I zoom. How can I zoom. I don't think I can zoom but I will tell you if you know, at least on my screen and I'm close I'm looking at this. And I don't know, can you see my pointer. Yeah. Okay, yes we can. Okay, so right there if that's not Fisher's face. I don't know what is. I mean, when I first got this photograph and was looking at it kind of zoomed in I'm just kind of going around it's like wait a minute, I stopped there it's like that's Fisher. And, you know, I'm quite so I'm fairly certain of it now if you want I'm happy to send you the picture and you can zoom in itself, but I'm sure I can identify here in the middle that's of the American delegation that's Andrew white. So, the guy from the Netherlands the US and best elements that's Friedrich calls there those four guys right there. And I'm pretty sure this is Fisher in the back with other technical delegates, because I think the German representative is two away from him, but I'm quite certain that's Fisher's face. It looks like him at the time. And I searched around them, having seen him to try to find Mahan and I can't find him in there, which makes sense given how he approached the conference so I'm fairly confident but I'll send it to you. I won't be in a position to argue with you. I was impressed. You've got to be on at least your third glass of wine by now right. So, you know, he probably will pop out. Very good. Well on that note, I think it's time to let you back to your life give you back your life and thank you for very interesting talk very interesting set of questions and so you know it's with it with the with the usual with the usual set of and promises for hospitality and wine when you're next in in London, and I'm sure that I speak for all 30 plus of us tonight in saying that this was a very interesting talk very informative talk, and we are very good. Well, thank you all very much and thank you Alan and I will certainly seek to collect. Next time I'm over on the wine. It's a deal. Other beverages.