 Book 8 CHAPTER XV Wherefore let not the mind truly religious and submitted to the true God suppose that demons are better than men, because they have better bodies. Otherwise it must put many beasts before itself which are superior to us, both in acuteness of the senses, in ease and quickness of movement, in strength and in long-continued vigor of body. What man can equal the eagle or the vulture in strength of vision? Who can equal the dog in acuteness of smell? Who can equal the hare, the stag, and all the birds in swiftness? Who can equal in strength the lion or the elephant? Who can equal in length of life the serpents which are affirmed to put off old age along with their skin, and to return to youth again? But as we are better than all these by the possession of reason and understanding, so we ought also to be better than the demons by living good and virtuous lives. For divine providence gave to them bodies of a better quality than ours, that that in which we excel them might in this way be commended to us as deserving to be far more cared for than the body, and that we should learn to despise the bodily excellence of the demons compared with goodness of life in respect of which we are better than they, knowing that we too shall have immortality of body, not an immortality tortured by eternal punishment, but that which is consequent on purity of soul. But now as regards loftiness of place, it is altogether ridiculous to be so influenced by the fact that the demons inhabit the air and we, the earth, as to think that on that account they are to be put before us, for in this way we put all the birds before ourselves. But the birds, when they are weary with flying, are required to repair their bodies with food, come back to the earth to rest or to feed, which the demons they say do not. Are they therefore inclined to say that the birds are superior to us and the demons superior to the birds? But if it be madness to think so, there is no reason why we should think that on account of their inhabiting a loftier element the demons have acclaimed to our religious submission. But as it is really the case that the birds of the air are not only not put before us who dwell on the earth, but are even subjected to us on account of the dignity of the rational soul which is in us, so also it is the case that the demons, though they are aerial, are not better than we who are terrestrial because the air is higher than the earth. That on the contrary, mannered to be put before demons because their despair is not to be compared to the hope of pious men. Even that law of plateaus, according to which he mutually orders and arranges the four elements, inserting between the two extreme elements, namely fire, which is in the highest degree mobile, and the immovable earth, the two middle ones, air and water, that by how much the air is higher up than the water, and the fire than the air, by so much also are the waters higher than the earth. This law, I say, sufficiently admonishes us not to estimate the merits of animated creatures according to the grades of the elements. And Apolaus himself says that man is a terrestrial animal in common with the rest, who is nevertheless to be put far before aquatic animals, though Plato puts the waters themselves before the land. By this he would have us understand that the same order is not to be observed when the question concerns the merits of animals, though it seems to be the true one in the gradation of bodies, for it appears to be possible that a soul of a higher order may inhabit a body of a lower, and a soul of a lower order, a body of a higher. CHAPTER XVI The same Apolaus, when speaking concerning the manners of demons, says that they are agitated with the same perturbations of mind as men, that they are provoked by injuries, created by services and by gifts, rejoice and honors, are delighted with a variety of sacred rites, and are annoyed if any of them be neglected. Among other things he also says that on them depend the divinations of augurs, soothsayers and prophets, and the revelations of dreams, and that from them also are the miracles of the magicians. But when giving a brief definition of them he says, Demons are of an animal nature, passive in soul, rational in mind, real in body, eternal in time. Of which five things, the three firsts, are common to them and us, the fourth peculiar to themselves, and the fifth common to them with the gods. But I see that they have in common with the gods two of the first things, which they have in common with us, for he says that the gods also are animals, and when he is assigning to every order of beings its own element, he places us among the other terrestrial animals which live and feel upon the earth. Wherefore if the demons are animals as to genus, this is common to them not only with men, but also with the gods and with beasts. If they are rational as to mind, this is common to them with the gods and with men. If they are eternal in time, this is common to them with the gods only. If they are passive as to their soul, this is common to them with men only. If they are aerial in body, in this they are alone. Therefore it is no great thing for them to be of an animal nature, for so also are the beasts. When being rational as to mind, they are not above ourselves, for so are we also, and as to their being eternal as to time, what is the advantage of that if they are not blessed, for better is temporal happiness than eternal misery? Again, as to their being passive in soul, how are they in this respect above us, since we also are so, but would not have been so had we not been miserable? Also, as to their being aerial in body, how much value is to be set on that, since a soul of any kind whatsoever is to be set above every body? And therefore religious worship which ought to be rendered from the soul is by no means due to that thing which is inferior to the soul. Moreover, if he had among those things which he says belong to demons, enumerated virtue, wisdom, happiness, and affirm that they have those things in common with the gods, and like them eternally, he would assuredly have attributed to them something greatly to be desired and much to be prized. And even in that case it would not have been our duty to worship them like God on account of these things, but rather to worship him from whom we know they had received them. But how much less are they really worthy of divine honor, those aerial animals who are only rational that they may be capable of misery, passive that they may be actually miserable, and eternal that it may be impossible for them to end their misery? CHAPTER XVII Wherefore to omit other things, and confine our attention to that which he says is common to the demons with us, let us ask this question. If all the four elements are full of their own animals, the fire and the air of immortal, and the water and the earth of mortal ones, why are the souls of demons agitated by the whirlwinds and tempests of passions? For the Greek word pathos means perturbation, once he chose to call the demons passive in soul because the word passion which is derived from pathos signified a commotion of the mind contrary to reason. Why then are these things in the minds of demons which are not in beasts? For if anything of this kind appears in beasts, it is not perturbation because it is not contrary to reason of which they are devoid. Now it is foolishness or misery which is cause of these perturbations in the case of men, for we are not yet blessed in the possession of that perfection of wisdom which is promised to us at last when we shall be set free from our present mortality. But the gods, they say, are free from these perturbations because they are not only eternal but also blessed, for they also have the same kind of rational souls but most pure from all spot and plague. Wherefore, if the gods are free from perturbation because they are blessed, not miserable animals, and the beasts are free from them because they are animals which are capable neither of blessedness nor misery, it remains that the demons like men are subject to perturbations because they are not blessed but miserable animals. What folly, therefore, or rather what madness, to submit ourselves through any sentiment of religion to demons when it belongs to the true religion to deliver us from that depravity which makes us like to them. For Apolaus himself, although he is very sparing toward them and thinks they are worthy of divine honors, is nevertheless compelled to confess that they are subject to anger, and the true religion commands us not to be moved with anger but rather to resist it. The demons are won over by gifts, and the true religion commands us to favor no one on account of gifts received. The demons are flattered by honors, but the true religion commands us by no means to be moved by such things. The demons are haters of some men and lovers of others, not in consequence of a prudent and calm judgment, but because of what he calls their passive soul, whereas the true religion commands us to love even our enemies. Lastly, the true religion commands us to put away all disquietude of heart and agitation of mind, and also all commotions and tempests of the soul which Apolaus asserts to be continually swelling and surging in the souls of demons. Why, therefore, except through foolishness and miserable error, shouldst thou humble thyself to worship a being to whom thou desirest to be unlike in thy life? And why shouldst thou pay religious homage to him whom thou art unwilling to imitate when it is the highest duty of religion to imitate him whom thou worshipest? Chapter 18 In vain, therefore, have Apolaus and they who think with him conferred on the demons the honor of placing them in the air between the ethereal heavens and the earth that they may carry to the gods the prayers of men to mend the answers of the gods. For Plato held, they say, that no god has intercourse with man. They who believe these things have thought it unbecoming that men should have intercourse with the gods, and the gods with men, but a befitting thing that the demons should have intercourse with both gods and men, presenting to the gods the petitions of men and conveying to men what the gods have granted, so that a chaste man and one who is a stranger to the crimes of the magic arts must use as patrons, through whom the gods may be induced to hear him, demons who love these crimes, although the very fact of his not loving them ought to have recommended to him to them as one who deserved to be listened to with greater readiness and willingness on their part. They love the abominations of the stage which chastity does not love. They love in the sorceries of the magicians a thousand arts of inflicting harm which innocence does not love. Yet both chastity and innocence, if they wish to obtain anything from the gods, will not be able to do so by their own merits except their enemies act as mediators on their behalf. Apolaus need not attempt to justify the fictions of the poets and the mockries of the stage. If human modesty can act so faithlessly towards itself as not only to love shameful things, but even to think that they are pleasing to the divinity, we can cite on the other side their own highest authority and teacher, Plato. CHAPTER XIX Moreover, against those magic arts concerning which some men, exceedingly wretched and exceedingly impious, delight to boast, may not public opinion itself be brought forward as a witness. For why are those arts so severely punished by the laws if they are the works of deities who ought to be worshipped? Shall it be said that the Christians have ordained those laws by which magic arts are punished? With what other meaning except that these sorceries are without doubt pernicious to the human race did the most illustrious poet say, By heaven I swear, and your dear life, unwillingly these arms I wield, and take to meet the coming strife and chantonet's sword and shield. And that also which he says in another place concerning the magic arts. I've seen him to another place transport the standing corn, has referenced to the fact that the fruits of one field are said to be transferred to another by these arts which this pastiferous and accursed doctrine teaches. Does not Cicero inform us that among the laws of the twelve tables, that is, the most ancient laws of the Romans, there was a law written which appointed a punishment to be inflicted on him who should do this? Lastly, was it before Christian judges that Apolaus himself was accused of magic arts? Had he known these arts to be divine and pious, and congruous with the works of divine power, he ought not only to have confessed, but also to have professed them, rather blaming the laws by which these things were prohibited and pronounced worthy of condemnation, while they ought to have been held worthy of admiration and respect. For by so doing, either he would have persuaded the judges to adopt his own opinion, or if they had shown their partiality for unjust laws and condemned him to death notwithstanding his praising and commending such things, the demons would have bestowed on his soul such rewards as he deserved, who, in order to proclaim and set forth their divine works, had not feared the loss of his human life. As armarters, when that religion was charged on them as a crime, by which they knew they were made safe and most glorious throughout eternity, did not choose by denying it to escape temporal punishments, but rather by confessing, professing, and proclaiming it, by enduring all things for it with fidelity and fortitude, and by dying for it with pious calmness, put the shame the law by which that religion was prohibited and caused its revocation. But there is extant and most copious and eloquent oration of this platonic philosopher in which he defends himself against the charge of practicing these arts, affirming that he is wholly a stranger to them, and only wishing to show his innocence by denying such things as cannot be innocently committed. But all the miracles of the magicians, who he thinks are justly deserving of condemnation, are performed according to the teaching and by the power of demons. Why, then, does he think that they ought to be honored? For he asserts that they are necessary in order to present our prayers to the gods, and yet their works are such as we must shun if we wish our prayers to reach the true God. Again, I ask, what kind of prayers of man does he suppose are presented to the good gods by the demons? If magical prayers they will have none such. If lawful prayers they will not receive them through such beings. But if a sinner who is penitent pour out prayers, especially if he is committed any crime of sorcery, does he receive pardon through the intercession of those demons by whose instigation and help he has fallen into the sin he mourns? Or do the demons themselves, in order that they may merit pardon for the penitent, first become penitents because they have deceived them? This no one ever said concerning the demons, for had this been the case they would never have dared to seek for themselves divine honors. For how should they do so, who desired by penitents, to obtain the grace of pardon, seeing that such detestable pride could not exist along with the humility worthy of pardon? Chapter 20 But does any urgent and most pressing cause compel the demons to mediate between the gods and men that they may offer the prayers of men and bring back the answers from the gods? And if so, what pray is that cause, what is that so great necessity? Because, say they, no God has intercourse with man. Most admirable holiness of God which has no intercourse with a supplicating man, and yet has intercourse with an arrogant demon, which has no intercourse with a penitent man, and yet has intercourse with the deceiving demon, which has no intercourse with a man fleeing for refuge to the divine nature, and yet has intercourse with a demon feigning divinity, which has no intercourse with a man seeking pardon, and yet has intercourse with a demon persuading to wickedness, which has no intercourse with a man expelling the poets by means of philosophical writings from a well-regulated state, and yet has intercourse with a demon requesting from the princes and priests of a state the theatrical performance of the mockeries of the poets, which has no intercourse with a man who prohibits the ascribing of prime to the gods, and yet has intercourse with a demon who takes delight in the fictitious representation of their crimes, which has no intercourse with a man punishing the crimes of the magicians by just laws, and yet has intercourse with a demon teaching and practicing the magical arts, which has no intercourse with a man shunning the imitation of a demon, and yet has intercourse with a demon lying in wait for the deception of a man. CHAPTER XXI But herein no doubt lies the great necessity for this absurdity so unworthy of the gods that the ethereal gods who are concerned about human affairs would not know what terrestrial men were doing unless the aerial demons should bring them intelligence, because the ether is suspended far away from the earth and far above it, but the air is contiguous both to the ether and to the earth. O admirable wisdom! What else do these men think concerning the gods, who they say, are all in the highest degree good, but that they are concerned about human affairs, lest they should seem unworthy of worship, whilst on the other hand, from the distance between the elements, they are ignorant of terrestrial things. It is on this account that they have supposed the demons to be necessary as agents through whom the gods may inform themselves with respect to human affairs, and through whom when necessary they may secore men, and it is on account of this office that the demons themselves have been held as deserving of worship. If this be the case, then a demon is better known by these good gods through nearness of body than a man is by goodness of mind. O mournful necessity, or shall I not rather say detestable and vain error, that I may not impute vanity to the divine nature. For if the gods can, with their minds free from the hindrance of bodies, see our mind, they do not need the demons as messengers from our mind to them. But if the ethereal gods, by means of their bodies, perceive the corporeal indices of minds as the countenance, speech, motion, and that's understand what the demons tell them, then it is also possible that they may be deceived by the falsehoods of demons. Moreover, if the divinity of the gods cannot be deceived by the demons, neither can it be ignorant of our actions. But I would, they would tell me, what of the demons have informed the gods that the fictions of the poets concerning the crimes of the gods displease Plato, concealing the pleasure which they themselves take in them, or whether they have concealed both, and have preferred that the gods should be ignorant with respect to this whole matter, or have told both, as well the pious prudence of Plato with respect to the gods as their own lust, which is injurious to the gods, or whether they have concealed Plato's opinion, according to which he was unwilling that the gods should be defamed with falsely alleged crimes through the impious license of the poets, whilst they have not been ashamed nor afraid to make known their own wickedness, which make them love theatrical plays in which the infamous deeds of the gods are celebrated. Let them choose which they will of these four alternatives and let them consider how much evil any one of them would require them to think of the gods. For if they choose the first, they must then confess that it was not possible for the good gods to dwell with the good Plato, though he sought to prohibit things injurious to them, whilst they dwelt with evil demons who exalted in their injuries, and this because they supposed that the good gods can only know a good man placed at so great a distance from them through the mediation of evil demons whom they could know on account of their nearness to themselves. If they shall choose the second and shall say that both these things were concealed by the demons so that the gods are wholly ignorant both of Plato's most religious law and the sacrilegious pleasure of the demons, what in that case can the gods know to any prophet with respect to human affairs through these mediating demons when they do not know those things which are decreed through the piety of good men for the honor of the good gods against the lust of evil demons. But if they shall choose the third and reply that these intermediary demons have communicated not only the opinion of Plato which prohibited wrongs to be done to the gods, but also their own delight in these wrongs, I would ask if such a communication is not rather an insult. Now the gods, hearing both and knowing both, not only permit the approach to those maligned demons who desire and do things contrary to the dignity of the gods and the religion of Plato, but also through these wicked demons who are near to them, send good things to the good Plato who is far away from them, for they inhabit such a place in the concatenated series of the elements that they can come into contact with those by whom they are accused, but not with him by whom they are defended, knowing the truth on both sides, but not being able to change the weight of the air and the earth. There remains the fourth supposition, but it is worse than the rest, for who will suffer it to be said that the demons have made known to columnius fictions of the poets concerning the immortal gods and also the disgraceful mockeries of the theaters and their own most ardent lust after and most sweet pleasure in these things, whilst they have concealed from them that Plato, with the gravity of a philosopher, gave it as his opinion that all these things ought to be removed from a well-regulated republic, so that the good gods are now compelled through such messengers to know the evil doings of the most wicked beings, that is to say of the messengers themselves, and are not allowed to know the good deeds of the philosophers, though the former are for the injury, but these latter are for the honor of the gods themselves. CHAPTER XXII None of these four alternatives, then, is to be chosen, for we dare not suppose such unbecoming things concerning the gods as the adoption of any one of them would lead us to think. It remains therefore that no credence whatsoever is to be given to the opinion of Apolaus and the other philosophers of the same school, namely that the demons act as messengers and interpreters between the gods and men to carry our petitions from us to the gods and to bring back to us the help of the gods. On the contrary, we must believe them to be spirits most eager to inflict harm utterly alien from righteousness, swollen with pride, pale with envy, subtle in deceit, who dwell indeed in this air as in a prison, in keeping with their own character, because, cast down from the height of the higher heaven, they have been condemned to dwell in this element as the just reward of irretrievable transgression. But though the air is situated above the earth and the waters, they are not on that account superior in merit to men, who, though they do not surpass them as far as their earthly bodies are concerned, do nevertheless far excel them through piety of mind, they having made choice of the true God as their helper. Over many, however, who are manifestly unworthy of participation in the true religion, they tyrannize as over captives whom they have subdued, the greatest part of whom they have persuaded of their divinity by wonderful and lying signs consisting either of deeds or of predictions. Some, nevertheless, who have more attentively and diligently considered their vices, they have not been able to persuade that they are gods, and so have feigned themselves to be messengers between the gods and men. Some, indeed, have thought that not even this latter honor ought to be acknowledged as belonging to them, not believing that they were gods, because they saw that they were wicked, whereas the gods, according to their view, are all good. Nevertheless they dared not say that they were wholly unworthy of all divine honor, for fear of offending the multitude, by whom, through inveterate superstition, the demons were served by the performance of many rites and the erection of many temples. Chapter 23 The Egyptian Hermes, whom they called Trismegistus, had a different opinion concerning those demons. Apolaus, indeed, denies that they are gods, but when he says that they hold a middle place between the gods and men's, that they seem to be necessary for men, as mediators between them and the gods, he does not distinguish between the worship due to them and the religious homage due to the supernal gods. This Egyptian, however, says that there are some gods made by the supreme God and some made by men. Anyone who hears this, as I have stated it, no doubt supposes that it has reference to images, because they are the works of the hands of men, but he asserts that visible and tangible images are, as it were, only the bodies of the gods, and that they dwell in them certain spirits which have been invited to come into them and which have power to inflict harm or to fulfill the desires of those by whom divine honors and services are rendered to them. To unite, therefore, by a certain art those invisible spirits to visible and material things so as to make, as it were, animated bodies dedicated and given up to those spirits who inhabit them, this, he says, is to make gods, adding that men have received this great and wonderful power. I will give the words of this Egyptian as they have been translated into our tongue. And, since we have undertaken the discourse concerning the relationship and fellowship between men and the gods, no, O Escalepius, the power and strength of man, as the Lord and Father, or that which is highest, even God, is the maker of the celestial gods, so man is the maker of the gods who are in the temples, content to dwell near to men. And a little after, he says, thus humanity, always mindful of its nature and origin, perseveres on the imitation of divinity, and as the Lord and Father made eternal gods, that they should be like himself, so humanity fashioned its own gods according to the likeness of its own countenance. When this Escalepius, to whom especially he was speaking, had answered him, and had said, Does thou mean that statues, O Trismegistus? Yes, the statues, replied he, however unbelieving thou art, O Escalepius, the statues, animated and full of sensation and spirit, and who do such great and wonderful things, the statues, prescient to future things and foretelling them by lot, by profit, by dreams, and many other things, who bring diseases on men and cure them again, giving them joy or sorrow according to their merits. Thus thou not know, O Escalepius, that Egypt is an image of heaven, or more truly a translation and dissent of all things which are ordered and transacted there, that it is, in truth, if we may say so, to be the temple of the whole world. And yet, as it becomes the prudent man to know all things beforehand, ye ought not to be ignorant of this, that there is a time coming when it shall appear that the Egyptians have all in vain with pious mind, and with most scrupulous diligence weighted on the divinity, and when all their holy worship shall come to naught, and be found to be in vain. Hermes then follows out at great length the statements of this passage in which he seems to predict the present time, in which the Christian religion is overthrowing all lying figments with the vehemence and liberty proportioned to its superior truth and holiness, in order that the grace of the true Savior may deliver men from those gods which man has made, and subject them to that God by whom man was made. But when Hermes predicts these things, he speaks as one who is a friend to these same mockries of demons, and does not clearly express the name of Christ. On the contrary, he deplores as if it had already taken place the future abolition of those things by the observance of which there was maintained in Egypt a resemblance of heaven. He bears witness to Christianity by a kind of mournful prophecy. Now it was with reference to such that the apostle said, that knowing God they glorified him not as God, neither were thankful, but became vain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart was darkened. Professing themselves to be wise, they became fools, and changed the glory of the incorruptible God into the likeness of the image of corruptible man, and so on for the whole passage is too long to quote. For Hermes makes many such statements agreeable to the truth concerning the one true God who fashioned this world. And I know not how he has become so bewildered by that darkening of the heart as to stumble into the expression of a desire that men should always continue in subjection to those gods which he confesses to be made by men, and to bewail their future removal, as if there could be anything more wretched than mankind tyrannized over by the work of his own hands, since man, by worshiping the works of his own hands, may more easily cease to be man, than the works of his hands can, through his worship of them, become gods. For it can sooner happen that man who has received an honorable position may through lack of understanding become comparable to the beasts, than that the works of man may become preferable to the work of God made in his own image, that is, to man himself, wherefore deservedly as man left to fall away from him who made him, when he prefers to himself that which he himself has made. For these vain deceitful pernicious sacrilegious things did the Egyptian Hermes sorrow, because he knew that the time was coming when they should be removed. But his sorrow was as impudently expressed as his knowledge was imprudently obtained, for it was not the Holy Spirit who revealed these things to him, as he had done to the holy prophets, who for seeing these things said with exultation, if a man shall make gods lo, they are no gods, and in another place, and it shall come to pass in that day, saith the Lord, that I will cut off the names of the idols out of the land, and they shall no more be remembered. But the holy Isaiah prophesies expressly concerning Egypt in reference to this matter, saying, and the idols of Egypt shall be moved at his presence, and their hearts shall be overcome in them, and other things to the same effect. And with the prophet are to be classed to those who rejoiced that that which they knew was to come had actually come, as Simeon or Anna, who immediately recognized Jesus when he was born, or Elizabeth, who in the Spirit recognized him when he was conceived, or Peter, who said by the revelation of the Father, Thou art Christ, the Son of the living God. But to this Egyptian those spirits indicated the time of their own destruction, who also, when the Lord was present in the flesh, said with trembling, art thou come hither to destroy us before the time, meaning by destruction before the time, either that very destruction which they expected to come, but which they did not think would come so suddenly as it appeared to have done, or only that destruction which consisted in their being brought into contempt by being made known. And indeed this was the destruction before the time, that is, before the time of judgment when they are to be punished with eternal damnation together with all men who were implicated in their wickedness as the true religion declares which neither errs nor leads into error, for it is not like him who, blown hither and thither by every wind of doctrine, and mixing true things with things which are false, bewails as about to perish a religion which he afterwards confesses to be error. Chapter 24 After a long interval Hermes again comes back to the subject of the gods which men have made, saying as follows. But enough on this subject. Let us return to man and to reason that divine gift, on account of which man has been called a rational animal. For the things which have been said concerning man, wonderful though they are, are less wonderful than those which have been said concerning reason. For man to discover the divine nature and to make it surpasses the wonder of all other wonderful things. Because, therefore, our forefathers erred very far with respect to the knowledge of the gods, through incredulity and through want of attention to their worship and service, they invented this art of making gods. And this art once invented, they associated with it a suitable virtue borrowed from universal nature. And being incapable of making souls, they evoked those of demons or of angels, and united them with these holy images and divine mysteries in order that through these souls the images might have power to do good or harm to men. I know not whether the demons themselves could have been made even by adoration to confess as he is confessed in these words. Because our forefathers erred very far with respect to the knowledge of the gods, through incredulity and through want of attention to their worship and service, they invented the art of making gods. Does he say that it was a moderate degree of error which resulted in their discovery of the art of making gods, or was he content to say they erred? No, he must need to add, very far, and say they erred very far. It was this great error and incredulity then of their forefathers who did not attend to the worship and service of the gods, which was the origin of the art of making gods. And yet this wise man grieves over the ruin of this art at some future time as if it were a divine religion. Is he not verily compelled by divine influence on the one hand to reveal the past error of his forefathers and by a diabolical influence on the other hand to bewail the future punishment of demons? For if their forefathers, by erring very far with respect to the knowledge of the gods, through incredulity and a version of mind from their worship and service, invented the art of making gods, what wonder is it that all that is done by this detestable art which is opposed to the divine religion should be taken away by that religion when truth corrects error, faith refutes incredulity, and conversion rectifies aversion? For if he had only said without mentioning the cause that his forefathers had discovered the art of making gods, it would have been our duty if we paid any regard to what is right and pious to consider and to see that they could never have attained to this art if they had not erred from the truth, if they had believed those things were worthy of God, if they had attended to divine worship and service. However, if we alone should say that the causes of this art were to be found in the great error and incredulity of men, and a version of the mind erring from and unfaithful to divine religion, the impudence of those who resist the truth were in some way to be born with. But when he who admires a man above all of the things, this power which that has been granted him to practice, and sorrows because a time is coming when all those figments of gods invented by men shall even be commanded by the laws to be taken away, when even this man confesses, nevertheless, and explains the causes which led to the discovery of this art, saying that their ancestors threw great error and incredulity, and through not attending to the worship and service of the gods invented this art of making gods. What ought we to say, or rather to do, but to give to the Lord our God all the thanks we are able, because he has taken away those things by causes the contrary of those which led to their institution? For that which the prevalence of error instituted the way of truth took away, that which incredulity instituted faith took away, that which a version for divine worship and service instituted conversion to the one true and holy God took away. Nor was this the case only in Egypt, for which country alone the spirit of the demons lamented in Hermes, but in all the earth which sings to the Lord a new song, as the truly holy and truly prophetic scriptures have predicted, in which it is written, sing unto the Lord a new song, sing unto the Lord all the earth. For the title of this Psalm is, when the house was built after the captivity. For a house is being built to the Lord and all the earth, even the city of God, which is the holy church, after that captivity in which demons held captive those men who through faith in God became living stones in the house. For although men made gods, it did not follow that he who made them was not held captive by them, when by worshiping them he was drawn into fellowship with them, into the fellowship not of stalled idols, but of cunning demons. For what are idols, but what they are represented to be in the same scriptures, they have eyes, but they do not see, and though artistically fashioned are still without life and sensation. But unclean spirits associated through that wicked art with these same idols have miserably taken captive the souls of their worshipers by bringing them down into fellowship with themselves. Once the apostle says, We know that an idol is nothing, but those things which the Gentiles sacrifice, they sacrifice to demons and not to God, but now would not he should have fellowship with demons. After this captivity therefore in which men were held by maligned demons, the house of God is being built in all the earth. Once the title of that Psalm in which it is said, Sing unto the Lord a new song, Sing unto the Lord all the earth, Sing unto the Lord bless his name, declare well his salvation from day to day, declare his glory among the nations, among all people his wonderful things. For great is the Lord and much to be praised, he is terrible above all gods. For all the gods of the nations are demons, but the Lord made the heavens. Wherefore he who sorrowed, because a time was coming when the worship of idols should be abolished, and the domination of the demons over those who worshiped them, wished, unto the influence of a demon, that that captivity should always continue, at the cessation of which that Psalm celebrates the building of the house of the Lord in all the earth. Hermes foretold these things with grief, the prophet with joyfulness, and because the spirit is victorious who sang these things through the ancient prophets, even Hermes himself was compelled in a wonderful manner to confess that those very things which he wished not to be removed, and at the prospect of whose removal he was sorrowful, had been instituted not by prudent, faithful, and religious, but by airing and unbelieving men, averse to the worship and service of the gods. And although he calls them gods, nevertheless when he says that they were made by such men as we certainly ought not to be, he shows, whether he will or not, that they are not to be worshipped by those who do not resemble these image-makers, that is, by prudent, faithful, and religious men, at the same time also making it manifest that the very men who made them involve themselves in the worship of those as gods who were not gods. For true is the saying of the prophet, if a man make gods, lo, they are no gods. Such gods therefore acknowledged by such worshipers, and made by such men, that Hermes call gods made by men, that is to say, demons, through some art of I know not what description, bound by the chains of their own lusts to images. But nevertheless he did not agree with that opinion of the Platonic Apolaus, of which we have already shown the incongruity and absurdity, namely that they were interpreters and intercessors between the gods whom God made, and men whom the same God made, bringing to God the prayers of men, and from God the gifts given and answered to these prayers. For it is exceedingly stupid to believe that gods whom men have made have more influence with gods whom God has made than men themselves have whom the very same God has made. And consider, too, that it is a demon which, bound by a man to an image by means of an impious art, has been made a god, but a god to such a man only, not to every man. What kind of god, therefore, is that which no man would make but one airing, incredulous, and averse to the true God? Moreover, if the demons which are worshipped in the temples being introduced by some kind of strange art into images, that is, indivisible representations of themselves, by those men who by this art made gods when they were straying away from, and were averse to the worship and service of the gods. If I say those demons are neither mediators nor interpreters between men and the gods, both on account of their own most wicked and base errors, and because men, though airing, incredulous and averse from the worship and service of the gods, are nevertheless beyond doubt better than the demons whom they themselves have evoked, then it remains to be affirmed that what power they possess, they possess as demons, doing harm by bestowing pretended benefits, harm all the greater for the deception, or else openly and undisguisedly doing evil to men. They cannot, however, do anything of this kind unless where they are permitted by the deep and secret providence of God, and then only so far as they are permitted. Then however they are permitted, it is not because they, being midway between men and the gods, have through the friendship of the gods great power over men, for these demons cannot possibly be friends to the good gods who dwell in the holy and heavenly habitation, by whom we mean holy angels and rational creatures, whether the thrones or dominations or principalities or powers, from whom they are as far separated in disposition and character, as vice is distant from virtue, wickedness from goodness. CHAPTER XXV Wherefore, we must by no means seek, through the supposed mediation of the demons, to avail ourselves of the benevolence or beneficence of the gods, or rather of the good angels, but through resembling them in the possession of a good will, through which we are with them, and live with them, and worship with them, the same God, although we cannot see them with the eyes of our flesh. But it is not in locality we are distant from them, but in merit of life, caused by our miserable unlikeness to them in will, and by the weakness of our character. For the mere fact of our dwelling on earth under the conditions of life in the flesh does not prevent our fellowship with them. It is only prevented when we, in the impurity of our hearts, mind earthly things. But in this present time, while we are being healed, that we may eventually be as they are, we are brought near to them by faith, if by their assistance we believe that he who is their blessedness is also ours. CHAPTER XXVI It is certainly a remarkable thing how this Egyptian, when expressing his grief that a timeless coming when those things would be taken away from Egypt, which he confesses to have been invented by men airing and credulous and averse to the service of divine religion, says, among other things, Then shall that land, the most holy place of shrines and temples, be full of sepulchres and dead men, as if ensued that these things were not taken away, men would not die, as if dead bodies could be buried elsewhere than in the ground, as if, as time advanced, the number of sepulchres must not necessarily increase in proportion to the increase of the number of the dead. But they who are of a perverse mind and opposed to us suppose to what he grieves for us that the memorials of our martyrs were to succeed to their temples and shrines in order for sooth that they may have grounds for thinking that gods were worshipped by the pagans and temples, but the dead men are worshipped by us and sepulchres. For with such blindness do impious men, as it were, stumble over mountains, and will not see the things which strike their own eyes, that they do not attend to the fact that in all the literature of the pagans there are not found any or scarcely any gods who have not been men to whom, when dead, divine honors have been paid. I will not enlarge on the fact that Varro says that all dead men are thought by them to be gods, and proves it by those sacred rites which are performed in the honor of almost all the dead, among which he mentions funeral games. During this the very highest proof of divinity, because games are only want to be celebrated in honor of divinities. Hermes himself, of whom we are now treating, and that same book in which, as if foretelling future things, he says with sorrow, then shall that land, the most holy place of shrines and temples, be full of sepulchres and dead men, testifies that the gods of Egypt were dead men. For having said that their forefathers, airing very far with respect to the knowledge of the gods, incredulous and inattentive to the divine worship and service, invented the art of making gods, with which art, when invented, they associated the appropriate virtue which is inherent in universal nature, and by mixing up that virtue with this art, they called forth the souls of demons or of angels, for they could not make souls, and caused them to take possession of or associate themselves with holy images and divine mysteries, in order that through these souls the images might have power to do good or harm to men. Having said this, he goes on, as it were, to prove it by illustrations, saying, Thy grand sire, O escalepius, the first discoverer of medicine, to whom a temple was consecrated in a mountain of Libya, near to the shore of the crocodiles, in which temple lies his earthly man, that is, his body, for the better part of him, or rather the whole of him, if the whole man is in the intelligent life, went back to heaven, affords even now by his divinity all those helps to infirm men which formerly he was want to afford them by the art of medicine. He says therefore that a dead man was worshipped as a god in that place where he had his sepulcher. He deceives men by a falsehood, for the man went back to heaven. Then he adds, Does not Hermes, who was my grand sire, in whose name I bear, abiding in the country which is called by his name, help and preserve all mortals who come to him from every quarter? For this elder Hermes, that is, Mercury, who, he says, was his grand sire, is said to be buried in Hermopolis, that is, in the city called by his name. So here are two gods whom he affirms to have been men, Escalepius and Mercury. Now concerning Escalepius, both the Greeks and the Latins think the same thing, but as to Mercury, there are many who do not think that he was formerly immortal, though Hermes testifies that he was his grand sire. But are these two different individuals who were called by the same name? I will not dispute much whether they are different individuals or not. It is sufficient to know that this Mercury, of whom Hermes speaks, is as well as Escalepius, a god who was once a man, according to the testimony of the same Trismegistus, esteemed so great by his countrymen and also the grandson of Mercury himself. Hermes goes on to say, But do we know how many good things Isis, the wife of Osiris, bestows when she is propitious, and what great opposition she can offer when enraged? Then, in order to show that there were gods made by men through this art, he goes on to say, For it is easy for earthly and mundane gods to be angry being made and composed by men out of either nature. Thus giving us to understand that he believed that demons were formerly the souls of dead men, which, as he says, by means of a certain art invented by men very far in error, incredulous and irreligious, were caused to take possession of images because they who made such gods were not able to make souls. When therefore he says either nature, he means soul and body, the demon being the soul and the image the body. What then becomes of that mournful complaint that the land of Egypt, the most holy place of shrines and temples, was to be full of sepulchres and dead men? Verily, the fallacious spirit by whose inspiration Hermes spoke these things was compelled to confess through him that even already that land was full of sepulchres and of dead men whom they were worshiping as gods. But it was the grief of the demons which was expressing itself through his mouth, who were souring on account of the punishments which were about to fall upon them at the tombs of the martyrs. For in many such places they are tortured and compelled to confess, and are cast out of the bodies of men of which they had taken possession. Chapter 27 But nevertheless we do not build temples and ordain priests, rites, and sacrifices for these same martyrs, for they are not our gods, but their God is our God. Certainly we honor their reliquaries as the memorials of holy men of God who strove for the truth even to the death of their bodies that the true religion might be made known and false and fictitious religion exposed. For if there were some before them who thought that these religions were really false and fictitious they were afraid to give expression to their convictions. But whoever heard a priest of the faithful standing at an altar built for the honor and worship of God over the holy body of some martyr, say in the prayers, I offer to thee a sacrifice, O Peter, or O Paul, or O Cyprian, for it is to God that sacrifices are offered at their tombs, the God who made them both men and martyrs and associated them with holy angels and celestial honor. And the reason why we pay such honors to their memory is that by so doing we may both give thanks to the true God for their victories, and by recalling them refreshed to remembrance may stir ourselves up to imitate them by seeking to obtain light crowns and palms, calling to our help that same God on whom they called. Therefore whatever honors the religious may pay in the places of the martyrs they are but honors rendered to their memory, not sacred rites or sacrifices offered to dead men as to gods. And even such as bring to their food, which indeed is not done by the better Christians, and in most places of the world is not done at all, do so in order that it may be sanctified to them through the merits of the martyrs in the name of the Lord of the martyrs, first presenting the food and offering prayer, and thereafter taking it away to be eaten or to be in part bestowed upon the needy. But he who knows the one sacrifice of Christians, which is the sacrifice offered in those places also knows that these are not sacrifices offered to the martyrs. It is then, neither with divine honors nor with human crimes by which they worship their gods that we honor our martyrs, nor do we offer sacrifices to them or convert the crimes of the gods into their sacred rites. For let those who will and can read the letter of Alexander to his mother Olympias, in which he tells the things which were revealed to him by the priest Leon, and let those who have read it recall to memory what it contains, that they may see what great abominations have been handed down to memory, not by poets, but by the mystic writings of the Egyptians, concerning the goddess Isis, the wife of Osiris, and the parents of both, all of whom, according to these writings, were royal personages. Isis, when sacrificing to her parents, is said to have discovered a crop of barley, of which she brought some ears to the king, her husband, and his counselor, Mercurius, and hence they identify her with Ceres. Those who read the letter may there see what was the character of those people to whom, when dead, sacred rites were instituted as to gods, and what those deeds of theirs were which furnished the occasion for these rites. Let them not once dare to compare in any respect to those people, though they hold them to be gods, to our holy martyrs, though we do not hold them to be gods. For we do not ordain priests, and offer sacrifices to our martyrs, as they do to their dead men, for that would be incongruous, undue, and unlawful, such being due only to God, and thus we do not delight them with their own crimes, or with such shameful plays as those in which the crimes of the gods are celebrated, which are either real crimes committed by them at a time when they were men, or else if they never were men, fictitious crimes invented for the pleasure of not just demons. The God of Socrates, if he had a God, cannot have belonged to this class of demons. But perhaps they who wished to excel in this art of making gods imposed a God of this sort on a man who was a stranger to, and innocent of, any connection with that art. What need we say more? No one who is even moderately wise imagines that demons are to be worshiped on account of the blessed life which is to be after death. But perhaps they will say that all the gods are good, but that of the demons some are good, and some bad, and that it is the good who are to be worshiped in order that through them we may attain to the eternally blessed life. To the examination of this opinion we will devote the following book. Book 9. CHAPTERS I THROUGH-12 OF THE CITY OF GOD. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Darren L. Slider, www.logoslibrary.org. The City of God by St. Augustine of Hippo. Book 9. CHAPTER I. Some have advanced the opinion that there are both good and bad gods, but some, thinking more respectfully of the gods, have attributed to them so much honor and praise as to preclude the supposition of any god being wicked. But those who have maintained that there are wicked gods as well as good ones have included the demons unto the named gods, and sometimes, though more rarely, have called the gods demons, so that they admit the Jupiter, whom they make the king and head of old arrest, is called a demon by Homer. Those, on the other hand, who maintain that the gods are all good, and far more excellent than the men who are justly cold good, are moved by the actions of the demons, which they can neither deny nor impute to the gods whose goodness they affirm, to distinguish between gods and demons, so that, whenever they find anything offensive in the deeds or sentiments by which unseen spirits manifest their power, they believe this to proceed not from the gods, but from the demons. At the same time, they believe that as no god can hold direct intercourse with men, these demons hold the position of mediators, ascending with prayers and returning with gifts. This is the opinion of the Platonists, the ableist and most esteemed of their philosophers, with whom we therefore chose to debate this question, whether the worship of a number of gods is of any service towards obtaining blessedness in the future life. And this is the reason why, in the preceding book, we have inquired how the demons, who take pleasure in such things as good and wise men loathe and execrate in the sacrilegious and immoral fictions which the poets have written, not of men, but of the gods themselves, and in the wicked and criminal violence of magical arts, can be regarded as more nearly related and more friendly to the gods than men are, and can mediate between good men and the good gods, and it has been demonstrated that this is absolutely impossible. CHAPTER II This book, then, ought, according to the promise made in the end of the preceding one, to contain a discussion not of the difference which exists among the gods, who according to the Platonists are all good, nor of the difference between gods and demons, the former of whom they separate by a wide interval from men, while the latter are placed intermediately between the gods and men, but of the difference, since they make one, among the demons themselves. This we shall discuss so far as it bears on our theme. It has been the common and usual belief that some of the demons are bad, others good, and this opinion, whether it be that of the Platonists or any other sect, must by no means be passed over in silence, lest someone suppose he ought to cultivate the good demons in order that by their mediation he may be accepted by the gods, all of whom he believes to be good, and that he may live with them after death, whereas he would thus be ensnared in the toils of wicked spirits, and would wander far from the true god, with whom alone, and in whom alone, the human soul, that is to say, the soul that is rational and intellectual, is blessed. CHAPTER III What then is the difference between good and evil demons? For the Platonist Apolaus, in a treatise on this whole subject, while he says a great deal about their aerial bodies, has not a word to say of the spiritual virtues with which, if they were good, they must have been endowed. Not a word has he said, then, of that which could give them happiness, but proof of their misery he has given, acknowledging that their mind, by which they rank as reasonable beings, is not only not imbued and fortified with virtues so as to resist all unreasonable passions, but that it is somehow agitated with tempestuous emotions, and is thus on a level with the mind of foolish men. His own words are, It is this class of demons the poets refer to when, without serious error, they feign that the gods hate and love individuals among men, prospering in a noblin sum, and opposing and distressing others. Therefore pity, indignation, grief, joy, every human emotion is experienced by the demons with the same mental disturbance and the same tide of feeling and thought. These turmoils and tempests banish them far from the tranquility of the celestial gods. Can there be any doubt that in these words it is not some inferior part of their spiritual nature, but the very mind by which the demons hold their rank as rational beings, which he says is tossed with passion like a stormy sea? They cannot then be compared even to wise men who with undisturbed mind resist those perturbations to which they are exposed in this life, and from which human infirmity is never exempt, and who do not yield themselves to a prove of or perpetrate anything which might deflect them from the path of wisdom and law of rectitude. They resemble in character, though not in bodily appearance, wicked and foolish men. I might indeed say they are worse, in as much as they have grown old in iniquity and incorrigible by punishment. Their mind, as Apolaeus says, is a sea tossed with tempest, having no rallying point of truth or virtue in their soul from which they can resist their turbulent and depraved emotions. CHAPTER 4 Among the philosophers there are two opinions about these mental emotions which the Greeks call pathé, while some of our own writers as Cicero called the perturbations, some affections, and some, to render the Greek word more accurately, passions. Some say that even the wise men is subject to these perturbations, though moderated and controlled by reason, which imposes laws upon them, and so restrains them within necessary bounds. This is the opinion of the Platonists and Aristotelians, for Aristotle was Plato's disciple and the founder of the Parapathetic School. But others, as the Stoics, are of opinion that the wise men is not subject to these perturbations. But Cicero, in his book De Finibus, shows that the Stoics are here at variance with the Platonists and Parapathetics rather in words than in reality, for the Stoics declined to apply the term goods to external and bodily advantages, because they reckon that the only good is virtue, the art of living well, and this exists only in the mind. The other philosophers, again, use the simple and customary phraseology and do not scruple to call these things goods, though in comparison of virtue which guides our life, they are little and of small esteem. And thus it is obvious that one of these outward things are called goods or advantages, they are held in the same estimation by both parties, and that in this matter the Stoics are pleasing themselves merely with a novel phraseology. It seems then to me that in this question, whether the wise men is subject to mental passions or wholly free from them, the controversy is one of words rather than of things. For I think that if the reality and not the mere sound of the words is considered, the Stoics hold precisely the same opinion as the Platonists and Parapathetics. For omitting for brevity's sake other proofs which I might adduce in support of this opinion I will state but one which I consider conclusive. Alus Galeus, a man of extensive erudition and gifted with an eloquent and graceful style, relates in his work entitled Noctis Attike that he once made a voyage with an eminent Stoic philosopher, and he goes on to relate fully and with gusto what I shall barely state, that when the ship was tossed then in danger from a violent storm the philosopher grew pale with terror. This was noticed by those on board, who though themselves threatened with death were curious to see whether a philosopher would be agitated like other men. When the tempest had passed over, and as soon as their security gave them freedom to resume their talk, one of the passengers, a rich and luxurious Asiatic, begins to banter at the philosopher and rally him because he had even become pale with fear while he himself had been unmoved by the impending destruction. But the philosopher availed himself of the reply of Aristipus the Socratic, who on finding himself similarly bantered by a man of the same character, answered, You had no cause for anxiety for the soul of a profligate debauchee, but I had reason to be alarmed for the soul of Aristipus. The rich man, being thus disposed of, Aulus Galeus, asked the philosopher in the interests of science not to annoy him what was the reason of his fear. And he, willing to instruct a man so zealous in the pursuit of knowledge, at once took from his wallet a book of Epictetus the Stoic, in which doctrines were advanced which precisely harmonized with those of Zeno and Chrysopus, the founders of the Stoical School. Aulus Galeus says that he read in this book that the Stoics maintain that there are certain impressions made on the soul by external objects, which they call fantasia, and that it is not in the power of the soul to determine whether or when it shall be invaded by these. When these impressions are made by alarming and formidable objects, it must needs be that they move the soul even of the wise man, so that for a little he trembles with fear, or is depressed by sadness, these impressions anticipating the work of reason and self-control. But this does not imply that the mind accepts these evil impressions, or approves or consents to them. For this consent is, they think, in a man's power. There being this difference between the mind of the wise man and that of the fool, that the fool's mind yields to these passions and consents to them, while that of the wise man, though it cannot help being invaded by them, yet retains with unshaken firmness a true and steady persuasion of those things which are not rationally to desire or avoid. This account of what Aulus Galeus relates that he had read in the book of Epictetus about the sentiments and doctrines of the Stoics, I have given as well as I could, not perhaps with his choice language, but with greater brevity, and I think with greater clearness. And if this be true, then there is no difference or next to none between the opinion of the Stoics and that of the other philosophers regarding mental passions and perturbations, for both parties agree in maintaining that the mind and reason of the wise man are not subject to these. And perhaps what the Stoics mean by asserting this is that the wisdom which characterizes the wise man is clouded by no error and sullied by no taint, but with this reservation that his wisdom remains undisturbed, he is exposed to the impressions which the goods and ills of this life, or as they prefer to call them the advantages or disadvantages, make upon them. For we need not say that if that philosopher had thought nothing of those things which he thought he was forthwith to lose, life and bodily safety, he would not have been so terrified by his danger as to betray his fear by the power of his cheek. Nevertheless, he might suffer this mental disturbance and yet maintain the fixed persuasion that life and bodily safety, which the violence of the tempest threatened to destroy, are not those good things which make their possessors good as the possession of righteousness does. But insofar as they persist that we must call them not goods, but advantages they quarrel about words and neglect things. For what difference does it make whether goods or advantages be the better name, while the Stoic no less than the parapetetic is alarmed at the prospect of losing them, and while, though they name them differently, they hold them in like esteem. Both parties assure us that if urged to the commission of some immorality or crime by the threatened loss of these goods or advantages, they would prefer to lose such things as preserve bodily comfort and security rather than commit such things as violate righteousness, and thus the mind in which this resolution is well grounded suffers no perturbations to prevail with it in opposition to reason, even though they assail the weaker parts of the soul. And not only so, but it rules over them, and, while it refuses its consent and resists them, administers a reign of virtue. Such a character is described to Aeneas by Virgil when he says, He stands immovable by tears, nor tenderest words with pity hears. CHAPTER V We thee not at present give a careful and copious exposition of the doctrine of scripture the sum of Christian knowledge regarding these passions. It subjects the mind itself to God that he may rule and aid it, and the passions again to the mind to moderate and bridle them, and turn them to righteous uses. In our ethics we do not so much inquire whether a pious soul is angry as why he is angry, not whether he is sad, but what is the cause of his sadness, not whether he fears, but what he fears. For I am not aware that any right-thinking person would find fault with anger at a wrong doer which seeks his amendment, or with sadness which intends relief to the suffering, or with fear lest one in danger be destroyed. The stoics, indeed, are accustomed to condemn compassion. But how much more honorable had it been in that stoic we have been telling of, had he been disturbed by compassion prompting him to relieve a fellow creature than to be disturbed by the fear of shipwreck? Far better and more humane and more consonant with pious sentiments are the words of Cicero in Praise of Caesar when he says, Among your virtues none is more admirable and agreeable than your compassion. And what is compassion but a fellow feeling for another's misery which prompts us to help him if we can? And this emotion is obedient to reason when compassion is shown without violating right, as when the poor are relieved for the penitent forgiven. Cicero, who knew how to use language, did not hesitate to call this a virtue which the stoics are not ashamed to reckon among the vices. Although, as the book of the eminent stoic depicted us, quoting the opinions of Zeno and Crispus, the founders of the school, has taught us, they admit that passions of this kind invade the soul of the wise man whom they would have to be free from all vice. Once it follows that these very passions are not judged by them to be vices, since they assail the wise men without forcing him to act against reason and virtue, and that, therefore, the opinion of the parapetetics or platinists and of the stoics is one and the same. But, as Cicero says, mere logomachy is the bane of these pitiful Greeks who thirst for contention rather than for truth. However, it may justly be asked whether our subjection to these affections, even while we follow virtue, is a part of the infirmity of this life, for the holy angels feel no anger while they punish those whom the eternal law of God consigns to punishment, no fellow feeling with misery while they relieve the miserable, no fear while they aid those who are in danger. And yet ordinary language ascribes to them also these mental emotions because, though they have none of our weakness, their acts resemble the acts to which these emotions move us, and thus even God himself is set in scripture to be angry and yet without any perturbation. For this word is used of the effect of his vengeance, not of the disturbing mental affection. CHAPTER VI Deferring for the present the question about the holy angels let us examine the opinion of the Platonists that the demons who mediate between gods and men are agitated by passions. For if their mind, though exposed to their incursions, still remain free and superior to them, Apolaus could not have said that their hearts are tossed with passions as the sea by stormy winds. Their mind, then, that superior part of their soul were by their irrational beings, and which, if it actually exists in them, should rule and bridle the turbulent passions of the inferior parts of the soul. This mind of theirs, I say, is, according to the Platonists referred to, tossed with a hurricane of passions. The minds of the demons, therefore, are subject to the emotions of fear, anger, lust, and all similar affections. What part of them, then, is free and endued with wisdom so that they are pleasing to the gods and the fit guides of men into purity of life, since their very highest part, being the slave of passion and subject to vice, only makes them more intent on deceiving and seducing in proportion to the mental force and energy of desire they possess? CHAPTER VII But if anyone says that it is not of all the demons, but only of the wicked, that the poets, not without truth, say that they violently love or hate certain men, for it was of them, Apolaus said, that they were driven about by strong currents of emotion. How can we accept this interpretation when Apolaus, in the very same connection, represents all the demons, and not only the wicked, is intermediate between gods and men by their aerial bodies? The fiction of the poets, according to him, consists in their making gods of demons, and giving them the names of gods, and assigning them as allies or enemies to individual men, using this poetical license, though they profess that the gods are very different in character from the demons, and far exalted above them by their celestial abode and wealth of beatitude. This I say is the poet's fiction, to say that these are gods who are not gods, and that under the names of gods they fight among themselves about the men whom they love or hate, with keen partisan feeling. Apolaus says that this is not far from the truth, since, so they are wrongfully called by the names of the gods, they are described in their own proper character as demons. To this category, he says, belongs the Minerva of Homer, who interposed in the ranks of the Greeks to restrain Achilles. For that this was Minerva he supposes to be poetical fiction, for he thinks that Minerva is a goddess, and he places her among the gods whom he believes to be all good and blessed in the sublime ethereal region, remote from intercourse with men. But that there was a demon favorable to the Greeks and adverse to the Trojans, as another whom the same poet mentions under the name of Venus or Mars, God's exalted above earthly affairs and their heavenly habitations, was the Trojan's ally and the foe of the Greeks, and that these demons fought for those they loved against those they hated. In all this he owned that the poet stated something very like the truth. For they made these statements about beings to whom he ascribes the same violence and tempestuous passions as disturbed men, and who were therefore capable of loves and hatreds not justly formed, but formed in a party spirit, as the spectators and races or hunts take fancies and prejudices. It seems to have been the great fear of this plateness that the poetical fiction should be believed of the gods and not of the demons who bore their names. CHAPTER VIII The definition which Apolaus gives of demons, and in which he of course includes all demons, is that they are in nature animals, in soul subject to passion, in mind reasonable, in body aerial, in duration eternal. Now in these five qualities he has named absolutely nothing which is proper to good men and not also to bad. For when Apolaus had spoken of the Celestials first, and had then extended his description so as to include an account of those who dwell far below on the earth, that after describing the two extremes of rational being he might proceed to speak of the intermediate demons, he says, Men therefore who were endowed with the faculty of reason and speech, whose soul is immortal and their members mortal, who have weak and anxious spirits, dull and corruptible bodies, dissimilar characters, similar ignorance, who are obstinate in their audacity and persistent in their hope, whose labor is vain and whose fortune is ever on the wane, their race immortal, themselves perishing, each generation replenished with creatures whose life is swift and their wisdom slow, their death sudden and their life a whale. These are the men who dwell on the earth. In recounting so many qualities which belong to the large proportion of men did he forget that which is the property of the few when he speaks of their wisdom being slow. If this had been omitted, this his description of the human race so carefully elaborated would have been defective, and when he commended the excellence of the gods he affirmed that they excelled in that very blessedness to which he thinks men must detain by wisdom, and therefore if he had wished us to believe that some of the demons are good he should have inserted in his description something by which we might see that they have, in common with the gods, some share of blessedness, or in common with men, some wisdom. But as it is he has mentioned no good quality by which the good may be distinguished from the bad. For although he refrained from giving a full account of their wickedness through fear of offending not themselves but their worshipers for whom he was writing, yet he sufficiently indicated to discerning readers what opinion he had of them, for only in the one article of the eternity of their bodies does he assimilate them to the gods, all of whom he asserts are good and blessed, and absolutely free from what he calls himself the stormy passions of the demons. When asked of the soul he quite plainly affirms that they resemble men and not the gods, and that this resemblance lies not in the possession of wisdom which even men can attain to, but in the perturbation of passions which sway the foolish and wicked, but is so ruled by the good and wise that they prefer not to admit rather than to conquer it. For if he had wished to be understood that the demons resemble the gods in the eternity not of their bodies but of their souls he would certainly have admitted men to share in this privilege because, as a Platonist, he of course must hold that the human soul is eternal. Accordingly when describing this race of living beings he said that their souls were immortal, their members mortal, and consequently if men have not eternity in common with the gods because they have mortal bodies, demons have eternity in common with the gods because their bodies are immortal. CHAPTER IX How then can men hope for a favorable introduction to the friendship of the gods by such mediators as these, who are, like men, defective in that which is the better part of every living creature, the soul, and who resemble the gods only in the body, which is the inferior part? For a living creature or animal consists of soul and body, and of these two parts the soul is undoubtedly the better. Even though vicious and weak it is obviously better than even the soundest and strongest body, for the greater excellence of its nature is not reduced to the level of the body even by the pollution of vice, as gold, even when tarnished, is more precious than the purest silver or lead. And yet these mediators by whose interposition things human and divine are to be harmonized, have an eternal body in common with the gods and a vicious soul in common with men, as if the religion by which these demons are to unite gods and men were a bodily and not a spiritual matter. What wickedness then or punishment has suspended these false and deceitful mediators as it were head downwards so that their inferior part, their body is linked to the gods above and their superior part, the soul, bond to men beneath, united to the celestial gods by the part that serves and miserable together with the inhabitants of earth by the part that rules. For the body is the servant, as Salist says, we use the soul to rule the body to obey, adding, the one we have in common with the gods, the other with the brutes. For he was here speaking of men, and they have, like the brutes, a mortal body. These demons, whom our philosophic friends have provided for us as mediators with the gods, may indeed say of the soul and body, the one we have in common with the gods, the other with men. But as I said, they are, as it were, suspended and bound head downwards, having the slave, the body, in common with the gods, the master, the soul, in common with the miserable men. Their inferior part exalted, their superior part depressed. And therefore, if anyone supposes that because they are not subject, like terrestrial animals, to the separation of soul and body by death, they therefore resemble the gods in their eternity, their body must not be considered a chariot of an eternal triumph, but rather the chain of an eternal punishment. CHAPTER X Plotinus, whose memory is quite recent, enjoys the reputation of having understood Plato better than any other of his disciples. In speaking of human souls, he says, the father in compassion made their bonds mortal. That is to say, he considered a due to the father's mercy that men, having a mortal body, should not be forever confined in the misery of this life. But of this mercy the demons have been judged unworthy, and they have received, in conjunction with the soul subject to passions, a body not mortal like man's, but eternal, for they should have been happier than men if they had, like men had a mortal body, and like the gods, a blessed soul. And they should have been equal to men, if a conjunction with a miserable soul they had at least received, like men, a mortal body, so the death might have freed them from trouble, if at least they should have attained some degree of piety. But as it is, they are not only no happier than men, having, like them, a miserable soul, they are also more wretched, being eternally bound to the body. For he does not leave us to infer that by some progress in wisdom and piety they can become gods, but expressly says that they are demons forever. CHAPTER XI He says, indeed, that the souls of men are demons, and that men become larries, if they are good, lemuries, or larvae, if they are bad, and manes, if it is uncertain what they deserve well or ill. Who does not see at a glance that this is a mere whirlpool sucking men to moral destruction, for however wicked men may have been? If they suppose they shall become larvae or divine manes, they will become the worse the more love they have for inflicting injury, for as the larvae are hurtful demons made out of wicked men, these men must suppose that after death they will be invoked with sacrifices and divine honors that they may inflict injuries. But this question we must not pursue. He also states that the blessed are called in Greek eudaimones because they are good souls, that is to say, good demons confirming his opinion that the souls of men are demons. CHAPTER XII But at present we are speaking of those beings whom he described as being properly intermediate between gods and men, in nature animals, in mind rational, in soul subject to passion, in body aerial, in duration eternal. When he had distinguished the gods whom he placed on the highest heaven for men whom he placed on earth, not only by position but also by the unequal dignity of their natures, he concluded in these words, You have here two kinds of animals, the gods, widely distinguished for men by sublimity of abode, perpetuity of life, perfection of nature, for their habitations are separated by so wide an interval that there can be no intimate communication between them, and while the vitality of the one is eternal and indefeasible, that of the others is fading and precarious, and while the spirits of the gods are exalted in bliss, those of men are sunk in miseries. Here I find three opposite qualities ascribed to the extremes of being, the highest and lowest. For after mentioning the three qualities for which we are to admire the gods, he repeated, though in other words, the same three as a foil to the defects of man. The three qualities are sublimity of abode, perpetuity of life, perfection of nature. These he again mentioned so as to bring out their contrasts in man's condition. As he had mentioned sublimity of abode, he says, their habitations are separated by so wide an interval, as he had mentioned perpetuity of life. He says that while divine life is eternal and indefeasible, human life is fading and precarious. And as he had mentioned perfection of nature, he says that while the spirits of the gods are exalted in bliss, those of men are sunk in miseries. These three things, then, he predicates of the gods, exaltation, eternity, blessedness, and of man he predicates the opposite, lowliness of habitation, mortality, misery. End of Book 9, chapters 1 through 12, recording by Darren L. Slider, Fort Worth, Texas, www.logoslibrary.org. Book 9, chapters 13 through 23 of The City of God. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. The City of God by St. Augustine of Hippo. Book 9, chapter 13. If now we endeavor to find between these opposites the mean occupied by the demons, there can be no question as to their local position. For between the highest and lowest place there is a place which is rightly considered and called the middle place. The other two qualities remain, and to them we must give greater care, that we may see whether they are all together foreign to the demons, or how they are so bestowed upon them without infringing upon their immediate position. We may dismiss the idea that they are foreign to them, for we cannot say that the demons, being rational animals, are neither blessed nor wretched as we save the beasts and plants, which are void of feeling and reason, or as we save the middle place, that it is neither the highest nor the lowest. The demons, being rational, must be either miserable or blessed. And in like manner we cannot say that they are neither mortal nor immortal, for all living things either live eternally or end life and death. Our author, besides, stated that the demons are eternal. What remains for us to suppose, then, but that these immediate beings are assimilated to the gods in one of the two remaining qualities, and to men and the other? For if they received both from above, or both from beneath, they should no longer be immediate, but either rise to the gods above or sink to men beneath. As it has been demonstrated that they must possess these two qualities, they will hold their middle place if they receive one from each party. Consequently, as they cannot receive their eternity from beneath, because it is not there to receive, they must get it from above. And accordingly, they have no choice but to complete their immediate position by accepting misery from men. According to the Platonists, then, the gods who occupy the highest place enjoy eternal blessedness or blessed eternity, men who occupy the lowest a mortal misery or a miserable mortality, and the demons who occupy the mean a miserable eternity or an eternal misery. As to those five things which Apolaus included in his definition of demons, he did not show, as he promised, that the demons are immediate. For three of them, that their nature is animal, their mind rational, their soul subject to passions, he said that they have in common with men, one thing their eternity in common with the gods, and one proper to themselves their aerial body. How then are they intermediate when they have three things in common with the lowest, and only one in common with the highest? Who does not see that the intermediate position is abandoned in proportion as they tend to and are depressed towards the lowest extreme? But perhaps we are to accept them as intermediate because of their one property of an aerial body, as the two extremes have each their proper body, the gods and ethereal, men of terrestrial body, and because two of the qualities they possess in common with man, they possess also in common with the gods, namely their animal nature and rational mind. For Apolaus himself, in speaking of gods and men, said, you have two animal natures, and Platonists are want to describe a rational mind to the gods. Two qualities remain, their liability to passion and their eternity, the first of which they have in common with men, the second with the gods, so that they are neither wafted into the highest nor depressed to the lowest extreme, but perfectly poised in their intermediate position. But then this is the very circumstance which constitutes the eternal misery or miserable eternity of the demons. For he who says that their soul is subject to passions, would also have said that they are miserable had he not blushed for their worshipers. Moreover, as the world is governed not by fortuitous haphazard, but as the Platonists themselves avow by the providence of the supreme god, the misery of the demons would not be eternal unless their wickedness were great. If then the blessed are rightly styled you demons, the demons intermediate between gods and men are not you demons. What then is the local position of those good demons, who above men, but beneath the gods, afford assistance to the former minister to the latter? For if they are good and eternal they are doubtless blessed, but eternal blessedness destroys their intermediate character, giving them a close resemblance to the gods and widely separating them from men. And therefore the Platonists will in vain strive to show how the good demons, if they are both immortal and blessed, can justly be said to hold a middle place between the gods, who are immortal and blessed, and men, who are mortal and miserable. For if they have both immortality and blessedness in common with the gods, and neither of these in common with men, who are both miserable and mortal, are they not rather remote for men and united with the gods than intermediate between them? They would be intermediate if they held one of their qualities in common with the one party and the other with the other, as man is a kind of mean between angels and beasts, the beast being irrational and mortal animal, the angel irrational and immortal one, while man inferior to the angel and superior to the beast, and having in common with the one mortality, with the other reason, is irrational and mortal animal. So when we seek for an intermediate between the blessed immortals and miserable mortals, we should find a being which is either mortal and blessed, or immortal and miserable. CHAPTER XIV It is a great question among men whether man can be mortal and blessed. Some, taking the humbler view of his condition, have denied that he is capable of blessedness so long as he continues in this mortal life. Others again have spurred this idea and have been bold enough to maintain that even though mortal, men may be blessed by attaining wisdom. But if this be the case, why are not these wise men constituted mediators between miserable mortals and the blessed immortals, since they have blessedness in common with the latter and mortality in common with the former? Certainly if they are blessed they envy no one for what more miserable than envy, but seek with all their might to help miserable mortals on to blessedness, so that after death they may become immortal and be associated with the blessed and immortal angels. CHAPTER XV But if, as is much more probable and credible, it must needs be that all men, so long as they are mortal, are also miserable, we must seek an intermediate who is not only man, but also God, that by the interposition of his blessed mortality he may bring men out of their mortal misery to a blessed immortality. In this intermediate two things are requisite, that he become mortal and that he do not continue mortal. He did become mortal, not rendering the divinity of the word infirm, but assuming the infirmity of flesh. Neither did he continue mortal in the flesh, but raised it from the dead, for it is the very fruit of his mediation that those for the sake of whose redemption he became the mediator should not abide eternally and bodily death. Wherefore it became the mediator between us and God to have both a transient mortality and a permanent blessedness, that by that which is transient he might be assimilated to mortals and might translate them from mortality to that which is permanent. Good angels therefore cannot mediate between miserable mortals and blessed immortals, for they themselves also are both blessed and immortal. But evil angels can mediate because they are immortal like the one party, miserable like the other. To these is opposed the good mediator, who in opposition to their immortality and misery has chosen to be mortal for a time and has been able to continue blessed in eternity. It is thus he is destroyed by the humility of his death and the benignity of his blessedness, the proud immortals and hurtful wretches, and has prevented them from seducing to misery by their boast of immortality those men whose hearts he has cleansed by faith and whom he has thus freed from their impure dominion. Man then, mortal and miserable, and far removed from the immortal and the blessed, what medium shall he choose by which he may be united to immortality and blessedness? The immortality of the demons which might have some charm for man is miserable, the mortality of Christ which might offend man exists no longer. In the one there is the fear of an eternal misery, and the other death which could not be eternal can no longer be feared, and blessedness which is eternal must be loved. For the immortal and miserable mediator interposes himself to prevent us from passing to a blessed immortality, because that which hinders such a passage, namely misery, continues in him. But the mortal and blessed mediator interposed himself in order that, having passed through immortality, he might have mortals make immortals, showing his power to do this in his own resurrection, and from being miserable to raise them to the blessed company from the number of whom he had himself never departed. There is then a wicked mediator who separates friends and a good mediator who reconciles enemies, and those who separate are numerous because the multitude of the blessed are blessed only by their participation in the one God, of which participation in the evil angels being deprived they are wretched and interposed to hinder rather than to help to this blessedness, and by their very number prevent us from reaching that one beatific good to obtain which we need not many but one mediator, the uncreated word of God by whom all things were made, in a partaking of whom we are blessed. I do not say that he is a mediator because he is the word, for as the word he is supremely blessed and supremely immortal, and therefore far from miserable mortals. But he is mediator as he is man, for by his humanity he shows us that, in order to obtain that blessed and beatific good, we need not seek other mediators to lead us through the successive steps of this attainment, but that the blessed and beatific God, having himself become a partaker of our humanity, has afforded us ready access to the participation of his divinity. For in delivering us from our mortality and misery he does not lead us to the immortal and blessed angels, so that we should become immortal and blessed by participating in their nature, but he leads us straight to that trinity by participating in which the angels themselves are blessed. Therefore when he chose to be in the form of a servant and lower than the angels that he might be our mediator, he remained higher than the angels in the form of God, himself at once the way of life on earth, and life itself in heaven. CHAPTER XVI That opinion which the same Platonist averse that Plato uttered is not true that no God holds intercourse with men. And this, he says, is the chief evidence of their exaltation that they are never contaminated by contact with men. He admits therefore that the demons are contaminated, and it follows that they cannot cleanse those by whom they are themselves contaminated, and thus all of life become impure, the demons by associating with men and men by worshipping the demons. Or if they say that the demons are not contaminated by associating and dealing with men, then they are better than the gods, for the gods were they to do so would be contaminated. For this we are told is the glory of the gods that they are so highly exalted that no human intercourse can sully them. He affirms indeed that the Supreme God, the creator of all things whom we call the true God, is spoken of by Plato as the only God whom the poverty of human speech fails even passably to describe, and that even the wise, when their mental energy is as far as possible delivered from the tramples of connection with the body, have only such gleams of insight into his nature as may be compared to a flash of lightning illuminating the darkness. If then this Supreme God, who is truly exalted above all things, does nevertheless visit the minds of the wise when emancipated from the body with an intelligible and effable presence, though this be only occasional, and as it were a swift flash of light a thwart the darkness, why are the other gods so sublimely removed from all contact with men as if they would be polluted by it, as if it were not a sufficient refutation of this to lift up our eyes to those heavenly bodies which give the earth its needful light. If the stars, though they by his account are visible gods, are not contaminated when we look at them, neither are the demons contaminated when men see them quite closely. But perhaps it is the human voice and not the eye which pollutes the gods, and therefore the demons are appointed to mediate and carry men's utterances to the gods who keep themselves remote through fear of pollution? What am I to say of the other senses? For by smell, neither the demons who are present nor the gods, though they were present in inhaling the exhalations of living men, would be polluted if they are not contaminated with the effluvia of the carcasses offered in sacrifice. As for taste, they are pressed by no necessity of repairing bodily decay so as to be reduced to ask food for men, and touches in their own power. For while it may seem that contact is so called, because the sense of touch is especially concerned in it, yet the gods, if so minded, might mingle with men so as to see and be seen, hear and be heard, and wear us the need of touching. For men would not dare to desire this if they were favored with the sight or conversation of gods or good demons, and if, through excessive curiosity, they should desire it, how could they accomplish their wish without the consent of the god or demon when they cannot touch so much as a sparrow unless it be caged. There is then nothing to hinder the gods from mingling in a bodily form with men from seeing and being seen, from speaking and hearing. And if the demons do thus mix with men, as I said, and are not polluted, while the gods, were they to do so, would be polluted, then the demons are less liable to pollution than the gods. And if even the demons are contaminated, how can they help men to attain blessedness after death, if, so far from being able to cleanse them and present them clean to the unpolluted gods, these mediators are themselves polluted. And if they cannot confer this benefit on men, what good can their friendly mediation do? Or shall its result be not that men find entrance to the gods, but that men and demons abide together in a state of pollution, and consequently of exclusion from blessedness? Unless, perhaps, someone may say that, like sponges or things of that sort, the demons themselves, in the process of cleansing their friends, become themselves the filthier and proportionless the others become clean. But if this is the solution, then the gods, who shun contact or intercourse with men for fear of pollution, mix with demons who are far more polluted. Or perhaps the gods, who cannot cleanse men without polluting themselves, can, without pollution, cleanse the demons who have been contaminated by human contact. Who can believe such follies, unless the demons have practiced their deceit upon him? If seeing and being seen is contamination, that of the gods, whom Apolaus himself calls visible, the brilliant lights of the world, and the other stars are seen by men, are we to believe that the demons, who cannot be seen unless they please, are safer from contamination? Or if it is only the seeing, and not the being seen, which contaminates, then they must deny that these gods of theirs, these brilliant lights of the world, see men when their rays beam upon the earth. Their rays are not contaminated by lighting an all manner of pollution, and are we to suppose that the gods would be contaminated if they mixed with men, and even if contact were needed in order to assist them? For there is contact between the earth and the suns or moons rays, and yet this does not pollute the light. CHAPTER XVII I am considerably surprised that such learned men, men who pronounce all material and sensible things to be altogether inferior to those that are spiritual and intelligible, should mention bodily contact and connection with a blessed life. Is that sentiment of plotness forgotten? We must fly to our beloved Fatherland. There is the Father, there are all. What fleet or flight shall convey us thither? Our way is to become like God. If then one is nearer to God the liker he is to him, there is no other distance from God than unlikeness to him, and the soul of man is unlike that incorporeal and unchangeable and eternal essence in proportion as it craves things temporal and mutable. And as the things beneath which are mortal and impure cannot hold intercourse with the immortal purity which is above, a mediator is indeed needed to remove this difficulty, but not a mediator who resembles the highest order of being by possessing an immortal body and the lowest by having a diseased soul which makes him rather grudge that we be healed than help our cure. We need a mediator who, being united to us here below by the mortality of his body, should at the same time be able to afford us truly divine help in cleansing and liberating us by means of the immortal righteousness of his spirit, whereby he remained heavenly even while here upon earth. Far be it from the incontaminable God to fear pollution from the man he assumed, or from the man among whom he lived in the form of a man. For, though his incarnation showed us nothing else, these two wholesome facts were enough that true divinity cannot be polluted by flesh, and that demons are not to be considered better than ourselves because they have not flesh. This then, as Scripture says, is the mediator between God and man, the man Christ Jesus, of whose divinity whereby he is equal to the Father, and humanity whereby he has become like us, this is not the place to speak as fully as I could. CHAPTER 18 This to the demons, these false and deceitful mediators, who, though their uncleanness of spirit frequently reveals their misery and malinity, yet by virtue of the levity of their aerial bodies and the nature of the places they inhabit, do contrive to turn us aside and hinder our spiritual progress, they do not help us towards God but rather prevent us from reaching Him. See, it is even in the bodily way which is erroneous and misleading, and in which righteousness does not walk, for we must rise to God not by bodily ascent, but by incorporeal or spiritual conformity to Him. In this bodily way, I say, which the friends of the demons arrange according to the weight to the various elements, the aerial demons being set between the ethereal gods and earthy men, they imagine the gods to have this privilege, that by this local interval they are preserved from the pollution of human contact. Thus they believe that the demons are contaminated by men rather than men cleansed by the demons, and that the gods themselves should be polluted unless their local superiority preserved them. Who is so wretched a creature is to expect purification by a way in which men are contaminating demons contaminated and gods contaminable. Who would not rather choose that way whereby we escape the contamination of the demons and are cleansed from pollution by the incontaminable God so as to be associated with the uncontaminated angels? CHAPTER XIX But as some of these demodulators, as I may call them, and among them Labéo, allege that those whom they call demons are by others cold angels, I must, if I would not seem to dispute merely about words, say something about the good angels. The Platonists do not deny their existence but prefer to call them good demons. But we, following Scripture, according to which we are Christians, have learned that some of the angels are good, some bad, but never have we read in Scripture of good demons. But wherever this or any cognate term occurs it is applied only to wicked spirits. And this usage has become so universal that even among those who are called pagans, and who maintain that demons as well as gods should be worshipped, there is scarcely a man no matter how well read and learned, who would dare to say by way of praise to his slave, you have a demon, or who could doubt that the man to whom he said this would consider it a curse? Why then are we to subject ourselves to the necessity of explaining away what we have said when we have given a fence by using the word demon, with which everyone or almost everyone connects a bad meaning, while we can so easily evade this necessity by using the word angel? Chapter 20 However, the very origin of the name suggests something worthy of consideration if we compare it with the divine books. They are called demons from a Greek word meaning knowledge. The apostle, speaking with the Holy Spirit, says knowledge puffeth up, but charity buildeth up. And this can only be understood as meaning that without charity knowledge does no good, but inflates a man or magnifies him with empty windiness. The demons then have knowledge without charity, and are thereby so inflated or proud that they crave those divine honors and religious services which they know to be due to the true God, and still, as far as they can, exact these from all over whom they have influence. Against this pride of the demons, under which the human race was held subject as its merited punishment, there was exerted the mighty influence of the humility of God, who appeared in the form of a servant, but men resembling the demons in pride but not in knowledge, and being puffed up with uncleanness, failed to recognize him. Chapter 21 The devils themselves knew this manifestation of God so well that they said to the Lord, then clothed with the infirmity of flesh, what have we to do with thee, Jesus of Nazareth? Art thou come to destroy us before the time? From these words it is clear that they had great knowledge and no charity. They feared his power to punish, and did not love his righteousness. He made known to them so much as he pleased, and when he was pleased to make known so much as was needful. But he made himself known not as to the holy angels who know him as the word of God, and rejoice in his eternity, which they partake, but as was requisite to strike with terror the beings from whose tyranny he was going to free those who were predestined to his kingdom and the glory of it, eternally true and truly eternal. He made himself known therefore to the demons, not by that which is life eternal, and the unchangeable light which illumines the pious whose souls are cleansed by the faith that is in him, but by some temporal effects of his power, and evidences of his mysterious presence which were more easily discerned by the angelic senses even of wicked spirits than by human infirmity. But when he judged it advisable gradually to suppress these signs, and to retire into deeper obscurity, the prince of the demons doubted whether he were the Christ and endeavored to ascertain this by tempting him insofar as he permitted himself to be tempted that he might adapt the manhood he wore to be an example for our imitation. But after that temptation, when, as scripture says, he was ministered to by the angels who were good and holy, and therefore objects of terror to the impure spirits, he revealed more and more distinctly to the demons how great he was, so that even though the infirmity of his flesh might seem contemptible, one dared to resist his authority. CHAPTER XXII The good angels therefore hold cheap all that knowledge of material and transitory things which the demons are so proud of possessing. Not that they are ignorant of these things, but because the love of God whereby they are sanctified is very dear to them, and because in comparison of that not merely immaterial, but also unchangeable and ineffable beauty with the holy love of which they are inflamed, they despise all things which are beneath it, and all that is not it, that they may with every good thing that is in them enjoy that good which is the source of their goodness. And therefore they have a more certain knowledge even of those temporal and mutable things, because they contemplate their principles and causes in the word of God by which the world was made, those causes by which one thing is approved, another rejected, and all arranged. But the demons do not behold in the wisdom of God these eternal, and as it were cardinal causes of things temporal, but only foresee a larger part of the future than men do by reason of their greater acquaintance with the signs which are hidden from us. Sometimes too it is their own intentions they predict, and finally the demons are frequently the angels never deceived. For it is one thing by the aid of things temporal and changeable to conjecture the changes that may occur in time and to modify such things by one's own well and faculty, and this is to a certain extent permitted to the demons, it is another thing to foresee the changes of times in the eternal and immutable laws of God which live in his wisdom, and to know the will of God, the most infallible and powerful of all causes by participating in his spirit, and this is granted to the holy angels by a just discretion. And thus they are not only eternal, but blessed, and the good wherein they are blessed as God by whom they were created, for without end they enjoy the contemplation and participation of him. If the Platonists prefer to call these angels gods rather than demons, and to reckon them with those whom Plato, their founder and master, maintains were created by the Supreme God, they are welcome to do so, for I will not spend strength in fighting about words. For if they say that these beings are immortal, and yet created by the Supreme God, blessed, but by cleaving to their Creator and not by their own power, they say what we say, whatever name they call these things by. And that this is the opinion either of all or the best of the Platonists can be ascertained by their writings. And regarding the name itself, if they see fit to call such blessed and immortal creatures gods, this need not give rise to any serious discussion between us, since in our own scriptures we read, the God of gods the Lord had spoken, and again confessed to the God of gods, and again he is a great King above all gods. And where it is said he is to be feared above all gods, the reason is forthwith added, for it follows, for all the gods of the nations are idols, but the Lord made the heavens. He said above all gods but added of the nations, that is to say above all those whom the nations count gods, in other words, demons. By them he is to be feared with that terror in which they cry to the Lord, has thou come to destroy us? But where it is said, the God of gods, it cannot be understood as the God of the demons, and far be it from us to say that great King above all gods means great King above all demons. But the same scripture also calls men who belong to God's people, gods. I have said, ye are gods, and all of you children of the most high. Accordingly, when God has styled God of gods, this may be understood of these gods, and so too when he has styled a great King above all gods. Nevertheless someone may say, if men are called gods because they belong to God's people, whom he addresses by means of man and angels, are not the immortals who already enjoy that felicity which men seek to attain by worshiping God, much more worthy of the title. And what shall we reply to this, if not that it is not without reason that in holy scripture men are more expressly styled gods than those immortal and blessed spirits to whom we hope to be equal in the resurrection, because there was a fear that the weakness of unbelief, being overcome with the excellence of these beings, might presume to constitute some of them a God. In the case of men, this was a result that need not be guarded against. Besides, it was right that the men belonging to God's people should be more expressly called gods to assure and certify them that he who is called God of gods is their God, because although those immortal and blessed spirits who dwell in the heavens are called gods, yet they are not called gods of gods, that is to say, gods are the men who constitute God's people, and to whom it is said, I have said, ye are gods, and all of you the children of the most high. That's the saying of the apostle, though there be that are called gods, whether in heaven or in earth, as there be gods many and lords many, but to us there is but one God, the Father, of whom are all things, and we in him, and one Lord Jesus Christ, by whom are all things, and we by him. We need not therefore laboriously contend about the name since the reality is so obvious as to admit of no shadow of doubt. That which we say, that the angels who are sent to announce the will of God to men, belong to the order of blessed immortals, does not satisfy the Platonists, because they believe that this ministry is discharged, not by those whom they call gods, in other words, not by blessed immortals, but by demons whom they dare not affirm to be blessed, but only immortal, or if they do rank them among the blessed immortals, yet only as good demons, and not as gods who dwell in the heaven of heavens, remote from all human contact. But though it may seem mere wrangling about a name, yet the name of demon is so detestable that we cannot bear in any sense to apply it to the holy angels. Now therefore let us close this book in the assurance that, whatever we call these immortal and blessed spirits, who yet are only creatures, they do not act as mediators to introduce to everlasting felicity miserable mortals, from whom they are severed by a twofold distinction. And those others who are mediators, insofar as they have immortality in common with their superiors, and misery in common with their inferiors, for they are justly miserable in punishment of their wickedness, cannot bestow upon us but rather grudge that we should possess the blessedness from which they themselves are excluded. And so the friends of the demons have nothing considerable to allege why we should rather worship them as our helpers than avoid them as traitors to our interests. As for those spirits who are good, and who are therefore not only immortal but also blessed, and to whom they suppose we should give the title of gods and offer worship and sacrifices for the sake of inheriting a future life, we shall, by God's help, endeavor in the following book to show that these spirits, called them by what name and ascribed to them what nature you will, desire that religious worship be paid to God alone, by whom they were created, and by whose communications of himself to them they are blessed.