 might actually mislead me into whether the real risk has been reduced or not. I guess the right answer is probably that yes, but not as much as the numbers suggest. A second question, and I didn't think about this before, but of course you were saying the procedures for compression are idiosyncratic to say each maybe CCP or whoever is in charge of doing this, and they are opaque. So what about risk of litigation? So the question is if there is a shock that produces the default of one of the counterparties after compression, the losses are gonna be allocated in different way than before compression. So can it be that then exposed you litigate for the choice of a particular compression algorithm that is favoring some parties against another? Again, maybe it's unfair to give this question to you. I will actually just in the interest of time ask the audience if there is some question from the audience and then the collect all these for you. Yeah. Very interesting presentation. Thank you very much. My question relates to the increased dependence of the system on compression as a technique. Have you put any thought into the scenario under which compression would suddenly cease to be available and there would be a sudden radical expansion there for margining costs? And what would those circumstances look like? Okay. I think Marco, you can ask. So to answer your first question, Javier. So the problem I think relates a lot to counterparty risk. So of course you can hedge a lot by going to different counterparties. So you have a net position and then you want to keep hedging and hedging this position. The main problem is that if you counterparties cannot pay you back, this becomes the gross becomes relevant. So it is very important that we understand the role of gross and what we talk about size of a market and we talk about size of asset size, liabilities. If we really understand this, I think it would greatly help to also monitoring and understand where counterparty risk lies. Also it has an important point in terms of understanding how this market work. So again, one trillion credit default swap on a sovereign does not mean that there is a request for insurance of one trillion. This is a key point that needs to be understood, I believe in terms of signaling probably. The second point about the procedure and the litigation, I cannot answer properly to this question because my legal background is extremely limited. So it's surely an avenue of research. So compression providers, I believe, tend to work out this type of agreements within master agreements and of course that occurs with the CCP that's already in place. In case of a default, I don't know, it would be definitely interesting to investigate. Dependence on compression technique to come to your point. I think this is a very good point. There's a research by Isda recently, came out like, I'm sorry, not that recently anymore, about a year ago, arguing that it's actually, if you take into account how much has been community-compressed, markets have been contrary expanded with respect to the pre-crisis level, to the immediate pre-crisis. So of course there are assumptions in that research. So one need to look very much into the assumptions that go into the construction of this figure. So my take is that now we have eliminated a lot in the market, so a lot has been compressed, that could have been compressed. I believe that given the type of the service in case there was a key provider leaving the market, maybe someone else could step in because there are several providers in the market. But this is absolutely a key question that we need to understand. So that is the dependence of market participants from external providers. And this is not the counterparty, again. It is just external providers to them. So thank you. I think in the interest of time, trains and flights, we are gonna close here. Thank you to all who stay until the end. Thank you to the ESRB for organizing such a great second conference.