 I's denken on being here last in the late 1990s, before Ireland had come into Nato's partnership for peace. And I do remember that I haven't been smuggled sort of in over the back garden hall at the time. I think that probably the Irish authorities were only too glad when my plaint took off in the afternoon. Because of course at that time, Ireland's relation i gyd Caerdydd arnyn i'r chion wahanol. Ond, yn hawdd arall, gan gael gydag unig i gydag greddiadau i gydag 60 gyda fi hynny, gweithio sy'n gwybod o'r dyfodol yn ei ei gydig sy'n antimony o'r mir o'r pysigau yma, gyda Cosevo, Bosnia, ffyrnes i gael i'w afganist wedi yn ei ddweud antol o feithio ar y pari ac o bandurio dyfodol yn y cyfaint ar yr angen yw spideradau ar y correddau. Mae'n gwneud hynny'r cyfle hwn o'r cyfligiau cyfligiau, y bwysig o'r cyffredinol sydd yn cyfligiau sydd yn cyfligiau cyfligiau. Rydych chi'n meddwl sut mae'n meddwl ymlaen. Mae'n meddwl am rhaid, mae'n iawn o'r pricursau o'r cyfligiau sydd ymlaeni'r feddwl. Mae'n hoffi bod rhaid oedd yma yn ymlaen yn ymlaen i ffyrdd y nifer o'r llunio, yn ymlaen i'r prys. Mae'n meddwl i'r llunio i'r artychau the NATO exercise a few weeks ago looking up there. That experience has helped you as well as you continue to play this very active role in world affairs, being involved with nearly 600 troops in 11 different peace support operations around the world. That's a great record that you should be proud of. So, it's great to come here today through the front door to be warmly welcomed. Not to have to rush off to the airport immediately afterwards and also to have an audience. Gael, mae'n unig i ddalch yn dweud yn cynnigion, gallwn i mi'n gwneud..] goseth o ran nadeynwyd a hynny wedi amser, ymlaen i dda wedi'i mynd ei gwirionedd mewn gwirionedd a'r ynchydigion oedd ymlaen nhw, fath yma chi'n gweithio'r ysgol ymlaen ei dda, a gwneud ei weld hynny'n wneud hynny, byddech chi'n gwybod, mae'n siaradb ei obon hynny mae'n digwydd gweithio ymlaen nesgr chi fod yn cymdeithas ymlaen. Ond llawer, mae'n gydag myned causedabol yw'r tyliadau gwahydol gyda'r gwasanaeth i'r newid yn bod y cwrs yn dweud gwahanol, yn dweud gwahanol i allu gweithio'i gwahanol i gael cael ei fod fel gwahanol. Mae'n gwybod wedi'i ddod allan i'r hyn sy'n bywyd gan hyn o'r gwahanol Iain, ond yna ffiddeol Castro o Lyonid Bresnif, yr aroeli gael cyfleid o'r hynod, i gael yn ymweld, rydym ni'n gweithio'n gwybod, nid i'n rai ei wneud hynny, i'ch gilydd computation yn y gynllun. Ac rydyn ni'n gondol i'n edrych gweithio felly i'w gweithio, yn gallu gan wyf yn oed o yüzden ar y drafodau oedd cyfryliau cynghwyl ac nid i fy modd yn ei ddefnyddio clywed. Rhywoddiwch chi'n ddigon i'r summit O Chicago. Rydych chi'n dwylo dros y cwrdd. Rhywoddi wedi mwyci yn Nato, яwn allan gyfathor i'n gwneud hynny, hynny'n cyfeirio blaenigo, gryfwyr, ac rwy'n credu i'r cyfnod o'r cyfnod o'r cyfnod, ond mae hi'n gweithio i'r llwyddoedd, rydyn ni'n mynd i ddim yn dweud. Rhyw oedd ymlaen i Afghanistan. ISAF, yn ymgyrchau, yn y 31 deisembraf 2014. Rhyw oedd ymlaen i Afghanistan o'r llwyddoedd yn ymddi, yn ymgyrch yn ymddi, rydyn ni'n gweithio i Afghanistan o'r 10 ymddi, oedd ymddi i'r cyfnod o'r cyfnod o'r cyfnod o'r Afganistan, Ac wedi gynnig ydych chi am y ddweud y troi'r ysgrifennu rhaglen sy'n gyffredinol yma o'r ysgrifennu rhaglen. Mae'n ei gwybr â'r cyfnod o'r roi'r rhaglen i'w gwbl i'r cyffredinol yma i'r cyffredinol yma o'r rhaid i ffordd. Mae'r rhai cyffredin o'r roi'r cyffredinol, mae'r rhaglen i'r roi'r cyffredinol. Mae'n hynny'n gyfosio eu wneud oes y cyffredinol sy'n gwneud. Uroedodwch gweld yn gwneud am y syniadau Cymru, sy'n absorbedu unrhyw o'r rhan oed o'r rhaglenio gyda cael eu bodi'n gweithredu ein amser o Gymru. O�'n gweithredu ym Mhlyneddau Gweithredu mewn ym Mhlyneddau. Ym ystafell, hanes yw y rhan o'r bwysig yn ymddangos ar ôl, dyma'ch cyfrifio a'i birio awdurdid yma sy'n codi a faeth, daeth y Llanfa Ffaldigol, mae'r Gweithredu Cymru yn ymdweith, yma'n gweithredu ffondi. O unwar, have do we plan that drawged down, because combat operations have to continue if they are required until 31 December? But of course it becomes more difficult when troops are preparing for their departure. So, how do we sort of phase out the NATO withdrawal. That also phase is in the assumption of responsibility of the Afghan forces so that we use the time that maximum number of NATO soldiers that's being in theater to get the maximum clygwch yn y ffawr ar y ddweud ar gyfer Yn Ysgrifennu Ffawr Ffawr Ffawr. Yn ystod ar gyfer Yn Ysgrifennu Ffawr Ffawr Ffawr, mae chi'n dweud yw ddweud yn ôl eu gweithio'r flynyddu fel y ddechrau ar y ffawr Ffawr. Felly, y dweud eich dweud yn adfodol ar gweithio'r ffawr yn y ddweud ar gyfer Yn Ysgrifennu Ffawr. Yn ysgrifennu Ffawr Ffawr Ffawr, a'r unrhyw gweithio cymdeithasol yw'r unrhyw gweithio Afgan oherwydd yna yn ynnodd i'r cyfrifol yma ymweld yma o'r unrhyw gweithio Afgan oherwydd yma. Felly mae'n progres. Yn y gweithio gweithio gweithio, mae'n gweithio ar y cwrs 2014. Mae'r ddigisio'n dweud yn y Shiwchag, dwi'n ddweud ymweld yma. Ynm wneud y faisaf yw fy nid yw'r nableig o gyfwil yn Afganistan. Mae hyn yn rhan o'r busyn. Yn rhan o'r busyn y gallwn hynny'n mynd i'r iawn. Fy gweithio'r ystafell. Mae'n gwybod iddo i chi fydd yw pethol. Dyna fwy o 20000 o gwybod spnolig. Ynrhyw y ffyrdd i'r Afganistan sy'n gweithdo'r 2014. Gweithio'su'n ddweud peithio? Mae'n dysgu eitio yn chi'n gwasrym eitio ym… o'r kaboedd o'r ddwy jechyd ymd이지ll, ymwneud y trofyneth i ddiwethaf i ddweud i ddeuwn i gael cymryd yn cyfartwyr hyn. Mae'r bwysig ffawr o'r ddisgu'r cymryd, oherwydd o'r rai a'r afganau, sy'n mynd i ddod am ffawr o'r cymryd cymryd ymlaen nhw'n ddiwrnod cymryd. Mae'r ddweud hynny – hynny'n gweithio'r cymryd o'r ddiwethaf. Mae'r ddweud eich cymryd i'r ddweud eich gweithio, ymddangos ar gyfer y penedig ganwch, 4.1 billion for an Afghan force, which will go down from 356,000 to 230,000, but how is that going to be sustained over the long run? The aim in Chicago was that within 10 years the Afghans will issue full financing of that force. Will they be able to? How is it going to be shared around? The NATO countries, as you can quite well imagine, having borne the brunt of the cost of ISAF for a decade already, would dearly like other countries, China, India, Russia, the Arab countries, the Gulf countries, to assume some of that financial burden. Will it be feasible? Those are issues that we still have to decide. Of course, one big question is the partners, 22 partner countries, have been with us in Afghanistan. In fact, the biggest troop contributor per capita is Tonga, Australia, 10th largest contributor. These partners, of course, have been intrinsic to the mission. Which ones are willing to stay on? We've had indications from Australia, Sweden so far, but how about the other 20? Of course, one issue at NATO, which I think we're well aware of, is that as we start a new mission, a training mission, it's going to be very important for those partners to come forward early on and identify themselves as being willing also to stay on, but that we also at NATO engage them as much as possible in consultations in the planning so that they feel as if they are fully fledged participants, no taxation without representation from the word go. So we have to have basically the initial planning directive for that follow on mission agreed in Brussels before the summer break so that knowing what we're transitioning to, we can plan the draw down in a way which obviously facilitates that. For example, countries need to know what they're doing. The Dutch were in a situation where they pulled out a lot of equipment two years ago, only then to decide that they were going to participate in the training and had to send all that equipment back, which was a great expense. We need to try to obviously avoid that situation. Second big issue in Chicago was the echoes of the Gates speech. I used to be a speech writer and I've spent a lot of my life giving speeches, but I envy Bob Gates, the former US Defense Secretary, because most of the speeches that I've given have sort of disappeared without a trace, which is probably quite reasonable given the quality of my speeches. But the speech that Bob Gates gave in Brussels last summer when he expressed his dissatisfaction with the European burden sharing in the alliance and you recall famously said that NATO might well have a dim if not dismal future if the Europeans didn't do more. That speech has had a massive impact on NATO, on NATO governments. It's mobilized massive efforts to overhaul the European defense contribution. And Chicago was the first sort of fruit of that effort in something that we call smart defense. We start off, frankly, from a very alarming background. Ten years ago, the United States spent 48% of the collective NATO budgets. That figure is now at 75%, even if it would be unfair to say that 75% of NATO is a single European ally. Notwithstanding 20 years of the common foreign security policy and European defense integration, today 95% of European forces are nationally constituted and directed. 75% of European defense contracts are solely national sourced. So there's very little integration around Europe. The European Commission calculates that at the very minimum, recovering from the current financial crisis will cost an additional 1% of GDP of the EU countries for the next 20 years. This produces a figure of about $140 billion a year, which is half of the total EU defense budget. So 50% of that money will be required for debt repayment. Already, we've seen around the alliance dramatic defense cuts in Libya. We had an aircraft carrier provided by Italy that ran out of money after two weeks. I've never known in NATO's history a piece of, kept being pulled back for financial rather than for operational or political reasons. The Europeans ran out of precision guided munitions after eight days. We had no 24-7 Europe, let's say, air cover, surveillance cover, no drones. The United States was able to provide one tanker for every six fighter aircraft. The European was one for every 28 fighter aircraft. 90% of all of the European air operations over Libya were directly, directly supported by the United States in terms of targeting, in terms of intelligence, in terms of search and rescue tanker support. So Gates obviously had a point. It wasn't just the grumblings of someone leaving office. Now it's going to take, as you can imagine, a long time to rectify that situation and arguably with the money that Europe spends on defence, which is still more than Russia, China and India combined. Even if, according to the IISS in London, this year we'll see for the first time more defence spending in Asia than in Europe. But still, this is still quite a packet of money that we should be able to use to increase the European contribution to NATO. So smart defence is not just something which is important for the Europeans, but has become a kind of litmus test of the American view of the utility of the alliance in the future. Chicago, as I said, was a down payment. We had three major projects all based on the pooling and sharing model. Missile defence essentially contributed by the Americans on the ground, on Aegis ships in the Mediterranean. But with the Europeans providing progressively one billion euros for the command and control architecture, the French providing satellite reconnaissance, the Germans and Dutch providing patriot air defence aircraft, the Spanish providing the Port of Rota as a base, the Dutch and the Spanish upgrading their radars, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. This is an example of a pooling arrangement. Second example was air policing. The Baltic states agreed to provide six million extra dollars a year to pay for the host nation support of the allies that send fighter aircraft to the Baltics to cover their air defence so that they don't spend on expensive supersonic aircraft. The third pro quo in return is that they contribute a brigade to Afghanistan and invest in ground forces. Third area, Allied Ground Surveillance, the procurement of five global hawks to provide what we lacked in Libya, the all-weather 24-7 coverage, the contract for that was signed in Chicago. And again, the idea now is to base this signella in Italy in a dedicated intelligence surveillance reconnaissance centre which can share know-how and best practice throughout the alliance. The other side of smart defence was essentially a set of so-called tier one commitments. In other words, first commitments by groups of allies to pool things given that they are similar in size, similar in capabilities, regional groupings, if you like. In other words, instead of NATO going to nations all the time and saying, hey, we've got a requirement for tanks. What can you, the Dutch, what can you, the Belgians, do? This time we allow groups of nations to come forward saying this is the status of military requirements and we can contribute that bit, this bit of the jigsaw puzzle because we have a capability and we're willing to invest in upgrading it. So instead of the top-down approach, it's now the bottom-up approach and we've got 20 initial projects. But I have to be honest and say that this is only a start. Why? Well, the first thing is many of the projects deal with sort of support capabilities, logistics, training, education, all good stuff. But rather than providing attack helicopters or a real hard capability or rationalising existing systems like spare parts for F-16s or pilot training for helicopters, then again producing a new capability. That's the first thing. The second thing, of course, is the top-down, the bottom-up approach relies largely on what people are willing to contribute, which is not always what is the priority. And we have to make sure that all of these individual initiatives make up a coherent whole. The third thing is that we have also certain sort of more philosophical issues that we have to come to terms with. For example, availability. If we pull equipment, how am I certain that if a crisis comes, I'll be able to use that capability? If country A has to go to its parliaments and get national approval before that capability can be deployed, which is the case with some allies, Germany is a notable example, it's that compatible with another country wanting to deploy that capability early. For example, if countries don't have the capability but participate in common funding for its use, will they then have the certainty that they will be able to use that capability? These kind of issues. Defense, as I said at the beginning, is an area where national sovereignty is still key. You need a lot of political trust before you start merging tanks and attack helicopters and all these kind of things. So this idea of how we settle the presumption of availability is key, people are going to invest. Another issue, for example, is partners. These kind of groupings, should we open them up immediately to partners on the basis of the reality that Sweden operated over the skies of Libya, whereas many allies didn't? So Sweden shared more of the burden on that particular case. I mentioned the 22 in Afghanistan, so should we operate on the logic that we'll always be doing operations with partners in the future and therefore fold them into these more traditional NATO collective defence type of arrangements, at least in terms of capability development right from the very beginning? Of course, it's great to do that, but some allies believe that NATO's defence should rely first and foremost on the allies, and although partners make extremely valuable contributions, we shouldn't get ourselves into a situation where we start depending on partners in order to be able to do our mission. So there is a big philosophical debate there that we have to resolve. The next thing, of course, is that as NATO sort of goes down with the financial crisis, the amount of multinational capability that you have starts to diminish. The command structure, for those of you who are connoisseur of this, know the command structure has gone from 11 headquarters down to 7, from 13,000 to under 8,000 forces, and that means to say that you can no longer cover all of your need through the multinational assets that you have at your disposal. And I was forces assigned to NATO. So you have to basically then go out to the nations and say, look, give me this, give me that, more of a UN type of approach where NATO does the planning but then has to generate all of the forces, many of them from within nations. So how can we assure that people in our national headquarters know how to work with NATO? People in the NATO headquarters know how to work with nations. How can we know what is potentially available out there to do our missions? This is going to be a major thing for the future. And then finally, of course, we need our nations to be more upfront with us about what they're planning when it comes to defence cuts. They often cut first and inform us later. And we would like to have a more versatile NATO defence planning process that could essentially you do find out in advance what nations are planning to do so that we can influence their decisions or at least the way they go about it before we are presented with a FET accompli, particularly in trying to make sure that national decisions are geared to NATO priorities. Yes, it's a no brainer, ladies and gentlemen. We lack money and therefore we have to go multinational as in every other area of life. But how we do it in practical terms in a way that makes it politically attractive to defence ministers and politically appetising for them is, I think, going to be the key. The third area, which came out of Chicago, is partners. We and of course Ireland here is directly in this perspective. I mentioned the operations, the cruciality of partners. We now have this global network that extends in Central and Eastern Europe, North Africa, the Middle East, Asia. But many of these partnerships have been based around operations. Australia has never signed an agreement with NATO, at least not until very recently. It's come in through the operations, through contributing and gradually building up interoperability, intelligence sharing, common doctrine on that basis. What happens after 2014 when everybody goes home and you potentially have, for the first time in NATO's existence, NATO not planning to fight somebody, not in an operation, not preparing for an operation, a sort of NATO at peace? Well, you could laugh at me and say, Jamie, that's not going to happen. There's always an operation. There's always a crisis. Look at Libya. Look at Yugoslavia. Nobody ever predicted these things. And that's true. That may well be the case, but there is also potentially a scenario where NATO could be not doing an operation for some time to come. And one of the big issues at NATO at the moment is, God, all of this experience that we've gained in Afghanistan painfully at the cost of blood as well as treasure of working together, the way in which the European armies have sort of upgraded their ability to do things like combat through the experience of Afghanistan working together. You know, a operation is the best exercise that you can conceive of. You know, how are we going to sort of lock in in the long run, that interoperability, that connectedness? How are we going to prevent gradual sort of re-nationalisation of defence so that some countries go off in the direction of expeditionary forces? Others go off in the direction of Article 5, collective defence, territorial forces, reserves. And you then in a future sort of situation have to go back to the drawing board in rebuilding this common doctrine and connectivity. So how can we therefore keep partners involved? Of course, nobody has the money for major exercises any longer like we had, you know, reforger during the Cold War, 60,000 American troops, 8,000 Canadians coming back to Europe every year. So how can we use sort of technology, you know, computer assisted training and education? One idea, for example, is the NATO Response Force to use that more and more for what it was intended to do to train an exercise. In the United States, while announcing that it's removing two combat brigade teams from Europe, also announced that one combat brigade team in Texas will be on station to return to Europe every year to train with the NATO Response Force. And again, should partners, as part of that interoperability, participate in these type of activities? So how do we preserve our partners? Now, looking to the future, I promise to be brief, I haven't, but I promise to end briefly. Where are we going? I mean, at the moment in Brussels, there's a lot of soul searching about, you know, covardist NATO after 2014. The Alliance, as I've said, has been in the business of doing operations since the collapse of the Berlin Wall. When one operation has finished, another one has begun. And if you look at NATO today, the result is very much the experience of operations, working with the EU, the UN. This wouldn't have happened, not in the way it did, had it not been for operations, the pressure on the ground. The partners, I mentioned that already, working with civilian agencies, the new NATO military doctrines, it's all geared on the fact that we do operations. The whole business model, if I can use that term, has been built around that particular paradigm. So there's a bit of soul searching at the moment. What will be, therefore, NATO's function after 2014 if there's no Afghanistan going on to keep us in the media headlines, to give us the resources from governments, to be the central pillar around which NATO folds in all of these other partners? I think, therefore, there are sort of three models. This is barring another Afghanistan coming along. Model number one is a return to core business in Europe type model. Let's be frank, there are many allies, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe, who would like NATO to return to its sort of core collective defence Article 5 mission. In the new strategic concept, that core central mission of NATO, Article 5 collective defence, was reaffirmed up front. So it's a perfectly legitimate request to make of the alliance. After all, that is what we exist for. And some allies may feel that these operations out of theatre have left them exposed in Europe, or would like more reassurance. It's called strategic reassurance. When I worked with Madeleine Albrighton, the group of experts on NATO's new strategic concept, this idea of strategic reassurance, so contingency planning, Article 5 exercises, the NATO response force in a collective defence role, the Baltic air policing, reassurance that NATO's still took this seriously. It hadn't become a paper guarantee. This was really something that was very instrumental in the debate. So you can imagine that post 2014 there are some allies who would like NATO to sort of come home as it were and refocus on preserving the balance of power. What terminology could we use these days? But at least in Europe. Now, again, I understand this desire. It's core business of NATO. And indeed there are, there's lots of unfinished legacies of the Cold War that we still need to address. For example, we have tactical nuclear weapons, so does Russia. And we haven't yet succeeded in starting an arms control negotiation to remove those weapons or at least have more transparency about their potential doctrine, where they're located, et cetera. We have missile defence. You've seen the Russian reaction to NATO's initial capability, the even statements about countermeasures involved with putting missiles into cleaning ground. Again, that shows a lack of trust, notwithstanding NATO's desire to work with Russia on missile defence. We've still got exercises where both sides have, you know, question marks about each other's military planning and exercises. We have a situation where neither NATO nor Russia today are observing the provisions of the CFE Treaty vis-à-vis each other, the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe. There is that kind of legacy which we have to somehow go back to because it hasn't gone away simply because the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. But my own view is that it would not be the best solution 20 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall for NATO's main sort of raison d'etre to be to maintain the military balance of power in Europe. We do not want to create new dividing lines, quite the opposite. We want a partnership with Russia. We're going to work on that steadfastly. So, yes, let's do Article 5 in Europe, but let's not only do collective defence Article 5 in Europe. The second paradigm, very briefly, is a kind of, you know, NATO that sort of waits for the next operation to come along. And which in a way would be rather like Manchester United where Alex Ferguson says, look, I'm sorry boys, but the football season has been cancelled. I'm not sure when the next one is going to come along. But in the meantime, we need to train every day to keep our skills, keep Rooney up front and to be ready. And this is often, NATO, there is debate here about what is the core NATO. What is the core NATO that we have to keep? The political directors from the NATO Defence Ministers will be meeting soon to try to define, you know, in an age of austerity, what is the core that we must have? Do we have to have a cyber defence capability as part of that? Does it mean missile defence? Do we have to have, you know, things like AWACs, observation platforms? What kind of command structures do we need? You know, what can we get rid of? Because we can reconstitute it in a crisis. But what do we have to keep? A ring fence from cuts so that if Libya comes along, we can respond in eight days rather than eight weeks. We've got, you know, a potential surge capability to build up. You know, what is it? What is fundamental? I think that's going to be a difficult debate because some people inevitably will see that only as doing another Afghanistan. You know, the core is an expeditionary mission. Others will interpret it more in, for example, territorial defence. Certain countries of Central and Eastern Europe would like that core capability to reserve the ability to do a multi joint operation plus, in other words, an article five, contingency type of exercise. Is that something that should be a priority? Others like myself want these core capabilities to include the ability, for example, to monitor cyber space, to do early warning, to do forensics, to continue to build in the NATO computer incident response capability, the rapid response teams, all of the things that we have developed for cyber defence. In other words, to extend collective defence into the area of the new challenges, but looking at resilience, you know, looking at the ability to recover quickly from those kind of attacks. So that's the second model. It's a kind of, you know, sort of NATO in hibernation but ready to bounce back model. The third model, which is my preference I have to say, is to continue NATO's post Cold War development even in an age of austerity. In other words, to stay true to the strategic concept, to keep NATO as a comprehensive security organisation and not just a collective defence organisation, to keep it involved in the broad range of security issues and not simply hard end military operations, to continue to interact with partners. What would this mean? Well, first of all, we have to be successful at preserving the global network of partners. Secondly, we have to keep the focus on the emerging security challenges, which are the things that are attacking us every day of the week. 5.5 billion cyber attacks recorded last year. It's very easy, of course, for the Allies to be sometimes dubious about NATO's role in dealing with the emerging security challenges. Why? Well, reason number one is many of them are civilian in nature. 95% of cyber is owned and operated by the private sector. There's a view that, you know, if one ally is attacked, only that ally suffers. You know, it's not like a conventional attack where everybody is affected. You do an energy cut off concerns country X. So you should solidarity apply where only one country is affected. Number three, you know, you need in developing these kind of strategies to have a very broad multi stakeholder approach. The UN does it well. The OSCE, where I was at this morning, the Irish Presidency, Conference on Cyber does it well, linking up with the private sector NGOs. NATO still is an organisation largely built around the military corps interacting with foreign and defence ministries. Nothing against those. They're very good. But we don't deal with, you know, intelligence services so much, Department of Homeland Security, interior ministry, police, you know, which is what you the kind of arrangements you need. So NATO would have to move in these directions to be more effective at dealing with these challenges. But I think above all, the major issue is that they don't lend themselves to all on nothing approach. You know, NATO has been in the situation in the last 20 years where we've either been 100% of the solution of something. Well, I'm exaggerating a bit, but a major, major stakeholder or we've not been involved at all. So Bosnia, who had the biggest responsibility there initially, NATO, Kosovo, Afghanistan. You know, nobody else has 150,000 troops in Afghanistan. So NATO has either owned a problem more or less for better or for worse or it, you know, Iraq, Syria at the moment hasn't been involved at all. So the problem with the new challenges is that you can't be all on nothing. You could be 10% of this, 20% of that. You know, you have to be a team player supporting somebody else. You can't be in the lead all the time. So the organisation has to sort of work out, you know, how it's going to relate to this broader multi-stakeholder community and to be happy, you know, not to be in the lead, but to be occupying a niche. And this is a bit of a cultural change for an organisation which is used to leading from the front and taking on the major sort of crisis management role. That said, I'm a firm believer that this is the only way to go because this is the nature of modern security and the new diplomacy. It is multi-stakeholder. The governments in cyber don't control the domain. They don't control the means of controlling that domain. The private sector has better threat analysis in many cases. And of course you're dealing with a multitude of different actors whose behaviour you can't influence through traditional diplomacy and who are not going to give up because in the cyber world they're not put off by the cost. There's no cost. They're not put off by geographical obstacles. They don't suffer from exhaustion. You can't tell them when they're losing as you can as a traditional state. So these problems are not going to go away. And for better or for worse, we need to find a way of dealing with them. Next thing, if we're going to continue on the lines of the strategic concept, we have to get NATO more involved in political consultation, intelligence sharing, early warning. We can't always wait for the attack to happen and then figure out how to respond. It's not easy to do prevention. People talk about it without being able to define it. But we need to think harder about how we can use NATO's political machinery to head off problems. And then if I may finally, on this note before I stop, if NATO is not going to be doing operations around the globe after Afghanistan, if I don't know, but one thing is for certain, others will be. The UN has about 22 different operations out there in the field today. Other organisations, African Union, ECOWAS, Arab League, tentatively, but still other regional organisations are beginning to step up to the plate. So somebody will be doing the peacekeeping somewhere. Many of these organisations suffer from problems we've known for a long time, training, equipment, strategic airlift, Medevac, the capacity building areas. And NATO, I believe, can use many of its instruments, Allied Command Transformation, Allied Command Operations, the centres of excellence that we've built up for training and education purposes on behalf of others. We haven't done many hybrid missions in the past. In fact, the first experience we had of working with the UN with the dual key in Bosnia was not a happy hybrid experience for us. You remember, we prefer to do things by ourselves. But the future I think is going to be a hybrid. The EU has done a lot of these things with the UN in Zaire, with the African Union in Somalia. And I think we also are going to have to be more comfortable with the idea that we are sharing an operation with another international organisation, providing backup and support. At the end of the day, they have the responsibility, African solutions for African problems. They do not want our boots on the ground. But NATO now has at least in the UN achieved a sort of legitimacy we didn't have before in terms of the willingness of these organisations to work with us. Look at the Arabs over Libya or the African Union in Darfur or Somalia. And we should build on this and increasingly see how we can be a facilitator or trainer for others and not only have them sort of following on behind ours. So there is a third scenario, which is to keep NATO, as I say, useful and engaged in all these issues, even in an age of austerity. I know that in this country Winston Churchill is not necessarily a heroic figure for historical reasons, which I truly understand. But when he was Chancellor of the Exchequer once said that gentlemen, we have run out of money and now we must think. And I think this is probably quite a good motto for NATO in the next decade as well. Thank you very much. Thank you.