 Chapter 5 of the Life of Washington, Volume 2 by John Marshall. This LibriVox recording is in the public domain. Chapter 5, Lord and Sir William Howe arrived before New York. Circulate letter of Lord Howe. State of the American Army. The British Land Enforce on Long Island. Battle of Brooklyn. Evacuation of Long Island. Fruitless negotiations. York Evacuated. Skirmish on the Heights of Harlem. Letter on the State of the Army. 1776. While Congress was deliberating in Philadelphia on the great question of independence, the British fleet appeared before New York. Lord and Sir William Howe arrived before New York. On evacuating Boston, General Howe had retired to Halifax where he proposed to remain until reinforcement should arrive from England. But the situation of his army in that place was so uncomfortable, and the delays in the arrival of the troops from Europe were so great that he had resolved to sail for New York with the forces already under his command. June 10 in the latter end of June he arrived off Sandy Hook in that gray hound and on that 29th of that month the first division of the fleet from Halifax reached that place. The division soon followed and that troops were landed on Staten Island July 3 and 4 on the 3rd and 4th of July. They were received with great demonstrations of joy by the inhabitants who took the oaths of allegiance to the British Crown and embodied themselves under the authority of the late Governor Tryon for the defense of the island. Strong assurances were also received from Long Island and the neighboring parts of New Jersey to the positions of a great proportion of the people to the royal cause. It was foreseen that the provisions remaining on the small islands about New York must fall into the possession of the invading army and General Washington had intended to remove them to a place of safety but the existing state of public opinion requiring the cooperation of the several committees this measure of wise precaution could not be completely executed on his arrival obtained ample supplies for his army. The command of the fleet destined for the American service was entrusted to Lord Hal, the brother of the general and they were both constituted commissioners for restoring peace to the colonies and granting pardons with such exceptions as they should think proper to make. He arrived at Staten Island on the 12th of July. July 12, the difficulty of closing the Hudson against an enemy possessing a powerful fleet was soon demonstrated to frigates past the batteries without injury and took a station which enabled them to cut off the communication by water between the army and New York and that at Ticonderoga an attempt to set these frigates on fire failed in its execution and only a tender was burnt soon after which these vessels returned to the fleet. Circular letter of Lord Hal, July 14 Lord Hal was not deterred by the Declaration of Independence from trying the influence of his powers for pacification. He sent on short by a flag a circular letter dated off the coast of Massachusetts addressed severally to the late governors under the crown enclosing a declaration which he requested them to make public. This declaration announced his authority to grant pardons to any number of description of persons who during the tumult and disorders of the times might have deviated from their just allegiance and who might be willing by a speedy return to their duty to reap the benefits of the royal favor and to declare any colony, town, port or place in the peace and under the protection of the crown and accepted from the penal provisions of the active parliament prohibiting all trade and intercourse with the colonies. Assurances were also given that the meritorious services of all persons who should aid and assist in restoring public tranquility in the colonies or in any parts thereof would be duly considered. July 19 these papers were immediately transmitted by the commander-in-chief to Congress who resolved that they should be published in the several gazettes that the good people of the United States might be informed of what nature were the commissioners and what the terms with the expectation of which the insidious court of Britain had sought to amuse and disarm them and that the few who still remain suspended by a hope founded either in the justice or moderation of their late king might now at length be convinced that the valor alone of their country is to save its liberties. About the same time Lord Howe sent with a flag a letter addressed to George Washington Esquire which the general refused to receive as it did not acknowledge the public character with which he was invested by Congress and in no other character could he have any intercourse with his lordship in a resolution approving this proceeding Congress directed that no letter or message be received on any occasion whatever from the enemy by the commander-in-chief or others the commanders of the American army but such as shall be directed to them in the characters they respectively sustain. July 20 the commissioners felt some difficulty in recognizing either the civil or military character conferred on individuals by the existing powers in America and yet it was desirable either for the purpose of effecting a pacification or if that should be impracticable of increasing the divisions already existing to open negotiations and hold out the semblance of restoring peace. They cast about for means to evade this preliminary obstacle to any discussion of the terms they were authorized to propose and at length Colonel Patterson, Adjutant General of the British Army was sent on shore by General Howe with a letter directed to George Washington et cetera et cetera et cetera he was introduced to the general whom he addressed by the title of Excellency and after the usual compliments opened the subject of his mission by saying that General Howe much regretted the difficulties which had arisen respecting the address of the letters that the mode adopted was deemed consistent with propriety and was founded on precedent in cases of ambassadors and plenty of potentiaries where disputes or difficulties had arisen about rank that General Washington might recollect he had last summer addressed a letter to the Honorable William Howe that Lord and General Howe did not mean to derogate from his rank or the respect due to him and that they held his person and character in the highest esteem but that the direction with the addition of et cetera et cetera implied everything which ought to follow Colonel Patterson then produced a letter which he said was the same that had been sent and which he laid on the table the general declined receiving it and that a letter directed to a person in a public character should have some description or indication of that character otherwise it would be considered as a mere private letter it was true the et cetera implied everything and they also implied anything that the letter to General Howe alluded to was an answer to one received from him under a like address which having been taken by the officer on duty he did not think proper to return and therefore answered in the same mode of address and that he should absolutely decline any letter relating to his public station directed to him as a private person Colonel Patterson then said that General Howe would not urge his delicacy farther and repeated his assertions that no failure of respect was intended after some conversation relative to the treatment of prisoners Colonel Patterson said that the goodness and benevolence of the king had induced him to appoint Lord Howe and General Howe his commissioners to accommodate the unhappy dispute at present subsisting that they had great powers and would derive much pleasure from effecting the accommodation and that he wished this visit would be considered as the first advance towards so desirable an object General Washington replied that he was not best with any powers on this subject but he would observe that so far as he could judge from what had yet transpired Lord Howe and General Howe were only empowered to grant pardons that those who had committed no fault wanted no pardon and that the Americans were only understanding what they deemed their indubitable rights this Colonel Patterson said would open a very wide field for argument and after expressing his fears that an adherence to forms might obstruct business of the greatest moment and concern he took his leave the substance of this conversation was communicated to Congress who directed its publication August the reinforcements to the British Army of whom about 450 had been captured by the American cruiser General Howe had also been joined by the troops from Charleston his strength was estimated at 24,000 men State of the American Army to this army alike formidable for its numbers, its discipline, and its equipments aided in its operations by a numerous fleet and conducted by commanders of skill and experience was opposed a force unstable in its nature incapable from its structure of receiving discipline and inferior to its enemy in numbers and arms and in every military equipment it consisted when General Howe landed on Staten Island of 10,000 men who were much enfeeble by sickness the diseases which always afflict new troops were increased by exposure to the rain and night air without tense at the instance of the general some regiments stationed in the different states were ordered to join him and in addition to the requisitions of men to serve until December requisitions not yet complied with the neighboring militia were called into service for the exigency of the moment yet in a letter written to Congress on the 8th of August he stated that for the several posts on New York, Long and Governor's Island and Paul's Hook the army consisted of only 17,225 men of whom 3,668 were sick and that to repel an immediate attack he could count certainly on no other addition to his numbers than a battalion from Maryland under the command of Colonel Smallwood this force was rendered the more inadequate to its objects by being necessarily divided for the defense of posts some of which were 15 miles distant from others with navigable waters between them these things continued the letter are melancholy but they are nevertheless true I hope for better under every disadvantage my utmost exhaustion shall be employed to bring about the great end we have in view and so far as I can judge from that professions and apparent dispositions of my troops I shall have their support the superiority of the enemy and the expected attack do not seem to have depressed their spirits these considerations lead me to think that though the appeal may not terminate so happily as I could wish that the enemy will not succeed in their views without considerable loss any advantage they may gain I trust will cost them dear soon after this letter the army was reinforced by Smallwood's regiment and by two regiments from Pennsylvania with a body of New England and New York militia which increased to 27,000 men of whom one fourth were sick a part of the army was stationed on Long Island under the command of Major General Sullivan the residue occupied different stations on York Island except two small detachments one on Governor's Island and the other at Paul's book and except a part of the New York militia under General Clinton who were stationed on the sound towards New Rochelle and about East and West Chester in order to oppose any sudden attempt which landed above Kingsbridge and cut off the communication with the country July 2 expecting daily to be attacked and believing that the influence of that first battle would be considerable the commander-in-chief employed every expedient which might act upon that enthusiastic love of liberty that indignation against the invaders of their country and that native courage which were believed to animate the bosoms of his soldiers and which were relied on as substitutes for discipline and experience the time say his orders issued soon after the arrival of General Howe is now near at hand which must determine whether Americans are to be freemen or slaves whether they are to have any property they can call their own whether their houses and farms are to be pillaged and destroyed and themselves consigned to a state of wretchedness from which no human efforts will deliver them the fate of unborn millions will now depend under God on the courage and conduct of this army our cruel and enemy leaves us only the choice of a brave resistance or the most subject submission we have therefore to resolve to conquer or to die our own our country's honor call upon us for a vigorous and manly exertion and if we now shamefully fail we shall become infamous to the whole world let us then rely on the goodness of our cause and the aid of the supreme being in whose hands victory is to animate and encourage us to great and noble actions the eyes of all our men are now upon us and we shall have their blessings and praises if happily we are the instruments of saving them from the tyranny meditated against them that is therefore animate and encourage each other and show the whole world that a free man contending for liberty on his own ground is superior to any slavish mercenary on earth to the officers he recommended coolness and time of action and to the soldiers strict attention and obedience with a becoming firmness and spirit he assured them that officers soldier or core distinguished by any acts of extraordinary bravery should most certainly meet with notice and rewards whilst on the other hand those who should fail in the performance of their duty would certainly be exposed and punished July 21 whilst preparations were making for the expected engagement intelligence was received of the repulse of the British squadron which had attacked Fort Moultrie the commander chief availed himself of the occasion of communicating this to his army to add a spirit of emulation to the other motives which should impel them to manly exertions this glorious example of our troops he said under the like circumstances with ourselves the general hopes will animate every officer and soldier to imitate and even to out do them when the enemy shall make the same attempt on us with such a bright example before us of what can be done by brave men fighting in defense of their country we shall be loaded with a double share of shame and if we do not acquit ourselves with courage and manifest a determined resolution to conquer or die as the crisis approach to his anxiety increased endeavoring to breathe into his army his own spirit and to give them his own feeling he thus addressed them the enemy's whole reinforcement is now arrived so that an attack must and will soon be made the general therefore again repeats his earnest request that every officer and soldier will have his arms and ammunition in good order keep within his quarters than encampments as far as possible be ready for action at a moment's call and when called to it remember that liberty property life and honor are all at stake that upon their courage and conduct rest the hopes of their bleeding and insulted country that their wives children and parents expect safety from them only and that we have every reason to believe that heaven will crown with success so just to cause the enemy will endeavor to intimidate by show and appearance remember they have been repulsed on various occasions by a few brave Americans their cause is bad and if opposed with firmness and coolness on their first onset with our advantage of works and knowledge of the ground the victory is most assuredly ours every good soldier will be silent and attentive wait for orders and reserve his fire until he is sure of doing execution of this the officers are to be particularly careful he directed explicitly that any soldier who should attempt to conceal himself or retreat without orders should instantly be shot down and solemnly promised to notice and reward those who should distinguish themselves thus did he by infusing those sentiments which would stimulate to the greatest individual exertion into every bosom endeavor to compensate for the want of arms of discipline and of numbers as the defense of Long Island was intimately connected with that of New York Brigade had been stationed at Brooklyn opposed capable of being maintained for a considerable time an extensive camp had been marked out and fortified at the same place Brooklyn is a village on a small peninsula made by East River the bay and go and scope the encampment fronted the mainland of the island and the work stretch quite across the peninsula from whale bought Bay in the East River on the left to a deep marsh on a creek emptying into go and scope on the right the rear was covered and defended against an attack from the ships by strong batteries on Red Hook and on Governor's Island which in a great measure commanded that part of the bay and by other batteries on East River which kept open the communication with York Island in front of the camp was a range of hills covered with thick woods which extended from east to west nearly the length of the island and across which were three different roads leading to Brooklyn Ferry these hills though steep are everywhere passable by infantry the British land enforced on Long Island the movements of General Howe indicating an intention to make his first attack on Long Island General Sullivan was strongly reinforced early in the morning of the 22nd the principal part of the British Army under the command of General Clinton landed under cover of the guns of the fleet and extended from the Ferry at the narrows through Utrecht and graves into the village of Flatland July 23 confident that engagement must soon take place General Washington made still another effort to inspire his troops with the most determined courage the enemy said he and addressing them have now landed on Long Island and the hour is fast approaching on which the honor and success of this army and the safety of our bleeding country depend remember officers and soldiers that you are free men fighting for the blessings of liberty that slavery will be your portion and that of your posterity if you do not acquit yourselves like men he repeated instructions respecting their conduct in action and concluded with the most animating and encouraging exhortations July 25 Major General Putnam was now directed to take command at Brooklyn with a reinforcement of six regiments and he was charged most earnestly by the commander in chief to be in constant readiness for an attack and regard the woods between the two camps with his best troops General Washington had passed the day at Brooklyn making arrangements for the approaching and at night had returned to New York the hashings under General De Heister composed the center of the British army at Flatbush Major General Grant commanded the left wing which extended to the coast and the greater part of the British forces under General Clinton Earl Percy and Lord Cornwallis turned short to the right and approached the opposite coast of Flatland the two armies were now separated from each other by the range of hills already mentioned the British center at Flatbush was scarcely four miles distant from the American lines at Brooklyn and a direct road led across the heights from the one to the other another road rather more circuitous than the first led from Flatbush by the way of Bedford a small village on the Brooklyn side of the hills the right and left wings of the British army were nearly equidistant from the American works and about five or six miles from them the road leading from the narrows along the coast and by the way of Gowens Co they took the right route to their left and their right night either returned by the way of Flatbush and unite with the center or take a more circuitous course and enter a road leading from Jamaica to Bedford these several roads unite between Bedford and Brooklyn a small distance in front of the American lines the direct road from Flatbush to Brooklyn was defended by a fort which the Americans had constructed in the hills and the coast and Bedford roads were guarded by detachments in the hills within view of the British camp light parties of volunteers were directed to patrol on the road leading from Jamaica to Bedford about two miles from which near Flatbush Colonel Miles of Pennsylvania was stationed with a regiment of riflemen the convention of New York had ordered General Wood Hall with the militia of Long Island to take post on the high grounds as near the enemy as possible but he remained at Jamaica and seemed scarcely to suppose himself under the control of the regular officer commanding on the island July 27 about nine at night General Clinton silently drew off the van of the British Army across the country in order to seize a pass in the heights about three miles east of Bedford on that Jamaica road in the morning about two hours before daybreak within half a mile of the pass his patrols fell in with and captured one of the American parties which had been stationed on this road learning from his prisoners that the pass was unoccupied General Clinton immediately seized it on the appearance of day the whole column passed the heights and advanced into the level country between them and Brooklyn before Clinton has secured the passes on the road from Jamaica General Grant advanced along the coast at the head of the left wing with ten pieces of cannon as his first object was to draw the attention of the Americans from their left he moved slowly skirmishing as he advanced with the light party stationed on that road this movement was then communicated to General Putnam who reinforced the parties which had advanced in front and as General Grant continued to gain ground still stronger detachments were employed in this service about three in the morning Brigadier General Lord Sterling was directed to meet the enemy with the two nearest regiments on the road leading from the Narrows major General Sullivan who commanded all the troops without the lines advanced at the head of a strong detachment on the road leading directly to Flatbush while another detachment occupied the heights between that place in Bedford about the break of day General Lord Sterling reached the summit of the hills where he was joined by the troops which had been already engaged and were retiring slowly before the enemy who almost immediately appeared in sight a warm cannonade was commenced on both sides which continued for several hours and some sharp but not very close skirmishing took place between the infantry Lord Sterling being anxious only to defend the pass he guarded could not descend in force from the heights and General Grant did not wish to drive him from them until the plan which had been entrusted to Sir Henry Clinton should be executed Battle of Brooklyn and evacuation of Long Island in the center General De Heister soon after daylight began to cannonade the troops under General Sullivan but did not move from his ground at Flatbush until the British right had approached the left and rear of the American line in the meantime in order the more effectively to draw their attention from the point where the grand attack was intended the fleet was put in motion and a heavy cannonade was commenced on the battery at Red Hook about half past eight the British right having then reached Bedford in the rear of Sullivan's left General De Heister ordered Colonel Donop's corps to advance to the attack of the hill following himself with the center of the army the approach of Clinton was now discovered by the American left which immediately endeavored to regain the camp at Brooklyn while retiring from the Widsbyte regiments about the same time the Hessians advanced from Flatbush against that part of the detachment which occupied the direct road to Brooklyn General Sullivan commanded in person but he found it difficult to keep his troops together long enough to sustain the first attack the firing heard towards Bedford had disclosed the alarming fact that the British had turned their left flank and were getting completely into their rear perceiving it once the full danger of their situation they sought to escape it by regaining the camp at most possible, celerity the sudden rout of this party enabled the Heister to detach a part of his force against those who were engaged near Bedford in that quarter two the Americans were broken and driven back into the woods and the front of the column led by General Clinton continuing to move forward intercepted and engage those who were retreating along the direct road from Flatbush thus attack both in front and rear and alternately driven by the British on the Hessians back again on the British succession of skirmishes took place in the woods in the course of which some parts of core forced their way through the enemy and regained the lines of Brooklyn and several individuals saved themselves under cover of the woods but a great proportion of the detachment was killed or taken the fugitives were pursued up to the American works and such as represented to have been the order of the British soldiers that it required the authority of their cautious commander to prevent an immediate assault the fire towards Brooklyn gave the first intimation to the American right that the enemy had gained their rear Lord Sterling perceived the danger and that he could only escape it by retreating instantly across the creek this movement was immediately directed and to secure it his lordship determined to attack in person a British core under Lord Cornwallis station that a house rather above the place that which he intended to cross the creek about 400 minutes of small woods regiment were drawn out for this purpose the attack was made with great spirit this small core was brought up several times to the charge and Lord Sterling stated that he was on the point of dislodging Lord Cornwallis from his post but the force in his front increasing a general grant also advancing on his rear the brave men he commanded were no longer able to oppose the superior numbers which assailed them on every quarter and those who survived were with their general made prisoners of war this attempt though unsuccessful gave an opportunity to a large part of the attachment to save themselves by crossing the creek the law sustained by the American Army in this battle could not be accurately ascertained by either party numbers were supposed to have been drowned in the creek or suffocated in the marsh whose bodies were never found and exact accounts from the militia are seldom to be obtained as the list of missing is always swelled by those who return to their homes general Washington did not admit it to exceed a thousand men but in this estimate included only the regular troops in the letter written by general how the amount of prisoners is stated at 1097 among whom were major general Sullivan and Brigadier Lord Sterling and Woodhall by him named Udall he computes the loss of the Americans at 3,300 men but his computation is probably excessive he supposes to that the troops engaged on the heights amounted to 10,000 but they could not have much exceeded half that number his own loss is stated at 21 officers and 346 privates killed wounded and taken as the action became warm general Washington passed over to the camp at Brooklyn where he saw with inexpressible anguish the destruction of which his best troops were involved and from which it was impossible to extricate them should he attempt anything in their favor with the men remaining within the lines it was probable the camp itself would be lost and that whole division of his army destroyed should he bring over the remaining battalions from New York he would still be inferior in point of numbers in his whole army perhaps the fate of his country might be staked on the issue of a single battle thus in auspiciously commenced compelled to behold the carnage of his troops without being able to assist them his efforts were directed to the preservation of those which remained July 28 believing the Americans to be much stronger than they were in reality and unwilling to commit anything to hazard General Howe made no immediate attempt to force their lines he encamped in front of them and on that 28th that night broke ground in form within 600 yards of a redoubt on the left July 29 in this critical state of things General Washington determined to withdraw from Long Island this difficult movement was effected on that night of the 28th with such silence that all the troops and military stores with a greater part of the provisions and all the artillery except such heavy pieces as could not be drawn through this roads rendered almost impassable by the rains which had fallen were carried over in safety early next morning the British outpost perceived the rear guard crossing the East River out of reach of their fire from the commencement of the action on the morning of the 27th until the American troops had crossed the East River on the morning of the 29th the exertions and fatigues of the commander and chief were incessant throughout that time he never closed his eyes and was almost constantly on horseback the manner in which this critical operation was executed and the circumstances under which it was performed added greatly to the reputation of the American general in the opinion of all military men to withdraw without loss a defeated, dispirited and undisciplined army from the view of an experienced and able officer and to transport them in safety across a large river while watched by numerous and vigilant fleet required talents of no ordinary kind and the retreat from Long Island may justly be ranked among those skillful maneuvers that distinguished a master in the art of war the attempt to defend Long Island was so perilous in itself and so disastrous in its issue that it was condemned by many at the time and is yet represented as a great error of the commander in chief but in deciding on the wisdom of measures the event will not always lead to a correct judgment before a just opinion can be formed it is necessary to consider the previous state of things to weigh the motives which induce the decision and to compare the value of the object and the possibility of securing it with the hazards attending the attempt it was very desirable to preserve New York if practicable or if that could not be done to consume the campaign in the struggle for that place the abandonment of Long Island besides giving the enemy secure and immediate possession of an extensive infertile country would certainly facilitate the success of his attempt upon New York it was therefore to be avoided if possible the impossibility of avoiding it was not evident until the battle was fought it is true that the American force on the island could not have been rendered equal even in point of numbers to that of the British but with the advantage of the defensible country through which the assailants were to pass and of a fortified camp which could be attacked only on one side hopes might be entertained without the imputation of being over-sanguine and maintaining the position for a considerable time and ultimately of selling it at a high price this opinion is supported by the subsequent movements of General Howe who even after the victory of the 27th was unwilling to hazard an assault on the American works without the cooperation of the fleet but chose rather to carry them by regular approaches nor would the situation of the troops on Long Island have been desperate even in the event of a conjoint attack by land and water before their strength and spirits were broken by the action of the 27th the east river was guarded by strong batteries on both sides from the bay was defended by Governor's Island which was fortified and in which two regiments were stationed the ships could not lie in that river without first silencing those batteries a work not easily accomplished the aid of the fleet therefore could be given only at the point of time when a storm of the work should be intended and when that should appear practicable the troops might be withdrawn from the island there was then considerable hazard in maintaining Long Island but not so much as to demonstrate the propriety of relinquishing a post of such great importance without a struggle with more appearance of reason the general has been condemned for not having guarded the road which leads over the hills from Jamaica to Bedford the written instructions given to the officers commanding on Long Island two days previous to the action directed that the wood should be well guarded and the approach of the enemy through them rendered as difficult as possible but his numbers were not sufficient to furnish detachments for all that defiles through the mountains and if a corps capable of making ineffectual resistance had been posted on this road and a faint had been made on it while the principal attack was by the direct road from Flatbush or by that along the coast the events of the day were probably have been not less disastrous the columns marching directly from Flatbush must on every reasonable calculation have been in possession of the plane in the rear of the detachment posted on the road from Jamaica so as to intercept its retreat to the camp so great is the advantage of those who attack in being able to choose the point against which to direct their grand effort the most advisable plan then appears to have been to watch the motions of the enemy so as to be master of his designs to oppose with a competent force every attempt to seize the heights and to guard all the passes in such a manner as to receive notice of his approach through any one of them in sufficient time to recall the troops maintaining the others this plan was adopted and the heavy disasters of the day are attributable principally to the failure of those charged with the execution of that very important part of it which related to the Jamaica road the letter of General Howe states that an American patrolling party was taken on this road and General Washington in a private and confidential communication to a friend says this misfortune happened in a great measure by two detachments of our people who were posted in two roads leading through a wood to intercept the enemy in their march suffering a surprise and making us precipitate retreat the events of this day to exhibit to the practical demonstration of a radical defect in the structure of the army it did not contain a single core of cavalry this miscalculating economy which refuses the means essential to the end was not sufficiently relaxed remit of so expensive and establishment have the general been furnished with a few troops of light horse to serve merely as the debts it is probable that the movement so decisive of the fate of the day could not have been made unnoticed the troops on the lines do not appear to have observed the column which was withdrawn on the evening of the 26th from flat bush to flat land have this important maneuver then communicated it would most probably have turned the attention of general Putnam more particularly to the Jamaica road it is to the want to the debts that to obtain this important intelligence is to be ascribed the necessity of changing the officer originally entrusted with the command was also an unfortunate circumstance which probably contributed to the event which happened whatever causes might have led to this defeat gave a gloomy aspect to the affairs of America here to for her arms have been frequently successful and her soldiers had always manifested a great degree of intrepidity a confidence in themselves a persuasion of superiority over the enemy arising from the goodness of their cause and their early and habitual use of firearms have been carefully encouraged this sentiment had been nourished by all their experience preceding this event when they found themselves by a course of evolutions in which they imagined they perceived a great superiority of military skill encircled with unexpected dangers from which no exertions could extricate them their confidence in themselves and in their leaders was greatly diminished and the courage of the enemy inspired the apprehension that some strategy was concealed from which immediate flight alone could preserve them September 2 in a letter from general washington to congress the state of the army after this event was thus feeingly described our situation is truly distressing the check our detachment sustained on that 27th ultima has dispirited to greater proportion of our troops and fill their minds with apprehension and despair the militia instead of calling forth efforts to brave a manly opposition in order to repair our losses are dismayed intractable and impatient to return great numbers of them have gone off in some instances almost by whole regiments in many behalf ones and by companies at a time this circumstance of itself independent of others when fronted by a well appointed enemy superior in numbers to our whole collective force would be sufficiently disagreeable but when it is added that their example has infected another part of the army the discipline and refusal of almost every kind of restraint in government have rendered a like conduct but too common in the whole and have produced an entire disregard of that order and subordination necessary for the well-doing of an army in which have been before inculcated as well as the nature of our military establishment would admit up our condition is still more alarming and with the deepest concern I am obliged to confess my want of confidence in the generality of the troops all these circumstances fully confirm I ever entertained in which I more than once in my letters took the liberty of mentioning to Congress that no dependence could be placed in a militia or other troops than those invested and embodied for a longer period than our regulations have hitherto prescribed I am persuaded and am as fully convinced as of any one fact that has happened that our liberties must of necessity be greatly hazarded if not entirely lost if their defense be left to any but a permanent army fruitless negotiations the first use made by Lord Howe of the victory of the 27th of August was to avail himself of the impression it had properly made on Congress by opening a negotiation and conformity with his powers as a commissioner for this purpose General Sullivan was sent on parole to Philadelphia with a verbal message the import of which was that though he could not at present treat with Congress as a political body yet he was very desirous of having a conference with some of its members whom he would consider the present only as private gentlemen and meet them as such at any place they would appoint that in conjunction with General Howe he had full powers to compromise the dispute between Great Britain and America on terms advantageous to both the obtaining of which detained him near two months in England and prevented his arrival in New York before the Declaration of Independence took place that he wished a compact might be settled at this time when no decisive blow was struck and neither party could allege being compelled to enter into such agreement that in case Congress was disposed to treat many things which they had not as yet asked might and ought to be granted them and that if upon the conference they found any probable ground of an accommodation the authority of Congress must be afterwards acknowledged otherwise the compact would not be complete this proposition was not without its embarrassments its rejection would give some countenance to the opinion that if independence were raised a restoration of the ancient connection principle formally deemed constitutional was still practicable an opinion which would have an unfavorable effect on the public sentiment on the other hand to enter into a negotiation under such circumstances might excite a suspicion that their determination to maintain their independence that had declared was not immovable and that things were in such a situation as to admit of some relaxation in the measures necessary for the defense of the country the answer given to Lord Howe through General Sullivan was that Congress being the representatives of the free and independent states of America cannot with propriety send any of its members to confer with his lordship in their private characters but that ever desirous of establishing peace on reasonable terms they will send the committee of their body to know whether he has any authority to treat with persons authorized by Congress for that purpose on behalf of America and what that authority is and to hear such propositions as he shall think proper to make the same. The president was at the same time directed to communicate to General Washington the opinion of Congress that no propositions for making peace ought to be received or attended to unless the same be made in writing and addressed to the representatives of the United States in Congress or persons authorized by them and if applications on that subject be made to him by any of the commanders of the British forces that he informed them that these United States who entered into the war only for the defense of their lives and liberties will chairfully agreed to peace on reasonable terms whenever such shall be proposed to them in manner aforesaid. It is worthy of remark that in these resolutions Congress preserves the appearance of insisting on the independence of the United States without declaring it to be the indispensable condition of peace. Mr. Franklin, Mr. John Adams and Mr. Edward Lucklage all zealous supporters of independence were appointed to receive the communications of Lord Howe. They waited on his lordship and on their return to receive them on the 11th of September on Staten Island opposite to Amboy with great politeness. He opened the conversation by acquainting them that though he could not treat with them as a committee of Congress yet as his powers enabled him to confer and consult with any private gentlemen of influence in the colonies on the means of restoring peace between the two countries he was glad of this opportunity of conferring with them on that subject if they thought themselves at liberty to enter into a conference with him in that character. The committee offered to his lordship that as their business was to hear he might consider them in what light he pleased and communicated to them any propositions he might be authorized to make for the purpose mentioned but that they could consider themselves in no other character than that in which they were placed by order of Congress. His lordship then proceeded to open his views at some length. He offered peace only on the condition that the colonies should return to their allegiance and obedience to the British crown. He made no explicit propositions as inducements measure but gave assurances that there was a good disposition on the king and his ministers to make the government easy to them with intimations that in case of submission the offensive acts of parliament would be revised and the instructions to the governors reconsidered so that if any just causes of complaint were found in the acts or any errors in government were found to have crept into the instructions they might be amended or withdrawn. The committee gave it as their opinion to his lordship that a return to the domination of Great Britain was not now to be expected. They mentioned the repeated humble petitions of the colonies to the king and parliament which have been treated with contempt and answered only by additional injuries. The unexampled patients which have been shown under their tyrannical government and that it was not until the late act of parliament which denounced war against them and put them out of the king's protection that they declared their independence, that this declaration had been called for by the people of the colonies in general and that every colony had approved it when they now considered themselves as independent states and were settling or have settled their governments accordingly so that it was not in the power of congress to agree for them that they should return to their former dependent state, that there was no doubt of their inclination for peace and their willingness to enter into a treaty with Britain that might be advantageous to both countries that though his lordship had a present no power to treat with them as independent states he might if there was the same good disposition in Britain much sooner obtain fresh from his government for that purpose then powers could be obtained by congress from the several colonies to consent to a submission. His lordship then expressed his regret that no accommodation was like to take place and put an end to the conference. These fruitless negotiations produced no suspension of hostilities. The British army now in full possession of Long Island was posted from Bedford to Hurlgate and thus fronted and threatened York Island from its extreme southern point to the part opposite the northern boundary of Long Island and a small distance below the heights of Harlem comprehending a space of about nine miles. The two armies were divided only by East River which is generally less than a mile wide. September 4 immediately after the victory at Brooklyn dispositions were made by the enemy to attack New York and a part of the fleet sailed around Long Island and appeared in the sound. Two frigates passed up the East River without receiving any injury from the batteries and anchored behind a small island which protected them from the American artillery. At the same time the main body of the fleet lay at anchor close in with Governor's Island from which the American troops had been withdrawn ready to pass up either the North or East River or both and act against any part of New York Island. These movements indicated a disposition not to make an attack directly on New York as had been expected but to land near Kingsbridge and take a position which would cut off the communication of the American army with the country. Aware of the danger of his situation General Washington began to remove such measures as were not immediately necessary and called to Council of General Officers for the purpose of deciding whether New York should be evacuated without delay or longer defended. In his letter communicating to Congress the result of this council which was against an immediate evacuation he manifested the conviction of the necessity of that measure though he yielded to that necessity with reluctance. Speaking of the enemy he observed it is now extremely obvious from their movements from our intelligence in every other circumstance that having their whole army upon Long Island except about 4,000 men who remain on Staten Island they mean to enclose us in this island by taking post in our rear while their ships effectively secure the front and thus by cutting off our communication with the country obliged us to fight them on their own terms or surrender at discretion or if that shall be deemed more advisable by a brilliant stroke endeavor to cut this army to pieces and secure the possession of our inability to replace. Having their system unfolded to us becomes an important consideration how it could be most successfully opposed. On every side there is a choice of difficulties and experience teaches us that every measure on our part however painful the reflection must be taken with some apprehension that all our troops will not do their duty. In deliberating upon this great question he added it was impossible to forget that history our own experience the advice was friends in Europe the fears of the enemy and even the declarations of Congress demonstrate that on our side the war should be defensive. It has ever been called a war of posts that we should on all occasions avoid a general action nor put anything to the risk unless compelled by necessity into which we are never to be drawn. After communicating the decision which had been made by the council of officers he stated the opinion of those who were in favor of an evacuation with such force as to confirm the belief that it remained his own. The majority who overruled this opinion did not expect to be able to defend the city permanently but to defer the time of losing it in the hope of wasting so much of the campaign before General Hale could obtain possession of it as to prevent his undertaking anything farther until the following year. They therefore advised a middle course between abandoning the town absolutely and concentrating their whole strength for its defense. This was to form the army into three divisions, one of which should remain in New York, the second be stationed at Kingsbridge, and the third occupy the intermediate space so as to support either extreme. The sick were to be immediately removed to Orange Town. I believe that Congress was inclined to maintain New York at every hazard and a dread of the unfavorable impression which its evacuation might make on the people seemed to have had great influence yet a short time longer. September 10, this opinion was soon changed. The movements of the British General indicated clearly an intention either to break the line of communication or to enclose the whole army in York Island. His dispositions were like calculated to favor the one or the other of those objects. The general who had continued to employ himself assiduously in the removal of the military stores to a place of safety called a second council to deliberate on the further defense of the city which majority that it had become not only prudent but absolutely is necessary to withdraw the army from New York. September 12, in consequence of this determination Brigadier General Mercer who commended the flying camp on the Jersey shore was directed to move up the North River to the post opposite Fort Washington and every effort was used to expedite the removal of the stores. On the morning of the 15-3 ships of work proceeded up the North River as high as Bloomingdale a movement which entirely stopped the water. About 11 on the same day Sir Henry Clinton with a division of 4,000 men who had embarked at the head of Newtown Bay where they had lain concealed from the view of the troops posted on York Island proceeded through that bay into the East River which he crossed and undercover of the fire of five men of war landed at a place called Kips Bay about three miles above New York. New York evacuated the works thrown up to oppose the landing at this place were of considerable strength and capable of the troops stationed in them abandoned them without waiting to be attacked and fled with precipitation. On the commencement of a candidate General Washington ordered the brigades of Parsons and Fellows to the support of the troops posted in the lines and rode himself towards the scene of action. The panic of those who had fled from the works was communicated to the troops ordered to sustain them and the commander-in-chief had the extreme modification to meet the whole party retreating in the utmost general's to stop their disgraceful flight. Whilst General Washington was exerting himself to rallying them a small corps of the enemy appeared and they again broke and fled in confusion the only part to be taken was immediately to withdraw the few remaining troops from New York and to secure the posts on the heights for this latter purpose the lines were instantly manned but no attempt was made to force them the retreat from New York was affected with an inconsiderable loss of men sustained in a skirmish at Bloomingdale but all the heavy artillery and a large portion of the baggage provisions and military stores much of which might have been saved had the post at Kipps Bay been properly defended were unavoidably abandoned in this shameful day one colonel, one captain, three subalterns and ten privates were killed one lieutenant colonel, one captain and 157 privates were missing the unsoldierly conduct displayed on this occasion was not attributable to a want of personal courage but to other causes the apprehensions that were decided by the defeat on Long Island had not yet subsided nor had the American troops recovered their confidence either in themselves or in their commanders their situation appeared to themselves to be perilous and they had not yet acquired that temper which teaches the veteran to do his duty wherever he may be placed to assure himself that others will do their duty likewise and to rely that those who take into view the situation of the whole will not expose them to useless hazard or neglect those precautions which the advantage of the whole may require unfortunately there existed in a great part of the army several causes in addition to the shortness of enlistments and reliance on militia which were but too operative in obstructing the progress of these military sentiments in New England once the supplies of men had been principally drawn the zeal excited by the revolution had taken such a direction as an at great degree to abolish those distinction between the platoon officers and the soldiers which are indispensable to the formation of all the purposes of war it has been already said that these officers who constitute an important part of every army were in many companies selected by the privates of consequence the disposition to associate with them on the footing of equality was a recommendation of more weight and frequently conduced more to the choice than individual merit gentlemen of high rank have stated that in some instances men were elected who agreed to put their pay in a common stock with that of the soldiers and divide equally with them it is not cause of wonder that among such officers the most disgraceful and unmilitary practices should frequently prevail and that the privates should not respect them sufficiently to acquire habits of obedience and subordination this vital defect had been in some degree remedied in new modeling the army before Boston but it still existed to a fatal extent September 15 having taken possession of New York General Howe stationed a few troops in the town and with the main body of his army encamped on the island near the American lines his right was at Horan's hook on the east river and his left reached the north river near Bloomingdale so that his encampment extended quite across the island which is in this place scarcely two miles wide and both his flanks were covered by his ships the strongest point of the American lines was at Kingsbridge both sides of which had been carefully fortified McGowan's past and Morris's heights were also occupied in considerable force and rendered capable of being defended against superior numbers a strong detachment was posted in an entrenched camp on the heights of Harlem within about a mile and a half of the British lines the present position of the army favored the views of the American general he wished to habituate his soldiers by a series of successful skirmishes to meet the enemy in the field and he persuaded himself that his detachments knowing a strong entrenched camp to be immediately in their rear would engage without apprehension would soon display their native courage and would speedily regain the confidence to make the experiments he wished were soon afforded the day after the retreat from New York the British appeared in considerable force in the plains between the two camps and the general immediately rode to his advanced post in order to make in person such arrangements as this movement might require soon after his arrival Lieutenant Colonel Nolton of Connecticut who at the head of a corps of rangers had been skirmishing with this party came in and stated their numbers on conjecture at about 300 men the main body being concealed in a wood the general ordered Colonel Nolton with his rangers a major light with the companies of the 3rd Virginia Regiment which had joined the army only the preceding day to gain their rear while he amused them with the appearance of making dispositions to attack their front skirmish on the heights of Harlem this plan succeeded the British men eagerly down a hill in order to possess themselves of some fences and bushes which presented an advantageous position against the party expected in front and a firing commenced but at too great a distance to do any execution in the meantime Colonel Nolton not being precisely acquainted with their new position made his attack rather on their flank than rear and a warm action ensued in a short time major Leich who had led the detachment with great intrepidity was brought off the ground mortally wounded having received 3 balls through his body and soon after was the gallant Colonel Nolton also fell not discouraged by the loss of their field officers the captains maintained their ground and continued the action with great animation the British were reinforced and General Washington ordered some detachments from the adjacent regiments of New England and Maryland to the support of the Americans thus reinforced they made a gallant charge drove the enemy out of the wood into the plane and repressing him still farther when the general content with the present advantage called back his troops to their entrenchments in this sharp conflict the loss of the Americans the wounded did not exceed 50 men the British lost more than double that number but the real importance of the affair was derived from its operation on the spirits of the whole army it was the first success they had obtained during this campaign and its influence was very discernible to give it the more effect the parole the next day was Leich and the general in his orders publicly thanked the troops under the command of that officer who had first advanced on the enemy and the others who had so resolutely supported them he contrasted their conduct with that which had been exhibited the day before and the result he said it evidenced what might be done where officers and soldiers would exert themselves once more therefore he called upon them so to act as not to disgrace the noble cause in which they were engaged he appointed a successor to the gallant and brave Colonel Nolton who would he said have been an honor to any country and who had fallen gloriously fighting at his post in this active part of the campaign when the utmost stretch of every faculty was required to watch and interact the plans of a skillful and powerful enemy the effects of the original errors committed by the government in its military establishment were beginning to be so seriously felt as to compel the commander-in-chief to devote a portion of his time and attention to the complete removal of the causes which produced them the situation of America was becoming extremely critical the almost entire dissolution of the existing army by the expiration of the time for which the greater number of the troops have been engaged was fast approaching the steps have been taken to recruit the new regiments which congress have resolved to raise for the ensuing campaign and there was much reason to apprehend that in the actual state of things the terms offered would not hold forth sufficient inducements to fill them September 24 letter on the state of the army was so unpromising a prospect before him the general found himself pressed by an army permanent in its establishment supplied with every requisite of war formidable for its discipline and the experience of its leaders superior to him in numbers these circumstances and the impressions they created will be best exhibited by an extract from a letter written at the time to congress it is in these words from the hours allotted to sleep I will borrow a few moments to convey my thoughts on sundry important matters to congress I shall offer them with that sincerity which ought to characterize a man of candor and with the freedom which may be used in giving useful information without incurring the imputation of presumption we are as it were upon the eve of another dissolution of our army the remembrance of the difficulties which happened upon that occasion last year the consequences which might have followed the change if proper advantages have been taken by the enemy added to a knowledge of the present temper and disposition of the troops reflect but a very gloomy prospect upon the appearance of things now and satisfy me beyond the possibility of doubt that unless some speedy ineffectual measures are adopted by congress our cause will be lost in vain to expect that any or more than a trifling part of this army will engage again in the service on the encouragement offered by congress women find that their townsmen and companions are receiving twenty thirty and more dollars for a few months service which is truly the case this cannot be expected without using compulsion and to force them into the service would answer no valuable purpose women are irritated and their passions inflamed they fly hastily and cheerfully to arms but after the first emotions are over to expect among such people as compose the bulk of an army that they are influenced by any other motives than those of interest is to look for what never did and I fear never will happen the congress will deceive themselves therefore if they expected a soldier reasoned with upon the goodness of the cause he is engaged in and the inestimable rights he is contending for hears you with patience and acknowledges the truth of your observations but adds that it is of no more consequence to him than to others the officer makes you the same reply with this further remark that his pay will not support him and he cannot ruin himself and family to serve his country when every member of the community is equally benefited and interested by his labors the few therefore who act upon principles of disinterestedness are comparatively speaking no more than a drop in the ocean it becomes evidently clear then that as this contest is not likely to become the work of the day as the war must be carried on systematically and to do it you must have good officers there is in my judgment no other possible means to obtain them by establishing your army upon a permanent footing and giving your officers good pay this will induce gentlemen and men of character to engage and until the bulk of your officers are composed of such persons as are actuated by principles of honor and a spirit of enterprise you have little to expect from them they ought to have such allowances as will enable them to live life and support the character of gentlemen and not be driven by a stanty pittance to the low and dirty arts which many of them practice to philge the public of more than the difference of pay would amount to upon an ample allowance besides something is due to the man who puts his life in your hands hazards his health and forsakes the sweets of domestic enjoyment why a captain in the continental service should receive no more than five shillings currency per day for performing the same duties that an officer of the same rank in the British service receives 10 shillings sterling for the service received especially when the latter is provided with every necessary he requires upon the best terms and the former can scarcely procure them at any rate there's nothing that gives a man consequence and renders him fit for command like a support that renders him independent of everybody but the state he serves with respect to the men nothing but a good bounty can obtain them upon a permanent establishment and for no shorter time than the continuance of the war ought to be engaged as facts prove that the difficulty and cost of enlistments increased with time when the army was first raised at Cambridge I am persuaded the men might have been got without a bounty for the war after that they began to see that the contents was not likely to end so speedily as was imagined and to feel their consequence by remarking that to get their militia in the course of the last year many towns were induced to give them a bounty foreseeing the evils resulting from this and the destructive consequences which would unavoidably follow short in a long-letter date not mal-recollected as my letter book is not here to recommend the enlistments for and during the war assigning such reasons for it as experience has since convinced me we're well founded at that time $20 would I am persuaded have engaged the men for this term but it will not do to look back and if the present opportunity is slipped I am persuaded that 12 months more will increase our difficulties fourfold I shall therefore take the liberty of giving it as my opinion that a good bounty be by the proper of at least 100 or 150 acres of land in a suit of clothes in a blanket to each non-commissioned officer and soldier as I have good authority for saying that however high the men's pay may appear it is barely sufficient in the present scarcity and dearness of all kinds of goods to keep them enclosed much less to afford support to their families if this encouragement then is given to the men and such pay allowed to the officers as will induce gentlemen of liberal character and liberal sentiments to be used in the nomination having more regard to the characters of persons than the number of men they can enlist we should in that little time have an army able to cope with any that can be opposed to it as there are excellent materials to form one out of but whilst the only merit an officer possesses his ability to raise men whilst those men consider and treat him as an equal and in that character of an officer regard him no more than a broomstick being mixed together as one common herd no order nor discipline the officer ever meet with that respect which is essentially necessary to do subordination to place any dependence upon militia is surely resting upon a broken staff men just dragged from the tender scenes of domestic life and accustomed to the dinner arms totally unacquainted with every kind of military skill which being followed by a want of confidence in themselves when opposed to troops regularly trained disciplined and appointed superior in knowledge and superior in arms makes them timid and ready to fly from their own besides the sudden change in their manner of living particularly in their lodging brings on sickness and many in patients and all and such an unconquerable desire of returning to their respective homes that it not only produces shameful and scandalous decisions among themselves but infuses the life spirit into others again men accustomed to unbounded freedom and no control cannot book the restraint which is indispensable necessary to the good order and government of an army without which life-sentience in every kind of disorder triumphantly rain to bring men to a proper degree of subordination is not the work of a day a month or a year and unhappily for us and the cause we are engaged in the little discipline I have been at laboring to establish in the army under my immediate command is in that manner done away by having such a mixture of troops as have been called together within these few months the frequent remonstrances of the commander-in-chief the opinions of all military men and the severe but correcting hand of it length produced some effect on the government of the union and soon after the defeat on Long Island Congress had directed the committee composing the board of war to prepare a plan of operations for the next succeeding campaign their report proposed a permanent army to be enlisted for the war and to be raised by the several states in proportion to their ability a bounty of twenty dollars was offered to each recruit and small portions of land to every officer and soldier October 4 the resolutions by the commander-in-chief soon after the transmission of the foregoing letter believing the inducements they held forth for the completion of the army to be still insufficient he in his letter acknowledging the receipt of them urged in the most serious terms the necessity of raising the pay of the officers and the bounty offered to recruits give me leave to say sir he observed I say it with due deference and respect and knowledge of the facts added to the importance of the cause and the stake I hold it in must justify your affairs are in a more unpromising way than you seem to apprehend your army as mentioned in my last is upon the eve of political dissolution true it is you have voted a larger one in lieu of it but the season is late and there is a material difference between voting battalions and raising men in the letter there are more difficulties than Congress seem aware of which makes it my duty as I have been informed of the prevailing sentiments of this army to inform them that unless the pay of the officers out of the field officers is raised the chief part of those that are worth retaining will leave the service at the expiration of the present term as the soldiers will also if some greater encouragement is not offered then $20 and 100 acres of land after urging in strong terms the necessity of a more liberal compensation to the army and stating that the British were actually raising a regiment with a bounty of 10 pounds sterling for each recruit he added when the pay and establishment of an officer of interest to detention the sloth negligence and even disobedience of orders which at this time but to generally prevail will be purged off while the service is viewed with indifference while the officer conceives that he is rather conferring than receiving an obligation there will be a total relaxation of all order and discipline and everything will move heavily on to the great detriment of the service and inexpressible trouble and vexation of the general the critical situation of our affairs and making fruitless experiments and unavailing trial of a month to get an army upon the terms proposed they render it impracticable to do it at all and prove fatal to our cause as I'm not sure whether any rubs in the way of our enlistments or unfavorable turn in our affairs may not prove the means of the enemies recruiting men faster than we do after stating at large the confusion and delay inseparable from the circumstance that the appointments for the new army were to be made I plainly foresee an intervention of time between the old and new army which must be filled with militia if to be had with whom no man who has any regard for his own reputation can undertake to be answerable for consequences I shall also be mistaken in my conjectures if we do not lose the most valuable officers in this army under the present mode of appointing them consequently if we have an army at all it would be composed of materials not only entirely raw but if uncommon pains are not taken entirely see such a distrust and jealousy of military power that the commander in chief has not an opportunity even by recommendation to give the least assurance of reward for the most essential services in a word such a cloud of perplexing circumstances appears before me without one flattering hope that I am thoroughly convinced unless the most vigorous and decisive exertions are immediately adopted to remedy these evils the certain and absolute loss of our liberties will be the inevitable consequence as one unhappy person will throw a powerful weight into the scale against us and enable general how to recruit his army as fast as we shall ours numbers being disposed and many actually doing so already some of the most probable remedies and such as experience has brought to my more intimate knowledge I have taken the liberty to point out the rest I beg leave to submit to the consideration of Congress I ask pardon for taking out so much of their time with my opinions but I should betray that trust which they are my country I'm also requesting on receiving this very serious letter Congress past resolutions conforming to many of its suggestions the pay of the offices was raised and a suit of clothes allowed annually to each soldier the legislatures of the states having troops in the Continental Service either New York, Ticonderoga or New Jersey were requested to depute committees to those places in order to offer the regiments on this new establishment and it was recommended to the committees to consult the headquarters at White Plains, here 22 miles northeast of New York City, Washington, made his headquarters in October 1776 and directed the Battle of White Plains, or Chatterton Hill, opposed to the American forces, was a British Army, greatly superior in numbers, under General Howe, whose delay in attaching the American-enabled Washington to take up an unassailable position at North Castle, preparatory to his subsequent masterly retreat across New Jersey. End of chapter 5