 Ewan oedd yma, ddweud am ymdweud yma, a rydyn ni'n gweithio ar y ddweud yma a'r dweud i'r Dwybl yn Centrall. Mae'n gŵr o'r gwbl yn ôl, ac nid oes i'n gweithio ar y ddechrau, ac rydyn ni'n mynd i'n wneud yr oedd ymddangos Sèry yn ymddangos eu cyffredinol i'r cyffredin hon yn ymdweud o'i ddaf yma, ac ymddangos ymddangos ar yr oedd ymddangos ymddangos yma ar y cwyr nhw, ac ymddangos ymddangos eu cyfr. Isaeth yn adill ar y cyffredin cyllustu gyda dwyd yn ofaeth y c pelwyddiol. A beth rwy'n gobeithio ychydig yn ystod gydweithio'r ffewrdd yn gweithio'r sefydliadau gan beth y gallu cyffredin ciliriaeth arall rhan o'i gydweithio. A hynny byddwch yn dwylo eich gaflu ar gwrthwyr gyngor. Roedd, oherwydd ciliriaeth ar gweithio'r eich bobl, ac yn y briforolus i gweithio, yn ystod dda'n ymhwytaeth a'r ystyried ymateb sydd yn ymddangos, yn ychydig ar gyfer y pethau yma ar y proses, ac yn ymwyaf ymweld yr ysgol yma ymweld yr ysgol ymweld yr ysgol, ymweld yr ysgol yn ymwyaf yr ardal Patrick. Cymru'n argyfwng arall, dyfodol yn ymweld yr argyffredig hynny yn ymweld yr ysgol, edrych gyda'r ysgol, y gallwn i'n rhaid i'w ddweud y cyfnodau bod y cynnig yn ei ddweud yn ymgyrch. Mae cyfnod ar gyfer y cyfnod am gyfryd ymgyrch gyda'r ysgol ymddiotiaeth yn ei ddweud i'r ysgol ymgyrch gyda'r ymgyrch gyda'r Yrddangodol, ac mae'r ysgol yn ymddir i'r hyn o ddysgu'n dod oedd yn ei ddweud o'r yr edrych ar gyfer gwneud ymgyrch gydag yn ymgyrch gyda'r cyfnod ac yn ymgyrch ar gyfer gwneud ac y gallwn cyfan wedi ychydig frysgau yma. Roedd o lawr sy'n ddych chi'n gwneud y concept ac y dyfu'r ymgylchedd i'w beth, ar gyfer ddechrau, byddai'r cyfaint cyfaint yma. Roedd o gynhyrch a ddysgu ddysgu byddwn yn meddwl i'r cyfeiniedl ar gyfer ddych chi ar gyfer ddydd byddwn yn y cyffredinol yma y byddwn yn gallu chi'n gwneud am y ddechrau. A'r cyflwydd o gyrraedd drosdyn yn ôl ac sy'n cael ei roi ein cyfaint gan rhain gyda'r cyfaint sydd yn y gyrhaf, ac yn ymgyrch yn Llyfrgellton Llyfrgell o bobl o'r drosol, этиiru y ddiweddordeb sy'n cyfrannu ychwanegi ymdau yng Nghymru sy'n gwneud ymmyl iawn ac yn y gyrtu'r gwynedd cyfaint. Ac oherwydd byddwn i ni i ni'n ddigwydd ar hyn o erbyn, gyda'n ei wneud o'r cyflwybr oedd yn ganfer o'r ddodol, dweud o'r ddodol, o'i arweithio o'r awr interlocki. Dwi'r reflectedio, dwi'n meddwl ei wneud, oedd yn gweithio i gyd yn i'r awr o'r leidio. Felly yn fel gael'u gyd yn ei weld o'r leidio i'r gwlad dweud o'r garfynau. Mae'r digwyddr ddwyll Dont Ddiadau bawb. Rhaid o'n rhaid ac yn clomiadwyr sy'n cyfwyrd fel myfyrdd mwy o'r cyfoedd. Rhaid o'r cyfwyrd i'w wahanol, ond rhaid o'r cyfwyrdd honno a'r cyfwyrdd byd. Mae'n rhaid o'n cyfwyrdd y pwyl, a wedi'i ffau y gweinig. Rwy'n dda yn fwy o bwysig, lle rhaid iddo ddweud yr edrydd i fynd bobl a gyntaf i'r funins rheolaeth Rydymol Rheinsiadol. Mae'n groes yma yn ffordd am y cwrdd Rheinsiadol yn adnodd cyfnod o'r ffaith comwr i'r newid am oedd gael eu cyfarfain oherwydd, ac yw gwirionedd mewn mynd i'r proses ychydig i'r cymysgfaeth eich累gen o'r dweud o'r greu cy freelyr yw'r hyffordd ym heddiol. Felly, ydych chi'n gweithio gweithio am y celfaith yma, a rwy'n cael ei gael'r barod o'r wneud yn y bydd yma, ddod yn ôl yn ni, ac rwy'n gofyn am gweithio i'w ddiddordeb yn y gallu'n gweithio'n gweithio'n gweithio'n gweithio. Felly, mae'r ddweud ystod yn y gweithio'n gweithio'n gweithio i gael'r barod o'r wneud. Yr ystod, yn y celfaith ar y Patrige'r werth, ac yn y celfaith ar y celfaith. mae'n addysg ei meddwl o'r cyfweld a'i ymddangos ystyried. Ydyn ni'n fwyfa'r cyfweld i'r cyfweld, gyda'ch yn bach y prosiectau peticoli a'r polisi economaeth, ond y tu'n meddwl yn oed i llwyafol iawn i chi, i ardalol iawn i gryf wladol. Ond oedd y gallu cyfweld i'r gwasiwn ffasiliad dowod o'r polisi兩ndol. One of the issues that Patrick explores in this book is the degree to which that perspective was missing in the run-up to the crisis period, where during that period it was assumed that we can make particular national budgetary decisions, make particular decisions in relation to the level of credits within our economy, but not be aware of the fact that, while we had a currency, obviously, We shared that currency with many, many other economies and countries. We focused on what the benefit was of sharing a single currency's own. We overlaid that with our membership of the single market. We didn't put enough focus on the fact that that conferered responsibility on us and didn't also give enough thought to the fact this is an amplifier not only of benefit to a national economy, ac yn ydych chi'n meddwl cyfodol. Mae'r team yw'r hyn yn ymhwylliant ar Y Patriarch i'r llwyr. Roeddwn i'r cyflwyno'r cynllunau. Fe yw'r ddebyg yn y cyflwyno ym mhwyaf â'r gynllun. Mae'r ddebyg yn ymhwyaf. Mae'r ddebyg yn ymgyrch ar y dyfynol ar gyfer mewn cymdeithasol, ac yn ymgyrch ar gyfer y policy. Ychydig o'r ffagorol ymgweld y Patriarch yn y llwyddon yn y bwysig, rydych chi gan neb unemployment hon ac yn meddyliad yn ei tanffordd. The second thing that was important to me was the other sea of the volume which is of course levels of credit. The book is a salutary reminder as if we need one but we always need to be reminded of us of these supercharged levels of credit that were available in our economy across our period. The cathastrophic effect that it subsequently had Mae'n gweithio'r cyflogol gyda'r ffigol. Rwy'n gweithio'n gweithio'r gweithio, yma yw'r pwysig mai 2008. Gweithio'r Llywodraeth yn y gynfaith i gweithio, ti'n 57 bilynyddiadau i 157 bilynyddio. Mae yna'r rhai diwethaf ei ddylch. Mae'n dweud i ddechrau'r cyflogol, ond dyna'r gweithio yn rhan o'r llwyffol, was not only the quantity of that credit, but it was the composition of that credit, how it was made up. By the mid-2000s, two-thirds of the loans in our economy had a loan-to-income ratio that was greater than three-and-a-half, and one-fifth of loans in our economy had a loan-to-value ratio that was greater than 95%. So, it wasn't just the level of credit we'd earn in our economy, it was the composition of it, it was the make-up of us, and of course we all know the subsequent vast difficulties that emerged from this, both when it became apparent that the level of funding wasn't actually in place to fund this level of credit, when it became apparent the degree to which domestic savings were utterly inadequate to deal with this level of credit, and our banks became more and more dependent on international capital markets to fund our credit with disastrous consequences for all of us. I contrast that with some of the debate that we have now. It is striking that we are, where we are at this point in our economic development and economic growth, with a level of credit that is a fraction of that. In fact, if you look at the levels of credit in our economy over the last number of years, in many different ways they've been flat, they haven't grown, and we are way below the level of credit that caused such vast harm to us. The next point that, again, I felt was relevant in this book is the work and the debates that Patrick raises regarding the European institutions that were in place across this period. I leave it to others that might speak, or others who read the book, to form a view regarding the role of the European institutions. I'm going to say that quite carefully because I'm still dealing with them myself at the moment. But what is striking in the book is the point that is made again and again is that the institutions, particularly across Europe, were only being put together or were underdeveloped for the scale of challenge that both the Eurozone and Ireland then had to confront. From an institutional point of view, that's particularly relevant to me. Last Thursday night I was in Luxembourg for a monthly Eurogroup and economic meeting. We spent, as can sometimes be the case, up to half-four on Friday morning, engaged in trying to reach agreement regarding the role of the ESM, regarding the role of the ESM being a backstop to future state and banking difficulties, and then engaged in a debate regarding the role and power of the single supervisory mechanism. Patrick's book is very clear in pointing out many of the issues regarding the institutional deficiencies and capacity gaps that were there. While there is definitely a debate to be had regarding the operation of what we have in place now, what has changed is the scale of institutions and the power that they have. I sometimes make this point in debates on this issue that for those who think our regulation of the banking sector has not changed, they've never dealt with the single supervisory mechanism. It's a very clear example of the change that has happened. The final point that was again relevant to me and work that I'm involved in is the point that Patrick makes in his book, not just about the deficiencies that were there in the design of the Eurozone, but also the deficiencies that we had in terms of our own institutions and their inability to be aware of the responsibilities that they had and their role within a single currency zone. If I go back to the first point regarding the incomplete design of the Eurozone, again last week we spent a lot of time engaging and trying to see if we could reach agreement in relation to what the term sheet is going to be for what's now called the BIC. The BIC, for those of you who might not be aware, is what now has been referred to as the budgetary instrument for convergence and competitiveness, which is a debate that is under way regarding the new kind of tools the Eurozone may need to support countries who face a systemic shock and what can be done to deepen the tools that are there. The fact that that debate is ongoing and the fact that that work is not yet complete speaks to the fact that some of the lessons and issues that Patrick identified are still really live issues. The debates done are not yet concluded and I can see at first hand the degree of tension at times and disagreement that exists, not only regarding the funding of those instruments but also regarding their use. A similar point is made regarding our own national institutions, regarding their failure across that period. If we contrast that with where we are now, we have a central bank through various legislative changes that has a significantly expanded policy armory open to us than it did during that period, much of which was instigated during Patrick's tenure as governor. The Iraq this then made a number of changes and much of that work now is still ongoing. To give a concrete example of that, tomorrow morning I'm taking to cabinet proposals in relation to how we can look at strengthening the accountability and the sanction regime available to individual key members of our banks. This is a deficiency that was identified by so many but the consequences of it and the harm that is imposed on our banks, again it's documented in many works not only Patrick's but this work is ongoing. We're still involved in much debate regarding changes that are needed and this is exemplified by the kind of debate now that we're having in relation to the conclusion of the mortgage tracker saga, all of the harm that that did and the inquiry that is still underway in relation to us. A very obvious example of the institutional change is now the role of the Irish Fiscal Advisory Council. The debate that I've been involved in and the scrutiny they're placing me under, that is not evidence of institutional weakness, that's evidence of institutional strength. The very reason an organisation like that was set up is to offer views regarding the performance of governments and the responsibilities that they have. And it's then up to the minister of the day and obviously me to form a view on that and to respond back. But this is the kind of change and the kind of contrast in the base and differing views that Patrick in his book makes the point was conspicuously absent. So in conclusion I'm reminded of a comment and a famous comment that was made by Winston Churchill when he concluded in one of his works of history that history is written by the victors. In Patrick's book he makes the point I think towards the end that the scars are still there, so much harm was done and this is a history from which it's very, very hard to see any victors at all, particularly within our own country and our own economy. And a balance that I need to strike and it's one that I'm constantly in the middle of is how we can deal with the social scars, how we can deal with the pent-up need and demand that is still there, that citizens still feel while trying to get the balance right between the needs of tomorrow. And this is the challenge of political economy. It's the challenge of being responsible for an economy that's located within a democracy. Trying to get that balance right between how you can maintain support for what you are doing in economy and getting the balance right between the needs of today and the imperative of tomorrow and this is the challenge. Having read much of Patrick's book and having considered some of the points that he made in the book, what I wanted to illustrate is two things. Number one, that many of the issues that he've identified we have made progress on but we still have more progress to make. And the second point is is that the level of challenge that Patrick described in his book, the cost that is there and the harm that it did not only obviously to our economy, to our society, is something that we always have to remind ourselves of and always have to challenge ourselves to see are there different ways of managing and ways of avoiding this crisis happening again. I believe a really important part of how we have to do that is ensuring there is debate about policy alternatives, ensuring our public debate can be better informed. And one small example of how this is done in Patrick's book is when it goes through the different five currency regimes that Ireland has participated in and goes through the counterfactual example of what we have been better off outside of the euro. And for those of you who want to find the answer to that question, you're going to have to read the book. So on that note, I just want to not only congratulate Patrick for the book, which is really relevant to many of the issues of today, very relevant to trying to understand where we were in recent years, and obviously, at a moment like this, congratulate him for the extraordinary contribution that he made to our country at a time of great difficulty. Thank you very much Minister for such interesting penetrating comments. I think we're very lucky to have such a thoughtful Minister for Finance. It's great that he's launched the book in such style this evening. Thanks are in order. But then, even the people in the room, there's so many people to thank, certainly have to thank Rory and Donal and Dill for hosting the event. I was just thinking... I was just thinking... talking to Donal and to Rory or Donald who's also there. It's now 30 years ago since Rory and myself wrote the first book in this institute about the single currency, and look what happened. No, but there are so many people. My successor, Philip Lane, not only insisted that I write the book and kept on saying, how far is it along now, how are you doing? But he also made it possible that I would have enough access to the documents that I needed because you can't take... And that was important to make sure that the thing is properly documented. And of course the archivists at the central bank. And then I start with the central bank. There's such a list of people who have been vital over the last 10 years in one way or another. So it's just impossible to... I don't know those things. It's up to us here. She's also made it possible. Now that the book is finished, I have no further excuses to be dodging to do... I'm thinking who else could you thank and you think we're bankers. Oh yes, because without the bankers, there wouldn't have been any materials. But having said that, banker bashing is good fun. And I noticed that the Irish Times journalists picked out that part of the book to highlight that Saturday week. But actually it is something that we have to be careful about is the role of our institutions, the institutions of state and the national institutions generally. First of all, of course, they should function for the people. But if they're seen and if we make cheap shots at everything, all the institutions of state, then the trust and the confidence of the general public can be eroded very badly. We've seen that in other countries and there's always a threat of that here. Of course that means that the institutions must serve the public. So let me come back to that in terms of the central bank. I want to make four points that are not the themes of the book but because everybody in the room knows the story and I hope you'll find some details that you don't know in the book. But just four themes that I thought of perspective that you might find interesting. First of all, the market is always wrong. On average it's right but it's nearly always wrong. And we saw that in many ways. We saw how wrong it was in the years before the crisis up to 2007. It was wrong because it was over-optimistic and thought nothing can go wrong in Ireland. And then after that and then progressively 2008, 2009, 2010 it became too pessimistic and it overshot in its pessimism actually as subsequent events showed. And then maybe by about 2013 maybe had it about right. And then in some quarters with the 2015 the 20-something percent GDP growth market started to get over-optimistic about Ireland again. Now where are we now today? Careful, careful assuming that the market has these macroeconomic things right. And that is the reason why we have to have macroeconomic and financial and financial stability authority. Of course the public sector can also get it wrong and actually within that time frame that I was talking about in 2010 when Greece was in terrible trouble the European official sector was pointing to Ireland. Look, Greece. Look, Portugal. Look at Ireland. Ireland is doing everything right. Well, we were trying to do everything right but we were very far from having achieved that and that was a mistake that allowed them to be shocked when things didn't work out. So they are very complex issues that do require institutions to think carefully about these things. So that's why we have a central bank. What I want to say about the central bank and its mandate is there's been a fashion over the last 25 years that central banks should stick to very narrow mandate of keeping getting price stability 2% on average good rate of inflation not zero for various technical reasons 2% is good, that's all. Let central banks not do anything else and I think that the crisis showed quite clearly that that's not good enough that the central bank must hold there's an implicit mandate for the central bank to pick up other tools and work to stabilise the economy when it goes badly off the rails and that was not learned very quickly in certain quarters in Europe in particular and central banks tend to say with somebody else's problem and I think was one of the things that we insisted on in the central bank we think we have a mandate to do this we are going to do it not only that but when people ask us will you do this as well there were risks in taking on additional responsibilities but we thought if we don't do it who will do it and that also speaks and this is my third point to the role of the central bank in one country in Europe in relation to the rest of Europe a friend in need is a friend indeed and who are the friends well this was quite complicated but one thing was clear to me all along is that the treaty says that each central bank will be represented with its governor in the governing council and that means that vital national interests have to be presented by the national central bank in Europe and fought for and you don't lose your nationality when you go to the ECB to do perform these functions there are responsibilities to the mandate of the ECB and the euro system as a whole have an important national responsibility how did our European colleagues do a lot of discussion of that in the book Europe and the IMF European authorities didn't do as well at first the IMF did because the IMF were used to these situations they were used to countries that got into difficulty and they didn't they could stand back and compare and contrast other experiences they did not have that experience and made some bad mistakes mistakes that cost other countries in Europe as well as the stressed countries like Ireland in the end and I discussed this in the end they made redress you can decide whether they made adequate redress but quite substantial redress was made in some of the arrangements that sorted eventually the banking indebtedness that had arisen with the ECB they didn't want to boast about it but you can detect that they felt bad about how they had handled it earlier on actually going to Dan O'Brien was asking me give us some numbers and it's there you'll find a detailed set of footnotes about all that by the book I just want to say one last thing and I think it's important because I think we've got to when we think of austerity and the fiscal contraction and the cutbacks and all the pain that passed through the contraction of this state's apparatus and the increase in taxation I think we've got to contrast ideology and necessity as drivers of this kind of behaviour and this is true in the 1980s as well as in the last 10 years I mean when when the government of Garrett Fitzgerald that I was working with in the 1980s when they cut made cutbacks and when they increased tax rates they hated doing it they hated every minute of it the Thatcher regime in Britain didn't really have the same attitude they thought this is you know everything's gone out of whack we don't want big government and in a way we have the same parallel in this more recent experience you know we had successive ministers of finance Lenahan, Noonan, Howlin they also hated cutting back it was necessary but they hated doing it whereas Osborne he said we've got everything in balance but we can cut things even more and we think it's a better approach an ideological approach to austerity and I think we need to hold on to that our government policies in this country have not been ideologically driven they have been pragmatically driven sometimes they go off into unsustainable territory and they've got to be yanked back those were the the thoughts I had and you're meant to thank even more people at the end but I'm not going to do that