 On behalf of the United States Institute of Peace, we're delighted to welcome you to this important discussion in commemoration of the 30th anniversary of Cambodia's Paris peace agreements. My name is Luis Grande, and I'm the president of USIP, which was established by the US Congress in 1984 as an independent, nonpartisan national institution dedicated to preventing mitigating and helping to resolve violent conflict abroad. Five years ago, USIP was proud to host an event marking the 25th anniversary of the agreements. Signed by 19 governments, the Paris agreements laid out a roadmap for ending two decades of conflict. They launched a process of national reconciliation, and they paved the way for future economic growth. These were pathbreaking agreements and a very important milestone in the history of Asia. In the five years since their last event, the political environment has changed. Significant progress has been made in implementing the many commitments that form the agreements, but there are still a number of commitments that haven't yet been honored. During the next hour, we hope to reflect together on the legacy and continuing relevance of the agreements and specifically to assess the impact of the agreements on Cambodia's political environment and to identify the steps parties can take to uphold the commitments when having yet been fully implemented. We're delighted to be collaborating today with the Bureau of Conflict Stabilization Operations at the US Department of State. I hope everyone joins us in welcoming our distinguished panelists, including Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Ariel Ekblat and Ambassador Trumsonri. I have the pleasure of now introducing Ariel Ekblat, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Conflict Stabilization Operations at the US State Department. Please join me in welcoming her. Thank you so much, Lise. So good morning, and I appreciate that gracious introduction. It's an honor to speak to you all today. I'd like to start by extending a heartfelt thank you to the US Institute for Peace for partnering on this important event. I want to thank you also to the Ambassador and all of today's panelists for sharing your wisdom as we reflect on the progress Cambodia has made and the progress that we are still seeking to attain. I look forward to hearing each of your insights. And lastly, I want to thank all of you who are joining us today, both from D.C. and Cambodia. Your presence as a testament to the continued importance of the Paris peace agreements. As you know, the 1991 peace agreements were a remarkable example of multilateral diplomacy that not only ended Cambodia's decades-long civil war, but paved the way for a constitution which guaranteed human rights and multi-party democracy. The agreements were the result of a lengthy and laborious negotiation co-taired by France and Indonesia with varied but significant involvement in the United States, the United Nations, Australia, and Japan. It was truly an international and multilateral effort with 19 secretory countries. The agreements laid the groundwork for the United Nations' first ever de facto administration of state and largest peacekeeping mission to date. The mission resulted in the repatriation of more than 360,000 refugees, substantial disarmament of combatants, excuse me, and an eventual tribunal for former leaders of the Khmer Rouge's genocidal regime. In 1993, building upon the agreements, Cambodia adopted a new constitution guaranteeing multi-party democracy and fundamental freedoms. The following elections handed state administration to a democratically elected Cambodian government. The Paris peace agreements were a historic and unprecedented achievement. Most importantly, the agreements demonstrated the will of the Cambodian people that they might pursue the ambition of the democratic experiment. The excitement that surrounded the agreements demonstrated the foundational belief in the agreement's underlying principles, inclusive government, true multi-party democracy, and the protection of fundamental freedoms. Today, the people of Cambodia have made it clear that these principles are not only still relevant, but that their protection is as urgent as it was in 1991. Over the last 30 years, Cambodia has gained stability and seen significant economic growth. Most recently, it's been running a successful COVID-19 vaccination campaign. The U.S. government and American people have been a proud partner with Cambodia throughout this period of growth. Cambodia has been a valued partner in the international fora, including on child protection, U.N. peacekeeping, public health and education, efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation, and expanding economic and commercial ties. Further, we appreciate Cambodia's work as the 2021 co-chair of the Mekong-U.S. partnership and look forward to working with Cambodia in its role as ASEAN's 2022 chair. To support this undeniable progress, the United States is engaged in a variety of efforts. Since the signing of the Paris peace agreements, the U.S. has invested more than $3 billion to improve the health, human development and food security of the people of Cambodia. The U.S. foreign assistance to Cambodia totals more than $100 million per year to protect Cambodia's critical ecosystems, improve governance, strengthen the educational system, prevent trafficking in persons, support demining, and U.N. peacekeeping training. Recently, the U.S. contributed $15 million to help address economic and health challenges caused by COVID-19 and provided $1.1 million Johnson & Johnson vaccines to support the government's vaccination campaign. The United States has supported Cambodia's economic growth through assistance programs and trade benefits. As a result, the United States is now Cambodia's largest export market, accounting for 36 percent of its exports. This represents a doubling over the past five years. This progress is laudable without a doubt. Cambodia's advancement in human development, health outcomes, and economic growth are greatly impressive. Still, some aspects of the agreements remain unfulfilled. Rather than realizing the competitive multi-party democracy envisioned 30 years ago, today Cambodia is witnessing increased repression and democratic backsliding. The country's primary opposition party was dissolved and its leaders subjected to politically motivated trials. Opposition supporters, journalists, civil society, and citizens who criticized the ruling Cambodia People's Party have been charged with incitement and imprisoned. Some reports indicate an alarming decrease in internet freedom and increasing prosecutions against individuals engaging in political discourse online. These actions have been widely condemned by many of Cambodia's international partners, including the United States. We have and will continue to urge the Cambodian government to protect fundamental freedoms and multi-party democracy. Freedom of speech, assembly, and democratic choice are essential for continued peace and prosperity. A departure from these principles is a departure from the primary vision of both the Paris peace agreements and the Cambodian constitution. That political power rests with the Cambodian people. Thus, the Paris peace agreements and the principles therein remain just as important today as they were 30 years ago. History has shown that countries that respect human rights are more peaceful, more prosperous, and more stable. Now more than ever, it's important for the government of Cambodia and all signatories to stand with the Cambodian people to reaffirm the Paris peace agreements commitments. The United States will continue to actively support Cambodia's development as a prosperous, democratic, and independent partner. You recognize that these principles resonate not only with those who experience the horrors of the Khmer regime, but are foundational to today's youth and their future. We are heartened by the emerging generation of forward-looking Cambodians that is emerging, young people who take seriously their demographic rights and responsibilities, their education, and their potential. Quite frankly, democracies at all stages of growth require self-reflection and course correction. The United States will continue to partner with Cambodia to encourage a return to such reflection and course correction. As we listen to our panelists, I challenge the audience to consider the ways in which you wish to see Cambodia grow into, grow in the years ahead. I look forward to today's discussion, and again, thank you all for joining us. Thanks so much. Thank you very much, Deputy Assistant Secretary Eklat for those opening remarks. And on behalf of USIP, I'm honored to introduce next his Excellency, Chum Sun-Ri, who is one of Cambodia's most distinguished diplomats. He's been the ambassador to the United States and to Mexico since 2018. Previously, he was an undersecretary of state at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation in Cambodia. He's previously been ambassador to Australia, New Zealand, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Russia. He was also first secretary at the embassy in Washington for three years in the 1990s. Ambassador Chum has received several national awards, including two medals of national merit, the Royal Order of Cambodia, and others. Ambassador, we're honored that you can join us today and look forward to your remarks. Yeah, thank you for your kind introduction. Yes. This is the grand president of the US Institute of Peace. We are honored by Adria Akbar, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the US Department of State. Distinguished ladies and gentlemen, first I wish to express my sincere thanks to the US Institute of Peace for organizing this public virtual event on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of Paris Agreement. As well as for the invitation extended to me to speak along with Deputy Assistant Secretary Adria Akbar and all the important speakers. Let me start by recalling some key historical events leading to the signing of the Paris Accord on Cambodia. The journey towards reaching an agreement was indeed long and started by the first meeting between Prime Minister Homsain and then Prince Laurent C. Hanoog in Fairam Tadden North from 2 to 4 December 1987. That paved the way for subsequent negotiations and the signing of the Paris Agreement. The Paris Accord offered a comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodian conflict. It led to the first general election in Cambodia in 1993, organized and supervised by the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia. After the election, the new constitution, the achievement of the Paris Agreement came into being. As a result, Cambodia became the constitutional monarchy and adhered to liberal, pluralist democracy, political system. However, the nation had not yet achieved full peace since the Khmer rule withdrew from the Paris Agreement and continued to wage war. As a matter of fact, UNTAC did not fully fulfill what the Paris Agreement was supposed to do. After spending our 2 billion US dollars and using a great number of force for the operation in Cambodia, UNTAC withdrew and left Cambodia with two control areas and governments, war did not end. To settle national problems, Prime Minister Homesign developed win-win policy initiatives to ensure peace and national reconciliation. Implementation of the win-win policy ended productive war in Cambodia and brought about full peace, national and territorial unity at the end of 1998. Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, political opponents of the royal government of Cambodia regularly involved the Paris Agreement to criticize and attack Cambodia. Therefore, I would like to share my government's view on the question, why quoting the Paris Agreement is irrelevant since the UN mission in Cambodia ended on September 20, 1993. These views, I believe, we set line on the question to be raised for discussion later, concerning three political environment commitments made under the Paris Agreement, the symmetry's current obligation towards the commitment, etc. When it got to the free political environment, what do we understand? My free political environment, no doubt that it means, in one word, democracy. Democracy requests a free and fair political debate, a peaceful confrontation on different ideas, might not on mutual respects. In Cambodia, since 1993, we have tried to comply with this principle. But the government will, for what we call, a culture of dialogue was betrayed. Because there are people who confuse freedom of expression with freedom to defend and slander. With freedom to call for racial hate, with freedom to publish fake news and fake documents. With freedom to provoke division among the nation by exacerbating the very sensitive issues like the legacy of the colonial time about the national territory boundary. With freedom to call the armed forces and the police to make sense. The government has refused to confuse freedom of expression with freedom of insult or falsification. Like in most of the democratic countries, we have lost most of them similar to those in the developed countries that prohibit and punish such crimes. So the answer to the question is yes. The space for a free political environment remains in Cambodia for citizens who do respect the law. Consenting the commitment under the Paris Agreement. The purpose of the Paris Agreement is the comprehensive political sentiment of the Cambodian conflict. This objective appears in the title and the preamble of the agreements. According to the report on the negotiation, leading to the agreement, the word comprehensive means the participation of the four parties of the conflict. And in particular, the inclusion of the democratic Cambodia decade, the Khmer rule faction in the sentiment. The decade, one of the four signatory Cambodian factions had the 40. The failure of one of the signatories to comply with their commitments had dramatic consequences for the objective pursuit by this agreement. During a transition period, disarmament of the faction, creation of a neutral political environment, promotion of human rights, characterization of refugees and display people, organization of election, rehabilitation, and reconstruction. This withdrawal radically changed the purpose of the Paris Agreement and put an end to the comprehensive character of this political sentiment which changed fundamentally the long negotiated balances and the resulting obligation. The joint mission ended on September 24, 1993. With the end of that mission, it was the end of the commitments provided for by the agreement. Everyone has his own evaluation of the way this commitment had been implemented. But the part of the joint square to regenerate as 25289 adopted by the Joint Security Council said. As symmetry to the Paris Agreement, the Cambodian party had the primary responsibility for their implementation and that the future stability and value of Cambodia depends on Cambodian themselves. However, it is clear that once the joint mission was over, it was up to the Cambodian to decide how to implement the Paris Agreement. For the question on the signatories' current obligation towards the commitment made in the Paris Agreement, there are no more current obligations under the Paris Agreement. The agreement on sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and inviolability, neutrality, and national unity of Cambodia clearly states that Cambodia will maintain its sovereignty and independence once these principles are enshrined in the constitution. It was never written in the Paris Agreement that Cambodia, after the transition period, that is to say once the United Nations mission ended, would remain under international supervision. How about human rights? In 1992, the Supreme National Council of Cambodia accepted to the relevant UN International Human Rights Instrument. Like our UN member states, Cambodia remained bound by the commitment implied by our membership in the UN. Cambodia as a full sovereign state has accepted the presence of an office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the mandate of a special representative of the UN Secretary General for Human Rights in Cambodia. It has been done not by virtue of an obligation created by the Paris Agreement, which mentions only the possibility after the end of the transition period. Cambodia is far on track since the end of the joint mission. Peace, security, and political stability brings about good opportunity and presided over Cambodia to score great and proud achievements of socio-economic development in the last two decades. Prior to the pandemic, Cambodia realized an average growth of over 7% per annum. As a result, national economy grows rapidly and healthy. In real GDP has increased from $3,649 million in 2000 to roughly $24,605 million in 2018. Based on the economic achievement, living conditions of people in general have continually improved, reflected in increase of average per capita income from $288 million in 2000 to $1,163 million in 2018. Poverty rate has lower from about 53.2% in 2004 to roughly 13.5% in 2014 and expected to continue lowering to around 10% in the present. 30 years ago, the UN has deployed a peacekeeper to assist us. Today, it is our turn to send back our peacekeeper to assist other countries in different parts of the world. Since 2006, Cambodia has deployed over 7,000 peacekeepers for the UN peacekeeping operation in Sudan, South Sudan, Central African Republic, China, Cyprus, Lebanon, Mali, Syria, and Yemen. Cambodia highly appreciates the assistance provided by the United States in the rehabilitation and development of Cambodia during the last two decades. And it is a sincere piece of the Cambodian government to further promote the relationship and cooperation and partnership with the United States. Thank you for your attention. Your Excellency Tsunri, thank you very much for your remarks and representation of the Cambodian government's position and for your service as ambassador in Washington. Again, we're very pleased that you are able to join us today to be part of this discussion. We will now turn to a panel discussion and questions and answers. So our opening speakers have agreed on the peace process and political settlements that were in the Paris peace agreements based on principles of democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms and reconciliation. And they've also agreed on the social and economic progress that Cambodia has made since the 1990s. But we've heard two very different views about whether the agreements are still enduring and relevant today. So in light of these different perspectives, we'd like to invite our panelists who are Cambodian and foreign experts on Cambodian politics and society to share their views on what's changed since the PPA was signed, how have signatories fulfilled their commitments, and how can the signatories promote and encourage respect for human rights and freedoms today. So we will hear from five panelists each will speak for three to five minutes each. And following that, there'll be discussion based on questions that members of the audience submit. You can do that on the USIP website event page. There's a space to submit questions there. So please do submit your questions for the panelists consideration. I'd like to briefly introduce the five panelists. So, first, we will hear from Dr. Sorpeng Hu, who is a Cambodian Canadian professor of politics and public administration at Ryerson University in Toronto. And he's previously served in departments of political science in Canada and Japan and Singapore. He has interests in global peace and security studies and comparative politics. Our second speaker will be Dr. Caroline Hughes, who's the Associate Dean for Policy and Practice in the Keough School of Global Affairs at the University of Notre Dame in Indiana. And she's also the Reverend Theodore Hesburg Chair in Peace Studies at the Crock Institute for International Peace Studies. Dr. Hughes' work conceptualizes peace and development as political relationships that are contested through post-conflict reconstruction in Cambodia and other countries in Southeast Asia. Third, we're pleased to welcome Chak Sopyap, who's the Executive Director of the Cambodian Center for Human Rights, which is a human rights organization working for the promotion and protection of political and civil rights in Cambodia. As one of Cambodia's most prominent human rights advocates, her work has been recognized by former President Obama, the Indian ASEAN Youth Award, Franco German Prize for Human Rights and Rule of Law and others. And she has a master's degree in international peace studies from the International University of Japan. Fourth, Dr. Aizawa Nobuiro is the Assistant Professor in Kyushu University's Department of Cultural Studies in Fukuoka, Japan. He's a specialist in Southeast Asia and international relations. He was a Japan scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington from 2020 to 21 and has been a researcher for the Japan National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies and the External Trade Organization's Institute of Developing Economies. And finally, our fifth speaker, Dr. Craig Etchison, is a visiting scientist at the Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health. From 2006 to 2012, he was the Chief of Investigations for the Office of Co-Prossecutors in the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia that prosecuted Khmer Rouge leaders. And he's the author of several previous books on Cambodia. So thanks to all of our distinguished panelists, and we'll turn first to Dr. Serpal. Good morning. Yes, let me express my gratitude to the US Institute of Peace for organizing this event and inviting me to share some of my thoughts about the PDA, the Peace Accord. But before I do that, let me say just a few words about what I'm going to say. The topic is still very controversial and even divisive. When the Peace Accord was signed in 1991, there was some real opposition for various reasons. The strongest of it was that it included the Khmer Rouge faction. It was a legitimate challenge to the Paris Peace Agreement in the sense that what the Khmer Rouge did from 1975 to 1978, it turned the whole country into killing fields. But I was one of those who supported the Peace Accord from the beginning, from day one. For me, it was a painful reality in the sense that it included the Khmer Rouge because I was a survivor of the Khmer Rouge regime. I lost many loved ones, including my parents, my grandparents, my father who was executed in 1975, and my mother and six brothers, sisters, and I were put in forced labor. So for me, it was a very difficult challenge, but I support it. So I just want to make it clear because I think that the Paris Peace Agreement was based on certain, what I would call it, pragmatic realism in the sense that there is no other choice. And I would say that the idea of even waging a war against the Khmer Rouge was not even a moral option for me. As someone who went through civil war and witnessed a lot of violence, Cambodia actually needed peace. So I just want to make that clear that my position has not changed since and I have written on this topic. And I would say that, you know, my overall, my way of thinking is not, is, is never driven by, by anger or by hatred. It's always about peace in Cambodia. So I just want to make that clear. It's, it's, it's a deep desire for peace for the Cambodian people that I have been motivated to, to write about Cambodia. I would want to make a few quick remarks here that the, when you assess the Paris Peace Agreement, the legacy, you have to be balanced and fair, both positive and negative. So, and I will make a plea at the end. But let me start with the positive legacy. The PDA, the Peace Accord made it possible for Cambodia to make a set of three transitions from war to peace, from dictatorship to democracy, from poverty to prosperity. So for me, if I were to sum up the Peace Accord, it has to be based on these three transitions of these three areas I would say the transition from poverty to prosperity is probably the most important one. The country has become a normal developing country. Economic growth has been a positive indicator. Human development index show good progress, as the ambassador pointed out. I don't need to repeat that. But less positive and still positive was the transition from war to peace. The UN intervention did not put an end to the conflict. The disarmament process was a complete failure. It was not until the late 1990s that the Khmer Rouge Rebellion ended. And I think the Cambodian government deserves a lot of credit for these positive legacy as well. So, there has been a lot of positive developments in Cambodia. But there are also negative legacies. When we are talking about negative legacies, I refer to the war is some political and legal developments and do not mean to suggest that no progress was made, but that the progress made after the UN intervention has been reversed. The negative legacy includes the following. Cambodia can no longer be considered a multi-party democracy. As a scholar, I know what it means when we say a multi-party democracy. So there has been a transition backward to a one-party democracy with elections held without any credible opposition parties in the last election. And certain rights have made some progress in some areas when you talk about civil liberties. But by and large, they are not well protected, especially in the area of political rights and certain civil liberties. The rule of law is still highly problematic. The World Justice Project rule of law index 2020, for instance, around Cambodia 127 place, 127 among 128 countries. Although I don't think that this assessment is fair, I still think that the assessment gave Cambodia a very bad image that must be fixed. So in terms of the rule of law, Cambodia still has a lot of work to do. So what worries me is that the state institutions remain deeply politicized and weak. Civil society organizations are far from playing an influential role. So my plea is this, Cambodia would be a better country if power could be shared and kept in check. If more efforts could be devoted to state and civil society institution building. But no effective action can be taken if we don't understand the real challenges. The most important of which is what I call the politics of survival. Still deeply rooted in the emotionally charged security environment where political leaders cannot trust each other, enough to find common solutions. Most experts like to talk about the culture of impunity that has played Cambodia. But I like always to focus on the culture of mutual distress and retribution that must be overcome. So in short, the peace agreement made a good foundation upon which we, the Camboon people can build a better future for ourselves and our children. But it would not be easy for them to achieve this objective because the Camboon politics has also been complicated by global and regional power politics as well. And that is another challenge for Cambodia. So thank you very much Dr. Sarpang for your balanced and nuanced remarks. Sorry that we have to move on in order to keep on time. But very much appreciated. We'll turn next to Dr. Hughes. Thank you very much. Thank you for inviting me to be part of the panel today. I very much appreciate all remarks that have been made so far. I'm perhaps going to be a little bit more skeptical about the situation in my remarks. My argument is that the Paris agreement certainly brought about a radical change in Cambodian politics and society that's without any shadow of a doubt. However, I'm a little more negative perhaps about the way in which development, peace and democracy have been connected in Cambodia over the past 30 years. And in fact, I would argue that the opportunities for peace and democracy have been undermined by an approach to development, although it has generated improvements in human development indicators has nevertheless been marked by a predatory approach and by a significant sort of background noise of violence. So on the question of human rights and democracy, as we heard from previous speakers, there were many advances after 1991, but recent events have shown that some of the achievements of the Paris agreements were fragile. And the problem I would argue was that there was a relatively relative lack of thinking in the Paris agreements and the discussion around them about how the opening of civic space, as as Professor Palace just been describing, might actually be secured beyond the establishment of formal institutions, such as a liberal constitution and an electoral process. Actually, you know, those those formal institutions still exist, the constitution still exists, but it's regularly interpreted in a manner that is antithetical to robust protection of basic human rights. Elections have been regularly held, but I would argue that really since 1993, they've been argued, they've been organized, I'm sorry, in such a manner as to ensure the dominance of the Cambodian People's Party. They've been a legitimizing device, rather than a vehicle for any kind of genuine accountability. I think the Paris agreements assumed that establishing a set of institutions that looked like the institutions common in Western countries would be sufficient for a liberal democratic polity to spring forward in Cambodia. But in that, I think they failed to take note of the deep disorganization of civil society in Cambodia that was a legacy of the war. They failed to take effective steps to reduce the significance of the military and military and the threat of military violence in strategies of rule. The imbalance between the power of the military and the weakness of civil society has undermined the potential for widening political space throughout the last 30 years. And because of that, I think we have seen civil society leaders and opposition politicians consistently calling for international assistance from the signatories of the Paris agreements to correct this imbalance. But that assistance has not been forthcoming, particularly since Western ideas about democratic enlargement that were prevalent in the 1990s were replaced by a much more counter-terrorism focus after 2001. And I think that the transformation of the economy, although it has been positive in terms of reducing poverty and so on, it has actually contributed to an ongoing environment of violence and insecurity. In terms of the objectives of the Paris peace agreements, we should consider this seriously. Has the development strategy that has been implemented in Cambodia been peaceful? And I would contend that it is not. We've seen violence used to promote the interests of investors across the board at the expense of general well-being. This includes the expulsion of rural communities from sites slated for plantation agriculture, the raising of informal settlements in Phnom Penh, brutal attacks on strikers, labour organisers and other activists. There's also indirect forms of violence that are very prevalent, widespread evidence of malnutrition amongst young women factory workers, for example, who repatriate up to half of their salaries to heavily indebted rural families. Young Cambodians migrate to work in cities and overseas at the expense of family life and under the risk of the threat of trafficking. The looming environmental crisis on the Mekong River, which is essential to the food security of millions of Cambodians, promises to reverse many of the developmental gains made since 1991. And I think, you know, for me, the political and developmental objectives of Paris agreements were in contradiction with one another. Political peace, based upon expanding trust between former enemies and deepening confidence in liberal safeguards, was at odds with a development strategy that was based on expulsion of ordinary people from the areas of Cambodia's richest natural resources, the selling of those natural resources to buy support for the ruling party. This prompted an extractive approach to the development of Cambodia's natural resources that was facilitated by international firms, including Western firms. And this has entrenched new forms of distrust and grievance and imposing order in the face of these has become a rationale for ongoing political violence. Obviously, it's easy to look clever in hindsight, but I think it's important to look back at the past 30 years at Cambodians experience because I think it has a lot to teach us all about the potential for violence in post-conflict development. And it teaches us that sustained active grassroots peace building work is necessary to assure social justice, positive peace and respect for human rights in post-conflict situations. Thank you. Thank you very much, Dr. Hughes, for bringing in developments and how it relates to peace and security. We'll now turn to the human rights situation and welcome Chuck Sopiep to share about her work and her perspectives on the agreements. Thank you, Andrew, and thanks to all remark made by professors and also the Cambodian representative under the government representative earlier. It's a bit challenging to be the speaker in the middle of the way where Enric's thoughts have been provoked. And I'm really inspired by the remark pointed out by Professor Sopiep, I would like to thank him a lot for sharing from his deep heart, you know, the feeling as a Khmer survivor where all those, you know, with the suffering of the loss of the family member, but he value and he support the Paris peace agreement. And to me, hearing that is really kind of, you know, like as a young generation, I feel so much appreciate in the way how he healed himself. And that is the way forward for us as a Cambodian to move forward. When it comes to the reflection of the Paris peace agreement, I want to make first looking at the relevancy of the Paris peace agreement because there have been arguments earlier and a lot of time there have been a debate, you know, the different issues between the Cambodian government, civil society or international community on whether the Paris peace agreement is a live document or it's already a dead document. Some to some they said that, you know, no more relevant but to me I would argue that it's still relevant. It's not a dead document because of two factors. And if you look at the agreement itself, of course, you know, the packet of the agreement consists of the four key documents and in one of the documents, of course, you know, the final act of the Paris conference, especially on the political segment of the Cambodian, it detailed the kind of arrangement during the transitional period, which lasts from 91 to 93. So, of course, when we look at this specific section, yes, the arrangement should be and within that transition period. However, the rest document does not, you know, cannot be the duration that, you know, it should end within this transition. However, it only, you know, like buying the Cambodian as well as the signatory obligation on the peace building process. So to me that is clear cut to me that the Paris peace agreement is an ongoing document. And maybe we can't be bad that no, it's no longer relevant. And second factor, when we're talking about peace building process, we have to really understand what peace really mean. I sent to Professor earlier, since he pointed out, you know, the need for us to work on the positive peace, because, you know, like in Cambodia, especially in the modern time, the government like to promote a lot about peace and peace. I think it's nothing wrong. I think we should allow peace. We should promote peace. However, when we're talking about peace in that sense, there have been a misconception that, you know, peace only understood as a merely upstream of the wall, which is a negative piece. So when we're talking about peace, we have to understand that it had to achieve both the negative piece and the positive piece, which means that it's not only the positive piece, but it had to be on the social harmony of the citizen and people had to fully enjoy their fundamental freedom. And that is when we can say that it's a complete piece. So I would agree to Ambassador earlier, he mentioned that, of course, you know, following the adoption of the Paris Agreement in the early 90s, Cambodia have not yet achieved a full peace. But later on when he said that, well, you know, up to the late 90s, with the disarmament and kind of rehabilitation of, you know, it's a reintegration of the army as well as guerrilla, into the society that knows as a full peace that have been achieved. I disagree with that because based on the concept of peace, it's not only the merely upstream of the wall, we have to work further on the enjoyment of people of freedom. So there is one point I want to reflect on the relevancy of the Paris peace agreement, but second is on the reflection. And I totally agree that we have to look at both positive and negative. What I could see the positive side is that Cambodia have made a very good document, which is the constitution. This is really well done. It followed the Paris peace agreement spirit that detailed that Cambodia is the country that follow multi-party system, follow the democratic value, et cetera, but on paper, yes, but in real implementation, that is another part that I do have a view a lot, which I totally agree that Cambodia have to work further to achieve, you know, this real democratic value, ensure the conducive environment of the free and fair election. And also, you know, the challenge following the Paris peace agreement still all those with a good document on constitution with the recognition of international human rights instrument. Cambodia have still have the challenges with the institution. We have a weak institution. We have a strong man. We have a strong individual in power, but we don't empower the institution. We don't have a clear separation of power with the court, the legislative body and the executive body that should be separate, but somehow it's on under control of the executive branch. And if we look at the military, which is a key power in the country, it's also politicized and that have to be reform if we want to achieve a real peace process as outlined in the Paris peace agreement. And I believe given the time as well, I just end my my reflection with the current challenges, you know, with the big institution with the, you know, the leg of conducive environment to free and fair and the enjoyment of fundamental freedom by citizen. I would look, you know, for us, you know, such a year of Paris peace agreement, if we compare to human being, it's like a mature adult. So we should be mature. We should not still argue, you know, something that, you know, whether the development first or human rights first, it should no longer the argument. It should go along the way. And I, I, I wish to, you know, recall to all political leader, especially Cambrian leader, policy leader, you know, to, to look at the Paris peace agreement as a model. You know, how the different fraction can come together at the time we were in a conflict, they are all now we don't have all. Why can't we come together and put everything on table? Why don't we address the issue together peacefully? You know, so that is my, my, my final thought that we should look at this 30 year as a reflection where we want Cambrian moving forward to a real peace process. Thank you. Thank you very much for those reflections and your, your passion for Cambodia today and the history that we've been through. We'll turn now to Dr. Etchison, who will share from his point of view about the agreements and links to transitional justice. Thank you, Andrew. It's a pleasure to be with you this morning. I would like to draw your attention to several contextual factors that I think are important to consider when we're discussing the legacy of the Paris peace agreements. The first has to do with the difference in Cambodia's situation and status in 1991 versus today in 2021. 30 years ago, in 1991, Cambodia was effectively a failed state. And as such, it was put under the receivership of the international community. Cambodia's sovereignty was symbolically invested in the Supreme National Council. But in reality, Cambodia's sovereignty was effectively exercised by the United Nations transitional authority in Cambodia, emphasis on the word authority. So, in that period, 30 years ago, Cambodia was effectively helpless before the international community. Today, in contrast, in 2021, Cambodia is a fully sovereign state, a member of the international community. As Secretary Eckblad and Ambassador Chum have pointed out, Cambodia has had a very robust economy for more than 15 years with 7% annual growth that regularly contributes troops to international peacekeeping operations. And displays all of the rights and responsibilities of a sovereign state and a member of the international community. So, the situation of Cambodia is very different in 1991 versus 2021. A second contextual factor concerns the interests of the international community in general and the signatories of the Paris peace agreement in particular. You will recall that through the war in Cambodia in the 1980s, there was fighting among four principal factions of Cambodians. But in reality, in many respects, the war in Cambodia was a proxy war being supported by Russia for the Soviet Union during that period, China and the United States. So, I would argue that the principal purpose of the Paris peace agreements was the desire of these great powers to terminate this proxy war and then leave Cambodians to solve their own problems. Now, when you're dealing with relations among sovereign states, there is a spectrum of methods or tools that diplomats and politicians use to try and preserve and press their interests. One might say there are carrots and there are sticks. In the carrots, you can have political, diplomatic, economic and military aid and cooperation of various types. And then at the other end of the spectrum, you can have political condemnation, diplomatic demarches, economic pressures up to and including trade sanctions, and in extreme cases, military intervention. Among the varying signatories of the Paris peace accords, France, Indonesia, the United States, Japan, and all of the others, these states have very different sets of interests with respect to Cambodia. And thus, it is difficult for this disparate collection of states to create a unified front in their relations with Cambodia. In fact, in my reading of the situation over the last 30 years, there have only been two situations where the international community has been able to present the unified front. One was the 1997 crisis and secondly, the creation of the Khmer Rouge Tribunal. Otherwise, there seems to be no unified international community will to press Cambodia to do anything in particular. Finally, a third contextual question is the capability of Cambodia to deal with international pressure in 1991 versus 2021. Even with more than 20,000 troops and civil servants in Cambodia, the United Nations couldn't really impose its will in 1991. The plan to can tone, disarm, demobilize and reintegrate the four armies completely fell apart in terms of protecting human rights with all of those troops in Cambodia. You will recall that the human rights component of UNTAC declared that acts of genocide were taking place while they were there. Did they prevent it? No. Did they punish it? No. They just announced that it was happening. So even with 20,000 troops, the international community could not even impose its will in 2021. Today, Cambodia knows how to deal with the international community. During the negotiations for the Khmer Rouge Tribunal, Cambodia's negotiators ran rings around the United Nations secretariat and effectively was able to cause the establishment of a tribunal that they could control. So my bottom line is that it's very difficult, not on impossible for any particular country to get Cambodia to do something that it doesn't want to do. And I'll leave my remarks right there. Thank you. Thanks very much. We can come back to this and other points in the questions and answers. We want to remind our audience if you haven't yet submitted a question on the USIP events site on the web, please do that now. And we will select from those questions for the remainder of the event after we hear from Dr. Izawa, who is our last speaker. Thank you very much, Andrew, and I'm very pleased to join this distinguished panel. My role here is to offer some different perspective from how Japan sees the process, not only the peace agreements and also the post peace agreements. I emphasize the post peace agreements because the Japanese view very much emphasize on the one word reconstruction. I think that is also embedded in Japanese history in post World War II as well, and its relationship with other Asian conflict be it in Korea, be it in Vietnam as well. We very much understand reaching peace and reconstructing from peace is an equally difficult and also politically demanding process. So I wouldn't go deep into the role of Japan in the peace agreements, but I really like to highlight the principle has Japan has took its very much on the inclusion. There's two levels of inclusion. One is political inclusion and also it's a social inclusion. First of all, I just wanted to highlight as Dr. Edison has highlighted in the post peace period in 1997. I think in in Cambodian process, there were so many occasions that there were politically, you could just walk out of dialogue, right, not just in 1991, and also 1997 as well. And there were every time there were political commitments to come back. And I think the current history should credit the way they kind of agreed to, you know, be able to include in the 97. It's always the second election is always the most difficult one to consolidate the piece. I think that history of inclusion should not be forget it. I mean, there are always pressure to exclude in the following elections and up until now which is an easy political decision, but Cambodia has built on a lot of political including decisions. You know, of course, it was through a lot of negotiations multi national negotiations is not just in 1991 and 1997 as well. But I think in historiography, I think Cambodia, why the fit why it is no longer a failed state. I think that political process of political inclusion should be highlighted. And I think that principle that principle of inclusion should be held because Cambodia proved it. That's number one. Number two, it's the social inclusion. I think, you know, many achievements from the Cambodian peace agreement be at the Constitution in the first elections, but I also want to highlight one thing. It's the civil code. That's where Japan really put an emphasis on. We had this concept of peace dividend, and how could peace dividend reach to a social level, and that social level of peace dividend could sustain. It's not the Constitution that will hold those dividend at place. It's also the civil code and the continuous judicial judicial reform and the upgrading of the system. I know this doesn't allow automatically to democracy. I know this is not enough, but I do think it was a necessary step. I think this is a foundation for the following. For example, democratization. I know. I know this is not a very like a newsworthy and highlighted because there is no major, you know, elections on that is a very time consuming long term process, but the trust to the civil code and the practice of law will definitely hold the Cambodian society together. And no matter what the political regime is, I think there is a foundation to hold that the state system is there to protect any people's civil rights and also the peace dividend. So I think, you know, highlighting those two, even though it might not be politically, you know, attractive, I think it's worth the highlighting in the following 30 years of process. Now, the final thing I would like to focus is this time. I think, you know, as Dr. Edison said, context matters. I think we should recognize that the bar that we set in 1991 and the bar we need to set in 2021 is different. Because it's 30 years, you like it or not. There's a different generation that becoming a social force for Cambodia. And those new generation may not take the credit of how Cambodian leader reached peace, as much as they like to see more, for example, economic development and so forth. This happened in Japan too. You know, the leadership in the 1940s could not have their political credit when they were trying to govern in the 1980s. So, you know, this is, this is a natural thing. But I think the Cambodian process also have to hire the bar. I don't think the peace agreement should be mentioned as either relevant or not relevant. I think it is the foundation. And I think it has to build on top of it. So what I mean by top of it is those state institutions are built. And I think now is the time to how to exercise that. And I think it lies to the people. And those people, whether it has to be, for example, democratically, democratically compassionate people with maybe tech savvy technology, you know, I think that kind of design of how to build people is going to be the bar. And I want that inclusiveness that was built on 1991 agreement and followed by the Cambodian people to be part of that human human building human capacity building too. Thank you very much. Thank you very much, Dr isawa and to all of our panelists for some really provocative and thoughtful remarks we've heard different perspectives about the success and status of the peace process. We'll get to questions in the 10 minutes or so remaining. The first question that I'd like to share is that we've heard about limitations to freedom of speech democracy and rule of law. What can the world do to promote democracy and Cambodia. And, you know, I know Dr Etchison's comment that no single state can compel Cambodia to do something, given that what what can be done. Maybe turn to Dr Sorpong first and then ask other panelists if they would like to add, and please keep your remarks short. Thanks. This is a very important question. If we compare to what to 1991 or the early 1990s and now 2021. You know, I'm a political scientist I look at power structure. I look at institutional structure. It has been turned upside down. There was certain balance of power at the time but no more the balance of power broke down. And now we have one party that that become dominant. It's very difficult to change a lot of things in Cambodia in terms of political structure. It's going to be very difficult. The only way that the international community can do to have Cambodia is to stay engaged and put pressure. But I would say even putting pressure has its own limitations, because of the power structure. So what that means is that sanctions may not even work. I publish my research on economic sanctions in Myanmar and North Korea. They have basically failed and they even cost human insecurity. So I think the international community need to stay engaged and put pressure. But I think at the end of the day, the Cambodian people have to really understand the situation that they are in, that if they continue down this road, it's quite unsustainable. And it is in Cambodia's interest to allow democracy to flourish. I understand that the CPP would never give up power. I understand that. But I also expected the CPP to share power in a way that is constructive. But that's my quickly thought. Thanks very much. Would anyone like to add to that or have a different perspective? Yeah, Dr. Azawa, please. Yes, I just wanted to add on Dr. Sokwon's point on engagement. I think engagement really matters and I think engagement delivers too. One of the things that how Japan engaged with Cambodia right now is, for example, the introduction of the digital central bank currency. I think that was possible because of the engagement. Cambodia did not only rely on superpowers. They had all the engagement with other powers, middle powers, neighboring powers. I think those multilateral engagement matters. Why we engage? I think we have a trust on Cambodia as well. How do you keep the trust? That's where democratic values, even though it's in the process, I think the way we agree on this is a process. We are not going to give up on it. And even though, as Dr. Sokwon says, the power sharing might be difficult, but we need to agree on principles and therefore an engagement comes and engagement will deliver. And that will stabilize and that will create choices for the country to build up on. So I think in that case, there is a lot of things that engagement will create Cambodia stronger. I just want to touch on that. Thanks very much. We have two questions relating to transitional justice. So the first is the Paris agreements don't explicitly provide for a transitional justice mechanism, but they do commit the signatories to ensure that the practices of the past will not be allowed to return. So did that make space for later transitional justice mechanisms like the ECCC? And then second, a question more for facts and clarification. How many individuals have been convicted of serious crimes committed during the Khmer Rouge regime by the extraordinary chambers? How long did it take? It has that transitional justice process been completed. So send that to Dr. Etchison first and then others if they want to comment. Thanks Andrew. If you look carefully at what's been going on in Cambodia since the Khmer Rouge regime was overthrown in 1979, you will find that a plethora of transitional justice mechanisms have been applied. Starting with 1979's People's Revolutionary Tribunal, amnesty initiatives, development initiatives, peacekeeping initiatives, on and on up through to and including the extraordinary chambers in the courts of Cambodia. So transitional justice is not a single event or a point in time, but it's a process that extends over time indeed over generations. And it's a work in progress in Cambodia and the current Khmer Rouge Tribunal, which is now winding down, is just another event in that process. As to the number of individuals convicted by the extraordinary chambers, so far there have just been three. The first was Ken Ketuv Elias Duk, who was effectively the chief of the secret police under the Khmer Rouge, sentenced to life in prison for war crimes and crimes against humanity. And the second two were Nguyen Chea, who was the number two Khmer Rouge leader, the second only to pull pot, and Q. Sampan, who was the head of state succeeding Nordim Sihanouk in that role. And those two have both been convicted of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. And of those three, only Q. Sampan remains alive at this point, still sentenced to life in prison. Thank you. Would anyone else like to comment on transitional justice questions? Dr. Sarpong, please. Yes, I just want to make a quick remark here. You know, I'm all for transitional justice. I think the Khmer Rouge leader, those in most responsible for the mass atrocities should even burn in hell, from my perspective. I don't agree on this. But I always have problem with this approach, simply because in a very institutionally fractured state, there is always a tension between peace and justice. We have to recognize that. And my research, right now I'm finishing a new book on global criminal justice. I just don't get it. It's very dangerous even in factually, structurally fractured society. It's very difficult to pursue criminal justice. And we have learned a lot, even about the ICC, the International Criminal Justice. It hasn't really worked that well. In fact, generate a lot of tension. Just want to make it strong. Thanks. I mean, this could be a topic for further discussion, perhaps in a future US IP event and doesn't only relate to Cambodia, but many other contexts in the world. Our final question is how can signatories support the Cambodian people to be part of the Paris Peace Accords Foundation and continuation. So I'd like to send that question first to Chak Sopya and then Dr. Hughes. Thank you so much. Yes, I think it's really important for us. Of course, I think Professor Isawa have mentioned earlier that we should not argue on, you know, where the Paris Peace Agreement is relevant or not. But the reality is that on the ground, I mean in Cambodia, people argue, especially from the government that, you know, no longer, you know, valid for the Paris Peace Agreement. I think to make sure that it will be the foundation, like you mentioned, as well as other speakers point out, you know, to see the legacy or to see the Paris Peace Agreement as the foundation for us to work further. It's really important for us to recognize, you know, that is relevant. And I still argue that. And when we agree that it's relevant for us, then it's the way forward. You know, for Cambodian government to recognize that, yes, you know, we have to work further for a peace building process. And, you know, by saying that, you know, by actually that, you know, Cambodian actually a complete peace, it's not totally right because, you know, when we're talking about peace, I again repeat the concept of peace that it's not just a really upset of war. And when we say every time, you know, we place on the banner on the streets, same piece, you know, and at every corner of the world, we see the kind of sign, same piece. I think we have to understand clearly what peace really means. So, go back to the question. I believe that it requires to recognize that, yes, we agree together that, you know, the foundation is there and there are much work for us to work further for a peace process. And, and, and, and secondly, it's not just the Cambodian people and it's not just the Cambodian government, who is obliged in this process, the symmetry, I think Japan, US, you know, other 18 symmetry, have to move forward as well, you know, and this symmetry are still obliged to support Cambodia. I think you, some of us mentioned that, you know, after the agreement and the purpose of the agreement is to set hold the political conflict and then after, after word, it is Cambodia, to decide, of course, yes, we will decide, but I think we need all of you as a next symmetry to support us, you know, otherwise, you know, we are still in the, you know, like a trend, maybe in Japan is think and send it go blue, it go very fast, but it, it goes from the right direction. Now we are not just going to, you know, to fast, but we are a bit off the track, you know, the democracy have been stepped backward. So, again, you know, on the 30th anniversary, I would appear to all symmetry, both the Cambodian government as one of the key player and other symmetry to review its obligation and link to the previous question how we can, you know, build a rule of law and insure the fundamental freedom for citizens. I think the symmetry can, can have, can exert it, it, it, it power it, it, you know, both economic, politic and, you know, bilateral or multilateral relationship by reviewing whether, you know, all of this partnership, either the ad or either the investment have, have, have respect the human right principle or not. And if it does not, what does your framework, I mean, different country framework allow you to do, you, we can't, I think a lot of time be at you on the geopolitics, you know, when you press so much, the China will be in, but you know, even without that China is in, not just in Cambodia, but almost in the Southeast Asia region and other countries, so it really requires to, you know, work together on the framework that each individual country have put out, you know, every time I heard US, I heard UK, I heard Australia saying that well, human right is our core principle. We work on the human right principle. But when we access to that kind of relationship, a lot of time one, one side you would argue that well, democracy is, is, is problematic, but well, yes, let us support you this. It is, it is not a consistent approach. And when I say that please don't quote me wrong that I, I suggest for, for a sanction, I, I suggest that different countries should not support Cambodia politically or economically. No, I don't argue in that manner. What I suggest is for different symmetry to really make sure that you walk the top of your own framework beyond the Paris peace agreement, as well as within the framework of Paris peace agreement. I hope I make it clear here. Thank you. Thank you very much for that full response. I'm sorry we're at the end of our time and for those who have submitted other questions. Apologize that we can't address all of them. Clearly there's a lot more we can discuss here. Before we close with everyone's agreement would like to invite Dr Hughes for a few last words. Yeah, well, just, just to follow up, I totally agree with Mr. Beap that I think reasserting, you know, we, we committing perhaps to to a culture of human rights is the most positive thing we can do. I mean, I think, I think we have to be a little bit careful about advocating for international intervention. I don't think that the US, for example, really has any moral high ground to stand on with the respect to the Cambodian history. So I'm a little nervous about advocating for vigorous action by outside countries, but I think we can all think about where the clothes that we buy come from and what we're prepared to accept in terms of ethical business practices. We can also all think about how the ecological crisis on the Mekong River relates to climate change that we will contribute to. And we can all think about just, you know, promoting the idea that human rights is a really valuable and really worthwhile approach to thinking about, you know, the way that humans live together. And I think that those are things that we really need to, we really need to do it at this particular moment in time. Thanks. Thank you very much. And thanks to everyone who's joined this event, including Deputy Assistant Secretary Ariel Eckblad, His Excellency Chum Sunri and our five panelists. So on behalf of the US Institute of Peace, I wish you all a good day and continued engagement and support of Cambodia and our peace building mission. Thank you. Thank you everyone.