 Hi, I'm Ernie Bauer and this is Mike Green. We're from CSIS. I'm the senior advisor for Southeast Asia. Mike is the chair of the Japan program here. We just got back from Hawaii, where we did a trilateral in Maui with the United States, Japan, and Southeast Asia. Mike, I thought we came out with some really interesting findings after talking with the Japanese and the Southeast Asians. What did you take away? Well, this trilateral dialogue, Japan, China, excuse me, Japan, the U.S. and key Southeast Asian countries, is part of a series we're doing with U.S.-Japan India, Charles Freeman's doing China, India, U.S., and as Asia gropes and tries to find regional architecture, a mix of institutions and forums that will reinforce peace and economic interdependence. It's obvious there are a lot of fissures and it's hard to mix and match, and so increasingly these trilateral groupings are yielding areas of common interest and sort of setting a path ahead for the rest of the region. And I thought there were a couple of areas where when the U.S., ASEAN, and Japan sat down together, those kinds of visions for the whole region came out. One of them that was quite clear, I thought, was how much the Southeast Asians were willing to articulate in that meeting and also in this statement we put out, that they really rely on the U.S. forward presence and the U.S.-Japan alliance. It's something they knew but rarely articulated before and I think it reflects some uncertainty about China. Yeah. I mean, what I took away that just blew me away was that 20 years ago when we all sat at the table and the ASEANs came in and they were looking for balance then, the issue was Japan. Yeah. That the Japanese had plans to develop the region and were dominating competition and the Americans weren't there and police get engaged. And now 20 years later, I was struck by the fact that everybody at that trilateral agreed that Japan would be a stronger ally of the United States through deeper engagement in Southeast Asia and also vice versa. The United States would be a stronger partner for the Japanese. Yeah. I mean, the ASEANs are actually pretty smart about this. They want their Americans, they want their Japanese and their Chinese but they don't want too much of any one of us and on the security front, they're most comfortable with us. It's quite clear. But it was also obvious that they want us and Japan to keep investing, both in terms of time and money in the economic relationship with Southeast Asia. The other thing that came out for me was how much the Obama administration's had some success in the region with its engagement in Southeast Asia. But a lot of questions about whether that's sustainable. And the useful thing about a trilogue is that the Japanese then can weigh in and say to Americans, we need you there too. And it picks up everybody's game in the region. I thought another interesting element of discussion was Burma. It's clear to me that the Chinese behavior or Chinese enablement or enabling the Burmese and the North Koreans really has an impact on their neighbors. And ASEAN has been carrying around the big black ball and chain that's Burma for the last decade. Well, the Chinese sort of take a free rider shot on this. And it's clear that everybody wants to see change in Burma. And I thought one of the great outcomes of this meeting was a real will by all partners to take a look at what are the levers of change in Burma? How can we look at those together? How can we encourage change? And maybe one of those ideas is to talk to the Chinese about, obviously the Chinese are feeling some reputational impact over their behavior in Asia over the last 18 months. I don't know whether you think anything. Well, that was an interesting part of the discussion, the beginning to look at what would bring change in Burma. And I think that's a fruitful area for further discussion because the region now seems to have the attitude a lot of countries, especially in ASEAN, that, hey, they had elections, they were highly flawed, but let's see what happens next. But I think from a U.S. perspective or perhaps Europe, Australia, and Japan to some extent, the facts on the ground haven't changed. And we just don't know. So it's worth, as we assess, thinking through together what would constitute change, what would the agents of change be, so that next time we talk about what we're going to do about Burma, we have some metric we can agree on. And I think that was an interesting discussion. I think it reflected how for a lot of ASEAN, despite the non-interference and internal affairs line, there is more and more attention to good governance, rule of law, and all these issues which they have in common with Japan as well. How about on trade? Clearly the Japanese are keen on getting in the TPP game. Can they do that politically though? Probably, probably, which is amazing considering how weak the Prime Minister is. He has 20-some percent support and agricultural interests in Japan have always been very powerful. But TPP, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which began in ASEAN, really, it was New Zealand, Singapore, Chile, Brunei, is really becoming where the action is. And the U.S. is negotiating and Vietnam, Australia are coming in. The Japanese government wants in. Japanese media almost unanimously wants in. Will Khan be powerful enough to overcome the vested interests that don't want reform? Probably, actually. And it shows you how important ASEAN is as an event driver in Asia still, despite the difficulties they're having as an association. Well, as you can tell, we had some really interesting discussions out in Maui. And I think, I hope you share this view, I think we should continue this trilateral and look for others too. Yeah, these many lateral discussions and we do a lot of them here at CSIS are the building blocks of what hopefully will be a more inclusive, open, and functionally effective multilateral diplomacy in Asia and not just a lot of talk shops. So hopefully we contributed to that. Thanks for joining us at CSIS.