 The next panel is going to shift gears and we're going to talk about the South China Sea in regional politics so we have speakers from a couple of non-disputing countries in the region and we have some other academics, other regional watchers who are going to talk about it in the context of regional architecture also. So our first panelist, you have their longer bio but it's Ambassador Hamant Singh who is the Iqir Wadwadi Chair in India US Policy Studies in New Delhi. He's a former ambassador to Indonesia, has also served as ambassador to Japan. Then we have Vice Admiral Hideki Kanada who is Director of the Okazaki Institute in a junk fellow of the Japan Institute of International Affairs and we have Professor Karl Thayer who is from the University of New South Wales at the Australian Defense Force Academy in Canberra and at the end of the table way at the end is Professor Don Emerson who heads up the Southeast Asia Forum at the Walter H. Shoram Asia Pacific Research Center in Stanford. So we've got another great lineup. What everybody's been asked to do is give a 10 minute overview of their perspectives, their paper and then we'll turn it over to discussion. So Ambassador Singh. Thank you, Murray, 10 minute timeline and so I will reduce my presentation accordingly. What I'm going to present to you is first the shift of India as an outlier into a potential net security provider as a result of the South China Sea related issues and other maritime security issues in the region. And then outline a little bit of what the changing focus of Indian policy, a more strategic focus towards this region means and finally notch up a dozen recommendations or conclusions. So by way of introduction which was originally meant to be much longer, basically the South China Sea is pretty much central to the region's geopolitics for several reasons among them China's growing power, a new pattern of China's behavior since 2009, regional power imbalances in the South China Sea and the desirability of rule based architecture for the entire region. The South China Sea issues have already obliged the U.S. to rebalance within Asia toward Southeast Asia. It has also engaged the attention of a host of regional powers on building security partnerships. Indisputably, it's a critical waterway, 21 of 39 of China's sea lanes carrying 60 percent of its trade pass through this, but also one third of global trade with this economically dynamic region pass through the South China Sea and it sort of brings out very clearly Asia's or emerging Asia's biggest challenge which is regional institutions that can address insecurity and evolve commonly accepted principles for managing differences. That said, now a little bit of China and how it has contributed to this becoming such an important issue. Basically if you try to seek truth from facts, the first is that clearly hiding your strength and biding your time is no longer China's policy. There have been snowballing assertions of China's core interests buttressed by a China dream based on the growing military power of what is an authoritarian state and these have become overall the root cause of instability in Asia in a certain sense. In the good old peaceful rise days, you could think of a declaration on conduct, but 10 years down the line, there is no code of conduct and the ASEAN states especially the smaller states are pretty much prescient about what this implies because what this implies is that an increasingly powerful China has become more intransigent and difficult to bring to the negotiating table. China's power assertions have risen after 2008. I won't go through the reasons among them a withdrawal syndrome signaled early in the Obama presidency and the G2 condominium which was attempted at that time. Also Japan's relative weakness under the DPJ. So China's new template became gradually the diplomatic and military assertion of ever expanding core interests and the military aspects have been emphasized by both the last president of China in November of last year and the incoming one in the past few months. So if I can relate this to the South China Sea in an overall way and make one observation that would be that China's dream today and its core interest is to become a power at sea befitting its status as a major power and in the East China Sea its aspirations are to some extent checked by the formidable power of the United States and Japan. South China Sea is a perfect opportunity weak states divided by competing claims and of course with good reason because China regard this as a strategic waterway and a soft underbelly for itself. And it is here that China's sea power assertions will be focused in the coming years. I think I will skip the rest of it because there is a, yeah, on the multilateral or on the let's say bilateral and multilateralized issues. Basically China's assertions have ensured that South China Sea is in effect a multilateralized concern. You have competing overlapping claims. You have asymmetries of power leading some of the smaller countries, ASEAN countries to seek multilateral code of conduct. There is also a lack of assurance by China that it will not impede freedom of navigation. That would be a very good start if they could do that and then move on to some kind of code of conduct with ASEAN it would provide a lot of reassurance. India's role, India's traditionally been very cautious about forays into regional geopolitics. Everybody knows that but the reticence is rapidly disappearing and one of the reasons why it has, it is disappearing is the South China Sea issue which has impacted the debate within India. A third of India's trade is with East Asia and more than half of that passes through the South China Sea. When the Chinese told ONGC which is one of our companies doing exploration of Vietnam in 2011 that they are in, they are in Chinese, on Chinese territory and that they should stop and cease their operations, India responded by standing its ground and gradually it gravitated at ASEAN summits and at EA summits joining others in demanding freedom of navigation maritime access in the South China Sea. We also had our Navy chief saying that if necessary India's normal perimeter of naval operations is up to the Malacca Straits but if we were required to protect our interests we would be willing to go beyond that and defend those interests. He was referring specifically to the oil and gas interests of ONGC. Now India in the meanwhile has also faced its own series of provocations from China on territorial issues which have recently really been highlighted. In April there was a 20 day occupation of a territory 20 kilometers inside Indian territory by Chinese PLA forces and of course they withdrew but I think India's approach has now changed. As my Prime Minister told the Chinese Prime Minister 10 days ago the basis for continued growth and expansion of India's relations with China has to be peace and tranquility on the border and we will very carefully watch how they perform on that score. We will also probably be ending up reorienting some of our reorient at least reshaping some of our approaches towards the boundary settlement issue with China. The India ASEAN convergences have been tremendously strengthened by South China Sea related issues and that's led to the kind of conclusions of the commemorative summit in December of 2012 where a strategic partnership and a maritime security partnership were both announced between India and ASEAN and recently when my Prime Minister was in Japan he utilized the opportunity to declare that India's look east policy has now moved from its economic emphasis to become increasingly strategic in its content and he defined this in three he said there are three pillars of this policy now. First one will be the strengthening of regional mechanisms that will help develop habits of consultation and cooperation and evolve commonly accepted principles. Second would be of course promoting wider and deeper economic integration and enhancing regional connectivity and finally of course will be cooperation for maritime security across the Indo-Pacific including upholding the principles of freedom of navigation and unimpeded lawful commerce in accordance with international law and resolving maritime issues peacefully. The Prime Minister also announced about ten days back in a major statement on defence issues in Delhi that India now sees itself as capable of providing of being a net security provider not only in its immediate region but beyond its immediate region. All these are major changes in the way India is looking at the security scenario in the broader Indo-Pacific and this I would say is the strongest affirmation yet by India in support of a rule based open and balanced regional architecture. It will have an impact on India's so-called strategic autonomy quote unquote as well because when you look at what it really means you cannot have a strategic autonomy which treats both those who want your rise and those who pose challenges in the same symmetrical way so we will there will be some some impact on that as well. Ten conclusions for you or some somewhat some closer to ten firstly whatever the domestic motivations of China's core interest based territorial assertions across Asia they appear to be designed to create new facts on the ground and undermine the status quo. Second that it strains credulity that China's push on multiple fronts constitutes isolated incidents which are not part of a concerted strategy sanctioned by the leadership. Third China is hardly alone in having a past where it was exploited and humiliated. The history issues argument in India certainly does not bite because I mean we also were exploited and humiliated centuries of colonial rule but the key question is of leadership if domestic pressures drive China's projection of nationalist power abroad it may find itself increasingly isolated. China will certainly try to capitalize on every single sign of weakness or strategic ambiguity on the part of its potential adversaries to further its core interests. It is important not just to diagnose the reasons behind China's regional assertiveness but to also apply the correct remedies which lie in bolstering Asian multipolarity and this brings me to Walter Russell Mead's preferred solution and prescription which is that while there can be no containment of China there can be no hegemonic domination of China of Asia by China either and there has to be a move on the part of China to start accepting the inevitability of Asian multipolarity. No country can single-handedly shape and sustain this security architecture for for Asia. China would do well to join hands with the US, India, Japan, ASEAN to advance rule-based and balanced multilateral security architecture through the EAS. Along with the need for a code of conduct in the South China Sea it is important to bolster regional power balances to prevent coercive actions or intimidation. Much will depend on America's pivot and its capacity to walk the talk on the pivot. The US needs to check a growing tendency to revert to a China-centered Asia policy which is again taking root and to cite Ernie Bauer to recognize the intrinsic importance of key regional allies and partners including Japan and India. The US pivot itself cannot be sustained as a signal of American weakness. It has to be a signal of American strength and a robust pivot in Washington circles it's very difficult to decide what can what can be done and what can't be done but frankly a robust pivot to us looks like something which will advance US economic and security interests and reduce the likelihood of a competitive arms buildup or even the further nuclearization of this region. What will China do? Well it could join in the kind of it will have to make strategic choices it could join more actively in in engaging ASEAN on the code of conduct etc. But the problem here is that if if China is determined to become a seapower it will continue to regard its dominance of the over the South China Sea as critical. So for regional diplomacy what this means is that maybe we should again rebalance all our efforts within the East Asia Summit 10 plus 8 framework to to try and push China and ASEAN into constructing a good code of conduct. Final point India's new strategic orientation of its look East policy emphasize its emphasis on regional security mechanisms and commonly accepted principles of freedom of navigation and its willingness to become a net provider of security in its immediate region and beyond. These we believe will have a beneficial impact on Asia's geopolitics and regional balance and as a symbol of this new approach currently as we speak ships of India's eastern fleet are on a month-long deployment to the South China Sea where they will be visiting Vietnam and the Philippines. Thank you. Great thanks Ambassador Singh Vice Admiral Kaneda. Thank you Mallory. Good afternoon ladies and gentlemen. I'm going to speak about the Chinese tactics of the maritime forceful advancement between South China Sea and East China Sea and also I would like to talk about the maritime security coalition between the sensible maritime countries. Historically aggressive maritime advancement of China began in the South China Sea in 1970s then went to the East China Sea in 1980s and then gradually move on to the Western Pacific Ocean. Now China advancement has not stopped yet in the near seas but move on to the beyond the South China Sea East China Sea with some persecution but are going to see of Japan, Indian Ocean, Oceania and so on. So South China Sea issue at the back of such Chinese maritime advancement the US, United States and China continues to take to military tactics over the South China Sea from my observation. EP3 incident in 2001 impeccable incident in 2009 is very typical one. In fact the South China Sea is not only the seas with many confrontations between the China and the neighboring countries of ASEAN over territories and marine interests but also it is a stage of US-China I say cool wall not cold wall which is a chilly wall between the US and China over the demonstration of their presences and the collection of the military information unlike the serious military confrontation during the Cold War. In 2010 and 2011 China frequently instigated several incidents over territorial disputes with the Philippines and the Vietnam again with China taking forceful acts against such acts taken by China the relevant parties of the Philippines of Vietnam started to strengthen the relationship with the United States. In view of the reactions from the Philippines and the Vietnam the Chinese and other ASEAN related ASEAN countries the Chinese government strengthened their efforts to seek resolution of these issues through bilateral diplomatic talks rather than multilateral talks. China took to such moves towards defeating individually. ASEAN countries shifted their tactics to join forces through military talks. During the series of summit meetings in with ASEAN countries starting from 2020 sorry 2010 that focused on the South China Sea issue that US certified firstly maintained the posture of seeking freedoms in the South China Sea Japan cooperated with the US. However China declined at the various ASEAN meetings through 2010 to 2012 to agree on the start to discussion aimed to establish a COC there was no real progress in China ASEAN consultation in South China Sea. Starting from around the installation of the new Chinese Communist Party leadership team China seems to have in its offensive on the South China Sea with added vigor. There appears to be little likelihood of the reduction in tension between China and the concerned parties ASEAN and the future China ASEAN consultation are likely to experience a rough going. The cool wall between the US and China is likely to continue involving ASEAN countries and Japan considering I'm going to flip-flop tactics of the China considering the patterns of the China's past contact enforceable maritime advancement in near-seas China often tried to shift attentions of international community to the East China Sea by instigating the incidents there. When China's forceful conduct to seek hegemony in the South China Sea drew too much attention or vice versa. At present Chinese hegemonic conduct over the sea is temporarily gone down in the South China Sea from the Japanese perspective while becoming more apparent in the East China Sea. Reflecting on China's past contact of maritime hegemonic advancement in the South China Sea their advancements started with illegal activities of Chinese fishermen in the disputed waters. Once their activities resulted in the conflicts with other countries having weaker, relatively weaker naval forces or even Navy ships or Chinese state-owned vessels. In some cases conduct is threatening acts by navigating the area under the name of protecting fishermen. If there was any power void absence among superpowers or any political turmoil in other countries China would occupy some islands and or coral reefs. If the reactions to such conduct were weaker then China would escalate their conducts. First by building some military facilities and also the name of the protecting fishermen. Eventually they would station military troops, deploy military forces and conduct further threatening. In order to prevent similar conducts arisen in the East China Sea, Japan has been taking very patient, cautious but resolute counteracts to confront China's coercive action over the issue of the Senkaku Islands you know. There's no doubt that the Senkaku Islands are clearly an inherent part of the territory of Japan in light of historical facts and based upon international law the islands are under the valid control of Japan. In 1895 the Senkaku Islands were incorporated into Okinawa prefecture through a cabinet decision of government Japan. Since then the government in Japan kept a valid control of the islands until the end of World War II. Under the San Francisco peace treaty of 1951 Japan renounced the Taiwan but leaving the Senkaku Islands under the territorial sovereignty of Japan. And while the US took the administration rights until 1972 China raised any objections. It was not until 1971 after potential oil reserves were identified in the region that China abruptly began to argue territorial sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands. Since then the China has made repeatedly unlawful acts against Japan around the Senkaku Islands. At last China has demonstrated extremely strong and coercive actions to Japan on the issue of Senkaku Islands. Since September 2012 following the Japanese government's decision to transfer ownership of these islands from the Japanese private sector. China's state owned vessels have roamed the sea near these islands and have repeatedly made intrusion into Japanese territory waters in an apparent attempt to erode Japan's effective control over the islands. At the recent Shangri-La Dial Defense Secretary Hegel of the US said the US would resist any coercive attempts to alter status quo in seas of Chinese coasts including the Japanese administrative Senkaku Islands. While the confrontation between the US and China in the South China Sea has been saying in the cool war involving Japan and the S&M the confrontation between Japan and China over the East China Sea is becoming nearly the cooler war involving the US. By the way, needless to say the maritime strategy is high both important to regional security and economy. In the case of the East China Sea the South China Sea is geographically located as a vital cross section of South-North expanded Asia as well as the East-Waste expanded Asia. In terms of maritime security the South China Sea as like the East China Sea is a very important place geographically and strategically within the closely unified and linked broad slug. The Trilateral Maritime Security Alliance Japan and the US Japan-US Australia should be a maritime security coalition covering North-South expanded Asia. While the Trilateral Maritime Partnership of Japan-US India should take responsibility as a co-responsive parties of a volunteer maritime security coalition covering the broad seas of the East-West expanded Asia. Here the maritime security coalition is defined as a broader regional nation-to-nation coalition with the objective to maintain and secure safe and free use of oceans from the peacetime to emergency and maybe what happened and worst situation. In Japan, the US, Australia and India holds very positive and eager to be a responsible stakeholder for such maritime security coalition in the region. It is urgently needed to develop a voluntary maritime security coalition inviting regional sensible maritime power such as Vietnam, Philippines, central around the Trilateral Maritime Seminary Alliance of Japan-US Australia and Japan-US India. Under the fundamental structure, if the sensible maritime powers are to join this coalition, it will boost the creation of the voluntary regional and maybe in the future the global web of maritime security coalition. The initiative of the web of maritime security coalition coincides with the arc of freedom and prosperity proposed by the then Foreign Minister Abe, ASO, sorry, now the financial minister and the coalition of nations based on the common values stated by the then Prime Minister Abe. Now the Prime Minister. Thank you. Thanks, Vice Admiral Kaneda. Professor Thayer. Thank you, Murray. The focus of my presentation is on ASEAN and more particularly Indonesia and its efforts to forge unity behind a code of conduct. We all would begin a discussion of this thinking of the ASEAN disarray at the 45th annual ministerial meeting when ASEAN couldn't reach a joint communique and then later in the year at the summit where the dispute arose over the Cambodian attempt to put internationalize into a final joint statement. Those developments overshadowed the fact that at the 45th AAM on the 9th of July before all this happened, the ASEAN foreign ministers unanimously agreed on proposed elements of a regional code of conduct between ASEAN and the People's Republic of China. And also at the ASEAN AMM retreat that evening when the ructions began, Indonesia offered to produce a non paper, which has been dubbed the zero draft code of conduct. One third of that current draft is based on the six principles. The other two thirds of the result of Indonesian diplomacy that it put before the ASEAN foreign ministers on the sidelines of last year's United Nations General Assembly meeting. So the ructions have overshadowed these positive developments and I want to walk us through that period. So the assessments of ASEAN's disarray have proved to be a temporary phenomena. We've already heard that Brunei has assumed the chair and it's foreign minister plus the Sultan have played a strong consultative role. Cambodia to Thailand has picked up as a country coordinator and has pushed discussions. Indonesia in particular the focus of my paper has carried the ball forward and quoting the current Prime Minister of Singapore Cambodia has ceased its obstructions inside ASEAN itself. So we're looking at the agreed code of conduct and then at the 9th ASEAN China senior officials meeting in April of this year, China proposed that it meet with ASEAN to discuss the code of conduct and I'll come to that. So what are ASEAN's proposed elements? And I'll just go through them very briefly because they're incorporated into the final. There's a preamble that lists all the previous cooperative agreement signed between ASEAN and China as the foundation and base, and it calls for a comprehensive and durable settlement of the disputes. Article one contains its operative provisions. Countries will respect the UN Charter, the 1982 UNCLOS, the ASEAN Treaty of Amity of Cooperation, the Declaration on Conduct of Party and the five principles of peaceful coexistence. Four principles to establish modalities and arrangement to promote peaceful settlement of disputes, to take actions consistent with the code of conduct, to encourage other countries, the US, China, to respect the purposes and principles contained in the COC and to establish an effective mechanism to monitor its implementation. Article two of the draft lists eight obligations, a ministerial level mechanism to monitor and others that I'll move on lodging the document with the ASEAN Secretariat in the UN. Article three requires signatories to establish a mechanism for settling disputes as to interpreting and applying the code of conduct in the R2, the first under the ASEAN Treaty of Amity in Cooperation with its High Council, and China is a signatory and is promised to faithfully abide by those obligations. And the second is a failing that they would use the dispute settlement mechanisms within UNCLOS, which is what exactly the Philippines has done on its own. So it's nothing new. It's already had been approved on the 9th of July last year is one of the recommended dispute settlement mechanisms. Now there were there were ructions following this ASEAN Contra Tomps, and this is where Indonesia picked up. It engaged in subtle diplomacy, went around the region and got agreement on six principles to fully implement the DOC, to fully implement the guidelines on the DOC, to conclude an early regional code of conduct, to respect the universal principles of international law, including UNCLOS, to exercise self restraint and non-use of force, and to peacefully resolve disputes. And the statement concluded by urging the ASEAN Foreign Minister to intensify consultation for these principles. And it did so. As I mentioned on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, the zero draft was put before the ministers. It's not been officially approved. That's still a work in progress to be completed. But nonetheless, it's there. It draws on three sources. The 2002 Declaration on Conduct, the ASEAN proposed elements, and the ASEAN six principles. Now the draft that I have seen is color-coded or highlighted, and I counted up the number of lines, and that's where I got one third are taken directly already from the 9th of July, agreed. And the two thirds that remains are all Indonesia's handy work in proposing it, and I propose to look at them. First three articles are drawn entirely from the six principles. Article four deals with the area of application is entirely new, and it starts out without prejudice to territorial claims, the sovereignty issues. The COC shall be applied in all unresolved maritime boundary areas of the party's concern. Article five, territorial claims, is also new. It has all the standard legal disclaimer that nothing parties will do will change the sovereignty claims of others, et cetera. It's very detailed. Article six is very important. It runs to three and a half pages, 44% of the total document, and it is entirely very, very detailed. It's a substantial new development. It contains two very detailed and possibly contentious points. The first deals with rules, norms, and procedures to carry out confidence building measures, such as prohibitions on conducting military exercises, military surveillance, or other provocative actions in the South China Sea. From occupying or erecting new structures on island and land features presently not occupied, inhabiting presently uninhabited islands or other land features, conducting activities that threaten navigational safety and or polluting the environment. So that's included. Article six contains detailed provisions for preventing incidents and collisions at sea, including complying with the 1972 international regulations for preventing collisions at sea, the Kohlregs. The parties agree to refrain from simulating attack by arm by aiming guns, missile launches, torpedo tubes, launching objects or firing signal flares in the direction of another ship, using lasers in such a manner, intentionally interfering with the communication of other ships. Article six then sets out in considerable detail what to do governing a breakdown of a ship, safe speed, safe distance, modes of communication, mutually assisting persons in vessels in distress and reporting mechanisms, including a hotline. Article seven is also new. It contains a general statement about monitoring and reporting mechanisms to be agreed in the future between China and ASEAN. So that's where the document has to be further improved. Article eight repeats verbatim the two dispute mechanisms in the original proposed elements, using the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation High Council to settle disputes amongst members which have signed on to the TAC. That includes China. And it also calls for using the mechanisms under UNCLOS. Article nine calls for a ministerial review of the mechanism every five years, if so required. So that is, as of last September the 27th, as far as I know, where the Indonesia's zero draft has gone. And it is for, it's still at senior official level, I'm told, but for the ministers to sign off and complete. So there straws in the wind. Despite the negative assessments, and I begin by paper which hopefully will be posted quoting from a Washington think tank in its negative assessments. Despite these negative assessments, for the prospects of a COC, there are straws in the wind that ASEAN efforts to engage China are bearing fruit. I've already mentioned the positive role of Brunei's ASEAN share. The new ASEAN Secretary General, both have pledged to make it a high priority and have given every sign of doing so. And I, Brunei Saltin has raised the matter with Xi Jinping at the Biao Forum in Beijing. Brunei's optimistically set October this year is a target date for completing of the COC in advance of an ASEAN China summit to commemorate their anniversary of strategic relations. At this year's 23rd ASEAN summit held under Brunei, there was a joint communique. And they look forward to continued engagement with China in implementing the DOC in a full and effective manner. And they tasked the ministers to work with China to carry it forward. At the moment, it looks like there'll be a meeting of the working group on the DOC at director general level, which will include discussions on the COC, so not a special group, and possibly a ministerial meeting. So media reporting has tended to depreciate ASEAN centrality and disarray. And I think we even heard some of that in presentations today. But the evidence that I've seen as Indonesia has played a key role picking up the ball, restoring unity and coming forward with the draft COC that has some bite in it, but still needs further work. Thank you. Professor Thayer, thank you very much. Heading clean up. If you's a baseball parallel. When Murray asked me during the break what I was going to say, I answered him truthfully. I said, I really don't know. I think I have a better idea having heard Carl. You know, I believe in the dialectic. I'm an academic. I'm track three or maybe track four, five, six. I'm very far from track one. I do believe in the dialectic. And I think out of a conflict of ideas and opinions and interpretation, we can approximate something closer to the truth. And I think that's a constructive process. Now, the two issues at stake here, if I can just pick up from what Carl said. One is his remark, and I quote, that ASEAN's disarray is a temporary phenomenon, unquote, on the South China Sea. I'm not so sure. And the comments I'm going to make are going to explore the possibility that perhaps that disarray is not as evanescent as Carl might like to think. And as I might like to think, I want to emphasize that. And the second issue, of course, is the hyphen between ASEAN and China. And on the right hand side of that hyphen is China. And so the question is not just disarray within ASEAN, but the possibility that China, if in fact these conversations are held, perhaps before the end of the year, maybe next year, I'm not sure when, on a COC based on the specifics that you just heard from Carl, will China go along? You know, I admire Dr. Wu for having sat through conversations earlier today in this room that very much singled out Chinese behavior. I mean, put yourself in his shoes right. If you were invited to a conference and everybody was talking about you, wouldn't there be some point during the day where you might think to yourself, maybe I really shouldn't be here and sort of quietly exit. And I noticed with some concern the absence of Dr. Wu from at least the table where he used to be sitting, because one obviously would want to ask him to what extent is what Carl said attractive to China? And will China in fact agree to paraphrase the famous quote from Beijing that the time is ripe rather than not yet ripe for conversations on the COC to proceed? Because again, ambiguity, my theme, as long as the time is not it ripe and it's not clear when the ripeness will occur, I'm not sure how optimistic we can be that based on an ASEAN centered process, in this case to shift us from a DOC that was violated almost from the beginning and continues to be violated. I note with some concern that the implementation guidelines for some reason have been taken off the ASEAN website. Maybe this is a technical question, electronics, right? Or maybe not. Maybe in fact in ASEAN there's some realism that says look, the DOC, forget it. It's just not viable. Not even the guidelines are viable. And so let's move on to the COC, which contradicts the notion that the DOC has to proceed the COC, right? You have to build the confidence first before you can actually get an agreement. So my concern is with ASEAN centrality for years in Southeast Asia. In talking with those of my colleagues who are enthusiastic about ASEAN, they return time and time again to the importance of ASEAN centrality. And I want to unpack that just a little bit in the time, limited time that I have. There is first of all geographic centrality, right? Call it horizontal centrality. And here, interestingly, we must, if we're going to pursue this, analytically isolate the South China Sea from other maritime disputes, including those in the East China Sea. And one of the interesting sort of sub themes in the conference so far today, it seems to me, has been is it wise to keep the COC separate from the East China Sea? Or not? And obviously, one of the questions becomes, well, what do they have in common? And of course, the first answer is very little. The number of disputants, different, most important, perhaps of all, the relative disadvantage of the less hard power endowed disputants compared with China is much greater in the case of the South China Sea than it is in the case of the East China Sea, where Japan, if it wanted to, and there's a problem with Article 9, I realize that perhaps under the Abe administration will be eroded, interpretively eroded, potentially China faces a much more serious hard power opposition from Japan than it does from any country in Southeast Asia. Well, OK, with the conceivable exception of the finest air force in Southeast Asia, namely in Singapore. But still, I think you see where I'm headed. And of course, there are two participants that are common to both disputes or both in Broglios, one, of course, being Taiwan and the other China. And it seems to me, one of the most interesting aspects of all of this is to see with due deference to Dr. Song, the creative activity on the margins in Taiwan, which clearly has a prime interest in recognition. And that prime interest in legal recognition may actually serve as something of an obstacle to the implementation of creative ideas that might otherwise come from people such as yourself in Taipei. But it seems to me, if you take a look at XP at the East China Sea Peace Initiative and you realize that it specifically states that we want a COC for Northeast Asia, right, for the dispute. We're talking about, you know, the pinnacles to use a neutral English term for Senkaku D'Aiu, right. That already means that there's a certain amount of potential learning going on from the example in the South China Sea that might apply to the East China Sea. We heard Dr. Song earlier today refer to the Indonesian sponsorship of the workshops, which has been going on now since 1990, if I'm not mistaken, an annual event which includes Taiwan interestingly enough and that that might also perhaps be used as a possibility in a Northeast Asian context. I could go on, but basically we have the potential for some sort of learning back and forth between the two. And then there's another point as well. If deep down the elephant in the room is Chinese intentions, then one could argue that it's the first island chain unmentioned so far today that is the real concern and that China expects biting your time is over, as has been said on the panel. It's time for us, that is to say China, to establish whether de facto or de jure, never mind how, control or at least major influence over the maritime spaces that are within that first island chain. Forget the second island chain. Maybe that's for later in the century, I'm not sure. And if that is the case, then treating the two crises or the two embryos, at least in some comparative relationship to try to learn from one to apply the other, could potentially be constructive. However, it is true that this line of thinking does not abide by the obsession on the part of ASEANists of the most extreme sort with the centrality of their organization. And with all due respect, I would suggest that there are those in ASEAN that are forgetting that an organization exists for a purpose, not to continue its own existence. And particularly as the external pressures, including those between China and the United States, have come into play, you can see reverberations in both directions, not just one, both directions, from dissension within ASEAN to Sino-American relations and in the other direction to perhaps exacerbate the discussion inside ASEAN. But at this point, I am not convinced that the disarray is temporary. And I am rather concerned that the disarray may be questioning the logic of maintaining ASEAN centrality as the keystone for the entire process. And that we ought to creatively and cautiously and with all due respect and admiration to ASEAN for all that it has accomplished, look at other possibilities. Now, it seems to me that, apart from horizontal centrality, that is geographic centrality, including some consideration of the issues in the North, the other obvious analytic distinction, which gets very academic and therefore perhaps I should shut up. But that's who I am, for better or worse, is a vertical conception of centrality in which ASEAN is simply one level of 10 countries that is located on a potential range of levels of countries. We start at the bottom with unilateral action by a single state. And we have an example of this from the Philippines. And let's remember, before we condemn unilateral action, that the Philippines' decision to go to the arbitral court process represents something that, in my view, and I think those of others in the room, could be a constructive unilateral action depending upon what happens. Especially if we look, frankly, and I can't resist because of Carl's optimism here, pointing out that we have potentially a horrific situation developing at Second Thomas Shoal. I mean, can you imagine, OK, what is the scenario going to be? OK, there may be a dozen Marines on the deck of the ship that is anchored to represent the Philippines at this spot. And so if China creates a siege, which seems to me entirely possible, to prevent the reprovisioning of those individuals, those Marines, then what's going to happen? The Philippines is going to start using helicopters to bring food and water and drop the food and water onto the deck of the ship. And that is going to create a question for Beijing. Will it shoot down the helicopters? One hopes and probably says, yes, probably not, not. I'm not predicting war. Don't misunderstand here. But I am showing you the Berlin Wall. Remember the airlift? Those of us who are old enough, right? The potential disastrous consequences of what is going on. And that's another reason why it seems to me that rather than waiting, forgive me, waiting for Godot, waiting for an ASEAN denominated process to generate a COC, which ultimately is probably going to be primarily about preventing conflicts that are already virtually on the point of blossoming into violence. It seems to me at least a minimally rational proposition to suggest that we look at alternatives to simply waiting for the ASEAN process to proceed. I don't have time to go through all of those alternatives. I mean, at some radical level, you could go way up to the top of the vertical chain and say, let's have the United Nations take it over. Lots of luck. But I am suggesting that below the level of ASEAN, there are minilateral, minilateral arrangements that could be considered to reduce the number of actors in the hope of increasing the probability of achieving an agreement. And my time is pretty much run out. I will not specify above the ASEAN centrality level the kinds of opportunities that might possibly exist. And don't misunderstand. I am not suggesting here a G2 between the United States and China. I can't resist being an academic who is professionally irresponsible. I can't resist suggesting that one of the interesting things about the coverage of sunny lands is that nobody has mentioned that it's actually at a place called Rancho Mirage. I'm sorry about that, but I apologize. And I will end on a, because I'm trying not to be too cynical, I will end on a wildly idealistic note. But actually, I want you to take this seriously. That is to say, to what extent have we started from, not from the rainbow to the pot of gold, but from the pot of gold itself? To what extent of the participants in the process or for that matter observers, the U.S. and so forth actually looked at the South China Sea and said, you know, let's just invent. This is what academics do. They just invent because they don't have any power. They just invent. Let's invent what might be a fair outcome. And here is just a series of questions on which I will end that it strikes me might be addressed to the actor's concern and also to significant observers. Ignoring the presumptions of sovereignty in the South China Sea that any literal L-I-T-T-O-R-A-L claimant may have, what would constitute a fair and reasonable formula for distributing and sharing rights and responsibilities among such claimants across, within, and beneath the waters of the South China Sea? Rights to what? Responsibilities for what? And above all, based on what evidence and criteria? And regarding the many uses of the SCS by non-claimant actors elsewhere in Asia and around the world, including freedom of navigation issues, how open or closed to these uses should the sea be? And again, by what evidence and criteria? What is missing here is empathy, empathy for the other person's point of view. By asking a idealistic, long-range, pot of gold question or series of questions of this sort, perhaps we might marginally inculcate a feeling of empathy which strikes me as an absolutely necessary requirement for any long-term solution. Thanks, Don. So we've had four diverse and rather different presentations taking on different aspects of the issue from the regional perspective. We'll turn it over now to the audience for questions. Joe, Leo? Thank you. Thank you very much for the fascinating presentations. My name is Leo Bernard from Center for International Law in Singapore. I have a question for Professor Emerson and Professor Tyre. The first one you mentioned about the current situation in the second gem show that is on the brink of escalating into something that we don't want to see. And just to catch your point on the fact that the negotiation between ASEAN and China regarding the COC to prevent and manage potential conflict might be too slow in light of this current event in the second gem show. If it does happen that China will block provisions for the Philippines' marines in that show, do you see maybe a bilateral, like, I'm sorry, a neutral role from one of the ASEAN countries? Example, I think Indonesia is the most obvious choice here as a neutral party to try to shuffle a diplomacy between China and Philippines, just like what Marty did between Bangkok and Phnom Penh when they were in the brink of armed conflict back in the temple Priyavir case. So do you see that role being taken by Indonesia in light of if something happened that escalated into that level and the fact that ASEAN is still a bit behind in coming up with a solution in that regard? My second question, Professor Tyre, you mentioned about the role of Indonesia has taken a prominent lead in pushing for the ASEAN solution with China in the South China Sea. Do you see this happen outside of this administration because we have to remember that there's a general election coming up next year in 2014? Do you see this role that Indonesia has taken continue on to the next administration or is just the focus of this administration or more specifically just the focus of and the capabilities of this specific foreign minister right now? So I want to see what's your opinion on that. Thank you. Don always likes the last word. No, no, no, no. I'm just being funny, go on. Indonesia's role, well, I think Indonesia has gone through a period where it was pretty critical of ASEAN to come back to embrace it and I still think it will be a central role in the next administration. Personality of foreign ministers, I don't know who's gonna be the next foreign minister, is a peculiar to Marty, but it's G20. It has a seat at that table. Indonesia has a larger regional role and I think you see in their interest to play and be active because its interests are affected and the ASEAN disarray inevitably affects Indonesia. At the beginning of my paper criticizing a Washington based think tank that was unnamed and it's not this one. They divided ASEAN into two categories and I disagreed with that. It's the claimant states versus the rest and what you've seen as a result of Indonesia, you have the four claimant states, okay, two subgroups but you have the maritime states, Indonesia, Singapore playing a role, Thailand playing a role so that leaves us with Laos, Cambodia, Miramar and I just would say be surprised when Miramar takes over. It could play a very positive role as ASEAN chair because it will receive rewards for it that will reinforce its program. So without that knowing who the foreign minister is but I can't believe in the Indonesian psyche as they are the natural leader of Southeast Asia playing that role of broker and bringing about peace is what they do naturally, maybe a different personality. Yeah, if I can kind of briefly, I mean, you know, I picture Marty going to his colleagues in ASEAN and say, what do you think? Should I do this? And then Carl's optimism becomes critical because if the disarray is only temporary, maybe they'll say yes and if it isn't maybe they'll say no. I don't think that the domestic political process in Indonesia, which of course as you know as a democracy is going significantly to erode the kinds of positions that have been taken by Marty. Or that we can go back and talk about Hassan Wida Yuda and a whole tradition of foreign ministers. I mean, the underlying point here is that Indonesia is an autonomous independent country and it does not ally itself with China or with the US or increasingly perhaps even necessarily with ASEAN because what is the interpretation to be given to Marty's now discovery of the Indo-Pacific? The Indo-Pacific represents an example of moving up the scale from ASEAN to be more inclusive, more constructive, one hopes, right? So I don't think one should exaggerate the loyalties that ASEAN has, or sorry, that Indonesia has toward ASEAN and it would be tempting I think on Marty's part to do what you suggest. He would however definitely first have to be convinced that his intervention would be productive and would not end up showing the impotence of the largest and therefore potentially the most effective country in Southeast Asia. So I guess that would be my comment. Let's go way in the back over here. Good afternoon. My name is Jiang Yili, with the Chinese Embassy in Washington DC. I just have a question to Vice-Admire Canada. So just now you mentioned, you know, the Diao-Yi Island, the so-called Senkaku Island dispute. So you said China never challenged the sovereignty of Senkaku or Diao-Yi Island. Actually it's not true. When U.S. returned the administration of the Diao-Yi Island to Japan, China had made a statement. Have you seen that? I think in early 70s. Also when China and Japan established diplomatic relations, they're both sides reached a consensus on this dispute. They agreed to put aside this dispute, so develop a relation. So that's why since 70s, China-Japan relations developed very fast. Since last year, because the so-called purchase of Diao-Yi Island, so the situation come to this situation. So why Japan not recognize this dispute issues? Also I want to make some comment on South China Sea issue. So this seminar is managing tensions in the South China Sea. So I think this is a very good opportunity to bring both many climates together to sit down to discuss the solution to reduce the tension in the South China Sea. Not to provide some opportunity to fall some countries to point fingers at each other. It should be discussed in the more constructive and active way, not in the negative way. I have been here since morning. There's so many thousands of times mentioned China, but it's in a positive way. So what the international committee is expect China to do? Actually, China exercise restraint on South China Sea issues. Our policy is very clear. We want to, through this dispute issues, through peaceful dialogue. We also, we don't want the South China Sea to ruin the China's relation with the neighboring countries. We try our best to do this. Thank you. Thanks for your question. Okay, regarding the East China Sea issue, actually in 1895, the Japan incorporated the Senkaku Island by the cabinet of the then government of Japan. There would be many, many chance for China then to ROC or China ROC and Republic of PRC. But, of surely, we don't have any claim to that Japanese ownership of the Japanese sovereignty over the Senkaku Island. Until the 1969, when the United Nations one organization that was operated by, cooperated by the Japan, China and South Korea, find out some possibility of the oil and gas fields around the Senkaku Island. So abruptly, China and Taiwan started to claim that these areas are the Chinese or Taiwanese territory. But, okay, over 75 years, the China didn't any claim on the sovereignty of the Senkaku Island to the China. This is true, maybe all of you know that well now. And we had, I don't have any time, we have many, many evidence that during 75 years, the China believes that, okay, Senkaku Island, Da Yuto Island in Chinese, belonging with Japan. Many, many evidence, we had, I had many, many. But this time I didn't do that, that is true. Okay, good. Thank you, good question. Mike. Two questions, one for Don. You're closing proposition about forgetting sovereignty and then perhaps working a compromise deal. If the energy information administration finding that we heard about earlier today turns out to be true, most of the gas and oil is on the continental shelf of Vietnam and the Philippines and China and the North China Sea and sovereignty to Spratlys or Paracels. Maybe it has some, it would be important for fishing, but other than that it doesn't gain you any of these valuable resources. And so the continental shelf then becomes the key issue and the key impediment to exploitation of the continental shelf rests once again on the infamous nine-dash line. And so unless that is stricken down, the countries of the continental shelf can't, they can't exploit it and nor is there any incentive for them to share it with China who absent that line would have no legal claim to any of those resources on the continental shelf. So that's, once again, it's all based on hypothesis about where the oil and gas really is. But it's an interesting thing to explore. My second question is from Bathurst Singh. It wasn't too long ago it struck me that Defense Minister Anthony made a very clear statement in effect saying the South China Sea is an interesting problem but it's not ours. We, you know, our writ really stops at the Eastern approaches to the Straits of Malacca and so we're interested in the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea and South Asia but not much further. So I would, your impression, your presentation gave me the impression that there has been a dramatic and very recent shift in Indian strategic thinking that suddenly you're back in the game as it were in East Asia. Is that correct or not? Okay, yeah, all right, here's my response. You're absolutely right. I agree with everything you've said. The question here, if I may, is China's willingness to massage, deconstruct whatever, the nine-dash line. You know, on the one hand, it is encouraging that two of the dashes of the 11-dash line were in fact deleted. So maybe there's a possibility of further deletion. I don't know. But here's my guess and because I've been a little bit cynical and critical before, let me be cautiously, maybe incautiously optimistic at this point. I think, I mean, actually there's a four-box matrix, sorry I'm an academic, in which you could have two different variables. One is what's the source of authority and the other is what is the spatial zone that is affected. Now the source of authority, historic or un-close. The zone, you know, the water or, well actually suppose there's a third, the water, the land features, and then both, okay. And you can construct a bunch of combinations that might perhaps be some future version of the nine-dash line. I am cautiously encouraged by something that I gather is underway, which is among these various schools. Dr. Hong is not here. She's identified four different schools of interpretation inside China, nevermind outside China. I think there is some perhaps more than completely trivial hope that China may already be preparing for the day in which it must actually focus on the land features. This might be termed the territorialization of this very wet and large claim. And I think the evidence includes some suggestion that there are individuals in China or that are affiliated with China that are already beginning to look at the interpretation of the difference between a rock and an island. And also at the provisions of un-close that operate with regard to the continental shelf. Now I'm not suggesting that China is tomorrow and certainly didn't happen today, going to reject the larger claim, right? I just, I don't see that happening in the short term. But in the longer term, I think you have made a point that the location of the hydrocarbons and why China is giving an estimate of those hydrocarbons that is so radically higher than those that is coming out of let's say the USGS is a question for the Chinese to answer. But I do think that as we learn that there is more solubility here, that there are intractable problems, but at least we can sort of operate more on the coastal strip on the continental shelf. China may come around to a land-featured based view. Very briefly, a couple of points. Our position, I said that we have generally been reticent in delving into regional geopolitics. And I also suggested that we have, this policy is changing and changing quite rapidly. So your presumption is quite right that there has been a considerable movement in India's position very recently, I would say over the last couple of months. So to understand that, I would just recommend a couple of statements of the Prime Minister if you could go through them. One is a statement on our defense posture and on our increasing approach towards the maritime issues of the Indian Ocean region and the wider Indo-Pacific region. That's about 15 days old. And that's where he also suggested that in turning our focus from continental power to maritime power in the Indian Ocean region, we are now well poised, as he put it, to become a net security provider, not just in our immediate neighborhood, but beyond. And the second is his state, he had a public speech in Tokyo on the 28th of May. That will give you the three or four elements of the new renewed, completely renewed, strategic focus on the Look East policy. As far as the Naval Doctrine and Malacca Straits and issues of that kind are concerned, we do not have a defense white paper and we do not renew these such papers periodically. Of course, there is a growing sentiment in India that it should be done. But the only documents which we do have to go back about four to five years when a former naval chief had come out with a broad Indian naval maritime doctrine. And in that, yes, it was suggested that our first area of focus really is up to the Malacca Straits. But the more expansive focus was not entirely ruled out in terms of that. And related to what I said earlier, in 2011, once we got this series of demarches from China, questioning the ONGC's oil exploration activities of Vietnam, things had to change because the first step was would India say, okay, enough? There's no reason to say we are stepping back. It's been 30 years since ONGC has been exploring oil in that area. And so we said no, the ONGC is going nowhere. It's very much here. And so the issue of how we will deal with these matters in the future, I guess primarily relates to creating the kind of architecture across the region, which is balanced, which is inclusive, where every stakeholder has some say in crafting something which can bring about a rule-based regional framework based on international law, based on peaceful settlement of disputes, and certainly based on access to the South China Sea for lawful maritime commerce and for other activities such as our own ONGC's activities of Vietnam. I think that is something for the government to answer and I do not represent the government here. But really the revival of a very invigorated, reinvigorated India-Japan partnership with the return of Prime Minister Abe to power a few months ago. That is something which is quite evident. It was under Abe's first term that we established a strategic and global partnership with Japan. And this trip basically both sides declared that they are natural and indispensable partners for the security of the region and for the future prosperity of the region based on their common principles, which is democratic principles and universal human rights and the rule of law. So this kind of an approach was echoed by Admiral Kaneda very much when he talked about how to shape security in the region. In short, I'd like to add his comment against his question. Just a week ago, Prime Minister Abe and Indian visiting Prime Minister Singh met and made a good talks and issued joint statement, which they decided to contact joint drills, drills, exercise between the Japanese Navy, the JMSDF and the Indian Navy wherever. And the two leaders also established to, agreed to establish providing the US to amphibian aircraft for the rescue purpose to the Indian Navy. Maybe that would be operated around the vast Indian Ocean. And we also agree that the successful outcomes of achieved during the two plus two dialogue as well as the trilateral dialogue between Japan, India and the US in the joint statement of the Japan and India. Thank you. Thank you. I'm Michael Billington. I work with Lyndon LaRouche in the executive intelligence review. We've looked at the South China Sea issue narrowly as was the subject of the conference, but I'm wondering, Don, and perhaps others, you could address this South China Sea crisis in the context of the very severe global strategic crisis that we find ourselves in. And I'll point at two aspects. One is that China has been very, very clear that they do not view or they are not convinced, as they said at Shangri-La most recently, that the pivot and the new ABM systems going into Japan and possibly the Philippines, the massive show of nuclear force and the recent Korea spat, that this is simply responding to North Korea, but they see this as an encirclement and a threat to their strategic defense capacities. And secondly, Russia and China are totally in sync in absolute opposition to the continued regime change policies in the Middle East and have clearly drawn a line that they're not going to allow what happened in Libya to happen in Syria. And we are very potentially in a nuclear confrontation mode around these issues. So I'd ask you to say, or what you think about how this crisis, which is a serious issue, but how you look at that in the context of this more global, serious strategic crisis. We are not in a nuclear confrontation mode. I'm sorry, I don't believe that. I think it is conceivable, anything is conceivable. But I'm much less alarmist than you are. And I think, although I did advocate moving up and down the ladder of abstraction, including moving up, I didn't advocate moving quite that far up. I'm almost tempted just to leave it at that. The issue, I will make one comment with regard to the issue of Chinese fear of encirclement. For years going to international meetings, when the Chinese delegate has spoken perhaps others of you have had the same experience, it has been my impression that the Chinese delegate is almost sort of speaking, my feelings are hurt. It's almost sort of like personal, it's kind of like psychological. There's not a lot of detail, empirical detail, but why don't you treat us right? And there used to be jokes about Jewish mother-in-laws. I mean, sometimes that would come to my mind. I mean, without in any way suggesting disrespect to Jewish mother-in-laws. And so in a way, again, I return to ambiguity here. If it's not really clear, if these are feelings, then the natural response that seems to me, at least on my part, is to say, well, what kind of facts really can we kind of deal with and improve so that you won't have those feelings, right? Now, I will say this about the pivot. Ever since the pivot sort of loomed on the policy horizon, I happened to be in November 2011 in Bali at the time of the EAS, and here comes Obama, right? Arrives fresh from Darwin, right? And so the message of the day is 2,500 Marines, the pivot is military, we're gonna have drones over Jakarta watching us take showers, right? I mean, really, the media in Indonesia just had a joyride with it, right? And they forgot that Obama had been in Honolulu for APEC, which was an economic agenda. And so I think this administration, with all due respect to its critics, at least in this respect, has learned. And the TPP may not be sort of everyone's preference in Southeast Asia to put it mildly. Nevertheless, it does represent an economic dimension of the pivot that allows us to make sure that China doesn't think, because I really don't believe that it is, a military assault preparing for an eventual showdown to contain or isolate China and to bring about this grossly unlikely prospect, let me repeat, of a nuclear confrontation. Thanks for your question. Regarding South China Sea, we must, okay, recognize that about the Chinese two strategy. The first one is near sea strategy. You know, the first island line extending from the southwestern island of Japan, Taiwan, Philippines, and Malaysia, and then Vietnam. Those are the first line, the first defense line is absolute, the Chinese defense line, where they know the other country, including the US, Japan, not enter in two. So this is a very vital strategy for the China to defend the South China Sea. So South China Sea means another feature of the Chinese strategy. It's a nuclear deterrence. They have a Hainan island where the nuclear submarine, the bases have been developed. So I'd like the Petropavlovsku in the Cold War era. It's like a sanctuary for nuclear submarine activity. So now they have a Gincras SSBN and are going around the South China Sea. So those are very, very important area for Chinese strategy. Thank you. Well, thank you very much for the opportunity to address question Yanhui Song from Academia Seneca. And I agreed with Professor Emerson that there are similarities and differences between the East China Sea and South China Sea. Both are semi-enclosed sea. Both are large ecosystem. Both need to, the country border that sea need to abide by the International Law of the Sea Convention, Article 121, Article 123, Article 73, the four and so on. We have to learn something. I'll agree with you, very important. We learn the experience. We take the experience, practice from the South China Sea to East China Sea. In that regard, I would like to bring your attention to role play by the United States, both in the East China Sea and South China Sea. In the South China Sea, this one South China Sea workshop began in 1990 until today, still going on. But the United States not a participant in that workshop. Now allow me to make one policy recommendation for the US government to consider. Why not? There is a US-led workshop on managing potential conflicts in the East China Sea. And that workshop will be called sponsored, organized by the United States government and perhaps one of the country border in the East China Sea, such as Republic of Korea, such as China, such as Taiwan and Japan. In that regard, we rotate that within that workshop. We're talking about code of conduct. We're talking about joint development. We're talking about marine environment, but environmental protection, and so on. And so that's the one thing I think we have to think about that, including this morning I mentioned that peace initiative by the United States. Because US national interests are very important, both in the East China Sea and South China Sea. When something happened, armed conflict happened, United States will be dragged into. No matter the US has to do something. So hence, I haven't said that. Allow me to comment on Dr. Drace 1 question to Dr. Emeril Kaneda. Now, in Sanggarilak meeting, Lieutenant General mentioned that less following this visitant by Deng Xiaoping in 1978, less past disputes to next generation. And the Japanese government said, no, no dispute whatsoever. And you mentioned that you are repeating those statements in the website, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs about Japanese claim. I can do that. I think other people can do that. But I'd like to bring your attention to a number of important points. First one, critical date. Second one, effective control. The third one, who changed status code. The fourth one, who triggered the disputes. The final last one, are they disputes? If no dispute, how can you say the Japanese resident cannot go to the island? Do you have disputes? Certainly, they are disputes. And how you are going to build up, promote the cooperation. How can you say that no disputes? And allow me to bring your attention to the critical date, January 14, 1894. Before that, Japanese government conducted the survey, not completed. Incomplete according to archive in the Japanese, your library, you can find those archive. You say that you have a lot of articles. I have a lot of evidence as well. But for academic discussion, I would really want to bring your attention that it's very important that we have to sit down together and find a peaceful solution. And then from that, we can have the peace and stability in the region. Thank you very much. OK. I'm a strong supporter of the existence of the Taiwan and state school, even the state school of Taiwan. And because the Taiwan, we, the Japanese, have a very, very, what to say, sympathy of the people and nation of the Taiwan. And also, when we look at the strategic future, the Taiwan, not only to Japan, but all the US or other country around there, very, very strategically important in the center of the strategic importance of that area. So I totally support the Taiwanese getting into the more internationalized, regional participants to that. But I'm not, of course, representing any opinion of the Japanese government. This is my very private opinion. But anyway, so you are very, very good. And you have lots of materials, so-called evidence. Thank you. So please join with me to talk more, drinking the whiskey for a night, overnight. OK. Maybe we'll ask a couple of hands of people I'm Dan Marquis from US Marine Corps. And I'm representing my sentiments, and not those of the commandant of the Marine Corps, just to clarify. Mr. Hebert, with respect to your presentation of what is a fair outcome, in another forum, I had the opportunity to ask a retired US military officer on the South China Sea equation when he made reference to the potential that his view was that I shared, that China was attempting to create some type of inland sea within the first island chain. So I posited to him a hypothetical, that if somehow we could peaceably get to a point where China consolidated all of its nine-dash line claim, and that all of the other claimant states were successfully profiting from a 49% share of all that could be exploited from the South China Sea, that commercial trade was unimpeded. And in fact, China was stepping up as a responsible nation and taking a role of guarding and safeguarding commercial traffic through the area. I asked him, how would that be a bad thing for the United States? And he answered, freedom of navigation, knee-jerk reaction. Clearly, unimpeded trade is not the issue of freedom of navigation. It fundamentally boils down to, at least from the US security mindset, from my perception, that it's Chinese military power that is the issue here, that the United States senior military officers, and this was an army officer, not a naval officer, in fact, perceived China as a country that cannot be trusted. And perhaps the littoral nations of the South China Sea see it similarly, and that we're dancing around the real fundamental problem is the relationship of China to the rest of the world. Could you please comment on that and anyone else on the panel if they wish to add to that? Thank you. Marie, I think that's for you. You mentioned me, but he was looking at you. Christine Shank, I work for the US Navy. So my question is, last year, then Vice President Xi Jinping proposed that the US and China agree to a new type of major power relationship. And he defined this with four characteristics. One was increasing mutual trust and transparency, respecting each other's core interests, cooperating on mutually beneficial issues, and more cooperation and coordination on global issues. So my question is, how does, or how would India, Japan, Indonesia, and the rest of the ASEAN countries as US allies, partners, and friends interpret this kind of potential agreement and how that might affect dynamics in the South China Sea? Hi, Dan Holtrup from Department of State. And I wanted to piggyback on the earlier discussion about Indian strategic interests. And we're hearing about India sending its fleet to the South China Sea. I was wondering what India is doing on land in Southeast Asia to sort of build the Indo-Pacific quarter. This is something Kirk Campbell used to like talking about building trade links, economic strategic links that way. And we've had some discussion now separately about the role of Taiwan. So I'm actually in the Taiwan office. And I'm wondering, we've heard from Dr. Song about this, what do the panelists perceive as the difference between Taiwan and PRC claims? What worries, if any, do you have about PRC United Front tactics? And what would your advice to Taiwan be when they have these historical claims, but they want to sort of maintain an image that they have historically? And we have a couple disturbing crises in the last year involving that area. Thanks. Thank you. Five minutes left. Let's go from the far right to the left and actions that you think you want to answer briefly. You're the far left, sorry. They're right left. OK, I'll try to be really, really quick. My colleague from the US Marines, I completely agree. And that actually illustrates the point I was trying to make in my optimistic opening of the possibilities of looking at the pot of gold rather than starting at the very beginning of the rainbow. Nobody can deny looking at a map that China must have a significant share. It just seems fair, I mean, to me anyway, in a range of activities, including those that you mentioned, economic development and so forth. As far as freedom of navigation, this is going to sound rather odd. But perhaps freedom of navigation is like family planning. What do I mean by that? We know, the historical evidence is quite persuasive, that family planning tends to occur when a per capita income has gotten to the point that there's sort of an advanced, reasonably industrial society. And mothers and fathers begin thinking twice about how many kids they're going to have. I'm summarizing, right? And perhaps it's also the case that China, as it develops its technological capacity, we've already seen, for example, the rumors that China is, in fact, engaging in intelligence gathering off the coast of Guam. And presumably its naval capacity will someday increase to the point, not to mention its stake in international trade, which we should not underestimate, which already exists, that China itself may approximate the American position on freedom of navigation. In which that then would become one of a range of zones in which China would play, yes, an important, responsible, constructive role. And I think there are lots of people in China that want exactly that. And that's certainly what I want. With regard to the reaction of Southeast Asians to the major power, sort of new major power relationship, all I would say is this. I mean, I think this is really, the problem is a lot of the rhetoric coming out of Beijing, again, going back to my theme, is too ambiguous. What does this mean, right? We'll find out, perhaps, I don't know, after not Rancho Mirage, but Sunnylands is over. But it does seem to me that a number of Southeast Asian countries are very concerned about the problem of the elephants either fighting to crush the grass, or making love to crush the grass. And that's, of course, the fear of a G2. And so when two individuals, you know, at the peak get together in Southern California, presumably this is constructive, but I would guess that there are more than a few outfits in Southeast Asia that are looking this and beginning to think, you know, is this really gonna be a new relationship? And if it is a new relationship, does it mean we're being essentially left out? I think the number of actors involved in the problems that we've been talking about all day are such that a G2 is absolutely undesirable, and one hopes, really, out of the question, I'll leave it at that. My only thing is, without having elephants making love, this is to bring in the Goldilocks. I think I've characterized Vietnam as they don't want the relationship to be too close or too antagonistic. Elements of friction and cooperation give Vietnam much more room to maneuver. I think the Philippines would be very concerned about collusion at its expense. And I think Indonesia pushing the ASEAN regional, as it did the ASEAN regional forum, would like to enmesh them. So there's no one Southeast Asia view. One is to institutionalize, to manage the relationship. I mean, make ASEAN the center and both have to woo you, even if they are cooperating, plus those other... Okay, thank you. For the first question from the gentleman. Okay, Japan, I think it's a kind of, yes, the major of our relationship. They need, you need, and China, Mr. Xi Jinping, need to discuss about some of the other issue other than the security, such as economy relationship or the, and so on. And also, from the U.S. perspective, U.S. would like to encourage the China following the international norm or international law or something like that. And, but anyway, those kind of relationship between even the two super countries would be needed. And also, we, Japan, intending to discuss about this kind of issue with China, but they closed the door. So, this is not a good, good situation. Please, the U.S. side, encourage the China to sit down at the table for summit talks. And to the U.S. Naval Officer's question. Yes, we are practically making a relationship with Taiwan. For instance, the, even the station occurred around the Senkaku issue between Japan and China and also the Japan and Taiwan. We have established the Japan-Taiwan Fishing Pact, Fishing Pact, which sets a joint fishing zone within Japan's EEZ, EEZ around the Senkaku islands, went into effect very recently, disconnecting the territorial issue. Those kind of things are very, very good for us. Thank you. Vassar Singh, you got the final word. I just have very quick 10-second responses to two questions which were put to me. The first one was from, I think, the lady from the U.S. Navy. And I'd like to just agree entirely with what Dr. Emerson said earlier about the G2 and to point out that China exploited the 2008 financial crisis and Obama's initial attempts at the G2 condominium to signal its own rise and the inevitability of U.S. decline in Asia. And the U.S. has been reacting ever since. That is my response to that element. And the other one was a question about India connectivity with ASEAN. One of the major activities which India and ASEAN have been undertaking, and this has been stepped up lately, is to reinforce what is being termed as the Indo-Pacific Corridor. It's also called the Chennai-Mikong Industrial Corridor. And the connectivity through Myanmar, through physical connectivity across Myanmar and going into all the way up to Vietnam is certainly very high priority for both ASEAN and for India. Before we thank our panel, I'd just like to remind you that we have another two panels tomorrow morning. Like to invite you all to come back. First one is on the role of international law in managing the dispute and the second one is going to, the second one will look at policy recommendations that we have based on what we've been talking about here the last day or so. So please join me in thanking the panelists and we hope you have a good evening.