 Hello and welcome to NewsClick. I am Neelanjan Mukhopadhyay and you are watching Present Past and the Future. In just a matter of few days, we will know who governs India for the next few years. Over the past several elections, the quality of our electoral narrative has been on a tailspin. But there has been something absolutely rotten about 2019 campaign. This time, there has been a radical rupture from the past. The pretense of commitment to inclusiveness has disappeared and the semblance of impartiality in the electoral process has evaporated. For the past several months, we have heard people's apprehensions of elections being subverted. These fears are not at all allied by the only institution which could do so, the Election Commission of India. As the campaign draws to a close, it is time to recall some of the new lows and the worries that arise from these. To discuss the campaign, which is fading into history, I am joined by two fearless academicians. My first guest is Hilal Ahmed, who has very recently written a book called C.R.C. Muslim's A Story of Political Islam in India, and Ajay Gudavarthi, a very eminent political scientist with the Jawaharlal Air University. First of all, we should have ideally had this conversation in Khan market, not in a studio, in the news click studio. Like always, we will begin this program with my three thesis, you know, and the first thesis or hypothesis which I call is I am going to put it open for discussion. This is that in 2014, the BJP's campaign fronted development, but was inlaid with Hindutva. This time, the façade has been done away with. There has been very little talk of vikas or development, and the emphasis was on vinas or destruction of the nation if the BJP is not voted back into power. Hilal, let me begin with you. We obviously agree that this has been a campaign of new laws. From your point of view, how do you see that what you think are the biggest symptoms of it touching the nadir, if it really does not become worse in subsequent elections? I think that the need, it has to do with the nature of competitive electoral politics and country. And we have to understand that the meaning of success in a society has changed dramatically. Now, success means you have to achieve something, no matter what means you have used. And this is the moral value of society. This is clearly reflected in competitive electoral politics. Now, there are two or three aspects of it, which new laws which you are talking about. One is that all political parties, and particularly BJP, they have started identifying the core constituency of their own, and they are keen that the vote of the core constituency should reach to them. In order to provoke them, they are relying on anti-Muslim discourse, which they have been doing openly. That is one. Second is that the discourse of majorityarianism has already established. So to target Muslim or to link Hindutva with nationalism, it becomes very, very simple and very straightforward. It becomes a triangle. You have a muscular nationalism. You have an anti- creating an Islamophobia. And then you also bring in those people who are opposed to your policies. Yeah. And the third and the most important aspect is, and which is my worry, I don't think that anti-Muslim discourse is going to survive for a long period of time. That is the anti-intellectual discourse in this campaign, this Khan market thing, which you just mentioned, is something has to do with that. That we need to just make fun of people who are seriously involved in academic activities and therefore, creating popularism of a different kind. So that's the third thing which is contributing to the entire electoral discourse. Ajay, Hilal was very optimistic when he said that he does not see this blind anti-Muslim politics surviving beyond a certain point. And he sees that possibly evolving into a very strong anti-intellectual discourse. This has been the push, in fact, over the last five years. You know, we have not actually ever seen a campaign where the prime minister has reduced everything to saying, Tukde, Tukde, gang. You know, a university protest becomes the metaphor for everything which is wrong against their idea of nationalism. How do you look at what always happened and especially in the context of this campaign? No, I think, taking on from the Tukde-Tukde gang, I think it's a very interlinked discourse. They are contemporizing in one sense what Goldwalke did. If you look at the urban Naxal discourse closely, and if you decode it, the way they have connected, those who were arrested, linked to Tukde-Tukde gang, linked to Maoist. So that stands for the communist in what Goldwalke has said. The Maoists were interlinked. Somebody like Gautam Nawalakha being arrested to Kashmiri jihadi, which is the Muslim face. Part of the problem with the RSS is that the Indian Muslim today no longer fits that kind of militant, vigorous, violent kind of a Muslim that they want. Now that can only fit with the Kashmiri kind of resistance, because Indian Muslim is not resistant. He is playing an intelligent game of being silent, either co-opted or silent. When playing according to democracy, their number game is what they are buying. And third in urban Naxal, they also arrested two human rights activists from Bombay, who were both Christians. So this old narrative of Muslim-Christian communists being three enemies, I think continues. And they're interconnecting that discourse. The point is how much of these very intricate kind of connections that they can carry it at a much mass popular level of building this kind of a sustained narrative. Now it can localize prejudices, can exist and disappear. But can it emerge into a sustained national narrative? I think the testing point was Kashmir this time. If you see the case of Kashmir, this government under these five years, they kept it burning. And it was on the headlines all through because Kashmiri Muslim stands for a pan Indian kind of an emotion, which the Indian Muslim no longer is able to provide that kind of polarization, because it's almost a vanquished adversary now. He doesn't know, he doesn't become a contest. Doesn't what he may be socially socially. So it doesn't we do see outside, just to interject, we do see instances outside Kashmir, especially during festive occasions, you know, during the month of Ramzan as we are currently facing after, you know, the evening, you know, iftar, you know, you find young Muslims moving around in bands or on the night of Shabe Barat, you see them moving and coming into spaces which are otherwise denied to them on occasions of Eid. So there is a conflict at that time. But thereafter, they retreat into their ghettos. So the ghettoization has happened in the last five years. Absolutely. So that that old resistance no longer exists because they simply do not have that social power or those economic resources. So I think this the problem is for a majority of muscular nationalism, you also need the other who is as strong as vocal. So if you see OYC, I think is only symbol today they have in Indian Muslim case who is able to retort, which I mean, I don't really approve the way he actually problematizes many of the issues, which I think is what the muscular national majority of nationalism requires. You have talked about the talk about Muslims, Muslim political representation in India, you have consistently argued that the number of legislators or parliamentarians is not the true indicator as to the level of participation. You have consistently argued as to how Muslim participation has gone up in the sense of rising Muslim voting data, which is available. Now what does this show at one level? You are being pushed out of the mainstream. The ruling party does not even pretend to accept your existence. You know, Sapkashat, Sapkavikas is just another jumla. It is no way there is no attempt on part of Mr. Modi to become what I call, you know, Sapka Neta. It is just used only to become so that he is Kuchka Neta. He wants to be the leader of only one section. Now, despite this, you know, and what Ajay was saying, you know, that they have kind of retreated being almost a vanquished community. Do you share this view? I think when we talk about Muslim, we must realize we are talking about huge number of people and they are, you know, they live in different areas. They live in different regions. There's not at all homogeneous community and we have to also look at the North-South divide. Ajay must be well aware of that and me. When we talk about this heterogeneity, we have to look at the, so we have to look at a two level. One is the discourse level. Certainly at the discourse level, anti-Muslim discourse has been established. But in terms of the actualities of politics, we have to look at in different contexts. Now look at the discourse level, what sort of issues they raised in the last five years. Gharwapsi, Ayodhya, Lavjihad and most importantly, beef. And beef, I won't consider into this because that's a different and specific issue. And most importantly, Ram Temple. All of these issues, or triple tala, all of these issues did not have that resonant within the Muslim community. For instance, Ayodhya, obviously there is a temple there for last, since 1992-93, any Hindu can go and perform worship. Even before that Muslims couldn't go in. Yes. So that was a non-issue for Muslims. Triple tala, there was overwhelming opposition to this practice. Within the community. Within the community and then many member of all India Muslim personal law board resigned just because of the standing on that. Look at Gharwapsi, it was highly complicated issue because there was not Arya Samaj. They were not going to do Shuddhi. So it was a defeating thing. And finally, Lavjihad. Because when this anti-Romeo Scott was created in UP, many of the people who caught were not Muslims. The problem is not just about what has been done by the BJP, what the social profiling which is done. So the thing is that because these were not the issues which actually provoked, at least in North India Muslim to the BJP, these were not creating kind of a social atmosphere of some kind. That's one. But this lynching thing, the cow vigilante and beef was very, very different. It was a low economy thing. You need not to create a kind of a big right. You have to just kill a few people and create an impact, which they did. And it gives a sense of triumphalism within the Hindu. So the fair psyche was created through this only. And as a result, the silences of Muslims must be interpreted with regard to these issues differently. So all four issues which I just narrated were different from the lynching issue. And as a result, the silence was obvious because this is not our issue. So why should I respond to that? But lynching somehow created a fear among Muslims. So if you ask me what is the most important and dominant Muslim issue at the moment is fear. That's right. Very important. Now let us move to the second thesis of mine in this program, where I say that populist authoritarianism and pragmatic communalism has not been new to India. It has been assured in earlier during the Indira Gandhi tenure. But over the past five years, we have witnessed a transition to authoritarian majoritarianism and programmatic communalism. We now have a government which is a democracy in name, but it is very much a democracy of just a few. An ethnic, a classical ethnic democracy if one can actually call it, which is driven by the idea of majoritarianism. How would you? No, that's true. But I think one has to also deconstruct and decode that this majoritarianism that looks pan-national, it's a national, also is linked to multiple micro narratives in each context. For instance, a way it's linked to the way they're subdividing caste in UP and Pihar. And they're subdividing caste on one hand. That subdivision of Dalits and Obesis is also in a very curious way leading to a more appetite for a muscular Hindutva. So for purpose of representation, you are a Dalit. For purposes of recognition, you are a Hindu. So I think this kind of a micro narrative, we have to get into those details. I think simply calling it majoritarianism. Similarly with the Muslim question, Ilaal already pointed out from the Muslim point of view. From the populist point of view too, we have to understand what is it that justifies this kind of a muscular ghettoization or subjugation of the Muslims. Is there building on a deep sense of historical injury? That there has been a historical injury. Muslims are not victims. They were a ruling elite. Urdu was an official language. Look at the whole Sabarimala issue. Sabarimala issue is nothing but kind of a minoritization of Hindus. So you had personal loss. So Muslim-based, faith-based practices were given a certain privilege. While from the days of Hindu Code Bill, Hindu faith-based practices were open to constitutional scrutiny. See that is the narrative they are trying to build. So Sabarimala is an up turning. So Sabarimala followed triple talak. So the point they are trying to make to the majority Hindus is that now we will open up Muslim faith-based cultural practices to constitutional. That's a question of individual justice. While Sabarimala is a faith-based practice where constitution has no business or judiciary has no business to intervene, this I think looks very reasonable. This looks like a sense of achieving a justice. Something that is setting wrong for an historical injury that happened on Hindus. So I think simply critiquing it as majoritarian. I don't think would help us. We'll have to think what is a narrative at the local level that we can generate. And these are multiple narratives at each level I can see linked to caste, neoliberalism, faith-based religious practices. So today it is upturned. Hindu feels a sense of deep sense of victimhood and feels Muslim is an aggressor. While in social terms we know where Muslims stand. So this kind of optics which has upturned the entire logic. How do we address this from and that is what is leading to a populist authoritarian consent? You know there is linked with this. There is also this narrative which has been created that all this sentiment which rather this the system of looking at things and the equations which exist has been justified because of institutions which has quote unquote appeased the minorities. There is a consistent argument that there is appeasement not just from the political parties you know which are the non-BJP political parties but also the constitutional institutions of the country. We have in the last five years seen that the integrity of these institutions come under a lot of pressure. In the course of this election we have seen I was referring to how the election commission has behaved and this is by and large been justified by the people. You will not find many people thinking that you know the EC has been kinder to the BJP or Mr. Modi or Amit Shah. You know does it also mean that there is added pressure from a majoritarian culture on institutions to change themselves and be more attuned to this version of nationalism? I think just taking this point from Ajay because he is making a very very crucial point that you know how to how the how some kind of a narrative is constructed and how this narrative is placed in the public discourse. Now in the if for instance we question the authority of say Supreme Court with regard to Sabri Mala but the the same kind of Triple Talag issue will be you know brought in. Now the question is that this tit for tat attitude and it reminds me on a lighter note this famous Diwar thing. So that has become the narrative so and you know this is this has been the strategy of this government. Since 2014 they have been questioning the opposition on their own on on the way they are they are being questioned. So in my view the larger point is that remember that institution and this is I think a problem of our own secular politics secular constitutional politics we have somehow started worshipping the constitution. Constitution is not made up of ideas it is practiced by people. So if the morality of the people is going to decline how can we expect that the institution will do justice because end of the day these are people by people like us. So therefore. But the constitution has been put on a pedestal by this government Mr Modi said that it's a holy book. If you know but that's that's the problem because if you freeze the constitution their attempt is to freeze it by saying that that this is a holy book. Now the counter argument should be that this is not a holy book it's a man made book and therefore it is subject to and amend criticism. So that openness somehow reduced from the public discourse. But they too would like to amend it at some point for their benefit. I don't think that they are going to create hindu rastra without constitution. They are going to use constitution to create hindu rastra. They are going to use techniques they are going to bring in changes to the constitution so that they can do a lot of things. I don't think that they are going to do changes in the constitution. In my view the existing frame of the constitution itself is adequate for them to to transform the policies they were they favorable for the creation of hindu rastra. Remember Bhagwat's all three lectures where he said that you know we are uncomfortable with the idea of minority. But at the same time if you look at the constitution constitution does not define who is the minority. Well it is time for me to present my third thesis you know which is that regardless of the outcome of the elections reclaiming the republic will be an arduous task. You don't require to be told as to why if the BJP returns to power. But even if there is an alternative government if it assumes office it will not be an easy task. The value on the y-axis of an imaginary index of hindutva is higher than ever before. Let's try to plot an imaginary index of hindutva where we have x-axis the number of years and we go back to 1971 you can decide your starting point for me it is going to be possibly 86 the the the Shah Banu case and the opening of the lock. From that point if we actually plot on the y-axis how hindutva has risen it has risen very sharply between 2014 and 2019. It did not to my mind decline very much between 2004 and 2014 so which means that there is a growing support for the idea of hindutva as an ideology. Do you agree with this and that can we in any way or what steps can be taken to reverse this? I think two things I like the manner in which someone like Shashi Tharoor came out with the formulation that hinduism is different from hindutva political hindutva political hindutva but I think they lack something that now the difference between hinduism and hindutva is crucial because hindutva is not merely an idea it is a practice now but hinduism the kind of hinduism Shashi Tharoor underlines is not remain a practice so therefore there become a ritual therefore some kind of the practice which Gandhi did with hinduism is needed and I'm really sorry that I do not find that practice at all in our political culture why because for that you need social movement kind of politics not the electoral politics the problem we threw in the social movement meaning you because we are you know over emphasizing on electoral politics as if that everything is going to be you know the source is constitution or the electoral politics no there is something called so society or social where movements are found and one of the crucial aspect is to raise the issue of religion in a positive way as a movement that is not happening and that is the reason why everything is reduced to election 2019 etc and that's the reason why hindu but remember hindutva is a practice it is not merely confined to electoral politics I can give you one example Indra Prasth in you know VHP has actually appropriated all the Ramnila committees in Delhi right they were not the case earlier I'm from Delhi I know that but now when you think of any of the organized religious activities you find all under the control of the Sangh Parivar so there should be there is a need to evolve an intellectual critique of Sangh Parivar at the same time you need to to evolve a new practice of religion which is which is completely different from the hatred kind of politics which then why why do people critique you know attempts like say Mamta Banerjee's of or of what the left front used to do of taking over the Durga Puja committees in Bengal no but there is a difference between the Durga Puja committee because if I remember correctly that that always celebrated as a part of culture yeah not to not not religion at all it's an occasion to eat occasion to eat centrally but in this case it is a kind of a political program and this political program is somehow very categorically in a straightforward way you know imbibed through these you know VHP committees right post May 23rd what's your prognosis where are we going forget what kind of government exactly you're not in any way in a capacity to to make any guesses I think the social consent and consensus has really shifted to the right that's the worrying part whichever government I mean while it's an important issue it stands out but I don't think that our our discourse or our struggle I think ends with that even if we have an alternate government the bigger question is if there's an alternate a new struggle begins yeah no struggle begins but I don't think the alternate has that kind of narrative as I see in the popular domain for the political commitment well even if there is a political commitment has to be backed by the right kind of politics and a political discourse the real crisis I don't think is merely political commitment but the real crisis is I think the missing secular narrative which has an appeal at the popular domain it has a appeal in the in in in circles like us we can continue to discuss you know we'll use that we call you know I think in that sense Modi's can't mark this job thing works that there has been this kind of a social divide and therefore I think BJP one has to take their discourse more seriously than what we did earlier in terms of they have been able to occupy that anti-elitist local cultural idiom very strongly so things even so I think everything has turned upside down you know that that logic of things have turned upside down the point that you know Hilal was making in terms of Hinduism has to be a new signification see what is the challenge for that kind of a discourse if you look at the Dalit OBC politics today in much of the Hindi heartland they do not want they are pro-Hindutva there's a lot there's been a lot of shift among yes but if you ask for a positive signification of Hinduism they say we are not Hindus absolutely see this this kind of a new challenge think Hindutva is able to shift the very terms of discourse in a very big way our old terms of discourse old social category especially in the secular social science discourse I feel are almost redundant I think there's no point in analyzing and imposing that they're only super imposing on that reality we'll have to now this generate a new secular discourse that has an appeal in the popular domain what that means which has to be beyond constitution which has to take into this whole institutional language that you are asking the previous look the whole institutions are a result of the collapse of the developmental state that these institutions did not deliver and therefore right has very rightfully occupied a space that is anti-institutional which comes from a wide range of anger from Dalits OBCs including Muslims you know because these institutions have been closed they cater to the interest of a certain caste Hindu which is what we are referring symbolic as Luteans Delhi and whatever but that there is a sociological reality and they are tuning in so they're re-signifying right anger for wrong purpose and they will divert it to their Hindu rastra hatred mob lynching and all of this but all of this has some real sociological basis and post neoliberalism this discontent has got exaggerated multiple fold and one of the reasons I think there's a purposeive direction in the economic policy people think it is just I think to disempower people and their argument the more the people are disempowered the more they feel they will be able to generate a kind of a consent for so we will have to really dig into that real crisis beyond the optics of what they're doing they want us to be caught in this optic institutions we have to look beyond you know one of the things as what they've been very successful is that in the last five years that they've barraged us with one narrative after another that by the time you're able to formulate your thoughts on one narrative they've already shifted terrain to another ground you know so you leave your arguments incomplete on the first terrain but then you have to move and grapple with the next next particular field too ilal to to end up you know last word from you you're talking about muslim fear you know the fear within the muslims the muslim society you know outside of jammu and kashmir you know ajay made a point that the muslim and jammu and kashmir has to be dealing from the rest of the country it's post fear post fear muslims where do they go from here they you can do nothing the fear is there but they still live so what what can one expect see there because i see things in a positive light and i think that if you look at the kind of emphasis is given on say education and employment is something which is you know if you go to any part of the india right and talk to muslim they would say that we want to be educated and we need employment right and they are you know they are not interested in raising old issues so this is actually a new empowerment narrative which is coming out slowly and gradually fortunately we don't then they'll eventually want political space no but fortunately we don't have such a commission the aura which is created through such a commission by up1 and up2 has gone up even the congress is not interested in such a now so so the real question in front of muslim is that how to be accommodated in the in in the realm of education and employment i don't think that the question of politics we certainly come late because you know i i analyze the kind of political responses which go which we got of muslims in post in in in modira post 2014 right and we find that the options are always open even a sizable number of muslims also prefer to vote to bjp in many cases so it means that see look at the bjps from bjps perspective they have created a narrative that muslim don't vote us but if you look at the bottom level of society if you look at the constituency level you find that muslims are preferably approached by the bjp candidate simply to so what is happening at the national level need not necessarily be happening at the local level because the candidate at times is interested in his particular victory or you know ensuring that he doesn't get lost and is not always focusing on the party's long-term agenda because he is a much shorter agenda he's looking at his immediate election but neander can i make a point yes see look at what happened to such a report yeah government did not give that up this is a part of their official policy they always submit an action taken report to such a every year yes so it means that to keep such a but the next level exactly bjps token exactly to keep the satchel alive will help them to create consolidated the majority vote that's what exactly they do so they constantly keep on referring to the muslims only because they can get the majority of the hindu population there well thank you you know the two of you it's really when we can you know actually talk about this for a much longer period of time but we have i think it's time for us to wind up thank you very much thank you for coming and joining me these are indeed very worrying times in days to come we will know if we can breathe a bit easy or not till then remain hopeful of a verdict that is in sync with our composite culture and inclusive spirit thank you very much for watching this program