 This is Swiss punctuality. So thank you for everyone in the room for joining us also. Thank you for everyone watching at home or in the office. Now we have 45 minutes to break down some of the biggest challenges for the world economy and really over this. There's one overarching question that we're going to try and answer as global growth has slowed, squeezing living standards and public finances, what can be done to reverse this trend and how should efforts to drive up growth balanced with other national and global imperatives. To answer this very important but also very difficult question, I am delighted to be joined by a stellar panel. Faisal Ali Brahim, the Minister of Economy and Planning for Saudi Arabia. Laura Dandrea Tyson, Distinguished Professor of the Graduate School, House of School of Business, University of California, Berkeley and Christian Keller, Head of Economics Research at Berkeley. So thank you all for joining us. Minister, let me start off with you and this is a difficult question. In the next 12 months, and we also have Jay Powell by the way speaking about three hours from now. So we're not gonna outshine or anticipate exactly what he'll have to say, but what kind of growth do you see in the next 12 months and then longer term, how will that transform in the next five years? So I believe over, if you'd asked us a few months ago, we'd say there are more concerns for recession or a slowdown than ever before. I think today there is less concern for a recession specifically, but definitely a slowdown and we'll find out today if the rate hikes will continue the same momentum or it will see a different pace. I think the IMF recently said that we had growth of above 3% last year. It's expected that this year is 2.8 and next year will probably go up again. Saudi, we've seen a growth rate of 8.7 last year being the highest or the fastest in the G20, but we expect a different growth profile this year. For non-oil activities, we expect the same momentum, high pace of non-oil activities, which leads me to maybe the conclusion that different areas, different regions and different countries witness different, definitely growth profiles. What we've witnessed since the beginning of the pandemic and the other poly crises that we've witnessed is that some governments have taken it upon themselves to really enact some reforms, to build institutional capabilities and to capture opportunities that align their interests better with global interests and we might see some momentum kind of, you know, growing their opportunities for a better growth profile than the global economy. Professor Tyson, is a recession at this point globally a given? No, I do not think it is. Look, the Economist report was just up here before the Economist report coming from the web. I think economists are just divided on this. This is like a 50-50 call at this point, okay? About half of economists think there's gonna be a recession in the United States and half don't. If you look at the historical record, you would say the odds of recession are pretty high because historically speaking, there's almost no example of a soft landing. So remember, what's happening here is the Fed is using monetary policy to cool off the economy without creating a recession, just to cool off the economy. That's the soft landing goal. Very, very hard to achieve and probabilistically pinging, not too likely. That would suggest to me that we get a rather short and rather shallow recession if we get one at all. And I would say there are already a lot of positive signs for the fight against inflation, which has motivated the Fed. If you look at the supply chains of industry, all of those pressures have really eased. If you look at key price areas, commodity prices, food prices, you see easing or declines. You see a labor market in the United States, which is showing signs of cooling, but luckily enough the signs are a soft landing cooling. Just a somewhat of a small increase in the quits rate, but quits remain very, a small decrease in the quits rate, but that they remain very high. People are thinking I can quit and find another job. The unemployment rate remains near historic lows and wage pressures seem to be easing. So I would say that right now the data suggests that indeed the Fed may manage a soft landing, but if not you will get, I would say, a recession which will be short and shallow. And growth really to me is more about the long term. And there I think we have to look at labor force growth and something that has not been discussed a lot in this conference so far and I think we should focus on and that is productivity growth. Because productivity growth long term, it's two things that drive long term growth. It's the growth of the labor force and the skills of labor force and productivity growth. And productivity growth has been very disappointing. It's been very disappointing in the advanced industrial countries for quite a long period of time. I won't get into this now, but let's think about will something like AI and technological change which drove the productivity expansion from 1994 to 2004. That was the internet, ICT, the development of that technology. Will the build out of AI have the same effect? So we'll talk about that. Yeah, we'll talk about AI, we'll talk about fragmentation, we'll talk about decoupling. All that. What kind of economy do you think we'll be left with Christian in the next 12 months? So we start with the cyclical which is my bread and butter in a way every day in the market. We do think we go into a shallow recession in the US. If you ask me about globally, I think we will not have a recession. In China, just coming out of a prolonged lockdown and there's a lot of dynamic now. Europe didn't go into the deep kind of energy crisis so there's dynamic there too, a lot less than in the US but it looks, if you added up, I think globally, we're going to 2.5% or so growth economy globally which is a lot less than we saw as an average over the last decades. But I think what we will see is probably less growth in the coming quarters because we had a massive global tightening of interest rates. We forget, it's not only the Fed, it's globally we had zero interest rates and now we're seeing in a very rapid way within 12 months or so, interest is going from zero or sometimes negative to like 4%, 5% and as economists typically, you expect this comes with a lag. So we will have a lot of the effects of that tightening will only happen over time. So, and we already start seeing it with some banks in the US, we saw it in the UK with a little bit of a pension crisis there. So whenever you increase interest rates that rapidly, I think you're going to see something, right? But I think the longer term question is very interesting and we have a massive demographic change, you mentioned. Labor force growth has been a driver in many economies and China, which contributed basically 20, 30% to global growth every year has a very, very dramatic demographic change. The labor force is not only slowing in growth but it's the growth is turning negative. So that's one. And I think productivity growth is the one part, I think, I guess we'll talk more about it, but that is I think the big hope because if you know, demographically, in the 60s, 70s we grew, the world population grew with 2, 2. something percent. We're now growing at 0.8. So I think there's no hope that just population growth will maintain growth. So it has to be productivity. Capital stock, we have to talk about greening of the economy. I think there's a little bit of expectations there. But I mean, it has to be a productivity growth and the good thing about it is, or the good thing in the sense of, it's so difficult to predict. It has been very low, like you say Laura, like since early 2000s, very disappointing. Very disappointing. But you know, there's a famous saying, I think it was Robert Solow, the famous growth economist. The famous... He said it in 89. He says, I see computers everywhere, but not in the growth statistics. And sure enough, three years later... Then it happened. We saw boom in U.S. productivity in the 90s. So look, I want to go on record. I say, you know, I see iPhones everywhere, but not in the productivity statistics. Well, maybe GPT chat is now going to turn into a, you know, into some kind of a productivity boom in the next 10 years. Who knows, but I think... But you're optimistic on that? You're optimistic? Yeah. Exactly. Listen to some people here. We talked over the last few days, you know, those who know this better, you know, understand it better than me, to the extent that we can fully understand it. It seems to me that could come quite quickly. Yes. You know, it typically takes a time between a new innovation and when it finally shows up in GDP. Yeah. It becomes a general purpose technology, like with electricity. But I think in this case, it could go quite quickly. You know, we all have it on the iPhones. Minister, are you optimistic about... I mean, first of all, the shift, and of course it's different if you're sitting in Saudi Arabia, having to diversify your economy than if you're, for example, in the UK, that kind of, first of all, you know, had to stem the decline and then have to put policies in place to grow further. So you mean... So what are the kind of policies that you're looking at that would actually work? So on AI or on large language models, we're also cautiously optimistic, but we see that there's a lot of opportunity for regulation to mature as fast as... Hopefully it won't slow down the innovation, but to catch up, to make sure that we have the best utilization of this. The kind of growth that we want to see is a growth that fosters or builds on people and ideas. I think this is what's gonna give economies the cutting edge moving forward. And it needs to be an inclusive growth, sustainable growth. Luckily, we started Vision 2030 seven, eight years ago, and then when the pandemic kicked in, everybody started thinking differently about their economies and their strategies and their policies, which made it easier for us to collaborate with other countries and multilateral platforms. And for us, we see one that really builds on making sure that growth is inclusive, especially when we have the intersection of economic opportunity, which is something we're witnessing a lot of, social responsibility, the same thing, and social development globally, especially as demographic profiles are changing. At the intersection of these three things, we have what we call inclusive growth, and it would be a shame and a waste if we don't, at the end of this, I'd say, disruptive period we're going through, we don't really crack the code on inclusive growth. Lord, do we have inclusive growth when you look at the cost of living crisis? Are politicians, also because of the election cycle and the short termism, really thinking about this longer term? So, I think we always have had a cost of living problem. And I'm just gonna talk about the advanced industrial countries. We have a situation, and we've had a situation where a significant fraction of the labor force is fully employed, and is not fully employed at a living wage. So, they have a cost of living crisis. It's ongoing, they're working. They're working full time. Sometimes they're working two jobs full time. Sometimes everybody in their house is working. And the minimum wage that society provides is not high enough, and therefore there is no living standard protection. That's a long term problem, okay? It's not a cyclical problem. It is certainly true that the short term increase in inflation, say, of commodities or of energy prices, hits those families very hard. The food crisis, the food alone is very significant. But I would say, again, we have to think about this inclusive growth as a long term goal. We have to think about how we do our growth strategies to try to make sure they are inclusive. So, if you listen to, say, the US and it's moving into what they're calling industrial strategies, which is basically green development strategies, and right now, semiconductors, every single item of those policies includes ways to make the policies inclusive. So, for example, if you are a semiconductor firm applying to the Department of Commerce for some money to help you build a new facility, you have to have in your proposal information about what you're doing for disadvantaged workers, information for what you're going to do for training, information for what you're going to do with the community colleges in that area. Every, and I could do that in the IRA too, this administration, the Biden administration has absolutely adopted that in physical policy that's pro-growth. We must have explicit elements of that policy which deal with inclusion and address the fact that we've had this long-term issue of people working but not at a living standard that is viable. Christian, and frankly, the Inflation Reduction Act has infuriated most European leaders and politicians. What's the growth plan for this region? Well, I mean, first of all, I would say we have a, what we see worldwide now is a bigger state, right? And that's very interesting how the state becomes involved, you know, just, and you know, not only on the IRA, but also, you know, as much as people suffered and there's no doubt, you know, and some people have experienced a cost of living crisis. You know, the US threw a lot of money during the pandemic at the issue. I mean, you know, this, to the households, there were checks being sent out. I mean, we had a fiscal expansion unseen outside of a wall. And this is why we have now, you know, some estimates, two and a half trillion of excess savings in the US. So meaning, you know, the state has been compensating a lot in Europe as well through different means, not as much as in the US. So, you know, in aggregate, there's a lot of demand out there. So it cannot be that everyone has no purchasing power. So, you know, maybe the government has to be actually become better very soon after the crisis now to very target this. At targeted, at targeted. Because right now, in aggregate, there was a lot. And, you know, so your question was on the, more on investment and the IRA. Well, yeah, Europe can do to actually put some of the similar policy. You has now come up with their own green deal, right? And that is a very comprehensive plan. And if you look at the totality of it, it's actually quite big. It's quite large. But we had yesterday on one of the panels, an ex-German minister who, you know, she was not involved directly in this, but she said, it's 400 pages long. And by the time you read it all and you get to it, it's apparently, and I've not read it, but apparently it's a lot more difficult than the US IRA. So in the US, you know, you read it through and there are a lot of qualifications, but and then you go and you get the money. Why the Europeans, maybe classic, the classic way the Europeans do it, at least in Brussels is, you know, it's very detailed. It has a lot of aspects and it takes a long time. The question is whether people, companies that is, really pick it up in the same way they can do it in the US. Can we just say politically speaking a reason for that? So to get that deal through, which was a complete, it was amazing. I mean, most, everyone was not predicting that we were gonna get that deal. But one way we got it is a lot, a lot of this is tax credits. And then, so the tax credits as they take effect, therefore tax credits for consumers to buy green products and producers to produce green products and their tax incentives are related to, well, is it produced in the United States? Because we would like to have inclusive growth. So will you please build the car in the United States and then you get a credit? It's easy to use the tax credits, but I will tell you it's been very hard for the Treasury to write them because they're not clean. That is, the frequently they'll have, well, you get the tax credit if you do X, but also you have to do Y at the same time. Okay, and the Y might be that, what number of workers you're employing? So I think it's easier than the European, but it's a little more multi-targeted because, again, it goes back to the, Biden administration is trying to encourage growth that is inclusive and green is the major area it's trying to do this in. So you can see the mix of targets, green targets, inclusive targets. Yeah, we had a conversation also with John Podesta who's gonna try and roll it out. And I mean, he says, look, it's exciting, but there are a lot of challenges on the credits also get to the right place. Minister, I mean, it feels like the world may be fragmenting a little bit, so I don't know whether we're talking about decoupling or supply chain issues. Like, what are you most pessimistic about growth worldwide in the next five years? So clearly globalization is evolving. We still see high levels of global trade, 32 trillion, I think at the end of 22, an increase by 15% in services, 10% in goods, although it witnessed a dip towards the end of the year. And I think it's just signaling that globalization is evolving. We're seeing near shoring. We're seeing all of localization, all of these things. I think that's mainly because we're going from cost efficiency, solving for cost efficiency to solving for resilience. This creates opportunities, but there is a concern that the collaboration between nations or regionally or intra or interregionally may not be at the same level, which would mean a slower or a different growth profile, even if some national interests are being served. So we need to continue to dial up the collaboration, the cooperation, try to invest. And then this is, if you look at it holistically, it's an investment in global resilience. And if you take a very long-term view, it's an investment in deeper globalization. So the concern is if we don't build the right institutional capabilities, utilize this crisis to build the right institutional capabilities that foster and continue to create the right kind of partnerships and collaboration opportunities between nations. And Laura, I mean, if you go back to supply chains, what does that do to productivity worldwide? If supply chains keep on shifting? Well, I completely agree with the minister that what is going on here is a kind of a resilience response. So if we think about the heyday of globalization, the last wave of it, was really built significantly from a US point of view on labor arbitrage. That is basically US companies, I heard an amazing comment from the head of tax at GE at one point and said, okay, the products are designed in the United States, they're produced in another place, and the tax revenues go to yet another place, which is a tax haven, okay? So basically, whether one believes the tax haven part or not, the truth is that a lot of US production as US manufacturing came down as a share of GDP, it did not come down that much, it really did not. What happened was the firms automated at home, okay? So if they were gonna keep stuff in the US, they automated it, and where they could, they essentially outsourced it for cost reasons. Labor cost arbitrage, it was very profitable. It worked, it worked, and that was a driver of globalization around the world, around the world, so that you had, that period of time was, that's where you saw a convergence of growth rates from the most developed countries to the least developed countries, from Africa to Asia to Europe to the United States, it was convergence. That has not been true since the Great Recession. Globalization leveled off, there was then COVID and the interruption of supply chains, and I think now what companies are doing is they're looking for building up another source of, so the resilience is there. I've heard companies in the United States say my strategy is China plus one other place. I need to have another place for resilience. I will just go here, I think we should continue the conversation of coupling or decoupling. I think US-China relations are on a very bad course, and I think for the rest of the world, I guess I would ask, it poses challenges for the rest of the world because, for example, what do the ASEAN nations do? Do they, are they going to be two blocks? Are they going to be a splinter net? So you got one internet system in it. I worry about this a lot. But Christian, so if the question is what growth policy works is the first question that you need answer to answer as a nation, what do I do with China? Well, first of all, I think exactly what Laura said. There were these imperfections, certainly, right? In particular tax arbitrage, that people could allocate into tax havens, but I think we have to be very careful not to pull the baby out with the bathwater in the sense that this globalization was a beautiful thing for millions, hundreds of millions of people to get them out of poverty. It was not good for certain workers in the US, middle class, I think also Europe, right? Exactly, but if we look at the numbers in terms of global equity and millions of emerging markets, hundreds of millions in China moved up, so that happened. Second, we got something that was called the great moderation. Since the mid-80s all the way to the global financial crisis, high growth, low inflation, and very little volatility. So now we talk about resilience, but the minister said something very interesting. He said global resilience. Actually, during that type of globalization, the global resilience was quite good. We had just in time, things were moving around, and now we're looking at national resilience. And now we realize that in many ways, there's been a huge dependence on China, and now we want to create redundancies, et cetera. By the way, we had this discussion here in one of the panels. I don't think that can be good for growth, at least from a perspective of just GDP growth, because you create inefficiencies purposefully. It will. And it will be good for other things, and maybe we want that. But to say, to claim that we want to create growth when you do redundancies and all this, I doubt it. So now I think what is very important, I think that's what you mentioned. We all realize now there's going to be a diversification supply chains, but US, China, trade, this has to continue. And maybe we can find ways whereby, yes, it's not high tech, but just one last number, I remember when we wrote a piece on globalization. In 1914, just before the First World War, global trade was 40% of GDP, export imports together. You know where it was after the Second World War? 7.5. And you know it was in 1990, I think 30. So only in 2005, just before the global financial crisis, we were at 50%, meaning it took 70, 80 years to get back to, or about 100 years actually, to get back to where we were already at a stage before the First World War. Now, I'm not calling that we are in a war here, but what I'm saying is it's good to talk about resilience. Everyone in Washington is united about that one needs to go against China, or be tough on China. But with regard to growth, what we had for growth were quite nicely, and we probably should correct it. It worked very well. But it was for the world. You also talked about polycrisis, right? What are we underestimating? If you look at the next five years, what's the biggest mistake that we could think of when you look at these polycrisis? Because the problem is that if they come from everywhere, it's very difficult for policymakers to find the right medicine. So I think maybe back to this point, national resilience, Christian probably without collaboration, without investing in multilateral, is less global resilience. So we need to cover that gap with more collaboration. I think what we've learned in the last few years is that risk assessment is an evolving thing, and we need to always be at the cutting edge of forecasting risks, discussing it, collaborating on in terms of how to mitigate it, but really keeping dialogue open, being inclusive with nations, even the least developed nations. I think there's a lot to learn, especially today. There's a hunt for talent, and because of that hunt, there's this pull for talent to show up everywhere, and we're seeing talent showing up in middle-income countries and least-developed countries, and some of them are actually evolving their institutional capabilities and policy-making capabilities faster in learning and offering lessons learned that we all can utilize. So I think we should not be blindsided by not taking into account that wider dialogue. I also wanted to add on globalization, I think 1.1 billion since 1990 lifted from poverty, and then in China, 800 million since China started opening up, but that was a result of globalization that really created centers where they received a lot of jobs because of the cost efficiency. Today, jobs are being spread all over the place because you're looking for resilience, and that may affect a little bit growth or create inflation environment, like the panelists said in the previous panel, but it also may create more inclusivity in terms of adopting a global view. Minister, when you talk about risk mitigation, are you surprised that we got so wrong? The economy, inflation, or geopolitics, it feels like the last three, four years were a bit of a blur, actually, in terms of our forecasting full stop. I think even the panel before us was talking about how it's tough. Even a few months ago, our views would be different. I think we tend to forget. During the pandemic, we all worked together almost like, I'd say, seamlessly to address the most global challenge that the world has ever faced or the most global thing that the world has faced, but I'm pretty sure that we didn't capture all the lessons learned, and I think the world is evolving at a different view than we've ever seen before, a different pace and a different structure than we've ever faced. Traditionally, we've always been busy trying to explain what happened in the previous crisis that we miss out on the signals of the upcoming crisis. So I don't have an answer, but I think it is challenging and without the right collaboration and dialogue and discussion, it would be even more challenging. Thank you. I know, I'm sure we have a lot of questions. So if I see a quick show of hands, and so we'll get to you, someone in the middle. Thank you so much. Don't know if we have a microphone and if the microphone can get to, or you can project. I can move without mic. Perfect. Go ahead. There you go. No, I was just saying. Actually, a microphone's coming. Productivity, right. I was fascinated by this remark about productivity and growth. In between 1950 and 1975, we had the golden quarter, and so in advanced Western economies, we had growth rates higher than 5%. After that, we never reset again, also not with IT. Now, according to the future of job study, we have shortage of labor, but still the level of automation is only marginally increased from 33% to 34%, while the expectation where that nearly half of the activities worldwide would be automated now. So don't you think that we are in a kind of hype cycle? So we have huge expectation of those emerging technologies, but it probably will take 10 to 15 years before they really result in substantial productivity increase. What is your view on when can we really benefit from these emerging technologies and will productivity lead to growth? Who wants to take it? I raised it, so I'll start. Maybe we do it together. First of all, the period 1994 to 2005 was a period of much stronger than anticipated productivity growth in the US. I was speaking about the US, and that's where you actually did see the ICT revolution take hold. Now, it doesn't take hold at the same time in all sectors. So it's the ICT sector itself and the financial services sector that really start to drive this. And it happens in about a decade. Then there's the financial crisis and the great recession. Everything seems to come unhinged by that. But if I use that as an example, the chat capabilities, the AI capabilities looks like they can be rolled out very fast. You don't need a whole new infrastructure. You can use it on the internet that exists. You can use it on the phones that exist. You can use it with the software that exists. You can embed it in existing software very easily. You can take a Salesforce thing and drive it by artificial intelligence. So my optimism is that this is a technology that can be rolled out pretty fast. Now, my pessimism is that it really goes to aging and what do people wanna buy? What do people want in life? Well, if people want a lot of human intensive care, if they want teachers in the room, if they want caregivers at home, if they want to have their own personal therapist, their own hairdresser. This is what a lot of middle-class people in developed economies spend their money on. I'm not sure that you're gonna see how AI can enhance productivity of those things. So what I'm saying is I think there'll be sectoral differences. I do think overall the productivity growth rate will be raised and could go back to essentially a short period in 1994 to 2005 when you actually see productivity growing at more than 2%. And I remember, you know, I was an advisor to President Clinton and I used to tell him the economy can't grow this fast because the productivity growth rate is gonna be no more than two. And then of course it turned out to be totally wrong. He still reminds me of that to this day. How come you told me that? I said because nobody could predict the productivity effects. But I think learning from that lesson with the optimism that this new technology can be, it's easy to interface with it. You don't have to train people very much for them to use it. Yeah, I agree. I mean, it's incredibly difficult to predict. No one predicts it. But you know, frankly the chance, the fact that since the early 2000s has been so low, you know the chances that at some point we get a productivity spurt is higher now. Now that is, I would complicate the issue a little bit more. And that is by the way, productivity. What do we measure? We measure GDP and the input. And there's something interesting that happens in the digital age is that a lot of products are free. Why? What enters GDP? It's output of produced goods and services and market prices. Market prices. How many things we consume today are free? Why? Because in a digital economy, a lot of things have zero marginal costs. Now, if something has a zero marginal cost, it's zero price. So without going too nerdy now on how GDP statistics are computed or compounded, I mean, fact is that we may actually be better in terms of growth and productivity than we think. And then there are a lot of people who start working on this. How could we actually capture some of that digital product that we are consuming? And maybe all the digital revolution that we think has been so useless with regard to lifting productivity in a way has already done something. Has already done something. Right. I mean, that is an easy way out. You just said... The quality of life. But I think it's a very interesting thing that we've discussed in the web for you already also. Minister, can I ask you actually as a minister in terms of the economy, do you have a favorite statistic that you look at? I don't know whether it's... We like taking bets on what Jay Powell looks at. But is there a... Because I have a favorite statistic. But we're improving our data, I'd say infrastructure, and we're looking at everything. What we're intrigued by is not only productivity, which is something we're trying to address because we want to shift from a resource-rich economy to one that is productivity-led and knowledge and innovation-based. But we're very proud of the female labor participation rates we've been witnessing, and we're very proud of all the reforms that we've been enacting, even on the cultural level. And I think one thing that can demonstrate how serious this transformation is, is that we've elected to go through social and cultural change to open up room for more optimal economic development. In the past, it was seen as something that will hopefully happen post-economic development. But I want to comment on the technology question. I think if you think in terms of decades, and you adopt a long-term investment horizon, decades is short. It's not mobile banking, how it disrupted Africa. It just happened three or four decades ago. It feels like we've always lived with it, but it happened COVID, our ability to shift from face-to-face meetings to virtual meetings in literally no time and actually address screening using apps and improve the logistics related to actual vaccination. It's something we couldn't have done without technology. AI and quantum, I think it's something every day we're looking at and its potential impact. I think this is more disruptive than the rest of the examples we've mentioned. I think it's important for us to keep in mind. But I think if it takes decades with a long-term horizon, it's fast enough. Thank you. Could I have a show of hands for the next question? So we have someone on the second row. Thank you. Bouchon, Stacey, PwC. Question about participation rates. Can we really have inclusive growth if we don't get childcare back into the workforce and if we go into population decline in some of the developed world? Who wants to take that? Look, the US has had poor labor force participation rates. And if you were looking at that number, you'd say, this is a society that's not working well. We've had decline in labor force participation rates for men. We've had that associated with a decline in longevity for men. We have, a lot of this has to do, as far as we can tell, with the displacement of the middle-skill, middle-wage jobs that these men would have had that disappeared, okay? The labor force participation rates for women are back up now, though they slow down and I think the care issue is a very important issue. It was highlighted in the pandemic. One of the many things that was highlighted in the pandemic, I did a lot of work with Saudi and the World Economic Forum on global gender parity. And one of the key, key, key issues is care. Because, and we saw this during the pandemic, women take on a disproportionate share of that, whether it's childcare or just household care, just taking care of the house. And if we could build up the care economy, not only would we have a source of growth for jobs in that economy, but we would also increase the capability for women to actually go into the rest of the economy. So I think this is a very big growth issue, certainly for the United States and probably for many other countries in the world. Just one very quick extension, maybe, that is labor force participation is one way to get your workforce up, right? You have a, the young population is not growing, homegrown. And so one way to deal with it, Japan is doing it relatively successfully, getting women into, usually it's women who have not been working. So you increase labor force participation. But another point is, you know, the demographic, the aging we're talking about is of course not homogeneous across the entire world. It's main, it's happening in China way too early. So they grow old while they're still relatively poor. But in generally it's an advanced economy, rich economy phenomenon. Now, there are many regions in the world where there's still relatively strong population with a lot of young population. And that is of course another way if it's increasing your own labor force participation, another one is dealing with this in a way, in an orderly migration way. And that is something I think that is probably, will be part of a successful global growth plan to kind of manage to get these resources into the right places. It's a very complicated issue because, I mean, you mentioned Japan. So if you kind of look at the use of robots, intelligent robots and AI in Japan in the healthcare sector, what you find is since they weren't gonna bring in migrants to handle that, they basically have, they're at the frontier in terms of what you can do in healthcare with robots, intelligent robots and AI. And they will continue to be because they're substituting for labor which they are not going to import. But your point also raises another thing which I've heard in the sessions and I think we should talk about this a little bit. And that is maybe the globalization of the next period is significantly services led. So what does that mean? It means that the digitization of everything means that a worker sitting somewhere in Thailand can do the job. Okay, a worker sitting somewhere in Kenya can do the job. And so instead of having the outsourcing of manufacturing production, which is what we had in the last wave, we actually have the outsourcing of service jobs, okay? And I think this is really important and different countries can set up their talent pool by developing the digital skills of that talent pool and also the broadband. You've gotta have the infrastructure to allow your workers to be in this global system. But I think that's gonna be a very important characteristic of the next decade. Minister. To answer the question, maybe with the Saudi example, 37% of target for female participation rate was 30%. We started at 2015, 16, at 16, 17%. We wouldn't be able to reach 37% if it wasn't for the many programs that the Ministry of Human Resources didn't put forward that even made it easy and accessible for women to go from one location to another and so many other enablers. And to answer the previous question, I have to add to productivity and labor participation rate, non-oil export complexity. That's very non-oil export complexity. We're trying to diversify our source of growth. That's the most important thing we look at. Thank you. Professor Schwab. Can I just... Oh, yeah, let's go ahead. Hold on. If we look at the world we have two, I would say mega challenges. Mega. One is to master artificial intelligence, but the other one is to master climate change. So my question would be, what will be, I mean, it's a tremendous effort, some people say, will cost us three trillion a year at least, what will be impact of the energy transition be actually on economic growth? And we're starting, I guess, we've felt it in the last six months. Who wants to start us off? Christian? Well, I think there's going to be a capital stock that has to be created and there's a lot of optimism around this and the jobs will be created and we have a new infrastructures needs to be built. I think what sometimes is neglected is of course that there's a lot of existing infrastructure and minister, I mean, you have a lot of existing infrastructure in old energy which now will be depreciated at a very fast rate. And, you know, if we had done this early on and we'd have let those brown infrastructure run out and build others, now we have to do it because climate change is pressing, we waited, we procrastinated, it now has to happen very quickly. So frankly, in the transition phase, and I would make a big difference between the way towards having then clean energy where everything runs clean on clean energy, I think that would be a, I don't want to exaggerate, a beautiful world, you know? But the transition, I think, will be tough. And I think sometimes that is a bit of pet peeve of mine. I think we sometimes trying to paste over it and pretend as if it's just new green jobs are being created and all the rest, don't worry, we reconfigure it. I think the transition may be tough and maybe politicians also at some point have to say, look, we want to have that goal. And maybe GDP growth, the output that we measure will not go up, maybe well-being will go up. I think we have to think about how we deal with the transition, which as I said, I think will not necessarily be one that will bring GDP growth the way we measure it up. Minister? You know, I think, you know, just to comment on the Saudi comment, Christian, I think we still are a conventional energy leader, a clean one, the cleanest actually, and we plan to be a renewable energy leader because mainly we are in the most drought stressed and heat stressed area. So we're at the front line of this. It's not just something we're trying to do to win praises, it's something we're trying to do for the well-being of our people and for our role in the global effort to counter or to fight climate change. But I think we need to fight climate change while thinking about energy security equally and think, so we don't go into the issues that we went to recently and also think about fair and equitable access to economic development. And I think we adopt several ways of thinking. One of them is the circular carbon economy where we say, let's reduce, reuse, recycle and remove. We have to have an inclusive view on how to deal with emissions and not just killing it at the source but probably efficiently removing it afterwards. Laura, how painful do you think this transition will be into greener drought? Well, I think, unfortunately, I think we're late in the transition. So the more we procrastinate, the tougher it will be. And we have these reports generally coming out over and over that we're not on track. We're nowhere near on track. So if the world is actually going to honor its net zero commitments and companies are gonna honor their net zero commitments, they're going to have to do much more than they're doing right now. I do think that this move to a different energy infrastructure, yes, it creates tremendous opportunities for investment and growth. But remember, we have an existing infrastructure. So with any kind of, I would say technological revolution, let's call it that, there's creative destruction. There's destruction. There will be job loss. There will be income loss for companies that are in the old energy field. And I think what policymakers need to do is to really ease that burden. I think U.S. historically speaking has handled creative destruction, which we've handled very well, except we don't worry too much about the destruction. Okay, and I do actually think that even in the creation of the IRA, there was a sense that no, we've got to actually create support for say the industries that are going to gradually decline. So I think I agree with you completely that it's not going to be easy, that we're making it harder by making it late, and that we're going to deal with some destruction. And then the question is, how do you ease that pain? How do you ease that pain? Thank you so much for a very spirited conversation. So please, everyone, stay in your seats. I'll ask the panel to actually exit with me. And it's my great pleasure to call on stage, Sadia Zahidi, for some closing remarks. Thank you.