 I turn now to Monsieur Véran. You have the floor, my dear. Please. Thank you very much, and a particular thanks to the World Policy Conference, and especially Thierry and Sangne, for including me. It's a particular privilege for me to be in this panel under the chairmanship of Jean-Claude Trichet, who is also the honorary chairman of Bruegel. You mentioned my affiliation there, Jean-Claude. I also want to apologize for being another male panelist in an old male panel, and I'm conscious of participating in a clearly suboptimal outcome here. But here we are. The question is, is the international economic order collapsing? And I will, again, give another attempt to answer this, and the answer is no. With every reason to be concerned these days, I think we all have them in mind, and they have been analyzed already by a number of participants. There is massive uncertainty. I think this is a dominant characteristic of the current movement, that we don't know a number of fundamental things, even in the very short term. And what happened in China in the last few weeks was a reminder of that. There are some very basic premises of how we look at the world that we cannot be completely sure of. And, of course, climate change is a massive challenge. We're losing the race against time in addressing it. So I'm not advocating complacency here, let me be very clear. But we don't see a collapse in sight of the order. I think the international economic order actually is surprisingly resilient. What happened this year? I was at the World Policy Conference last year. I was privileged to be also here in Abu Dhabi, the other side of town. And since then extraordinary events have been happening. Russia has invaded Ukraine. The consequence has been Russia being isolated in the international system and, to a large extent, taken out of it. So a ring fence from the international economic system as opposed to this conflict leading to a collapse of the system. I think nobody puts the gist of what happened more eloquently than actually two days before the invasion, the Kenyan ambassador to the United Nations, Martin Kimani, who, as probably many of you remember, made that point that what Russia was at the time threatening to do, the invasion of Ukraine, was an absolutely fundamental challenge to all the norms that bind us together on this planet. And so the response in terms of international economic institutions has been forceful, but I would say proportionate in terms of the extraordinary violation of norms that we have seen and an extraordinarily forceful response. So let's look at what I mean by resilience very quickly. The WTO, Mr. Paul Gam, reminded us that it's still there and running even after the aggression of the Trump administration. The G20, we had, to my mind, a very successful summit in Bali, which kind of illustrates what I'm talking about, including some strong wording in the final declaration compared to what I think everybody was expecting. And I think the Indonesian presidency of the G20 deserves a lot of credit for that. The Bretton Woods institutions, Jan Lebsky reminded us of the challenges and the need for the common framework to make progress. That's, we're getting a little bit into the weeds here, but I think if you look at, for example, the restructuring of, the announcement restructuring of the debt of Zambia, we see a possibility of some constructive evolution, especially in the main challenge to the IMF these days, which is the interplay between Chinese lending to a number of developing and emerging countries and the traditional framework embodied by the Paris Club. So I'm not saying the problem is resolved here. I'm just saying that the worst-case scenarios are not materializing. The World Bank, it has been mentioned by somebody in the audience, it's still led by somebody who has taken positions close to climate change denial, but it remains a strong institution. Let's talk about finance, because that's the area I specialize in most. The Basel III Accord on Banking, capital requirements, leverage, liquidity, and stress testing has been an extraordinary international success. It's been implemented in a more globally consistent way than the previous Accord of Basel II. Sadly, the European Union is still not compliant, but most other jurisdictions are, and I think that has led to great resilience in the financial system, in the banking system, as we have seen with the COVID-19 shock and with the shock of the Ukrainian war. The Bank for International Settlements has echoing what I was saying about the violation by Russia of international norms for the first time that I'm aware of applied international sanctions on Russia, one of its members, one of the members also of the Financial Stability Board, showing the effectiveness of collective discipline in the system, I would argue. I'm not aware that the BIS had ever participated in international sanctions before, with the possible exception of freezing the assets of the Central Bank of Yugoslavia, but that was after Yugoslavia no longer existed. We also have seen that challenges to the international, economic and financial orders have not been very successful. I'm not going to expand on crypto these days. We don't see either from Russia or China in very different environments, attempts to, we don't see successful attempts to replace the basic infrastructure of the global financial system, agreements, messaging, SWIFT, the international transaction settlement through CLS group and infrastructures of the same nature. And finally, as Gabrielle has mentioned, we even have unprecedented progress, unfinished of course, in an area which until now had been completely immune to that kind of collective cooperation which is taxation with the efforts of the OECD, I can't finish business to say the least, but the fact that this has even been possible to initiate, I think, has to be taken as a step forward that has happened under difficult circumstances. And of course, the EU, the European Union, which I come from and which is the most advanced exercise in supranational economic and political cooperation, has been built on rejection of economic nationalism with coal and steel in the first place. Well, it has faced an existential crisis, but it has overcome it. Certainly, it has lost an important member, the United Kingdom, but on many parameters, it's now stronger than ever, and we've seen that with the next generation EU, a program of borrowing and spending, which is the first time on this scale that the EU has been able to finance itself on its own at the European level with redistribution among its countries. So, as I said, no complacency. We don't need to replace this system, and I think that echoes what Chaoyi just said. China is not asking for the replacement of the system. It's asking rightly for its reform and transformation. I'm talking about the official discourse of China here. One thing I will say, there have been many ideas already put forward for reform, and I'm not going to repeat things that have already been said. I will just say, as a European, I think Europeans have to be proactive in creating space for other jurisdictions in a changing world, maybe echoing what Aminata Tore was saying in the first panel. When you look at the things I focus most on, the BIS, the Basel Committee, the Financial Stability Board, Europeans are clearly massively overrepresented in that infrastructure. There's absolutely no reason that in the Basel Committee you would have seven individual countries of the eurozone represented individually together with the ECB. So that has to change. Europeans need to take the initiative and provide for more balanced representation, particularly of East Asia, but also of the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. Let me conclude on that. Thank you very much for this strong plea for the European to be less numerous, but as influential as they are, but less numerous in many of these groupings.