 Part 4, Section 8 of The Freedom of the Will by Jonathan Edwards. This LibriVox recording is in the public domain. Some further objections against the moral necessity of God's volitions considered. The author, last cited as, has been observed, owns that God, being perfectly wise, will constantly and certainly Jews what appears most fit, where there is a superior fitness and goodness in things, and that it is not possible for him to do otherwise. So that it is in effect confess that in those things where there is any real preferableness, it is no dishonor, nothing in any respect unworthy of God, for him to act from necessity, notwithstanding all that can be objected from the agreement of such a necessity with the fate of the Stoics and the necessity maintained by Mr. Hobbes, from which you will follow that if in all the different things among which God chooses there were ever more a superior fitness or preferableness on one side, then it would be no dishonor or anything unbecoming for God's will to be necessarily determined in everything. And if this be allowed, it is giving up entirely the argument from the unsuitableness of such a necessity to that liberty, supremacy, independence and glory of the divine being and resting the whole weight of the affair on the decision of another point, wholly diverse. Whether it be so indeed that in all the various possible things which are in God's view and may be considered as capable objects of his choice, there is not ever more a preferableness in one thing above another. This is denied by this author who supposes that in many instances between two or more possible things which come within the view of the divine mind, there is a perfect indifference and inequality as to fitness or tendency to attain any good end which God can have in view or to answer any of his designs. Now therefore I would consider whether this be evident. The arguments brought to prove this are of two kinds. One, it is urged that in many instances we must suppose there is absolutely no difference between various possible objects of choice which God has in view. And two, that the difference between many things is so inconsiderable or of such a nature that it would be unreasonable to suppose it to be of any consequence or to suppose that any of God's wise designs would not be answered in any one way as well as the other. Therefore one, the first thing to be considered is whether there are any instances wherein there is a perfect likeness and absolutely no difference between different objects of choice that are proposed to the divine understanding. And here in the first place it may be worthy to be considered whether the contradiction there is in the terms of the question proposed does not give reason to suspect that there is an inconsistence in the thing supposed. It is inquired whether different objects of choice may not be absolutely without difference. If they are absolutely without difference then how are they different objects of choice? If there be absolutely no difference in any respect then there is no variety or distinction. For distinction is only by some difference and if there be no variety among proposed objects of choice then there is no opportunity for variety of choice or difference of determination for that determination of a thing which is not different in any respect is not a different determination but the same that this is no quibble may appear more fully in a short time. The arguments to prove that the most high in some instances chooses to do one thing rather than another where the things themselves are perfectly without difference are two. One that the various parts of infinite time and space absolutely considered are perfectly alike and do not differ at all one from another and that therefore when God determined to create the world in such a part of infinite duration and space rather than others he determined and preferred among various objects between which there was no preferableness and absolutely no difference. Answer this objection supposes an infinite length of time before the world was created distinguished by successive parts properly and truly so or a succession of limited and unmeasurable periods of time following one another in an infinitely long series which must needs be a groundless imagination the eternal duration which was before the world being only the eternity of God's existence which is nothing else but is immediate perfect and invariable possession of the whole of his unlimited life together and at once we tie into the novelist total symbol at perfect possess you which is so generally allowed that I need not stand to demonstrate it. So this objection supposes an extent of space beyond the limits of the creation of an infinite length breadth and depth truly and properly distinguished into different measurable parts limited at certain stages one beyond another in an infinite series which notion of absolute and infinite space is doubtless as unreasonable as that now mentioned of absolute and infinite duration it is as improper to imagine that the immensity and omnipresence of God is distinguished by a series of miles and leagues one beyond another as that the infinite duration of God is distinguished by months and years one after another a diversity in order of distinct parts limited by certain periods is as conceivable and does this naturally obtrude itself on our imagination in one case is the other and there is equal reason in each case to suppose that our imagination deceives us it is equally improper to talk of months and years of the divine existence as a square miles of deity and we equally deceive ourselves when we talk of the world being differently fixed with respect to either of these sorts of measures I think we know not what we mean if we say the world might have been differently placed from what it is in the broad expanse of infinity or that it might have been differently fixed in the long line of eternity and all arguments and objections which are built on the imaginations we are apt to have of infinite extension or duration are buildings founded on shadows or castles in the air to the second argument to prove that the most high wills one thing rather than another without any superior fitness or preferableness in the thing preferred is God's actually placing in different parts of the world particles or atoms of matter that are perfectly equal and alike the four mentioned author says page 78 etc if one would descend to the minute specific particles of which different bodies are composed we should see abundant reason to believe that there are thousands of such little particles or atoms of matter which are perfectly equal and alike and could give no distinct determination to the will of God where to place them he their instances in particles of water of which there are such immense numbers which compose the rivers and oceans of this world and the infinite myriads of the luminous and fiery particles which compose the body of the sun so many that it would be very unreasonable to suppose no two of them should be exactly equal and the like answer one to this I answered that as we must suppose matter to be infinitely divisible it is very unlikely that any two of all these particles are exactly equal and alike so unlikely that it is a thousand to one yay and infinite number to one but it is otherwise and that although we should allow a great similarity between the different particles of water and fire as to their general nature and figure and however small we suppose those particles to be it is infinitely unlikely that any two of them should be exactly equal in dimensions and quantity of matter if we should suppose a great many globes of the same nature with the globe of the earth it would be very strange if there were any two of them that have exactly the same number of particles of dust and water in them but infinitely less strange than that two articles of light should have just the same quantity of matter for a particle of light according to the doctrine of the infinite divisibility of matter is composed of infinitely more assignable parts than there are particles of dust and water in the globe of the earth and as it is infinitely unlikely that any two of these particles should be equal so it is that they should be alike in other respects to instance in the configuration of their surfaces if there were very many globes of that nature of the earth it would be very unlikely that any two should have exactly the same number of particles of dust water and stone in their surfaces and all positive exactly like one with respect to another without any difference in any part discernible either by the naked eye or microscope but infinitely less strange than that two articles of light should be perfectly of the same figure but there are infinitely more assignable real parts on the surface of a particle of light than there are particles of dust water and stone on the surface of the terrestrial globe answer to but then supposing that there are two particles or atoms of matter perfectly equal and alike which God has placed in different parts of the creation as I will not deny it to be possible for God to make two bodies perfectly alike and put them in different places yet it will not follow that two different or distinct acts or effects of the divine power have exactly the same fitness for the same ends for these two different bodies are not different or distinct in any other respects than those wherein they differ they are to in no other respects than those wherein there is a difference if they are perfectly equal and alike in themselves then they can be distinguished or be distinct only in those things which are called circumstances as plays time rest motion or some other present or past circumstances or relations for it is difference only that constitutes distinction if God makes two bodies in themselves every way equal and alike and agreeing perfectly in all other circumstances and relations but only their place then in this only is there any distinction or duplicity the figure is the same the measure is the same the solidity and resistance are the same and everything the same but only this place therefore what the will of God determines is this that there should be the same figure the same extension the same resistance etc into different places and for this determination he has some reason there is some end for which such a determination act has a peculiar fitness above all other acts here is no one thing determined without an end and no one thing without a fitness for that end superior to anything else it would be the pleasure of God to cause the same resistance and the same figure to be in two different places and situations we can no more just the argue from it that here must be some determination or act of God's will that is holy without motive or end that we can argue that whenever in any case it is a man's will to speak the same words or make the same sounds at two different times there must be some determination or act of his will without any motive or end the difference of place in the former case proves no more than the difference of time does in the other if anyone should say with regard to the former case that there must be something determined without an end these that of those two similar bodies this in particular should be made in this place and the other in the other and should inquire why the creator did not make them in a transposition when both are alike in each would equally have suited either place the inquiry suppose is something that is not true namely that the two bodies differ and are distinct in other respects besides their place so that with this distinction inherent in them they might in their first creation have been transposed and each might have begun its existence in the place of the other let us for clearness sake suppose the God had at the beginning made two globes each of an inch diameter both perfect spheres and perfectly solid without pores and perfectly alike in every respect and place them near one to another one towards the right hand and the other towards the left without any difference as to time motion or rest past or present or any circumstance but only their place and the question should be asked why God in their creation placed them so why that which is made on the right hand was not made on the left and vice versa that it be well considered whether there be any sense in such a question and whether the inquiry does not suppose something false and absurd that it be considered what the creator must have done otherwise than he did what different act of will or power he must have exerted in order to the thing proposed all that could have been done would have been to have made two spheres perfectly alike in the same place as where he has made them without any difference of the things made either in themselves or in any circumstance so that the whole effect would have been without any difference and therefore just the same by the supposition the two spheres are different in no other respect but their place and therefore in other respects they are the same each has the same roundness it is not a distinct rotundity in any other respect but its situation there are also the same dimensions differing in nothing but their place and so of their resistance and everything else that belongs to them here if any chooses to say that there is a difference in another respect bees that they are not numerically the same that it is thus with all the qualities that belong to them that it is confessed they are in some respects the same that is they are both exactly like but yet numerically they differ thus the roundness of one is not the same numerical individual roundness with that of the other let this be supposed then the question about the determination of the divine will and the affair is why did God will that this individual roundness should be at the right hand and the other individual roundness at the left why did not he make them in a contrary position let any rational person consider whether such questions be not words without a meaning as much as if God should see fit for some ends to cause the same sounds to be repeated or made at two different times the sounds being perfectly the same in every other respect but only one was a minute after the other and it should be asked upon it why God caused these sounds numerically different to succeed one the other in such a manner why he did not make that individual sound which was in the first minute to be in the second and the individual sound of the last minute to be in the first which inquiries would be even ridiculous as I think every person must see in the case proposed of two sounds being only the same repeated absolutely without any difference but that one circumstance of time if the most high sees it will answer some good end that the same sound be made thunder at two distinct times and therefore wills that it should be so must it needs therefore be that here in there is some act of God's will without any motive or end God saw fit often at distinct times and on different occasions to say the very same words to Moses namely those I am Jehovah and would it not be unreasonable to infer as a certain consequence from this that here must be some act or acts of the divine will in determining and disposing the words exactly like at different times wholly without aim or inducement but it would be no more unreasonable than to say that there must be an act of God without any inducement if he sees it best and for some reasons determines that there shall be the same resistance the same dimensions and the same figure in several distinct places if in the instance of the two spheres perfectly alike it be supposed possible that God might have made them in a contrary position that which is made at the right hand being made at the left then I ask whether it is not evidently equally possible if God had made but one of them and that in the place of the right hand globe that he might have made that numerically different from what it is and numerically different from what he did make it though perfectly alike and in the same place and at the same time and in every respect in the same circumstances and relations namely whether he might not have made it numerically the same with that which he has now made at the left hand and so have left that which is now created at the right hand in a state of non-existence and if so whether it would not have been possible to have made one in that place perfectly like these and yet numerically differing from both and let it be considered whether from this notion of a numerical difference in bodies perfectly equal and alike which numerical difference is something inherent in the bodies themselves and diverse from the difference of place or time or any circumstance whatsoever it will not follow that there is an infinite number of numerically different possible bodies perfectly alike among which God chooses by a self-determining power when he goes about to create bodies therefore let us put the case thus supposing that God in the beginning had created but one perfectly solid sphere in a certain place and it should be inquired why God created that individual sphere in that place at that time and why did not create another sphere perfectly like it but numerically different in the same place at the same time or why he chose to bring into being there that very body rather than any of the infinite number of other bodies perfectly like it either of which he could have made there as well and would have answered his end as well why he caused to exist at that place and time that individual roundness rather than any other of the infinite number of individual rotundities just like it why that individual resistance rather than any other of the infinite number of possible resistances just like it and it might as reasonably be asked why when God first caused it to thunder he caused that individual sound then to be made and not another just like it why did he make choice of this very sound and reject all the infinite number of other possible sounds just like it but numerically differing from it and all differing one from another I think everybody must be sensible of the absurdity and nonsense of what is supposed in such inquiries and if we calmly attend to the matter we shall be convinced that all such kind of objections as I am answering are founded on nothing but the imperfection of our manner of conceiving things and the obscureness of language and great want of clearness and precision in the signification of terms if any should find fault with this reasoning that it is going a great length into metaphysical nice cities and subtleties I answer the objection to which they are a reply is a metaphysical subtlety and must be treated according to the nature of it too another thing alleged is that innumerable things which are determined by the divine will and chosen and done by God rather than others differ from those that are not chosen in so inconsiderable a manner that it would be unreasonable to suppose the difference to be of any consequence or that there is any superior fitness or goodness that God can have respect to in the determination to which I answer it is impossible for us to determine with any certainty or evidence that because the difference is very small and appears to us of no consideration therefore there is absolutely no superior goodness and no valuable and which can be proposed by the creator and governor of the world in ordering such a difference the forementioned author mentions many instances one is there being one atom in the whole universe more or less but I think it would be unreasonable to suppose that God made one atom in vain or without any end or motive he made not one atom but what was a work of his almighty power as much as the whole globe of the earth and requires as much of a constant exertion of almighty power to uphold it and was made and is upheld with understanding and design as much as if no other had been made but that and it would be as unreasonable to suppose that he made it without anything really aimed at in so doing as much as to suppose that he made the planet jupiter without aim or design it is possible that the most minute effects of the creator's power the smallest assignable difference between the things which God has made may be attended in the whole series of events and the whole compass and extent of their influence the very great and important consequences if the laws of motion and gravitation laid down by Sir Isaac Newton hold universally there is not one atom nor the least assignable part of an atom but what has influenced every moment throughout the whole material universe to cause every part to be otherwise then it would be if it were not for that particular corporeal existence and however the effect is insensible for the present yet it may in length of time become great and important to illustrate this let us suppose two bodies moving the same way in straight lines perfectly parallel one to another but to be diverted from this parallel course and drawn one from another as much as might be by the attraction of an atom at the distance of one of the furthest of the fixed stars from the earth these bodies being turned out of the lines of their parallel motion will by degrees get further and further distant one from the other and though the distance may be imperceptible for a long time yet at length it may become very great so the revolution of a planet around the sun being retarded or accelerated and the orbit of its revolution may greater or less and more or less elliptical and so its periodical time longer or shorter no more than maybe by the influence of the least atom might in length of time perform a whole revolution sooner or later than otherwise it would have done which might make a vast alteration with regard to millions of important events so the influence of the least particle may for all we know have such effect on something in the constitution of some human body has to cause another thought to arise in the mind at a certain time then otherwise would have been which in length of time yay and that not very great might occasion a vast alteration through the whole world of mankind and so innumerable other ways might be mentioned wherein the least assignable alteration may possibly be attended with great consequences another argument which the forementioned author brings against a necessary determination of a divine will by a superior fitness is that such doctrine derogates from the freeness of God's grace and goodness and choosing the objects of his favor and bounty and from the obligation upon men to thankfulness for special benefits page 89 etc in answer to this objection I would observe one that it derogates no more from the goodness of God to suppose the exercise of the benevolence of his nature to be determined by wisdom than to suppose it determined by chance and that his favors are bestowed all together as random his will being determined by nothing but perfect accident without any end or design whatsoever which must be the case as has been demonstrated if volition be not determined by a prevailing motive that which is owing to perfect contingence wherein neither previous inducement nor antecedent choice as any hand is not owing more to goodness or benevolence than that which is owing to the influence of a wise and to it is acknowledged that if the motive that determines the will of God in the choice of the objects of his favors be any moral quality in the object recommending that object to his benevolence above others is choosing that object is not so great a manifestation of a freeness and sovereignty of his grace as if it were otherwise but there is no necessity for supposing this in order to our supposing that he has some wise and in view in determining to bestow his favors on one person rather than another we are to distinguish between the merit of the object of God's favor or a moral qualification of the object attracting that favor and recommending to it and the natural fitness of such a determination of the act of God's goodness to answer some wise design of his own some end in the view of God's omniscience it is God's own act that is the proper and immediate object of his volition three I suppose that none will deny but that in some instances God acts from wise design in determining the particular subjects of his favors none will say I presume that when God distinguishes by his bounty particular societies or persons he never in any instance exercises any wisdom in so doing aiming at some happy consequence and if it be not denied to be so in some instances then I would inquire whether in these instances God's goodness is less manifested than in those where in God has no aim or end at all and whether the subjects have less cause of thankfulness and if so who shall be thankful for the bestowment of distinguishing mercy without enhancing circumstance of the distinction being made without an end how shall it be known when God is influenced by some wise aim and when not it is very manifest with respect to the apostle Paul that God had wise ends in choosing him to be a Christian and an apostle who had been a persecutor etc the apostle himself mentions one end 1st Timothy 1 15 16 Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners of whom I am chief how be it for this cause I obtained mercy that in me first Jesus Christ might show fourth all long suffering for a pattern to them who should hereafter believe on him to life everlasting but yet the apostle never looked on it as a diminution of the freedom and riches of divine grace in his election which he so often and so greatly magnifies this brings me to observe for our supposing such a moral necessity in the acts of God's will as has been spoken of is so far from necessarily derogating from the riches of God's grace to such as are the chosen objects of his favor that in many instances this moral necessity may arise from goodness and from the great degree of it God may choose this object rather than another as having a superior fitness to answer the ends designs and inclinations of his goodness being more sinful and so more miserable and necessitous than others the inclinations of infinite mercy and benevolence may be more gratified and the gracious design of God in sending his sin into the world may be more abundantly answered in the exercises of mercy towards such an object rather than another one thing more I would observe before I finish what I have to say on the head of the necessity of the acts of God's will and that is that something much more like a servile subjection of the divine being to fatal necessity will follow from Armenian principles than from the doctrines which they oppose for they at least most of them suppose with respect to all events that happen in the moral world depending on the volitions of moral agents which are the most important events of the universe to which all others are subordinate I say they suppose with respect to these that God has a certain foreknowledge of them and to see into any purposes or decrees of his about them and if so they have a fixed certain futurity prior to any designs or volitions of his and independent on them and to which his volitions must be subject as he would wisely accommodate his affairs to this fixed futurity of the state of things and the moral world so that here instead of a moral necessity of God's will arising from or consisting in the infinite perfection and blessedness of the divine being we have a fixed unalterable state of things properly distinct from the perfect nature of the divine mind and the state of the divine will and design and entirely independent on these things and which they have no hand in because they are prior to them and to which God's will is truly subject being obliged to conform or accommodate himself to it in all his purposes and decrees and in everything he does in his disposals and government of the world the moral world being the end of the natural so that all is in vain that is not accommodated to that state of the moral world which consists in or depends upon the acts and state of the wills of moral agents which had a fixed future rician from eternity such a subjection to necessity is this would truly argue and inferiority and servitude that would be unworthy of the supreme being and is much more agreeable to the notion which many of the heathen had a fate as above the gods than that moral necessity of fitness and wisdom which has been spoken up and is truly repugnant to the absolute sovereignty of God and inconsistent with the supremacy of his will and really subjects the will of the most high to the will of his creatures and brings him into dependence upon them in the part four section eight part four section nine of the freedom of the will by Jonathan Edwards this LibriVox recording is in the public domain concerning that objection against the doctrine which has been maintained that it makes God the author of sin it is urged by Armenians that the doctrine of the necessity of men's volitions or their necessary connection with antecedent events and circumstances makes the first cause and supreme order of all things the author of sin in that he has so constituted the state and course of things that sinful volitions become necessary in consequence of his disposal Dr. Whitby in his discourse on the freedom of the will cites one of the ancients as on his side declaring that this opinion of the necessity of the will absolves sinners as doing nothing of their own accord which was evil and would cast all the blame of all the wickedness committed in the world upon God and upon his providence if that were admitted by the assertors of this fate whether he himself did necessitate them to do these things or ordered matters so that they should be constrained to do them by some other cause and the doctor says in another place in the nature of a thing and in the opinion of philosophers Causa deficiens in Rebus Nick Sarius adcausen per se eficientem raducenda est in things necessary the deficient cause must be reduced to the efficient and in this case the reason is evident because the not doing what is required for not avoiding what is forbidden being a defect must follow from the position of the necessary cause of that deficiency concerning this I would observe the following things one if there be any difficulty in this matter it is nothing peculiar to this scheme it is no difficulty or disadvantage wherein it is distinguished from the scheme of Armenians and therefore not reasonably objected by them Dr. Whitby supposes that if sin necessarily follows from God withholding assistance where that assistance be not given which is absolutely necessary to the avoiding of evil then in the nature of the thing God must be as properly the author of that evil as if he were the efficient cause of it from whence according to what he himself says of the devils and damn spirits God must be the proper author of their perfect unrestrained wickedness he must be the efficient cause of the great pride of the devils never their perfect malignity against God Christ his saints and all that is good and of the insatiable cruelty of their disposition for he allows that God has so forsaken them does so withhold his assistance from them that they are incapacitated from doing good and determined only to evil our doctrine in its consequence makes God the author of men's sin in this world no more and in no other sense than his doctrine in its consequence makes God the author of the hellish pride and malice of the devils and doubtless the latter is as odious and effect as the former again if it will follow at all that God is the author of sin from what has been supposed of a sure and infallible connection between antecedence and consequence it will follow because of this bees that for God to be the author or orderer of those things which he knows beforehand will infallibly be attended with such a consequence is the same thing in effect as for him to be the author of that consequence but if this be so this is a difficulty which equally attends the doctrine of armenians themselves at least of those of them who allow God's certain foreknowledge of all events from the supposition of such foreknowledge this is the case with respect to every sin that is committed God knew that if he ordered and brought to pass such and such events such sins would infallibly follow as for instance God certainly foreknew long before Judas was born that if he ordered things so that there should be such a man born at such a time and at such a place and that his life should be preserved and that he should in divine providence be led into acquaintance with Jesus and that his heart should be so influenced by God's spirit or providence as to be inclined to be a follower of Christ and that he should be one of those 12 which should be chosen constantly to attend him as his family and that his health should be preserved so that he should go up to Jerusalem at the last Passover in Christ's life and it should be so ordered that Judas should see Christ's kind treatment of the woman which anointed him at Bethany and that that reproof from Christ which he had at that time and see and hear other things which excited his enmity against his master and other circumstances should be ordered as they were ordered it would most certainly and infallibly follow that Judas would betray his lord and would soon after hang himself and die in penitent and be sent to hell for his horrid wickedness therefore this supposed difficulty ought not to be brought as an objection against the scheme which has been maintained as disagreeing with the Armenian scheme seeing it is no difficulty owing to such a disagreement but a difficulty we're in the Armenians share with us that must be unreasonably made an objection against our differing from them which we should not escape or avoid at all by agreeing with them and therefore I would observe to they who object that this doctor makes God the author of sin ought distinctly to explain what they mean by that phrase the author of sin I know the phrase as it is commonly used signifies something very ill if by the author of sin be met the sinner the agent or actor of sin or the doer of a wicked thing so it would be a reproach and blasphemy to suppose God to be the author of sin in this sense I utterly deny God to be the author of sin rejecting such an imputation on the most high as what is infinitely to be afford and deny any such thing to be the consequence of what I have laid down but if by the author of sin is meant the permitter or not a hinderer of sin and at the same time a disposer of the state of events in such a manner for wise holy and most excellent ends and purposes that sin if it be permitted or not hindered will most certainly and infallibly follow I say if this be all that is meant by being the author of sin I do not deny that God is the author of sin though I dislike and reject the phrase as that which by use and custom is that to carry another sense it is no reproach for the most high to be thus the author of sin this is not to be the actor of sin but on the contrary of holiness what God doth hear in is holy and a glorious exercise of the infinite excellency of his nature and I do not deny that God being thus the author of sin follows from what I have laid down and I assert that it equally follows from the doctrine which is maintained by most of the Armenian divines that it is most certainly so that God is in such a manner the disposer and order of sin is evident if any credit is to be given to the scripture as well as because it is impossible in the nature of things to be otherwise in such a manner God ordered the obstinacy of Pharaoh in his refusing to obey God's commands to let the people go Exodus 4 21 I will harden his heart and he shall not let the people go chapter seven two through five Aaron thy brother shall speak under Pharaoh that he send the children of Israel out of his land and I will harden Pharaoh's heart and multiply my signs and my wonders in the land of Egypt but Pharaoh shall not hearken unto you but I may lay mine hand upon Egypt by great judgments etc chapter 9 12 and the Lord hardened the heart of Pharaoh and he hearken not unto them as the Lord had spoken unto Moses chapter 10 1 2 and the Lord said unto Moses go in unto Pharaoh for I have hardened his heart and the heart of his servants that I might show these my signs before him and that thou mayest tell it in the ears of thy son and thy son son what things I have wrought in Egypt and my signs which I have done amongst them that ye may know that I am the Lord chapter 14 4 and I will harden Pharaoh's heart that he shall follow after them and I will be honored upon Pharaoh and upon all his hosts verse 8 and the Lord hardened the heart of Pharaoh king of Egypt and he pursued after the children of Israel and it is certain that in such a manner God for wise and good ends ordered that event Joseph being sold into Egypt by his brethren Genesis 45 5 now therefore be not grieve nor angry with yourselves that ye sold me hither for God did send me before you to preserve life verse 7 8 God did send me before you to preserve a posterity in the earth and to save your lives by a great deliverance so that now it was not you that sent me hither but God Psalms 107 17 he sent a man before them even Joseph who was sold for a servant it is certain that thus God ordered the sin and folly of Sihon king of the Amorites and refusing to let the people of Israel pass by him peaceably Deuteronomy 230 but Sihon king of Heshban would not let us pass by him for the Lord thy God hardened his spirit and made his heart obstinate that he might deliver him into thine hand it is certain that God thus ordered the sin and folly of the kings of Canaan that they attempted not to make peace with Israel but with a stupid boldness and obstinacy set themselves violently to oppose them and their God Joshua 1120 for it was of the Lord to harden their hearts that they should come against Israel in battle that he might destroy them utterly and that they might have no favor but that he might destroy them as the Lord commanded Moses it is evident that thus God ordered the treacherous rebellion of Setakai against the king of Babylon Jeremiah 52 3 4 through the anger of the Lord it came to pass in Jerusalem and Judah until he had cast them out from his presence that Setakai rebelled against the king of Babylon so second Kings 24 20 and it is exceeding manifest that God thus ordered the repine and unrighteous ravages of Nebuchadnezzar in spoiling and ruining the nation's roundabout Jeremiah 25 9 behold I will send and take all the families of the north say of the Lord and Nebuchadnezzar my servant and will bring them against this land and against all the nations roundabout and will utterly destroy them and make them an astonishment and then hissing and perpetual desolations chapter 43 10 11 I will send and take Nebuchadnezzar the king of Babylon my servant and I will set his throne upon these stones that I've hid and he shall spread his royal pavilion over them and when he cometh he shall smite the land of Egypt and deliver such as are for death to death and such as are for captivity to captivity and such as are for the sword to the sword thus God represents himself as sending for Nebuchadnezzar and taking him and his armies and bringing him against the nations which were to be destroyed by him to that very end that he might utterly destroy them and make them desolate and as appointing the work that he should do so particularly that the very persons were designed that he should kill with the sword and those that should be killed with famine and pestilence and those that should be carried into captivity and that in doing all these things he should act as his servant by which less cannot be intended than that he should serve his purposes and designs and in Jeremiah 27 4 through 6 God declares how he would cause him thus to serve his designs bees by bringing this to pass in his sovereign disposals as the great possessor and governor of the universe that disposes all things just as pleases him thus saith the Lord of hosts the God of Israel I have made the earth the man and the beast that are upon the ground by my great power and my stretched out arm and have given it down to whom it seemed meet unto me and now I have given all these lands into the hands of Nebuchadnezzar my servant and the beast of the field have I given also to serve him and Nebuchadnezzar is spoken of as doing these things by having his arms strengthened by God and having God's sword put into his hands for this end Ezekiel 30 24 25 26 yet God speaks of his terribly ravaging and wasting the nations and cruelly destroying all sorts without distinction of sex or age as the weapon in God's hand and the instrument of his indignation which God makes use of to fulfill his own purposes and execute his own vengeance Jeremiah 51 20 etc. Thou art my battle acts and weapons of war for with thee will I break in pieces the nations and with thee I will destroy kingdoms and with thee I will break in pieces the horse and his rider and with thee I will break in pieces the chariot and his rider with thee also will I break in pieces man and woman and with thee I will break in pieces holding young and with thee will I break in pieces the young man and the maid etc. It is represented that the designs of Nebuchadnezzar and those that destroy Jerusalem never could have been accomplished had not God determined them. Lamentations 3 37 who is he that saith and it cometh to pass and the Lord commandeth it not and yet the king of Babylon thus destroying the nations and especially the Jews has spoken of as his great wickedness for which God finally destroyed him. Isaiah 14 4 through 6 12 Habakkuk 2 5 through 12 and Jeremiah chapter 50 and 51 it is most manifest that God to serve his own designs providentially ordered Jimmy's cursing of David 2 Samuel 16 10 11 the Lord hath said unto him curse David let him curse for the Lord hath bitten him it is certain that God thus for excellence holy gracious ends ordered the fact which they committed who were concerned in Christ's death and that therein they did but fulfill God's designs as I trust no Christian will deny it was the design of God that Christ should be crucified in that for this end he came into the world it is very manifest by many scriptures that the whole affair of Christ's crucifixion with its circumstances and the treachery of Judas that made way for it was ordered in God's providence and pursuance of his purpose notwithstanding the violence that is used with those plain scriptures to obscure and pervert the sense of them acts to 23 him being delivered by the determinant counsel and foreknowledge of God you have taken them with wicked hands have crucified in slain Luke 22 21 22 but behold the hand of him that betrayeth me is with me on the table and truly the son of man goeth as it was determined acts for 27 28 for of a truth against the holy child Jesus whom thou hast anointed both Herod and Pontius Pilate with the Gentiles and the people of Israel were gathered together for to do whatsoever thy hand and thy counsel determined before to be done acts 3 17 18 and now brethren I want that through ignorance he did it as did also your rulers but these things which God before had showed by the mouth of all his prophets that Christ should suffer he has so fulfilled so that what these murders of Christ did is spoken of as what God brought to pass or ordered and that by which he fulfilled his own word in revelations 17 17 the agreeing of the kings of the earth to give their kingdom to the beast though it was a very wicked thing and then is spoken up as fulfilling God's will and what God had put into their hearts to do it is manifest that God sometimes permits him to be committed and at the same time orders things so that if he permits the fact it will come to pass because on some accounts he sees it needful and of importance that it should come to pass Matthew 18 7 it must needs be that offenses come but woe to that man by whom the offense cometh with first Corinthians 11 19 for there must also be heresies among you that they which are approved may be made manifest among you thus it is certain and demonstrable from the holy scriptures as well as the nature of things and the principles of our meetings that God permits sin and at the same time so orders things in his providence that is certainly and infallibly will come to pass in consequence of his permission I proceed to observe in the next place three that there is a great difference between God being concerned thus by his permission in an event enact which in the inherent subject and agent of it is sin though the event will certainly follow on his permission and his being concerned in it by producing it and exerting the act of sin or between his being the order of its certain existence by not hindering it under certain circumstances and as being the proper actor or author of it by a positive agency or efficiency and this notwithstanding what doctor Whitby offers about a saying of philosophers that causa deficiens in rebus neccesarius causing per say a fichientum as as there is a vast difference between the sun being the cause of the lightsomeness and warmth of the atmosphere and the brightness of gold and diamonds by its presence and positive influence and it's being the occasion of darkness and frost in the night by its motion whereby it descends below the horizon the motion of the sun is the occasion of the latter kind of events but it is not the proper cause efficient or producer of them though they are necessarily consequent on that motion under sub circumstances no more is any action of the divine being the cause of the evil of men's wills if the sun were the proper cause of cold and darkness it would be the fountain of these things as it is the fountain of light and heat and then something might be argued from the nature of cold and darkness to a likeness of nature in the sun and it might be justly inferred that the sun itself is dark and cold and that his beams are black and frosty but from its being the cause no otherwise than by its departure no such thing can be inferred but the contrary it may justly be argued that the sun is a bright and hot body if cold and darkness are found to be the consequence of its withdrawment and the more constantly and necessarily these effects are connected with and confined to its absence the more strongly does it argue the sun to be the fountain of light and heat so in as much as sin is not the fruit of any positive agency or influence of the most high but on the contrary arises from the withholding of his action and energy and under certain circumstances necessarily follows on the want of his influence this is no argument that he is sinful or his operation evil or has anything of the nature of evil but on the contrary that he and his agency are altogether good and holy and that he is the fountain of all holiness it would be strange arguing indeed because men never commit sin but only when god leaves them to themselves and necessarily sin when he does so that therefore their sin is not from themselves but from god and so that god must be a sinful being as strange as it would be to argue because it is always dark when the sun is gone and never dark when the sun is present that therefore all darkness is from the sun and that his disc and beams must needs be black for it properly belongs to the supreme and absolute governor of the universe to order all important events within his dominion by his wisdom but the events in the moral world are of the most important kinds such as the moral actions of intelligent creatures and their consequences these events will be ordered by something they will either be disposed by wisdom or they will be disposed by chance that is they will be disposed by blind and undesigning causes if that were possible and could be called a disposal is it not better that the good and evil which happened in god's world should be ordered regulated bounded and determined by the good pleasure of an infinitely wise being who perfectly comprehends within his understanding and constant view the universality of things in all their extent and duration and sees all the influence of every event with respect to every individual thing in circumstance throughout the grand system and the whole of the eternal series of consequences than to leave these things to fall out by chance and to be determined by those causes which have no understanding or aim doubtless in these important events there is a better and a worse as to the time subject place manner and circumstances of their coming to pass with regard to their influence on the state and course of things and if there be it is certainly best that they should be determined to that time place etc which is best and therefore it is in its own nature fit that wisdom and not chance should order these things so that it belongs to the being who is the possessor of infinite wisdom it is the creator and owner of the whole system of creative existences and as the caravan I say it belongs to him to take care of this matter and he would not do what is proper for him if he should neglect it and it is so far from being unholy in him to undertake this affair then it would rather have been unholy to neglect it as it would have been a neglecting what fitly appertains to him and so it would have been a very unfit and unsuitable neglect therefore the sovereignty of god doubtless extends to this matter especially considering that if god should leave men's volitions and all moral events to the determination and disposition of blind unmeaning causes or they should be left to happen perfectly without a cause this would be no more consistent with liberty in any notion of it and particularly not in the Armenian notion of it than if these events were subject to the disposal of divine providence and the will of man were determined by circumstances which are ordered and disposed by divine wisdom as appears by what has been already observed but it is evident that such a providential disposing and determining of men's moral actions though it infers a moral necessity of those actions yet it does not in the least infringe the real liberty of mankind the only liberty that common sense teaches to be necessary to moral agency which as has been demonstrated is not inconsistent with such necessity on the whole it is manifest that god may be in the manner which has been described the order and disposer of that event which in the inherent subject and agent is moral evil and yet is so doing may be no moral evil he may will the disposal of such an event and is coming to pass for good ends and his will not be anymore or sinful will but a perfect holy will and he may actually in his providence so dispose and permit things that the event may be certainly an infallibly connected with such disposal and permission and his act there and not be anymore or unholy but a perfectly holy act sin may be an evil thing and yet that there should be such a disposal and permission as that it should come to pass may be a good thing this is no contradiction or inconsistence joseph's brethren selling him into egypt considered only as it were acted by them and with respect to their views and aims which were evil was a very bad thing but it was a good thing as it was an event of god's ordering and considered with respect to his views and aims which were good genesis 50 20 as for you ye thought evil against me but god meant it unto good so the crucifixion of christ if we consider only those things which belong to the event as it proceeded from his murderers and are comprehended within the compass of the affair considered as their act their principles dispositions views and aims so it was one of the most heinous things that ever was done in many respects the most horrid of all acts but consider it as it was willed in order of god in the extent of his designs and views it was the most admirable and glorious of all events and god willing the event was the most holy volition of god that ever was made known to men and god's act in ordering it was a divine act which above all others manifests the moral excellency of the divine being the consideration of these things may help us to a sufficient answer to the cavals of armenians concerning what has been supposed by many calvinists of a distinction between a secret and revealed will of god and their diversity one from the other supposing that the calvinists herein ascribe inconsistent wills to the most high which is without any foundation god's secret and revealed will or in other words his disposing and precepted will may be diverse and exercised into similar acts the one in disapproving and opposing the other and willing and determining without any inconsistence because although these dissimilar exercises of the divine will may in some respects relate to the same things yet in strictness they have different and contrary objects the one evil and the other good thus for instance the crucifixion of christ was a thing contrary to the revealed or preceptive will of god because as it was viewed and done by his malignant murderers it was a thing infinitely contrary to the holy nature of god and so necessarily contrary to the holy inclination of his heart revealed in his law yet this does not at all hinder but that the crucifixion of christ considered with all those glorious consequences which were within the view of the divine omniscience might be indeed and therefore might appear to god to be a glorious event and consequently be agreeable to his will though this will may be secret that is not revealed in god's law and thus consider the crucifixion of christ was not evil but good if the secret exercises of god's will were of a kind that is dissimilar and contrary to his revealed will respecting the same or like objects if the objects of both were good or both evil then indeed to describe contrary kinds of volition or inclination to god respecting these objects would be to describe an inconsistent will to god but to describe to him different and opposite exercises of heart respecting different objects and objects contrary one to another is so far from supposing god's will to be inconsistent with itself then it cannot be supposed consistent with itself any other way for any being to have a will of choice respecting good and at the same time a will of rejection and refusal respecting evil is to be very consistent but the contrary means to have the same will towards these contrary objects and to choose and love both good and evil at the same time is to be very inconsistent there is no inconsistence in supposing that god may hate a thing as it is in itself and considered simply as evil and yet that it may be his will it should come to pass considering all consequences I believe there is no person of good understanding who will venture to say he is certain that it is impossible it should be best taking in the whole compass and extent of existence and all consequences in the end of the series of events that there should be such a thing as moral evil in the world and if so it will certainly follow that an infinitely wise being who always chooses what is best must choose that there should be such a thing and if so then such a choice is not evil but a wise and holy choice and if so then the providence which is agreeable to such a choice is a wise and holy providence mendu will sin as sin and so are the authors and actors of it they love it as sin and for evil ends and purposes god does not will sin as sin or for the sake of anything evil though it be his pleasure so to order things that he permitting sin will come to pass for the sake of the great good that why his disposal shall be the consequence is willing to order things so that evil should come to pass for the sake of the contrary good is no argument that he does not hate evil as evil and if so then it is no reason why he may not reasonably forbid evil as evil and punish it as such the armenians themselves must be obliged whether they will or no to allow a distinction of god's will amounting to just the same thing that calvinists intend by their distinction of a secret and revealed will they must allow a distinction of those things which god thinks best should be considering all circumstances and consequences and so are agreeable to his disposing will and those things which he loves and are agreeable to his nature in themselves considered who is there that will dare to say that the hellish pride malice and cruelty of devils are agreeable to god and what he likes and approves and yet i trust there is no christian divine but will allow that it is agreeable to god's will so to order and dispose things concerning them so to leave them to themselves and give them up to their own wickedness that this perfect wickedness should be a necessary consequence dr whitby's words plainly suppose and allow it these following things may be laid down as maxims the plain truth and indisputable evidence one that god is a perfectly happy being in the most absolute and highest sense possible two that it will follow from hence that god is free from everything that is contrary to happiness and so that in strict propriety of speech there is no such thing as any pain grief or trouble in god three when any intelligent being is really crossed and disappointed and things are contrary to what he truly desires he is the less pleased or has less pleasure his pleasure and happiness is diminished and he suffers what is disagreeable to him or is the subject of something that is of a nature contrary to joy and happiness even pain and grief from this last axiom it follows that if no distinction is to be admitted between god's hatred of sin and his will with respect to the event and the existence of sin as the all wise determinant of all events under the view of all consequences through the whole compass and series of things i say then it certainly follows that the coming to pass of every individual act of sin is truly all things considered contrary to his will and that his will is really crossed in it and this in proportion as he hates it and his god's hatred of sin is infinite by reason of the infinite contrarity of his holy nature to sin so his will is infinitely crossed in every act of sin that happens which is as much as to say he endures that which is infinitely disagreeable to him by means of every act of sin that he sees committed and therefore as appears by the preceding positions he endures truly and really infinite grief or pain from every sin and so he must be infinitely crossed and suffer infinite pain every day in millions of millions of instances he must continually be the subject of an immense number of real and truly infinitely great crosses and vexations which would be to make him infinitely the most miserable of all beings if any objector should say all that these things amount to is that god may do evil that good may come which is justly esteemed immoral and sinful and men and therefore it may be justly esteemed inconsistent with the moral perfections of god i answer that for god to dispose and permit evil in the manner that has been spoken of is not to do evil that good may come for it is not to do evil at all in order to a thing being morally evil there must be one of these things belonging to it either it must be a thing unfit and unsuitable in its own nature or it must have a bad tendency or it must proceed from an evil disposition and be done for an evil end but neither of these things can be attributed to god's ordering and permitting such events as the immoral acts of creatures for good ends one it is not unfit in its own nature that he should do so for it is in its own nature fit that infinite wisdom and not blind chant should dispose moral good and evil in the world and it is fit that the being who has infinite wisdom and is the maker owner and supreme governor of that world should take care of that matter and therefore there is no unfitness or unsuitable unless and is doing it it may be unfit and so immoral for any other beings to go about to order this affair because they are not possessed about wisdom that in any manner fits them for it and in other respects they are not fit to be trusted with this affair nor does it belong to them they not being the owners and lords of the universe we need not be afraid to affirm that if a wise and good man knew with absolute certainty it would be best all things considered that there should be such a thing is moral evil in the world it would not be contrary to his wisdom and goodness for him to choose that it should be so it is no evil desire to desire good and to desire that which all things considered is best and it is no unwise choice to choose that that should be which it is best should be and to choose the existence of that thing concerning which this is known these that it is best it should be and so is known in the whole to be most worthy to be chosen on the contrary it would be a plain defect in wisdom and goodness for him not to choose it and the reason why he might not order it if he were able would not be because he might not desire it but only the ordering of that matter does not belong to him but it is no harm for him who is by right and in the greatest propriety the supreme order of all things to order everything in such a manner as it would be a point of wisdom in him to choose that they should be ordered if it would be a plain defect of wisdom and goodness in a being not to choose that that should be which he certainly knows it would all things considered be best should be as was but now observed then it must be impossible for a being who has no defective wisdom and goodness to do otherwise than choose it should be and that for this very reason because he's perfectly wise and good and if it be agreeable to perfect wisdom and goodness for him to choose that it should be and the ordering of all things supremely and perfectly belongs to him it must be agreeable to infinite wisdom and goodness to order that it should be if the choice is good the ordering and disposing things according to that choice must also be good it could be no harm in one to whom it belongs to do his will in the armies of heaven and amongst the inhabitants of the earth to execute a good volition if this will be good and the object of his will be all things considered good and best then the choosing or willing it is not willing evil that good may come and if so then his ordering according to that will is not doing evil that good may come to it is not of a bad tendency for the supreme being thus to order and permit that moral evil to be which it is best should come to pass for that it is of good tendency is the very thing supposed in the point now in question christ crucifixion though a most hard fact in them that perpetrated it was a most glorious tendency as permitted and ordered of god three nor is there any need of supposing it proceeds from any evil disposition or aim for by the supposition what is aimed at is good and good is the actual issue in the final result of things end of part four section nine part four section ten of the freedom of the will by jonathan edwards this libre box recording is in the public domain concerning sins first entrance into the world the things which have already been offered may serve to obviate or clear many of the objections which might be raised concerning sins first coming into the world as though it would follow from the doctrine maintained that god must be the author of the first sin through his so disposing things that it should necessarily follow from his permission that the sinful act should be committed etc i need not therefore stand to repeat what has been said already about such a necessity not proving god to be the author of sin in any ill sense or in any such sense as to infringe any liberty of man concerned in his moral agency or capacity of blame guilt and punishment but should it nevertheless be said that if god when he had made man might so order his circumstances that from these together with his withholding further assistance in divine influence his sin would infallibly follow why might not god as well have first made man with a fixed prevailing principle of sin in his heart i answer one it was meat if sin did come into existence and appear in the world it should arise from the imperfection which properly belongs to a creature as such and should appear so to do that it might appear not to be from god as the efficient or fountain but this could not have been if man had been made at first with sin in his heart nor unless the abiding principle and habit of sin were first introduced by an evil act of the creature if sin had not arisen from the imperfection of the creature it would not have been so visible but it did not arise from god as the positive cause and real source of it but it would require room that cannot be here allowed fully to consider all the difficulties which have been started concerning the first entrance of sin into the world and therefore too i would observe that objections against the doctrine that has been laid down in opposition to the armenian notion of liberty from these difficulties are altogether impertinent because no additional difficulty is incurred by adhering to a scheme in this manner differing from theirs and none would be removed or avoided by agreeing with and maintaining theirs nothing that the armenians say about the contingents or self-determining power of man's will can serve to explain with less difficulty how the first sinful volition of mankind could take place and man be justly charged with the blame of it do you say the will was self-determined or determined by free choice in that sinful volition which is to say that the first sinful volition was determined by a foregoing sinful volition is no solution of the difficulty it is an odd way of solving difficulties to advance greater in order to it to say two and two make nine or that a child begat his father solves no difficulty no more does it to say the first sinful act of choice was before the first sinful act of choice and chose and determined it and brought it to pass nor is it any better solution to say the first sinful volition chose determined and produced itself which is to say it was before it was nor will it go any further towards helping us over the difficulty to say the first sinful volition arose accidentally without any cause at all any more than it will solve that difficult question how the world could be made out of nothing to say it came into being out of nothing without any cause as has been already observed and if we should allow that the first evil volition should arise by perfect accident without any cause it would relieve no difficulty about god laying the blame of it to man for how was man to blame for perfect accident which had no cause and which therefore he was not the cause of any more than if it came by some external cause such kind of solutions are no better than if some person going about to solve some of the strange mathematical paradoxes about infinitely great and small quantities as that some infinitely great quantities are infinitely greater than some other infinitely great quantities and also that some infinitely small quantities are infinitely less than others which yet are infinitely little should say that mankind have been under a mistake in supposing a greater quantity to exceed a smaller and that a hundred multiplied by ten makes but a single unit end of part four section 10 part four section 11 of the freedom of the will by jonathan edwards this Lieber vox recording is in the public domain of a supposed inconsistence between these principles and god's moral character the things which have been already observed may be sufficient to answer most of the objections and silence the great exclamations of Armenians against the Calvinists from the supposed inconsistence of Calvinistic principles with the moral perfections of God as exercised in his government of mankind the consistency of such a doctrine of necessity as has been maintained with the fitness and reasonableness of God's commands promises and threatenings rewards and punishments has been particularly considered the cavals of our opponents as though our doctrine of necessity may God the author of sin have been answered and also their objections against these principles as inconsistent with God's sincerity in his councils invitations and persuasions has been already obviated in what has been observed respecting the consistency of what Calvinists suppose concerning the secret and revealed will of God by that it appears there is no repugnance in supposing it may be the secret will of God that his ordination and permission of events should be such that it shall be a certain consequence that a thing never will come to pass which yet it is man's duty to do and so God's perceptive will that he should do and this is the same thing as to say God may sincerely command and require him to do it and if he may be sincere in commanding him he may for the same reason be sincere in counseling inviting and using persuasions with him to do it councils and invitations are manifestations of God's preceptive will or of what God loves and what is in itself and as man's act agreeable to his heart and not of his disposing will and what he chooses as a part of his own infinite scheme of things it has been particularly shown part three section four that such a necessity as has been maintained is not inconsistent with the propriety and fitness of divine commands and for the same reason not inconsistent with the sincerity of invitations and councils in the corollary at the end of that section yet it has been shown part three section seven corollary one that this objection of Armenians concerning the sincerity and use of divine exhortations invitations and councils is demonstrably against themselves notwithstanding I would further observe that the difficulty of reconciling the sincerity of councils invitations and persuasions with such an antecedent known fixedness of all events as has been supposed is not peculiar to the scheme as distinguished from that of the generality of Armenians which acknowledge the absolute foreknowledge of God and therefore it would be unreasonably brought as an objection against my differing from them the main seeming difficulty in the case is this that God in counseling inviting and persuading makes a show of aiming at seeking and using endeavors for the thing exhorted and persuaded to whereas it is impossible for any intelligent being truly to seek or use endeavors for a thing which he at the same time knows most perfectly will not come to pass and that it is absurd to suppose he makes the obtaining of a thing his end in his calls and councils which he at the same time infallibly knows will not be obtained by these means. Now if God knows this in the utmost certainty and perfection the way by which he comes by this knowledge makes no difference if he knows it is by the necessity which he sees in things or by some of the means it alters not the case but it is in effect allowed by Armenians themselves that God's inviting and persuading men to do things which he at the same time certainly knows will not be done is no evidence of insincerity because they allow that God has a certain foreknowledge of all sinful actions and omissions and as this is implicitly allowed by most Armenians so all that pretend to own the scriptures to be the word of God must be constrained to allow it. God commanded and counseled Pharaoh to let his people go and use arguments and persuasions to induce him to it. He laid before him arguments taken from his infinite greatness and almighty power Exodus 7 16 and forewarned him of the fatal consequences of his refusal from time to time chapter 8 1 2 2021 9 1 through 5 13 through 17 and 10 3 6 he commanded Moses and the elders of Israel to go and beseech Pharaoh to let the people go and at the same time told them he knew surely that he would not comply with it. Exodus 3 18 19 and thou shalt come thou and the elders of Israel unto the king of Egypt and you shall say unto him the Lord God of the Hebrews hath met with us and now let us go we beseech thee three days journey into the wilderness that we may sacrifice unto the Lord our God and I'm sure that the king of Egypt will not let you go. So our blessed Savior the evening wherein he was betrayed knew that Peter would shamefully deny him before the morning for he declares it to him with us aberrations to show the certainty of it and tells the disciples that all of them should be offended because of him that night. Matthew 26 31 through 35 John 13 38 Luke 22 31 through 34 John 16 32 and yet it was their duty to avoid these things they were very sinful things which God had forbidden in which it was their duty to watch and pray against and they were obliged to do so from the councils and persuasions Christ used with them at that very time so to do. Matthew 26 41 watch and pray that ye enter not into temptation so that whatever difficulty there can be in this matter it can be no objection against any principles which have been maintained in opposition to the principles of Armenians nor does it any more concern me to remove the difficulty than it does them or indeed all that call themselves Christians and acknowledge the divine authority of the scriptures nevertheless this matter may possibly God allowing be more particularly and largely considered in some future discourse on the doctrine of predestination but I would here observe that however the defenders of that notion of liberty which I have opposed exclaim against the doctrine of Calvinists as tending to bring men into doubts concerning the moral perfections of God it is their scheme and not the scheme of Calvinists that indeed is justly chargeable with this for it is one of their most fundamental points that are freedom of will consisting in self-determination without all necessity is essential to moral agency this is the same thing as to say that such a determination of the will without all necessity must be in all intelligent beings in those things wherein they are moral agents or in their moral acts and from this it will follow that God's will is not necessarily determined in anything he does as a moral agent or in any of his acts that are of a moral nature so that in all things wherein he acts holily just then truly he does not act necessarily or as well as not necessarily determined to act holily and justly because if it were necessarily determined he would not be a moral agent in this acting his will would be attended with necessity which they say is inconsistent with moral agency he can act no otherwise he is at no liberty in the affair he is determined by unavoidable invincible necessity therefore such agency is no moral agency yet no agency at all properly speaking a necessary agent is no agent he being passive and subject to necessity what he does is no act of his but in effect of a necessity prior to any act of his this is agreeable to their manner of arguing now then what has become of all our proof of the moral perfections of God how can we prove that God certainly will in any one instance do that which is dust and holy seeing his will is determined in the matter by no necessity we have no other way of proving that anything certainly will be but only by the necessity of the event where we can see no necessity but that the thing may be or may not be there we are unavoidably left at a loss we have no other way properly and truly to demonstrate the moral perfections of God but the way the mr chubb proves them page 252 261 to 263 of his tracks these that God must necessarily perfectly know what is most worthy and valuable in itself which in the nature of things is best and fittest to be done and as this is most eligible in itself he being omniscient must see it to be so and being both omniscient and self-sufficient cannot have any temptation to reject it and so must necessarily will that which is best and thus by this necessity of the determination of God's will to what is good and best we demonstrably established God's moral character corollary from what has been observed it appears that most of the arguments from scripture which are minions make use of to support their scheme are no other than begging the question for in these they determine in the first place that without such a freedom of will as they hold men cannot be proper moral agents nor the subjects of command council persuasion invitation promises threatenings expostulations rewards and punishments and that without such freedom it is to no purpose for men to take any care or use any diligence endeavors or means in order to their avoiding sin or becoming holy escaping punishment or obtaining happiness and having supposed these things which are grand things in question in the debate then they heap up scriptures containing commands councils calls warnings persuasions expostulations promises and threatenings as doubtless they may find enough such the Bible being confessively full of them from the beginning to the end and then they glory how full the scripture is on their side how many more texts there are that evidently favor their scheme then such as seem to favor the contrary but let them first make manifest the things in question which they suppose and take for granted and show them to be consistent with themselves and produce clear evidence of their truth and they have gained their point as all will confess without bringing one scripture for none denies that there are commands councils promises threatenings etc in the Bible but unless they do these things they're multiplying such texts of scriptures is insignificant and vain it may further be observed that such scriptures as they bring are really against them and not for them as it has been demonstrated that it is their scheme and not ours is inconsistent with the use of motives and persuasives or any moral means whatsoever to induce men to the practice of virtue or abstaining from wickedness their principles and not ours are repugnant to moral agency and inconsistent with moral government with law or precept with the nature of virtue or vice reward or punishment and with everything whatsoever of a moral nature either on the part of the moral governor or in the state actions or conduct of the subject end of part four section 11 part four section 12 of the freedom of the will by Jonathan Edwards this LibriVox recording is in the public domain of a supposed tendency of these principles to atheism and licentiousness if any object against what has been maintained that it tends to atheism I know not on what ground such an objection can be raised unless it be that some atheists have held a doctrine of necessity which they supposed to be like this but if it be so I'm persuaded the Armenians would not look upon it just that their notion of freedom and contingence should be charged with a tendency to all the errors that ever any embrace to have held such opinions the stoic philosophers whom the Calvinists are charged with agreeing with were no atheists but the greatest theists and nearest to can to Christians in their opinions concerning the unity and the perfections of the godhead of all the heathen philosophers and Epicurus that chief father of atheism maintained no such doctrine of necessity but was the greatest maintainer of contingence the doctrine of necessity which supposes a necessary connection of all events on some antecedent ground and reason of their existence is the only medium we have to prove the being of God and the contrary doctrine of contingence even as maintained by Armenians which certainly implies or infers that events may come into existence or begin to be without dependence on anything foregoing as their cause ground or reason takes away all proof of the being of God which proof is summarily expressed by the apostle in Romans 120 and this is a tendency to atheism with a witness so that indeed it is the doctrine of Armenians and not of the Calvinists that is justly charged with a tendency to atheism it being built on a foundation that is the utter subversion of every demonstrative argument for the proof of a deity as has been shown part two section three and whereas it has often been said that the Calvinistic doctrine of necessity saps the foundations of all religion and virtue and tends to the greatest licentiousness of practice this subjection is built on the pretense that our doctrine renders vain all means and endeavors in order to be virtuous and religious which pretense has been already particularly considered in the fifth section of this part where it has been demonstrated that this doctrine has no such tendency but that such a tendency is truly to be charged on the contrary doctrine in as much as the notion of contingence which their doctrine implies in its certain consequences overthrows all connection in every degree between endeavor and event means and end and besides if many other things which have been observed to belong to the Armenian doctrine or to be plain consequences of it be considered there will appear just reason to suppose that it is that which must rather tend to licentiousness their doctrine excuses all evil inclinations which men find to be natural because in such inclinations they are not self determined as such inclinations are not owing to any choice or determination of their own wills which leads men wholly to justify themselves and all their wicked actions so far as natural inclination has had a hand in determining their wills to the commission of them yay these notions which suppose moral necessity and inability to be inconsistent with blame or moral obligation will directly lead men to justify the vilest acts and practices from the strength of their wicked inclinations of all sorts strong inclinations inducing a moral necessity yay to excuse every degree of evil inclination so far as this has evidently prevailed and been the thing which has determined their wills because so far as antecedent inclination determined the will so far the will was without liberty of indifference and self determination which at last will come to this that men will justify themselves and all the wickedness they commit it has been observed already that this scheme of things exceedingly diminishes the guilt of sin and the difference between the greatest and smallest defenses and if it be pursued in its real consequences it leaves room for no such thing as either virtue or vice blame or praise in the world and again how naturally does this notion of the sovereign self determining power of the will in all things virtuous or vicious and whatsoever deserves either reward or punishment tend to encourage men to put off the work of religion and virtue and turning from sin to god since they have a sovereign power to determine themselves just when they please or if not they are wholly excusable and going on in sin because of their inability to do any other if it should be said that the tendency of this doctrine of necessity to licentiousness appears by the improvement many at this day actually make of it to justify themselves and their dissolution courses i will not deny that some men do unreasonably abuse this doctrine as they do many other things which are true and excellent in their own nature but i deny that this proves the doctrine itself has any tendency to licentiousness i think the tendency of doctrines by what now appears in the world and in our nation in particular may much more justly be argued from the general effect which has been seen to attend the prevailing of the principles of armenians and the contrary principles as both have had their turn of general prevalence in our nation if it be indeed as is pretended that Calvinistic doctrines undermine the very foundation of all religion and morality and innovate and disenol all rational motives to holy and virtuous practice and that the contrary doctrines give the inducements to virtue and goodness their proper force and exhibit religion in a rational light tending to recommend it to the reason of mankind and enforce it in a manner that is agreeable to their natural notions of things i say if it be thus it is remarkable that virtue and religious practice should prevail most when the former doctrine so inconsistent with it prevailed almost universally and that ever since the latter doctrine so happily agreeing with it and of so proper and excellent a tendency to promote it have been gradually prevailing vice profaneness luxury and wickedness of all sorts and contempt of all religion and of every kind of seriousness and strictness of conversation should proportionably prevail and that these things should thus accompany one another and rise and prevail one with another now for a whole age together it is remarkable that this happy remedy discovered by the free inquiries and superior sense and wisdom of this age against the pernicious effects of Calvinism so inconsistent with religion and tending so much to banish all virtue from the earth should so long a trial be attended with no good effect but that the consequence should be the reverse of amendment that in proportion as the remedy takes place and is thoroughly applied so the disease should prevail and the very same dismal effect take place to the highest degree which Calvinistic doctrines are supposed to have so great a tendency to even the banishing of religion and virtue and the prevailing of unbounded licentiousness of manners if these things are truly so they are very remarkable and matter a very curious speculation end of part four section 12 part four section 13 of the freedom of the will by Jonathan Edwards the sleeper vox recording is in the public domain concerning that objection against the reasoning by which the Calvinistic doctrine is supposed that it is metaphysical and abstruse it is often been objected against the defenders of Calvinistic principles that in their reasonings they run into nice scholastic distinctions and abstruse metaphysical subtleties and set these in opposition to common sense and it is possible that after the former manner it may be alleged against the reasoning by which I have endeavored to confute the Armenian scheme of liberty and moral agency that it is very abstracted and metaphysical concerning this I would observe the following things one if that be made an objection against the foregoing reasoning that it is metaphysical or may properly be reduced to the science of metaphysics it is a very impertinent objection whether it be so or no is not worthy of any dispute or controversy if the reasoning be good it is as frivolous to inquire what science it is properly reduced to as what language it is delivered in and for a man to go about to confute the arguments of his opponent by telling him his arguments are metaphysical would be as weak as to tell him his arguments could not be substantial because they were written in French or Latin the question is not whether what is said be metaphysics physics logic or mathematics Latin French English or Mohawk but whether the reasoning be good and the arguments truly conclusive the foregoing arguments are no more metaphysical than those which we use against the papers to disprove their doctrine of transubstantiation alleging it is inconsistent with the notion of corporeal identity that it should be in 10 000 places at the same time it is by metaphysical arguments only we are able to prove that the rational soul is not corporeal that lead or sand cannot think that thoughts are not square around or do not weigh a pound the arguments by which we prove the being of God if handled closely and distinctly so as to show their clear and demonstrative evidence must be metaphysically treated it is by metaphysics only that we can demonstrate that God is not limited to a place or is not mutable that he is not ignorant or forgetful that it is impossible for him to lie to be unjust and that there is one God only and not hundreds or thousands and indeed we have no strict demonstration of anything accepting mathematical truths but by metaphysics we can have no proof that is properly demonstrative of any one proposition relating to the being and nature of God his creation of the world the dependence of all things on him the nature of bodies or spirits the nature of our own souls or any of the great truths of morality and natural religion but what is metaphysical I am willing my argument should be brought to the test of the strictest and justice reason and that a clear distinct and determinant meaning of the terms I use should be insisted on but let not the whole be rejected as if all were confuted by fixing on it the epithet metaphysical to if the reasoning which has been made use of be in some sense metaphysical it will not follow that therefore it must need be abstruse unintelligible and akin to the jargon of the schools I humbly conceive the foregoing reasoning at least to those things which are most material belonging to it depends on no abstruse definitions or distinctions or terms without a meaning or a very ambiguous and undetermined signification or any points of such abstraction and subtlety as tends to involve the attentive understanding in clouds and darkness there is no high degree of refinement and abstruse speculation in determining that a thing is not before it is and so cannot be the cause of itself or that the first act of free choice has not another act of free choice going before that to excite or directed or in determining that no choice is made while the mind remains in a state of absolute indifference that preference and equilibrium never coexist and that therefore no choice is made in a state of liberty consisting in indifference and that so far as the will is determined by motives exhibiting and operating previous to the act of the will so far it is not determined by the act of the will itself then nothing can begin to be which before was not without a cause or some antecedent ground or reason why it then begins to be that effects depend on their causes and are connected with them that virtue is not the worse nor sin the better for the strength of inclination with which it is practiced and the difficulty which then surrises of doing otherwise that when it is already infallibly known that the thing will be it is not contingent whether it will ever be or know or that it can be truly said notwithstanding that it is not necessary it should be but it either may be or may not be and the light might be observed of many other things which belong to the foregoing reasoning if any shall still stand to it that the foregoing reasoning is nothing but mere metaphysical sophistry and that it must be so that the seeming force of the arguments all depends on some fallacy and while that is hid in the obscurity which always attends a great degree of metaphysical abstraction and refinement and shall be ready to say here is indeed something tends to confound the mind but not to satisfy it for who can ever be truly satisfied in it that men are fitly blamed or commended punished or rewarded for those volitions which are not from themselves and of whose existence they are not the causes men may refine as much as they please and advance the abstract notions and make out a thousand seeming contradictions to puzzle our understandings yet there can be no satisfaction in such doctrine as this the natural sense of the mind of man will always resist it I humbly concede that such an objector if he has capacity and humility and calmness of spirit sufficient impartially and thoroughly to examine himself will find that he knows not really what he would be at and indeed his difficulty is nothing but a mere prejudice from an inadvertent customary use of words in a meaning that is not clearly understood nor carefully reflected upon let the objector reflect again if he has candor and patience enough and does not scorn to be at the trouble of close attention in the affair he would have a man's volition be from himself let it be from himself most primarily and originally of any way conceivable that is from its own choice how will that help the matter as to his being justly blamed or praised unless that choice itself be blame worthy or praise worthy and how is the choice itself and ill choice for instance blame worthy according to these principles unless that be from himself to in the same manner that is from his own choice but the original and first determining choice in the affair is not from his choice his choice is not the cause of it and if it be from himself some other way and not from his choice surely that will not help the matter if it be not from himself of choice then it is not from himself voluntarily and if so he is surely no more to blame than if it were not from himself at all it is vanity to pretend it is a sufficient answer to this to say that it is nothing but metaphysical refinement and subtlety and so attended with obscurity and uncertainty it would be the natural sense of our minds that what is blame worthy and a man must be from himself then it doubtless is also that it must be from something bad in himself a bad choice or bad disposition but then our natural sense is that this bad choice or disposition is evil in itself and the man blame worthy for it on its own account without taking into our notion of its blame worthiness another bad choice or disposition going before this from whence this arises for that is a ridiculous absurdity running us into an immediate contradiction which our natural sense of blame worthiness has nothing to do with never comes into the mind nor is supposed in the judgment we naturally make of the affair as was demonstrated before natural sense does not place the moral evil evolutions and dispositions in the cause of them but the nature of them an evil thing being from a man or from something antecedent in him is not essential to the original notion we have a blame worthiness but it is its being the choice of the heart as appears by this that if a thing be from us and not from our choice it has not the nature of blame worthiness or ill dessert according to our natural sense when a thing is from a man in that sense that it is from his will or choice he is to blame for it because his will is in it so far as the will is in it blame is in it and no further neither do we go any further in our notion of blame to inquire whether the bad will be from a bad will there is no consideration of the original of that bad will because according to our natural apprehension blame originally consists in it therefore a thing being from a man is a secondary consideration in the notion of blame or ill dessert because those things and our external actions are most properly said to be from us which are from our choice and no other external actions but those that are from us in this sense have the nature of blame and they indeed not so properly because they are from us as because we are in them that is our wills are in them not so much because they are from some property of ours as because they are our properties however all these external actions being truly from us as their cause and we being so used in ordinary speech and in the common affairs of life to speak of men's actions and conduct which we see and which affect human society is deserving ill or well as worthy of blame or praise hence it is come to pass that philosophers have in cautiously taken all their measures of good and evil praise and blame from the dictates of common sense about these overt acts of men to the running of everything into the most lamentable and dreadful confusion and therefore I observe three it is so far from being true whatever may be pretended that the proof of the doctrine which has been maintained depends on certain abstracts unintelligible metaphysical terms and notions and that the Armenian scheme without needing such clouds and darkness for its defense is supported by the plain dictates of common sense that the very reverse is most certainly true and that to a great degree it is fact that they and that we have confounded things with metaphysical unintelligible notions and phrases and have drawn them from the light of plain truth into the gross darkness of abstracts metaphysical propositions and words without a meaning their pretended demonstrations depend very much on such unintelligible metaphysical phrases as self-determination and sovereignty of the will and the metaphysical sense they put on such terms as necessity contingency action agency etc quite diverse from their meaning as used in common speech in which as they use them are without any consistent meaning or any manner of distinct consistent ideas as far from it as any of the abstracts terms and perplexed phrases of the peripatetic philosophers of the most unintelligible jargon of the schools of account of the wildest fanatics yet we may be bold to say these metaphysical terms on which they build so much are what they use without knowing what they mean themselves they are pure metaphysical sounds without any ideas whatsoever in the minds to answer them in as much as it has been demonstrated that there cannot be any notion in the mind consistent with these expressions as they pretend to explain them because their explanations destroy themselves no such notions as implies self contradiction and self abolition and this is a great many ways can subsist in the mind as there can be no idea of a whole which is less than any of its parts or of solid extension without dimensions or of an effect which is before its cause Armenians improve these terms as terms of art and in their metaphysical meaning to advance and establish those things which are contrary to common sense in a high degree thus instead of that plain vulgar notion of liberty which all mankind in every part of the face of the earth and in all ages have consisting in an opportunity to do as one pleases they have introduced a new strange liberty consisting in indifference contingents and self determination by which they involve themselves and others in great obscurity and manifold gross inconsistence so instead of placing virtue and vice as common sense places them very much in fixed bias and inclination then greater virtue and vice and stronger more established inclination these through their refinings and abstruse notions suppose a liberty consisting in indifference to be essential to all virtue and vice so they have reasoned themselves not by metaphysical distinctions the metaphysical confusion into many principles about moral agency blame praise reward and punishment which are as has been shown exceeding contrary to the common sense of mankind and perhaps to their own sense which governs them in common life end of part four section 13