 Great. Well, good afternoon, everyone. Hi. Thank you so much for coming to New America today. And welcome to our session, Violence Prevention in Southern Somalia, Perspectives from the Field. My name is Melissa Sallick-Burk. I'm a Policy Analyst at New America's International Security Program. And for those of you new to New America, we're a think and action tank, a civic platform that connects a research institute, tech lab, solutions network, media hub, and public forum. The International Security Program aims to provide evidence-based analysis of some of the toughest security challenges facing American policymakers and the public, from homegrown American terrorism to the United States' drone wars abroad, and the proliferation of drones around the world, as well as profound changes in warfare wrought by new technology and societal changes. I'd like to introduce you first to Bridget Moykes from Peace Direct who will open our session today. Bridget serves as Peace Direct's U.S. Senior Representative and Head of Advocacy. She has worked for 20 years on international peace and conflict issues with a focus on U.S. foreign policy. Prior to joining Peace Direct full-time, she was part of its founding U.S. Board for four years. She has also served as an Atrocity Prevention Fellow with USAID's Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation, and has also spent time lobbying on U.S. foreign policy and peace issues with the Friends Committee on National Legislation, where she helped and led the peaceful prevention of deadly conflict programs. She has also worked with the Quaker United Nations Office, Oxfam America, American Friends Service Committee, and the World Policy Institute. Bridget holds a PhD with George Mason University School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, where she focused her dissertation on understanding the motivations of local peace builders and how the international community can better support them. This afternoon, we'll get a comprehensive analysis from local practitioners who will discuss with us the best ways to prevent violence and will save the last 30 minutes or so for audience Q&A. And with that, I'll hand it over to Bridget. Thank you so much, Melissa. That was a long foray of my history. That was actually quite comprehensive. You know everything about me now. I'm really happy to be here. I work with Peace Direct. We're so happy to partner with New America on this event. Melissa's done a huge amount of work as has Vahe and others on the New America and the Peace Direct team. So thanks to everyone. Thanks to our speakers who've come a long way to be here with us. And thank you all for coming out today. It's a beautiful day and you'd probably rather be outside walking around for your lunch hour. So we're really glad that you're here to have this conversation. I know there's a huge amount of expertise in the room on Somalia, violence prevention, and related issues. So I know we're going to have a very robust and good conversation today. Peace Direct works with local people to stop violent conflict and build lasting peace. We work in 12 countries right now with partners, local organizations there on the front lines of violent conflict who are implementing the solutions they believe are needed most in their communities. I noticed that there's a publication from New America out on the bookshelf called All Jihad is Local. And at Peace Direct, we believe all peace is local. We really believe that local people understand the problems they face best, and they are the ones that can design the best solutions. So our role in the international community is to figure out how can we best support them. I'm really glad that our partner from Somalia, Sado, is here and you'll hear from Issei in the conversation today. I just want to frame the conversation today by pointing out a couple of our recent research reports that were out on the table. I hope you might have picked up that give you some context for the conversation around violence prevention in Somalia from the perspective of local peace builders. This research brief on women conflict and peace learning from Kismayo Somalia is a brief on the perspectives of women in the Kismayo area who've been doing local peace building work and who looked at the roles of women both in fueling conflict and in building peace. And of course the conclusion is you really need women at the table and you need women involved. But there's a lot of in-depth research behind this and our partner, the Somali women solidarity organization who partnered with us on this research unfortunately is still on her way here thanks to USBs or processes. But she is on her way and will be with us tomorrow. I'm sorry you won't get to hear from her today. And then the second research report just to mention is called Opportunities for Peace in Kismayo Somalia. And this is a more recent report actually just released this week drawing on the experience of local peace builders who came together in Kismayo for a peace exchange with Issei facilitated and looked at the threats that they were facing, their own analysis of the problems in Somalia right now and what are the peace building approaches that are most needed. And you might not be surprised to find that some of the key findings that came out of this report also have to do with the important role of local civil society, the role of youth in Somalia, the role of women, also the role of traditional elders and plan structures. So there's more to read in the reports but more interesting I know will be the conversation today with all our experts. So I would like to just kick it off perhaps by having everyone if we could just quickly go around and do introductions your name and where you're from because I think it will be really interesting to see all the different people who've come to the table. I know there's a lot of people coming from different different parts. So can we start here? I am Christine. I work at the Peace Direct Office of Bridges and I'm very excited to have these here. He was with us last year and great to be able to bring it back and to update us on what's happening on the ground. Should we keep it down? Yeah. Great. Thank you. I guess I'll repeat myself for everyone online. My name is Christine and I work with Peace Direct also and I was just saying how it's great to have ESA back with us. He was with us last year around this time to speak in D.C. as well as in Minneapolis because there's a huge small diaspora there. Hi, I'm John with Peace Direct. Eddie Epiricio, Department of Commerce. Olivia Jackson Jordan with Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service. Scott Morgan with Red Eagle Enterprises. Ken Meierkorn, retired. Iman Hassan with the Center on Conscience and War. I'm the staff attorney there, litigating on behalf of COs. Steve, retired. Richard Bates, physician. Marisa, New America. David Sturman, New America. Leah Crowder, New America and University of Oxford. Joseph Salah, D.A. and N. Group. Dennis Williams, Colonel in the Army and a military fellow here at New America. Nat Haas, University of Richmond. I'm the chairman with the Global Engagement Center. I'm Brooke. I'm with DOJ. Steve with DOJ. Jack Wipeski, unaffiliated. Jason Calder with the U.S. Office of Safer World. My other trick, I lead Peace Building and CVE Strategy, Programming and Research at Equal Access International. Hi, Kimi Lofo, who's from Search for Common Ground. Hello, Shukria Belloar with Friends Committee on National Legislation. Ben Rolls also at the Friends Committee on National Legislation. Valha Merykyan with Peace Direct. Thank you, Angela. So once you get a red light and you know they're off, we'll come back to you to do the Q&A and then you can bring those mics back on. Okay. Thank you so much. So now I'd like to introduce you to our panelists today, which we're thrilled to have here with us. They are really incredible people, so I think you'll learn a lot from today's. So first we have Abdelahi Eise, who's the Executive Director for Social Life and Agricultural Development Organization in Somalia, which is a national humanitarian NGO founded in 1994. Sado operates in the South Central regions of Somalia and implements programs, such as emergency response, livelihood support, resilience building and economic recovery. And Eise has been a humanitarian worker since 1994 and has worked for different agencies, such as UNHCR, UNICEF, ICRC, and other U.S. agencies. And then we have Brittany Brown, who's the Chief of Staff at International Crisis Group. She joined the team in 2018, after more than a decade in the U.S. government, working for a range of government agencies, including USAID, Departments of Justice, State and Defense under both the Obama and Trump White Houses. She served on the staff of the National Security Council as the Acting Senior Director for African Affairs under the Trump Administration and as the National Security Council's Horn of Africa Director under President Obama. Brittany began her government career as a Presidential Management Fellow with the Drug Enforcement Administration, and before joining the U.S. government, she worked with juvenile detainees and children in the foster care system. And she holds a bachelor's degree in political science and sociology from DePaul University in Chicago and a Master of Arts in Public Policy and Administration from Northwestern University. And last but not least, we have Pauline Muchina, who is the Public Education and Advocacy Coordinator for the American Friends Service Committee's Africa Region Team in Washington, D.C. Previously, she served as a Senior Partnership Advisor for U.N. AITS, and Pauline has served on several boards and advisory groups, including the Global Room for Women and the Center for Health and Hope, and is a member of the Circle of Concerned African Women Theologians. In 2015, Pauline founded African Women and Youth Initiative and is also the founder of Future African Leaders Project. In 2011, Pauline received the United Methodist Church Global Leadership Award, and in 2014, Huffington Post honored Pauline as one of 50 women powerful international religious leaders. She holds a master's degree from Yale University Divinity School and a Ph.D. from the Union Theological Seminary. So thank you all. Let's just dive right in. So to begin with, broadly, what are the current obstacles and opportunities for peace in Somalia? And anybody can begin with this before we get into some specifics. Thank you, everyone. Thanks for the introduction. I hope everybody in this room knows what's going on in Somalia. Because if you are interested in Somalia, if you're interested, you have the information. And I think the best way would have been like to answer the question. In my thinking, the best way is the violence in Somalia is driven by some factors. So if we, instead of fighting what we see, I think we should fight the drivers. To me, drivers, it is a few, including poverty. It's one factor, that driving the factors. So we see a lot of kids, young people, women and boys, are joining Al-Shawab for incentive. We also see a population of almost 70% that point after the government that has no idea what the government looks like. So they need to understand what the government is and what it can bring to them. So we see young people with that did not have an opportunity for education or unemployment. So all those are obstacles and all those are the driving factors. So unless we tackle that, I think it's difficult. Obstacles, I can say, it's also international influence. Goal of crisis has major impact. We see the past friend, the past neighbor of Kenya who has been hosting millions of Somalis are now thinking out of the way. Because of that, the sea border dispute where oil has discovered, Kenya claims it's part of its territory. Somalia says no. They'll say the sea line should be there or it should go to the land structure. So it's big conflict. So there are a lot of obstacles. But I can say poverty, lack of the young people that poem during the war and the international influence are the driving factors of the country and obstacles for the peace in Somalia. Thank you. So I think we've hit on a lot of them so far and it is hard to talk about what the opportunities are without talking about what some of those obstacles are and how we're going to overcome them. When President Formaggio came into power, I think that there was a lot of hope. There was a lot of great ideas from the international community. The relationship between President Formaggio and President Trump. I think it was something that folks were really excited about, about how that could improve the U.S. relationship with Somalia or just continue it on a positive track. I think everybody has been a little bit disappointed with President Formaggio. Spent a lot of time focused on security and not as much time focused on the other things like empowering civil society, good governance, just the governance of the security sector, providing basic social services, the things that actually make Somalis feel Somali. You know, really investing in things to create one country. And I think for many people in this room who are Americans based on your accent, you know, we recognize that Somalia is a, it has a federalist system. And so with federalism, sometimes as Americans, we have a hard time understanding like what that means. But what's really important in Somalia is that all of the federal states are on board. And one of the things that Formaggio still, you know, has not done a good job at, but I think could do a good job is empowering these federal states. You do that through transparency, you do it through accountability, you do it of sharing of resources. So I think there is some hope, but a lot of that hope has disappeared over the last two years as we've seen President Formaggio, you know, do what many leaders do in the African continent, which is consolidate power and not actually create good governance that leads to good basic services. So I think our one area for peace and one, you know, opportunity we have is continuing to pressure the Formaggio government and the administration as we get closer to his next election. And I think what goes into that is, for those of you who are, you know, Somalia, Somalia watchers, you'll know that, you know, the goal was to have a one person, one vote election last time. We didn't get there. I think that hopefully we can be aiming again to try and get closer to, you know, I mean, the US has the way that we do our elections with the electoral college. There's other ways that we can do it. And I think it's trying to also support the Somalis as they move towards a one person, one vote election system. And so we have all of these opportunities for about two years away from some of that taking place. And we can try dive more into obstacles or you want to, if you want to, otherwise we can. Yeah, well, and then we'll hit that one before. Wow, where to begin. But what has been saved by my colleagues is correct. But I also want to raise the issue that the problem in Somalia didn't just start recently. It started a long time ago. The colonialism that took place there. And then after colonialism, trying to merge Pundaland with Somaliland and all the clans in different parts of Somali, trying to come together and fighting over power, who is to control land, who is to control resources, who is to control what happens to the country. And what happened with that Somalia was left in a very volatile situation because different clans and different militia groups started arming themselves to the teeth. They are all heavily armed and are not afraid to use their weapons to defend their interests. And then you add another component, the international community involvement in that country. And the regional countries as well, Kenya, Ethiopia and especially Ethiopia and the long term conflict or support of conflict in Somaliland. And it has made it really ungovernable. So push forward, you have a government that has less money than militia in the country. Al-Shabaab has more money than the government of Somalia. They don't have control of most of the country. Actually, they have control over some parts of Mogadishu, but some of the militia groups still control some of the area. And then the issue of poverty, but you have to look more at what has created poverty. Of course, the protracted civil war has created poverty in Somalia, but also natural disasters have contributed. And also the fact that they are constantly attacked, that people cannot stay in peace in one area. They're either being attacked from the air by, you know, U.S. government, the army from and others. And then within themselves also attacking each other. So it becomes really, really difficult. I think some of the issues that also are problematic or obstacle in Somalia is that there is no justice, I mean the justice system in Somalia is very weak. So most of the militia, most of the clans, they operate with impunity. You know, there is some have created Sharia law, and where Sharia law has been practiced, there have been some semblance of calm, but they are very, very strict. And, you know, we've seen people's human rights being violated under the Sharia law. Yeah, Somalia is prone to, I already said about the disaster. So the issue of law literacy rates, which has led to brainwashing of the young generation, the 70% that you're talking about, you know, they don't have schools because schools are attacked, you know, and people, students and teachers have to run away in order to be safe. So those frequent attacks makes people not to stay in school and learn. So currently, they are over 2 million refugees from Somalia who have sought, you know, refuge in other countries, but I think the numbers are higher than that. I don't think it's just 2 million, but within Somalia itself, people are displaced and there is 1.5 million people who are displaced internally, and they don't have access to basic needs, you know, because the government is unable to provide basic needs. There is a role that the government can play, but they are also hampered, not just by their own corruption, but also international communities disregard in terms of helping Somalia, like they're heavily indebted, so they don't have access to international funding that should be going into that country to help with resources. And even when people provide humanitarian support, the militia also prevent that support from getting to the communities that need it. I think I'll stop there, but on the issue of women, I know we'll be talking more about that, but sexual violence, including domestic violence, rape and sexual abuse remains widespread in this area. And because of the insecurity in the country and weak rule of law, gender inequality, well, Somalia customary laws and Sharia laws, combined with all these other factors, make it very unsafe for women and children in Somalia. Thank you. Yes, of course. It's also worth to mention, you say Amazon. The role of Amazon is not clear to Somalis. Eglory is the government. Each troop from Kenya, Uganda, Chabuti, Etopia, they get the instruction from their governments. Not, there is no central Amazon command that can tell this and this and this. So it's completely, I don't know, it said the Ugandan troops or Amazon troops. It said peacekeeping troops or other type of troops. If there is a peace, if there is peacekeeping, where is the peace to keep? That's the big question. So that's also now, it started the thinking of the role of the military. The other thing is, I think it will be a good opportunity for Somalis to get income to invest in peace and people from the recently discovered oil. It will take time to maybe extract, but now it gives attention to many powerful countries. So maybe the Somalis become victim of the oil that's discovered, where maybe Kenya want to have, do they want not to produce, to keep its oil high prices? Or maybe America is bushing from European companies or European companies, we call it nicely, we're from here, America go there. Like it's also become a big factor at the moment. Corruption is mistrusted with the government, it's also the problem. So the people like, okay, someone should be the president of the government and should come from a Kalan X or Kalan Y or someone someone. So like, it's still because of the proper reconciliation and trust among the people who have ever come to power, become the someone's person, some Kalanist person. So it's still challenging. The opportunity, I totally agree with Prini, like election of the someone who is the Kassim or the nephew of the former dictator, Syad Pare, and getting support, waits about all Somalis, wherever they are, even in Kenya. And he told me a show is that people need the government more than they need their Kalans, which was the problem. The problem was a Kalan, Kalan fighting, Kalan to Kalan, whatever the reason was. But now people are looking for, and they forget the past of the Syad Pare, because of the money people think that he has done something. So they forget that one, which is the welcoming his nephew to be elected in Mogadishu. So that's the good sign that at least the opportunity people are ready for the government itself. Sorry for that. But again, it's a good sign that as a Somali, I can walk everywhere in Somali, which was not the case 10 years ago. Business are moving everywhere and interconnected, which is also making the people integration and forget about the isolation that has been there. So that's all opportunities. And I think, I mean, you hit a little bit on some of these spoilers. And I think it's something as the international community, some of the folks in the sermon, other people that to continue to watch those spoilers. And I think you started it on, but for one of the things that we've been watching really carefully is the Gulf influence. And when you see the amount of money that's going in, not just to the central government, but also to each of these federal states, that they're benefiting from this division. And so the more that outside communities can continue to support the US government and European and Western governments can continue to sort of support the idea of one Somalia. And the question of Somali land will sort of leave off the table, but everything else, South Central Somalia and like Portland on down that if we can continue to sort of add that pressure that the Gulf States need to stay out. Because when we see this huge amount of money coming in or just the perception of money, because right, we can all imagine being in charge of a federal state and you think that $500 million is going to your central government, you're sitting there saying, where is my cut of this 500 million? If I'm part of this country, like the way that Firmajo can handle that is he can have radical transparency when it comes to this. He can say, you're right, I just got $200 million from Qatar or whatever. I mean, I don't actually know these numbers. People in the US government maybe have a better idea, but you know, just got this hundreds of millions of dollars, I'm going to divide it up by population. I'm going to create websites and documents and flyers that are going to show how am I spending every single penny? How are we dividing this money up? Because I think what happens is there starts to be this narrative of like, wait, Firmajo and the people in Mogadishu are making huge amounts of money. Like, why are we not taking care of the people of Somalia? And you know, what's happening to these basic services? And so I think we all need to be really highlighting and raising a lot of alarm bells when it comes to the outside influences coming into Somalia. That's fantastic context. Thank you. I'm wondering if we can also talk a little bit about programming and maybe you could start off a little bit Issei. In terms of practical violence prevention work, can you walk us through some of Sado's programming and how you even decide what issue areas your team wants to focus on? It's always difficult to figure out which way is best to address one problem. So I think it's context-invasive interventions. And the problem again is, as we say, there is a lot of uncoordinated initiatives that even contradicting to each other. For us, we choose to work with the people. First of all, who can bring peace? You have to understand. Is it the government? Is it the world? Is it the children? Is it the youth? Is it the civil societies or elders or religious groups? So and then what peace? Is it, in the case of Trubalan, is it in Trubalan or holds some money? Can if the Trubalan, can Trubalan alone be safe and peaceful while the others are not, other regions are not or should be interconnected? So it's dynamic. But I think what we do here is more we focus on on on grassroot level. We work with the civil societies. We support victims of the conflict or the violence, as we say, youth. We're looking for justice for all that people can feel. We look for and do participation in order to be able to feel this is their government, not the Farmacha government or or Ahmad Madafi government. It's government by trying to grab trying to close the gap with the people and the government by facilitating dialogues, debates in open discussions, facilitating that, bringing the president itself to talk to the community. We support forecasting the positive information that and correct. We work with the youth to participate in more in community engagement at these building initiatives. Still, there are big questions. If, as she said, Somali problem was before al-Shabaab, but now maybe it's al-Shabaab. When it comes to the conflict, not the rebuilding the institutions and the trans accountability and that's different things, but when it comes to the conflict now, it's al-Shabaab. But why al-Shabaab is there is the big question. Why why al-Shabaab is there? Who creates al-Shabaab that we we know as Somalis al-Shabaab was created by someone and the someone is still there. Yeah, al-Shabaab is not. They're not a religious organization or religious group. They are using the name of the religion, but they are a political group that proxies to someone, to some government. It's not necessary to mention unless I'm asking. So we work with the people. We work with the government and institutions out there. There is always a challenge. For some of the cases al-Shabaab is ideology. So it's fighting, military fighting with solo. Oh, there is a counter-ideology, methodology or strategy that we want to teach. These people who believe is wrong as a right by someone make these people to believe wrong is the right. And we research, we reverse by teaching them right, right wrong is wrong. And how? Or should we continue the approach of U.S. policy of we don't talk terrorist? Then who is terrorist? It's a big complex, but for us to make our work, we actually like, we fight driving factors. As we say, it's ideology. If it's public driving, we try to support the youth or any member of the community that are in the risk of recruitment or training the extremists. How do you know? They say public. That's also that issue. I would know that who wants to join Shabaab or who wants to explore themselves. That's there. That we use all available mechanisms, whether the parentage or the filetial that is of the youth to youth, without also, I think it's not the big challenge. If we bring back, if we use all sources and bring back some kids from Shabaab and then when they come, government culture and both in prison, then the parents will say, you, I say, you mission assassination. You know, it's complex, but I think we realize and we believe as the preacher says, like, localism knows how to play around and how to solve that because we speak the language. We know who we're talking about. I know like a 50% of Alishabaab because I'm from south. I'm not Alishabaab. I'm not impressed that idea, but I know them. I'm from south. And those in south, in Ghedo, in Trubalan, I know them. I talk to them sometimes for passage for to be safe, my stuff, to be safe, to be like, if they see this thing, they should not understand we are against them. But we say, oh, we always want to be, including yourself and yourself. So we work with the community by addressing the contributing factors to the violence. That's fantastic. Can you tell us a little bit more about the peace and reconciliation work that you're doing and who comes to the table? Because I want to get Pauline's thoughts on this after two. Reconciliation, it's two levels to us. When we say intra and then we say we have seen, we have seen some, for example, last time, let me get in Istanbul, in Trubalan, there is a state of Trubalan. So it's the member of the federal government of Somalia. And there are peak lands there. So to form a government, a state government of Trubalan, people should be, should be reconciled their differences. And they should come up with the consensus that we should build the state. But if they are fighting or if there is hostilities among them, it's hard to bring them together to form a state. So we, we facilitate, we started the facilitation among the clients. It's, it's, it's, it's, it's, I'm not feeling good to say major clients because they're the minority clients that should be considered and consulted, even though we, we facilitate them and bring them on board. But we facilitate a reconciliation meeting, but in the major clients. Firstly, we sit each one separately. We say, what do you want? We say, we don't want to have any system of the government, client X or that client, that client has a more army and he controls the smiles of, he wants the more share. How do you know? We didn't even talk to them. Then each we discuss and then we convince them to talk and come to a reconciliation table and meeting. And then we address the outstanding conflicts and issues that can trigger conflicts or, or the sensitive issues that can sub-attach the peace process that we want to do it. So we're bringing them together. And by healing most of wounded outside and then convincing each to accept the rights of the other one before the table. And then at the end of the day, we, we found a state of trouble that we, the elder is managed to come together and form good trouble and after talks that takes six months. So it's long process. So we do that one. And also we, we always try to facilitate between the clients to talk for any issues and differences they have. So that's the reconciliation. Sometimes it's a little little. It's like IDPs and the whole community. Thank you. Now, Pauline, we've talked a little bit about in your opening remarks, the role of women. Can you talk more about that and especially with context? What's, what's the importance of that? Yes. Thank you. So first of all, I just want to also just highlight that the word al-Shabaab means youth in Somalia. So when you condemn al-Shabaab as a term, you're condemning 70% of the Somali population. Of course, there is the al-Shabaab militia, which is separate from, you know, ordinary youth, you know, from Somalia, but they've been able to recruit more using, you know, that youth term. And I'm telling you, they are very good at it. And they've been helped by the international community, because every time the international community strikes a village or strikes, you know, al-Shabaab members, they go back and say, see, they want to kill us all because the strikes also strike civilians. And when the young people in those communities see their people are being affected, you know, and they are given a little bit of money because they are an employee, they are uneducated, they join al-Shabaab. So there is an opportunity here for both the international community and the local government and the NGOs to start changing the young people's mindset, you know, create space for young people to think differently than what al-Shabaab is teaching them. If even al-Shabaab's education system or whatever system they are using is more powerful than what we all are providing, then we'll never win the mindset of the young people in Somalia. And that's where we want to be, because the military intervention will never, will never bring peace in Somalia. It will bring a semblance of peace in Somalia, but never full peace. So I just wanted to say that. When it comes to women, Somalia women and actually youths are very eager to see a difference in their country. They are very powerful women living in conditions of discrimination, you know, within their customs, but also within their religion. Although there have been talks that Sharia law gives women a little bit of say more than the customary law in Somalia, but that is to be debated. So we can discuss that. But women, we as American Friends Service Committee, we've been doing programs with women and youths in Somalia and we've realized that they have a lot of say at the family level. You know, they are the ones who are educating their children. They are the ones who are trying to even actually sometimes broker peace between different clans. You know, they play a very critical role in brokering peace between the clans. Unfortunately, when it comes to peace talks, they are not at the table. You know, they are excluded. And when they bring themselves like to the meeting at Djibouti and also Nairobi, where women actually Somalia women decided we are going to be part of this and were there in big numbers until they were given space, especially in Nairobi, you know, 27 women were brought to the table to have the conversation. And the others were walking the halls of, you know, bombers of Kenya trying to influence the elders who had come to the meeting. So, but that doesn't mean that women have a lot of say. No, they don't because they are uneducated. They fall under the same poverty cloud in Somalia. You know, they don't go to school. Some of them have experience FGM. Some of them don't have access to maternal health services in the country and are either dying while they're giving birth and stuff like that. But, you know, we what we have been doing is to create or establish programs to address causes of conflict at the grassroots level and engaging women, you know, and then, you know, we also are looking at creating a mechanism to engage them so that because they even know when conflict is going to break, you know, before it breaks. So, having to talk to them so that we can prevent conflict is very important. And when conflict takes place, who is to talk? The men are not going to be talking to each other. They're going to be killing each other. That's how they talk to each other. So, how do we use the clan system of women as members of those community to influence community? The other thing we are realizing in our work is that people have been so traumatized, especially women, through violence, all forms of violence. So, we provide trauma healing, you know, and psychosocial support programs for survivors of problems. And then we are also looking at creating space for art and music to repair their own communities. And women are playing a critical role in art and music, you know. One time, a woman had a poem, you know, they were discussing peace. And she wasn't allowed to speak at the meeting. And she decided she was going to recite a poem, you know, to the group. And she did. And that poem raised a lot of interest in listening to what the women are saying, because she cried through that poem and showed the men what they are doing to their children and to their women. I think the other thing that AFSC is looking for is to create space for provoking conversation to change, not just the mindset of youth, but also of women and the elders. And also looking at the clan structures and trying to see how do we use those clan structures as entry points to engage them in conversation, rather than condemning them all the time. Thank you. Well, I can say more about women. That's great. Thank you so much. Now, you did touch on something I was going to say to the end, because I know it's on everybody's mind, but let's talk about airstrikes. So the US has had a lot of airstrikes this year. I know it's been a little bit controversial in the news recently. New America tracks airstrikes in four different countries. Somalia happens to be one of them. And we know that there have been almost 40 this year alone. We're only in May. Last year, there were 47 confirmed strikes. And then in 2017, there were 39. So keeping that all in the context, that would mean that the Trump administration has nearly tripled the amount of airstrikes that have happened in Somalia, which are more than the Bush and Obama administrations combined. So keeping that, I guess at the back of your head, I know that you have already stated it's very clear that Al-Shabaab uses it as a recruitment tactic. That was going to be one of my questions. I'm curious if you both have thoughts about that and what it means when we have outside interventions coming in on the ground, even if they're supposed to be in collaboration with the government. What has your experience been at a local level? And if anyone has just general thoughts, I think it would be good to discuss. Mine's a very US perspective. So I can let you guys go first, or I can dive into the US. I think, as I say, we said the right intervention. That's the question. If, of course, we believe US want to eliminate Al-Shabaab, if they are the only one of the problem, let's put that good, good, good part. America want to eliminate Al-Shabaab. But is it the right one, the right intervention to use a drone? There was a talk show, Indian Lady, like 2002, she says, like Osama Bin Laden, he escaped from Kabul with a motorcycle. He was needed only to send the one with the three legs, not the military. So to me, I think it's not, it's not helping, or it's not defeating Al-Shabaab, but it's helping them for recruitment. It's what we believe. And it's not what I only believe. This is what a lot of study shows. The reports we are getting from everywhere, they say, oh, Al-Shabaab using this one, this Friday prayer, they're using this, they're using that, and they are mobilizing the people, especially their control areas to defensive themselves from Americans. So I think it will be good not to use it. And it's not helping at all. But it's not defeating, but helping. Very strong. Thank you. Yeah, you know, even the link between Al-Shabaab and ISIS or other militia groups and Al-Qaeda in Somalia has made the US and the international community to be more aggressive towards attacking. But as you rightly say, you know, is it effective? What results is it achieving? And it can achieve, like, you know, maybe Al-Shabaab will withdraw today from where the attack happened, but they will regroup tomorrow and do even damage. And they are not, I'm from Kenya, so we are taking the flag from what is happening in Somalia. It's coming to counters in Kenya. People have died, you know, last June I was in, I mean, last February I was in Kenya when they attacked a local hotel a few blocks from our office. And I wasn't at the site where it happened, but there was chaos, the whole city, you know, it took me five hours to get home, you know, others the whole night. So, and people lost their lives. So we really, as AFSC, we feel that the US needs to reevaluate its tactics, its use of drones, its use of military, and Amisom as well, you know, also needs to do the same so that we can regain peace. But US government is also doing a lot of work in Somalia, which has to be acknowledged, but it's overshadowed by, you know, these other ones. Like, they are helping, you know, a program called Bringing Unity, Integrity, and Legitimacy to Democracy, you know, which is called BUILD. And that program is actually helping the current Somalia government to prepare for the next elections, you know, because a government cannot be legitimate until there is fair elections. And at the moment, you know, it's really quite a challenge even for the current government to get there. So they are supporting electoral and political processes across Somalia by fostering increased citizen participation. So they are also educating citizens at the same, you know, they are also supporting the development of issue-based and viable political parties. So even some of the clan people are getting support. And then, you know, they are supporting, I already said, civic education. They are supporting the expanding of access to justice system within Somalia. They are training the current Somalia military, you know. And they are doing a lot of work that they are putting a lot of money, but that will be undermined by what else they do in Somalia. So that has to be discussed. Some of the, can I get into recommendations or not later? Let's talk about that a little bit towards the end of that work. Yes, I also want to hear your perspective. I think it's really important to hear about what's happening on the ground. I was in Mogadishu a year ago, so April of last year, and it was interesting because the people that I spoke with, you know, civil society folks, and obviously, you know, whenever you go somewhere, you sometimes self-select. But I was actually surprised by the amount of positive feedback we got about drone strikes. And so this was with international crisis group. And the amount of people who said, Al-Shabaab is a problem, please continue to try and eliminate Al-Shabaab. And so a year ago, thinking about where we are and like the uptick and the amount of strikes, but there were a lot of folks that we spoke to who actually were very supportive of the U.S. military actions. And the second part was, what are you doing now these areas are cleared? I mean, that was the question. It wasn't, it was everyone was actually, I think I didn't talk to anyone who was anti-strike, which was a very big surprise to me. But so everyone we talked to you pretty much said, you know, please continue the strikes. You need the what's next. You need the, you know, making sure that we can hold areas after Al-Shabaab leaves. If you're going to strike someone, what's next with basic government services? So you heard a lot of positive things. I think that has probably changed a little bit based on some of the lack of transparency around civilian casualties. The Trump administration no longer tracking civilian casualties. When you're starting to see a lack of transparency from the government of Somalia, when you're seeing the Firmaggio administration not communicating as well with the people about what's happening with these strikes, what you saw at the beginning was a lot of coordinated strikes. You saw a coordination between the Firmaggio government and AFRICOM. You saw a lot more coordination and a lot more discussion about what was happening. And I think that is maybe was hopeful at the beginning and very quickly dropped off. And so it's probably a little bit different now. But I think at the beginning there was actually a lot of hope. I think now people have started to see the civilian impact is huge. And it also can exacerbate a lot of these Klan dynamics that we talked about. And I think the question is always, how is the U.S. military actually being used by one Klan or the other? So they might say, hey, did you know this is an Al-Shabaab camp? But it turns out it's just a different Klan. And for those of you who are Somali watchers, you'll know that it's really complicated, these Klan dynamics. So it's something that I think even people who follow Somalia for decades from the outside will never have a really good grasp of what's actually happening with some of the Klan dynamics because they go back so far. And then I also am happy to answer any questions about the U.S. policy at the White House when we went from Obama to Trump and all that. It's helpful to talk about that. I think we should at some point too. I also, since we talked a little bit about what can we do next and everyone wants to know what to do next. Do you all have recommendations? I mean, these are wide topics. So it's either recommendations for on the ground, violence prevention, recommendations for maybe U.S. government and kind of how they're getting involved more with Somalia. Things that you've just thought of that you think would be helpful for everybody in the room to be more aware of. Anyone can start. In American policy, American intervention there, it's totally agreed like they are doing a lot of good things there. Especially when it comes to the raw material and resiliency and economic recovery programs, they are doing a lot under of them, different agents of all of them, none of them. U.S.A.D. U.S.A.D. Yes. After those good stuff too, they do the Humanitarianism. They are doing good job. They are doing good job in rebuilding Somali National Army. They are doing good job there. The only question is the drone part is it supporting or hurting? That's the case. So we agree with that. So the recommendation we will I would have is like U.S. government to review its strategy. Is it defeating or helping? Which intervention should be eliminated or which should be continued? Is this the best way? And then they have to look the availability of other cheaper and effective options to win over Shabab if this is not working. So they just need to review realistically what is happening. Is it productive or not productive? In this building part, I think we, as we say, there is no one prescription for all problems. So I think we should be, should diagnose the problems and then try the prescription based on that. Then starting from who is fighting who, who has an issue with who. Then who can bring this? Is it the elders? Is it religious? Is it the women? Is it the tribal state government? Or is it the federal? And then so forth. What we really realize is like the job I have just mentioned facilitate the reconciliation between the Chinese to form a tribal and state. It's going to be difficult for American government to do that. And we simply did it. So the role of of civil society and the local people, it's very important then international. I'm not saying this directly, but I know you like that. The local, local knows the problem and knows the the corridors to an evidence to use. So I think that's there. Thank you. And I think that's really important using the local experts and local community to do the work that needs to be done in Somalia. And one group that has been overlooked is the diaspora Somalia. They have sustained that country for a long time. The remittance that the diaspora sends back home, the businesses that they've started has actually made a huge difference, even a huge difference more than the international community itself. So I think it's it's an opportunity for international NGOs and international community to look at how do they do they take advantage of the fact that all these diaspora and there are so many even here in the US, you know, can actually help with bringing peace because some of them have been exposed to something different than fighting with the implants. And some of them have the resources that they are sending back home. And then the militia is also involved in trying to, you know, undermine that. So one of the other things I would also raise is the fact that there's no infrastructure in Somalia. The US government and the international community, the international NGOs can just have a humanitarian mindset when it comes to Somalia. We have to start thinking of how to help Somalia to rebuild Somalia, you know, to the infrastructure, roads, health services, you know, water systems. You name it, you know, it's basic infrastructure that can run a country and it's not there right now. If we really, I would say instead of investing in military, let's invest in helping them to rebuild their structure, because that will also legitimize the government to its own people because the government will see, oh, our government is helping us to do this, you know, I can, I can take, you know, I can travel safely, I can get a host to a hospital, all the things that needs to happen. The other thing that really needs to happen from the international community is to cancel debt for Somalia. You know, Somalia's debt is almost five billion dollars. Most of it is ordered to the US. The Department of DOJ, I had, did I hear DOJ or DOD, we have people from the Department. So, you know, most of that debt is from that, the money that was given to the president who was overthrown in 1991, you know, is what the Somalia government or Somalia people still own. All the 70 percent of Somalia population never benefited from that debt, you know, and will never benefit from that debt. So it is time to cancel it, to allow the government now to be able, you know, minus corruption, to be able to, you know, rebuild their countries. So we also need to evaluate the role of Ethiopian military in Somalia, the role of Amazon or presence of Kenyan and other, you know, AU sponsored groups in Somalia, you know, and now they are saying that they will leave Somalia in 2020, you know, will they have really helped the Somalia government be able to establish security within its country because that's where we need to be, not international or local, regional military coming to help, but the Somalia itself being able to provide security for its people and then invest in peace talks, you know, among the clans. Even the militia need to be at the table in the conversation. I know that some governments don't negotiate with terrorists, but in Somalia, who is a terrorist and who is not, you know, so if you want to broker peace in Somalia, you have to have everybody at the table and that can be done, you know, by using the entry points within the Somalia government itself, but also the clans and the religious leaders in Somalia because they also play a critical role in conversations in Somalia. Thank you. Sorry. So right before we get to audience Q&A, Brittany, you happen to mention that you'd be willing to share some perspective on between administration to administration, some intervention policies, would you be willing to share that? Yeah, absolutely. Just like a couple really quick comments. I think, you know, everyone can always tell the priority of an administration based on their budget. I think if you take a look at what the U.S. government spends on security assistance to Somalia in the hundreds of millions, you know, I think it was 250 million last year just from the State Department for, you know, the Somali National Army, and then you look at USAID that it's closer to like 50 or 60 million, you start to see where the U.S. government is putting their priorities. And that doesn't even include all of the support that comes from DOD and from AFRICOM. So I think there's, it's look at the budgets and that helps get people an idea. And once again, we all know the budgets are in Congress. So you want to see these things, you call your congressman, you support Congress's earmarking of funds specifically for development as opposed to just building a larger military and folks with security assistance. I also just wanted to hit on the, who is al-Shabaab? I think that is one of the most important things in this discussion when we were talking about airstrikes. Like, you know, most Somalis seem to say that like, they might be al-Shabaab right now if it helps them, but they're not actually al-Shabaab, they're not following any sort of like ideological anything. It's about where are the jobs, where are the economic opportunities, where are the services being provided. So this idea that every person that is being struck down as an al-Shabaab terrorist by, you know, however many people were killed this year, 250 people so far, whatever it is, with these airstrikes, were those really al-Shabaab? Or was it a guy carrying a gun who was happened to be like protecting his camels who, you know, maybe gave some money to al-Shabaab so he could take his camel across the road? And I think it really is that complicated. And I think that's like a question that we need to continue to force the U.S. government to ask. And I think it's Congress's job to ask that question. So when you were talking about the strikes, I think it is really important for everyone to reflect on that these strikes began under President Obama, like the level of strikes that we were seeing. The push. Under Bush. No, the push. The push. The real push was under President Obama. This drone war, using drones because they're easy and they're cheap. It's a very easy way to project U.S. foreign policy, protect the U.S. military without putting a lot of American soldiers or airmen or whoever at risk. I mean, Somalia has a couple hundred U.S. military personnel on the ground, but I think when we talk about all of this, it's very important where drones are cheap and it's very easy to like project our power, U.S. government power. And so this all started under Obama. Yes, under Trump, it did increase and I think the New York Times has done a great job of reporting about how some of these authorities changed. I think what we'll see is that in March of 2017, the Trump administration changed the policy so that you were able to do strikes in more places in Somalia and for longer periods of time. Those are important changes and Congress should be holding the executive branch accountable for whether or not they have the right to do that. We have specific laws, whether it's AUMF or other things, it's a little wonky, but people can look into how are we actually holding the U.S., the executive branch, how is Congress holding the executive branch accountable for pushing things. We're at an active war. I mean, doing this many strikes is the U.S. government at war against Al-Shabaab or the Somali people. And I think that's something that's very important that people continue to ask about, is this really how the U.S. wants to project power? And so although I think it's an easy blame sometimes to say like this just happened to the Trump administration, I think it is important to remember it did actually start under Obama and a lot of this was just amplified. And the U.S. government's habit of using counterterrorism as the main focus of our foreign policy on the continent of Africa and specifically in sub-Saharan Africa is something we should also be asking. Like, why is it that the military only has counterterrorism missions on the continent of Africa? That's a very important question we look at. All of the things the U.S. military does all over the world that is not focused on counterterrorism. It's focused on, you know, working on good governance and the governance of security forces. When you look at Latin America or you look at Asia, you're not just seeing counterterrorism missions. Why is it on the continent of Africa that it's only focused on counterterrorism? Once again, began under Obama, has been exacerbated under Trump or increased under Trump. But I think it's important that we all see that this has been a trend for a while. Thank you. And also to remember that some of the reporting mechanisms that were in place in Obama's administration have been eroded under this administration. So there's no transparency. So that transparency is so critical so that the U.S. citizens can know what their government is doing there, you know, and actually we've been doing some research or other partners have been doing research and finding out that it may not affect a lot of military men physically, but psychologically, you know, you're still killing. So there's there the trauma is also happening to those who are operating those drones. And really, it's a moral issue, you know. Obviously, the people who are making the drones are benefiting because they're selling more and more drones, you know. But, you know, as U.S. citizens, you know, do we want our government to represent us to the world like that? Do we care about children and women and men of Somalia who get killed in the process? You know, those are questions that we have to ask ourselves. It's not just a question of this is safe for our soldiers, but is this morally correct? Or does it undermine our policy of helping the world rather than killing the world? Thank you. Audience questions. Yes. If you could if you could come near my so that the people on the live stream can hear just push the button to the screen to introduce your name and affiliation really quickly. Sure. Hi, I'm Rachel. I work on the Kenya Somalia portfolio at the International Republican Institute. Pauline, thank you. I appreciate I actually work on the build program. So I appreciate the shout out. And yes, we really do try to work with the parliamentarians and now the women caucuses. So I thank you all again. Something that I think was important is that Task Force International came out with their preventing violent extremism in fragile states in February, you know, and really talked about this change in rhetoric of countering violent extremism to more of like this prevention side. I think that we talk about sometimes. But to really some of the recommendations were, you know, having a locally driven context, accountability, political inclusion. And Pauline, you mentioned about how to use clan structures as entry points for women inclusion. And I just wanted to see if you could just touch on that further, because you know, as you know, the clan base is something of a very local to Somalia, and it's been around for a very long time. So just if you could just couple points on that and maybe how we could really open up that space for those entry points would be really beneficial for me. Thank you. Oh, it'll be easier just to do a one or more. And then I can take a couple. Okay, so some of the programs that we do is educating women on a brokering piece without violence, you know, and these are women who have come forward wanting to be part of that. But we start with skill, I mean, livelihoods, you know, livelihood skills. And in that process, that's when we start discussing that. And they take it back to their communities. And they start reaching out to the women in the other clans, you know, where they are allowed, because it's still a very male controlled environment. But they are reporting back to us that they're having conversation. This is self reporting, you know, that they are having conversations with women who are not of their own clan. And to us, that is very, very important having conversation in the first place, you know, and you begin to see the other person as human, not as this, you know, clan or this, you know, enemy, but you begin to see the other person as human. And we have some tools that we use within AFSC on how to, what is the word for it, how to establish or maintain peace with non violence approach, you know, so they go through a training program, including young people, the young people, they go through a program. And we also sometimes take them out of Somalia and bring them to a place like Kenya or other countries where they are not, they are not in the same environment. The other thing that we do, we actually bring people from different clans to start a business together, you know, so the economic interest is sometimes outweighs their differences in at the clans level. Thank you. Yeah, you can use the phone. And roles with the Friends Committee on National Legislation. I'm wondering how you all see the Ethiopia-Ariotrea-Thaw affecting conflict in Somalia? I think, yes. We think with the couple of reports and investigations, when the fighting, when the fighting between the Ethiopian Aliteria was going on, Aliteria always want to have another front. No, Aliteria want another front for Ethiopia from Somali side. So they support a group called Islamic Court to attack Ethiopia from Somali side. So that was Islamic Court. Then Ethiopia defeated the Islamic Court and Islamic Court is building into two. One take the peace side and then attended the Arta Conference in Chaputi. The Islamic Court led by Sheikh Sharif, the third president before Hassan Sheikh, Sharif Sheikh Ahmad. So he was the chairman of the Islamic Court. So when the Islamic Court would defeat it, he joined the reconciliation process in Chaputi and he become the president replacing Abdullah Yusuf. So Aliteria lost its plan to have the active front in Somali side. So they established Al-Shabaab. So they got Al-Shabaab. So we believe Al-Shabaab initially established and supported, created by Aliteria to have another front Ethiopia from Somali side. So this is still the Al-Shabaab, Ethiopia, Aliteria created. So it has an effect. Now I'm not sure this Horn of Africa initiative led by Abu Ahmed, the Prime Minister of Ethiopia. It will work, but it's, it would have been a good idea because of the, Aliteria is the real, how I can say anchor. Yeah, he, they have a direct influence of Somali politics. It has been before for Ahmed Abi for the country, Prime Minister. So if, if the problem is solved with Aliteria, we're, we're expecting Aliteria will stop the support to Al-Shabaab because it doesn't need another front for Ethiopia. So it's, we will see how it should be struggling its own problem at the moment, despite it has been a good player in Somali issues. But I think, yeah, solving the problem in two countries will minimize or maybe take the interest of Aliteria, Al-Shabaab. So it has a good, I think, memory by answer, but the US government has invested heavily on supporting the Ethiopian military. I think that's something that has to be thought because they, they, you know, because of the colonial borders, you know, these are very large population of Somalia, Somalians, both in Kenya and in Ethiopia. So it's very easy for people to organize outside of Somalia to attack, you know, the current government. But the support of the US government towards the Ethiopian military needs to come to an end. So one, just one point of clarification. So the US government supports the Ethiopian troops who are a part of Amazon in Somalia. There's no direct support to the Ethiopian military that are active in Ethiopia. All the assistance goes directly to the troops in Somalia. I think that you're right. Those people go back to Ethiopia at some point. Those guns can go back. But currently, Congress actually has like very strict limitations because of human rights violations about whether or not the, because I think of exactly what you're describing, like, that it all goes actually to the troops in Somalia. It never actually goes through Ethiopia, just as a, you're right, that people all go back, right? They go back and they are neighbors. So, you know, you, you are pitting them against each other in a very drastic way. And, you know, guns, right? With guns, I mean, the Somalia and most people are armed to the teeth. So there is also a component of disarmament, you know, but who is going to disarm the countries that are supporting also are the ones who are supplying those weapons. You know, the role of Russia in, in, in the role of the Middle East, you know, the Gulf countries in terms of arming people in Somalia is really something that hasn't even been, you know, brought to the service enough for people to be able to address it. It's critical. And I apologize if there is no direct funding, but historically, you know, the US government has been supporting Somalia. Now they're supporting them through Amisom, which is the Amisom and that also, Amisom is problematic, you know, because this Uganda, Burundi, a country like Burundi that is in shambles, almost like Somalia, is actually sending soldiers to, to Somalia and getting funded by the international community, you know. Kenya, you know, our soldiers that work in Somalia make a lot of money, you know, so soldiers want to go. Of course, it's risky, but they can also sell illegal charcoal, you know, from, from Somalia in Kenya. So the, some of these things, you know, have to be able, they can't continue the way they've been continuing because they're actually undermining the peace process. I think it's a really important point when we think about like the AU. The AU has, has picked with Somalia that the way to peace is through the military, right? It's through Amisom, it's through, or not, it's through, what does it go through young unsom to Amisom, whatever you guys understand that, but the AU has decided that they're going to put all their eggs in the security basket, not in the political basket. And I think that's another thing that hopefully the AU is going to stop and reflect a little bit about what it means when you have a war-torn country and then you invest only in security and you don't invest in the political. If we're thinking about Amisom withdrawing, this is the time for the AU to try and start playing catch-up and start figuring out how we spend more of those resources and that energy on the political side as opposed to just all on the security side. You're absolutely right. Thank you. Yes, we'll go this and over here. Thank you. You spoke a little bit about remittances, which I appreciate, especially in the diaspora, adding a lot of value to the GDP and adding a lot of support during crisis moments, especially famine. I wanted to know if you saw an effect on the disruption of informal value transfers or informal money transfers, also known as hawalas, by the United States government in multiple ways when there is this supposed risk or particular risk in perhaps funneling in money through terrorism or piracy. Can you speak on how we can support informal value transfer systems in order to keep this lifeline consistently there, especially during moments of crisis, but also there for the everyday person in the diaspora in Minnesota, for example, that is sending by, there was a statistic done that 87% of all people in Minnesota sent at least $100 a month. So adding that much value to country in crisis cannot be disrupted without notice, yet both state chartered and federal chartered banks hesitant to do businesses and take the money from these informal value transfer systems because of this oversight that was created without real evaluation of how to create parallel forms of money transfer systems that are as effective and as cheap as the ones that are currently in existence. Great question. One that I don't have an answer for because I don't work directly on on that particular issue, but from my own observation, those sanctions of fund, I mean, money transfers had the local population more than, you know, than Al Shabaab or than militia. So how to control that is a question that needs to be asked by the international community. Is there any other way that funding can get to the local communities in Somalia without, without the danger of it falling in the arms of, you know, terrorists, you know. So that's a question that has not been addressed and instead the, some of them were shut down and causing all the havoc of lack of funding and people here worrying about their family's food, their family's well-being because they could not send any funding because the system was disrupted. So, and I think Kenya started the MPSA system and then Somalia actually, the informal money transfer has, as I said, has really revived the business community in Somalia. So if it is not supported, you know, then, you know, they won't get anywhere. Thank you. I think we, we always have our challenges like the bank have a right to, to protect maybe because of the US government says like, if 100 dollars you transfer, goes to the hands of the tourists, it will be penalized for 100 million. Why not the person who's sending the money should not be penalized, not the bank? You know, that hurts the economy and it's, it's risky and as a real material also it, it, it's very dilemma to us. Dilemma, right? Dilemma, right? Like in some cases if you, if you are given money for emergency response for some communities, if 50 dollars or 20 dollars of that American money goes to the Al-Shabaab hand, like you are kaput, you, you will be, if not arrested, you will be blacklisted. And then here is the problem. You see like this Halema, a woman in the village has six kids and her husband become Al-Shabaab and he left her alone with the kids in this village and she has nothing. She is completely illegible and seriously illegible for, for assistance. So the problems if you give them, you are going to come because they know her number, maybe they know her number. If you don't support what kind of your material are you delivering? So we always have a, that issue of, yeah. Just to clarify the federal banks have already procedures in place like KYC that protects them from anything if, if they follow those procedures, right? So it's not that as someone who worked for banks as an attorney, they're, they're multiple procedures that are currently in place that keeps them very safe. Yet it's the continuous harassment of the federal government that makes them shy of taking on the burden, even though procedurally, as long as they didn't follow it, not that even in the formal system like HSBC hasn't followed those procedures and gotten into a lot of trouble. So just, just to clarify that. But there's also U.S. law, strict humanitarian organization, peace building organization from giving aid to anyone who might be on the list, including the wife of, with the six kids whose husband may have left her, but with assisting with al-Shabaab. So there are U.S. laws that are a part of the problem as well. Or rehabilitated youth from al-Shabaab, you know, I know that has been a challenge that once you've been associated with al-Shabaab, even if you come out and the government of Somali is actually rehabilitating or giving amnesty to people who haven't committed serious crimes that have been in al-Shabaab to come back to the community. But when they come back to the community, they cannot access the resources that, you know, some of us NGOs have, because then we will be seen as if we are cooperating with al-Shabaab. Thank you. I think we have one last question. Maybe you can take the last round. Sure, we'll do the last round and then everyone can answer how they'd like. So we had one, Miss, you had one? Yes, start with you. So the federal government of Somali has made it clear that they don't have to see over the years that purely militaristic intervention is also not going to end the defeat of al-Shabaab or some new reinvention of al-Shabaab that maybe looks like a consent before like an actual political group. And so I'm wondering what are the opportunities for the international community or maybe CSOs to try to support and advocate for and open a peace talk or dialogue between the government and al-Shabaab? Like what would that look like and how could we get there? Thank you. And then the last question. I was just wondering if, you know, because looking at the micro-level, recommendations and also the depth cancellation on the macro-level, but in terms of mediating the Somalian conflict, are there any parties that are directly, that are not directly or indirectly involved that can be a good mediator to the conflict? Sure. Actually, mine is right in this same burrow here on how you see an end to this conflict potentially. And I guess the one thing that I would add to what you say is, what do you think are the three or four things the international community should be doing to help encourage some sort of a peace process? I mean, we've done our own research with communities in Somalia and looking at the overall conflict, which appears to be quite stalemated and patience is waning with Amazon troops and how long the support will be there for that is uncertain. And so that suggests maybe that we should be looking for an opportunity for dialogue. But what do you think the U.S. in particular and the international community more broadly should be doing to help that process Thank you. You can take anyone that you would like to. I can take the peace talk. Sure. Yes, I think this war can be ended only because of its ideology and inside of many people even are not feasible. And this war has no front, you know, your front is not I have drawn I have a tiny boom boom boom you I win you lose. It's not that one. It's, it's the an idea between the people and taking advantage of some for nor ability that that's there. So I think the end of the day, it needs to talk. Nothing else. And I think talk, there's two challenges. First of all, the government of Somalia. It's, I cannot say I don't know how to say it, but they don't want maybe to take an action without consulting its donors international donors, those who support their governance America or EU or I don't know who they are, but they have to consult on some of the policies. They say we don't negotiate on talk stories. Even though U.S. is talking Taliban, I don't know if they take off the list of tourists Taliban to talk to them. I don't know if they are still in the list. They are talking and even they say they will pay the money for travel and all those those things. That's illegal, but yeah. So yes, the government of Somalia should talk and should start discussing with its donors. Now as a group of civil societies, we're talking this morning with the State Department. We actually open a discussion now to pressure the government to talk to Al-Shabaab. Again, we need to know, as I say earlier, is Al-Shabaab the final decision makers or their proxy to someone? I think that the collapse of Omar Al-Bashir, the ending conflict between Al-Etheria and Ethiopia. I think that, you know, that that that might determine or not determine that might minimize their importance to to some foreign influence, but it still go off even though they're using non-religious groups like within the parliament, oppositions and all those things they're using. It still maybe they have an influence, but now it was not there. But now as a civil society, we started the talking discussion among themselves to put a proposal together to the government and say, you have to talk. Would they accept the decision on them? But I think it depends. It's someone, whether Khadr or Kutuk or who to use, I think, but the government should determine to talk. That's what we want to start the bushing. So I think, you know, President Firmazio missed a very good opportunity to do this with Robo for, you know, a former Al-Shabaab person who who was running for office and, you know, Firmazio decided instead to aggravate that. And I think that's where it, you know, in reality, I think we do have a very upheld battle. If it comes to, you know, I don't think anyone's recommending talking to the extremists on the Al-Shabaab team, but I think those folks who maybe are kind of Al-Shabaab sometimes sometimes are not or maybe aren't as fully committed to some of the destruction of the West language that comes out of like the very the few very small, the minority of Al-Shabaab that is sort of the extremists. I think there is room for talks. I think, unfortunately, Firmazio is not doing himself any favors by refusing to work with people like Robo. And so I think that is a real problem. I think there's a couple of important points on this right. We all agree that the solutions to peace like in Somalia is not going to be kinetic. It's not going to be one through military things. But we should remember that the military insecurity is a tool, right, that should be used in this larger toolkit of all of the hundreds of other options and things. We have it is still one tool. And I think the mediator question, even if Al-Shabaab was gone tomorrow, Somalia would not find peace. There are so many clan dynamics that are complicated and a lot of it having to do with resources and long histories of things. So I think it's important to also remember this isn't just about Al-Shabaab when we're talking about peace in Somalia. I believe we should put some faith in the AU. The AU can come in with a little bit of more legitimacy maybe than some of the international community that's from the West or from the United States. I think there's room in the AU. But at the end of the day, we need to provide an alternative to the Al-Shabaab way. And that's done through good governance. It's done through basic service provisions. It's done through some of the things you guys have talked about, making people feel Somali, making empowering the federal states and incentivizing the federal states to behave as Somali as opposed to a divided country. And so when it comes to the international community, I think that the AU is a good way to go. And it's also to pressure Formaggio to think about ways that we can work with some of the former Al-Shabaab who have come out and tried to be a part of the political system. And you cannot, you know, you cannot broker peace when you have people on the table and others are not on the table. And they are the ones who are causing problems. So at some point, you have to bring them to the table. You know, they are those who are willing. They are those who need to be convinced. And they are those who need incentives. So we need to look at all those three and see, you know, how do we, what kind of incentives will bring even the ones who are not willing, but they see their incentives, they will come to the table. You know, right now they are making a lot of money with their piracy activities with, you know, so what is the alternative to a better livelihood to them? You know, if we don't provide that or if we don't promise that they will never leave what they are doing. So, and maybe majority, it's a smaller group rather than a bigger group, the ordinary clan elders, they want peace. They want to be able to see their people live in their ancestral, I can't say that one, the land of the ancestors, you know, and flourish within that land. They don't want to see them living in foreign lands. So when you bring them to the table, they will talk. But nobody has succeeded doing that because of the government and also because of some of the international community approach towards happening again. Thank you. So now before Bridget has a quick announcement, I just want to thank Bridget, Issei, Brittany, and Pauline for an excellent discussion. Thank you so much. Thank you all. I just want to make an announcement that this evening, if you haven't gotten enough on peace in Somalia, we have an event at Eaton Workshop. It's on the corner of 12th, okay, it's a wonderful space. This is one of our peace talks and Issei will be sharing stories of his journey as a peace builder and from hope and work in Somalia for peace, along with the Somali diaspora leader, Anab Ali, who runs an orphanage in Somalia, and she'll be sharing some of her story as well. So you're all welcome to come out 7 to 9 at 12 and K. Thank you everyone. Have a good afternoon.