 Well, good evening everybody. It's my enormous pleasure, Gareth Evans as Chancellor of the ANU, to pleasure and privilege really to welcome you all, especially the members of John G's family, his widow Liv, his brother Edward and his wife Annie, his daughters Rebecca and Chrissy and his son Nick. Absolutely delighted to have you all here to this 2018 John G Memorial Lecture to be delivered, of course by Dr. Lassimer Zerbo, and we'll introduce in a moment, and hosted this year by the Coral Bell School, together with National Security College and the Strategic and Defense Studies Center, all here at the College of Asia and Pacific at the Australian National University. This lecture honors each year and has been doing so since 2007. The memory of a man who really did make an extraordinary contribution to making the world a safer and saner place, in particular with the tireless and absolutely brilliant work he did in bringing to conclusion the Chemical Weapons Convention, and then implementing it in practice through the Office for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the OPCW. An institutional achievement that you remember was recognized worldwide with the award to the OPCW of the 2013 Nobel Peace Prize. It's one of the many tragedies of John G's early death in 2007 that he didn't in fact live to enjoy that recognition, which it's really not an exaggeration to say would not have occurred without his own quite remarkable work. As I've described before in cheering these annual lectures, I first became aware of John's professional work in the mid-1980s when as a chemical and biological weapons desk officer in the Disarmament Division of Foreign Affairs Department, he was responsible almost single-handedly for the establishment of the Australia Group, founded in the wake of the use of chemical weapons by Saddam Hussein in the Iran-Iraq War with the objective, founded that organization with the objective of denying access by countries of preparation concern to chemicals and biological agents, to precursors and to dual-use equipment. In the mid-1980s again, John G started to take a very close interest in the long-stalled negotiations over a chemical weapons convention and working closely with the Defense Science and Technology scientists, Bob Matthews and Shirley Freeman, drafted the critical path for the acceleration of those negotiations, focusing particularly on the need to get industry support for an effective verification regime. That effort, with which I personally became very closely associated as Foreign Minister after 1988, ultimately bore fruit in the conclusion of the convention in 1992, which is an international achievement, I think, of which Australia can continue to be very proud. 1991, John was appointed by the UN Secretary-General to the UN Special Commission, or UNSCON, which had been set up to oversee the elimination of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction after the first Iran-Iraq war. In 1993, John was appointed Director of the Verification Division of the new OPCW, being set up in the Hague under the convention, charged with the complex and extremely politically sensitive task of developing and implementing the institutions and the procedures necessary to verify compliance with the convention. And when the convention ended into force in 1997, John became its Deputy Director-General for the next six years before returning to Australia in 2003, working at the ONA, the Office of National Assessments, until he was struck down by the illness to which we lost him, sadly, in 2007. So with that record, I have total confidence in saying that John was absolutely one of the best and brightest public servants Australia has ever produced. And I'm delighted again that we continue to have the opportunity each year to celebrate his memory, his life, his achievements through this lecture. This lecture, the first of which I was privileged to give myself in 2007, in which I've had the pleasure of chairing since 2010, was established at the particular initiative of Bob Matthews, the DSTO, then at the DSTO, who does continue to be the prime organisational mover, although he's overseas and unable to join us this evening. Initiative also of Rod Barton, who is with us this evening, was Rod, there he is. And the Lowy Institute, also, of international policy played a role, as did the SDSC here at ANU. Lectures since that first one, all of which in the series have focused one way or another on arms control related issues, have been delivered by defence specialist, now MP, Mike Kelly in 2008, former Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser in 2009, the President of the International NGO, the Ploughshares Fund, Joe Sincione in 2010, former UN Assistant Secretary General and of course, ANU Professor Ramesh Thakur in 2011, the OPCW Director, Ahmed Assumchuk, in 20, when was that, 2012, US Ambassador Chris Hill in 2014, Secretary of Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Peter Varghese in 2015, IAEA Director General, Yuki Amanah in 2016, and last year you'll remember most of you, I guess, I can recognise many familiar faces here, Stanford University's Professor Scott Sagan, one of not only America's, but the world's best known thinkers and writers on the subject of nuclear weapons. So, against that background, we could not be more privileged than to have as our 2018 lecturer, Dr. Lucina Sabo, taking as his subject an extraordinarily topical one in this nationalist, post-rationality, post-truth, post-decency, Trumpian world, the topic of preserving and protecting multilateralism to address 21st century challenges. Lassema has, Dr. Sabo, Lassema has served as Executive Secretary of the small but beautifully formed Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization, CDBTO, since August 2013, and in this role, he has cemented that organisation's position as the world's absolute centre of excellence for nuclear test ban verification, not least, of course, in the context of DPRK, nuclear testing activity in recent years. And he's continued to lead the worldwide effort, so for exhausting but fruitless, but he'll talk about that, to bring into force and universalise the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, CDBTO. Prior to his present role as head of the CDBTO, Lassema was Director of the International Data Centre within the organisation where he spearheaded the responses to the 2006, 2009, 2013 DPRK nuclear tests, as well as the 2011 triple disaster in Japan. He established and led also the CDBTO Science and Technology Conference series and managed the successful deployment of the CDBTO Virtual Data Exploration Centre, which provides an innovative framework for interacting with the wider scientific community. Lassema, I think you were Bikini Faso, national, originally. You studied at the University of Paris, but among your many other career enterprises, you have worked in leadership positions at BHB Billiton and Anglo-American PLC, overseeing activities in Africa, Asia and Australia. So you were by no means a stranger to this country. You're an extraordinarily welcome one on this occasion. So please, everyone, welcome to the podium. Our 2018 John G. Memorial Lecturer, Dr. Lassema Serba. Thank you, Gareth, for your very kind words. And let me thank you and John for inviting me to the John G. Memorial Lecture 2018. So I met John G's family, so welcome to the lecture. Pleased to meet you. I mean, when you talk about those who preceded me for this lecture, I'm wondering if I'll be up to. But let me try. So I'm pleased to be here. I'm pleased to be back in Australia. On my remark, I will briefly touch upon three key consideration in thinking about preserving and promoting multilateralism to address the 21st century challenges. So first, the current geopolitical context and increasing pressure on arms control, nuclear non-preferential and disarmament agreements. Second, the need for multilateralism and science diplomacy to address 21st century challenges. When I say science diplomacy, I think we're basically paying tribute to John G. Because he's a scientist and a diplomat. And I say, I used to be a scientist and I'm now turned to sort of a diplomat. But I don't want to be a diplomat. I want to remain a scientist. So I'm pleased to be, you know, being at this John G. Memorial to basically bring science diplomacy into the context as a solution for multilateralism. And then I'll come to that. And three, no surprise, the CTBT and its verification regime as a model for future arms control and scientific collaboration. And I think you won't blame me for that. I'm heading the Comprehensive Test Bound Treaty. So now geopolitics and arms control. Assessing the current state of geopolitics and international security. We see what most would describe as rather bleak picture. In many regions of the world, political strife, sectarian violence, intra and interstate conflicts have become all too commonplace. There is also what many view as backsliding in cooperation between the nuclear arms state on measures to reduce nuclear threat and collectively address other challenges to international peace and security. So what is perhaps most alarming is that in the past several years, we have witnessed the weakening of some of our international institutions and global norms. There is no other fields in which this has been more distressing than in the realm of arms control and non-proliferation and international security. So while the 2010 non-proliferation treaty review conference, and I hope everyone is familiar with the non-proliferation treaty review conference, adopted an action plan for nuclear disarmament, the optimism that surrounded that document has faded as key action and objective have not been met. And that's a key issue. Objective have not been met. And then we basically have a deficit of trust. And in the deficit of trust, problems come. And when I say problem come, mainly in the area of disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear weapon states continue to, non-nuclear weapon state, let me start by non-nuclear weapon state continue to question the commitment of the nuclear weapon state to move towards not only reduction in global stockpile, but also to diminish the role and significance of weapon agreed to in an action plan. So in 2015, we remember the non-proliferation treaty review conference failed to adopt the consensus final document and prospect for the current review cycle. The review cycle don't appear any better. And that's the situation we're in now. Division continue to plug the process leading up to the 220 NPT review conference. And we have to deal with those division. How to get a consensus plan, action plan that would give a positive outcome of the NPT 2020 review conference. So contentious issues have precluded agreement on any consensus substantive document in the first two NPT PREPCOM meetings. With little indication that there is progress on the horizon. This issue includes the ban treaty, call the treaty on prohibition of nuclear weapon, a WMDWN nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East, progress in disarmament by the nuclear weapon state, as well as question relating to peaceful uses of nuclear energy and verification standards for IEA safeguards. New start treaty brought modest reductions and maintain important transparency, verification and confidence building mechanism. But prospects for this renewal much less any meaningful follow on treaty are uncertain at best. Just last month we learned that the US administration plans to terminate the Intermediate Range Nuclear Force Treaty, the INF, which has been under duress for disagreement over compliance and implementation as well as effectiveness and perceived value. Throughout the Cold War and for many years after the United States and the Soviet Union now Russia managed to find ways to cooperate on various nuclear risk reduction and arms control measures. We find ourself now looking at potential new arms race between countries with each investing in modernization program and new delivery vehicle. And that's the biggest challenge that we have when we deal with arms control today. The CTBT, the Comprehensive Testment Treaty because of its burdensome entering to force provision is no closer to entering into force. And I was just talking to Garrett about it just now. Then it was six years ago when Indonesia ratified the treaty. Indonesia among the eight, no, not the eight, the annexed two country, the 44 countries which ratification is absolutely necessary for the entry into force of the Comprehensive Testment Treaty. So the last one to have ratified and then we have eight remaining countries, US, China, India, Pakistan, Iran, Israel, Egypt, and the DPRK. So among those eight, I mean you're laughing but serious. I mean that's what it is. Among those eight, we have five that have signed, the five that have signed are US, Russia, Israel, Egypt, and Iran. So the bad boys are India, Pakistan, and the DPRK. So what I'm trying to say is who want to be a bad boy? So if you don't want to be a bad boy, leave North Korea alone. And then I'm trying to see how best we can get India and Pakistan to join slowly the Comprehensive Testment Treaty. And Pakistan is an observer to the treaty. We had to get India and then I was talking to DFAT and then to many of the experts in Australia to help us get India closer and closer to the Comprehensive Testment Treaty. So as our international institution and norms come under increasing pressure, there is an accompanying erosion of trust in the United Nations and other international organizations. Instead of building upon the multilateral framework of peace and security arrangement, the trend of unilateralism has been on the rise in many corners of the world. Against this backdrop, it would be hard for some not to conclude that arms control may be a vestige of the past. There are, of course, serious challenges at play in moving an arms control and disarmament agenda forward. But let us not lose our resolve to find the diplomatic and technical solution to these difficult issues. And that leads me to the topic, multilateralism to effectively address the 21st century challenges. As Garrett mentioned, my background is in geophysics. And I began working at the CTBT as director of the International Data Center in 2004. This was my first introduction to international organization in the United Nations system. And it was a new opening, yes, a new opening to say the least. Coming from a private sector, you mentioned BHP Billitone, Anglo-American. Private sector perspective, I learned quickly that operating in an international environment required a completely different approach. And this is why I don't want to be a diplomat. Completely different approach. It became clear to me that confidence and consensus building was key to achieving success. So how do you get consensus when you have 184 countries? And you have to please 184 countries. If you please them all, it means you're not doing your job. So if some are not happy, you know that you're doing something. And then there's a feeling of progress. And this is how we navigate. And this is how we try to navigate. Let's me put it this way. So in working in an organization devoted to advancing the goals of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, it's also become apparent that these type of transponder challenges could not be contained or addressed with unilateral solutions. As I see it, there's only one future for non-proliferation and disarmament, science-based, multilaterally verified mechanism in which all states, parties, share equal rights and responsibility. And that's why I was talking about science diplomacy. And I guess this is what John G. has basically embodied by being a scientist and then being a diplomat at the same time and being one of the best civil servants as you say of Australia. So while bilateral measure will likely need to be taken in the near to midterm, it is clear to me that multilateralism will be the only true way to advance our shared objective of nuclear disarmament. If we are to make any progress towards the world free from the threat of nuclear weapons, then we need to redouble our effort to reinforce our existing multilateral institution and regime. Taking key action forward to meet the objective, because one of the issues I mentioned earlier is because we haven't met the objective of the NPT 2010 framework. So trust might be built among countries that multilateral verification measures are not only possible, but also the most effective and efficient means to promote and maintain international peace and security. National technical means of verification can take you only so far. Because often we told the international monitoring system is great that nuclear weapon countries have their national technical means. But how far that take them? And I'll come to that. But this is no substitute to multilateral measure that can provide additional level of transparency, confidence, and more importantly, credibility. One example, in particular, where multilateralists and multilateral institution can play an important role in the current situation is the current situation with the DPRK. The DPRK, where I think we should do our best not to miss an opportunity. When I say not to miss an opportunity, we talk about the only country that is basically testing nuclear weapon in the 21st century. My question is, how can we deal with this country? How can we find a solution with this country without getting the CTBT on board? We shouldn't take it as some country don't like the CTBT and therefore, when we have multilateral discussion in multilateral environment, we don't talk about CTBT because we don't want to upset a specific country. The DPRK is the only, only, only chance in arms control and non-preferential to see progress. And I mean it. I mean it because Garrett mentioned our organization framework that is technically sounded with a treaty that is not yet in force. If we don't get the DPRK to sign the Comprehensive Test Plan Treaty, if you don't get the organizational setting of the Comprehensive Test Plan Treaty to be part of the framework that will see through the denuclearization of the current peninsula, where else can we get that opportunity now? What can we tell India? What can we tell Pakistan? What can we tell Iran? There will be no other way to move forward if we miss the opportunity of the current peninsula. The capability that have been developed by the CTBT are there to be used by you if you want organizational framework to be cost effective. There's no other way to move in the DPRK, no other way to verify compliance with an agreement. I'm not talking about compliance with the CTBT because as you know, the Comprehensive Test Plan Treaty allows verification only after it's entered into force. But does it mean that if we have expertise, resources, at the service of the international community, they should not be used? I say no, we should use them. We should use them for we have to make use of what we have, and we have to be cost effective because this is what you guys are asking us to do. If you ask us to do this, let's grab the opportunity of the current peninsula to get the DPRK not only to consider signature and ratification of the CTBT, but for us to proof check that the closing of the nuclear weapon test site is irreversible because that's what we want. If we can prove that, there's still an opportunity for the DPRK to come back to nuclear testing. But even if we prove that, if the DPRK doesn't come with a legally binding signature of the Comprehensive Test Plan Treaty, the door is still open for them to resume testing at some point. And this is what we should do. So the expertise and the CTBT are there to be used, and we must use it. I often say we stand available should our member states agree to join any joint international mechanism that we'll see through the denuclearization of the current peninsula. So the question this morning was how Australia can help a lot. And that's a discussion we had this morning. Your bilateral ties with some of the country in the region, your bilateral discussion with the country that are reluctant with regard to the CTBT, we got to get the possibility to talk to them, for them to integrate the Comprehensive Test Plan Treaty as a key element to progress in arms control and on proliferation. So any agreement that would achieve the denuclearization of the current peninsula must contain guarantees against conducting nuclear test explosion. The CTBT and its verification regime can be explicitly called upon to verify this aspect of an agreement. When I say, at some time, hesitate to use the word verification, because people always remind me that you do verification when the treaty into force. But we thought the treaty would be in force within three years after its opening for signature. We're more than 22 years beyond. And the treaty is still not in force, but we have an organization that no one can stop. It's a baby that has grown, grown, grown. And as my predecessor said, the baby has grown in the same shirt. Can you take that in your mind a bit to see a baby growing in the same shirt? And then the shirt is getting smaller and smaller, and then the shirt cracks. And you have no way than dealing with that baby. And that's what the CTBT is today. We can push the CTBT back in any bottle. You have to deal with it. So even while political circumstances surrounding the CTBT remain challenging, there is no doubt about the organization's technical capability to provide effective verification of a nuclear test ban and also of disagreement with the DPRK. The CTBT seems to be the only organizational framework of the proven competencies and capability to provide adequate verification to monitor and end to nuclear tests in North Korea. I mean, that sentence is very important, because I'm not saying the CTBT is the only organization to deal with the deducialization of the Korean Peninsula. I'm talking about providing verification and compliance with nuclear tests. There's no other organization. So with the DPRK, the lease would be to get the DPRK to march the United States with its signature if you don't want to push forward. But better and in an ideal situation, I would want to wake up an NC chairman Kim Yong who said, look, I'm so serious about denuclearizing that I would want to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty together with China and the United States. That would be so beautiful. And that will change completely your geopolitical context today. And it might give room for positive light towards the NPT 2020. And this is why I'm saying we should not miss this opportunity. We have to get DPRK on board. And we have to get China to play a leadership role. China is a key player in the Korean Peninsula issue. China has been showing leadership in climate change under difficult circumstances. China should show leadership with the CTBT. They should not wait for the United States. They should join the DPRK in ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and opening the door to have nuclear tests forever. So we have been presented with a clear opening to bring the DPRK into the CTBT. That's an opportunity to get this DPRK on board. So closing the test site, but also agreeing to the IMS monitoring as part of the non-testing guarantee or by formally signing and ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The situation we see today may be best. Best be described as a litmus test moment for the international community. That's exactly what I say just now. The DPRK has been the top concern with regard to nuclear testing over the past 12 years. If the CTBT and its verification capability are not considered relevant for providing a very viable stop on nuclear testing in the DPRK, then when will they be? No other opportunity, hopefully. And this brings me to the CTBT and its verification regime as a model for future arms control and scientific collaboration. Finally, I would like to highlight how I believe the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty can play a crucial role as both a model for future multilateral arms control measures as well as a platform for promoting confidence and scientific collaboration in support of diplomacy. For decades before negotiation began their work in Geneva, a group of international scientific experts held discussion aimed at working out the technical requirement for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty verification regime. I was talking to Rob Floyd early in the afternoon about the FMCT, what they need. It's the same type of discussion, bringing experts from around the world to reflect on what could be a future FMCT. And that's what was done in the case of the CTBT to make it as strong as it is today. So this technical engagement established relationship built trust among parties and eventually led to the development of a solid technical foundation for when the political landscape was favorable for formal negotiation to begin. And this is probably what we need, Rob, for the FMCT. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty has now 184 state signatories. That means that states have taken on an international obligation not to test, but that's not all. There are other obligations that states undertake when signing the treaty. When I say 184 countries that have signed the treaty, often when I talk to students, they say, but with 184 countries, why isn't the treaty enforced? And John Carson, that brings me to one of the topics you mentioned today. Maybe what we need, leadership not only from the usual suspect, but leadership from Australia to gather traction with the country that have ratified the treaty, country that have signed the treaty to decide that, hey, guys, you know what? We de facto enforce. That's probably what we need. If you talk about provisional application, provisional application goes into legal and legal and legal battle. And that's why I don't want to be a lawyer, too, by the way. So someone has to come from somewhere and then lead this initiative to decide. No, maybe not to decide. Decide is probably a stronger word. To agree that the CTBT is the de facto not only a norm, effective norm, again, nuclear testing, but that we can move on with a verification mechanism because the international community needs it. The point is with the CTBT, we've always dealt with a country that test and then say that they test because they want to show that they're strong. But have you thought of a situation where a country will test and not mention it, basically trying to evade this treaty? So that would put a great challenge to the international community and to the system as well. Some people say, we're still relevant because the DPRK is testing. But I'm saying the DPRK is the only country to test because the international monitoring system of the CTBT exists. So let's see this international monitoring system and the verification regime in the build up as a deterrent. But when I say deterrent, I hate to use this word because when you say deterrent, it's about weapon deterrents. And then people think that I'm a proponent of nuclear weapon. So that's why I don't use the word deterrent. But I'm talking about the deterrence that the CTBT and its international monitoring brings not to allow country to test. So we've developed this deterrence not only with the IMS International Monitoring System and the International Data Center. But we've had large scale exercises to build our on-site inspection capability. If I don't talk about on-site inspection, Malcolm Koskett will complain because he's one of our task leaders. So and Malcolm Koskett has made Australia the champion in on-site inspection. So let me mention this. But unfortunately, or fortunately, right now, some country do not believe in the on-site inspection capability. Not the capability. They don't want the on-site inspection in actual. Because on-site inspection allows to intrude a country or a space where we think nuclear test explosion has happened. But we need that. After doing remote monitoring, if you detect, you have to verify. And to verify, you need on-site inspection. So trust by verify. And when I say trust by verify, it reminds me of something I read in the US when I visited the Air Force Technical Center. It was written in world with trust. No, in God we trust, all other, we monitor. So that's basically the CTBT. In God we trust, but we should monitor all others. So we've developed a verification regime that is now strong. We have our biannual science and technology series of conference that gather nearly 1,000 people, experts from around the world, to allow us to think out of the box. Because one thing I found out in joining multilateral diplomacy and then scientists that are locked in their own environment is they think they are the hub of the universe. They think they're the best in the world. And then they don't listen to scientists outside. And that's why Malcolm will remember we had data confidentiality. And we couldn't open ourselves to the rest of the world. We couldn't give our data for civil and scientific application. Garrett mentioned that I've gone through many of the crisis, like the tsunami in 2004 and the DPRK. But when we had the tsunami in 2004, people came and said, but what is this organization that have so a wealth of data that could serve and then help international community for warning for tsunami and not making it available to the rest of the world? We had hundreds of deaths in Indonesia and Thailand. And then we're basically forced to contribute with our data. But it took us two and a half years to convince and get the consensus that would lead to providing data to the international community. This is how difficult consensus is when you deal with more than 180 states. And this is why multilateral is difficult but a must. Because when you have consensus, it's strong. And this is why the comprehensive test on treaty, although not in force, if we manage to get this treaty, that is the only multilateral agreement that has that close, where a chosen number of countries should ratify to get it into force, it will be the strongest ever in the history, not only of arms control and disarmament, but also of multilateral diplomacy. And this is why I'm so proud to champion this initiative, to champion the CTBT, and then to try and get it into force. Will I get it? That's not the issue. But I want to put my part of the seeds that will prepare for the entry into force. And this is why I invested in the next generation, the youth, youth for CTBT. When I say youth for CTBT, youth for CTBT gather now more than 500 young people from around the world. But more importantly, more Indian and Pakistani than any other national. Indian, Pakistan, those are two countries that have not signed a treaty. Why would you get young people from those countries to be so determined and so engaged? Both scientists and policymakers. One of the answer that I have is, at this age, you do what you're told not to do. Because you're young, you want to do. But the other way is that you want to change the world. You don't want the world to be what you live in now. You want a different world for yourself, and then the generation to come. So the younger generation will change the paradigm. The younger generation will get the CTBT into force. And Malcolm, you will remember Bob Cameron. Bob Cameron is 82 years old. He worked most of his life for this treaty. And he said, I will never retire until the treaty get into force. He's American. So when I visit the US, I tell them, you may not want to ratify the CTBT. But you want Bob Cameron to retire. So do something for us. OK? So this is what I'm trying to do. But I'm saying this because you should know, I don't want to miss any opportunity to get the CTBT to get closer to his entry into force. If the American could have the compassion to get Bob to deal and then take care of his grandkids, then they should ratify the CTBT. And this is what we try and tell them. So a lot has been done. But a lot still remain. And people often say, we are victim of our success. Success because this is a great organization. A great technical framework that serves multilateral diplomacy. So what we have to do is what I just read recently in one magazine, that humankind today faces three common problems that make a mockery of all national borders and that can only be solved through global cooperation. These are nuclear war, climate change, and technological disruptions. So those issues cannot be dealt with bilaterally. So to make progress and any progress towards a world free from nuclear threat, we must complete the unfinished business of getting the Comprehensive Testment Treaty into force. I look forward to addressing these and other issues during our discussion. Thank you so much. Thank you, Lassima. Incredibly impressive leadership of an incredibly impressive organization, but an enormously frustrating task. We couldn't have it in better hands, but there it is. You've heard the storyline. You've heard the nature of the challenge. We're open now to comments and questions. If you were on the floor, who would like to start? Could you please introduce yourself? Hi, Simon. Well, he is my name. I'm the director of this policy institute. I study international relations when I was at the University of Queensland. And the problem with the DPRK was one that we constantly argued about. How realistic is it to get them to agree to the CTPT? I mean, they are a pro-I state. They were not allowing inspectors how realistic is it that it could ever happen? Given that at the moment, the best that they seem to be able to do, and this is a feature of common states, is to talk and take. They would be talking, talking, and talking. And they have been talking since 1994 when President Clinton wanted to form the young, young reactor. Why would it be any different in, say, to any of these world views for them? OK. I tend to go along your line when you say that they will not allow inspectors, OK? But here's why I think the CTPT can make a difference. They've started by saying, we're closing our nuclear weapon test site. They've invited journalists already. But among the journalists, it would have been great if we had scientists with equipment for a short period of time to showcase that they can do some measurement and allow others to come. Dealing the test site to me is the simplest thing that we can do in addressing the DPRK issue. But bringing inspectors into checking the uranium processing, the plutonium processing, it's a much complicated issue. So if they would not allow a group of experts from different countries to help them show to the international community that the test site is irreversibly close, then I agree with you that there's no way they will allow inspectors from any organization framework to go and inspect the nuclear power plants or processing facilities. But should we say, OK, that's it? We leave it there? No. They're coming up with a light that we must see through and then allow them to be trusted. What is the DPRK issue right now? It's their security, at least that's what they say. Some are of the view that they would not give anything if they don't receive something in a share. And this is basically what you're saying. But what do they want now? I think there's a lot of progress that has been made. Stopping, for instance, the exercises that they've ordered, but that's not happening for some time. They've stopped testing as well. They've stopped not only nuclear weapon testing but missile testing. So one can hope that there is an opportunity there to grab. But that opportunity takes leadership, leadership from those countries who are directly involved, and in China, and in US, and in Russia, to talk about the nuclear weapon countries. But you have also South Korea. But South Korea has done a lot by trying to be closer and closer to DPRK. But I think I shocked some of the people this morning when I say, when you talk to students in South Korea today, I mean, you have mixed views. Some are saying, we want to get closer to the DPRK so that as one country we have nuclear weapon. That's not something to ignore. But some would say, we want to get closer to DPRK so that the condition is that they give up the nuclear weapon. So where do you stand? And then we go to Japan. Some will tell you, young generation, if the DPRK is developing nuclear weapon and the international community can do nothing for our safety and security, we would want to develop as well. And I'm sure if you look into younger generation in Australia, looking at your geographical situation, if nothing is done with the Korean Peninsula, you may start seeing people talking more and more about why not Australia? And if why not Australia, why not Africa again? Because that's what I hear in Africa when I go. They say, South Africa made a great mistake by getting rid of its nuclear weapon. It's not good to hear this. But it's not because DPRK represent that biggest challenge that they will not allow anyone to go, that we shouldn't have strong and constructive leadership to get them on board and then to talk to them. When I say talk to them, I'll give you one example before I hand off with your question. When we, I won't say celebrate, when we went into the 20 years anniversary of the Comprehensive Test and Treaty Open for Signature, I decided to invite the DPRK to come to the Congregation in Vienna. And people were telling me, why do you invite them? We don't deal with DPRK. But how do we get DPRK to join the CTBT if you don't invite them? That's a difficulty in diplomacy. Yes, ma'am. Well, Matthew's retired Chief Executive Officer. Dr. Zerber, thank you again for your presentation. I can understand the frustration with your policy where in a multilateral setting, very often you get a progress in your consensus. And in bilateral discussions with the two countries, you often receive these standard talking points from them. But I want to, have you thought about coming to the chain and whether the CTBTO would perhaps organize a leaders meeting of the two countries? From public experience, including a short time in APEC, very often the leaders meetings are where we get decisions where officials can break through the meeting. I just thought, is that something that the CTBTO could organize perhaps to go on to some other meeting? I mean, this is basically my dream. During the 20th anniversary, we tried to bring not only leaders of annexed two countries, but the five nuclear weapons states under the NPT to join the Congregation in Vienna. For what we wanted was a strong statement by those five that they're serious about the CTBT and they're together serious about nuclear non-proliferation and the Zerber one. But as you know, among those leaders, it's, are you going? If one said no, I'm not sure, then there's no decision from the other because no one wants to be the first to go and then find themselves alone. And they forget that it takes one to say, I'm going for others to say I will come as well. So we got at some point three that were confirmed coming and then with a light that a fourth and possibly a fifth one will send somebody at high level. And then in the end, no one came. No one came, but we had people at the ministerial level. And one of the champion in this ministerial level supported the CTBT's Federica Mogherini. But I'll step back to the recent discussion of the Security Council. I was there, chaired by President Trump. The great supporters of the CTBT, some of them in their statement, didn't even mention the entry into force of the CTBT. So how about that? You come and tell me in Vienna, you support the CTBT, you're sitting at the Security Council meeting where you should defend and promote and advocate for the CTBT and you just don't mention it in your statement. How's that? So what I see in this, you talk about diplomacy, of course, many of you write the talking point for your leaders. Don't forget the CTBT. Don't forget the CTBT. You go to NATO today. For the past four years, we have negotiated a text in the NATO report that calls for the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Last year, this test was amended to say, we call and support the IMS and the IDC. How about that? So we're going backwards, okay? And then when I get in a situation where a country like Russia basically uses its strengths in the CTBT because they've ratified, they sign and ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and they're competing to be the next country to complete the segment of the International Monetary System. They brag about the CTBT and then they say, this is how we saw well-engaged in non-preferential design. So you sit in that framework where you're dealing with Russia and then they seem in different platforms are not compliant. So what do we do? What do we do? So what we need is probably not leadership from the usual suspects. We need leadership and traction from countries like Australia and many others in the developing world to help push some arms control agreement to their hand, to finish basically the CTBT or to find alternative solution to show to the international community that we're serious about non-preferential but we're serious about design. If we don't do that, we have the ban treaty on our head because the ban treaty comes from the frustration for no progress in arms control and non-preferential and that's why they come with all or nothing because we can't get any traction with treaties that have been pending for so long like the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty or the FMCT which is still not a baby yet but yet to come. Yes, I believe. Hi, thanks for the lecture, it was really good to meet you. My name's Ethan and I also study potential relations. You mentioned the INF Treaty and the forthcoming extension or possibility extension of the new stuff. Do you see them as related to the CTBT? So obviously the US notified Russia last month that they were on the floor and if Russia and the US aren't talking about extending the INF Treaty or through negotiating through extension of the new stuff, do you think there's also no chance that they're going through the US not going to notify the CTBT? Do you see them as related? No, I don't see the each, the start treaty and the INF directly related to the CTBT. If it was when it was negotiated under the Obama administration, we should have had the CTBT immediately after. So that showed that those two are not related. But what this brings is again this deficit of trust that we're talking about. If there's no agreement about among the two countries that have the most nuclear weapon on this planet, how do you want other countries to believe? How do you want other countries to feel about their security? And that's one of the challenges we have right now. And when people feel insecure, they're finding other means. And the DPRK is supposedly in that situation. And you know, one thing that really shocks me is, you know, today people say, when I go and talk to younger generation, they say, look, it seems to us that the only way to be listened to is to have nuclear weapon. I hope you don't recall this, but that's what you hear. So, because with the doubt, who knows? In 2006, when the DPRK started testing and then the international, oh no, that's a fair test. They're not serious, those guys. They came in 2009. Oh, we're not sure. Two-thirteen. And then the world is shocked by the power of the explosive that they detonated. And then we say, okay, no one knows whether they have it or not. And now we say, they probably have it. So we should have dealt with them since 2006 and be maybe a little bit forceful, but constructive in getting them to join, to move in a different direction than where they were. So to your question, INF start not directly linked to the CTBT. I think that's a strategic question among the big players. It's probably more related to China than it is to Russia today. Because when you look at the INF, it's among US and Russia, but I'm sure the international community would want to see other nuclear weapons and join the INF to stop that possibility of nuclear andrace. Doug, Kane? My name is Doug Kane. I work for the Office of National Assessments, which was the last organisation, as Gareth mentioned, that John G worked for. One of John's outstanding characteristics was optimism that kept him going. So I'd like to inject some optimism into the discussion with the suggestion... This is deeply out of character, Doug, but... LAUGHTER Let's enjoy it while it lasts. That's what I'm certainly going to do. I think one could argue that international pressures, multilateral pressures, economic sanctions are more effective than they used to be in restraining proliferation and the move to nuclear testing. After all, the rate of proliferation has slowed as the years go by, and it's possible North Korea will be the last country to explode a nuclear weapon. Do you accept anything I just said? I wish North Korea is the last country to explode a nuclear weapon. But when you talk about sanctions, I have mixed feelings about the power of sanctions. North Korea developed this capability under sanctions. Let's not forget that. North Korea has developed its capability, the capability that they have right now under sanctions. So if sanctions worked, how did they manage to get to a position where you have doubt now whether they have nuclear weapons or not? That's a question we should ask ourselves. If we say today that the long-term sanctions is what is pushing North Korea to come to the table of negotiations, maybe. But as he said, are we there? Are they stopping or reversing anything? Not there yet. They're talking. And he said they've been talking for 10 years, or even more. So the question is, how effective can we see those sanctions? And I was in a discussion about Iran where they say the number of processing fatalities has gone five times more under sanctions than what Iran was capable of doing before the sanctions. So a sanction working. What I've seen, when you apply sanctions, you give an opportunity for the country to unite. And then for the country to say, we want to fight against those who are applying those sanctions to us. You're basically giving to the leadership of the country the possibility to gather more support than anything else. This is what we see today. If you see all those rallies when they're sanctioned, it's not because they support the government. It's because they're against what is applying to them as civil society and people who will suffer the consequences of those sanctions. So I have mixed feelings. I don't want to say one way or another, but let's hope that North Korea is the last one, but North Korea will be the last one if we're serious about moving and progressing once we control that non-proliferation. We have time for just one or two more questions before a reception awaiting us outside. So, and then, lady over there. Thank you for lecture, Dr. Berger. My question is regarding India and Pakistan. As they're relational of private security, would it be beneficial to get them to for maybe Australia to facilitate a bilateral agreement? Because maybe once compliance depends on the others. So if Australia could facilitate a bilateral agreement between the two, does all they actually comply with the CDBDO? I think you're saying what I've been talking earlier on, which is the role that countries like Australia can play with India and Pakistan and many others. Pakistan is an observer to the CTBT and Pakistan has been voicing the need for India to join them to move on the CTBT and many other arms control agreement. Are they serious about it? At least this is what they're telling me. They've offered publicly that India join them on a bilateral agreement on a moratorium against nuclear testing. So India hasn't moved yet. But probably because it's a pride that India takes that they don't want to be taught or to be told what to do. They want to decide themselves. And that's the same thing with the NSG, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, as I was talking earlier as well. With the Nuclear Suppliers Group, you come with a number of countries, 48, 49, who have all signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and India and Pakistan trying to join the NSG. And some countries coming forcefully and saying, no, the precondition for you joining is a signature or a ratification or even joining by, you know, at least approaching the CTBT. You know, why would India want to be put against the rope? I mean, if you know boxing, you know, a boxer is stronger when he's against the rope because he has no other job than punching back. That's basically the situation India might be in. So I think Australia can find a platform where they get India to be sympathetic to the CTBT without putting the CTBT as a precondition to joining the NSG or any other agreement that India and Australia might have or Australia and Pakistan might have. And one of the solutions that I was saying was why not Australia in the embassy in Delhi or in Islamabad organizing a seminar where they talk about the whole scope of arms control, non-preflation, disarmament and inviting CTBT at least for people who haven't heard about the CTBT for so long to listen and then to see where we are and to see how key this treaty is in arms control and non-preflation today. That might make a difference. Last question. Sir, thank you so much for one cool lecture and I agree with the perspective that it went through and just a question from a lot of perspective of disarmament when countries in their old respective zones like Russia versus the US or the Korean Peninsula or in the south continent that you see everyone has this relative sense of insecurity with their so-called rivals having more strength in the nuclear arena. What is the way forward and how can CTBT you don't have the eventual pull of disarmament and how can say non-nuclear countries also join in? How can CTBT help? I'm tempted to say today I only see the CTBT as a way to move or to progress in arms control. Not only the CTBT but the FMCT offers as well that platform. I see the CTBT as a low hanging fruit in arms control and non-proliferation. When you look at the overall scope in that field what do we have on the table? We got the GCPOA after so many years but the GCPOA seems to be a limbo but at the same time strongly supported by the rest of the international community. I talk about the deficit of trust. What issue brings the perception of consensus right now? If you look at the last resolution at the General Assembly the first committee on CTBT only one country voted against it's DPRK and one country abstained it's the US. So, not that bad but if you take any other agreement you find far more country going against or abstaining than you would see on the CTBT. So what does it mean? It means that with a little bit more work we can get people to at least move on the CTBT to prepare the ground for other arms control agreement. If we don't get that how on earth can we do about achieving a nuclear weapon free world? You need a nuclear test free world before you achieve a nuclear weapon free world for the CTBT is a low hanging fruit. Mr. Secretary just a couple of comments on my own before we wind up I think the senior is absolutely right to point to the centrality of the North Korean issue in terms of signposting the way forward if we can get a breakthrough notwithstanding the narcissistic barfurnery of the prime mover and achieving that breakthrough it really is going to make potentially quite a big circuit breaking difference and I have to say that I share some of my senior's optimism at one point about talking and taking in the past I mean I was around during the 95 negotiations as Australian Foreign Minister I was around very closely observing things from the National Crisis Group in the 2005-06 negotiations and in both of those cases I do not ascribe the sole blame at all to Pyongyang for walking away from those negotiations it really was not followed through on the western side in the way there should have been there was a dismissal about the obligations that were involved not taking them seriously a belief in the inherent weakness of the other side and that they could be ignored so my belief is that the sort of trust-building approach that the South Koreans under Moon Jae-in is advancing at the moment is potentially a very, very important way forward and that we ought to be giving a lot more encouragement to that side of the negotiations and the US currently seems prepared because at the end of the day North Korea's relies on nuclear weapons is essentially psychological rather than rational they know they can't use these things to do them, to use any of the weapons they have would turn themselves into a carpark with the next 24 hours it's possible it's rationally possible to find a way through that and I think it don't take too much account of things that have gone wrong in the past there's at least a couple of sides to that story the other point that I would make is and I think the other very important and helpful point that was seen and made was about the role of countries like Australia middle powers out there and not weapons states ourselves but with a reasonably influential voice in the wider community if we choose to exercise it in a coalition building kind of a way as we have in the past in Australia and I think one particular role for Australia to play is identifying a way forward on the disarmament story between the absolutism of the ban treaty which you just never going to get by into from any of the nuclear arms states to the absolute negatives and the those who talk the talk but don't do anything at all and I think an identification of the particular key steps forward no first use doctrine, reduced deployments taking weapons off alert status and reducing numbers well not and of course CTBT and FNCT as part of that story as well it's a very important agenda to be articulating we did that in the Australian Japan Commission the Kevin Rudd Commission we don't get a mention in his biography just as a cat gets two pages but the international commission doesn't get any he blames it on the publishers who apparently had to chop out about 500 pages of text from the 600 that we are presently pleasuring in the public but there is an identification out there and Australia has been part of that in the past we haven't been under the current regime because it's not the size of the interest but come the next six months or so injecting another little note of optimism I think there really will be a commitment to try and energize worldwide a drive towards realistic objectives in this area and maybe to enlist the support of countries like China who have been very keen to no first use and are to be taken seriously I think in that respect India notionally very notionally is committed to it so don't lose our optimism and one of the things that keeps my optimism alive is that despite the the lesion of dross that's out there in the international diplomatic community we do have some real stars some real stars in that mix people with extraordinary technical competence extraordinary diplomatic competence extraordinary leadership competence we've done a demonstrably magical job in incredibly frustrating circumstances in taking the game forward the CDBUTO is one of the great success stories of multilateral cooperation and I think we've it's been a very great pleasure and a privilege for all of us tonight to have you with us, Lucina, to tell us that story thank you