 Question 160 of Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde. Triatis on the Cardinal Virtues, The Virtue of Temperance. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde. Triatis on the Cardinal Virtues, The Virtue of Temperance. By St. Thomas Aquinas. Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 160 of Modesty in two articles. We must now consider modesty. And one, modesty in general. Two, each of its species. Under the first head, there are two points of inquiry. First, whether modesty is a part of temperance. Second, what is the matter of modesty? First article, whether modesty is a part of temperance. Objection one, you would seem that modesty is not a part of temperance. For modesty is denominated from mode. Now mode is requisite in every virtue, since virtue is directed to good. And good, according to Augustine, in On the Nature of Good III, consists in mode, species, and order. Therefore, modesty is a general virtue, and consequently, should not be reckoned a part of temperance. Objection two, further, temperance would seem to be deserving of praise chiefly on account of its moderation. Now this gives modesty its name. Therefore, modesty is the same as temperance, and not one of its parts. Objection three, further, modesty would seem to regard the correction of our neighbor, according to 2 Timothy 2 verses 24 and 25. The servant of the Lord must not wrangle, but be mild towards all men, with modesty admonishing them that resist the truth. Now admonishing wrongdoers is an act of justice or of charity, as stated above in question 33 article 1. Therefore, seemingly modesty is a part of justice, rather than of temperance. On the contrary, Tully, and On the Art of Rhetoric 254, reckons modesty as a part of temperance. I answer that, as stated above in question 141 article 4, as well as in question 157 article 3. Temperance brings moderation into those things wherein it is most difficult to be moderate, namely the concupiscences of pleasures of touch. Now whenever there is a special virtue about some matter of very great moment, there must needs be another virtue about matters of lesser import, because the life of man requires to be regulated by the virtues with regard to everything. Thus it was stated above in question 134 article 3, first reply, that while magnificence is about great expenditure, there is need in addition for liberality, which is concerned with ordinary expenditure. Hence there is need for a virtue to moderate other lesser matters where moderation is not so difficult. This virtue is called modesty, and is annexed to temperance as its principle. Reply to Objection 1. When a name is common to many, it is sometimes appropriated to those of the lowest rank. Thus the common name of angel is appropriated to the lowest order of angels. In the same way, mode, which is observed by all virtues in common, is specially appropriated to the virtue which prescribes the mode in the slightest things. Reply to Objection 2. Some things need tempering on account of their strength. Thus we temper strong wine. But moderation is necessary in all things, where for temperance is more concerned with strong passions and modesty about weaker passions. Reply to Objection 3. Modesty is to be taken there for the general moderation which is necessary in all virtues. Second article. Whether modesty is only about outward actions. Objection 1. It would seem that modesty is only about outward actions. For the inward movements of the passions cannot be known to other persons. Yet the Apostle enjoins in Philippians 4-5. Let your modesty be known to all men. Therefore modesty is only about outward actions. Objection 2. Further, the virtues that are about the passions are distinguished from justice, which is about operations. Now modesty is seemingly one virtue. Therefore, if it be about outward works, it will not be concerned with inward passions. Objection 3. Further, no one same virtue is about things pertaining to the appetite, which is proper to the moral virtues, and about things pertaining to knowledge, which is proper to the intellectual virtues. And again about things pertaining to the irrationable and concupisable faculties. Therefore, if modesty be one virtue, it cannot be about all these things. On the contrary, in all these things it is necessary to observe the mode whence modesty takes its name. Therefore modesty is about all of them. I answer that as stated above in Article 1. Modesty differs from temperance, in that temperance moderates those matters where restraint is most difficult, while modesty moderates those that present less difficulty. Authorities seem to have had various opinions about modesty. For wherever they found a special kind of good or a special difficulty of moderation, they withdrew it from the province of modesty, which they confined to lesser matters. Now it is clear to all that the restraint of pleasures of touch presents a special difficulty, wherefore all distinguished temperance from modesty. In addition to this, moreover, Tully, in the Art of Rhetoric 254, considered that there was a special kind of good in the moderation of punishment, wherefore he severed clemency also from modesty and held modesty to be about the remaining ordinary matters that require moderation. These seemingly are of four kinds. One is the movement of the mind towards some excellence, and this is moderated by humility. The second is the desire of things pertaining to knowledge, and this is moderated by studiousness, which is opposed to curiosity. The third regards bodily movements and actions, which require to be done becomingly and honestly. Whether we act seriously or in play. The fourth regards outward show, for instance, in dress and the like. To some of these matters, however, other authorities appointed certain special virtues, thus Andronicus in On the Affection's Mentions, meekness, simplicity, humility, and other kindred virtues of which we have spoken above in question 143. While Aristotle, in Ethics 2.7, assigned eotrapalia to pleasures in games, as stated above in the Paris Prima Secundae, Question 60, Article 5. All these are comprised under modesty as understood by Tully, and in this way modesty regards not only outward, but also inward actions. Reply to Objection 1. The Apostle speaks of modesty as regarding externals. Nevertheless, the moderation of the inner man may be shown by certain outward signs. Reply to Objection 2. Various virtues assigned by various authorities are comprised under modesty, wherefore nothing prevents modesty from regarding matters which require different virtues. Yet there is not so great a difference between the various parts of modesty as there is between justice, which is about operations, and temperance, which is about passions. Because in actions and passions that present no great difficulty on the part of the matter, but only on the part of moderation, there is but one virtue, one namely for each kind of moderation. Wherefore the reply to the Third Objection also is clear. End of Question 160. Read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert, LC. Question 161, a Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde. Triatis on the Cardinal Virtues. The Virtue of Temperance. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde. Triatis on the Cardinal Virtues. The Virtue of Temperance. By St. Thomas Aquinas. Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 161 of Humility in Six Articles. We must consider next the species of modesty. One, humility and pride which is opposed to it. Two, studiousness and its opposite curiosity. Three, modesty as affecting words or deeds. Four, modesty as affecting outward attire. Concerning humility, there are six points of inquiry. First, whether humility is a virtue. Second, whether it resides in the appetite or in the judgment of reason. Third, whether by humility one ought to subject oneself to all men. Fourth, whether it is a part of modesty or temperance. Fifth, of its comparison with the other virtues. Sixth, of the degrees of humility. First article, whether humility is a virtue. Objection one, it would seem that humility is not a virtue. For virtue conveys the notion of a good. But humility conveys the notion of a penal evil according to Psalm 114.18. They humbled his feet in fetters. Therefore, humility is not a virtue. Objection two, further, virtue and vice are mutually opposed. Now humility seemingly denotes a vice, for it is written in Ecclesiasticus 1923. There is one that humbleth himself wickedly. Therefore, humility is not a virtue. Objection three, further, no virtue is opposed to another virtue. But humility is apparently opposed to the virtue of magnanimity, which aims at great things, whereas humility shuns them. Therefore, it would seem that humility is not a virtue. Objection four, further, virtue is the disposition of that which is perfect according to Physics 717. But humility seemingly belongs to the imperfect. Wherefore, it becomes not God to be humble, since he can be subject to none. Therefore, it seems that humility is not a virtue. Objection five, further, every moral virtue is about actions and passions according to Ethics 23. But humility is not reckoned by the philosopher among the virtues that are about passions, nor is it comprised under justice, which is about actions. Therefore, it would seem not to be a virtue. On the contrary, Origen, commenting on Luke 148, he hath regarded the humility of his handmade, says in his homily eight on the Gospel of Luke. One of the virtues, humility, is particularly commended in holy writ. For our Savior said, Learn of me, because I am meek and humble of heart. I answer that, as stated above in the Bar's Prima Secunde, question 23, article 2, when we were treating of the passions. The difficult good has something attractive to the appetite, namely the aspect of good, and likewise something repulsive to the appetite, namely the difficulty of obtaining it. In respect of the former, there arises the movement of hope, and in respect of the latter, the movement of despair. Now it has been stated above in the Bar's Prima Secunde, question 61, article 2, that for those appetitive movements which are a kind of impulse towards an object, there is need of a moderating and restraining moral virtue. While for those which are a kind of recoil, there is need on the part of the appetite of a moral virtue to strengthen it and urge it on. Wherefore, a twofold virtue is necessary with regard to the difficult good, one to temper and restrain the mind, lest it tend to hide things immoderately, and this belongs to the virtue of humility, and another to strengthen the mind against despair and urge it on to the pursuit of great things according to right reason, and this is magnanimity. Therefore, it is evident that humility is a virtue. Reply to Objection 1, as Isidor observes in his Atomologies, 10, A humble man is so called because he is, as it were, Translators note, literally, bent to the ground, that is, inclined to the lowest place. This may happen in two ways. First, through an extrinsic principle, for instance, when one is cast down by another, and this humility is a punishment. Secondly, through an intrinsic principle, and this may be done sometimes well, for instance, when a man, considering his own failings, assumes the lowest place according to his mode. Thus Abraham said to the Lord in Genesis 1827, I will speak to my Lord, whereas I am dust and ashes. In this way, humility is a virtue. Sometimes, however, this may be ill done, for instance, when a man, not understanding his honor, compares himself to senseless beasts and becomes like to them, Psalm 4813. Reply to Objection 2, as stated in the first reply, Humility, insofar as it is a virtue, conveys the notion of a praiseworthy self-abasement to the lowest place. Now, this is sometimes done merely as to outward signs and pretense, wherefor this is false humility, of which Augustine says in a letter, his letter 149, that it is grievous pride. Since, to wit, it would seem to aim at excellence of glory. Sometimes, however, this is done by an inward movement of the soul, and in this way, properly speaking, humility is reckoned a virtue, because virtue does not consist in externals, but chiefly in the inward choice of the mind, as the philosopher states in Ethics 2.5. Reply to Objection 3, Humility restrains the appetite from aiming at great things against right reason, while magnanimity urges the mind to great things in accord with right reason. Hence, it is clear that magnanimity is not opposed to humility. Indeed, they concur on this, that each is according to right reason. Reply to Objection 4, A thing is said to be perfect in two ways. First, absolutely. Such a thing contains no defect, neither in its nature, nor in respect of anything else, and thus God alone is perfect. To him, humility is fitting, not as regards his divine nature, but only as regards his assumed nature. Secondly, a thing may be said to be perfect in a restricted sense, for instance, in respect of its nature or state or time. Thus, a virtuous man is perfect, although in comparison with God, his perfection is found wanting, according to the word of Isaiah, Chapter 40, Verse 17. All nations are before him, as if they had no being at all. In this way, humility may be competent to every man. Reply to Objection 5. The philosopher intended to treat of virtues as directed to civic life, wherein the subjection of one man to another is defined according to the ordinance of the law, and consequently is a matter of legal justice. But humility, considered as a special virtue, regards chiefly the subjection of man to God, for whose sake he humbles himself by subjecting himself to others. Second article, whether humility has to do with the appetite. Objection 1. It would seem that humility concerns not the appetite, but the judgment of reason, because humility is opposed to pride. Now pride concerns things pertaining to knowledge, for Gregory says in his commentary on Job 3422 that, pride, when it extends outwardly to the body, is first of all shown in the eyes. Wherefore it is written in Psalm 130 verse 1, Lord, my heart is not exalted, nor are my eyes lofty. Now eyes are the chief aids to knowledge. Therefore it would seem that humility is chiefly concerned with knowledge, whereby one thinks little of oneself. Objection 2. Further Augustine says in on virginity 31 that, almost the whole of Christian teaching is humility. Consequently, nothing contained in Christian teaching is incompatible with humility. Now Christian teaching admonishes us to seek the better things, according to 1 Corinthians 1231, be zealous for the better gifts. Therefore it belongs to humility to restrain not the desire of difficult things, but the estimate thereof. Objection 3. Further it belongs to the same virtue both to restrain excessive movement and to strengthen the soul against excessive withdrawal. Thus fortitude both curbs daring and fortifies the soul against fear. Now it is magnanimity that strengthens the soul against the difficulties that occur in the pursuit of great things. Therefore if humility were to curb the desire of great things, you would follow that humility is not a distinct virtue from magnanimity, which is evidently false. Therefore humility is concerned not with the desire, but with the estimate of great things. Objection 4. Further Andronicus in on the affections assigns humility to outward show. For he says that humility is the habit of avoiding excessive expenditure and parade. Therefore it is not concerned with the movement of the appetite. On the contrary, Augustine says in his sermon 351 on penance that the humble man is one who chooses to be an abject in the house of the Lord, rather than to dwell in the tents of sinners. But choice concerns the appetite. Therefore humility has to do with the appetite rather than with the estimative power. I answer that as stated above in article 1. It belongs properly to humility that a man restrain himself from being born towards that which is above him. For this purpose he must know his disproportion to that which surpasses his capacity. Hence knowledge of one's own deficiency belongs to humility as a rule guiding the appetite. Nevertheless, humility is essentially in the appetite itself and consequently it must be said that humility, properly speaking, moderates the movement of the appetite. Reply to objection 1. Lofty eyes are a sign of pride in as much as it excludes respect and fear. For fearing and respectful persons are especially want to lower the eyes as though not daring to compare themselves with others. But it does not follow from this that humility is essentially concerned with knowledge. Reply to objection 2. It is contrary to humility to aim at greater things through confiding in one's own powers. But to aim at greater things through confidence in God's help is not contrary to humility, especially since the more one subjects oneself to God, the more is one exalted in God's sight. Hence Augustine says in Unvirginity 31. It is one thing to raise oneself to God and another to raise oneself up against God. He that abases himself before him, him he raises up. He that raises himself up against him, him he casteth down. Reply to objection 3. In fortitude there is the same reason for restraining daring and for strengthening the soul against fear, since the reason in both cases is that man should set the good of reason before the dangers of death. But the reason for restraining presumptuous hope, which pertains to humility, is not the same as the reason for strengthening the soul against despair. Because the reason for strengthening the soul against despair is the acquisition of one's proper good, lest man, by despair, render himself unworthy of a good which was competent to him. While the chief reason for suppressing presumptuous hope is based on divine reverence, which shows that man ought not to ascribe to himself more than is competent to him according to the position in which God has placed him. Wherefore humility would seem to denote in the first place man's subjection to God. And for this reason Augustine, in his commentary on the Sermon of the Mount 1.4 ascribes humility, which he understands by poverty of spirit, to the gift of fear whereby man reveres God. Hence it follows that the relation of fortitude to daring differs from that of humility to hope. Because fortitude uses daring more than it surpasses it, so that excess of daring is more like fortitude than lack of daring is. On the other hand, humility suppresses hope or confidence in self more than it uses it. Wherefore excessive self-confidence is more opposed to humility than lack of confidence is. Reply to Objection 4. Excess in outward expenditure and parade is want to be done with a view of boasting, which is suppressed by humility. Accordingly, humility has to do in a secondary way with externals as signs of the inward movement of the appetite. Third article. Whether one ought by humility to subject oneself to all men. Objection 1. It would seem that one ought not by humility to subject oneself to all men. For as stated above in article 2, third reply, humility consists chiefly in man's subjection to God. Now one ought not to offer to a man that which is due to God, as is the case with all acts of religious worship. Therefore, by humility, one ought not to subject oneself to man. Objection 2. Further, Augustine says in On Nature and Grace 34, Humility should take the part of truth, not of falsehood. Now some men are of the highest rank, who cannot, without falsehood, subject themselves to their inferiors. Therefore, one ought not by humility to subject oneself to all men. Objection 3. Further, no one ought to do that which conduces to the detriment of another's spiritual welfare. But if a man subject himself to another by humility, this is detrimental to the person to whom he subjects himself, for the latter might wax proud, or despise the other. Hence Augustine says in his rule, found in letter 211, Lest through excess of humility, the superior lose his authority. Therefore, a man ought not by humility to subject himself to all. On the contrary, it is written in Philippians 2.3, In humility let each esteem others better than themselves. I answer that we may consider two things in man, namely that which is God's and that which is man's. Whatever pertains to defect is man's, but whatever pertains to man's welfare and perfection is God's, according to the saying of Osea 13.9, Destruction is thy own, O Israel. Thy help is only in me. Now humility, as stated above in Article 1, 5th reply, as well as in Article 2, 3rd reply, properly regards the reverence whereby man is subject to God. Wherefore, every man, in respect of that which is his own, ought to subject himself to every neighbor in respect of that which the latter has of God's. But humility does not require a man to subject what he has of God's to that which may seem to be God's in another. For those who have a share of God's gifts know that they have them, according to 1 Corinthians 2.12, that we may know the things that are given us from God. Wherefore, without prejudice to humility, they may set the gifts they have received from God above those that others appear to have received from him. Thus the apostle says in Ephesians 3.5, The mystery of Christ was not known to the sons of men as it is now revealed to his holy apostles. In like manner, humility does not require a man to subject that which he has of his own to that which his neighbor has of man's. Otherwise, each one would have to esteem himself a greater sinner than anyone else. Whereas the apostle says without prejudice to humility, in Galatians 2.15, We by nature are Jews and not of the Gentiles, sinners. Nevertheless, a man may esteem his neighbor to have some good which he lacks himself, or himself to have some evil which another has not, by reason of which he may subject himself to him with humility. Reply to Objection 1. We must not only revere God in himself, but also that which is his in each one, although not with the same measure of reverence as we revere God. Wherefore, we should subject ourselves with humility to all our neighbors for God's sake, according to 1 Peter 2.13. Be ye subject to every human creature for God's sake. But to God alone do we owe the worship of Latria. Reply to Objection 2. If we set what our neighbor has of God's above that which we have of our own, we cannot incur falsehood. Wherefore, a gloss on Philippians 2.3. Esteem others better than themselves, says, We must not esteem by pretending to esteem, but we should in truth think it possible for another person to have something that is hidden to us, and whereby he is better than we are, although our own good whereby we are apparently better than he be not hidden. Reply to Objection 3. Humility, like other virtues, resides chiefly inwardly in the soul. Consequently, a man by an inward act of the soul may subject himself to another without giving the other man an occasion of detriment to his spiritual welfare. This is what Augustine means in his rule, found in Letter 211. With fear, the superior should prostrate himself at your feet in the sight of God. On the other hand, due moderation must be observed in the outward acts of humility, even as of the other virtues, lest they conduce to the detriment of others. If, however, a man does as he ought, and others take therefrom an occasion of sin, this is not imputed to the man who acts with humility, since he does not give scandal, although others take it. Fourth Article Whether humility is a part of modesty or temperance Objection 1 It would seem that humility is not a part of modesty or temperance. For humility regards chiefly the reverence whereby one is subject to God as stated above in Article 3. Now it belongs to a theological virtue to have God for its object. Therefore, humility should be reckoned a theological virtue, rather than a part of temperance or modesty. Objection 2 further Temperance is in the concupisable, whereas humility would seem to be in the irrational, just as pride which is opposed to it and whose object is something difficult. Therefore, apparently humility is not a part of temperance or modesty. Objection 3 Further, humility and magnanimity are about the same object as stated above in Article 1 Third Reply. But magnanimity is reckoned a part not of temperance but of fortitude, as stated above in Question 129 Article 5. Therefore, it would seem that humility is not a part of temperance or modesty. On the contrary, origin says in his homily Ait on the Gospel of Luke. If thou wilt hear the nature of this virtue and what it was called by the philosophers, know that humility which God regards is the same as what they called metriotes, that is, measure or moderation. Now this evidently pertains to modesty or temperance. Therefore, humility is a part of modesty or temperance. I answer that as stated above in Question 137 Article 2 First Reply as well as in Question 157 Article 3 Second Reply. In assigning parts to a virtue, we consider chiefly the likeness that results from the mode of the virtue. Now the mode of temperance, whence it chiefly derives its praise, is the restraint or suppression of the impetuosity of a passion. Hence, whatever virtues restrain or suppress, and the actions which moderate the impetuosity of the emotions, are reckoned parts of temperance. Now just as meekness suppresses the movement of anger, so does humility suppress the movement of hope, which is the movement of a spirit aiming at great things. Wherefore, like meekness, humility is accounted a part of temperance. For this reason, the philosopher in Ethics 4-3 says that a man who aims at small things in proportion to his mode is not magnanimous, but temperate, and such a man we may call humble. Moreover, for the reason given above in Question 160 Article 2, among the various parts of temperance, the one under which humility is comprised is modesty as understood by Tully in On the Art of Rhetoric 254. Inasmuch as humility is nothing else than a moderation of spirit, wherefore it is written in 1 Peter 3-4, in the incorruptibility of a quiet and meek spirit. Reply to Objection 1, the theological virtues whose object is our last end, which is the first principle in matters of appetite, are the causes of all the other virtues. Hence, the fact that humility is caused by reverence for God does not prevent it from being a part of modesty or temperance. Reply to Objection 2. Parts are assigned to a principle virtue by reason of a sameness, not of subject or matter, but of formal mode, as stated above in Question 137 Article 2, First Reply, as well as in Question 157 Article 3, Second Reply. Consequently, although humility is in the irascible as its subject, it is assigned as a part of modesty or temperance by reason of its mode. Reply to Objection 3. Although humility and magnanimity agree as to matter, they differ as to mode. By reason of which magnanimity is reckoned a part of fortitude and humility a part of temperance. Fifth Article. Whether humility is the greatest of the virtues. Objection 1. It would seem that humility is the greatest of the virtues. For Chrysostom, expounding the story of the Pharisee and the Publican, in Luke Chapter 18 says, in His homily seven, on the humility of the soul, that if humility is such a fleet runner, even when hampered by sin, that it overtakes the justice, that is the companion of pride, whether will it not reach if you couple it with justice. You will stand among the angels by the judgment seat of God. And so it is clear that humility is set above justice. Now justice is either the most exalted of all the virtues or includes all virtues according to the philosopher in Ethics 5.1. Therefore humility is the greatest of the virtues. Objection 2. Further Augustine says in a sermon, are you thinking of raising the great fabric of spirituality? Attend first of all to the foundation of humility. Now this would seem to imply that humility is the foundation of all virtue. Therefore apparently it is greater than all the other virtues. Objection 3. Further the greater virtue deserves the greater reward. Now the greatest reward is due to humility since he that humbleth himself shall be exalted according to Luke 14.11. Therefore humility is the greatest of virtues. Objection 4. Further according to Augustine in On the True Religion 16. Christ's whole life on earth was a lesson in moral conduct through the human nature which he assumed. Now he especially proposed his humility for our example saying in Matthew 11.29, Learn of me because I am meek and humble of heart. Moreover Gregory says in his pastoral rule 3.1 that the lesson proposed to us in the mystery of our redemption is the humility of God. Therefore humility would seem to be the greatest of virtues. On the contrary charity is set above all the virtues according to Colossians 3.14. Above all things have charity. Therefore humility is not the greatest of virtues. I answer that the good of human virtue pertains to the order of reason which order is considered chiefly in reference to the end. Therefore the theological virtues are the greatest because they have the last end for their object. Secondarily however it is considered in reference to the ordering of the means to the end. This ordinance as to its essence is in the reason itself from which it issues but by participation it is in the appetite ordered by the reason. And this ordinance is the effect of justice especially of legal justice. Now humility makes a man a good subject to the ordinance of all kinds and in all matters while every other virtue has this effect in some special matter. Therefore after the theological virtues after the intellectual virtues which regard the reason itself and after justice especially legal justice humility stands before all others. Reply to Objection 1. Humility is not set before justice but before that justice which is coupled with pride and is no longer a virtue. Even so on the other hand sin is pardoned through humility for it is said of the public in Luke 1814 that through the merit of his humility he went down into his house justified. Hence Chrysostom says in his homily five on the incomprehensibility of the divine nature, bring me a pair of two horse chariots in the one harness pride with justice in the other sin with humility and you will see that sin outrunning justice wins not by its own strength but by that of humility while you will see the other pair beaten not by the weakness of justice but by the weight and size of pride. Reply to Objection 2. Just as the orderly assembly of virtues is by reason of a certain likeness compared to a building so again that which is the first step in the acquisition of virtue is likened to the foundation which is first laid before the rest of the building. Now the virtues are in truth infused by God, wherefore the first step in the acquisition of virtue may be understood in two ways. First by way of removing obstacles and thus humility holds the first place in as much as it expels pride which God resisteth and makes man submissive and ever open to receive the influx of divine grace. Hence it is written in James 4.6 God resisteth the proud and giveth grace to the humble. In this sense humility is said to be the foundation of the spiritual edifice. Secondly, a thing is first among virtues directly because it is the first step towards God. Now the first step towards God is by faith according to Hebrews 11.6. He that cometh to God must believe. In this sense faith is the foundation in a more excellent way than humility. Reply to Objection 3. To him that despises earthly things, heavenly things are promised. Thus heavenly treasures are promised to those who despise earthly riches according to Matthew 6, 19 and 20. Lay not up to yourselves treasures on earth, but lay up to yourselves treasures in heaven. Likewise, heavenly consolations are promised to those who despise worldly joys according to Matthew 4.5. Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted. In the same way spiritual uplifting is promised to humility, not that humility alone merits it, but because it is proper to it to despise earthly uplifting. Wherefore Augustine says in his homily 351 on penance, Think not that he who humbles himself remains forever abased, for it is written, he shall be exalted, and do not imagine that his exaltation in men's eyes is affected by bodily uplifting. Reply to Objection 4. The reason why Christ chiefly proposed humility to us was because it especially removes the obstacle to man's spiritual welfare consisting in man's aiming at heavenly and spiritual things, in which he is hindered by striving to become great in earthly things. Hence our Lord, in order to remove an obstacle to our spiritual welfare, showed by giving an example of humility, that outward exaltation is to be despised. Thus humility is, as it were, a disposition to man's untrammeled access to spiritual and divine goods. Accordingly, as perfection is greater than disposition, so charity, and other virtues whereby man approaches God directly, are greater than humility. 6. Article Whether 12 degrees of humility are fittingly distinguished in the rule of the Blessed Benedict. Objection 1. It would seem that the 12 degrees of humility that are set down in the rule of Blessed Benedict. Translators note Saint Thomas gives these degrees in the reverse order to that followed by Saint Benedict. Are unfittingly distinguished? The first is to be humble, not only in heart, but also to show it in one's very person, one's eyes fixed on the ground. The second is to speak few and sensible words and not to be loud a voice. The third is not to be easily moved and disposed to laughter. The fourth is to maintain silence until one is asked. The fifth is to do nothing but to what one is exhorted by the common rule of the monastery. The sixth is to believe and acknowledge oneself vileer than all. The seventh is to think oneself worthless and unprofitable for all purposes. The eighth is to confess one's sin. The ninth is to embrace patience by obeying under difficult and contrary circumstances. The tenth is to subject oneself to a superior. The eleventh is not to delight in fulfilling one's own desires. The twelfth is to fear God and to be always mindful of everything that God has commanded. For among these there are some things pertaining to the other virtues, such as obedience and patience. Again there are some that seem to involve a false opinion, and this is inconsistent with any virtue, namely to declare oneself more despicable than all men, and to confess and believe oneself to be in always worthless and unprofitable. Therefore these are unfittingly placed among the degrees of humility. Objection two further. Humility proceeds from within to externals, as do other virtues. And therefore in the aforesaid degrees those which concern outward actions are unfittingly placed before those which pertain to inward actions. Objection three. Further Anselm gives seven degrees of humility, the first of which is to acknowledge oneself contemptible. The second to grieve for this. The third to confess it. The fourth to convince others of this, that is to wish them to believe it. The fifth to bear patiently that this be said of us. The sixth to suffer oneself to be treated with contempt. The seventh to love being thus treated. Therefore the aforesaid degrees would seem to be too numerous. Objection four further. A gloss on Matthew 15 says, perfect humility has three degrees. The first is to subject ourselves to those who are above us, and not to set ourselves above our equals. This is sufficient. The second is to submit to our equals, and not to set ourselves before our inferiors. This is called abundant humility. The third degree is to subject ourselves to inferiors, and in this is perfect righteousness. Therefore the aforesaid degrees would seem to be too numerous. Objection five further. Augustine says in on virginity 31. The measure of humility is apportioned to each one according to his rank. It is imperiled by pride. For the greater a man is, the more liable he is to be entrapped. Now the measure of a man's greatness cannot be fixed according to a definite number of degrees. Therefore it would seem that it is not possible to assign the aforesaid degrees to humility. I answer that as stated above in article two. Humility has essentially to do with the appetite insofar as a man restrains the impetuosity of his soul from tending inordinately to great things. Yet its rule is in the cognitive faculty in that we should not deem ourselves to be above what we are. Also the principle and origin of both these things is the reverence we bear to God. Now the inward disposition of humility leads to certain outward signs in words deeds and gestures which manifest that which is hidden within as happens also with the other virtues. For a man is known by his look and a wise man when thou meetest him by his continents according to Ecclesiasticus 1926. Wherefore the aforesaid degrees of humility include something regarding the root of humility namely the twelfth degree that a man fear God and bear all his commandments in mind. Again they include certain things with regard to the appetite lest one aim inordinately at one's own excellence. This is done in three ways. First by not following one's own will and this pertains to the eleventh degree. Secondly by regulating it according to one's superior judgment and this applies to the tenth degree. Thirdly by not being deterred from this on account of the difficulties and hardships that come in our way and this belongs to the ninth degree. Certain things also are included referring to the estimate a man forms in acknowledging his own deficiency and this is in three ways. First by acknowledging and avowing his own shortcomings this belongs to the eighth degree. Secondly by deeming oneself incapable of great things and this pertains to the seventh degree. Thirdly that in this respect one should put others before oneself and this belongs to the sixth degree. Again some things are included that refer to outward signs. One of these regards deeds namely that in one's work one should not depart from the ordinary way. This applies to the fifth degree. Two others have reference to words namely that one should not be in a hurry to speak which pertains to the fourth degree and that one be not immoderate in speech which refers to the second. The others have to do with outward gestures for instance in restraining haughty looks which regards the first and in outwardly checking laughter and other signs of senseless mirth and this belongs to the third degree. Reply to objection one. It is possible without falsehood to deem an avow oneself the most despicable of men as regards the hidden faults which we acknowledge in ourselves and the hidden gifts of God which others have. Hence Augustine says in On Virginity 52, Be think you that some persons are in some hidden way better than you although outwardly you are better than they. Again without falsehood one may avow and believe oneself in always unprofitable and useless in respect of one's own capability. So as to refer all one's sufficiency to God according to 2 Corinthians 3.5. Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves as of ourselves but our sufficiency is from God and there is nothing unbecoming in ascribing to humility those things that pertain to other virtues since just as one vice arises from another so by a natural sequence the act of one virtue proceeds from the act of another. Reply to objection two. Man arrives at humility in two ways first and chiefly by a gift of grace and in this way the inner man precedes the outward man. The other way is by human effort whereby he first of all restrains the outward man and afterwards succeeds in plucking out the inward root. It is according to this order that the degrees of humility are here enumerated. Reply to objection three. All the degrees mentioned by Anselm are reducible to knowledge of vowel and desire of one's own abasement. For the first degree belongs to the knowledge of one's own deficiency but since it would be wrong for one to love one's own failings this is excluded by the second degree. The third and fourth degrees regard the avowal of one's own deficiency namely that not merely one simply asserts one's failing but that one convents another of it. The other three degrees have to do with the appetite which seeks not outward excellence but outward abasement and bears it with equanimity whether it consists of words or deeds. For as Gregory says in the register 210 letter 36 there is nothing great in being humble towards those who treat us with regard for even worldly people do this but we should especially be humble towards those who make us suffer and this belongs to the fifth and sixth degrees or the appetite may even go so far as lovingly to embrace external abasement and this pertains to the seventh degree so that all these degrees are comprised under the sixth and seventh mentioned above. Reply to objection four. These degrees refer not to the thing itself namely the nature of humility but to the degrees among men who are either of higher or lower or of equal degree. Reply to objection five. This argument also considers the degrees of humility not according to the nature of the thing in respect of which the aforesaid degrees are assigned but according to the various conditions of men. End of question 161. Read by Michael Shane Greg Lambert, LC.