 OK, so I would like to run this concluding session as a dunk tank on Mick Ryan. So anybody who has ordinance they'd like to hurl. Please, please let me know. But I want to start for a few minutes, my friend, because I am such an enormous fan, not just of your work, but the way you do your work. And I want to start by asking you to talk a little bit about the book, because nowhere yet have you done that in these couple of days. And it's such an important guide to how to think about the problems of war in the future. So the book War Transform published nine days before the Russians crossed the border into Ukraine came out of a whole range of things. But I guess the final piece that fell into place for me was a conversation with Alan Dupont a few years ago. And I was talking to Alan about maybe doing a PhD. And Alan probably knows me well enough to know, well, you're probably not going to like the discipline of that. You're probably not going to like being told what to do. And he was very right. I said, why don't you write a book? And I thought, that's a good idea. So I was doing a fair bit of writing. And I wanted just to write about something that I think is a core part of human existence, which is warfare. And ensuring that our country and other Western nations are able to generate advantage and deter conflict in the 21st century. And that's really where it came from. So my favorite news source is The Onion, the satirical newspaper in my country. And three weeks after the September 11, 2001 attacks, The Onion ran an enormous headline saying, Americans yearning to return to pointless bullshit. And it encapsulates what I think is the Chinese and Russian view of the inevitable decadence of free societies. What's your reaction to that? Because our narrative is about the sparkly vitality and ingenuity to build a better mousetrap creativity of free societies. How do these two narratives diverge so convincingly? Yeah, I think Xi's got a real problem with his declaration of the decline of the West, particularly since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. One, it's shown that authoritarian powers don't always generate effective military forces. But it's also shown that the West is remarkably more united in how it feels about those kind of the foreign actions the Russians have undertaken in Ukraine than they anticipated. I don't think there's anything inevitable about decline of the West or anything like that. And that kind of argument is the same as this we see from time to time the military is more woke. And it's like, well, I don't think so. I think we're a pretty tough, focused organization that just thinks that everyone should get a fair go now, not just white folks. And if giving everyone a fair go and encouraging a more diverse bunch of people to be able to serve their country regardless of whatever their background, bring on the wokeness. But that's not what it is. It's smart because our superpower, I talked about before, our superpower is our capacity to do the right thing, I think. And really, it's about leveraging the best in every member of society, which authoritarian powers can never do and we can, at least theoretically. I think the Russians are at a double disadvantage, not only as an authoritarian power, but as under Putin styling themselves the preservers of traditional culture by which they mean a particular definition of masculinity that you see the Russian military videos on TikTok and stuff, extoll. And they're getting their lunch handed to them by the transvestites and professional ballerinas of the Ukrainian military. So that too falls by the wayside. Because actually what matters is people having their heart in the fight and thinking creatively about in the chaos of a battlefield, where do you see opportunity and advantage? How do you capitalize on it? Do you have the intellectual framework for the prosecution of organized violence? And the Russians have failed so catastrophically about that. Were you surprised by your Twitter handles war in the future? How did we get the Russian military so wrong? There's a whole bunch of things here and I'd caveat this by saying there's so many things we're not seeing that's going on me. I mean, there's a lot of data that we just don't have about this war. And to, I don't want to be fair to the Russians, but to be fair, the start of every war is a bit of an experiment for both sides. If you go back and look at every war for the last however long humans have fought, the first few months is an exploration of what works and what doesn't because most countries go into not having fought for a long time. Have a look at Australia at the beginning of World War II. We were a disaster, we were just lucky. We were a long way away from everywhere. That gave us strategic breathing space. So the Russians have kind of gone through that again, but that's not the only problem. I mean, they suffer from a lack of purpose, invading a sovereign country by surprise because most of these soldiers didn't know what they were doing. It doesn't inspire people to go that extra mile. So they've suffered from a lack of purpose, but also they were kind of dodging, dodging the books a little bit in a lot of their military readiness and stuff. And some of these battalion tactical groups they talk about are only half the size they're supposed to be. So they didn't prepare themselves well. They've kind of had a bad plan and a bad military and the conjunction of those two things has been a disaster for the first few months. I will say, I think they're learning. The Russians are learning. They are demonstrating endurance. They certainly demonstrate will. They don't think they're losing. I don't see any evidence where they think they're losing. And I think they use as evidence the Germans, for example, and others to say, we can wait these countries out and we can carve them off one at a time to eventually win. I think that's honestly what they think and that's why this unified effort, sticking with Ukraine, strategic patience, understanding that vegetables might be a bit more important, but at least your kids aren't dying on the frontline because if we allow Russia to win this, that just emboldens future adventurism by him, Xi and others. So given how wrong we were about the capacity of the Russian military, what are you worried about we might be bad at in our own militaries? Exactly the same things. You never know how good a military organization is till it actually fights. You can exercise all you want, you can do readiness tests all you want, but you never actually know until they fight someone else. And all our militaries, I mean, the US Army, beginning of World War II in North Africa was a bit of a disaster. So you get out of disasters. You know, Pearl Harbor, the first six months of the First World War, all throughout history, our militaries have suffered disaster catastrophes and really bad events, Calipoli, because, you know, this stuff's hard and the other side gets a vote. And we sometimes forget that, you know, war's not a computer game. You can't simulate it. You can't predict outcomes. Klaus Witz is still red because he got it right. You know, friction, the fog of war, uncertainty, chance, it all plays a role. The Ukrainians have fought hard, but they've also been lucky. They were lucky to come up and against a adversary, had a bad strategy that used bad strategic assumptions and a poor military. I don't know how long that luck will last, though, if the Russians keep at it. And what lessons do you think the Chinese are learning from watching both the Russians' performance in Ukraine and ours? I think President Xi will be looking at this one. It hasn't stopped him at all wanting Taiwan back. So, no one should look at this and go, the Chinese are thinking, oh, Taiwan will be too late. No. You know, the Chinese defense minister at Shinglala was very keen. We're gonna get Taiwan back one way or the other. Paraphrase. He, I think he's learned that if you're gonna do it, gotta do it quickly. You gotta do it before the West perceives Taiwan has a fighting chance. Because if you remember the first couple of days of the Russian invasion, most people kind of went, except for the U.S., the U.S. didn't, but just about everyone else sat back on, let's just wait to see how this plays out. It was only when the Ukrainians showed that they were willing to fight, could fight, everyone started piling on. The Chinese are going, I wonder how long that period is for Taiwan. We've got to be successful in that period. Now, the operational problem for Taiwan, very different, 180 kilometers of sea is a really extraordinarily difficult challenge. So, speed will be big for them. Now, the second one is they'll have to kill the entire Taiwanese government very quickly. They've got to take out anyone that might inspire international opinion or solicit aid. And the third one is they need to kill the national telecommunications system because that has been central to Ukraine's ability for both government and citizen journalists to get out to the world images, video, and other media of what's going on. So, I think they'd be the three lessons they'd be looking at and from that would flow a whole range of military, economic, political deductions. It was said on the last panel that nobody wins the war in space. Do you agree with that judgment? Well, it depends what your definition of winning is. I mean, if you both got 100 satellites and you kill 90 of theirs and you've got 60 left, you could call that a win. The West has an idea of what winning is, but that's different to what the Russians might see as winning, what the Chinese might see as winning. So, we need to understand how different cultures view conflict, not just from our own perspective. And whilst we may see a war in space as something that's not winnable, other cultures will look at and go, we think we can win it or we think we can do this. So, I think that cultural appreciation, understanding is really important. No one goes into a war thinking they can't win it. Everyone goes into it thinking they'll win and it doesn't matter which domain that's in. So, my favorite book in my field is Jeffrey Blaney's Causes of War, which comes very strongly to that same conclusion. If you want to know why wars start, it's because somebody thinks they can win. They can achieve their political objectives through violence. I was actually paraphrasing that book in that last answer because it is a superb book. I'm sure many of you have read it. It is a really good book. He told me not long ago that he's revising it and changing the title slightly to say, Causes of War and Peace, which is going to be interesting. Okay, so my last question, you guys arm your weaponry, start locking in on the target. My last question for you is, what are you most worried about the future of warfare? What keeps you up at night? The thing that worries me is that we might think it's not possible again. That's what worries me because once you start thinking that you don't invest in deterring war, I mean, that's the most important thing you can invest in is deterring and not going to it. You've got to stop it before it happens because even if you win it, it's extraordinarily expensive in your people, treasure, across the board. So we have to make sure people understand that it can happen again. It always has, probably always will. I'll give you a quick annotate. When I took over the Australian Defence College in 2018, I gave a talk about how we needed to study war and why we're doing that. And one of the staff said, talking about war, that's a really military thing. I don't have a lot of hair, but it kind of blew me out. I said, we're supposed to be teaching this stuff, but I said, you've got to understand it if you're going to prevent it and you've got to understand it if you're going to fight it. But I said, war's not a military thing at all. War's a national thing. And that's how we need to conceive of war is this is a national, not a military undertaking. So I misrepresented my restraint, my friends. I do have one more question I want to ask. Which is, you have been such a fabulous mentor to young military officers and young authors interested in thinking about war. And you've participated in a group of people who've used science fiction as a way to relax some of the constraints around how we think about warfare. Say a little bit about why science fiction is such a valuable tool for helping young, up and coming people in the field to think about the future of war. Like I'm sure some people in this room, I'm a total science fiction tragic. And about five years ago on a Sunday afternoon, I was sitting on my back deck having a beer and I, as a bit of a joke, wrote a piece on why I think military officers should read science fiction. And I thought, I'll never publish this, I'll get laughed out of town. But anyway, I read through it, made sure there were no spelling errors or intemperate language. So I sent it off to granted curiosity and they published it and I was really worried. But the response I got was extraordinary. People going, this is great, it's okay to be a nerd and a military officer. I mean, I myself confess, nerd. And it started me thinking, so I started working with others on reading lists and then I set up an elective at the Defence College for staff college students in their own time to think through contemporary or near future problems through the lens of science fiction. I didn't just do it by myself, I went to the CDF at the time, Mark Binskin. He just thought, what a great idea. I said, you give me the topics. And for the last four years for him and General Campbell, they've written topics and they've written either non-fiction or fictional narratives, guided by professional authors, Kim Wilkins from UQ, Kat Sparks, who's a local Canberra author and a wonderful one, Peter Singer, August Cole, John Birmingham. And we've written stuff for our Chief of Defence just looking at just beyond the current investment program, not the current investment program, don't mess with that, but just beyond that. And it gives people a lot of freedom to think differently. And for me, it's about nurturing creativity and saying, you know what, it's okay to think differently. It's okay, you can do that, please. Okay, my friends, take your shots, fish in a barrel. Yes, sir. First of all, in China, I think we were right. Big lesson they take out is to do it quickly and back to Russia. Oh, sorry, sorry. Yeah, coming back to Russia, we have had a bit of a laugh at Russia's expense in the first few months of this war, but you touched on this. The new narrative seems that it's turning in their favor and at least as they'll be able to hold a large amount of territory, perhaps regroup, perhaps start to go west again. And if that's the case, if that's a trend that sticks, then that has profound implications, doesn't it? Because they do actually win on any number, according to any number of metrics. And I'd like to hear more from you about that, about Russia actually winning. Yeah. I think the context for that is the last couple of hundred years with different technologies, there's been a back and forth between offense and defense as the stronger, right? You know, the start of First World War, people expected offense would be it was actually defense. We're seeing the same now, and there's been a lot of work in the last decade seeing with new sensor technologies connection to fires, defense is actually the stronger arm of war at the moment. And I think that's played out with what the Ukrainians have done. It's been one of the advantages. The Russians have learned they can't take the whole country, not in one bite. They might have to have several bites down the track. But what they've got, they're going to want to hold on to, particularly the south and the east, that kind of L shape section they've taken. They're going to be very hard to dig out, just because there's a natural advantage now in the defense. Ukraine is reaching a level of exhaustion, so I think there will be an operational pause for a while. Not stalemate. It's not a ceasefire. It's just an operational pause that you see in every long war. So I think the Russians will consolidate after they take at least Lhansk. I think the rest of the Donbas is going to be really hard. Let's have a bit of a pause, rethink. I mean, the Russians aren't fools. They have a long history of operational art and grinding their way through military victories. So I think they'll just look at this and go, okay, so this is what we've got this time. In six months or a year or two, we'll have another go and go for some more. But Putin, he's not stepping back from this challenge. He's not talking like someone who's reconsidering. So I take the other side of that issue, which is I actually do think the Russians are going to lose this. 80% of their army is already committed in the Ukraine, and they don't have reserves to repair to. They have, I don't know, 9 million dumb artillery shells that they are pocket, creating pockets all over Ukraine. But I think the simple arithmetic of being unable to reinforce the fact that the arithmetic on the other side of the equation, which is the only pressure the Biden administration is under on Ukraine is why aren't you doing more? And so all of us are just about to run out of old Soviet equipment. We can hand over to the Ukrainians, which means we're going to start the transition to higher quality Western weapons for them, which I think will make an appreciable qualitative difference in their ability to go after the Russians. And the third thing that I think is going to affect it and prevent Russian success is the pressure to open, to demine the territorial waters and reopen ports because of a potential food scarcity problem. I noticed that the Russians and the Turks are playing footsies about Turkey reopening the Bosporus and allowing the Russians to inspect ships going in and out, which means the Russians are feeling some pressure about closing off food exports. And so I think those three things are going to combine by the fall to slowly corrode and then collapse Russia's ability to hang on to what they have now. All the way in the back. We can't assume that's going to happen though. We have to plan and work towards the worst case to ensure that happens, which is what we all want. All the way in the back with the great tie. Not you, Samir. Although that is a great tie, as I believe I'm already on the record about. That's right. I just wanted to ask the general question on the lack of purpose for something you mentioned as one of the vulnerabilities of Russia's operations this time or invasion this time. Do you believe the discourse coming out of Europe, the cancellation of Russians from ballets and theaters and their books and the tennis matches, do you think it is going to close the difference between Putin and his people and maybe infuse a sense of purpose for the long run that you were mentioning? So are we, do we have to be a little careful with the communications coming out from the side? And are we really reuniting and catalyzing a nation to get behind the leader? Is that a worry and do defence planners think about something like that? I'd be worried about that. I mean, Putin's narrative all the way through has been NATO's predation on Russia as a mechanism to unite the Russian people. A lot of the surveys show that he actually has a reasonable number of Russians who support what he's doing. You can go through all the reasons in the world for that, but that is what's happening. And we're seeing Russian messaging being amplified in different parts of the world that we don't traditionally watch follow. China very quietly and subtly, but through some areas in the Middle East, some areas in Africa, some areas in Southeast Asia, they're still trading with Russia. They're not buying the Western narrative of the inevitable defeat of Russia. So, you know, we need to pay attention of the other side of this story, which is really much what you're getting at. You don't win by just assuming you're going to win. You win by assuming the worst and making sure that doesn't happen. The other thing is that, so next question all the way in the back. But the other thing about this is that, you know, just as cyber war was supposed to be this great tornado that had flying sharks with lasers coming out of it, and that's not what we've seen. The other thing we haven't seen is that economic sanctions were supposed to be the nuclear weapons of our age. And in fact, Russia's turned an enormous profit because the price of oil has gone up and Russians seem to be holding up pretty much OK without McDonald's. And it doesn't appear to be denting Putin's support. So, in addition to cyber looking different than we thought and sanctions not being quite the neutron bomb we expected, we may have a Russia problem, not just a Putin problem. All the way in the back. Can I just talk to that very quickly? There's no such thing as a silver bullet that just doesn't exist in conflict. It's integrated effects across all the domains. And this is why this multi-domain concept is important. It's got some weaknesses, but the integration of different elements of military and national power is so important. I mean, the Chinese wrote about this in Under-Restricted Warfare in 1999. If you haven't read it, really good book, actually. But secondly, this is why the Chinese have systems destruction warfare as a key concept to break down integration that we might be able to generate at strategic and operational levels. Great point. Yes, sir. OK, I see all the way in the back. And then I'm going to take three more questions then we're going to go drink. I love that. James Robinson from Home Affairs. The question is around what lessons should Australia derive from the Ukraine situation on national resilience and the importance of it for us? Good question. You know, I think I did a piece a little while ago about learning from Ukraine. There's two kinds of lessons you take away, right? These lessons that are specific to that conflict. And there are lessons that will be more general. I think in the general category, this national resilience construct around cohesion, I mean, Ukraine has probably never been more cohesive than it has been the last six months. The protection of critical infrastructure, which didn't start on 24 February, obviously started, you know, probably a decade ago, are really important in what they've been able to achieve so far, you know, civil defence, keeping key services operating, firemen, ambulance people, they've kept them all operating. So I think civil defence, whichever term you want to use, offers quite a few lessons that we might be able to draw from Ukraine. Also, I think, at least in the case of my sweet provincial country, we haven't actually had to think about civil defence since basically the Eisenhower administration. And we get our highway system from the need to be able to evacuate major American cities. We haven't had to think in a serious way about societal resilience in a long time. And one of the things we could profit from the tragedy Ukraine is experiencing is to start thinking ourselves in serious ways again. How do we pull together the challenge of divisive societies in the face of those kinds of challenges, which we could very well face if we come to the defence of Taiwan or in lots of other contingencies? Angus. I've got a question for both of you. I get the impression that Russia is running out of precision weapons. I know that there's a real problem in supplying Ukraine with precision weapons. So I'd be interested to know what your views are on the ability of both sides to sustain the war given what appears to be a significant shortfall in the weaponry that they require. And then I wonder if you'd extend it to Germany, European countries, United States, and also Australia, because I know that if the worst were to happen down here, we'd be caught once again with our pants down. Preparedness is something that I think we need to give a much higher priority to. And I think the Europeans are finding that very much at the moment because they are really worried about what you spoke about, about the extension of the war into the NATO countries. Thank you. Go ahead. Precision weapons is one of those things that one, you don't hold a lot of them. One, because they're expensive, but two, they have shorter self-life than dumb weapons. Like you can keep an artillery shell forever. Well, you know, 50-100 years if you want. But a precision weapon, normally I think around 10 years is shelf-life. When you're playing on getting rid of 10% of your stock each year. That's a rough planning figure. So generally countries don't have large holdings of things like javelins, air-to-air missiles, harpoons, those kind of things. They have just enough for an initial pulse of combat. And then they hope either it's over or manufacturing might catch up. I think those assumptions have been proven wrong in this war. And that, one, we're going to have to re-look at stock-holding. That's probably going to have to be larger than we potentially imagine. That's going to be expensive. A more diverse range of manufacturers are going to have to come online. Because, you know, as we saw in Iraq, if you tried to buy a night vision monocular, you had a huge waiting time because the US Army was taking everything from the world market. And it's the same with precision weapons. We're going to have to develop our own capacity to design and build these things. Not just take American designs, but probably design our own and build our own innovative approaches to precision munitions that are cheaper and more numerous and not just fired from crude systems. So I agree with Mick, but I would add two points. The first is that, you know, we're all looking for good high-tech manufacturing jobs in our societies and investing in the ability to build munitions that might preserve our sovereignty and be able to activate industrial supply lines when you need them instead of keeping things in stockpiles that the clock is ticking down on. Like, why are we not good at that? This is like how we won World War II to your point earlier about, hey, we actually need to think about societal resilience. And the second point I would make is that there were a lot of wars fought and won in the days before precision weaponry. The Russians are probably already out and they're doing okay in the eastern part of the country having. And so we need to not become so invested in a single way of thinking about what will be successful that we don't do what that 15-year-old kid did, right? I got a drone and they don't need smart bombs because they actually have precise location. And so it's going to be messy. It's going to be ugly. And welcome to the modern battlefield. So if I can just build on that question. We talked about precision munitions, but I think it holds for a whole range of capabilities. Since the end of the Cold War, we've developed professional militaries that are smaller. And essentially we are exquisitely trained and educated. Like, the average military officer has a couple of master's degrees. Our soldiers are superbly educated and trained. You can't scale that when you've got to mobilize. You just can't scale that. You've got to have a different mobilization model when we go from an army of 30,000 to an army of half a million if that happens. So it's not just precision munitions. How do you scale a military understanding the ADF we have now is not going to be an ADF by 10 when we mobilize. That's just not possible. It's possible with a small force. A mobilized force is going to have to think differently about people, weapons systems, equipment, and how it trains and operates. Excellent point. Eric. Thanks. A question for both of you, really. Mick, you mentioned that war is inevitable. Major war is inevitable. And that's a key continuity. I wonder, though, if it's not becoming less inevitable, less likely, given that it doesn't seem to be working in favor of the aggressors. I mean, there was a famous line by Adam Tooze. You'd be hard-pressed to the name a single war since a war of aggression since 1914 that has yielded clearly positive results for the first mover. I mean, do you believe, do you think that Russia and Ukraine is a prime example of that? And then turning to Taiwan, I mean, if the lesson of Ukraine is that ironically a special military operation literally might have been successful for Russia, but the wholesale occupation was too much for them to chew, couldn't a similar lesson then be applied for Taiwan? And if I can be really sneaky, you talked about... You mean sneak in a third question after the two you already have snuck in? Thanks, Corey. You're welcome for my service. You talked about how the West was galvanized into action. It often takes a crisis for the West to wake up and realize that it can do something or that it is still something after all. But the West would count for less in the event of a Taiwan contingency. I mean, Europe is that much further away. There are fewer allies in Asia of the US. You're basically talking about Japan and Australia. So isn't that a big, big disadvantage that the US would be up against in the event of a war over Taiwan? So the last seven questions go to Alan. So take the microphone to him and please answer any of the 37, are they all right? For your first two questions, maybe, but I'm not willing to bet the life of my country on it. And there's always someone who thinks they can win. I mean, that's one of the great enduring themes in warfare. It doesn't matter if it makes no sense to us. This isn't about what's rational to us. It's about deterring those who think differently to us who think they can win. So I'm not willing to bet the life of the future of my country on it's less likely there's going to be a major conflict. Let's do things that ensure major conflicts don't happen and you've got to invest in a whole range of national security things. On Taiwan, I think the assumption that only Australia and Japan keys, kind of like Putin, assuming no one's going to help Ukraine, I think that's a flawed assumption. China cannot take Taiwan without a level of brutality that will get people going, frankly. It will change people's opinions of it just as it's coercive behaviour in the last few years have. And if you do the maths of an invasion at Taiwan and what the people of Taiwan now believe about themselves, remember that Taiwan now is not the Taiwan 10 or 20 years ago, every year there are less people who remember China, more people who see themselves as Taiwan. They are going to fight. And that will draw people to their side and countries to their side. So we should not assume that only Japan and Australia care. I think there are a lot more countries that are sitting on a fence that at the first sign of Chinese aggression they'll go, well, if we don't stop on there, that might be us next. So two quick points to add to that. They're very much like mixed suggestions that, you know, it's a big bet to have an economist say, I look back a lot across the last 100 years and I believe I see a huge trend. And, you know, economists have predicted the last 11, have predicted 11 of the last three financial crises. And so I'm not sure we ought to bet the country's salvation on that. And the second thing, I am more inclined I think than Mick towards your anxiety about who's, not just who's going to show up and help in a Taiwan contingency, but upon whom are we critically relying for access, for throughput, for other things essential, even to the operation of our own military forces. Zach Cooper and Sheena Chestnut Gritons have a fabulous essay coming out in the American Enterprises Collection of Essays on Taiwan later this month. I would encourage you to read it. And the closing question, please quickly. And Ashley, you get to ask yours over drinks. Okay, this may seem a silly question to end the day's proceedings on, but my question is, what do you mean by war? I can just elaborate a little bit quickly. So in the days of John Wayne movies, you know, there was a declaration of war, and guys that looked like us went to war with uniforms on the other guys had different uniforms, right? So we all know that that's changed. But now there's a belief that we're in a no war, no peace situation. And in fact, there's almost near wars going on in cyberspace, for example. So when you, I confess I haven't read your book yet, Mick, but you may have answered this question. So when you talk about war, what are you actually talking about? Are you talking about the formal stuff? I think he's got it. Go. Oh, it's about humans seeking to imposing their wills on other humans through the use of violence. That's what war is. You know, this is why Tom Reid wrote a book called Cyber War Does Not Exist. And I said, all it is, is bits and bytes are going on each other. That's not war. So, you know, I think war, at least in the Western tradition, that's what it is. Now, this is why I think we need to understand the conception of war from other cultures. Pete Mansour and Will Wick Murray had a great book come out two years ago on culture and military organizations. In that, Dave Kilcullen has a chapter on this fairy thing. What is war from different national and cultural perspectives? And I think that's worth reading for everyone because how the West sees war and the war, tradition of war of the last couple of hundred years in the West is actually different in different bits of the world. And I would give myself the luxury of the last word by saying that when you said war in the John Wayne era, I'm thinking of the great John Ford movies of the American Indian Wars, where there's no declaration of war, where there's no organized military operations. There are raiding and depredations on civil society on both sides. So I think the era of war as a discreetly defined military on military is anomalous, and therefore we shouldn't use it as a baseline. My friends, thank you for hanging in there this whole day for all these great conversations. Let's go have a drink together. And thank you. Thank you.