 Propositions 60-79 of the Elements of Theology by Proclas, translated by Thomas Taylor. This LibriVox recording is in the public domain. Recording by Jeffrey Edwards. Proposition 60. Everything which is the cause of a greater number of effects is better than that which is allotted a power of producing a less number, and which produces the parts of those things to the holes of which the other gives subsistence. 4. If the one is the cause of a less, but the other of a greater number of effects, but the former are parts of the latter, that which gives subsistence to a greater number of effects will produce all that the other produces, but not vice versa. Hence, the former of these two is more powerful and more comprehensive. 4. As that which proceeds is to that which proceeds, so is one product of power to another, when assumed with reference to each other. For that which is able to affect a greater number of things possesses a greater and more total power, but this is nearer to the cause of all things. That, however, which is nearer to this cause is in a greater degree good, just as the cause of all is the good itself. Hence, that which is the cause of a greater number of effects is essentially more excellent than that which produces a less number. Proposition 61. Every power which is impartable is greater, but when divided is less. For, if it is divided, it proceeds into multitude, and if this be the case, it becomes more remote from the one, but in consequence of this it is able to affect a less number of things through departing from the one, and the unity which contains it, and will be imperfect since the good of everything consists in union. Proposition 62. Every multitude which is nearer to the one is less in quantity than things more remote from it, but is greater in power. For, that which is nearer to is more similar to the one, but the one gives subsistence to all things without having any multitude in itself. Hence, that which is more similar to it, being the cause of a greater number of effects, since the one is the cause of all things, has more the form of unity, and is more impartable because that is one. As therefore, that which is less multiplied is more allied to the one. So likewise, as being allied to the cause of all things, it is productive of a greater number of effects. Hence it is more powerful. Corollary. From these things it is evident that there are more corporeal natures than souls, more souls than intellectual natures, and more intellects than divine unities, and there is the same reasoning in all things. Proposition 63. Every thing which is imparticipable gives subsistence to twofold orders of participated natures, one indeed in things which sometimes participate, but the other in things which always and canacently participate. More that which is always participated is more similar to the imparticipable than that which is sometimes participated. Hence, before the imparticipable establishes that which is sometimes, it will establish that which is always participable, and which by being participated differs from that which is posterior to it. The always is more allied and more similar to the imparticipable. Nor are there alone things which are sometimes participated, for prior to these are the natures which are always participated, through which these also are bound to imparticipables according to a certain well-ordered progression. Nor are there alone things which are sometimes participated, for these possessing an inextinguishable power, since they are always or prolific of other things which are sometimes participated, and as far as to these the diminution proceeds. Corollary. From hence it is evident that of the unions proceeding from the one and which illuminate beings, some are always, but others sometimes participated, intellectual participations likewise are in a similar manner to fold, as also are the animations of souls, and the participations of other forms. For beauty, similitude, permanency, and sameness, being imparticipable, are participated by natures which always participate, and secondarily by those that sometimes participate according to the same order. Proposition 64. Every monand which ranks as a principle gives subsistence to a twofold number, one indeed of self-perfect hypostases, but the other of illuminations which possess their hypostases in other things. For if progression is according to diminution, through things appropriate to producing causes, perfect natures will proceed from the all-perfect, and through these as media, imperfect natures will proceed in a well-ordered progression, so that some indeed will be self-perfect hypostases, but others will be imperfect, and these latter will become the forms of participants. For, being imperfect, they will be indigent of subjects in their very nature, but the self-perfect hypostases will produce things which participate of themselves, for, being perfect, they will indeed fill these from themselves and establish them in themselves, but they will require nothing of inferior natures to their own subsistence. Self-perfect hypostases, therefore, through their separation into multitude, are indeed diminished with respect to their principle monand, but through their self-perfect aparxies they are in a certain respect assimilated to it, but imperfect hypostases, in consequence of subsisting in other things, are remote from that which subsists from itself, and through their imperfection are separated from that which perfects all things. Progressions, however, are through similars, as far as to natures which are entirely dissimilar. Every monand, therefore, which ranks as a principle gives subsistence to a two-fold number. Corollary From these things it is evident that of the unitias some are self-perfect proceeding from the one, but others are illuminations of unions, and, with respect to intellects, that some of them are self-perfect essences, but others belong to animated natures, being only the images of souls, and thus neither is every union a God, but this is true of a self-perfect unity alone, nor is every intellectual peculiarity an intellect, but an essential peculiarity alone is entitled to this appellation, nor is every illumination of soul a soul, but there are also images of souls. Proposition 65 Every thing which has any subsistence whatever, either subsists according to cause, so as to have the form of a principle, or according to a parxis, or according to participation, after the manner of an image. For either that which is produced is seen in that which produces as pre-existing in cause, because every cause antecedently comprehends in itself the thing caused, being that primarily which the thing caused is secondarily, or that which produces is seen in that which is produced. For the latter participating of the former exhibits in itself secondarily that which the producing cause is primarily, or each thing is beheld in its own order, and is neither seen in the cause nor in the effect. For the cause subsists more excellently than that which exists out of the cause, but that which is in the effect is less excellent than that which exists out of the cause, but not in anything else. It is however necessary there should be that which after this manner is, but everything subsists according to a parxis in its own order. Proposition 66 All beings with reference to each other are either whole or parts, or the same or different. For either some of them comprehend, but the rest are comprehended, or they neither comprehend nor are comprehended, and they either suffer something which is the same as participating of one thing, or they are separated from each other. But if they comprehend they will be whole, and if they are comprehended, parts. If also many things participate of one thing, they are the same according to this one. But if they are alone many things, so far as they are many they will be different from each other. Proposition 67 Every wholeness, allates, is either prior to parts, or consists of parts, or is in a part. For the form of each thing is either surveyed in its cause, and we call that which subsists in its cause a whole prior to parts, or it is seen in the parts which participate of it, and this in a twofold respect. For it is either seen in all the parts together, and this is a whole consisting of parts, any part of which being absent diminishes the whole, or it is seen in each of the parts, so that the part also becomes according to participation a whole, which makes the part to be a whole partially. The whole, therefore, which is according to parxies, consists of parts, but the whole, which is prior to parts, is according to cause, and the whole, which is in a part, is according to participation. For this also, according to an ultimate diminution, is a whole, so far as it imitates the whole, which consists of parts, when it is not any casual part, but is capable of being assimilated to the whole, of which the parts also are whole. Proposition 68 Every whole, which is in a part, is a part of that whole which consists of parts. Four, if it is a part, it is a part of a certain whole, and it is either a part of the whole which it contains, according to which it is assimilated to be a whole in a part, but thus it will be a part of itself, the part will be equal to the whole, and each will be the same, or it is a part of a certain other whole, and if of some other, it is either the only part of that, and thus again, it will in no respect differ from the whole, being one part of one thing, or it is a part in conjunction with another part. Four, of every whole, the parts are more than one, and that will be a whole from many parts of which it consists, and thus the whole, which is in a part, is a part of the whole which consists of parts. Proposition 69 Every whole, which consists of parts, participates of the wholeness, which is prior to parts. Four, if it consists of parts, the whole is passive, et est, the whole participates of another whole, for the parts becoming one are passive to a whole on account of their union, and the whole subsists in parts which are not wholes, but the imperticipable subsists prior to everything which is participated. The imperticipable wholeness, therefore, subsists prior to that which is participated. Hence, there is a certain form of wholeness prior to the whole which consists of parts, which is not passive to a whole, but is wholeness itself, and from which the wholeness consisting of parts is derived. For the whole, indeed, which consists of parts, subsists in many places, and in many things, in various ways. It is, however, necessary that there should be a monad, essentially, of all totalities. Four, neither is each of these holes genuine, since it is indigent of parts that are not wholes, of which it consists. Nor is the whole which is in a certain thing capable of being the cause of wholeness to all other things. Hence, that which is the cause to all wholes of their being wholes is prior to parts. Four, if this also consisted of parts, it would be a certain whole, and not simply whole. And again, this would be from another whole and so on to infinity, or it will subsist on account of that which is primarily a whole and which is not a whole from parts, but is a wholeness. Proposition 70. Everything which is more total among principal causes illuminates participants prior to natural natures, and when these fail still continues to impart its illuminations. Four, it begins its energy upon secondary natures prior to that which is posterior to it, and is present in conjunction with the presence of it. When likewise that which is posterior to it no longer energizes, it is still present, and that which is more causal continues to energize, and this not only in different subjects, but likewise in each of the natures that sometimes participate. Thus, it is necessary, for instance, that being should be first generated afterwards animal and afterwards man, and man indeed is not, if the rational power is absent, but there is still animal, breathing, and sentient, and again life-feeling being remains, for though a thing does not live, yet it has existence, and there is a similar reasoning in all things. The cause, however, of this is that the more causal nature being more efficacious energizes on the thing caused prior to that which is less causal, for the thing caused participates first of that which is more powerful, and that which is secondary again energizing that which is more powerful energizes with it, because everything which the secondary nature produces, that which is more causal produces likewise in conjunction with it. When the former also fails, the latter is still present, for the communication of the more powerful cause operating in a greater degree leaves that which participates it, posterior to the energy of the less powerful cause, for through the communication of the secondary nature it corroborates its own illumination. Proposition 71. All things which among principal causes possess a more total and higher order in their effects according to the illuminations proceeding from them become in a certain respect subjects to the communications of more partial causes, and the illuminations indeed from higher causes receive the progressions from secondary causes, but the latter are established in the former and thus some participations precede others, and some representations extend after others, beginning from on high to the same subject, more total causes having a prior energy, but such as are more partial supplying their participants with their communications posterior to the energies of more total causes. 4. If more causal natures energize prior to such as are secondary on account of exuberance of power, and are present with those that have a more imperfect aptitude, and illuminate them also, but things more subordinate, and which are second in order are supplied from such as are more causal, it is evident that the illuminations of superior natures antecedently comprehend that which participates of both these, and give stability to the communications of things subordinate, but these illuminations of superior causes employ the resemblances of subordinate natures as foundations, and operate on that which participates of them, the superior causes themselves having a prior energy. Proposition 72 All things which in their participants have the relation of a subject proceed from more perfect and total causes. 4. The causes of a greater number of effects are more powerful and total, and are nearer to the one than the causes of fewer effects, but the natures which give subsistence to such things as are antecedently the subjects of others are among causes the sources of a greater number of effects. Corollary From hence it is evident why matter which derives its subsistence from the one is of itself destitute of form, and why body, though it participates of being, is of itself without the participation of some. For matter being the subject of all things proceeds from the cause of all, but body being the subject of animation derives its subsistence from that which is more total than some, and participants after a certain manner of being. Proposition 73 Every whole is at the same time a certain being, and participates of it, but not every being is a whole. For either being and whole are the same, or the one is prior, but the other posterior, if however a part, so far as it is a part is being, for a whole is from parts which have a being, yet it is not of itself also a whole. Being therefore and whole are not the same. For if this were the case a part would be a non-entity, but if a part was a non-entity the whole would have no existence. For every whole is a whole of parts, either as existing prior to them, and therefore causally containing them in itself, or as subsisting in them. But the part not existing neither is it possible for the whole to exist, if however whole is prior to being, every being will immediately be a whole. Again therefore there will not be a part. This however is impossible. For if the whole is a whole, being the whole of a part, the part also being a part will be the part of the whole. It remains therefore that every whole indeed is being, but that not every being is a whole. Corollary From these things it is evident that being which has a primary subsistence is beyond wholeness. For the one indeed, without a leeket, being is present with a greater number of things, since to be is present with parts so far as they are parts, but the other without a leeket wholeness is present with a less number of things, for that which is the cause of a greater number of effects is more excellent, but the cause of a less number is of a subordinate nature as has been demonstrated. Proposition 74 Every form is a certain whole, for it consists of many things, each of which has its completion to the form, but not every whole is a form. For a particular thing is a whole and also an individual, so far it is an individual, but neither of them is a form. For every whole consists of parts, but form is that which may be divided into individual forms. Whole therefore is one thing another, and the one is present with many things, but the other with a few. Hence whole is above the forms of beings. Corollary From these things it is evident that whole has a middle order between being and forms, and hence it follows that being subsists prior to forms, and that forms are beings, but that not every being is form. Whence also in effects, privations are in a certain respect beings, but are no longer forms, and in consequence of the unical power of being, they also receive a certain obscure representation of being. Proposition 75 Every cause which is properly so called is exempt from its effect. For if it is in the effect, it either gives completion to it, or is in a certain respect indigent of it, in order to its existence, and thus it will be more imperfect than the thing caused. For being in the effect, it is rather a con-cause than a cause, and is either a part of that which is generated by the instrument of the maker. For that which is a part in the thing generated is more imperfect than the whole. The cause also, which is in the effect, is an instrument of generation to the maker, being unable to define of itself the measures of production. Every cause, therefore, which is properly so denominated, if it is more perfect imparts to its effect the measure of generation, and is exempt from instruments and elements, and in short, from everything which is called a con-cause. Proposition 76 Everything which is generated from an immovable cause has an immutable hypoxies, but everything which is generated from a movable cause has a mutable hypoxies. For if that which makes is entirely immovable, it does not produce from itself that which is secondary through motion, but by its very being. If, however, this be the case, it has that which proceeds from it concurrent with its own essence, and if this also be the case, it will produce as long as it exists. But, it exists always, and therefore, it always gives subsistence to that which is posterior to itself. Hence, this is always generated from sense, and always is conjoining with the ever according to energy of the cause, its own ever according to progression. If, however, the cause is moved, that also which is generated from it is essentially mutable. For that which has its being through motion changes its being when its movable cause is changed. For if, though produced from motion, it should itself remain immutable, it would be better than its producing cause. This, however, is impossible. It will not therefore be immutable. Hence, it will be mutable, and will be essentially moved, imitating the motion of that which gave its subsistence. Proposition 77 Everything which is in capacity proceeds from that which is in energy, and that which is in capacity proceeds into energy, that also which is in a certain respect in capacity so far as it is in capacity is the offspring of that which is in a certain respect in energy, but that which is all things in capacity proceeds from that which is all things in energy. For that which is in capacity is not naturally adapted to produce itself into energy because it is imperfect. For if being imperfect it should become the cause to itself of perfection, and this in energy the cause will be more imperfect than that which is produced by it. Hence that which is in capacity so far as it is in capacity will not be the cause to itself of a subsistence in energy. For, on this hypothesis, so far as it is imperfect it would be the cause of perfection. Since everything which is in capacity so far as it is in capacity is imperfect, but that which is in energy is perfect. Hence, if that which was in capacity becomes in energy it will have its perfection from something else, and this will either be in capacity, but thus again the imperfect will be generative of the perfect, or it will be an energy and either something else, or this which was in capacity will be that which becomes in energy. But, if something else which is in energy produces operating according to its own peculiarity it will not, by being in capacity make that which is in another to be in energy, nor will this which is now made to be in energy becomes this so far as it was in capacity. It remains therefore that from that which is in energy that which is in capacity must be changed into energy. Proposition 78 Every power is either perfect or imperfect. For, the power which is prolific of energy is perfect for it makes other things to be perfect through its own energies. That, however which is perfective of other things is in a greater degree perfect as being more self-perfect. But the power which is indigent of another that pre-exists in energy according to which indigence it is something in capacity is imperfect. For it is indigent of the perfection which is in another in order that by participating of it it may become perfect. Hence, such a power as this is of itself imperfect so that the power of that which is in energy is perfect being prolific of energy. But the power of that which is in capacity is imperfect and obtains perfection from the power which is in energy. Proposition 79 Every thing which is generated is generated from a two-fold power. For it is requisite that the thing generated should possess aptitude and an imperfect power. And that which makes being an energy that which the thing generated is in capacity antecedently comprehends a perfect power. For all energy proceeds from inherent power. For if that which makes did not possess power how could it energize and produce something else? And if that which is generated did not possess power according to aptitude how could it be generated? For that which makes or acts makes or acts in that which is able to suffer, but not in any casual thing and which is not naturally adapted to suffer from the agent. And of Proposition 79 Propositions 80 to 99 of The Elements of Theology by Proclus translated by Thomas Taylor. This LibriVox recording is in the public domain. Recording by Geoffrey Edwards Proposition 80 Every body is naturally adapted of itself to suffer, but everything incorporeal to act. And the former indeed is essentially inefficacious, but the latter is impassive. That which is incorporeal however suffers through its communion with body just as bodies are able to act through the participation of incorporeals. For body, so far as body is alone divisible and through this becomes passive being entirely partable and this to infinity. But that which is incorporeal being simple is impassive. For neither is that which is impartable capable of being divided, nor can that be changed in quality which is not compounded. Either therefore nothing will be effective, or this must be affirmed of an incorporeal nature since body, so far as body does not act because it is alone liable to be divided and to suffer. For everything which acts has an effect of power, so that body so far as it is body will not act, but so far as it contains in itself a power of acting. Hence when it acts it acts through the participation of power. Moreover in corporeal natures when they are inherent in bodies participate of passions being divided together with bodies and enjoying their partable nature though according to their own essence they are impartable. Proposition 81 Everything which is participated in a separable manner is present with its participant by a certain inseparable power which it inserts in it. For if it is itself present with the participant in a separate manner and is not in it as if it possessed its subsistence in it a certain medium between the two is necessary connecting the one with the other and which is more similar to that which is participated and subsists in the participant. For if this medium is separable how can it be participated by the participant since the participant neither contains the medium nor anything proceeding from it a power therefore and illumination proceeding from that which is separable into the participant conjoins both. Hence one of these will be that through which the participation is affected another will be that which is participated and another that which participates. Proposition 82 Everything incorporeal which is converted to itself when it is participated by other things is participated in a separable manner. For if in an inseparable manner the energy of it would not be separate from its participant as neither would its essence. If however this were the case it would not be converted to itself for being converted it will be separate from its participant each being different from the other. If therefore it is able to be converted to itself it will be participated in a separable manner when it is participated by other things. Proposition 83 Every thing which has a knowledge of itself is entirely converted to itself. For knowing itself it is evident that it is converted to itself in energy for that which knows and that which is known are one and the knowledge of itself is directed to itself as to that which is known. This knowledge also as pertaining to that which knows is a certain energy but it is the knowledge of itself directed to itself because it is gnostic of itself. Moreover that it is converted to itself essentially if it is so in energy has been demonstrated. For every thing which by energizing is converted to itself has also an essence verging to and subsisting in itself. Proposition 84 Every thing which always is possesses an infinite power. For if its hypothesis is never failing the power also according to which it is that which it is and is able to exist is infinite. For the power of existing being finite it will some time or other fail. But this failing the existence also of that which possesses it will fail and it will no longer be that which always is. It is necessary therefore that the power of that which always is and which connects and contains it essentially should be infinite. Proposition 85 Everything which is always becoming to be or rising into existence possesses an infinite power of becoming to be. For if it is always rising into existence the power of generation in it is never failing. For if this power was finite it would cease in an infinite time but the power of becoming to be ceasing that which is rising into being according to this power would cease and thus it would no longer be always becoming to be. It is however supposed to be always becoming to be. Hence it possesses an infinite power of rising into existence. Proposition 86 Everything which is truly being on us on is infinite neither according to multitude nor according to magnitude but according to power alone. For every infinite is either in discreet or in continued quantity or in power but that which always is is infinite as having an inextinguishable life a never failing aparxis and an undiminished energy. That which is eternally being however is neither infinite on account of magnitude for that which is truly being is without magnitude being self-subsistent since everything self-subsistent is impartable and simple nor is it infinite on account of multitude for it has in the most eminent degree the form of the one as being arranged most near and being most aligned to it but it is infinite according to power. Hence it is also impartable and infinite and by how much the more it is one and impartable by so much the more is it infinite for the power which is divided becomes imbasil and finite and powers which are entirely divided are in every respect finite for ultimate powers and which are most remote from the one are in a certain respect finite on account of their distribution into parts but first powers on account of their impartability are infinite for a separation into parts divorces and dissolves the power of everything but impartability compressing and contracting that which it contains renders it never failing and undiminished in itself moreover infinity according to magnitude and also according to multitude is entirely a privation and falling off from impartability for that which is finite is most near to the impartable but the infinite is most remote from it entirely departing from the one hence that which is infinite according to power is not infinite either according to multitude or magnitude since infinite power subsists in conjunction with impartability but the infinite either in multitude or magnitude is most remote from the impartable if therefore that which is truly being was infinite either in magnitude or multitude it would not possess infinite power it does however possess infinite power therefore is not infinite either according to multitude or according to magnitude everything eternal indeed is being but not every being is eternal for the participation of being is present in a certain respect with generated natures so far as each of these is not that which in no respect is but if that which is generated is not entirely deprived of being it is in a certain respect being the eternal however is in no respect whatever present with generated natures and especially not with such of these as do not even participate of the perpetuity which subsists according to the whole of time moreover everything eternal always is for it participates of eternity which imparts to the natures by which it is participated to be always that which they are being therefore is participated by a greater number of things than eternity and hence being is beyond eternity for by those natures by whom eternity is participated being is also participated but not everything which participates of being participates also of eternity proposition 88 everything which is truly being is either prior to eternity or in eternity or participates of eternity for that there is true being prior to eternity has been demonstrated but true being is also in eternity for eternity possesses the always in conjunction with being and that which participates of eternity has both the always and being according to participation eternity however possesses the always primarily but being according to participation but being itself is primarily being proposition 89 everything which is primarily being consists of bound and infinity for if it possesses infinite power it is evident that it is infinite and on this account consists from the infinite if also it is impartable and has the form of the one through this it participates of bound for that which participates of unity is bounded moreover it is impartable and therefore possesses infinite power hence everything which is truly or primarily being consists of bound and infinity proposition 90 the first bound and the first infinity subsist by themselves prior to everything which consists of bound and the infinite for if beings which subsist by themselves are prior to those which are certain beings as being common to all essences and principal causes and not the causes of certain but in short of all beings it is necessary that the first bound and the first infinity should be prior to that which consists of both these for the bound in that which is mixed or the first being participates of infinity and the infinite participates of bound but of everything that which is the first is nothing else than that which it is it is not therefore proper that the first infinite should have the form of bound or that the first bound should have the form of infinity these therefore subsist primarily prior to that which is mixed proposition 91 every power is either finite or infinite but every finite power indeed derives its subsistence from infinite power and infinite power subsists from the first infinity for the powers which have an existence at a certain time are finite falling from the infinity of existing always but the powers of eternal beings are infinite never deserting their own aparxies proposition 92 every multitude of infinite powers is suspended from one first infinity which does not subsist as a participated power nor in things which are endowed with power but subsists by itself not being the power of a certain participant but the cause of all beings for though the first being possesses power yet it is not power itself for it has also bound but the first power is infinity for infinite powers are infinite through the participation of infinity infinity itself therefore will be prior to all powers through which being also possesses infinite power and all things participate of infinity for infinity is not the first of things or the ineffable principle of all since that is the measure of all things being the good and the one nor is infinity being for this is infinite but not infinity hence infinity subsists between that which is first and being and is the cause of all infinite powers and of all the infinity that is in beings proposition 93 every infinite which is in true beings is neither infinite to the natures that are above beings nor is it infinite to itself for that by which each thing is infinite by this also it exists uncircumstribed but everything which is in true beings is bounded by itself and by all the things prior to it it remains therefore that the infinite which is in true beings is infinite to subordinate natures alone above which it is so expanded in power as to be incomprehensible by all of them for in whatever manner they may extend themselves towards this infinite yet it has something entirely exempt from them and though all things enter into it yet it has something occult and incomprehensible by secondary natures though likewise it evolves the powers which it contains yet it possesses something on account of its union insurmountable contracted and surpassing the evolution of beings since however it contains and bounds itself it will not be infinite to itself nor much less to the natures situated above it since it has a portion of the infinity which is in them for the powers of more total natures are more infinite in consequence of being more total and having an arrangement nearer to the first infinity Proposition 94 every perpetuity is indeed a certain infinity but not every infinity is perpetuity for there are many infinites not of the infinite not on account of the always such for instance as the infinity according to magnitude the infinity according to multitude and the infinity of matter and whatever else there may be of the like kind which is infinite either because it cannot be passed over or through the indefiniteness of its essence that perpetuity however is a certain infinity is evident for that which never fails is infinite but this is that which always has its hypothesis inexhaustible infinity therefore is prior to perpetuity for that which gives subsistence to a greater number of effects and is more total is more causal hence the first infinity is beyond eternity and infinity itself is prior to eternity Proposition 95 every power which is more single is more infinite than that which is multiplied for if of powers the first infinity is nearest to the one that power which is more allied to the one is in a greater degree infinite than that which recedes from it for being multiplied it loses the form of the one in which while it remained it possessed a transcendency with respect to other powers being connected and contained through its impartability for in partable natures themselves the powers when congregated are united but when divided they are increased in number and become obscured Proposition 96 the power which is infinite of every finite body is incorporeal for if it were corporeal if this body indeed is finite the infinite will be contained in the finite but if the body is infinite it will not be power so far as it is body for if so far as it is body it is finite but power is infinite it will not be power so far as it is body hence the power which is infinite in a finite body is incorporeal Proposition 97 in each series of things every cause which has the relation of a leader imparts to the whole series the peculiarity of itself and that which the cause is primarily the series is according to diminution for if it is the leader of the whole series and all coordinate natures are co-arranged with reference to it it is evident that it imparts to all that the series contains the one idea according to which they are arranged in that series for either all things partake of similitude to this cause without a cause or that which is the same in all is derived from it but the former of these is impossible for that which is without a cause is also fortuitous but the fortuitous can never take place in things in which there is order, connection and an invariable seemness of subsistence from the cause therefore which ranks as a leader every series receives the peculiarity of the hypothesis of that cause but if from it it is evident that this is accompanied with a diminution and decrement adapted to secondary natures for either the peculiarity exists similarly in the leader into the natures that are secondary and how in this case can the former be the leader but the latter be allotted an hypothesis after the leader or it exists dissimilarly and if this be the case it is evident that sameness is derived to the multitude from one thing but not vice versa and the illustrious peculiarity of the series which is primarily in one thing or the leader is secondarily in the multitude suspended from the leading cause Proposition 98 every separate cause is at one and the same time everywhere and nowhere for by the communication of its own power it is everywhere for this is a cause which replenishes the natures that are naturally adapted to participate of it rules over all secondary beings and is present to all things by the prolific progressions of its illuminations but by an essence unmingled with things in place and by its exempt purity it is nowhere for if it is separate it is established above all things in a similar manner also it is in no one of the natures inferior to itself for if it was alone everywhere it would not indeed be prevented from being a cause and from subsisting in all its participants but it would not be prior to all of them in a separate manner if also it was nowhere without being everywhere it would not indeed be prevented from being prior to all things and from being nothing pertaining to subordinate natures but it would not be in all things as causes are naturally adapted to be in their effects by the abundant and unenviying communications of themselves in order therefore that existing as a cause it may be in all things that are able to partake of it and that being separate in itself it may be prior to all the natures that are filled by it it is everywhere and at the same time nowhere and it is not indeed partly everywhere and partly nowhere for thus it would be divorced and separate from itself if one part of it was everywhere in all things but another was nowhere and prior to all things but the whole of it is everywhere and in a similar manner nowhere for the things which are able to participate of it meet with the whole of it and find the whole present with themselves that at the same time being wholly exempt from them for the participant does not place the separate cause in itself but participates of it as much as it is capable of receiving nor in the communication of itself does it become contracted by the multitude of the participants of it for it is separate nor do its participants participate of it defectively for that which in parts is everywhere Proposition 99 Every imperticipable so far as it is imperticipable does not derive its subsistence from another cause but it is itself the principle and cause of all its participants and thus every principle in each series is unbegotten for if it is imperticipable in its own proper series it is allotted the principality and does not proceed from other things for it would no longer be the first if it received this peculiarity according to which it is imperticipable from something else but if it is inferior to other things and proceeds from them it does not proceed from them so far as it is imperticipable but so far as it participates for of the things from which it originates it doubtless participates and it is not primarily the things of which it participates hence it is not from a cause so far as it is imperticipable for so far as it is from a cause it participates and is not imperticipable but so far as it is imperticipable it is the cause of things that are participated and is not itself a participant of other things and of Proposition 99 Propositions 100 to 119 of the Elements of Theology by Proclus translated by Thomas Taylor This LibriVox recording is in the public domain recording by Jeffrey Edwards Proposition 100 Every series of holes is extended to an imperticipable cause and principle but all imperticipables are suspended from the one principle of all things for if each series suffers something which is the same or a certain sameness there is something in each which is the leader and the cause of the sameness for as all beings are from unity so every series is from unity but again all imperticipable monands are referred to the one as all of them are analogous to the one so far therefore as they also suffer something which is the same through an analogy to the one so far a reduction of them to the one is affected and so far indeed as all of them are from the one no one of these is a principle but so far as each is imperticipable so far each is a principle hence being the principles of certain things they are suspended from the principle of all things for that is the principle of all things of which all things participate all things however alone entirely participate of the first but of other things not all but certain things participate hence also that it est the inevitable is simply the first but other things are firsts with reference to a certain thing but simply are not firsts Proposition 101 Imparticipable intellect is the leader of all things that participate of intellect imperticipable life of all things that participate of life and imperticipable being of all things that participate of being but of these being is prior to life but life is prior to intellect for, because in each series of beings beings, in participables, are prior to things which are participated, it is necessary that intellect should be prior to intellectuals, that life should be prior to vital natures, and that being itself should be prior to beings. Because however that which is the cause of a greater number of effects precedes that which is the cause of a less number, hence among these being will be the first, for it is present with all things to which life and intellect are present. For everything that lives and participates of intelligence necessarily is, but not vice-versa. For many beings neither live nor energize intellectually, but life is the second. For all things that participate of intellect participate also of life, but not vice-versa. For many things live indeed, but are left destitute of knowledge, and intellect is the third. For everything which is in any manner whatever gnostic also lives and is, if therefore being is the cause of a greater number of effects, but life of a less number, and intellect of still fewer effects, being is the first, life the second, and intellect the third. Proposition 102. All beings which exist in any manner whatever consist of bound and the infinite through that which is primarily being, but all living beings are motive of themselves through the first life, and all gnostic beings participate of knowledge through the first intellect. For if that which is imparticipable in each series imparts its own peculiarity to all the natures under the same series, it is evident that the first being also imparts to all things bound and at the same time infinity, since it is itself primarily mixed from these. Life also imparts to all things the motion which it possesses in itself. Their life is the first progression and motion from the stable hypostasis of being, and intellect imparts knowledge to all things. For the summit of all knowledge is an intellect, and intellect is the first gnostic nature. Proposition 103. All things are in all, but appropriately in each. For in being there is life and intellect, and in life being and intellect, and in intellect being and life, but in intellect indeed all things subsist intellectually, in life vitally, and in being all things are truly beings. Since everything subsists either according to cause, or according to aparxies, or according to participation, and in the first the rest are according to cause, in the second the first is according to participation, but the third according to cause, and in the third the natures prior to it are according to participation. This being the case, life, and intellect have a prior or causal subsistence in being. Since however each thing is characterized according to aparxies, and neither according to cause, for cause pertains to other things, e'ed est to affects, nor according to participation, for a thing derives that elsewhere of which it participates. Hence in being there is truly life and intellect, essential life and essential intellect, and in life there is being indeed according to participation, but intellect according to cause. Each of these however subsists there vitally, for the aparxies is according to life, and in intellect life and essence subsists according to participation, and each of these subsists there intellectually, for knowledge is the essence and the life of intellect. Everything which is primarily eternal has both its essence and its energy eternal. For if it primarily participates of the perpetuity of eternity, it does not partially participate of it, but entirely, for either it participates of it in energy, but not in essence. This however is impossible, since in this case energy would be more excellent than essence, or it participates of it according to essence, but does not participate of it according to energy. In this case however, that which is primarily eternal, and that which primarily participates of time will be the same, and time indeed will primarily measure the essence of certain things, but eternity which is more excellent than all time will not measure the essence of anything, if that which is primarily eternal is not essentially contained by eternity. Hence, everything which is primarily eternal has both an eternal essence and energy. Everything immortal is perpetual, but not everything perpetual is immortal. For if the immortal is that which always participates of life, but that which always participates of life, participates also of being, and that which always lives, always is. Hence, everything immortal is perpetual, but the immortal is that which is unreceptive of death, and always lives, and the perpetual is that which is unreceptive of non-being, and always is. If however, there are many beings more and less excellent than life, which are unreceptive of death, but exist always, if this be the case, not everything which is perpetual is immortal. That however, there are many beings not immortal that exist always is evident, for there are certain beings indeed which are destitute of life but which exist always and are indestructible. For as being is to life, so is the perpetual to the immortal. For the life which cannot be taken away is immortal, and the being which cannot be taken away is perpetual, but being is more comprehensive than life, and therefore the perpetual is more comprehensive than the immortal. Proposition 106. The medium of everything which is entirely eternal, both in essence and energy, and of everything which has its essence in time, is that which is partly indeed eternal, and partly is measured by time. Or that which has its essence comprehended by time is entirely temporal, for by a much greater priority this will be allotted a temporal energy, but that which is entirely temporal is in every respect dissimilar to that which is entirely eternal. But all progressions are through similars, hence there is something between these. The medium therefore is either that which is eternal in essence, but temporal in energy or vice versa. This latter, however, is impossible, for energy would be more excellent than essence. It remains therefore that the medium is the former of these. Proposition 107. Which is partly eternal and partly temporal is that one and the same time being and generation. For everything eternal is being, and that which is measured by time is generation, so that if the same thing participates of time and eternity, yet not according to the same, it will be both being and generation. Corollary. From these things it is evident that generation indeed, having a temporal essence, is suspended from that which partly partakes of being, and partly of generation, participating at once of eternity and time. But this is suspended from that which is in every respect eternal, and that which is in every respect eternal is suspended from being, which is prior to the eternal. Proposition 108. Everything which is partial in each order is able to participate in a twofold respect of the monand which is in the approximately superior order. Either through its own wholeness or through that which is partial in the superior order, and coordinate with the thing according to an analogy to the whole series. For if conversion is to all things through similitude, that which is partial in an inferior order is dissimilar to that which is monadic, and a whole in a superior order. And in short, is as that which is partial to a whole, and as one order to another. But a partial nature is similar to a whole of the same series, through a communion of peculiarity, and to the approximately superior coordinate peculiarity, through an analogous subsistence. It is evident, therefore, that through these media a conversion from one to the other is affected, as through similars to that which is similar. For the one is similar as the partial to that which is partial, but the other as that which is the appropriate of the same series. But the whole of the superior series is dissimilar in both these respects. Proposition 109. Every partial intellect participates of the unity which is above intellect, and the first, both through the intellect which ranks as a whole, and through the partial unity which is coordinate with this partial intellect. Every partial soul likewise participates of the intellect which is a whole, through the soul which ranks as a whole, and through a partial intellect. And every partial nature of body participates of the soul which is a whole, through the wholeness of nature, and a partial soul. Furthermore, every thing partial participates of the monad which is in a superior order, either through its proper wholeness, or through that which is partial in that order, and which is coordinate to the thing. Proposition 110. Of all the things that are arranged in each series, such as are first, and are conjoined with their monad, are able to participate of the natures which are approximately established in the superior series, through analogy, but such as are more imperfect and remote from their proper principle are not naturally adapted to enjoy these natures. Four, because such things as are first are allied to those in a superior series being allotted a better and more divine nature in the order to which they belong, but such things as are more imperfect proceed further from their principle, and are allotted a secondary and ministrant, but not a primary and leading progression in the whole series. This being the case, the former are necessarily canacially conjoined to the things in a superior order, but the latter are unadapted to be conjoined with them. Four, all things are not of an equal dignity, though they may belong to the same order. Four, there is not one and the same ratio in all, but all things proceed from their proper monad as from one, and with reference to one thing. Hence they are not allotted the same power, but some things are able to receive approximately the participations of superior natures, while others being dissimilar to them by proceeding to a greater distance from their principles are deprived of a power of this kind. Proposition 111. Of every intellectual series some things are divine intellects receiving the participations of the gods, but others are intellects alone, and of every psychical series some things are intellectual souls suspended from their proper intellects, but others are souls alone. Of all corporeal natures likewise some have souls supernally presiding over them, but others are natures alone, destitute of the presence of souls. Four of each series, not the whole genus is adapted to be suspended from that which is prior to itself, but that which is more perfect in it, and sufficient to be cognizant with superior natures. Neither, therefore, is every intellect suspended from deity, but those intellects only which are supreme and most single, for these are allied to the divine unities. Nor do all souls participate of participable intellect, but such only as are most intellectual. Nor do all corporeal natures enjoy the presence of soul, and of the soul which is participated, but those only that are more perfect and possess in a greater degree the form of reason, and this is the mode of demonstration in all things. Proposition 112. Of every order those things that are first have the form of the natures prior to them, for the highest genera in each order are conjoined through similitude to the natures placed above them, and through the connection and coherence of the progression of holes. Hence, such as the superior natures are primarily, such also is the form which these highest genera are allotted, and which is allied to the nature of those in the superior order. They are also such according to the peculiarity of subsistence as are the natures prior to them. Proposition 113. Every divine number is unical, for if a divine number has a precedenous cause, without a liquet the one, just as an intellectual number has intellect, and a psychical number so, and if multitude is everywhere analogous to its cause, it is evident that a divine number is unical since the one is God, but this follows, since the one and the good are the same, for the good and God are the same. For that beyond which there is nothing, and after which all things aspire, is God, and also that from which all things proceed, and to which all things tend, but this is good. If, therefore, there is a multitude of gods, the multitude is unical, but that there is is evident, for every principal cause is the leader of an appropriate multitude which is similar and allied to the cause. Proposition 114. Every God is a self-perfect unity, and every self-perfect unity is a God, and every self-perfect unity is a God. For, if the number of unities is twofold, as has been before demonstrated, and some are self-perfect, but others are illuminations from the self-perfect unities, and if a divine number is allied to and conatural with the one and the good, the gods are self-perfect unities, and vice versa, if there is a self-perfect unity, it is a God, for as unity is in the most imminent degree allied to the one and the self-perfect to the good. So likewise, according to both these, the self-perfect participates of the divine peculiarity and is a God. But if a God was a unity, yet not a self-perfect unity, or a self-perfect hypothesis, yet not a unity, he would be arranged in another order, on account of the mutation of the peculiarity. Proposition 115. Every God is super-essential, super-vital, and super-intellectual. For if each is a self-perfect unity, but neither being, life, or intellect is a unity, but that which is united, it is evident that every God is beyond each of these. For if these differ from each other, but all are in all, each of these being all will not be one only. Far there still, if the first God is super-essential, but every God is of the series of the first, so far as a God, each will be super-essential, but that the first God is super-essential is evident. For essence is not the same with unity, nor is to exist the same thing as to be united. If, however, these are not the same, either the first God is both these, and in this case he will not be one only, but something else besides the one, and will participate of unity, but will not be the one itself, or he is one of these. But if indeed he is essence, he will be indigent of the one. It is, however, impossible that the good and the first should be indigent, hence he is one alone, and therefore super-essential. But if each thing imparts the peculiarity of that which it is, primarily to the whole series, of which it is the leader, hence every divine number is super-essential, since every principle cause produces similars prior to dissimilars. If, therefore, the first God is super-essential, all the Gods will be super-essential, for they will be entirely similar to the first. Since, however, they are also essences, they will be produced from the first essence as the monads of essences. Proposition 116. Every deity except the one is participable. For that the one is imparticipable is evident, since if it were participated, and on this account pertained to something else, it would no longer be similarly the cause of all things, both of such as our prior two beings, and of beings themselves. But that the other unities are participated, we shall thus demonstrate. For, if there is another imparticipable unity after the first, in what does it differ from the one? For either, it subsists after the same manner as that, and how in this case is the one the second but the other first, or it does not subsist after the same manner, and thus one of these will be the one itself, but the other one, and not one. This non-one also, if it is no hypostasis, whatever, will be one alone. But, if it is a certain other hypostasis besides the one, in this case the one will be participated by the non-one, and that will be a self-perfect one which conjoins the non-one with the one, so that again God will be this. We dare leaket the one, so far as he is God, but that which is non-one will subsist in the participation of the one. Every unity, therefore, which subsists after the one is participable, and every God is participable. Proposition 117. Every God is the measure of beings. For, if every God is unical, he defines and measures all the multitude of beings. For, all multitudes being in their own nature indefinite are bounded through the one, but that which is one being, or being characterized by the one, measuring and terminating the natures with which it is present, leads into bound that which according to its own power is not bounded. For, the one being has the form of the one by participation, but that which is uniform, or has the form of the one recedes from indefiniteness and infinity, and by how much the more uniform it is, by so much the less is it indefinite and without measure. Every multitude of beings, therefore, is measured by the divine unities. Proposition 118. Everything which is in the Gods pre-exists in them according to their peculiarities, and the peculiarity of the Gods is unical and super-essential. Hence, all things are contained in them uniquely and super-essentially. For, if everything subsists in a three-fold manner, we directly get either according to cause, or according to aparxies, or according to participation, but the first number of all things is the divine number. Nothing will be in the Gods according to participation, but all things will subsist in them either according to aparxies or according to cause. Such things, however, as they antecedently comprehend, as being the causes of all things, they antecedently comprehend in a manner appropriate to their own union. For everything which is the leader of secondary natures causally, contains the cause of things subordinate in a way naturally adapted to itself. All things, therefore, are in the Gods uniquely and super-essentially. Proposition 119. Every God subsists according to super-essential goodness, and is good neither according to participation nor according to essence, but super-essentially, since habits and essences are allotted a secondary and manifold order from the Gods. For, if the first God is the One and the Good, and so far as He is the One, He is also the Good, and so far as the Good, the One, if this be the case, every series of the Gods has the form of the One, and the form of the Good according to one peculiarity, and each of the Gods is not a unity and goodness according to anything else. But each, so far as He is a unity, so far He is a goodness, and so far as He is a goodness, so far He is a unity, so far also as the Gods posterior to the first God proceed from the first. They have the form of the Good, and the form of the One, since the first is the One and the Good, but so far as all of them are Gods, they are unities and goodnesses. As, therefore, the One of the Gods is super-essentially, so likewise is their goodness, since it is nothing else than the One. For each of them is not anything else than the Good, but is good alone, as neither is each anything else than the One, but is good alone, as neither is each anything else than the One, but is good