 Section 30 of the Anti-Coup. This is a LibriVox recording. While LibriVox recordings are in the public domain, for more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. The Anti-Coup by Gene Sharp and Bruce Jenkins. Preparations by the Civil Institutions. Despite the vulnerability of many democratic governments, not all political leaders will see the desirability and feasibility of preparing for anti-coup defense. A capacity for defense against coup d'etats is nevertheless important and needs to be developed. Where the government for whatever reason does not take the initiative in adopting an anti-coup defense policy and preparing for it, the way is open in societies with any degree of civil liberties for the society itself to take action. In these cases, there is a very important role for direct preparations for anti-coup defense by the civil institutions themselves. In many situations, the basic concept of anti-coup defense and the principles of resistance can be disseminated and preparations for it may be initiated by the civil institutions of the society, independently of governmental involvement. These preparations would not mean, of course, that everyone thinks that the current government is the best possible or that it is no serious limitations or problems. The view would simply be that the regime that might be imposed by possible pooches would most likely be significantly worse. Blocking the imposition through a coup of a more autocratic and repressive government would then be a prerequisite to making needed improvements in the political system and society. Often the targeted current government may suffer from blatant inadequacies, such as widespread corruption or social disruption, such as a breakdown of law and order. Pooches may sincerely or falsely claim that their coup is necessary to correct these situations. That claim may give them significant popular support. Nevertheless, defenses needed against those coups. The new regime may not end corruption, and the claim to support law and order may be used to impose a new authoritarian or dictatorial regime. The use of a coup to correct such problems represents a dangerous president as to how a problem regime should be changed. That coup might in fact take a very different turn and the next coup might be much more sinister. One of the several possible alternative remedies includes carefully focused campaigns by conventional forms of action or narrowly directed nonviolent protests or resistance. As an anti-democratic technique of political change, coup d'etat are intrinsically dangerous even when it is claimed that they are intended to correct a serious problem. In politics there are often unintended consequences of one's actions, and not all intentions are always made public. Non-governmental institutions and organizations can disseminate the essential concept of anti-coup defense widely throughout the society through various means of communication. Though civil bodies can then individually and in cooperation with others initiate and implement an anti-coup defense policy. They may do this by educating their own constituents, making preparations, and undertaking planning as to how their sector of the population and society might most effectively act to help defeat a future coup. For example, individuals, groups, and institutions working in communications, transportation, government offices, the police, religious life, education, and every major aspect of the society would need to plan how effectively to block control by the pooches. Strong preparations for anti-coup defense can merge into both education and organization within government structures, even when the national anti-coup defense policy has not been adopted. In some situations organized preparations by the civil institutions might also involve local and regional governments in cooperation with personnel and groups within the national governmental structure. This type of planning would need to focus to a significant degree on those aspects of the society that would be priority areas of legitimization and control for the pooches. Among the high priority areas would be control of the governmental apparatus, civil servants, bureaucrats, and the like, and control of the police and members of the military forces. Also highly important would be newspapers, radio, television, telephones, water energy, and food supplies. Through such initiatives in education, organization, planning, and preparations, national plans to block future coups could be prepared that are suited to specific national conditions. Such a defense policy could be made powerful even without governmental initiative. If such institutions are strong and represent the diverse components of the society, it is possible for them to prepare and to conduct a sufficiently powerful anti-coup defense that is able to defeat such an attack even when the government itself has not participated in the organization of such a defense. And of section 30. Section 31 of the anti-coup. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org, the anti-coup, by Jean Sharp and Bruce Jenkins. Government initiated preparations. Where the society has a higher degree of democracy, or at least the political leaders wish their society to evolve peacefully without abrupt changes by coup d'etat, governments may adopt anti-coup defense policies. Legislatures and other parts of the government can establish measures to prepare for effective defense against future coups. These measures might be aided by constitutional, legal, and organizational changes aimed to bar puchests from seizing control of the government and society. For example, in 1997, Thailand adopted a new constitution that takes a major step in this direction. It's article 65 states, a person shall have the right to resist peacefully. Any act committed for the acquisition of power to rule the country by a means which is not in accordance with the modes provided in this constitution. Obviously, such a constitutional provision is of major significance. However, to be effective, it requires the addition of legal provisions for implementing the principle, and also both governmental and non-governmental preparations to make the non-cooperation sufficiently powerful so as to be successful where possible. Involvement of the government itself in the dissemination of the concept of defense against coups, and in the preparations for a vigorous defense, can have significant advantages. The most important advantage would, of course, be the direct preparation of the governmental machinery to resist a takeover. The bureaucracy, civil service, ministries, administrative departments, police, and military forces could be trained to offer strong resistance. Specific obligations and guidelines for anti-coup resistance would be developed for and by civil servants, media staff, communications operators, police, military forces, and employees of local, regional, and provincial governments. If these components of the state machinery can be kept unusable by pushists, the defense will be more extensive and powerful, than if this were not the case. Also, the struggle is likely to be shorter with fewer casualties. End Section 31. Section 32 of the anti-coup. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. The Anti-Coup by Jean Sharp and Bruce Jenkins. Possible legislation and other plans to mobilize defense. Governmental preparations may require new legislation and implementation of its provisions. Among the steps that can be taken are these. For a fuller discussion of governmental preparations, see Appendix 1. For a discussion of preparations by civil institutions, see Appendix 2. 1. A constitutional amendment can be adopted that grants citizens the rights and responsibility to resist a coup and denies them the right to recognize a coup as being legitimate. 2. Legislation can be enacted that obliges all police and military forces to refuse to participate in or assist with a coup. 3. Legislation can be enacted that obligates all government employees to refuse cooperation with a coup and obedience to usurpers. In the event of a coup, government employees would be obliged to carry on their work according to established constitutional and legal procedures and policies. 4. Legislation can be enacted that obliges all personnel in the fields of communications, media, and transportation to resist censorship by the Puchas and to refuse to cooperate with or communicate orders from coup leaders. 5. Legislation can be enacted that obliges all public and private financial institutions to refuse financial relations with the Puchas. 6. The constitutional government can communicate in advance of a crisis with all international bodies, organizations, and governments with which it has relations that in the event of a coup those bodies should maintain recognition of the constitutional government and refuse all relations with the Puchas. 7. In the event of a coup, individuals and bodies within the constitutional government can appeal to religious and moral leaders to denounce the attack and to oppress upon their adherents that they should refuse to cooperate with it. 8. The constitutional government can make plans for continuation of leadership in case important government buildings are seized or government officials are imprisoned or executed. 9. The legislature can prepare plans for how the constitutional government should resume control of the country once a coup attempt collapses. 10. The legislature can appeal to organizations and educational institutions to develop and implement programs to educate citizens on their right and duty to refuse cooperation with an attempted coup. In all of this planning it must be made clear that the nature of the anti-coup resistance is non-violent and that no one is to commit acts of violence against fellow citizens who illegally support the coup. It should also be made clear what the penalties are for individuals who are found guilty of either initiating or cooperating with a coup. End of section 32. Section 33 of the anti-coup. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org the anti-coup by Gene Sharp and Bruce Jenkins. Other types of preparations. In addition to preparation and dissemination of general guidelines for anti-coup resistance several other types of preparations for defence are possible. For example, training maneuvers could be organized in which imaginary coups would be defied by staged civilian resistance. These maneuvers could take place in residential areas, offices or factories, cities, provinces and across the whole country. Technical preparations would also be necessary for this type of defence against coup. Provisions and equipment would be required for communications after the Puchests had occupied key centres and seized facilities of established newspapers and radio and television stations. Publishing supplies and broadcasting equipment for underground newspapers, resistance leaflets and underground radio could be secured and hidden for use in emergencies. Advanced arrangements should be made for locating such broadcasting stations, communication centres or printing plants in the territory of a friendly, supportive country. End Section 33 Section 34 of the anti-coup. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org. The Anti-Coup by Gene Sharp and Bruce Jenkins. Consequences of an Anti-Coup Defence The objective of this defence policy against coup d'etat is to preserve constitutional government by blocking the imposition of viable governments by the Puchests, by making the attacked society unruly by the attackers and by enabling the population to maintain control and self-direction of their society even when under attack. The responsibility for this preservation of constitutional government rests with all members of the society. It is they who can maintain and expand their freedoms and continue to improve their society in accordance with the cherished principles of the nation. This anti-coup defence policy would have major positive qualities. It is a policy based on people, not bullets and bombs, on human institutions, not military technology. It is a policy that can serve freedom instead of threatening civil war or submitting to a new dictatorship. Adopted and practiced widely internationally, this policy would make a major contribution to removing the coup d'etat as a major political problem. This would limit the rise of new dictatorships reducing the prevalence of tyranny in the world. This policy is a creative defence based on the power of people, even in grave crisis to become and remain the masters of their own destinies. The consequences of this could be profound. End of section 34 Section 35 of the anti-coup. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org The Anti-Coup by Gene Sharp and Bruce Jenkins. Appendix 1 Legislation and other governmental preparations for anti-coup defence. Important preparations can be made with governments to prevent and defeat coup d'etat. These may require new legislation and implementation of its provisions. In all of this legislation and these declarations of responsibilities and duties, it shall be made clear that no one is to commit acts of violence against ones fellow citizens who are acting illegally. The following legal measures and procedures are recommended for this purpose. 1. A constitutional provision should be adopted that no citizen of any status, role or position in the society whatsoever has the right to accept as the legitimate government any person or group that has conducted a coup d'etat. To the contrary, all citizens, without exception, have the constitutional duty to deny legitimacy to any group of putschists and to refuse all cooperation with them and all obedience to them. Citizens will persistently continue their usual duties and assist in meeting the human needs of their fellow citizens while defying the putschists. 2. Specific laws should be enacted to establish the legal obligations of all government employees and civil servants on national, regional and local levels of government to refuse to assist coup d'etat. Their legal obligation would be to persist in conducting their work according to established pre-coup, constitutional and legal procedures and policies only. They would also be legally bound to refuse all cooperation with and obedience to any group of usurpers. This refusal would be aimed to deny to putschists all administrative support to carry out their illegal orders and objectives. 3. Specific laws should be enacted to implement the new constitutional provision to make it a legal obligation of all members of police forces and all members of the military forces to swear not only allegiance to the constitutional government, but to pledge, perhaps in the induction oath, to refuse to participate in any conspiracy to organise or conduct a coup d'etat. In case a coup is then later attempted, it would be the duty of these persons to refuse to obey, serve or collaborate with any group that has attempted to seize the state apparatus. The police at all levels and members of the judicial system must be mandated to continue to apply the previously established laws, policies and procedures only. They must ignore any new policies, edicts and orders received or announced from those who have illegally attempted to seize the state. Specifically, they may warn persons and groups of the likelihood of arrest, and they should refuse to locate and arrest patriotic resistors who are defying the putsch, either by individual actions or by group resistance and demonstrations. At times this police resistance may be quite open and at other times police may pretend to be obeying the putschists, but not actually doing so. For example, they may report that it was impossible for them to locate and arrest wanted persons. If ordered to disperse street demonstrations, police actions may range from simply being present at the site, but not taking repressive measures to joining the demonstrators as resistors themselves. The police must not be allowed to become a tool of repression for the usurpers. 4. In addition to resisting the putschists, police should, wherever feasible, be obligated to actively assist the resistance. For example, it has happened in past resistance movements that police transported supplies of resistance newspapers and other literature in police cars to other parts of the city or region where they were needed. 5. Soldiers and other members of military forces must not allow themselves to become a tool of repression in the service of those who have attempted to replace the constitutional government. Their non-cooperation and disobedience may be especially difficult when the coup has been conducted by officers of the military forces as compared to a political group which seeks the compliance of military forces in enforcing their illegal domination of the government and society. Similarly to the options for police, soldiers in this difficult situation who oppose the coup may take any one of a range of actions, none of which serves the usurpers. They may, for example, be very gentle in facing street demonstrators or, when ordered to fire at protesters, may shoot above their heads so as not to injure anyone. They may also seek to encourage their military unit to openly defy the usurpers or, without using their military weapons, soldiers may engage in especially dangerous acts of protest and defiance against the putschists. Open resistance by both police and military troops is likely to be extremely dangerous as the penalty for disobedience and mutiny is often execution. Consequently, other less obvious ways of denying usurpers, obedience and assistance are at investigation and application. Six. Specific laws should be enacted to make it a legal obligation of all persons and organisations working in communications to persist in their loyalty to the constitutional government only. This would mean that in the event of a coup d'etat they would be legally bound to refuse to submit to the putschist's attempts to impose censorship, publish announcements and orders from the putschists and comply with any other illegal orders from the putschists. In case the regular communications, printing and broadcasting facilities are made unusable for normal activities and for use on behalf of the legitimate government as a result of repressive actions of the putschists it should be the responsibility of people in those professions as well as other citizens to create new means of communication among the population outside the control of the usurpers. Seven. All persons and groups working for any level of government should in the event of a coup for as long as possible continue to apply established policies and procedures and ignore any new policies, orders and instructions issued by the usurpers. Under likely initial conditions the government employees can continue this defiance at their usual places of work. If intolerable repression is launched against them there these persons and groups can go on strike or even disappear. The machinery of government must not be permitted to become a tool of the usurpers for controlling the society as a whole. Eight. Specific laws should be enacted to make it a legal obligation of all persons and organisations working in transportation to refuse all orders from the usurpers and to make the transportation system unusable by the putschists and instead use it to assist the resistance. Nine. Specific laws should be enacted to make it a legal obligation of all governmental and private financial bodies all banks, business institutions and other financial institutions and all labour unions and similar associations to refuse all financial relations whatsoever with the putschists. Ten. Well in advance of a coup attempt the government should communicate to all governments with which it has diplomatic relations and to all international organisations including the United Nations that those bodies are requested to refuse to conduct any normal political or economic relationships with potential usurpers and instead should recognise the constitutional government only. Eleven. The legislature and governmental ministries and departments should make various types of contingency plans for the continuation of legitimate leadership in case the putschists occupy government buildings, imprison or execute government officials and representatives or take similar repressive actions. Twelve. The legislature should in advance make precise plans as to how constitutional government shall resume full, normal operations upon the collapse of the attempted coup. No other group of usurpers shall be permitted undemocratically to impose its own rule during a period of transition. In case of loss of life by previous officials during the coup and defence against it provisions should be made as to how other persons may legitimately assume the constitutional positions that have been vacated. Thirteen. The legislature should in advance of an attempted coup urge and support all independent institutions, organisations, associations and all educational institutions of the country to participate in the education of their members and the general citizenry as to their appropriate patriotic duties to repudiate the usurpers and to practice non-cooperation and defiance against any attempted coup d'etat. Fourteen. The legislature may also enact legislation to deny participants in a coup any lasting financial gain from their illegal activities. They would also be prohibited from holding any future government employment or positions. Fifteen. The legislature should also consider what other types of punishment should be provided in the law for initiating and cooperating with a coup. These provisions need to take into consideration the need to encourage early supporters of a coup to reverse their action and to join the defence against it. And section 35. Section 36 of the anti-coup. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. The Anti-Coup by Jean Sharp and Bruce Jenkins. Appendix 2. Preparations by the Civil Society for Anti-Coup Defence. coup d'etat are less likely to be attempted and more likely to be defeated if the institutions of civil society are prepared and able to resist any attempted seizure of the state. This defence would be prepared and waged by the non-governmental organizations and associations, educational institutions, economic organizations, communications and transportation bodies, religious organizations and institutions, and other bodies. This resistance action by civil society may be waged either in support of planned governmental defence measures or in their absence may be waged independently and directly at the initiative of the citizenry. In either case, advanced preparations for anti-coup resistance by the society's independent institutions are likely to make anti-coup plotters think twice before attempting such an attack. If they nevertheless attempt a putish, these preparations would increase the power of the anti-coup defence. These preparations and resistance can be grouped roughly into five types of activity. One, public education. Two, media. Three, political organizations. Four, religious institutions. And five, specific groups and institutions. One, public education. The tasks of these non-governmental bodies would include educating their members and the general citizenry about effective means to reject as illegitimate any usurpers and how to wage widespread non-cooperation and defiance of the putish efforts to govern. The aim would be to make illegitimate controls and rule impossible. While all institutions of civil society should participate in these efforts to educate their own members, certain institutions would be especially suitable for reaching the general public. These would include the formal educational system and various branches of the media, such as newspapers, magazines, radio, television, the internet, and the cinema. The political content of such public education measures would include both one, the importance of denying legitimacy to any pooches, and two, the importance of non-cooperation and defiance to make it impossible for them to establish and maintain their illegitimate rule. In addition to explicit instructions on how to resist, documentaries and film dramas about cases of earlier anti-coup resistance could be used. Information on consequences in other countries of the failure to resist a coup d'etat could also be important. The public will need to be informed about the characteristics of non-violent struggle, including its many methods and the way it operates in conflicts. At times, open street demonstrations may be useful to communicate opposition to an illegal seizure of the state. However, at other times, such action as street marches toward the guns of the pooches' troops may be most unwise. Such action may lead not only to massive casualties, but also strike fear into the public and therefore submission. Because of these situations, the public must be informed well in advance of the crisis about alternative forms of protest and defiance that are less obviously dangerous but that make popular opposition unmistakably clear. For example, if the mass of the urban population for specified periods simply stayed indoors, in their homes, schools or other buildings, the streets will be largely empty of people and therefore not be suitable shooting ranges to kill and intimidate resistors. The empty streets will, however, communicate widespread opposition. 2. Media The members of society's media, journalists, newspaper and magazine editors, radio and television reporters and directors, printing unions, communication aids and the like can organize advanced resistance against a coup d'etat. This would include plans to resist censorship by the pooches, plans to communicate messages from the constitutional government to the general citizenry and plans to refuse to communicate messages from the pooches to the population. In addition, media personnel can make advance preparations for communications in case they lose their operational centers or must go into hiding. If the pooches take control of society's media apparatus, printers' unions, radio operators and others can claim mechanical failures and inability to carry out the pooches' instructions. Plans for underground printing presses and secret radio broadcasting capacity can also be developed. Preparations to broadcast from neighboring countries can be arranged as well. All of these actions will significantly limit the legitimacy and control that people could give to coup leaders because those leaders will be unable to exercise full control over the information to which the society has access and the defenders will be able to communicate widely among themselves and with the public. 3. Political Organizations Both political parties and nonpartisan organizations devoted to advancing their social, economic and political agendas should include in their missions efforts at educating their members and the public as to the importance and methods of anti-coup defense. Their prior organizational contacts and networks can also help significantly in communicating guidance about needed resistance and conducting the anti-coup defense. 4. Religious Institutions Religious and moral leaders and groups should urge their believers and supporters to regard a coup as an attack on constitutional democracy that is both immoral and a violation of the codes of behavior by which their adherents and believers should live. Consequently, if such an attack occurs, those religious and moral leaders and groups should urge their believers and supporters to apply their beliefs by refusing to give any legitimacy to the pooches, refusing all cooperation with and obedience to them and instead by participating actively in the anti-coup defense. 5. Specific Groups and Institutions The members of officials of individual groups and institutions in the society could also organize around preventing the pooches from controlling the areas of the society that they operate. For example, members of civil society who work in transportation, economic activities, mass media, communications, religious institutions and all other major functioning components and services of the society need to prepare and apply non-cooperation and defiance to retain their independence from pooches. It will be highly important for these bodies and institutions to block attempts by the pooches or their supporters to seize internal control of these bodies and institutions. Attackers may also even attempt to destroy these independent groups and institutions and replace them with new institutions controlled by the pooches or their collaborators. Those efforts, too, will need to be defeated. The citizens and their non-governmental institutions should launch preparations and in a crisis should initiate actual resistance. This anti-coup resistance could be in accordance with an advanced governmental anti-coup defense plan or, as noted earlier, could be launched independently if no such plan has been prepared. Those population groups and institutions that operate or control important social, economic, political, or industrial functions will usually be more skilled in determining what specific forms of non-cooperation and defiance may be most effective in keeping that area of the society out of the control of usurpers than the theorists of such resistance. A few examples follow. One, transportation workers such as truck drivers, railroad employees, or airline operators are likely to be far more skilled in determining how best to slow or paralyze the transportation system and to keep it out of the hands of the pooches than staff in a government office. They are also likely to be more skilled in knowing how, despite partial paralysis by resistors or blockages of transportation by pooches, to move food and other important supplies to places where they are most needed. Two, in the communications field, as long as cell phones and email systems are still operating, they can be used creatively to help communication resistance plans, to initiate resistance activities, and to report the status of pooches' controls and resistance struggle. Reserve broadcast equipment that has been hidden away for an emergency can be used for defense purposes even when government offices or previous broadcasting stations have been occupied. Three, civil servants in government offices can continue to function independently even if their directors have joined the pooches. In addition to open defiance, civil servants can also quietly resist the coup through bureaucratic slowness, misfiling important papers, and similar non-provocative but effective activities that limit the pooches' control. Four, labor unions can defiantly refuse to follow pooches' efforts to direct economic activities and can continue those activities that have been prohibited whatever the pooches' leaders, collaborating administrators, or corporation officials may say. Five, special days that honor persons, events, or principles of significance to the nation and to the democratic resistors may be observed even when the pooches' span them and new such days may be instituted to honor events or casualties of the anti-coup resistance. Please visit LibriVox.org The Anti-Coup by Jean Sharp and Bruce Jenkins The Albert Einstein Institution Mission Statement The mission of the Albert Einstein Institution is to advance the worldwide study and strategic use of nonviolent action and conflict. The institution is committed to defending democratic freedoms and institutions opposing oppression, dictatorship, and genocide and reducing the reliance on violence as an instrument of policy. This mission is pursued in three ways by encouraging research and policy studies on the methods of nonviolent action and their past use in diverse conflicts. Sharing the results of this research with the public through publications, conferences, and the media and consulting with groups in conflict about the strategic potential of nonviolent action. The Albert Einstein Institution 427 Newberry Street Boston, Massachusetts 02115-1802 United States of America About the authors Jean Sharp, Doctor of Philosophy at Oxford University is a senior scholar at the Albert Einstein Institution in Boston, Massachusetts. He holds a Bachelor of Arts and a Master's of Arts from Ohio State University and a degree of philosophy in political theory from Oxford University. He is also Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of Massachusetts, Dartmouth. For nearly 30 years he held a research appointment at Harvard University's Center for International Affairs. He is the author of various books including The Politics of Nonviolent Action, 1973, Gandhi as a Political Strategist, 1979, Social Power and Political Freedom, 1980, Making Europe Unconquerable, 1985, Civilian-Based Defence, 1990, and From Dictatorship to Democracy, 1993 and 2002. A new major book is now in preparation, Waging Nonviolent Struggle, 20th Century Practice and 21st Century Potential. His writings have been published in more than 30 languages. Bruce Jenkins is Policy Director of the Bank Information Center in Washington DC. He previously served as Executive Director of the Albert Einstein Institution from 1995 to 2000 and was also Assistant Director of the Institution's Policy and Outreach Program. He holds a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from the University of New Hampshire and a Diploma in Political Science in International Relations from the Frey Universitat Berlin with a special focus on international economic sanctions. He has extensive international experience working with both policymakers and civil society groups. He has participated in consultations, workshops and fact-finding missions in China, Sweden, Russia and the Baltic States on nonviolent democratization processes. End Section 37 End the Antico by Gene Sharp and Bruce Jenkins.