 Now I am going to explain about to connectionism and folk psychology. There are many philosophical problems are existing in connectionist model of mind and secondly whether this connectionist model of mind replacing folk psychology and connectionism plays vital role to solve many kinds of scientific as well as our day-to-day problems. But when connectionism is trying to explain mind in terms of connections, units, nodes and synaptic relations, then the philosophical question arises, then it replaces folk psychology, then it explains folk psychology in ordinary way. Although this connectionist model of mind is part of also one of the cognitive model of mind which we have seen and connectionism is one of them also. In the modern cognitive science these models are provided the basis for simulating or modeling a cognitive performance. Simulation is one of the important ways of testing theories of the mind. And if a simulation performs in a manner comparable to the mind and then that will offer support for the memory underlying in that simulations. However in cognitive science we see that two models are provided basis for most of the simulation activities. There are two models in the simulation activities if we find in the cognitive science. On the one hand if you see the digital computer can be used to manipulate symbols. And insofar as it becomes possible to program the symbol processing computer to execute task that seems to require intelligence. That is the symbol processing computer becomes a plausible analogy of the mind. There are various cognitive science theories have been attracted to the proposal that the mind itself is a symbol processing device. The model of the brain on the other hand is a technique anatomy and physiology of the brain. And this view suggest that the brain consist of a network of simple electrical processing units which can simulate and inhabit one another. This style of explanation of the brain in the cognitive science is generally considered as the brain style computations. Now the question is why should there be a brain style computations and there are many connections they have replied to this question very scientifically. And this is the basic assumption is that we seek explanation at the program or functional level rather than the implementation level. Thus it is often pointed out that we can learn very little about what kind of program a particular computer may be running by looking at the electronics with which it is made. In fact we do not care much about the details of the computer at all but all we care about program that is running. And if we know the program we will know how the system will behave in any situation. It does not matter whether we use vacuum tubes or transistors that is the essential characteristics of the same. Between both the things vacuum tubes or transistors the essential characteristics are the same because it functions in a mechanistic way. And it is true for computers because they are all essentially same whether we make them out of vacuum tubes or transistors. We invariable use computers of the same design. But when you look at essentially a different architecture and we see the architecture make a good deals of differences. It is the architecture that determines which kinds of algorithm are most easily carried out on the machine in questions. And it is the architecture mechanism that determines the essential nature of the program itself. And thus it is reasonable that we should begin by asking that we know about the architecture of the brain and how it might shape the algorithm. Underlaying the biological intelligence and human mental life. The way we have been understanding a architecture in the same way we can understand in the biological intelligence and human mental life. And the way we know the algorithm process is going on in the this computational way and the same way this biological intelligence and human mental life is going on. And one of the propaganda of this thesis is Rommelhardt is one of the found of this thesis. It says that the basic strategy of the connection to approach to take the neurons as the fundamental processing units. Neurons as the fundamental processing unit that is one of the important things according to Rommelhardt. And we imagine that the computation is carried out through a simple interaction among such process units. Then essentially the idea is that these processing elements communicate by sending numbers along the lines and connect the processing elements. This identification already provides some interesting constraints on the kinds of algorithm that might underlie human intelligence. A question may arise here. How does the replacement of the computer metaphor as the model of mind affects our thinking? Rommelhardt has given one one plausible answer says that this changes in orientation leads us to a number of considerations that further inform and constrain our models of building efforts. Because neurons are remarkable relative to the components in modern computers. And he says that neurons operate in the time scale of millisecond whereas a computer components operates in the time scale of nanosecond. Here there is a huge difference between speed between brain and a computational system. And even if a computational system is more faster because a computer system is running in the time scale of nanosecond. But in the case of human brain is functioning in the time scale of milliseconds. This distinction is very vital distinction and this shows that computer is superior to human mind. And if this is superior to human mind then consciousness can be explainable in this level also. And even if this consciousness can be quantified and this quantification consciousness can be explainable in the mechanistic way or in the connectionist model according to Rommelhardt. And this means that human brain process that receives the order in a second or less can involve only a hundred or so times steps. Because the most of the computational process like perceptions, memory travel, etc., take about a second functions. That is we seek an explanation of this mental phenomena that do not require more than about a hundredth elementary sequential operations. The human brain contains billions of such processing elements as the computer organizes computation with many serial steps. Similar the brain can deploy many processing elements cooperatively and in parallel to carry out its activities. There is a cooperation is there and there is a parallel is there. And that way it is functioning. Thus the use of brain style computational system offers not only a hope that we can characterize how brain actually carry out certain information processing task but also offer a solution to a computational problems and that seems difficult to solve in traditional computational framework. In the traditional system it is very difficult to measure how a brain is functioning and what level consciousness is there. But in the connectionist model according to Rommelhardt that we can able to solve the computational problems with the help of this model. Because this model shows that there is a mechanistic system is functioning faster than the human brain. Therefore we can able to solve some problem in computational model of mind. The connectionist systems are capable of exploiting and mimicking brain style computational like artificial intelligence also. And they have been trying this artificially way and a connectionist operates both as a system and a process also. The connectionist systems are very important because they provide good solution to a number of difficult computational problems that seems to arise often in models of cognitions. A connectionism as a process mechanism is carried out by a number of processing elements. And these elements called nodes or units have a dynamic which is roughly an analog to simple neurons. Each node receives inputs from some number of nodes and responds to that inputs according to a simple activation function. And in turn executes or inhabits other nodes to which it is connected. The above analogy will be very clear if you go through the connectionistic system. Let us see a figure. In this figure we have taken arbitrarily as a connectionist model. In any connectionist model there are three units as input units, hidden units and output units. And here the input units are as such I, S, T, H, E, M, A, O, N, R. And the hidden units here is the mat on and rat. And the output units is the rat on the mat. There may be many inputs even if many hidden units and many other output units. The hidden units serve neither as input nor as the output. But facilitate the processing of information through the system. This model will be very clear if you go through Ramallah 7 major component of any connectionistic model. There are seven components of any connectionistic model. First major component is a set of processing unit. Any connectionistic system begins with a set of processing unit. All of these processing units connectionistic system is carried out by these units. There is no execute or other agency. See there are only relative and simply units. Each doing its own relative simple job. A unit job is simply to receive inputs from its neighbor as its function. It sends output values to its neighbor. The system is inherently parallel in the sense that units can carry out their computational process at the same time. Whenever it is passing getting information and giving the information, in that process also computation are there at the same time. There are three types of units and inputs, units, output and hidden units. Input units receive inputs from sources external to the system under study. The output unit sends signal out of the systems. The hidden units which are check the inputs and which check also output within the system they are modeling. But they are not visible to the outside system which is hidden inside the system. Secondly, the state of activation and in addition to the set of units, we also need representation of state of at a time. What time we are activating particular unity and this primary specified by a vector time representing the pattern of activations over the set of processing unity. Each element of the vector stands for the element of one of the units. It is the pattern of activation over the set of units and that capture what the system represents at any time and it is useful to see processing in a system as the evolution through time or pattern of activities over the set of units. Thirdly, output of the units and unity interacts by transmitting signals to their neighbors and the strength of their signals and degrees to which they affect the neighbors are determined by their degree of activations. The output units also depends on the on its activation values and how much inputs we have given and it depends upon the output values also. The pattern of connectivity, there is a pattern of connectivity among the different nodes in the unity. Specifically, all these processing functions not in the arbitrary way but in the pattern of connectivity among the processing unity and that processing unity is there is one kind of pattern of connectivity there and it will respond arbitrary to particular unity. It is not necessary to give if you put something then it will automatically will get the exact result from the output and activation source. We also need a set of rules where the inputs impinging on a particular units are combined with one another undergoing processing with the current states of units that produces a new states of activations. Six-three, modifying a pattern of connectivity as a foundation of experience and it can develop new connections, a loss of existing connections and modification of the strength of connection that are already existing. Modification is there and it may get new connections automatically. It may modify the changes and get also strength of already that modification of the strength of connection that are already existing. Lastly, representations of the environment. For the development of any model it is very difficult to have a clear representation of the environment in which this model is to exist. In connectivity model we represent the environment as a time-making stochastic function over the space of input patterns and that is we imagine that at any point of time there is some probability that any of the possible set of inputs patterns is impinging on the inputs units also. This probability depends on the history of inputs as the output of the systems and in practice most models involve much simple characterizations of the environment. Now we have to see some of the philosophical implications of connectionistic model of mind. There are many philosophical problems which are existing in this connectionistic model of mind. In the understanding of cognitions connectionism will necessarily have implementation of philosophy of mind because it is also explaining mind in a mechanical way because of that philosophers are reacting against this thesis. There are also two areas in particular in which it is like to have impact. There are analysis of the mind as a representational system even if the connectionistic model of mind will also like a representational system. Analyzes functional, intentional representations which forward distinguishes in the computational theory of mind from the representational theory of mind and for our concept of this representation we will see in the next sections. As we have seen the representational theory of mind holds the view that systems have mental states by virtue of encoding representations and stating in particular relations to them. The computational theory asks that cognitive activities consist of formal operation performed on this representation system. Fodor argument against connectionism brings out the defects of the connectionistic model. He opines that it fails to support the computational theory because fodor interprets connection model as representational and so potential conforming to the representational theory of mind and this is because connectionists routinely interpret the activation of units or groups of units as representing contents and here there is no distinction between the connectionistic model of mind and the representational model of mind and use the way representational model of mind representing something in the symbolic process system in the same way connectionistic model mind is doing and this is the case of inputs and output units providing cognitive interpretation of networks activity and thus the theorist must create the input as a representation of a problem and output as a representation to the answer and even if whenever the problem arises we give the inputs and we get the answer the answer is like the output and a given unit is found to be activated by units with certain features and so interpreted as representing those features and this suggests that connectionist system can indeed be understood as a representational theory of mind even if the connectionistic networks exemplify the representational theory of mind they are significantly different from more traditional example of the representational theory firstly it is not clear that we can always give an interpretation what units in your connectionistic network represent in the natural language terms secondly the representational that are concerned are not discrete but it is distributed and that is the same unit and the same connects many different representational role rather than employing one representations per role this distribution connectionist representations from those that have previously been designed and thirdly it is emphasized that the pattern of activation on the hidden units in the connectionist system the system has undergone and the interpretations assigned to these units are not arbitrary they are represented symbolically but our analysis of how the network has solved the problems it was confronting and thus the network is connected to sensory inputs and not supplied inputs by a modular machinery and the generality of this representation is genuine not merely a product of these theorist interpretations therefore it is like representational model of mind according to Jerry Ford now we have to see whether this connectionist model of mind contributes to the replacement of folk psychology folk psychology general we mean the ordinary people believe in the activities of mind that is why it is a folk and it is not a scientific it is not a classic way of explaining mind but it is a folk of explaining mind the folk psychology explaining that way whether this connectionist model is replacing folk psychology even if it is replacing the folk psychology because we know that in many ways cognitive science and philosophy emerges first with respect to the question whether folk psychology remains viable or must be replaced if it is replaced then the reliance on the propositions and representations of knowledge in other areas of philosophy would be at risk because even if replacing folk psychology it is also replacing phenomenal mind also and qualia also because connectionism is a mechanical process and it leaves out the mentality of the human mind and this theory suggest that there is no mental quality such as belief intention the way we ordinarily think about the human mind if connectionism should provide a correct account of mental processing if it did not turn out to implement symbolic systems the accounts of mental life are only involving the manipulation of propositions would appear to be false and that is the mental states involves propositions will not figure in the genesis of behavior and here I would like to one of the important points which has been erased by William Churchland that eliminative materialistic says that even if like connectionistic model by maintaining that if a theory fails to reduce our best scientific theory at lower level it must dismissed as false and the eliminative metallist says that we should eliminate concept mind in the when we are explaining brain or any other scientific there is nothing called mind in the case of folk psychology because there is nothing in the head with which to identify the propositions it posits this conclusion entails the further proposition it posits this conclusion entails the further conclusion that folk psychology is false even if not only connectionist model of mind says that folk psychology is not there it can replace the folk psychology as we know folk psychology refers to a people's attributions of propositional attributes to other people and uses these to predict and explain the the the the the the and uses these to predict and explain their behaviour and these attributions are made to whole persons that is folk psychology does not itself for an account of the finer gained internal operations that may produce propositional attitudes if we attribute to a person a particular belief if we attribute to an internal state that is the state inside the person that enable the person to have a belief with will have a quite different character and they apply the above point to the case of cognitions because the activities inside the head may make it possible for a person to have a belief and desires and these propositional attitudes it may be the case that the internal activities are best described in the connectivity approach however if you see it does not show that folk psychology is false because if you see but if it is false it will be the same I would like to argue that the cognitions to model of mind is unable to refute folk psychology because the cognitions to explains mind in terms of syntactic and thereby neglect the semantics and which is very important for understanding the human mind and this is mental content which represent the world but there is a central agency of the eye to which the mental activity is ascribed this shows that human mind as propositional attitudes about the world and there is a regular relationship between human mind and the world as David Chalmers points out who which are the mental states such as belief doubt etc often call as propositional attitudes or attitudes to the proposition concerning the world it is not even if it may existing it may not existing but anything whatever we do we do about the activity about the world even if about the our self we also part of the world therefore there is a constant relationship between mind and world and if there is a constant relationship replace the folk psychology this is one of the important point for folk psychology to argue against connectionistic model of mind for example when I believe that John will tour India I endorse a certain proposition concerning John when I hold that John will and attitude toward the same propositions that John will tour India and here the central feature of these mental state is their semantic aspect or intentionality that is a belief has a semantic content content of many belief cited cited is something like propositions that John will tour India this semantic aspect has the feature of subjectivity and qualia and the subject of consciousness is an essential feature of mental states and which can prove that the analysis of mental state is an irreducible fact of fact version ontology whereas in the case of connectionistic model of mind the explanation of mind in third person perspective