 So, one explanation for a limited stock market participation having touch upon is a version to uncertainty. So if you know the probability distribution of stock market returns, then you maximize your expected utility and you get your optimal share, but you always invest in the stock market. If you are not sure about the distribution of stock market returns, so what you do you maximize your expected utility over the worst possible outcome. So if you are extreme aversion to uncertainty, then you end up not investing in the stock market at all. And I don't know about the experimental evidence for the degree of uncertainty of version with different wealth levels, but it could well be that the richer you are, the less uncertain aversion you are, and that could explain part of your results. Take the second one at the back. Yeah. This is fascinating. On the comment of the discussion about trying to control for the sort of beta risk, I think it's very difficult because people are investing in those sort of assets that you cannot measure easily at beta. But what you could try to see is whether the wealth of the the richer varies more in the time series with stock market. So get it sort of a measure, more aggregate measure of whether they are just more exposed to the cycle. Over here. So two questions. The first is following up on what Shaddle was saying that maybe we should, the people who are less able to manage their wealth and earn high returns should give it to someone. He suggested the government. There's another natural candidate which is the wealth management industry. So do you have any thoughts on why some of these people aren't handing over their portfolios to say a fund manager or a wealth manager who could do it better for them? And then the second question is you're asking where does this diversity and returns come from? And it seems like a lot of it comes from something you call skill. Skill must be information, right? There's no other way to systematically buy assets that will have high returns. It's not a measurable strategy unless you know something about the returns. And I point that out because if it's information, if some people have higher quality signals or lower noise signals, that implies a cross-equation restriction between returns and dispersion, right? Because noisy signals will give you low average returns because you can't choose your investments very wisely. But the same noise will lead to heterogeneity in signals. Of course, people put less weight on those noisier signals. And you can actually get lower dispersion in returns from noisier signals. And the quantitative mapping between those two tells you something about how uncertain people were to begin with. So it would be interesting to use this data and impose actually the cross-equation restrictions from an information model to back out, you know, how much information, how much signal quality are we talking about, and how uncertain were people to begin with. Noji, do you want to start answering? Okay. Maybe we'll do the first set of questions. Thank you very much. I think I don't know whether the exercise passed the test of the expert because, you know, the discussion is from Norway. So he knows the data much better than me. And he knows the potential and the shortcoming. I think even such a good data set has shortcomings. And he was pointing out to some of them. So thanks for the comment. We have been discussing on some of these issues before. And I think we'll go on trying them. So on the fact that we are missing essentially two components of the balance sheet of the house, which are extremely important. The first one is housing, and the other is the counterpart of the funding or the financing of the house that is the mortgage. That is clearly important precisely because, you know, it carries a huge weight in the wealth of a large share of the families, not those below median, but those above median up to, let's say, the 90% type. Then the very wealthy, the old housing but, you know, the share goes down dramatically and they are heavily invested in private businesses. So we are collecting the data. We are almost done. And the next version of the paper will include both housing and mortgages. I think when you include that, the main feature of what I learned from the first resource that we have is that you scale people at that point by net worth instead of total assets. What you see is that there are people at the bottom of net worth. There are two types of people. People that are highly leveraged, so they borrow and spend it out. They eat everything. Those realize negative returns. Then there are people that use the market in order to borrow and invest. And those have relatively high returns. So it is important to have the whole population, including the very bottom of people in terms of net worth, because otherwise you are missing those that potentially at a certain point, because they can exploit the market, borrow and invest in good opportunities, they will climb the wealth later. So that is the main, I think, in terms of substantive contribution that we get once we had the debt. So in terms of... So we are not providing what is behind this persistent component. There could be many sources. The information. That is one potential explanation. I think I would explain a bunch of features, including the sharp ratio. So the main feature of information in that can rationalize a higher sharp ratio among better informed people. The correlation with wealth, because wealthier people tend to have more incentives to face the cost of information gathering, and so they should be able to earn a higher sharp ratio. And I am thinking about trying to go in the direction that you are saying. It is true that depending on how you model information gathering, you can reduce the conditional variance of returns and so earn higher sharp ratios that way. But you can use information in order to spot different profit opportunities. And so you can earn higher sharp ratios because the numerator goes up. So there are both channels, and I think they are both interesting. And I have different implications for the cross-sectional variance. That is one thing that we are planning to do in a different project, in a different paper. On the limited stock market participation, there are many explanations for that, including uncertainty and so on. I think one reason why that is important to sort of point out is because it can provide a rationale for why people differ in their portfolio composition. So if you are averse to ambiguity, what you do, or if you have limited attention and you want to economize information, you tend to specialize your portfolio. So you tend to get away from full diversified portfolio, look at a bunch of stocks and focus on them. So we can explain heterogeneity, departure from the standard fully diversified portfolio, specialization in a single, in a bunch of things. On the fund managers, so I think that is how poor people and uninformed investors should manage their assets. So there should be an industry that helps them out. The problem is that the industry is costly, it's not for free. You are taxed. Usually the fee that you pay is of the order of 200 business points. So systematically, uninformed people that rely on fund managers, they are less than informed people that can manage on their own. In addition, you are also exposing to potential abuses. So you can get the advice, sometimes the advice is also distorted. Okay, I think I would stop here. I just want to say that in terms of the, it's also important to keep in mind that, what, 80% of the households own a house here. And over this period, the return on that asset has been amazing. Just because you happen to start when the housing market bottomed out. In terms of the beta risk, so what I mean was to look at people, for example, with only liquid, with only financial assets, I think it's perfectly doable. There was some more questions. There's one question over there, Peter. It would be interesting, I think, and maybe you know, to compare the persistent returns of your high wealth people with the persistent returns of the Norway sovereign wealth fund. Yeah, that is definitely public. And so in this revision, we are also adding the wealth in this fund that is clearly shifting pro quota. But it is important because in terms of differences across individuals, the return on the fund for a poor individual is super important. The car is a very large weight. For a very wealthy, it doesn't matter. So it's going to shrink the heterogeneity in returns once we include that component. And also, I think we are going to add also pension wealth that probably is kind of redistributes a lot in terms of returns away from the wealthy and more to the poor. So once you include all these type of kind of public assets, you are going to see a little bit less diversity of heterogeneity in returns. But I think we haven't done the components that you are suggesting that we can definitely do it. And then we'll have to close just looking at the time. Is the mic working? Ah, sorry, lady over there. One of Kettle's comments, this issue of the very high returns for the wealthy people, I would have thought that you could rule out stock picking as an explanation just because they're pretty good estimates of, for example, hedge fund advantages in terms of sharp ratios, and they might be there, but they're not so big. So it seems like that's something that... Yeah, we haven't looked into the details. So what I see in the data is the following. So most of the sharp ratios for the wealthy, they are coming for the investment in their private businesses. So I suppose that the sharp ratio of Zuckerman is above market. That is my guess. I haven't computed it, but that would be my guess. So it's all a mystery that some people beat the market. There are people that are above average. So that is not... Maybe systematically, in 200 years, he will converge. But over a relatively long period of time, I think that is not particularly surprising. So I think most of the difference between the sharp ratio that you have in mind on the Oslo stock exchange and the ones that we are measuring is different from the fact that some entrepreneurs they have access to assets that don't belong to the Oslo stock exchange, I think. Okay, but you could look at... In your data, when you look at people who don't own private equity, you have to find the same, in fact, actually a higher sharp ratio. So what would make me happy is a graph that shows that all percentiles are below the market sharp ratio. But for the wealthy, they are less so. And then when you include private equity, it can be whatever. I think on that note, just looking at the time and Luke has already hinted to me. I think I'd like to thank everyone. Thank you, Luigi. Thank you, Chetil. And we'll close for the next session. Thank you.