 CHAPTER 27 BULLE AND BRAG PERRYVILLE ROSACRANCE AND MERFRIESBURREL GRANCE VIXBURG EXPERIMENTS GRANCE MAY BATTLES SEAGE AND SURRENDER OF VIXBURG LINCOLN TO GRANT ROSACRANCE'S MARCH TO CHETANUGA BATTLE OF CHICAMARGA GRANT AT CHETANUGA BATTLE OF CHETANUGA BURNSIDE AT NOXVILLE BURNSIDE REPULSES LONG STREET From the Virginia campaigns of 1863 we must return to the Western campaigns of the same year, or to be more precise, beginning with the middle of 1862, when, in July of that year, Halleck was called to Washington to become General-in-Chief, the principal plan he left behind was that Buell, with the bulk of the forces which had captured Corinth, should move from that place eastward to occupy eastern Tennessee. Buell, however, progressed so leisurely that before he reached Chattanooga the Confederate General Bragg, by a swift northward movement, advanced into eastern Kentucky, enacted the farce of appointing a Confederate governor for that state, and so threatened Louisville that Buell was compelled abruptly to abandon his eastward march and, turning to the north, run a neck-and-neck race to save Louisville from rebel occupation. Successful in this, Buell immediately turned and, pursuing the now retreating forces of Bragg, brought them to Bay at Perryville, where, on October 8, was fought a considerable battle from which Bragg immediately retreated out of Kentucky. While on one hand Bragg had suffered defeat, he had on the other caused Buell to give up all idea of moving into east Tennessee, an object on which the President had specially and repeatedly insisted. When Halleck specifically ordered Buell to resume and execute that plan, Buell urged such objections and intimated such unwillingness that, on October 24, 1862, he was relieved from command, and General Rosocrans was appointed to succeed him. Rosocrans neglected the east Tennessee orders as heedlessly as Buell had done, but reorganizing the army of the Cumberland and strengthening his communications marched against Bragg, who had gone into winter quarters at Murfreesboro. The severe engagement of that name fought on December 31, 1862, and the three succeeding days of the new year between forces numbering about forty-three thousand on each side was tactically a drawn battle, but its results rendered it an important Union victory, compelling Bragg to retreat. Though for reasons which he never satisfactorily explained, Rosocrans failed for six months to follow up his evident advantages. The transfer of Halleck from the west to Washington in the summer of 1862 left Grant in command of the district of west Tennessee. But Buell's eastward expedition left him so few movable troops that during the summer and most of the autumn he was able to accomplish little, except to defend his department by the repulse of the enemy at Ayuka in September and at Corinth early in October, Rosocrans being in local command at both places. It was for these successes that Rosocrans was chosen to succeed Buell. Grant had a doubtless given much of his enforced leisure to studying the great problem of opening the Mississippi, a task which was thus left in his own hands, but for which as yet he found neither a theoretical solution, nor possessed an army sufficiently strong to begin practical work. Under the most favorable aspects it was a formidable undertaking. Union gun boats had full control of the great river from Carrow as far south as Vicksburg, and Farragut's fleet commanded it from New Orleans as far north as Port Hudson. But the intervening link of two hundred miles between these places was in as complete possession of the Confederates, giving the rebellion uninterrupted access to the immense resources in men and supplies of the Trans-Mississippi country and effectually barring the free navigation of the river. Both the cities named were strongly fortified, but Vicksburg, on the east bank, by its natural situation on a bluff two hundred feet high, rising almost out of the stream, was unassailable from the riverfront. Farragut had, indeed, in mid-summer passed up and down before it with little damage from its fire, but in return his own guns could no more do harm to its batteries than they could have bombarded a fortress in the clouds. When, by the middle of November 1862, Grant was able to reunite sufficient reinforcements, he started on a campaign directly southward toward Jackson, the capital of Mississippi, and sent Sherman, with an expedition from Memphis, down the river to the mouth of the Azoo, hoping to unite these forces against Vicksburg. But before Grant reached Granada, his railroad communications were cut by a Confederate raid, and his great depot of supplies at Holly Springs captured and burned, leaving him for two weeks without other provisions than such as he could gather by foraging. The costly lesson proved a valuable experience to him, which he soon put to use. Sherman's expedition also met disaster. Landing at Millican's Bend, on the west bank of the Mississippi, he ventured a daring storming assault from the east bank of the Azoo at Haines Bluff, ten miles north of Vicksburg, but met a bloody repulse. Having abandoned his railroad advance, Grant next joined Sherman at Millican's Bend in January 1863, where also Admiral Porter, with a river squadron of seventy vessels, eleven of them ironclads, was added to his force. For the next three months, Grant kept his large army in Flotilla busy with four different experiments to gain a practicable advance toward Vicksburg, until his fifth highly novel and, to other minds, seemingly reckless and impossible plan secured him a brilliant success and results of immense military advantage. One experiment was to cut a canal across the tongue of land opposite Vicksburg, through which the Flotilla might pass out of range of the Vicksburg guns. A second was to force the gunboats and transports up the tortuous and swampy Azoo to find a landing far north of Haines Bluff. A third was for the Flotilla to enter through Yazoo Pass and Coldwater River, two hundred miles above, and descend the Azoo to a hoped-for landing. Still a fourth project was to cut a canal into Lake Providence, west of the Mississippi, seventy miles above, find a practicable waterway through two hundred miles of bayous and rivers, and establish communication with banks and ferrigate, who were engaged in an effort to capture Port Hudson. The time, the patience, the infinite labor, and enormous expense of these several projects were utterly wasted. Early in April Grant began an entirely new plan, which was opposed by all his ablest generals, and, tested by the accepted rules of military science, looked like a headlong venture of rash desperation. During the month of April he caused Admiral Porter to prepare fifteen or twenty vessels, iron clads, steam transports, and provision barges, and run them boldly by night past the Vicksburg and, later, past the Grand Gulf Batteries, which the Admiral happily accomplished with very little loss. Meanwhile, the general, by a very circuitous route of seventy miles, marched an army of thirty-five thousand down the west bank of the Mississippi and, with Porter's vessels and transports, crossed them to the east side of the river at Bruinsburg. From this point, with an improvised train of country vehicles to carry his ammunition, and living, meanwhile, entirely upon the country, as he had learned to do in his baffled Granada expedition, he made one of the most rapid and brilliant campaigns in military history. In the first twenty days of May he marched one hundred and eighty miles and fought five winning battles, respectively Port Gibson, Raymond, Jackson, Champions Hill, and Big Black River, in each of which he brought his practically united force against the enemy's separated detachments, capturing altogether eighty-eight guns and over six thousand prisoners, and shutting up the Confederate General Pemberton in Vicksburg. By a rigorous siege of six weeks, he then compelled his antagonist to surrender the strongly fortified city with one hundred and seventy-two cannon, and his army of nearly thirty thousand men. On the fourth of July, eighteen sixty-three, the day after Meade's crushing defeat of Lee at Gettysburg, the surrender took place, citizens and Confederate soldiers doubtless rejoicing that the old national holiday gave them escape from their caves and bomb-proofs and full Yankee rations to still their long-endured hunger. The splendid victory of Grant brought about a quick and important echo. About the time that the Union army closed around Vicksburg, General Banks, on the lower Mississippi, began a close investment in siege of Port Hudson, which he pushed with determined tenacity. When the rebel garrison heard the artillery salutes which were fired by order of Banks to celebrate the surrender of Vicksburg, and the rebel commander was informed of Pemberton's disaster, he also gave up the defense, and on July 9 surrendered Port Hudson with six thousand prisoners and fifty-one guns. Great national rejoicing followed this double success of the Union arms on the Mississippi, which, added to Gettysburg, formed the turning tide in the War of the Rebellion, and no one was more related over these western victories which fully restored the free navigation of the Mississippi than President Lincoln. Like that of the whole country, his patience had been severely tried by the long and ineffectual experiments of Grant, but from first to last Mr. Lincoln had given him firm and undeviating confidence and support. He not only gave the general quick promotion, but crowned the official reward with the following generous letter. My dear general, I do not remember that you and I ever met personally. I write this now as a grateful acknowledgment for the almost inestimable service you have done the country. I wish to say a word further. When you first reached the vicinity of Vicksburg, I thought you should do what you finally did. March the troops across the neck, run the batteries with the transports, and thus go below. And I never had any faith except a general hope that you knew better than I that the Yazoo Pass expedition and the like could succeed. When you got below and took Port Gibson, Grand Gulf, and vicinity, I thought you should go down the river and join General Banks, and when you turned northward east of the Big Black, I feared it was a mistake. I now wish to make the personal acknowledgment that you were right and I was wrong. End of quote. It has already been mentioned that General Rosicrance, after winning the Battle of Murfreesboro at the beginning of 1863, remained inactive at that place nearly six months, though, of course, constantly busy recruiting his army, gathering supplies, and warning off several troublesome Confederate cavalry raids. The defeated General Bragg retreated only to Shelbyville, ten miles south of the battlefield he had been obliged to give up, and the military frontier thus divided Tennessee between the contestants. Against repeated prompting and urging from Washington, Rosicrance continued to find real or imaginary excuses for delay until mid-summer when, as if suddenly awaking from a long lethargy, he made a bold advance and by a nine-days campaign of skillful strategy forced Bragg into a retreat that stopped only at Chattanooga, south of the Tennessee River, which, with the surrounding mountains, made it the strategical center and military key to the heart of Georgia and the south. This march of Rosicrance, ending the day before the Vicksburg Surrender, again gave the Union forces full possession of Middle Tennessee down to its southern boundary. The march completed, and the enemy thus successfully maneuvered out of the state, Rosicrance once more came to a halt and made no further movement for six weeks. The President and General Halleck were already out of patience with Rosicrance for his long previous delay. Bragg's retreat to Chattanooga was such a gratifying and encouraging supplement to the victories of Vicksburg and Port Hudson that they felt the Confederate Army should not be allowed to rest, recruit, and fortify the important gateway to the heart of the Southern Confederacy, and early in August sent Rosicrance peremptory orders to advance. This direction seemed the more opportune and necessary since Burnside had organized a special Union force in eastern Kentucky and was about starting on a direct campaign into east Tennessee. Finally, obeying this explicit injunction, Rosicrance took the initiative in the middle of August by a vigorous southward movement, threatening Chattanooga from the north, he marched instead around the left flank of Bragg's army, boldly crossing the Cumberland Mountains, the Tennessee River, and two mountain ranges beyond. Bragg, seriously alarmed lest Rosicrance should seize the railroad communications behind him, hastily evacuated Chattanooga, but not with the intention of flight, as Rosicrance erroneously believed and reported. When on September 9 the left of Rosicrance's army marched into Chattanooga without firing a shot, the Union detachments were so widely scattered in separating mountain valleys, in pursuit of Bragg's imaginary retreat, that Bragg believed he saw his chance to crush them in detail before they could unite. With this resolve Bragg turned upon his antagonist, but his effort at quick concentration was delayed by the natural difficulties of the ground. By September 19 both armies were well gathered on opposite sides of Chattanooga Creek, eight miles southeast of Chattanooga, each commander being as yet, however, little informed of the other's position and strength. Bragg had over seventy-one thousand men, Rosicrance fifty-seven thousand. The conflict was finally begun, rather by accident than design, and on that day and the twentieth was fought the Battle of Chickamauga, one of the severest encounters of the whole war. Developing itself without clear knowledge on either side, it became a moving conflict. Bragg constantly extending his attack toward his right and Rosicrance meeting the onset with prompt shifting toward his left. In this changing contest, Rosicrance's army underwent an alarming crisis on the second day of the battle. A mistake or miscarriage of orders opened a gap of two brigades in his line, which the enemy quickly found, and through which the Confederate battalions rushed with an energy that swept away the whole Union right in a disorderly retreat. Rosicrance himself was caught in the panic and, believing the day irretrievably lost, hastened back to Chattanooga to report the disaster and collect what he might of his flying army. The hopeless prospect, however, soon changed. General Thomas, second in command and originally in charge of the center, had been sent by Rosicrance to the extreme left and had, while the right was giving way, successfully repulsed the enemy in his front. He had been so fortunate as to secure a strong position on the head of a ridge around which he gathered such remnants of the beaten detachments as he could collect, amounting to about half the Union army, and here, from two o'clock in the afternoon until dark, he held his semi-circular line against repeated assaults of the enemy, with a heroic valor that earned him the subricot of The Rock of Chickamauga. At night Thomas retired under orders to Rossville, halfway to Chattanooga. The President was, of course, greatly disappointed when Rosicrance telegraphed that he had met a serious disaster, but this disappointment was mitigated by the quickly following news of the magnificent defense and the successful stand made by General Thomas at the close of the battle. Mr. Lincoln immediately wrote in a note to Halleck, quote, I think it is very important for General Rosicrance to hold his position at or about Chattanooga, because, if held, from that place to Cleveland, both inclusive, it keeps all Tennessee clear of the enemy, and also breaks one of his most important railroad lines. If he can only maintain this position without more, this rebellion can only eke out a short and feeble existence as an animal sometimes may with a thorn in its vitals, end of quote. And to Rosicrance he telegraphed directly, bidding him be of good cheer and adding, quote, We shall do our utmost to assist you, end quote. To this end the administration took instant and energetic measures. On the night of September 23 the President, General Halleck, several members of the cabinet and leading Army and railroad officials met in an improvised council at the War Department, and issued emergency orders under which two Army Corps from the Army of the Potomac, numbering twenty thousand men in all with their arms and equipment ready for the field, the whole under command of General Hooker were transported from their camps on the rapid end by railway to Nashville and the Tennessee River in the next eight days. Burnside, who had arrived at Knoxville early in September, was urged by repeated messages to join Rosicrance and other reinforcements were already on the way from Memphis and Vicksburg. All this help, however, was not instantly available. Before it could arrive, Rosicrance felt obliged to draw together within the fortifications of Chattanooga, while Bragg quickly closed about him, and by practically blockading Rosicrance's river communication, placed him in a state of siege. In a few weeks the limited supplies brought the Union Army face to face with famine. It having become evident that Rosicrance was incapable of extricating it from its peril, he was relieved and the command given to Thomas, while the three western departments were consolidated under General Grant, and he was ordered personally to proceed to Chattanooga, which place he reached on October 22. Before his arrival, General W. F. Smith had devised and prepared an ingenious plan to regain control of river communication. Under the orders of Grant, Smith successfully executed it, and full ration soon restored vigor and confidence to the Union troops. The considerable reinforcements under Hooker and Sherman coming up put the besieging enemy on the defensive, and active preparations were begun, which resulted in the famous battle and overwhelming Union victory of Chattanooga on November 23, 24, and 25, 1863. The city of Chattanooga lies on the southeastern bank of the Tennessee River. Back of the city, Chattanooga Valley forms a level plain about two miles in width to Missionary Ridge, a narrow mountain range five hundred feet high, generally parallel to the course of the Tennessee, extending far to the southwest. The Confederates had fortified the upper end of Missionary Ridge to a length of five to seven miles opposite the city, lining its long crest with about 30 guns, amply supported by infantry. This formidable barrier was still further strengthened by two lines of rifle pits, one at the base of Missionary Ridge next to the city, and another with advanced pickets still near Chattanooga Northward. The enemy strongly held the end of Missionary Ridge, where the railroad tunnel passes through it. Southward they held the yet stronger point of Lookout Mountain, whose rocky base turns the course of the Tennessee River in a short bend to the north. Grant's plan in rough outline was that Sherman, with the Army of the Tennessee, should storm the northern end of Missionary Ridge at the railroad tunnel. Hooker stationed at Wajachi, thirteen miles to the southwest, with his two corps from the Army of the Potomac, should advance toward the city, storming the point of Lookout Mountain on his way, and Thomas, in the city, attacked the direct front of Missionary Ridge. The actual beginning slightly varied this program, with a change of core and divisions, but the detail is not worth noting. Beginning on the night of November 23, Sherman crossed his command over the Tennessee, and on the afternoon of the twenty-fourth, gained the northern end of Missionary Ridge, driving the enemy before him as far as the railroad tunnel. Here, however, he found a deep gap in the ridge, previously unknown to him, which barred his further progress. That same afternoon Hooker's troops worked their way through Mist and Fog up the rugged sides of Lookout Mountain, winning the brilliant success which has become famous as the battle above the clouds. That same afternoon, also, two divisions of the center, under the eyes of Grant and Thomas, pushed forward the Union line about a mile, seizing and fortifying a hill called Orchard Knob, capturing Bragg's first line of rifle pits and several hundred prisoners. So far everything had occurred to inspirate the Union troops and discourage the enemy, but the main incident was yet to come, on the afternoon of November 25. All the forenoon of that day Grant waited eagerly to see Sherman making progress along the north end of Missionary Ridge, not knowing that he had met an impassable valley. Grant's patience was equally tried at hearing no news from Hooker, though that general had successfully reached Missionary Ridge and was ascending the gap near Rossville. At three o'clock in the afternoon Grant at length gave Thomas the order to advance. Eleven Union brigades rushed forward with orders to take the enemy's rifle pits at the base of Missionary Ridge and then halt to reform. But such was the ease of this first capture, such the eagerness of the men who had been waiting all day for the moment of action that, after but a slight pause without orders and moved by a common impulse, they swept on and up the steep and rocky face of Missionary Ridge, heedless of the enemy's fire from rifle and cannon at the top, until in fifty-five minutes after leaving their positions they almost simultaneously broke over the crest of the ridge in six different places, capturing the batteries and making prisoners of the supporting infantry, who, surprised and bewildered by the daring escalade, made little or no further resistance. Bragg's official report soundly berates the conduct of his men, apparently forgetting the heavy loss they had inflicted on their assailants, but regardless of which the Union veterans mounted to victory in an almost miraculous exaltation of patriotic heroism. Bragg's Confederate army was not only beaten, but hopelessly demoralized by the fiery Union assault and fled in panic and retreat. Grant kept up a vigorous pursuit to a distance of twenty miles, which he ceased in order to send an immediate, strong reinforcement under Sherman to relieve Burnside, besieged by the Confederate general Longstreet at Knoxville. But before this help arrived Burnside had repulsed Longstreet, who, promptly informed of the Chattanooga disaster, retreated in the direction of Virginia. Not being pursued, however, this general again wintered in East Tennessee, and for the same reason the beaten army of Bragg halted in its retreat from Missionary Ridge at Dalton, where it also went into winter quarters. The battle of Chattanooga had opened the great central gateway to the south, but the rebel army still determined and formidable, yet lay in its path only twenty-eight miles away. End of Chapter 27, Recording by John Leader Bloomington, Illinois Chapter 28 of A Short Life of Abraham Lincoln This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recorded by Laurie Ann Walden A Short Life of Abraham Lincoln by John George Nicolay Chapter 28 Grant Lieutenant General Interview with Lincoln Grant Visit Sherman Plan of Campaigns Lincoln to Grant From the Wilderness to Cold Harbor The Move to City Point Siege of Petersburg Early Menaces Washington Lincoln Under Fire Sheridan in the Shenandoah Valley The Army rank of Lieutenant General had, before the Civil War, been conferred only twice on American commanders, on Washington for service in the War of Independence, and on Scott for his conquest of Mexico. As a reward for the victories of Donaldson, Vicksburg, and Chattanooga, Congress passed and the President signed in February 1864 an act to revive that grade. Calling Grant to Washington, the President met him for the first time at a public reception at the Executive Mansion on March 8, when the famous General was received with all the manifestations of interest and enthusiasm possible in a social state ceremonial. On the following day, at one o'clock, the General's formal investiture with his new rank and authority took place in the presence of Mr. Lincoln, the Cabinet, and a few other officials. General Grant, said the President, The nation's appreciation of what you have done and its reliance upon you for what remains to do in the existing great struggle are now presented with this commission constituting you, Lieutenant General, and the Army of the United States. With this high honor devolves upon you, also, a corresponding responsibility. As the country herein trusts you, so, under God, it will sustain you. I scarcely need to add that with what I hear speak for the nation goes my own hearty personal concurrence. General Grant's reply was modest and also very brief. Mr. President, I accept this commission with gratitude for the high honor conferred. With the aid of the noble armies that have fought on so many fields for our common country, it will be my earnest endeavor not to disappoint your expectations. I feel the full weight of the responsibilities now devolving on me, and I know that if they are met, it will be due to those armies, and above all to the favor of that providence which leads both nations and men. In the informal conversation which followed, General Grant inquired what special service was expected of him, to which the President replied that the country wanted him to take Richmond, and being asked if he could do so replied that he could if he had the troops, which he was assured would be furnished him. On the following day, Grant went to the Army of the Potomac, where Meade received him with Frank courtesy, generously suggesting that he was ready to yield the command that anyone Grant might prefer. Grant, however, informed Meade that he desired to make no change, and returning to Washington, started West without a moment's loss of time. On March 12, 1864, formal orders of the War Department placed Grant in command of all the armies of the United States, while Halleck, relieved from that duty, was retained at Washington as the President's Chief of Staff. Grant frankly confesses in his memoirs that when he started East, it was with a firm determination to accept no appointment requiring him to leave the West. But when I got to Washington and saw the situation, it was plain that here was the point for the commanding general to be. His short visit had removed several false impressions, and future experience was to cure him of many more. When Grant again met Sherman in the West, he outlined to that general, who had become his most intimate and trusted brother officer, the very simple and definite military policy which was to be followed during the year 1864. There were to be but two leading campaigns. Sherman, starting from Chattanooga, full master of his own movements, was to lead the combined Western forces against the Confederate army under Johnston, the successor of Bragg. Grant would personally conduct the campaign in the East against Richmond, or rather against the rebel army under Lee. Meade would be left in immediate command of the Army of the Potomac to execute the personal daily directions of Grant. The two Confederate armies were 800 miles apart, and should either give way, it was to be followed without halt or delay to battle or surrender, to prevent its junction with the other. Scattered as a large portion of the Union forces were in garrisons and detachments at widely separated points, there were of course many details to be arranged, and a few expeditions already in progress, but these were of minor importance, and for contributory rather than main objects, and need not here be described. Returning promptly to Washington, Grant established his headquarters with the Army of the Potomac at Culpeper, and for about a month actively pushed his military preparations. He seems at first to have been impressed with the dread that the President might wish to influence or control his plans. But the few interviews between them removed the suspicion which reckless newspaper accusation had raised, and all doubt on this point vanished when, on the last day of April, Mr. Lincoln sent him the following explicit letter. Not expecting to see you again before the spring campaign opens, I wish to express in this way my entire satisfaction with what you have done up to this time so far as I understand it. The particulars of your plan I neither know nor seek to know. You are vigilant and self-reliant, and, pleased with this, I wish not to obtrude any constraints or restraints upon you. While I am very anxious that any great disaster or capture of our men in great numbers shall be avoided, I know these points are less likely to escape your attention than they would be mine. If there is anything wanting which is within my power to give, do not fail to let me know it. And now, with a brave army and a just cause, may God sustain you. Grant's immediate reply confessed the groundlessness of his apprehensions. From my first entrance into the volunteer service of the country, to the present day, I have never had cause of complaint, have never expressed or implied a complaint against the administration or the Secretary of War for throwing any embarrassment in the way of my vigorously prosecuting what appeared to be my duty. Indeed, since the promotion which placed me in command of all the armies, and in view of the great responsibility and importance of success, I have been astonished at the readiness with which everything asked for has been yielded, without even an explanation being asked. Should my success be less than I desire and expect, the least I can say is the fault is not with you. The Union Army under Grant, 122,000 strong, on April 30, was encamped north of the Rapidan River. The Confederate Army under Lee, numbering 62,000, lay south of that stream. Nearly three years before, these opposing armies had fought their first battle of Bull Run, only a comparatively short distance north of where they now confronted each other. Campaign and battle between them had surged far to the north and to the south, but neither could as yet claim over the other any considerable gain of ground or a final advantage in the conflict. Broadly speaking, relative advance and retreat, as well as relative loss and gain of battlefields substantially balanced each other. Severe as had been their struggles in the past, a more arduous trial of strength was before them. Grant had two to one in numbers, Lee the advantage of a defensive campaign. He could retire toward cumulative reserves and into prepared fortifications, knew almost by heart every road, hill, and forest of Virginia, had for his friendly scout every white inhabitant. Perhaps his greatest element of strength lay in the conscious pride of the Confederate Army that through all fluctuations of success and failure it had for three years effectually barred the way of the Army of the Potomac to Richmond. But to offset this, there now ministered what was before absent in every encounter, the grim, unflinching will of the new Union commander. General Grant devised no plan of complicated strategy for the problem before him, but proposed to solve it by plain, hard, persistent fighting. He would endeavor to crush the Army of Lee before it could reach Richmond or unite with the Army of Johnston, or failing in that he would shut it up in that stronghold and reduce it by a siege. With this in view he instructed Meade at the very outset, Lee's army will be your objective point, where Lee goes, there you will go also. Everything being ready on the night of May 4, Meade threw five bridges across the rapidan, and before the following night the whole Union Army with its trains was across the stream moving southward by the left flank, past the right flank of the Confederates. Suddenly as was the advance it did not escape the vigilant observation of Lee, who instantly threw his force against the flanks of the Union columns, and for two days there raged in that difficult, broken and tangled region known as the Wilderness a furious battle of detachments along a line five miles in length. Thickets, swamps and ravines rendered intelligent direction and concerted maneuvering impossible, and furious and bloody as was the conflict its results were indecisive. No enemy appearing on the seventh, Grant boldly started to spot Sylvania Courthouse, only however to find the Confederates ahead of him, and on the eighth and ninth these turned their position, already strong by nature, into an impregnable entrenched camp. Grant assaulted their works on the tenth, fiercely but unsuccessfully. There followed one day of inactivity during which Grant wrote his report, only claiming that after six days of hard fighting and heavy losses, the result up to this time is much in our favor, but expressing in the phrase which immediately became celebrated his firm resolution to fight it out on this line if it takes all summer. On May 12, 1864, Grant ordered a yet more determined attack, in which with fearful carnage on both sides the Union forces finally stormed the earthworks which have become known as the Bloody Angle. But finding that other and more formidable entrenchments still resisted his entrance to the Confederate camp, Grant once more moved by the left flank past his enemy toward Richmond. Lee followed with equal swiftness along the interior lines. Days passed in an intermittent and about equally matched contest of strategy and fighting. The difference was that Grant was always advancing and Lee always retiring. On May 26, Grant reported to Washington, Lee's army is really whipped. The prisoners we now take show it, and the action of his army shows it unmistakably. A battle with them outside of entrenchments cannot be had. Our men feel that they have gained the morale over the enemy and attack him with confidence. I may be mistaken, but I feel that our success over Lee's army is already assured. That same night, Grant's advance crossed the Pamunkey River at Hanover Town, and during another week with a succession of marching, flanking, and fighting. Grant pushed the Union army forward to Cold Harbor. Here, Lee's entrenched army was again between him and Richmond, and on June 3, Grant ordered another determined attack in front to break through that constantly resisting barrier. But a disastrous repulse was the consequence. Its effect upon the campaign is best given in Grant's own letter, written to Washington on June 5. My idea from the start has been to beat Lee's army, if possible, north of Richmond, then after destroying his lines of communication on the north side of the James River, to transfer the army to the south side and besiege Lee in Richmond, or follow him south if he should retreat. I now find, after over thirty days of trial, the enemy deems it of the first importance to run no risks with the armies they now have. They act purely on the defensive behind breastworks, or feebly on the offensive immediately in front of them, and where, in case of repulse, they can instantly retire behind them. Without a greater sacrifice of human life than I am willing to make, all cannot be accomplished that I had designed outside of the city. During the week succeeding the severe repulse at Cold Harbor, which closed what may be summed up as Grant's campaign against Richmond, he made his preparations to enter upon the second element of his general plan, which may be most distinctively denominated the siege of Petersburg, though in fuller phraseology it might be called the siege of Petersburg and Richmond combined. But the amplification is not essential. For, though the operation and the siege works embraced both cities, Petersburg was the vital and vulnerable point. When Petersburg fell, Richmond fell of necessity. The reason was that Lee's army, enclosed within the combined fortifications, could only be fed by the use of three railroads centering at Petersburg, one from the southeast, one from the south, and one with general access from the southwest. Between these two plank roads added a partial means of supply. Thus far Grant's active campaign, though failing to destroy Lee's army, had nevertheless driven it into Richmond, and obviously his next step was either to dislodge it or compel it to surrender. Cold Harbor was about ten miles from Richmond, and that city was enclosed on the Washington side by two circles of fortifications, devised with the best engineering skill. On June 13 Grant threw forward an army corps across the Chickahominy, deceiving Lee into the belief that he was making a real direct advance upon the city, and so skillfully concealed his intention that by midnight of the sixteenth he had moved the whole Union army with its artillery and trains about twenty miles directly south and across the James River on a pontoon bridge over two thousand feet long to City Point. General Butler, with an expedition from Fortress Monroe, moving early in May, had been ordered to capture Petersburg, and though he failed in this he had nevertheless seized and held City Point, and Grant thus affected an immediate junction with Butler's force of thirty-two thousand. Butler's second attempt to seize Petersburg while Grant was marching to join him also failed, and Grant, unwilling to make any needless sacrifice, now limited his operations to the processes of a regular siege. This involved a complete change of method. The campaign against Richmond from the crossing of the Rapidan in the Battle of the Wilderness to Cold Harbor and the change of base to City Point occupied a period of about six weeks of almost constant swift marching and hard fighting. The siege of Petersburg was destined to involve more than nine months of mingled engineering and fighting. The Confederate army forming the combined garrisons of Richmond and Petersburg numbered about seventy thousand. The army under Grant, though in its six weeks campaign it had lost over sixty thousand and killed, wounded, and missing, was again raised by the reinforcement sent to it, and by its junction with Butler, to a total of about one hundred and fifty thousand. With this superiority of numbers Grant pursued the policy of alternately threatening the defenses of Lee, sometimes south, sometimes north of the James River, and at every favorable opportunity pushing his siege works westward in order to gradually gain and command the three railroads and two plank roads that brought the bulk of absolutely necessary food and supplies to the Confederate armies and the inhabitants of Petersburg and Richmond. It is estimated that this gradual westward extension of Grant's lines, readouts, and trenches, when added to those threatening Richmond and Petersburg on the east, finally reached a total development of about forty miles. The catastrophe came when Lee's army grew insufficient to man his defensive line along this entire length, and Grant, finding the weakened places, eventually broke through it, compelling the Confederate general and army to evacuate and abandon both cities and seek safety in flight. The central military drama, the first two distinctive acts of which are outlined above, had, during this long period, a running accompaniment of constant underplot and shifting and exciting episodes. The Shenandoah River rising northwest of Richmond, but flowing in a general northeast course to join the Potomac at Harper's Ferry, gives its name to a valley twenty to thirty miles wide, highly fertile and cultivated, and having throughout its length a fine turnpike, which in anti-railroad days was an active commercial highway between north and south. Bordered on the west by the rugged Allegheny Mountains, and on the east by the single outlying range called the Blue Ridge, it formed a protected military lane or avenue, having vital relation to the strategy of campaigns on the open Atlantic slopes of central Virginia. The Shenandoah Valley had thus played a not unimportant part in almost every military operation of the war, from the first battle of Bull Run to the final defense of Richmond. The plans of General Grant did not neglect so essential a feature of his task. While he was fighting his way toward the Confederate capital, his instructions contemplated the possession and occupation of the Shenandoah Valley as part of the system which should isolate and eventually besiege Richmond. But this part of his plan underwent many fluctuations. He had scarcely reached city point when he became aware that General Lee, equally alive to the advantages of the Shenandoah Valley, had dispatched General Earley with seventeen thousand men on a flying expedition up that convenient natural Salliport, which was for the moment undefended. Earley made such speed that he crossed the Potomac during the first week of July, made a devastating raid through Maryland and southern Pennsylvania, threatened Baltimore, and turning sharply to the south was, on the eleventh of the month, actually at the outskirts of Washington City, meditating its assault and capture. Only the opportune arrival of the Sixth Army Corps under General Wright, on the afternoon of that day, sent Earley by Grant from city point, saved the federal capital from occupation and perhaps destruction by the enemy. Certain riders have represented the government as panic-stricken during the two days that this menace lasted, but neither Mr. Lincoln nor Secretary Stanton nor General Halleck, whom it has been even more the fashion to abuse, lacked coolness or energy in the emergency. Indeed the President's personal unconcern was such as to give his associates much uneasiness. On the tenth he rode out as was his usual custom during the summer months to spend the night at the soldier's home in the suburbs, but Secretary Stanton, learning that Earley was advancing in heavy force, sent after him to compel his return to the city, and twice afterward intent on watching the fighting which took place near Fort Stevens, he exposed his tall form to the gays and bullets of the enemy in a manner to call forth earnest remonstrance from those near him. The succeeding military events in the Shenandoah Valley must here be summed up in the brief statement that General Sheridan, being placed in command of the middle military division and given an army of thirty or forty thousand men, finally drove back the Confederate detachments upon Richmond in a series of brilliant victories, and so devastated the southern end of the valley is to render it untenable for either army, and by the destruction of the James River Canal and the Virginia Central Railroad, succeeded in practically carrying out Grant's intention of effectually closing the avenue of supplies to Richmond from the Northwest. Chapter 29 of a short life of Abraham Lincoln. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. This reading by Allison Hester of Athens, Georgia. A short life of Abraham Lincoln by John G. Nicolay. Chapter 29 Sherman's Meridian Expedition. Capture of Atlanta. Hood supersedes Johnston. Hood's Invasion of Tennessee. Franklin and Nashville. Sherman's March to the Sea. Capture of Savannah. Sherman to Lincoln. Lincoln to Sherman. Sherman's March through the Carolinas. The Burning of Charleston in Columbia. Arrival at Goldsboro. Junction with Chofield. Visit to Grant. While Grant was making his marches, fighting his battles, and carrying on his siege operations in Virginia, Sherman in the West was performing the task assigned to him by his chief to pursue, destroy, or capture the principal Western Confederate army, now commanded by General Johnston. The forces which under Bragg had been defeated in the previous autumn at Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge had halted as soon as pursuit ceased and remained in winter quarters at and about Dalton, only 28 or 30 miles on the railroad southeast of Chattanooga, where their new commander, Johnston, had in the spring of 1864 about 68,000 men with which to oppose the Union advance. A few preliminary campaigns and expeditions in the West need not here be detailed, as they were not decisive. One, however, led by Sherman himself, from Vicksburg to Meridian, must be mentioned since, during the month of February, it destroyed about 100 miles of the several railroads centering at the latter place and rendered the whole railroad system of Mississippi practically useless to the Confederates, thus contributing essentially to the success of his future operations. Sherman prepared himself by uniting at Chattanooga, the best material of the three Union armies, that of the Cumberland, that of the Tennessee, and that of the Ohio, forming a force of nearly 100,000 men with 254 guns. They were seasoned veterans, whom three years of campaigning had taught how to endure every probation and develop themselves of every resource. They were provided with every essential supply, but carried with them not a pound of useless baggage or impedimenta that could retard the rapidity of their movements. Sherman had received no specific instructions from Grant, except to fight the enemy and damage the war resources of the South. But the situation before him clearly indicated the city of Atlanta, Georgia as his first objective, and as his necessary route, the railroad leading fither from Chattanooga. It was obviously a difficult line of approach, for it traversed a belt of the Alleghenies 40 miles in width, and in addition to the natural obstacles they presented, the Confederate commander anticipating his movement had prepared elaborate defensive works at the several most available points. As agreed upon with Grant, Sherman began his march on May 5, 1864, the day following that on which Grant entered upon his wilderness campaign in Virginia. These pages do not afford space to describe his progress. It is enough to say that with his double numbers he pursued the policy of making strong demonstrations in front with effective plank movements to threaten the railroad in the Confederate rear, by which means he forced back the enemy successively from point to point until by the middle of July he was in the vicinity of Atlanta, having during his advance made only one serious front attack, in which he met a costly repulse. His progress was by no means one of mere strategical maneuver. Sherman says that during the month of May across nearly 100 miles of as difficult country as was ever fought over by the civilized armies, the fighting was continuous, almost daily among trees and bushes on ground where one could rarely see 100 yards ahead. However skillful and meritorious may have been the retreat into which Johnston had been forced, it was so unwelcome to the Richmond authorities and damaging to the Confederate cause that about the middle of July Jefferson Davis relieved him and appointed one of his core commanders, General J.B. Hood in his place, whose personal qualities and free criticism of his superior led them to expect a change from a defensive to an aggressive campaign. Responding to this expectation, Hood almost immediately took the offensive and made vigorous attacks on the union positions, but met disastrous repulse and found himself fully occupied in guarding the defenses of Atlanta. For some weeks, each army tried ineffectual methods to seize the other's railroad communications, but toward the end of August, Sherman's plank movements gained such a hold of the Macon Railroad at Jonesboro, 25 miles south of Atlanta, as to endanger Hood's security. And when, in addition, a detachment sent to dislodge Sherman was defeated, Hood had no alternative but to order an evacuation. On September 3rd, Sherman telegraphed to Washington, quote, Atlanta is ours and fairly one. Since May 5th, we have been in one constant battle or skirmish and need rest, end quote. The fall of Atlanta was a heavy blow to the Confederates. They had, during the war, transformed it into a city of mills, foundries, and workshops, from which they drew supplies, ammunition, and equipment, and upon which they depended largely for the manufacture and repair of arms. But perhaps even more important than the military damage to the south, resulting from its capture, was its effect upon northern politics. Until then, the presidential campaign and progress throughout the Free States was thought by many to involve fluctuating chances under the heavy losses and apparently slow progress of both Eastern and Western armies. But the capture of Atlanta instantly infused new zeal and confidence among the Union voters, and from that time onward, the re-election of Mr. Lincoln was placed beyond reasonable doubt. Sherman personally entered the city on September 8th and took prompt measures to turn it into a purely military post. He occupied only the inner line of its formidable defenses, but so strengthened them as to make the place practically impregnable. He proceeded at once to remove all its non-combatant inhabitants with their effects, arranging a truce with Hood under which he furnished transportation to the south for all those whose sympathies were with the Confederate cause, and sent to the north those who preferred that destination. Hood raised a great outcry against what he called such barbarity and cruelty, but Sherman replied that war is war, and if the rebel families wanted peace, they and their relatives must stop fighting. Quote, God will judge us in due time, and he will pronounce whether it be more humane to fight with a town full of women and the families of a brave people at our back, or to remove them in time to places of safety among their own friends and people. End quote. Up to his occupation of Atlanta, Sherman's further plans had neither been arranged by Grant nor determined by himself, and for a while remained somewhat undecided. For the time being, he was perfectly secure in the new stronghold he had captured and completed, but his supplies depended upon a line of about 120 miles of railroad from Atlanta to Chattanooga, and very near 150 miles more from Chattanooga to Nashville. Hood, held at bay at Lovejoy Station, was not strong enough to venture a direct attack or undertake a siege, but chose the more feasible policy of operating systematically against Sherman's long line of communications. In the course of some weeks, both sides grew weary of the mere waste of time and military strength consumed in attacking and defending railroad stations, and interrupting and re-establishing the regularities of provision trains. Toward the end of September, Jefferson Davis visited Hood, and in rearranging some army assignments, united Hood's and an adjoining Confederate department under the command of Beauregard, partly with a view to adding the councils of the latter to the always energetic and bold, but sometimes rash military judgment of Hood. Between these two, Hood's eccentric and futile operations against Sherman's communications were gradually shaded off into a plan for a Confederate invasion of Tennessee. Sherman, on his part, finally matured his judgment that instead of losing a thousand men a month merely defending the railroad without other advantage, he would divide his army, send back a portion of it under the command of General Thomas to defend the state of Tennessee against the impending invasion, and abandoning the whole line of railroad from Chattanooga to Atlanta, and cutting entirely loose from his base of supplies, marched with the remainder to the sea, living upon the country and, quote, making the interior of Georgia feel the weight of the war, end quote. Grant did not immediately fall in with Sherman's suggestion, and Sherman prudently waited until the Confederate plan of invading Tennessee became further developed. It turned out as he had hoped and expected. Having gradually ceased his raids upon the railroad, Hood, by the end of October, moved westward to Tuscumbia on the Tennessee River, where he gathered an army of about 35,000 to which a Calvary force under forest of 10,000 more was soon added. Under Beauregard's orders to assume the offensive, he began a rapid march northward and, for a time, with a promise of cutting off some advanced Union detachments. We need not follow the fortunes of this campaign further than to state that the Confederate invasion of Tennessee ended in disastrous failure. It was severely checked at the Battle of Franklin on November 30, and, when in spite of this reverse, Hood pushed forward and set his army down before Nashville, as if for attack or siege, the Union army, concentrated and reinforced to about 55,000, was ready. A severe storm of rain and sleet held the confronting armies in forest immobility for a week, but on the morning of December 15, 1864, General Thomas moved forward to an attack, in which, on that and the following day, he inflicted so terrible a defeat upon his adversary that the Confederate army not only retreated in rout and panic, but soon literally went to pieces in disorganization and disappeared as a military entity from the Western conflict. Long before this, Sherman had started on his famous march to the sea. His explanations to Grant were so convincing that the General-in-Chief, on November 2, telegraphed him, quote, go on as you propose, end quote. In anticipation of this permission, he had been preparing himself ever since Hood left him a clear path by starting westward on his campaign of invasion. From Atlanta, he sent back his sick and wounded and surplus stores to Chattanooga, withdrew the garrisons, burned the bridges, broke up the railroad, and destroyed the mills, foundries, shops, and public buildings in Atlanta. With 60,000 of his best soldiers and 65 guns, he started on November 15, on his march of 300 miles to the Atlantic. They carried with them 20 days supplies of provisions, five days supply of forage, and 200 rounds of ammunition, of which each man carried 40 rounds. With perfect confidence in their leader, with perfect trust in each other's valor, endurance, and good comradeship, in the fine weather of the southern autumn, and singing the inspiring melody of John Brown's body, Sherman's army began its marching through Georgia as gaily as if it were starting on a holiday. And indeed, it may almost be said such was their experience in comparison with the hardships of war which many of these veterans had seen in their varied campaigning. They marched as nearly as might be in four parallel columns abreast, making an average of about 15 miles a day. Kilpatrick's admirable Calvary kept their front and flanks free from the improvised militia and irregular troopers of the enemy. Carefully organized foraging parties brought in their daily supply of miscellaneous provisions, corn, meat, poultry, and sweet potatoes, of which the season had yielded an abundant harvest along their route. The Confederate authorities issued excited proclamations and orders, calling on the people to, quote, fly to arms, end quote, and to, quote, assail the invader in front, flank, and rear by night and by day, end quote. But no rising occurred that in any way checked the constant progress of the march. The southern whites were, of course, silent and sullen, but the Negroes received the Yankees with demonstrations of welcome and good will, and in spite of Sherman's efforts, followed in such numbers as to embarrass his progress. As he proceeded, he destroyed the railroads by filling up cuts, burning ties, heating the rails red-hot and twisting them around trees, and to irreparable spirals. Threatening the principal cities to the right and left, he marched skillfully between and past them. He reached the outer defenses of Savannah on December 10th, easily driving before him about 10,000 of the enemy. On December 13th, he stormed Fort McAllister and communicated with the Union Fleet through a sob all sound, reporting to Washington that his march had been most agreeable, that he had not lost a wagon on the trip, that he had utterly destroyed over 200 miles of rails and consumed stores and provisions that were essential to Lee's and Hood's armies. With pardonable exultation, General Sherman telegraphed to President Lincoln on December 22nd, quote, I beg to present to you as a Christmas gift the city of Savannah with 150 heavy guns and plenty of ammunition, also about 25,000 bales of cotton, end quote. He had reason to be gratified with the warm acknowledgement which President Lincoln wrote him in the following letter. My dear General Sherman, many, many thanks for your Christmas gift, the capture of Savannah. When you were about leaving Atlanta for the Atlantic Coast, I was anxious, if not fearful, but feeling that you were the better judge and remembering that nothing risked, nothing gained, I did not interfere. Now the undertaking being a success, the honor is all yours, for I believe none of us went farther than to acquiesce. And, taking the work of General Thomas into the count, as it should be taken, it is indeed a great success. Not only does it afford the obvious and immediate military advantages, but in showing to the world that your army could be divided, putting the stronger part to an important new service, and yet leaving enough to vanquish the old opposing force of the whole hood's army, it brings those who sat in darkness to see a great light. But what next? I suppose it will be safe if I leave General Grant and yourself to decide. Please make my grateful acknowledgments to your whole army, officers, and men. End of letter. It was again General Sherman who planned and decided the next step of the campaign. Grant sent him orders to fortify a strong post, leave his artillery and cavalry, and bring his infantry by the sea to unite with the army of the Potomac before Petersburg. Greatly to Sherman's satisfaction, this order was soon revoked, and he was informed that Grant wished, quote, the whole matter of your future actions should be left entirely to your own discretion. End quote. In Sherman's mind, the next steps to be taken were as clear as daylight. The progress of the war in the West could now be described step by step, and its condition and probable course be estimated with sound judgment. The opening of the Mississippi River in the previous year had cut off from the Rebellion, the vast resources west of the Great River. Sherman's meridian campaign in February had rendered useless the railroads of the state of Mississippi. The capture of Atlanta and the march to the sea had ruined the railroads of Georgia, cutting off another huge slice of Confederate resources. The battles of Franklin and Asheville had practically annihilated the principal Confederate army in the West. Sherman now proposed to Grant that he would subject the two Carolinas to the same process, by marching his army through the heart of them from Savannah to Raleigh. The game is then up with Lee, he confidently added, unless he comes out of Richmond, avoids you and fights me, in which case I should reckon on your being on his heels. If you feel confident that you can whip Lee outside of his entrenchments, I feel equally confident that I can handle him in the open country. Grant promptly adopted the plan and, by formal orders, directed Sherman to execute it. Several minor Western expeditions were organized to contribute to its success. The Union fleet on the coast was held in readiness to cooperate as far as possible with Sherman's advance, and to afford him a new base of supply, if at some suitable point he should desire to establish communications with it. When, in the middle of January 1865, a naval expedition captured Fort Fisher at the mouth of Cape Fear River, an army corps under General Schofield was brought east from Thomas's army of the Tennessee and sent by the sea to the North Carolina coast to penetrate into the interior and form a junction with Sherman when he should arrive. Having had five weeks for rest and preparation, Sherman began the third stage of his campaign on February 1st, with a total of 60,000 men, provisions for 20 days, forage for seven, and a full supply of ammunition for a great battle. This new undertaking proved a task of much greater difficulty and severe hardship than his march to the sea. Instead of the genial autumn weather, the army had now to face the wintry storms that blew in from the neighboring coast. Instead of the dry Georgia uplands, his route lay across a low sandy country cut by rivers with branches at right angles to his line of march and bordered by broad and myery swamps. But this was an extraordinary army which faced exposure, labor, and peril with a determination akin to contempt. Here were swamps and water courses to be weighted waist deep, endless miles of corduroy road to be laid and relayed as course after course sink into the mud under heavy army wagons. Frequent headwater channels of rivers to be bridged, the lines of railroads along their route to be torn up and rendered incapable of repair, food to be gathered by foraging, keeping up, meanwhile, a daily average of 10 or 12 miles of marching. Under such conditions, Sherman's army made a midwinter march of 425 miles and 50 days, crossing five navigable rivers, occupying three important cities, and rendering the whole railroad system of South Carolina useless to the enemy. The 10 to 15,000 Confederates with which General Hardy had evacuated Savannah and retreated to Charleston, could, of course, oppose no serious opposition to Sherman's march. On the contrary, when Sherman reached Columbia, the capital of South Carolina, on February 16, Hardy evacuated Charleston, which had been defended for four long years against every attack of a most powerful union fleet, and where the most ingenious siege works and desperate storming assault had failed to rest Fort Wagner from the enemy. But though Charleston fell without a battle, and was occupied by the Union troops on the 18th, the destructive hand of war was at last heavily laid upon her. The Confederate government pertenaciously adhered to the policy of burning accumulations of cotton to prevent it falling into Union hands, and the supply gathered in Charleston to be sent abroad by blockade runners, having been set on fire by the evacuating Confederate officials, the flames not only spread to the adjoining buildings, but grew into a great conflagration that left the heart of the city a waste of blackened walls to illustrate the folly of the first secession ordinance. Columbia, the capital, underwent the same fate, to an even a broader extent. Here the cotton had been piled in a narrow street, and when the torch was applied by similar Confederate orders, the rising wind easily floated the blazing flakes to the near roofs of buildings. On the night following Sherman's entrance, the wind rose to a gale, and neither the efforts of the citizens nor the ready help of Sherman's soldiers were able to check the destruction. Confederate riders long nursed the accusation that it was the Union army which burned the city as a deliberate act of vengeance. Contrary proof is furnished by the orders of Sherman, leaving for the sufferers a generous supply of food, as well as by the careful investigation by the mixed commission on American and British claims under the Treaty of Washington. Still pursuing his march, Sherman arrived at Chiral, March 3rd, and opened communication with General Terry, who had advanced from Fort Fisher to Wilmington. Hither, too, his advance had been practically unopposed, but now he learned that General Johnston had once more been placed in command of the Confederate forces and was collecting an army near Raleigh, North Carolina. Well knowing the ability of this general, Sherman became more prudent in his movements. But Johnston was able to gather a force of only twenty-five or thirty thousand men, of which the troops Hardy brought from Charleston formed the nucleus. And the two minor engagements on March 16th and 19th did little to impede Sherman's advance to Goldsboro, where he arrived on March 23rd, forming a junction with the Union army sent by sea under Shofield that had reached the same point the previous day. The third giant stride of Sherman's great campaign was thus happily accomplished. His capture of Atlanta, his march to the sea in capture of Savannah, his progress through the Carolinas, and the fall of Charleston formed an aggregate expedition covering nearly a thousand miles with military results that rendered rebellion powerless in the central states of the Southern Confederacy. Several Union Calvary raids had accomplished similar destruction of Confederate resources in Alabama and the country bordering on East Tennessee. Military affairs were plainly in a condition which justified Sherman and temporarily devolving his command on General Shofield and hurrying by sea to make a brief visit for urgent consultation with General Grant at his headquarters before Richmond and Petersburg. And Chapter 29 Congressional Election in Louisiana Letter to Military Governors Letter to Shepley Amnesty Proclamation December 8, 1863 Instructions to Banks Banks' Action in Louisiana Louisiana Abolishes Slavery Arkansas Abolishes Slavery Reconstruction in Tennessee Missouri Emancipation Lincoln's Letter to Drake Missouri Abolishes Slavery Emancipation in Maryland Maryland Abolishes Slavery To subdue the Confederate armies and establish order under martial law was not the only task before President Lincoln. As rapidly as rebel states or portions of states were occupied by federal troops it became necessary to displace usurping Confederate officials and appoint in their stead loyal state, county, and subordinate officers to restore the administration of local civil law under the authority of the United States. In western Virginia the people had spontaneously affected this reform, first by repudiating the Richmond succession ordinance and organizing a provisional state government, and second by adopting a new constitution and obtaining admission to the union as the new state of West Virginia. In Missouri the state convention which refused to pass a succession ordinance affected the same object by establishing a provisional state government. In both these states the whole process of what in subsequent years was comprehensively designated reconstruction was carried on by popular local action without any federal initiative or interference other than prompt federal recognition and substantial military support and protection. But in other seceded states there was no such groundwork of loyal popular authority upon which to rebuild the structure of civil government. Therefore when portions of Tennessee, Louisiana, Arkansas, and North Carolina came under federal control President Lincoln during the first half of 1862 appointed military governors to begin the work of temporary civil administration. He had a clear and consistent constitutional theory under which this could be done. In his first inaugural he announced the doctrine that the union of these states is perpetual and unbroken. His special message to Congress on July 4, 1861 added the supplementary declaration that the states have their status in the union and they have no other legal status. The same message contained the further definition. The people of Virginia have thus allowed this giant insurrection to make its nest within her borders and this government has no choice left but to deal with it where it finds it and it has the less regret as the loyal citizens have in due form claimed its protection. Those loyal citizens this government is bound to recognize and protect as being Virginia. The action of Congress entirely conformed to this theory that body admitted to seats senators and representatives from the provisional state governments of West Virginia and Missouri and also allowed Senator Andrew Johnson of Tennessee to retain his seat and admitted Horace Maynard and Andrew J. Clements as representatives of the same state. Though since their election Tennessee had undergone the usual secession or serpation and had as yet organized no loyal provisional government the progress of the union armies was so far checked during the second half of 1862 that military governor Phelps appointed for Arkansas did not assume his functions and military governor Stanley wielded but slight authority in North Carolina. Senator Andrew Johnson appointed military governor of Tennessee established himself at Nashville the capital and though union control of Tennessee fluctuated greatly he was able by appointing loyal state and county officers to control the administration of civil government and considerable districts under substantial federal jurisdiction. In the state of Louisiana the process of restoring federal authority was carried on a step farther owing largely to the fact that the territory occupied by the union army though quite limited comprising only the city of New Orleans and a few adjacent parishes was more securely held and its hostile frontier less disturbed. It soon became evident that considerable union sentiment yet existed in the captured city and surrounding districts and when some of the loyal citizens began to manifest impatience at the restraints of martial law president Lincoln in a frank letter pointed the way to a remedy. The people of Louisiana he wrote under date of July 28 1862 who wished protection to person and property have but to reach forth their hands and take it let them in good faith re-inaugurate the national authority and set up a state government conforming there too under the constitution. They know how to do it and can have the protection of the army while doing it. The army will be withdrawn so soon as such state government can dispense with its presence and the people of the state can then upon the old constitutional terms govern themselves to their own liking. At about this date there occurred the serious military crisis in Virginia and the battles of the peninsula of the Second Bull Run and of Antietam necessarily compelled the postponement of minor questions but during this period the president's policy on the slavery question reached its development and solution and when on September 22 he issued his preliminary proclamation of emancipation it also paved the way for further defining of his policy of reconstruction. That proclamation announced the penalty of military emancipation against all states in rebellion on the succeeding first day of January but also provided that if the people thereof were represented in Congress by properly elected members they should be deemed not in rebellion and thereby escape the penalty. Wishing now to prove the sincerity of what he said in the Greeley letter that his paramount object was to save the union and not either to slave or destroy slavery he wrote a circular letter to the military governors and commanders in Louisiana, Tennessee and Arkansas instructing them to permit and aid the people within the districts held by them to hold elections for members of Congress and perhaps a legislature. State officers and United States senators in all available ways he wrote give the people a chance to express their wishes at these elections follow forms of law as far as convenient but at all events get the expression of the largest number of the people possible all see how such action will connect with and affect the proclamation of September 22 of course the men elected should be gentlemen of character willing to swear support to the Constitution as of old and known to be above reasonable suspicion of duplicity but the president wished this to be a real and not a sham proceeding as he explained a month later in a letter to Governor Shepley we do not particularly need members of Congress from there to enable us to get along with legislation here what we do want is the conclusive evidence that respectable citizens of Louisiana are willing to be members of Congress and to swear support to the Constitution and that other respectable citizens there are willing to vote for them and send them to send a parcel of northern men here as representatives elected as would be understood and perhaps really so at the point of the bayonet would be disgraceful and outrageous and were I a member of Congress here I would vote against admitting any such man to a seat thus instructed Governor Shepley caused an election to be held in the first and second congressional districts of Louisiana on December 3 1862 at which members of Congress were chosen no federal office holder was a candidate and about one half the usual vote was polled the House of Representatives admitted them to seats after full scrutiny the chairman of the committee declaring this had every essential of a regular election in a time of most profound peace with the exception of the fact that the proclamation was issued by the military instead of the civil governor of Louisiana military affairs were of such importance and absorbed so much attention during the year 1863 both at Washington and at the headquarters of the various armies that the subject of reconstruction was of necessity somewhat neglected the military governor of Louisiana indeed ordered a registration of loyal voters about the middle of June for the purpose of organizing a loyal state government but its only result was to develop an inevitable antagonism and contest between conservatives who desired that the old constitution of Louisiana prior to the rebellion should be revived by which the institution of slavery as then existing would be maintained and the free state party which demanded that an entirely new constitution be framed and adopted in which slavery should be summarily abolished the conservatives asked president Lincoln to adopt their plan while the president refused this he in a letter to general banks dated august 5 1863 suggested the middle course of gradual emancipation for my own part he wrote i think i shall not in any event retract the emancipation proclamation nor as executive ever returned to slavery any person who is freed by the terms of that proclamation or by any of the acts of congress if louisiana shall send members to congress their admission to seats will depend as you know upon the respective houses and not upon the president i would be glad for her to make a new constitution recognizing the emancipation proclamation and adopting emancipation in those parts of the state to which the proclamation does not apply and while she is at it i think it would not be objectionable for her to adopt some practical system by which the two races could gradually live themselves out of their old relation to each other and both come out better prepared for the new education for young blacks should be included in the plan after all the power or element of contract may be sufficient for this probationary period and by its simplicity and flexibility may be the better during the autumn months the president's mind dwelt more and more on the subject of reconstruction and he matured a general plan which he laid before congress in his annual message to that body on december 8 1863 he issued on the same day a proclamation of amnesty on certain conditions to all persons in rebellion except certain specified classes who should take a prescribed oath of allegiance the proclamation further provided that whenever a number of persons so amnestyed in any rebel state equal to one tenth the vote cast at the presidential election of 1860 should reestablish a state government which shall be republican and in no wise contravening said oath such would be recognized as the true government of the state the annual message discussed and advocated the plan at length but also added saying that reconstruction will be accepted if presented in a specified way it is not said it will never be accepted in any other way this plan of reconstructing what came to be called ten percent states met much opposition in congress and that body reversing its action in former instances long refused admission to members and senators from states similarly organized but the point needs no further mention here a month before the amnesty proclamation the president had written to general banks expressing his great disappointment that the reconstruction in louisiana had been permitted to fall in abeyance by the leading union officials there civil and military i do however he wrote urge both you and them to lose no more time governor shepley has special instructions from the war department i wish him these gentlemen's and others cooperating without waiting for more territory to go to work and give me a tangible nucleus which the remainder of the state may rally around as fast as it can and which i can at once recognize and sustain as the true state government he urged that such reconstruction should have in view a new free state constitution for said he if a few professedly loyal men shall draw the disloyal about them and colorably set up a state government repudiating the emancipation proclamation and reestablishing slavery i cannot recognize or sustain their work i have said and say again that if a new state government acting in harmony with this government and consistently with general freedom shall think best to adopt a reasonable temporary arrangement in relation to the landless and houseless freed people i do not object but my word is out to be for and not against them on the question of their permanent freedom general banks and reply excused this in action by explaining that the military governor and others had given him to understand that they were exclusively charged with the work of reconstruction in louisiana to this the president rejoined under date of december 24 1863 i have all the while intended you to be master as well in regard to reorganizing a state government for louisiana as in regard to the military matters of the department and hence my letters on reconstruction have nearly if not quite all been addressed to you my air has been that it did not occur to me that governor shepley or anyone else would set up a claim to act independently of you i now distinctly tell you that you are master of all and that i wish you to take the case as you find it and give us a free state reorganization of louisiana in the shortest possible time under this explicit direction of the president and basing his action on martial law as the fundamental law of the state the general caused a governor and state officials to be elected on february 22 1864 to override the jealousy and quarrels of both the conservative and free state parties he set out in his proclamation that the officials to be chosen should until others are appointed by competent authority constitute the civil government of the state under the constitution and laws of louisiana except so much of the said constitution and laws as recognize regulate or relate to slavery which being inconsistent with the present condition of public affairs and plainly inapplicable to any class of persons now existing within its limits must be suspended and they are therefore and hereby declared to be an operative and void the newly elected governor was inaugurated on march 4 with imposing public ceremonies and the president also invested him with the powers exercised here too by the military governor of louisiana general banks further caused delegates to a state convention to be chosen who in a session extending from april 6 to july 25 perfected and adopted a new constitution which was again adopted by popular vote on september 5 following general banks reported the constitution to be one of the best ever penned it abolishes slavery in the state and forbids the legislature to enact any law recognizing property in man the emancipation is instantaneous and absolute without condition or compensation and nearly unanimous the state of arkansas had been forced into rebellion by military terrorism and remained under confederate domination only because the union armies could afford the latent loyal sentiment of the state no effective support until the fall of vicksburg and the opening of the mississippi after that decisive victory general steel marched a union column of about 13 000 from helena to little rock the capital which surrendered to him on the evening of september 10 1863 by december eight regiments of arkansas citizens had been formed for service in the union army and following the amnesty proclamation of december eight the reorganization of a loyal state government was speedily brought about mainly by spontaneous popular action of course under the direction and with the assistance of general steel in response to a petition president lincoln sent general steel on january 20 1864 a letter repeating substantially the instructions he had given general banks for louisiana before these could be carried out popular action had assembled at little rock on january eight 1864 a formal delicate convention composed of 44 delegates who claimed to represent 22 out of the 54 counties of the state on january 22 this convention adopted an amended constitution which declared the act of secession null and void abolish slavery immediately and unconditionally and holy repudiated the confederate debt the convention appointed a provisional state government and under its schedule an election was held on march 14 1864 during the three days on which the polls were kept open under the orders of general steel who by the president's suggestion adopted the convention program a total vote of 12179 was cast for the constitution and only 226 against it while the provisional governor was also elected for a new term to gather with members of congress and a legislature which in due time chose united states senators by this time congress had manifested its opposition to the president's plan but mr. lincoln stood firm and on june 29 wrote to general steel i understand that congress declines to admit to seats the person sent as senators and representatives from arkansas these persons apprehend that in consequence you may not support the new state government there as you otherwise would my wish is that you give that government and the people there the same support and protection that you would if the members had been admitted because in no event nor in any view of the case can this do any harm while it would be the best you can do towards suppressing the rebellion while military governor andrew johnson had been the earliest to begin the restoration of loyal federal authority in the state of tennessee the course of campaign and battle in that state delayed its completion to a later period than the others the invasion of tennessee by the confederate general brag in the summer of 1862 and the long delay of the union general rosencrans to begin an active campaign against him during the summer of 1863 kept civil reorganization in a very uncertain and chaotic condition when at length rose crans advanced and occupied chattanooga president lincoln deemed it a propitious time to vigorously begin reorganization and under date of september 11 1863 he wrote the military governor emphatic suggestions that the re inauguration must not be such as to give control of the state and its representation in congress to the enemies of the union driving its friends there until political exile you must have it otherwise let the reconstruction be the work of such men only as can be trusted for the union exclude all others and trust that your government so organized will be recognized here as being the one of republican form to be guaranteed to the state and to be protected against invasion and domestic violence it is something on the question of time to remember that it cannot be known who is next to occupy the position i now hold nor what he will do i see that you have declared in favor of emancipation in tennessee for which may god bless you get emancipation into your new state government constitution and there will be no such word as fail for your case in another letter of september 19 the president sent the governor specific authority to execute the scheme outlined in his letter of advice but no substantial success had yet been reached in the process of reconstruction in tennessee during the year 1864 when the confederate army under hood turned northward from atlanta to begin its third and final invasion of the state this once more delayed all work of reconstruction until the confederate army was routed and dispersed by the battle of nashville on december 15 1864 previous popular action had called a state convention which taking immediate advantage of the expulsion of the enemy met in nashville on january 9 1865 in which 58 counties and some regiments were represented by about 467 delegates after six days of deliberation the convention adopted a series of amendments to the constitution the main ordinance of which provided that slavery and involuntary servitude except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted are hereby forever abolished and prohibited throughout the state these amendments were duly adopted at a popular election held on february 22nd and the complete organization of a loyal state government under them followed in due course the state of missouri needed no reconstruction it has already been said that her local affairs were administered by a provisional state government instituted by the state convention chosen by popular election before the rebellion broke out in this state therefore the institution of slavery was suppressed by the direct action of the people but not without a long and bitter conflict of party factions and military strife there existed here two hostile currents of public opinion one the intolerant pro-slavery prejudices of its rural population and other the progressive and liberal spirit dominant in the city of st louis with its heavy german population which as far back as 1856 had elected to congress a candidate who boldly advocated gradual emancipation st louis with outlying cities and towns supplying during the whole rebellion the dominating influence that held the state in the union and at length transformed her from a slave to a free state missouri suffered severely in the war but not through important campaigns or great battles persistent secession conspiracy the kansas episodes of border strife and secret orders of confederate agents from arkansas instigating unlawful warfare made missouri a hotbed of gorilla uprisings and of relentless neighborhood feuds in which armed partisan conflict often degenerated into shocking barbarity and the pretense of war into the malicious execution of private vengeance president lincoln drew a vivid picture of the chronic disorders in missouri and replied to complaints demanding the removal of general showfield from local military command we are in civil war in such cases there is always a main question but in this case that question is a perplexing compound union and slavery it does becomes a question not of two sides merely but of at least four sides even among those who are for the union saying nothing of those who are against it thus those who are for the union with but not without slavery those for it without but not with those for it with or without but prefer it with and those for it with or without but prefer it without among Being these again is a subdivision of those who are for gradual, but not for immediate, and those who are for immediate, but not for gradual, extinction of slavery. It is easy to conceive that all these shades of opinion, and even more, may be sincerely entertained by honest and truthful men. Yet, all being for the Union, by reason of these differences, each will prefer a different way of sustaining the Union. At once sincerity is questions, and motives are assailed. Actual war-coming, blood grows hot, and blood is spilled. Thought is forced from old channels into confusion, deception breeds and thrives, confidence dies, and universal suspicion reigns. Each man feels an impulse to kill his neighbor, lest he be first killed by him. Revenge and retaliation follow. And all this, as said before, may be among honest men only. But this is not all. Every foul bird comes abroad, and every dirty reptile rises up. These add crime to confusion, strong measures deemed indispensable, but harsh at best. Such men make worse by maladministration, murders for old grudges, and murders for pelf, proceed under any cloak that will best cover for the occasion. These causes amply account for what has occurred in Missouri, without ascribing it to the weakness or wickedness of any general. The newspaper files, those chroniclers of current events, will show that the evils now complained of were quite as prevalent under Fremont, Hunter, Halleck, and Curtis as under Schofield. I do not feel justified to enter upon the broad field you present in regard to the political differences between radicals and conservatives. From time to time I have done and said what appeared to me proper to do and say. The public knows it all, it obliges nobody to follow me, and I trust it obliges me to follow nobody. The radicals and conservatives each agree with me in some things and disagree in others. I could wish both to agree with me in all things, for then they would agree with each other, and would be too strong for any foe from any quarter. They, however, choose to do otherwise, and I do not question their right. I, too, shall do what seems to be my duty. I hold whoever commands in Missouri or elsewhere responsible to me, and not to either radicals or conservatives. It is my duty to hear all, but at last I must, within my sphere, judge what to do and what to forbear. It is some consolation to history that out of this blood and travail grew the political regeneration of the state. Slavery and emancipation never gave each other a moment's truce. The issue was raised to an acute stage by Fremont's proclamation in August 1861. Though that ill-advised measure was revoked by President Lincoln, the friction and irritation of war kept it alive, and in the following year a member of the Missouri State Convention offered a bill to accept and apply President Lincoln's plan of compensated abolishment. Further effort was made in this direction in Congress, where in January 1863 the House passed a bill appropriating $10 million, and in February the Senate another bill appropriating $15 million to aid compensated abolishment in Missouri. But the stubborn opposition of three pro-slavery Missouri members of the House prevented action on the latter bill or any compromise. The question, however, continually grew among the people of Missouri and made such advance that parties, accepting the main point as already practically decided at length, only divided upon the mode of procedure. The conservatives wanted the work to be done by the old state convention, the radicals desired to submit it to a new convention fresh from the people. Legislative agreement having failed, the provisional governor called the old state convention together. The convention leaders, who controlled that body, inquired of the president whether he would sustain their action. To this he made answer in a letter to Schofield, dated June 22, 1863. Your dispatch, asking in substance whether, in case Missouri shall adopt gradual emancipation, the general government will protect slave owners in that species of property during the short time it shall be permitted by the state to exist within it, has been received, desirous as I am that emancipation shall be adopted by Missouri, and believing as I do that gradual can be made better than immediate for both black and white, except when military necessity changes the case, my impulse is to say that such protection would be given. I cannot know exactly what shape an act of emancipation may take. If the period from the initiation to the final end should be comparatively short, and the act should prevent persons being sold during that period into more lasting slavery, the whole would be easier. I do not wish to pledge the general government to the affirmative support of even temporary slavery beyond what can be fairly claimed under the Constitution. I suppose, however, this is not desired, but that it is desired for the military force of the United States, while in Missouri, to not be used in subverting the temporarily reserved legal rights in states during the progress of emancipation. This I would desire also. Proceeding with its work, the Old State Convention, which had hitherto made a most honorable record, neglected a great opportunity. It indeed adopted an ordinance of gradual emancipation on July 1st, 1863, but of such an uncertain and dilatory character that public opinion in the state promptly rejected it. By the death of the provisional governor on January 31st, 1864, the Conservative Party of Missouri lost its most trusted leader, and thereafter the radical succeeded to the political power of the state. At the presidential election of 1864, that party chose a new state convention, which met in St. Louis on January 6th, 1865, and on the sixth day of its session, January 11, formally adopted an ordinance of immediate emancipation. Maryland, like Missouri, had no need of reconstruction, except for the Baltimore riot and the arrest of her succession legislature during the first year of the war, her state government continued its regular functions. But a strong popular undercurrent of virulent succession sympathy among a considerable minority of her inhabitants was only held in check by the military power of the Union, and for two years emancipation found no favor in the public opinion of the state. Her representatives, like those of most other border states, coldly refused President Lincoln's earnest plea to accept compensated abolishment, and a bill in Congress to give Maryland $10 million for that object was at once blighted by the declaration of one of her leading representatives that Maryland did not ask for it. Nevertheless, the subject could no more be ignored there than in the other states, and after the President's emancipation proclamation, an emancipation party developed itself in Maryland. It was no longer any evading the practical issue when, by the President's direction, the Secretary of War issued military order early in October 1863 regulating the raising of colored troops in certain border states, which decreed that slaves might be enlisted without consent of their owners, but provided compensation in such cases. At the November election of that year, the Emancipation Party of Maryland elected its ticket by an overwhelming majority and a legislature that enacted laws under which a state convention was chosen to amend the Constitution. Of the delegates elected on April 6, 1864, 61 were emancipationists and only 35 opposed. After two months' debate, this convention by nearly two-thirds adopted an article that hereafter in this state there shall neither slavery nor involuntary servitude except in punishment of crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted and all persons held to service or labor as slaves are hereby declared free. This decisive test of a popular vote accepting the amended Constitution as a whole remained, however, yet to be undergone. President Lincoln willingly complied with a request to throw his official voice and influence in favor of the measure and wrote, on October 10, 1864, A convention of Maryland has framed a new Constitution for the state. A public meeting is called for this evening at Baltimore to aid in securing its ratification by the people, and you ask a word from me for the occasion. I presume the only feature of the instrument about which there is serious controversy is that which provides for the extinction of slavery. It needs not to be a secret, and I presume it is no secret, that I wish success to this provision. I desire it on every consideration. I wish all men to be free. I wish the material prosperity of the already free, which I feel sure the extinction of slavery would bring. I wish to see in process of disappearing that only thing which ever could bring this nation to civil war. I attempt no argument. President, upon the question, is already exhausted by the abler, better, informed, and more immediately interested sons of Maryland herself. I only add that I shall be gratified exceedingly if the good people of the state shall, by their votes, ratify the new Constitution. At the election, which was held on October 12 and 13, stubborn Maryland conservatism, whose roots reached far back to the colonial days, made its last desperate stand, and the Constitution was ratified by a majority of only 375 votes out of a total of nearly 60,000. But the result was accepted as decisive, and in due time the Governor issued his proclamation declaring the new Constitution legally adopted.