 We already starting getting questions on your presentation in the chat. So the first one we have is from Alessandro Molinares, he's from the SSM from our banking supervision site. And he has a question on this expansion of mandates of the central bank and going into the area of climate policies. And he asks, this question is two-fold. One is, you know, currently we purchase at the ECB according to a market neutrality principle. And he's asking whether this is actually acting as a boundary for central bank to meaningfully change towards the most sustainable future. And the second is a more broader question he has is how would you draw the boundaries between political choices and monetary policy decisions, for instance on buying carbon intensive companies or bonds. Well, I mean, I think the choices about what to buy is a political decision and you can make it for a while as a monetary authority. I mean, in the case of Europe, I think there's, you know, a fair degree of coordination here and the European Commission, the European Parliament has spoken, I think, with a fairly clear voice. You're putting in carbon border taxing, Europe's just way ahead of everybody else. So I, you know, at least in the case of the ECB, I would not be surprised if, you know, it's fairly clear. I'd say in the case of the Federal Reserve, I, by the way, I favor much more dramatic transition, but they clearly don't have, they're clearly not charged with doing that. And so I think that's a very clearly political thing and where it's not a, not a monetary issue. Now, you know, if I could just say in general the green investing and is something which has become very popular, it's actually curiously been profitable. There's almost like a bubble in it, but I'm not sure that's going to last because at some level if you put a constraint on what you're able to invest in, you probably ultimately end up doing worse in some ways central banks are following this. But it's, you know, it's, it's a second order action in terms of what central banks need to do, the much more they need to focus on their core mandates, their core targets. And unfortunately, those are going to become more and more important if we are successful in doing a transition. And that's one of the reasons I said with supply problems, not just the natural catastrophes that are coming, but the man made ones that are that are inevitable as we fumble our way around in the transition. Thanks. Well, the colleagues are typing away, but maybe potentially other questions in the chat. I mean, I will have used by a role last year here to also ask you a question. Okay, to talk about challenges in the post covered era and you of course naturally touched upon the low natural rate environment and when we look at the interaction of monetary fiscal policy would kind of normally say fiscal policy has, has a special role to play for having more role as macro stabilization than they would see when they interest rates are further away from zero and the arm energy is not negative as we see for the moment. But I was wondering to question you, how would you see the challenge going forward from our fiscal interaction because of course, on the one hand we have that story but on the other hand, you know, you have those who are concerned about high debts and the risk of fiscal dominance in such an environment and and what would you you put the trade off between those two. So they're different worlds. There's the world we're in. Post pandemic, where fiscal dominance is natural in a crisis situation where, you know, the risks at the moment are that inflation stays longer, or that we need it to stay longer that it's not so easy to raise interest rates because of the high debt levels, because of markets. That's one situation, but I've never, I never agreed with the point that at the zero bound monetary policy should be basically passive and fiscal policy should take over. I maybe I'm too close to my own country watching the nonsense that takes place in debate. These they're not going to our fiscal authorities are not going to be able to stabilize the economy like surgeons, which the monetary authorities do a better job of. That's that's a big part of the reason that I pushed the idea of eventually not this moment, but because of the pandemic, but eventually restoring effective negative interest rate policies that we have monetary stabilization policy, which I would argue at the moment is very weak and fiscal policy very unpredictable and unreliable. We received further questions in the chat and again on climate, it seems a popular topic these days, not only in central banks actually. So a question is the argument that central bank should accompany the green transition by stabilizing the economy Federico Madula asked in this regard. How should central bank raise stabilization of real activity versus prices in these cases because the two may give rise to conflicting policy prescriptions. We need ECB research papers on exactly this kind of question. I mean, seriously. That's exactly the kind of question central bank should be asking with the case of employment and inflation. I think research on inequality did lead to a nuance that at least the central bank has adopted of saying, basically, we need to put a little less weight on inflation, a little higher weight on unemployment in taking into account how in the steady state it affects inequality. And I think, I think similar discussion needs to be had, but that that's a perfect topic for central banks to be thinking about. We have the supply chain problems now, but if there is a green transition and it could happen very suddenly in a place like China, and it could have very dramatic global effects. It could happen suddenly in the United States with a radical change in administration that it's possible. And it's going to lead, we need to do it. It's going to lead to problems we can't foresee. And, and I think that that's exactly where central banks need to be thinking and not, you know, so much about should we how much nuclear should we have how much wind how fast should we get rid of natural gas. That's not the primary focus. That's a very good question. Thanks. The next set of questions that come in is on another topic on the expanding agenda of central banks. Well, of course, money has always been on this agenda, but it's relating to digital currencies. And there's a question from Francis Miller, she's asking whether you think that the central banks should actually issue a digital currency. You talked about stable coins, but should we actually go as far as actually issuing one as well. But 100% yes, but the questions on timing. Is it how much is it retail? You know, because will it pay interest? There are many, many questions around this, but I think, I think all central banks will be issuing digital currencies within 10 years, dare I say. And I want to emphasize retail digital currencies, at least as much as US Treasury direct is, you know, exactly how convenient they make them. They're not going to be crypto currencies, certainly. They're issues around privacy, many, many problems, but, you know, we're definitely headed in a Kansas transition towards a less cash society. And there's no reason. It's not just there's no reason. I think we need to have central bank digital currencies as a piece of this. But there are 1000 questions around it. And the next question brings us back again to to monetary and fiscal interactions. He knows that you emphasize that QE could also be implemented by fiscal authorities. And he asks, don't you think that central banks have a very specific role to implement it. If they do so in order to maintain price stability. Well, it's just not a very powerful instrument. I mean, part of the reason bank central banks have been so successful in maintaining price stability is that there have been powerful deflationary pressures. The central banks can affect the flow going through the market on any one day, any one week. But the fiscal authorities are affecting the overall maturity structure. So if you're talking about bringing down long term interest rates, Ben Bernanke emphasize that as a central point in QE. I don't think the central banks have a role to play in the maturity transformation. They might in forward guidance. Forward guidance can say, you know, we'll keep lower for longer. We're not going to bring interest or that that kind of thing. But in maturity structure, I describe it in my book as smoke and mirrors. And maybe that's a little too strong and Lou of get back and questions work on the short term liquidity flows. But I think if you look, you know, over the month, long and longer horizons that it's still pretty much sums things up. Thank you very much. I'm still on the role of fiscal monetary policy. We got a question also from a killer lens and he notes the relevance of household heterogeneity for the transmission of shocks would speak in favor of a larger role for fiscal policy than for monetary policy, even in normal times. So far from the lower effective bond, what are your views on the on the aspect? I already feel nodding. So let's. Well, I mean, I think in an age of greater inequality using transfers more makes a lot of sense. Having programs which give greater transfers to very low income households makes sense. I'm not sure that giving transfers to middle income households and upper income households makes sense. Although it may be more politically viable. I come back to, I, we had the many of you know, new Alberto, Alicina, who is my, you know, colleague and very sadly passed away last year. I want to emphasize the importance of political economy and it just amazes me how that's forgotten in many of the discussions that somehow, you know, central banking fiscal policies just drawing an ISLM diagram and shifting the curves. That is not how fiscal policy works. In notion that fiscal policies can become technocratic and surgical, I think is really a pipe dream. And that's what's wrong with the idea that fiscal policy can just take over. Now there are ideas for having fiscal authorities. There are ideas for greater automaticity, but let's not forget, you know, when, you know, Germany is an example where the state if the stabilizers are creating deficits too big. They'll cut back on them, even though the stabilizers are automatic and many countries do that. So you can't overcome the democratic accountability and fiscal maybe we'll figure out evolve to a society that can do that. But I just don't see how fiscal policy can be technocratic. When a meteor hits the earth, when we have a financial crisis, when they're pandemic, you can bring fiscal policy together and get amazing things done. But in normal times, the secondary tensions around the size of the government who benefits just become too large and, you know, going back to the work by Alberto Alicina. This is a theme he emphasized throughout his work. Thanks. And I think we squeeze in one last question. Because we're one minute over time in the chat, but I would like to give a chance to the question from Christopher new nose. He's asking whether the drop in the exchange rate volatility that she's so nicely illustrated. Is it related potentially due to the increase of importance of global shocks which lead to common monetary policy responses across the world. Yeah, although it's not just what's happening immediately the exchange rate depends on the whole forecast of future interest rates. So it's not just how things hit in a quarter. We've, we've never had before the pandemic a situation where the US had a recession and exchange rate volatility went down. And certainly global shocks is a factor, but I think much more that's so many and we're looking at the core central the core central banks. We're so many central banks are not just at the zero bound but if we picked a shadow interest rate they'd be way below the zero bound and markets see that. And so whether forward guidance is successful or not, people realize that interest rates are going to be pretty dormant for a long time. At least that's what we saw when we wrote the paper at the end of 1920, I don't know what the next year or two will bring. Thank you very much. And yes, let's see maybe in one year we invite you again to the conference and we can see what world we are in that or in two years. Thank you. Thank you for the honor. I'll look forward to coming maybe two years. So I have time to think of something. Thank you very much. And with this I close the keynote speaker session and I pass the forum to the chair of the first session with Imen Ramuni Hoso. Thank you very much.